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

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ΟΥ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ

THE WORKS

OF

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FORMERLY

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TO WHICH IS PREFIXED A REVIEW

OF THE

AUTHOR'S LIFE AND WRITINGS,

BY

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LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF.

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A FURTHER VINDICATION

OF

CHRIST'S DIVINITY:

IN ANSWER TO A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED,

OBSERVATIONS ON DR. WATERLAND'S SECOND DEFENCE.

MAGNA EST VERITAS ET PRÆVALEBIT.

THE

INTRODUCTION.

SINCE the publication of my Second Defence in the cause of our blessed Lord's *Divinity*, I have been waiting to see what further attempts we were to have from the Arians. I perceive they are still resolute in their opposition to the faith of Christ, blaspheming his *Godhead*, impugning his *worship*, and despising every kind offer of instruction, or exhortation, to convince or reclaim them. I have the satisfaction however to observe, that they daily give ground more and more; that the *defensive* part, which they begun with, is, in a manner, yielded up; their main *scheme* appearing so *gross*, and so untenable, that they themselves are afraid or ashamed to *own* it. As to the *offensive*, which is now all that they are willing to abide by, they hold it on still as far as they are able: and yet even here one may observe, that, as to matter of *argument*, their attacks are as *harmless* as a man might wish; only there is a certain *fierceness* or *bitterness of spirit* still remaining, and which seems to increase, as their strength decreases; and which perhaps may grow upon them more and more to the last, as is natural and common in such cases. But to come to the point.

Their first effort to renew the contest appeared under the title of Remarks, &c. by one Philalethes Cantabrigiensis, printed for J. Noon. Having no manner of acquaintance, that I know of, with the man under that conceited name; and finding little in the piece more than tedious *repetition* and studied *confusion*, I slighted it, as apprehending myself not at all obliged to take notice of it.

Waiting a while longer, there comes out another pamphlet, entitled, Observations, &c. and *by the Author of the Reply to my First Defence*, printed for James Knapton, &c. which when I saw, I immediately concluded as I had some leisure upon my hands, that here was a call to me to set pen to paper once more. For however low an opinion I might have of the performance, after reading it, yet *the Author of the Reply*, when he has any thing to say, and while our readers are not quite weary, may always command my more especial notice. Whether it be Dr. Clarke, or whether it be Mr. Jackson, (for though it be doubted which, all agree that it lies between them,) they are both men whom I must attend to: one, as he is the *principal* in the cause; the other, as he is *second*, and had the first hand in committing my Queries to the press, engaging me ever after in the *public service*. Let but *either* of those *two* gentlemen stand accountable in the *opinion* of the *world*, (I mean no more,) for any *foul play* on *their* side, as I by setting my *name* am answerable for any on *mine*, and then I shall think myself upon even terms with them in that respect: and as to any other, I humbly conceive, I have no reason to fear their gaining any advantage.

The *author* of the Observations begins with giving us *his* judgment of his *own* performance; assuring his reader, in the most *solemn manner*, that the Observations contain in them *no argument*, nor *branch of any argument*, but what, upon the most serious consideration and careful review, appears to *him* strictly and perfectly *conclusive*. Thus far perhaps may be true: for I know not how things may *appear* to *him*, nor how defective he

may be in *judgment*. But I wish he could have added, *no representations* but what, upon calm examination, he had found to be *strictly just*; no *reports*, but what he *knew* to be *true*; no *charges* upon his adversary,' but what he believed to be *honest* and *upright*; no *personal reflections* beyond what he had *clear* and *sufficient* grounds for. But I pass on to his book.

He has cast his work into fourteen *observations*; the weightiest, no doubt, that the whole compass of the controversy could afford. I shall consider what to say to them, after I have given the reader some brief hints of the past and present state of the *dispute* between us. It should be remembered, that this gentleman at his first setting out, and all along till now, undertook to answer *queries*, to satisfy *objections*, to assoil *difficulties*, to reconcile the *new* scheme to *itself*, to *Scripture*, to *antiquity*, and to *reason*; that so having first cleared his *own* doctrine in every part, beyond any thing that could be done for the *faith received*, he might then with a better face disturb the *peace* of the *Church*, and plead the more earnestly (but modestly withal) for a thorough change. This was what he undertook: and had he been as able to *execute*, as he was forward to *project*, I profess sincerely, he should not have wanted any encouragement, or even *thanks* of mine; so far should I have been from giving him further molestation. But it hath happened to him, (as it ordinarily must to every man, who undertakes a business before he has seen into it,) that he has met with many *difficulties*, more than he at first apprehended, and is by no means able to surmount them.

To mention a few particulars, out of a great number:

1. He has not been able to clear his scheme of the unsupportable charge of making *two Gods*, one *supreme* and another *inferior*[a].

2. He has not been able to get over the difficulty of supposing God the Son and God the Holy Ghost *two creatures*[b], in direct

[a] See my First and Second Defence, Query v. vol. i. and ii.

[b] See my First and Second Defence, Query xi. xii. vol. i. and ii.

opposition to *Scripture* and *antiquity*. He has indeed avoided giving them the name of *creature*, which yet can contribute but little satisfaction to as many as plainly see how the *thing* is otherwise fully and repeatedly owned under other names[c].

3. He has not been able to defend or excuse *creature-worship*, so fully condemned by *Scripture*, and by the ancient Jews and Christians, with one voice[d].

4. Nor hath he been able to disprove or elude the proofs brought from *Scripture* and *antiquity*, of the *divine* worship due to Christ[e].

5. He hath not been able to salve, or so much as to colour over a notorious flaw in his scheme, relating to the *foundation* of the *worship* of Christ; taking up principles there which can suit only with the Socinian scheme, at other times espousing the Arian, though it be impossible for *both* to stand together[f].

6. He has not been able to give any tolerable account of the divine *titles*, *attributes*, and *honours* being ascribed to a *creature*[g].

7. He has given no satisfaction at all about Christ being *Creator* and *creature* too; not being able to elude the proofs of the former, nor to reconcile both parts together[h].

8. Though he set out with pompous pretences to *antiquity*, he cannot make them good: but it is proved upon him, nor can he elude the proof, that in *thirteen* instances of doctrine, containing the main branches of his scheme, he runs directly counter to all Catholic antiquity[i].

9. He has not been able to vindicate Dr. Clarke's quotations from the *ancients*: which have been proved, all of them, to be

[c] See my Supplement to the Case, &c. vol. ii. p. 324. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 642, &c.

[d] First and Second Defence, Query xvi. xvii. vol. i. and ii.

[e] See my First and Second Defence, Query xvi. xviii. vol. i. and ii.

[f] First Defence, vol. i. p. 434, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 676, &c.

[g] First and Second Defence, Query x. xi. vol. i. and ii. Sermons vii. viii. vol. ii.

[h] First and Second Defence, Query xii. vol. i. and ii.

[i] First Defence, vol. i. p. 497. Second, vol. ii. p. 729, &c.

either *not pertinent*, or *not justly quoted*, or *not fairly translated*, or *not rightly understood*[k].

The author of the Reply having thus failed in the main business, I might reasonably decline any further dispute with him. He is so sensible of the lameness of his former performances in the *defensive*, that he is now pleased to quit that part entirely, and to *attempt* it no longer. My Queries remain queries still; and the *oracle* shuts up in sullen silence. All that I contended for seems to be *tacitly* yielded up to me; and I stand in quiet and peaceable possession of it. What room then is there for any further dispute? Yes, there is room still, this *gentleman* thinks, to act upon the *offensive:* and since he has been so unhappy as to give no satisfaction in respect of his *own* scheme, he hopes however to be even with us in some measure, by declaring himself still dissatisfied with *ours*. He had many objections formerly, which he has been pleased to drop one after another in the course of the debate: and he has some left still, which he resolves to abide by; though the force even of these few remaining have been already so broken and blunted, that were it not for the *ignorance* of some readers, and the convenient use of *misrepresentations*, *misreports*, *flouts*, and *scoffs*, and an assuming *positiveness*, in lieu of a just reply, he could do nothing with them.

For the benefit therefore of *weak* readers, who may be moved by *weak* things, and for the sake of *truth* and *godliness*, and in regard to the *character* of the men I am engaged with, I proceed to examine the Observations. The author has taken his own method; and so will I mine, as to me seems most proper, and most convenient for the reader. As his work is a rhapsody of independent thoughts, thrown under heads, at discretion: and as the author in the composition observes very little coherence, but jumps from thing to thing, blending matters together as it

[k] First and Second Defence, Query xxvii. vol. i. and ii.

happened, or as came into his head, I shall not think it necessary to follow him all the way in his rambling chase. But some *method* I must have too; and it shall be this, to rank his most material observations under several heads, viz. *False Charges*, *Misrepresentations*, *Flouts* and *Scoffs*, &c. And these heads shall make so many chapters.

A FURTHER VINDICATION

OF

CHRIST'S DIVINITY.

CHAP. I.

False and injurious Charges *contained in the Observations.*

1. IN the list of *false charges*, I shall first place one that stands in page 118th, as being a very remarkable one, and proper to be first spoken to, by way of introduction to what shall come after. The words of the Observator are,

"Not so much as one single writer in the three first centuries "——has presumed to teach, but, on the contrary, they would "all have judged it the *highest blasphemy* either to say or think, "(which is the very point in which Dr. Waterland's whole doc- "trine centres,) that God the Father Almighty, even the one "God and Father of all, who is above all, has no natural and "necessary supremacy of authority and dominion *at all;* has no "other supremacy of authority and dominion, than what is founded "merely in mutual agreement and voluntary concert; but has, "naturally and necessarily, a priority of order only."

Here is a high charge, a charge of *blasphemy* laid to me, and in the name too of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, whose memory will be ever precious, and whose judgment I respect and reverence. Now, that the reader may the better judge of this extraordinary paragraph of the Observator, I must take care to inform him how the case stands between him and me in regard to the *supremacy*. In the preface to my Second Defence, and again in the book, I intimated over and over, in as plain words

as I could speak, that provided the Son's *necessary existence* be secured, that he be acknowledged not to exist *precariously*, or *contingently*, but *necessarily*, that his *coeternity* and *consubstantiality* be maintained, his *creative* powers, his *infinite* perfections, his being *no creature*, but *one God* with the Father, and the like; that then the *supremacy* shall be no matter of dispute with me. Any *supremacy* of the Father that is *consistent* with these *certain*, *plain*, *Catholic* tenets, always and universally believed by the churches of Christ; I say, any *supremacy* consistent herewith, I hold, assert, and maintain: any that is *not consistent*, I reject, remove, and detest, with all the Christian churches early and late.

The case then, betwixt this *gentleman* and me, lies thus:

It is agreed, I presume, on both sides, that God the Son is either strictly *equal* with God the Father, as to all *essential* perfections, or that he is *infinitely* inferior to him, as one that does not exist *necessarily*, must of course be *infinitely* inferior to another that does.

The *equality* of nature, it seems, is not consistent with this writer's *supremacy;* and he readily acknowledges that it is not: but he will maintain however the *supremacy* at all adventures; which is directly making God the Son *naturally* subject to the *Father*, who is therefore his sovereign Lord and Ruler, to *reward* him if he does well, to *punish* him if he does amiss, to do with him according to his will and pleasure, as with any other *creature*. The consequence is, making God the Son a *creature;* the *Jehovah*, the *true God*, and *God blessed for ever*, &c. a *creature*, a being that might never have existed, and might cease to exist, if God so pleased. These are the plain certain consequences of this *gentleman's* scheme, and such the tendency of his doctrine about the *supremacy*. He urges the *supremacy* to destroy the *equality:* I stand by the *equality*, and insist upon it, that it is consistent with all the *supremacy* that either *Scripture* or Catholic Fathers taught. And I have this plain reason to offer, with respect to the *Fathers*, that while they maintained the *supremacy*, they maintained also the *necessary existence*, the *coeternity*, the *consubstantiality* of God the Son, and his *unity* of *Godhead* with the Father; which points once secured, I am very ready to admit any consistent *supremacy*. The consequences which Dr. Clarke and his adherents draw from the *supremacy*, I answer, as the Church of Christ has always done from the time such

consequences were pleaded, by admitting a *supremacy* of *order*, which is *natural*, and a *supremacy* of *office*, which is *economical*. The consequences, on the other hand, which we draw against them, as destroying the *equality*, (so manifestly taught through the whole *Scripture* and by the *primitive* churches,) they have never answered, nor can they answer them: which they are so sensible of, that they do not care to have them *mentioned*, but perpetually disguise, conceal, dissemble them, and keep them out of sight.

I must therefore, in my turn, now tell the objector, that he is the blasphemer, upon the avowed principles of the Ante-Nicene churches; in making God the Father *naturally* sovereign Lord and Ruler over *God* the *Son* and *God* the *Holy Ghost;* in reducing both the *divine* Persons to the condition of *creatures*, or precarious beings; brought into existence at *pleasure*, and reducible to *non-existence* again at pleasure. This is not the doctrine of *Scripture* or *Fathers*, but diametrically repugnant to both; is derived from ancient *heresies*, and is false, wicked, and detestable.

There may be some difficulties objected to the Church's way of reconciling (the *Church's* way I call it, for such it is, not *mine*) the *equality* and *supremacy* together: but no greater difficulties than what occur in almost every other controversy. They that have seen into the heart of the controversy between Jews and Christians, or between Atheists and Theists, or between Papists and Protestants in some points, or between Calvinists and Arminians, must acknowledge the same thing in every one of them: which is owing to this, that human capacity is *finite*, and our *ignorance* of wider compass than our *knowledge;* and that therefore it is much easier to raise doubts and difficulties, than it is to solve them. But *difficulties* are one thing, and *demonstrations* another: and it very ill becomes this gentleman, when he has such large *scores* of his own, and while he bends under the weight of many *insuperable* objections, to grow so exceeding flippant, and above measure assuming, upon the strength only of two or three stale cavils, borrowed from ancient *heresies*.

I should take notice of his wording the charge, about *the natural and necessary supremacy of dominion*. He gives it out that I have totally disowned and denied that the Father has any, asserting that he *has none at all*. I think there is a great deal of difference between saying, that the *Father* has a natural and necessary dominion over the creatures in *common* with the

Son and *Holy Ghost*, and saying, that he has no natural supremacy of dominion *at all*. And this *writer* could not be ignorant with what iniquity he thus worded the thing, to leave room for a false construction, and to shock and astonish every careless and ignorant reader. However, thus much may be said, that, in strictness, no supremacy of dominion can be *natural* and *necessary*, in such a full sense as God's attributes are natural and necessary, eternally and constantly residing in him. All *supremacy* of *dominion* supposes an *inferior*, and commences with the *existence* of that inferior; and is therefore so far, and so much *voluntary*, as the *creating* of an inferior is. But upon the *inferior's* coming into being, then indeed commences the *supremacy;* which is an extrinsic *relation*, no essential *attribute:* only, thus far it may be called *natural* and *necessary*, as being necessary *ex hypothesi*, or, *upon that supposition*, as being a relation founded upon the *natural* and *necessary* perfections of the Godhead, which set it above the *creatures*, and make an *infinite* disparity of *nature* between that and them. So that, after all, this superabundant eagerness and vehemence for a *natural* supremacy over *God* the *Son*, and *God* the *Holy Ghost*, is only contending, in other words, for a *disparity* or *inferiority* of *nature* in those two Persons: and this is the sole meaning of appointing them a *governor*. The *blasphemy* I am charged with, is only the denying that they have *naturally* any *ruler* and *governor*. I venture once and again to repeat, that they have not, nor ever could have: and this I maintain upon the clear and undoubted principles of all the *ancient* and *modern* churches.

This gentleman may call it, if he pleases, (words are free,) my *wonderful fiction*, p. 7, my *new* and *unheard of fiction*, p. 23, *entirely of* my *inventing*, p. 28, my *own invention*, p. 46, 52, 100. If he really thinks so, I should advise him to read the *ancients;* or if that be too much, to read only Bishop Pearson, or Bishop Bull, to inform himself better: or if he does not believe it, and yet says it, I should entreat him to correct that evil habit of *romancing*, that outrageous method of *reviling*, and to learn the due government of his *mind*. I have *invented* nothing, have coined no new notion, but have plainly and sincerely followed what the *ancients*, with one voice, have led me into, and the two excellent *moderns*, just mentioned, have taught and maintained upon the same bottom. Bishop Bull may be consulted at large: I shall quote one passage of Bishop Pearson, because short: "The Word, that is, Christ as God, hath the supreme and uni-

" versal dominion of the world[a]." Which is to all intents and purposes *denying* the *Father's supremacy* as much as I have ever done. But what a pass are things come to, that the *known* standing doctrine of all Christian churches, ancient and modern, must be treated as a *novelty*, as a *fiction* or *invention* of mine! If the reader desires a *specimen* of the *ancient* doctrine in this point, he may turn to the quotations in my First Defence, (vol. i. p. 443,) which express the Catholic doctrine, and to which all the Fathers are conformable. So much in answer to the charge of *blasphemy*.

Whether this gentleman can ward off that very charge, or prevent its returning on his own head, may deserve his consideration. The good *Christians* of old would have stopped their ears against such *blasphemy* as his tenets amount to. All reclaim against it: some *directly* and *expressly*, as often as they pronounce any *two*, or the whole *three*, to be *one God*, or *one substance*, of *one dominion*, of *one power* or *glory*: and the rest *consequentially*, by maintaining the *necessary existence, consubstantiality, coeternity*, or other *divine* attributes of the *Son* or *Spirit*.

I have now done with the first *charge;* which I have dwelt the longer upon, because it runs in a manner through the book; and the answering it here in the entrance will give light to what follows:

II. A second *false charge* upon me is in these words: " Neg- " lecting therefore the reason upon which the Scripture expressly " founds the honour we are to pay to Christ, the Doctor builds " it entirely upon another foundation, on which the Scripture " never builds it, viz. on this, that by him God created all " things," p. 7.

I shall say nothing here of the absurdity of *founding* the *worship* of Christ in the manner this author does, by tacking *Socinianism* and *Arianism* together, though entirely repugnant to each other, as I have observed elsewhere[b]: but as to the *charge* brought against me, of founding Christ's worship as is here said; I must beg leave to confute it by producing my own words. " I found the Son's title to worship upon the *dignity* of his " *Person;* his *creative* powers declared in John i. and elsewhere; " his being Θεὸς from the beginning; and his *preserving* and " *upholding* all things, (according to Coloss. i. 16, 17. and " Heb. i.[c])"

[a] Pearson on the Creed, p. 188. Oxf. edit. 1847.

[b] Defence, vol. i. p. 434. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 676.

[c] Defence, vol. i. p. 434.

" I say, his honour is founded on the *intrinsic* excellency and " *antecedent* dignity of his Person; whereof the power of *judg-* " *ment* committed is only a further attestation, and a provisional " security for the payment of his due honour. It did not *make* " him *worthy*, but *found* him so: and it was added, that such his " high worth and dignity might appear, &c.[d]"

Is this founding it *entirely* upon what the author here pretends? As to his pleading, that his way of founding it is *scriptural*, and mine *not scriptural:* both the parts of his pretext are abundantly confuted in my First and Second Defence[e], and in a preface to my Sermons[f].

III. Another *false charge* is in these words, p. 11. " Here the " Doctor directly *corrupts* the Apostle's assertion; not allowing " him to say (what he expressly does say) that to *us there is one* " *God, the Father*, but only on the reverse, to give the Father " the style or title of the one God." He grounds the charge upon what he finds in my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 527, 694. In the first I have these words: " Yes, he (the Apostle) tells us, that " the *Father, of whom are all things, is the one God*, (N.B.) in " opposition to *false* ones, to *nominal* gods and lords: and it is " plain, that he meant it not in opposition to God the Son, be- " cause he reckons him *God to us.*" Rom. ix. 5.

Now where, I pray, is the *corruption* of what the Apostle *asserts?* Or how do I refuse to *allow him to say* what he does say? This gentleman, it seems, will shew it by this wise remark; " It is one thing to say, that the one God is the Father, of " whom are all things; and another thing to say, that the " Father (though not the Father only) is the one God. Now it is " evident the Apostle in this text is not reciting the characters " of the Father, and telling us that he may be styled the one " God; but—he is declaring to us who the one God is, viz. the " Father." The difference then between us is only this; that I suppose the Apostle to tell us *who is the one God*, he supposes him to tell us *who the one God is.* A notable *criticism*, to found such a charge, of *directly corrupting* and *disallowing* Scripture, upon! Especially considering that the Greek words (εἷς Θεὸς ὁ Πατὴρ) may bear either construction, (if they be really two constructions,) and either may equally suit with the context. For though the text is not reciting the Father's characters, not all

[d] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 685. and ii. Query xvi. xvii. xviii. xix.
[e] First and Second Defence, vol. i. [f] Preface to Eight Sermons, vol. ii.

his characters, yet the design was to point out *who is the one God;* and he fixes that character upon the Person of the *Father*, as being *primarily* and *eminently*, though not *exclusively*, the one God.

I have been considering (longer perhaps than it deserves) where the difference lies between asking *who is the one God*, and asking, *who the one God is:* and to me it appears so very small and imperceptible, that I can lay no hold of it. I have tried what I could do in another instance: let it be inquired, *Who is the apostle of the Gentiles?* The answer is, *Paul of Tarsus*, &c. Well, but inquire, *Who the apostle of the Gentiles is?* The answer is still the same, *Paul of Tarsus*, &c. Put the *questions* into Latin, we are still never the nearer, they are plainly tantamount: at least the difference to me is undiscernible; unless by *who*, in the latter case, be meant *what:* upon which supposition, the text we are concerned with should not be translated, *To us there is but one God, the Father;* but thus; *To us the one God is a Father*, &c. Perhaps this ingenious gentleman may be able to clear up the matter to satisfaction: but since he has not yet done it, it is plain he was too *hasty* in charging me *at all*, but very *injurious* in running it up to such an extravagant height.

IV. "The doctrine of the Trinity delivered in these words "(Eph. iv. 3, 5, 6.) by the Apostle, is so expressly contradictory "to Dr. Waterland's scheme, and so impossible to be perverted "even into any appearance of consistency with it, that the "Doctor finds himself here obliged even fairly to tell us, that "St. Paul *ought not* to have writ thus as he did, &c." p. 17.

This is a charge so malicious and petulant, and withal so groundless, that I cannot well imagine what could transport the man into such excesses. For supposing I had misinterpreted St. Paul, and very widely too, would it amount to a declaration that the Apostle *ought not to have writ* what he did write? How hard would it be with *commentators*, if upon every *misconstruction* of a text, *really* such, they were to be thus charged with taking upon them to be *wiser* than the *sacred* penmen, and to *correct* the *Spirit* of God!

After all, if the reader pleases to look into my Defence[g], he will be surprised to find how *innocent* the words are, which have been wrought up into this *high charge*. In my Defence, I say, "Ephes. iv. 6 has been generally understood by the *ancients* of

[g] Defence, vol. i. p. 280.

" the *whole* Trinity: *above all*, as Father; *through all*, by the " *Word*; and *in all*, by the Holy Ghost." I refer to Irenæus, Hippolytus, Marius Victorinus, Athanasius, and Jerome, for that construction: I conclude, " However that be," (that is, whatever becomes of that interpretation, be it just or otherwise,) yet " the Father may be reasonably called the *one*, or *only* God, " without the least diminution of the Son's real divinity[g]."

In my Second Defence, all I pretend is, that " I see no " absurdity[h]" in the interpretation now mentioned: and I observe, that " we are not *there* inquiring into the sense of the " *text*, but into the sentiments of the *ancients upon it*;" and I exhibit their testimonies at large. And to take off the pretended *absurdity* of that ancient interpretation, in making the *one God and Father of all* include all the three Persons, I observe how Irenæus (one of the Fathers quoted) reckons the Son and Holy Ghost to the *Father*, as being his very *self* in a qualified sense. And I further add, that " nothing is more " common than for a *head* of a family, suppose Abraham, to be " understood in a stricter or larger sense, either as denoting his " own proper person, or as denoting him and all his descendants " considered as contained in him, and reckoned to him." I shew further from the plain and express testimonies of Hippolytus and Tertullian, that they also, as well as Irenæus, sometimes considered the *Father* in that *large* sense before mentioned[i].

These are the *facts*; which this gentleman should have confuted, instead of bringing against me railing accusations. If there be any force (as there is none) in the *charge*, it falls upon the *Fathers*; whose interpretation I defended no further than by shewing it not to be *absurd*, nor unsuitable to the language of the early times. As to myself, I did not so much as condemn the *common* interpretation, but was content to admit of it: and yet if I had *condemned* it, I should not, I conceive, have been therefore chargeable with *condemning* St. Paul.

This writer has a further complaint, it seems, in relation to the present text. He is positive that the title of *Father of all* is *very disagreeable*[k] to me: and he insinuates, that pure *decency* here restrained me from *finding fault with St. Paul, for choosing such a* Pagan *expression*. A *mean* suggestion, and entirely

[g] Defence, vol. i. p. 280.
[h] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 430.
[i] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 431, 457.
[k] Observations, p. 18.

groundless. For neither did I give any the least hint of dislike to St. Paul's expression, nor did I *find fault with* the Fathers for adapting sometimes their style to *Pagans*, but commended them rather for doing it, in the cases by me mentioned[l], as doing what was *proper*. And certainly it was *commendable* in St. Paul, and I acknowledged it to be so[m], to adopt the *Pagan* phrase of *unknown God*, and to apply it in a Christian sense, to lead the *Pagans* into a belief of the *true* God.

Before I leave this article, I would take notice of this gentleman's *affectation*, (to call it no worse,) of *loading* every thing beyond measure, in a way *uncommon*; and *pointing* and *edging* his expressions to such a degree as to make them *ridiculous*. It is not enough, with him, to say, as another man would in such a case, that a *text* has been *misconstrued*, and its sense *perverted* or *misapplied*; no, that would sound flat and *vulgar*: but it is to be called *corrupting* the Apostle's assertion, *not allowing him to write* what he did write; or, it is *finding fault with* him, or fairly telling us that *he ought not* to have writ thus as he did; or, it is an attempt to *expose and render ridiculous* the Apostle's doctrine, and arguing, not against Dr. Clarke, but against *plain Scripture*, and against the *Evangelists* and *Apostles* themselves[n]. This it is to be *elegant* and *quaint*, and to push the *satire* home. I can pardon the *pedantry*, and the *false sublime*, in a man of such a taste: but I desire he may use it somewhere else; and not where he is laying an *indictment*, or making a *report*, which requires *truth* and *strictness*.

V. "The supreme authority and original independent absolute "dominion of the God and Father of all, *who is above all*; that "authority which is the foundation of the *whole law of nature*, "which is taught and confirmed in every page of the New Tes- "tament; which is professed and declared in the first article "of every *ancient creed*, in every Christian church of the world, "and which is maintained as the *first principle* of religion by "*every Christian writer*, not only in the three first centuries, but "even in the following ages of contention and ambition: this "supreme authority, &c. Dr. Waterland in his last book (merely "for the more consistent salving of a metaphysical hypothesis) "has, by a new and unheard of fiction, without any shadow of "evidence from any one text of Scripture, in direct contra-

[l] See Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 486. [m] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 530.
[n] See Reply, p. 195, 197.

" diction to the first article of all the ancient *creeds*, without the " testimony of *any one ancient* (I had almost said, *or modern*) " writer, very presumptuously (and had he himself been an op- " poser of the hypothesis he defends, he would have said, *blas-* " *phemously*)—reduced entirely to nothing." p. 23.

Here seems to be something of sounding *rhetoric* in this paragraph; which had it been intended only for an *exercise*, or by way of *specimen*, might have been tolerable: but it was wrong to bring it in here, in a grave debate, because there is not a word of *truth* in it.

To speak to the matter, all this hideous outcry against an innocent man means only this, as hath been above hinted; that I have been willing to think, and as willing to say, that God the Son and God the Holy Ghost have *naturally no Governor*, are not *naturally* subject to any *Ruler* whatever. This gentleman is here pleased to intimate that they are, and is very confident of it. Let me number up the many palpable *untruths* he has crowded into half a page. *One* about *the foundation of the law of nature:* a *second*, about the *New Testament:* a *third*, about *every ancient creed:* a *fourth*, about the *first principle of religion*, and *every Christian writer: four* or *five* more, about Dr. Waterland. There is not a syllable of *truth* in any of the particulars of which he is so positive. For neither does any *law of nature*, nor any *text* of the New Testament, nor any *ancient creed*, nor any Christian and Catholic *writer*, early or late, ever assert, or intimate, that God the Father is *naturally* supreme *Governor* over his *own Son* and *Spirit;* or that they are *naturally* under his *rule* or *government*. And as to Dr. Waterland, it is no *new or unheard of fiction* in him, to assert *one common dominion* to all the three Persons, and to deny that either the Son or Holy Ghost is *naturally* subject to (that is, a *creature of*) the Father. He has full *evidence* for his persuasion, from innumerable *texts* of *Scripture*, from all the *ancient creeds*, as understood by the Christian churches from the beginning to this day: and he has neither *blasphemously* nor *presumptuously*, but soberly, righteously, and in the fear of God, stood up in defence of the injured honour of the ever *blessed Trinity*, grievously insulted and outraged by the Arians of these times; who when they have carried on their resolute opposition as far as argument and calm reasoning can go, and are defeated in it, rather than yield to conviction, come at length to such a degree of *meanness*, as to attempt the sup-

port of a baffled cause by the low methods of *declaiming* and *railing*.

VI. " When Dr. Waterland says, that *many supreme Gods in* " *one undivided substance* are not *many Gods, for that very reason,* " *because their substance is undivided*, he might exactly with the " same *sense* and *truth* have affirmed, that many supreme persons " in one undivided substance are not many persons; for that " very reason, because their substance is undivided." p. 51.

Here I am charged with saying, that " many supreme Gods " are not many Gods." Let my own words appear as they stand. *Second Defence*, vol. ii. p. 645.

" I assert, you say, *many supreme Gods in one undivided sub-* " *stance.* Ridiculous: they are not many Gods, for that very " reason, because their substance is undivided." Is this saying, that *many Gods are not many Gods?* No; but *they*, that is, the three Persons, supposed by the objector to be *three Gods* upon our scheme, are not three Gods, not *many*, but *one* God only. This *gentleman* appears to be in some distress; that, in order to form his objection, he is forced to invent words for me, and to lay them before the reader instead of mine. He seems however, in the same paragraph, to aim obscurely at an *argument* which the Author of the Remarks has expressed plainly, and urged handsomely enough[o], though with too much *boasting*.

The answer, in short, is this: though the union of the three Persons (each Person being *substance*) makes them *one substance*, yet the same union does not make them *one Person;* because *union* of *substance* is one thing, and *unity* of *Person* is another: and there is no necessity that the same kind of union which is sufficient for one must be sufficient for the other also. There is no consequence from one to the other, but upon this *supposition*, that *person* and *acting substance* are *equivalent* and *reciprocal:* which the Author of the Remarks had acuteness enough to see, and therefore fixes upon me, unfairly, that very *supposition*. If he pleases to turn to my *definition* of *person*, he will find, that though I suppose *Person* to be *intelligent acting substance*, yet that is not the *whole* of the definition, nor do I ever suppose the *terms* or phrases *reciprocal;* any more than the asserting *man* to be an *animal* is supposing *man* and *animal* to be tantamount, or to be *reciprocal* terms. I have taken this occasion of replying to the Remarks upon this head, to let the author see that I do

[o] Remarks, p. 36.

not neglect his performance for any *strength* it bears in it. That which I have now answered is, in my judgment, the *best* and *strongest* argument in the whole piece: and I believe he thinks so too.

VII. "When the Doctor affirms that the one supreme God "is not one *supreme God* in Person, but in substance: what is "this but affirming, that the one supreme God is two *supreme* "*Gods* in Person, though but one *supreme God* in substance?" p. 51.

Let the reader see my words upon which this weak charge is grounded: they are in my First Defence, vol. i. p. 294.

"Father and Son both are the one supreme God: not one in "Person, as you frequently and groundlessly insinuate, but in "substance, power, and perfection." I neither said, nor meant to say, *not one* supreme God *in Person*; but, *not one in Person*: the rest is of this writer's foisting in by way of blunder, first to make *nonsense*, and then to comment upon it, and add more to it. In the meanwhile, it is some satisfaction to me to observe, that in a controversy where it is not very easy to express every thing with due *accuracy*, the keenest adversaries have not yet found any *offensive* or *unjustifiable* expression to lay hold on, till they have first made it so, by artifice and management.

VIII. "Another method whereby Dr. Waterland attempts "to destroy the supremacy of the one God, &c.—is by denying "any real generation of the Son, either temporal or eternal." *Observ.* p. 56.

Here are two *false* and *injurious* charges: one of my denying any *temporal generation* of the Son; the other of my denying any *eternal* generation. Every body that has seen my books knows that I assert, maintain, and inculcate *three generations*; the first *eternal*, the other two *temporal*: so that this charge of the Observator must be made out, if at all, by inference, or consequence only, and not directly: and therefore he ought not to have expressed this article in such general terms as he has, but should have said, *consequentially*, *implicitly*, or the like, if he had not been exceeding prone to set every thing forth in the *falsest* and *blackest* colours.

What he advances in support of these two charges betrays such *confusion* of thought, and such surprising *forgetfulness* of ancient learning, (for I am unwilling to impute it *all* to formed, premeditated *malice*,) that I stand amazed at it.

1. One of his first blunders is, his attributing the words *before all ages* (πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων) to the Council of Nice: this he repeats, p. 67, 70, though every body knows that those words were not inserted by the Nicene Council, but the Constantinopolitan, above fifty years after. It is necessary to remark this, because part of the argument depends upon it. There can be no doubt but that the Constantinopolitan Council intended *eternal* generation: but as to the Nicene Council, it may be questioned whether they did or no. These two our writer, as his way is to confound every thing, has blended together, and, I suppose, very *ignorantly*.

The use he makes of it is, bringing me in as his voucher (p. 67.) for the Nicene Fathers professing no more than a *temporal* generation, *though they expressly say, it was* πρὸ πάντων αἰώνων, *before all ages*. I do indeed offer such a conjecture about the Nicene Fathers[p]; but then I know nothing of the πάντων αἰώνων which this gentleman puts upon them; nor do I allow that either the Nicene or Ante-Nicene Catholics understood that phrase in the limited sense[q].

2. Another mistake, or rather gross misreport, is what he says of the *writers* before and at the time of the Nicene Council, that using the similitude of *light* from *light*, or fire from fire, they "always take care to *express* this one difference in the "similitude, that whereas light shineth forth, and is communi- "cated not by the *will* of the luminous body, but by a necessary "property of its nature, the Son of God is, by the power, and "*will*, and *design* of the Father, his *substantial* image."

I do not know that any *single* writer ever *expressed* this before Eusebius; if it may be said of him. If it be pretended, that they *meant* it at least; yet neither can that be proved, in the *full extent* of what is here asserted, of any one of them. All that is true is, that as many Ante-Nicene Fathers as went upon the *hypothesis* of the *temporal* ante-mundane generation, so many acknowledged such generation to be by *will* and *counsel:* but none of those writers ever used that *similitude* upon which Eusebius made the remark now mentioned; viz. that of *light* and *splendor;* but that of one *light*, or one *fire* of *another*, which has

[p] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 595. Compare Bull. D. F. sect. iii. cap. 9. But see also Lowth's note upon Socrat. Eccl. Hist. p. 24. ed. Cant.

[q] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 355, &c.

a very different meaning[r] and application. But it is not the Observator's talent to think or write accurately.

I must further add, that Origen, Theognostus, Dionysius of Alexandria, and Alexander, making use of the same *similitude* that Eusebius does, give no such account of it[s]. And none that intended to illustrate *eternal generation* thereby ever intimated that it was by *will*, *design*, or *counsel*, in opposition to what is *natural* or *necessary*, in our sense of *necessary*.

3. A third instance of this writer's great *confusion*, upon the present head, is his blending and confounding together what I had laid down distinctly upon different subjects. What I say of Post-Nicenes only, he understands of Ante-Nicenes too: and what I say of one Ante-Nicene writer, he understands of another; and thus, by the *confusion* of his own intellect, I am made to be perpetually *inconsistent*. It would be too tedious to repeat. All may be seen very *distinctly*, and with great *consistency*, set forth in my Second Defence; whither I refer the reader that desires to see the sentiments of every particular *writer* fairly considered[t].

4. A fourth instance of this author's *confusion*, is his pretending that none of the Ante-Nicene writers *ever mention any prior generation, any other ante-mundane generation, beside* that *temporal* one before spoken of. It is *true* that many, or most of the Ante-Nicene writers were in the hypothesis of the *temporal* generation, mentioning no other: but it is very *false* to say, that none of them speak of any higher. Origen, and Dionysius of Alexandria, and Methodius, and Pamphilus, and Alexander, are express for the *eternal* generation, or filiation[u]: and Irenæus, and Novatian, and Dionysius of Rome may, very probably, be added to them. These together make eight, and may be set against Ignatius, Justin, Athenagoras, Tatian, Theophilus, Clemens of Alexandria, Tertullian, Hippolytus, who make an equal number for the other *hypothesis*. And I have often observed, and proved, that the difference between these writers was *verbal* only, all agreeing in the main doctrines, and differing only about *terms*, whether this or that should be *called* generation[x].

5. Another instance of his great *confusion* under this head, is

[r] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 614.
[s] Ibid.
[t] Ibid. from p. 590 to p. 609.
[u] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 353, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 598, &c.
[x] First Defence, vol. i. p. 266, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 442, 617.

his objecting to me again, as before in the Reply, my appealing to the *ancients* for the understanding of *will* in the sense of *acquiescence* and *approbation*, meaning by *ancients*, Post-Nicene writers. This I did to obviate Dr. Clarke's pretences from some Post-Nicene writers, such as Hilary, Basil, Marius Victorinus, and Gregory Nyssen. And, certainly, in expounding these writers, heed must be given to their way and manner of using their phrases. And as to calling them *ancients*, the Author of the Reply had done the same twice together[y].

6. This writer discovers his *ignorance*, or *infirmity* rather, in calling my interpretation of *ἀνάγκη φυσικὴ ridiculous*, as *taken only from* some *later Christian* writers. I proved my interpretation from Athanasius, Epiphanius, Hilary, and the history of the times in which the Sirmian Council was held, in order to fix the meaning of the phrase about that time, which is the first time we find it applied in this subject[z]. And I fully answered all this *gentleman's* cavils, which he now repeats.

7. Another instance of his *confusion*, is his saying of the *procession*, or temporal generation, that it is *no generation at all*; and that "not one Ante-Nicene writer ever was so absurd, as to call "that a *generation* by which the generated person was no more "*generated* than he was before." As to the fact, that the Ante-Nicene writers, in great numbers, called this procession *generation*, I proved it at large; nor can any *scholar* make doubt of it. And as to the poor pretence, which he here repeats, I answered it before in these words, (Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 598.) "Though the *Logos* was the same *essentially* before and after "the generation, he was not the same in respect of *operation*, "or *manifestation*, and outward *economy*; which is what those "Fathers meant." And I particularly proved this to be their meaning, from the express testimonies of Justin, Methodius, and Hippolytus[a]; and confirmed it by quotations from Zeno Veronensis, Hilary, Phœbadius, and others. And what does it signify for the Observator to set his raw conceptions and fond reasonings about the meaning of a word, against such valuable *authorities*? Can any thing be more ridiculous, than to sit down and argue about what an ancient writer must or must not have said, from pretended reasons *ex absurdo*? I assert it to be *fact*,

[y] See Reply, p. 256, 257, and my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 609.
[z] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 601, 607.
[a] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 593, 616.

that they *said* and *meant* what I report of them; and I have produced their *testimonies*: the author may, if he pleases, go on with his *dreams*.

This writer having performed so indifferently upon one part of the *charge*, will not be found less defective in regard to the other; wherein he charges me with denying *eternal* generation, or reducing it to *nothing*. He will not, I presume, pretend that I either *deny* it or *destroy* it, as he does, by pronouncing all *eternal* generation *absurd* and *contradictory*. If I *deny* it or *destroy* it, it is in *asserting* it however at the same time: and it must be by *explaining* it, if any way, that I reduce it to *nothing*. If it happens not to be so explained as to fall under this gentleman's *imagination*, it is, according to him, reduced to *nothing*. But before he comes to his *metaphysical* speculations on this head, he gives us a taste of his *learning*, in respect of the *ancients*; boldly asserting, that they never express the *first* (or eternal) generation of the Son, by *filiation*, or *generation*, or *begetting*, *or by any other equivalent term*. This is a notorious untruth. For when Irenæus reproves some persons as attributing any *beginning* to the *prolation* of the *Son*, (*prolationis initium donantes*,) he uses a term equivalent to *filiation*, or *generation*[b]. When Origen declares there was *no beginning of the* Son's *generation*, he uses the very word[c], as also when he speaks of the *only begotten*, as being *always* with the Father. Dionysius of Alexandria expresses it by the word ἀειγενὴς, *eternally generated*[d]; which surely is very express. When Methodius asserts, that he never became a Son, but always was so[e], what is this, but saying the same thing? And when other writers assert, that the *Father was always a Father*, this is at least asserting an eternal generation in *equivalent* terms. But this writer's knowledge of *antiquity* has been sufficiently shewn. Let us see whether he can perform any thing better in *metaphysics*. He forms his attack thus: "Dr. "Waterland—desires, you would by no means understand him "to intend eternal generation indeed, but a mere *coexistence* "with, and not at all any *derivation* from the Father." p. 72.

And certainly Dr. Waterland is very right in making *eternal* generation to be *eternal*, amounting to a *coexistence* with the Father, without which it could not be *eternal*. It is observable

[b] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 353. [c] Ibid. p. 353.
[d] Ibid. p. 357. [e] Ibid. p. 357.

however, that this gentleman opposes *derivation* to *coexistence*; which shews what kind of *derivation* he intends; a derivation from a state of *non-existence*, a derivation commencing *after* the existence of the Father, and because later than the Father's existence, *infinitely* later, as it must be if *at all* later. In short then, it is a derivation of a *creature* from his *Creator:* this is the *eternal* generation he is contending for, in opposition to *mine;* while he is endeavouring to shew that mine is not *generation;* as his, most certainly, is not *eternal*, nor *generation*, but *creation*. The sum of what he has to advance is, that *coexistence* is incompatible with *generation;* that an *eternal derivation* is absurd, and contradictory. No doubt but such a *derivation* as he is *imagining* (which he explains by a *real* motion *of emission*, and *growth of one out of the other*) is incompatible with *coexistence*. But what the primitive Fathers intended, and what the Scripture intended by *eternal generation*, implies no such *motion of emission*, no such *growth* of one out of the other, but an *eternal relation* or reference of one to the other as his *Head*. An *eternal relation* has no difficulty at all in the conception of it. All the difficulty lies in the supposition of its not being *coordinate*, though the Persons be *coexistent*. And when it can be shewn that all *priority* of *order* must of course imply a *priority* of *duration* too, then the objection may have some weight in it. Till that be done, the notion of *eternal generation* will stand: an *eternal Logos* of the *eternal Mind*, which is the aptest *similitude* to express the *coeternity* and *headship* too; and is the representation given of it both by *Scripture* and *antiquity*. I proceed to a new charge.

IX. "Another method by which Dr. Waterland endeavours "to destroy the *supreme dominion*, &c.—is his labouring, by a "dust of learned jargon, to persuade men that the very terms "*one God* mean nobody knows what." p. 85. To this I answer, that *one God* means *one necessarily existing, all-perfect, all-sufficient substance*, or *Being:* which *substance*, &c. consists (according to Scripture account) of three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, one *Jehovah*. This is *one God*. Let this gentleman disprove it, when he is able.

I had said, [f] "If Scripture makes the three Persons *one God* "either *expressly* or by necessary *consequence*, I know not what "men have to do to dispute about *intelligent agents* and *identical*

[f] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 434.

" *lives*, &c. as if they understood better than God himself does, " what *one God* is, or as if *philosophy* were to direct what shall or " shall not be *Tritheism*." Upon this our Observator remarks; " Better than Dr. Waterland himself does, is all that he means." I would allow the justice of his reflection, were we disputing what *one God* is, upon the foot of *Scripture:* for then it would amount only to this difference, that his *interpretation* leads one way, and *mine* another. But as the competition is made between *Scripture* and *philosophy*, he may easily perceive both the *impertinence* and *iniquity* of his reflection. While the point is removed from *Scripture* to *philosophy* for a decision of it, I insist upon it, that this is *interpretatively*, and in *effect*, though not in *design*, pretending to understand the thing *better* than *God* himself does. But to proceed with our writer's pretences against the account I had before given from the *ancients*.

He objects, (p. 86,) that " one substance is not the same as " one God; because two equally supreme, two unoriginate di- " vine Persons would be two Gods," by my own confession: for I say (vol. ii. p. 537.) that " two unoriginate divine Persons, " however otherwise inseparable, would be two Gods according to " the ancients." I knew very well what I said, though I perceive this gentleman does not apprehend it. The *ancients* thought this reference of one Person to the other, as *Head*, was one requisite among others, to make the *substance one*, being thus more closely allied, and, as it were, of *one stock*. This made me say, *however otherwise inseparable:* that is, whatever *other* union may be supposed, the Persons would not be perfectly *inseparable*, not perfectly *one substance*, (according to the *ancients*,) and so not *one God*, but upon the present supposition. And now how does this shew that *one substance* and *one God*, are not, in this case, tantamount? To me it seems, that it both *confirms* and *explains* it.

X. The Observator charges me (p. 94.) with making one *compound* person of *many* distinct persons. His words are: " He " thinks a person may be compounded of many distinct persons." He refers to page the 652nd of my Second Defence. If the reader can find any such thing there, or any where else in my books, let the charge of *false doctrine* lie upon me: if not, let the charge of *slander* and *calumny* lie upon the accuser.

XI. He charges me, p. 62, with referring to a passage in Modest Plea, without " pretending to make any the least answer " to it." This is like his other *misreports:* I abundantly answer

it, (vol. ii. p. 545,) by allowing *necessary existence* to be *positive*, but denying it of *self-existence*.

From the instances here given, (to which more will be added under the next chapter,) the reader may perceive, that speaking of the *truth*, in simplicity and singleness of heart, is none of this gentleman's talent. If he hits upon any thing really true, and which he might perhaps make some little advantage of, he has such a faculty of *inventing* and *straining*, that he quite spoils it in the telling, and turns it into *romance*. One would not expect such exorbitances as these are from men of their profession and character: but it now brings to my mind the Postscript to the Reply[s]: and I shall wonder at nothing of this kind hereafter.

CHAP. II.

Misreports *and* Misrepresentations *contained in the Observations.*

EVERY page of the pamphlet is concerned in this charge: the whole is, in a manner, one continued *misrepresentation* from beginning to end. But some of the *misrepresentations* have been already shewn in the first chapter, among *false charges*; and others will fall under a subsequent chapter. I shall select a convenient number to fill up this.

1. Page 11. the author writes thus: "The Doctor is forced "further to affirm, that the Son is *tacitly* included, though the "Father be eminently styled the *one God*: nay, (which is very "hard indeed,) *tacitly included*, though by name expressly *ex-* "*cluded*, and *contradistinguished* by a peculiar character of his "own, in the very words of the text itself." Thus he leaves the remark, without informing the reader in what sense I suppose the Son *tacitly* included. I explain it in my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 720:

"I have before shewn what we mean by saying that the Son "is *tacitly included*, though the Father be eminently styled the "*one God*: not that the word *God*, or the word *Father*, in such "cases, includes Father and Son; but the word *God*, is predi- "cated of one only, at the same time that it is tacitly understood "that it may be predicated of either, or both: since no *opposition* "is intended against either, but against *creatures* and *false gods*."

This gentleman pretends indeed that the *one God* is *opposed* to

[s] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 765.

the one *true Lord*, (in 1 Cor. viii. 6,) as well as to *false* gods. But this is *gratis dictum*; and he does not consider that then the Son can be no *God* at all *to us*, contrary to Rom. ix. 5. besides many other places of Scripture. I say therefore that the *exclusive* term, in this case, is not to be understood with utmost rigour, but with such qualifying considerations, as other Scriptures manifestly require to be consistent with this. I gave instances, in good number, of *exclusive* terms so used, [h] which this laconic gentleman *confutes*, first, by calling them *ridiculous*; and next, by *positively affirming*, that "wherever any particular thing "or person is by any particular title or character contradistin- "guished from any other thing or person mentioned at the "same time under another particular title or character, it is "infinitely *absurd* to suppose the latter *tacitly included* in the "former, from which it is expressly excluded." Now allowing him the whole of what he here asserts, all that follows is, that in 1 Cor. viii. 6. the Son is *excluded* from being God in that *eminent* manner, that *unoriginate* manner as the Father is; not from being *God* in the *same sense* of the word, [i] nor from being *one God* with him. But it will be difficult for him to prove any thing more, than that the Father is there described under the character of the *one God*, of whom are all things, and the Son under the character of the *one Lord*, by whom are all things, in opposition only to *nominal* gods and lords, and not to each other. For since all things are *of one*, and by the *other*, they together are *one Fountain* of all things, one God and Lord: and thus may this text stand with verse the 4th of the same chapter, which declares that there is but *one God*; and with Rom. ix. and 5, which declares the Son to be "over all, God blessed for "ever."

II. Page the 18th of the Observations, I am found fault with for misunderstanding a passage of Athanasius, in his Epistle to Serapion [k]. I had said, that the one God is his *subject* in

[h] Vol. ii. Sermon iv. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 405, 424, 444.

[i] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 425.

[k] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 430.

Εν γὰρ εἶδος θεότητος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ, καὶ εἷς Θεός. ὁ πατὴρ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὢν κατὰ τὸ ἐπὶ πάντων εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ δὲ φαινόμενος κατὰ τὸ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἅπασι διὰ τοῦ Λόγου ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνεργεῖν, οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἕνα διὰ τῆς τριάδος ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν——ὅτι τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν. Athan. Orat. iii. p. 565.

Εἷς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύττεται, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν· ἐπὶ πάντων μέν, ὡς πατὴρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ, καὶ πηγή· διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ—

that passage; as is manifest to every one that can read and construe.

My smart corrector here says, "And yet not only the neces-" sary construction of this very passage, but moreover Athana-" sius himself declares, on the contrary, in the fullest and most " express words, that he is speaking of the Father all the way." And to prove this, he refers me to Athanasius's third Oration against the Arians; a *prior* work, and which therefore could declare nothing about his meaning in the place I had to deal with: so far from declaring in the *fullest* and *most express* words. It would have been sufficient for a *cooler* writer to have said, that Athanasius had explained his meaning in *one* place by what he had said in *another:* and to have offered it as a *probable* argument to determine a *doubtful* construction.

Certain it is, that Athanasius did not, *could not* in *full* and *express* words, declare beforehand in his third Oration against the Arians, that he should be "speaking of the Father all the " way," several months or years after, in an epistle not yet written, nor perhaps thought of. I can with better reason plead, that since the Epistle to Serapion was written *after* the other, and contained his *later*, thoughts, that either the *former* treatise should be interpreted by the *latter*, or at least that his *second thoughts* upon the text should be preferred. However, upon a careful review of both the places, and upon considering the context, and the argument Athanasius is upon in both, (namely, to prove *one Godhead* in all the *three* Persons, *one God* in, or by, *a Trinity*, his express words,) I am so far from thinking that the passage in his Oration is at all against me, that it rather confirms my construction of the other; allowing only a different *pointing* from what appears in the prints, such as I have here given. And I desire the words, ἕνα Θεὸν διὰ τῆς τριάδος, may be attended to, *one God in Trinity*. If ἕνα Θεὸν means the Father only, then the sense is, *one God the Father, in* (or *by*) *Father, Son, and Holy Ghost;* which is a sense that this writer will call perfectly absurd. I submit this whole matter to the judgment of the *learned*. In the mean while it is evident, that our Observator has let his pen run too fast; has been exceeding *positive* in a thing which he cannot make *clear*, or so

οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑμῶν φρόνημα εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν, τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι. Τὸ γὰρ, ἐν πᾶσιν οὐκ ἔχετε, διαιροῦντες καὶ ἀποξενοῦντες ἀπὸ τῆς θεότητος τὸ πνεῦμα. *Athanas. ad Serap.* i. p. 677.

much as *probable;* and that he has expressed his *positiveness* in such a manner, and in such words, as cannot be justified by common rules.

I may just note, before I leave this article, that this gentleman has not shewn his skill in Greek, by rendering ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὢν, (as if it had been ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, or ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ,) *existing of himself:* nor does he apprehend the force of ἐπὶ πάντων, or what Athanasius is talking of in that place. When he understands the maxim of Irenæus, (*invisibile Filii Pater*, p. 234,) and considers how God the Son was supposed to be let down, as it were, to the *creatures*, while the Father remained *in excelsis*, and, as it were, within himself; he will then know how to construe that passage.

III. Page 19th of the Observations, we meet with another *misrepresentation*, a very great one.

" It was further alleged, that Dr. Waterland most absurdly " so interprets this phrase, (ἐχαρίσατο) *given him a name;* as if " it could signify extolling and magnifying in such a sense as " men extol and magnify God; as if men could (χαρίσασθαι) " *graciously grant* any thing to God." I had interpreted *exalting* to signify *praising*, (in such a sense as men *exalt* God,) in opposition to the other sense of *exalting*, which is *raising* up to a *higher place* or dignity. This is all the objector has to ground his weak suggestion upon. As to χαρίσασθαι, *giving, gratifying* with, or the like, as it may be done by *equals* to *equals*, or even by *inferiors* to *superiors*, as well as by *superiors* to *inferiors;* where is the inference that the Father must be *superior* to the Son, because of his *giving him a name?* My answer therefore was in these words: " I see no *absurdity* in interpreting *giving* " *a name* to be *giving a name*. But it is *absurd* to imagine that " God may not glorify his Son, as well as his Son may glorify " him; by spreading and extolling his name over the whole " creation[1]:" which this writer transcribes, and leaves as he found; not being able to answer it. Nor indeed is there any just objection against an *equal* doing thus to an *equal:* nor does χαρίσασθαι intimate any thing more than its being a *free* and *voluntary* act. But it is trifling in this case to strain the words (used in the other case) *in such a sense as men exalt God;* which were intended only in opposition to another quite *different* sense of *exaltation:* and are still to be understood with allowance for the *different* circumstances.

[1] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 550.

IV. Page 34th, this writer cites some words of my Second Defence, (vol. ii. p. 516,) which are these: "If you ask why "that Person called the Son might not have been Father, I "have nothing to say, but that in fact he is not. So it is "written, and so we believe: the Father is Father, and the "Son is Son." Upon which he is pleased to remark as follows: "By the Doctor's hypothesis therefore, there was no impossi- "bility in the nature of things, but unoriginate might have been "originate, and originate unoriginate; underived might have "been derived, and derived underived; the Father might have "been begotten, and the Son unbegotten." Such is his *malicious* or thoughtless misconstruction of very plain and very innocent words. In the same paragraph, from which he cited my words, I assert the *priority of order* (that is, the originateness of one, and unoriginateness of the other) to be *natural*, that is, *necessary* or *unalterable*, and eternally so: so that one could never have been the other; which is my constant doctrine. But if you ask *why* they *could not*, which is asking a *reason a priori* in a case which admits of none, I pretend not to it; being content to prove the fact *a posteriori*, which is all that can be done. Will any man give me a reason *a priori*, why there *must* have been a God, or *why* it *could not* have been otherwise? It is impossible. It is sufficient to prove *a posteriori*, that in fact there is a God, and that he *could not but be*, because we find that he exists *necessarily*, and without a cause. But we shall have more of this in the sequel.

V. Page 35. Observat. "Instead of *eternal generation*, the Doc- "tor, if he was at liberty, had much rather say *eternal existence* "of a real and living Word, &c.—And for this reason, I suppose, "it is, that instead of the Nicene words, *begotten of the Father*, "and *from the substance of the Father*, the Doctor, by a new and "unheard of expression, affirms the Son to be *the substance of the* "*Father*." *First Defence*, vol. i. p. 496.

Answ. As to what he is here *imagining* of what the Doctor had *rather say*, and *if he was at liberty*, it deserves no answer: my sentiments in that article are sufficiently known, and fully laid down in my writings. His other remark about a *new and unheard of expression*, betrays his *ignorance* in antiquity, or something worse. Ever since the terms *substance* and *person* came into this controversy, Father and Son have been always believed and professed to be *one substance:* as high as Tertullian, all the

three have been called *one substance. Una substantia in tribus cohærentibus.* What is this but saying, that both the Son and Holy Ghost are the Father's substance, since all are *one substance,* which one substance is the *Father's,* as well as theirs? This is all that I say in the place referred to, "that the "Son might be justly called the Father's substance, both "being one."

VI. "Tertullian presumes to add, speaking of one of Dr. "Waterland's principal assertions, if the Scripture itself had "taught it, it could not have been true." Observ. p. 52. comp. p. 47. This is *misrepresentation* both of Tertullian and *me.* The assertion of which Tertullian speaks is, that "the Father was "actually incarnate, suffered," &c. the tenet of the Praxeans. And he does not say, it could not have been *true,* but could not have been *believed,* and that with a *perhaps,* (*fortasse non credenda de Patre licet scripta,*) to shew that it was rather a rhetorical figure of speech, than to be taken strictly, and with utmost rigour: and his chief reason why he said so much, was because such a tenet could hardly, if at all, be reconciled with other *Scriptures* and their description of the *Father,* and the standing *economy* of the three Persons therein *revealed.* How does this at all affect my assertion that, antecedent to the economy, "there "was no impossibility in the nature of the thing itself, but the "Father himself might have done the same that the Son did?" This is not the assertion which Tertullian strikes at: nor did he say of the other, that *it could not be true,* nor *positively,* that it *could not be believed.* Three *false* reports this gentleman has here crowded into one short sentence. And I must remind him of what I before told him [m], (though he is pleased to forget it,) that the same Tertullian, in the same treatise, when, in the course of the dispute, he was brought closer up to the pinch of the question; had nothing to say about the *natural impossibility* of the supposition: but he resolves the case entirely into this, that *Scripture* had warranted the assertion in regard to God the *Son,* and had not done so, but the contrary, in regard to God the *Father.* So little reason had this writer to appeal, *twice,* to Tertullian upon this article.

VII. "The three Persons in the Trinity are (with Dr. Water- "land) real Persons, each of them an individual intelligent "agent, undivided in substance, but still distinct Persons: so

[m] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 480.

" distinct, that were they all unoriginated, he himself allows " they would be three Gods." [Good reason *why*, when upon that supposition they would be more *distinct* than they now are: but this is one of our author's *shrewd* remarks.] " Yet at the " same time, in a most unintelligible manner, and with the " utmost inconsistency, he professes them to be all but one living " Person." Where do I profess any such thing? This hasty *gentleman* might better have stayed a while to prove what he pretends, instead of fixing upon me a *consequence* of his *own*, and in such a manner as must make an ignorant reader think he had *quoted my own words*. He brings some passages of mine to prove his charge, which yet prove nothing like it. If the reader pleases to turn to my definition of *person*[n], he will easily perceive that the *same life* may be common to three Persons, and that *identical* life no more infers *singularity* of Person, than identity of *essence*. When this writer pleases to give us another *definition* of person, or to confute *mine*, we may give him a further hearing.

VIII. In the next page, (p. 90,) I meet with a *misrepresentation* of so odd a kind, that I could never have suspected it, and can scarce think he was well awake when he made it. He pitches upon a passage of my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 531. which runs thus:

" You have taken a great deal of fruitless pains to shew, that " the particular glories belonging to the Son, on account of his " *offices*, are distinct from the glories belonging to the Father. " You might in the same way have shewn that the particular " glories due to the Father under this or that consideration, " are distinct from the glories of the Father considered under " another capacity." Now let us come to the remark of this acute gentleman upon it. It is thus: " What is this, but " saying, that the Persons of the Father and Son differ no other- " wise than as *capacities* of the same Person?" I am content to put it off, and to refer the reader to my book, which fully explains the whole thing; hinting only, that the writer might as well have said *offices*, (as capacities,) when his hand was in; and that nothing is more evident than that, if distinct offices in *different* persons are a foundation for *distinct* worships, then distinct offices in the *same* person will make as many *distinct worships* as there are *offices*.

[n] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 650.

IX. One noted *misrepresentation* must not be neglected: the author insults mightily upon it. I shall cite part of what he says:

" A coordination or subordination of mere order, without " relation to *time, place, power, dominion, authority*, or the like, " is exactly the same manner of speaking and thinking, as if a " man should say, a coequality or inequality of *equality*. Dr. " Waterland therefore was really much *weaker* than he imagines, " when he *wantonly* declared, *he was so weak as to think, that the* " *words* coordination *and* subordination *strictly and properly* " *respected* order, *and expressed an equality or inequality of* order[p]. " Are not things come to a fine pass, if the prime foundation of " religion, the first and great commandment, is to be ludicrously " placed on such a *quicksand as this?*" p. 33.

The reader, I suppose, is pretty well acquainted with this gentleman's manner, before this time, [so] that I have the less need to take notice of his affecting big swelling words, and his running out into extravagant exclamations on very slight occasions. It is his unhappiness, that he never knows where to stop, nor how to be *moderate* in any thing. It is *ludicrous* indeed for him to pretend a zeal for the *first and great commandment*, while he is preaching up *two Gods*, and is a friend to *creature-worship:* but that I mention by the way only. As to the point in hand; had I made any mistake in a very nice part of the controversy, he might have borne it with *temper*, as I have many and great ones of his, where there was less excuse for them. To come to the business: he will not find it easy to confute a very plain thing, that *coordination* and *subordination* strictly and properly respect *order*, (to say nothing here what the *order* respects,) as much as *contemporary* or *coeval* respects *time* or *age*, *collateral* place, *concomitant* company; or as any other word of like nature bears a signification suitable to its *etymology*, and to the *analogy* of speech.

Against this he objects, that a " coordination or subordination " of mere order is exactly the same manner of speaking, as a " coequality or inequality of equality:" which happens to be a blunder. For as *coequality* and *equality* are the same, in this case, the expression to answer *a coequality or inequality of equality* would be this; *a coordination or subordination of coordination;*

[p] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 456.

which is not my *expression*, nor any thing like my *sense*. What *order*, abstractedly considered, may signify, or what in this particular case, are questions which may come in presently. But in the mean while it is evident, that there is no solecism nor impropriety, but *truth* and *accuracy* too, in saying that *coordination* and *subordination* respect *order*; not *dominion*, not *dignity*, &c. as this author pretends; unless all *order* implies *dominion*, as it certainly does not. *Order* is a general word, and is sometimes determined to a particular meaning by what it is joined with: as order of *time*, order of *situation*, order of *dignity*, order of *nature*, order of *conception*, order of *existence*, order of *causality*, order of *dominion*, and the like. But then *order* is also frequently used *simply* and *absolutely*, without any thing further to determine or specify its signification: and thus it hath been *anciently*[q], as well as in later times, made use of in our present subject. Thus far then, I hope, it may be very excusable to use the word *order* in this subject *simply* and *absolutely*. If any word is to be put to it, to make the sense more *special*, I admit order of *conception*, with Tertullian[r]; or order of *existence*, as the Son exists *of* and *from* the Father: which may be likewise called order of *causality*[s], in the old sense of *causality* respecting emanative *necessary* causes. That I did not use the word *order* without a *meaning*, may appear from the very passages which this writer quotes from me, p. 34, though he is pleased to call them *empty words*; as every thing here is *empty* with him that carries not in it his crude conceptions about *natural dominion*. His argument to prove them *empty*, being founded on nothing but his own shufflings and mistakes, is answered above, p. 31.

[q] Λέγοντας Θεὸν πατέρα, καὶ υἱὸν Θεὸν, καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, δεικνύντας αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσιν. *Athenag. Legat.* cap. 10.

Ὁ υἱὸς τάξει μὲν δεύτερος τοῦ πατρὸς, ὅτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου· καὶ ἀξιώματι ὅτι ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία, τῷ, εἶναι αὐτοῦ πατέρα, καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτοῦ ἡ πρόσοδος καὶ προσαγωγὴ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα· φύσει δὲ οὐκέτι δεύτερος, διότι ἡ θεότης ἐν ἑκατέρῳ μία. *Basil. contr. Eunom.* lib. iii. p. 272. ed. Bened. See my Second Defence, in relation to this passage, vol. ii. p. 646, 723, 751.

Ἔστι τι τάξεως εἶδος, οὐκ ἐκ παρ' ἡμῶν θέσεως συνιστάμενον, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίᾳ συμβαῖνον, ὡς τῷ πυρὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐστι τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ——τίνος οὖν ἕνεκεν ἀθετεῖ τὴν τάξιν ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λαμβάνεσθαι;——ἡμεῖς δὲ, κατὰ μὲν τὴν τῶν αἰτίων πρὸς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν σχέσιν, προτετάχθαι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα φαμέν· &c. *Basil.* l. i. p. 232.

[r] Principaliter determinatur ut *prima Persona*, quæ ante Filii nomen erat proponenda, quia *Pater* ante cognoscitur, et post Patrem Filius nominatur. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. 18.

[s] Nihil plane differt in substantia, quia verus Filius est: differt tamen *causalitatis* gradu; quia omnis potentia a Patre in Filio est: et in substantia minor non est Filius; *auctoritate* tamen major est Pater. *Auct. Quæst. utr. Testam. apud August. Quæst.* 122.

The meaning however of *order*, in this case, may be thus intelligibly set forth to the meanest capacity.

While we consider the *scale* of persons from God the *Father* down to *man*, or ascending from *man* up to God the Father, he is the *first* in the scale from whom all things *descend;* and he is the *last*, in the way of *ascent*, in whom all things *terminate*. The Father by the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* conveys all his blessings to his *creatures;* and his creatures in the *Holy Ghost* and by the *Son* ascend up to the *Father*. Such is the *scale* of existences, such the *order* of things: and this, I hope, is intelligible enough.

If it be next inquired what the *foundation* of this *order* is, and why the *Father*, if but *equal* in nature to the *Son* or *Holy Ghost*, shall yet be at the top of all, and stand *first;* we have this to say, that both the parts are *true* and *certain;* and that the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, though in nature *equal*, are yet *referred up* to the Father as their *head* and *source*, because *of him* and *from him*, in a mysterious and inscrutable manner, they both are. The Father is *from none;* they *from the Father*. This is the Catholic doctrine[t], and as old as Christianity itself, so far as we can find in the primitive records: all acknowledging (conformable to Scripture) this *order*, and reference of the *Son* and *Holy Ghost up* to the *Father*, and at the same time asserting their *consubstantiality, coeternity, necessary existence, equality* of *nature*, and *unity* of *Godhead*.

If our *ideas* of this eternal reference of one Person up to another be no more than *general* and *confuse*, not full and adequate; what wonder is it that we should find it so in a subject so sub-

[t] Πᾶσα δὲ τοῦ κυρίου ἐνέργεια ἐπὶ τὸν παντοκράτορα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει, καὶ ἔστιν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, πατρική τις ἐνέργεια ὁ υἱός. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* 7.

Ἡνῶσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη τῷ Θεῷ τῶν ὅλων τὸν θεῖον Λόγον· ἐμφιλοχωρεῖν δὲ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι δεῖ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. ἤδη καὶ τὴν θείαν τριάδα εἰς ἕνα, ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφήν τινα, τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαί τε καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. *Dionys. Roman. ap. Athan.* vol. i. p. 231.

Φύσις δὲ τοῖς τρισὶ μία Θεός. ἕνωσις δὲ ὁ πατὴρ, ἐξ οὗ, καὶ πρὸς ὃν ἀνάγεται τὰ ἑξῆς. *Gregor. Nazianz. Orat.* xxxii. p. 520.

Θεὸς δὲ ἐξαιρέτως λέγεται, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἕνωσις, ἤτοι ἀνάπτυξις, καὶ ἀνακεφαλαίωσις τῆς τριάδος ὁ πατήρ ἐστι ὡς εἶπεν ὁ θεολόγος. *Theod. Abucar. ap. Petavium, Trin.* lib. iv. cap. 15. p. 262.

"This origination in the divine "Paternity hath anciently been looked "upon as the assertion of the unity: "and therefore the Son and Holy "Ghost have been believed to be but "*one God with the Father*, because "both *from* the Father, who is *one*, "and so the *union* of them." *Pearson on the Creed*, p. 40. See also my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 417, 516, 767.

lime! Is it not the tremendous *substance* or *essence* of the *Divine* Being that we are here considering? And who is sufficient for these things? Let any man try the utmost stretch of his capacity, in any thing else immediately pertaining to the *divine substance*; and he will soon perceive how short and defective all his *ideas* are. He cannot tell us *what* it is, nor whereunto we may *liken* or *compare* it: cannot say *how* it is *present* every where, or *how* it *acts* any where. Every thing belonging thereto, as *simplicity, infinity, eternity, necessary existence*[u], is all dark and mysterious: we see but "through a glass darkly," and cannot "see God as "he is." It may therefore become these gentlemen to be a little more *modest*, and less *positive* in these *high* matters; and not to insult us, in their manner, as teaching a *collocation of words*, or an *order* of *empty* words; only because we cannot give them, what we cannot have, full and adequate *ideas* of the *mysterious* order and relation of the *blessed Three*, one among another. We might as reasonably object to them an *eternity* of *words*, or an *omnipresence* of *words*, a *verbal ubiquity, simplicity, infinity*, and the like, as often as we perceive that they are not able to give us more than *general, confuse*, and *inadequate* conceptions of those things.

Such is our answer, such our just defence, after attending to every *consequence* the adversary can object, and after suffering it, in the way of fair debate, to be run up to the utmost height. We acknowledge God's *essence* to be *inscrutable*, as did the ancient Catholics in the same cause, against the Eunomians; who finding themselves thereby pinched, had no way left but to put on a bold face, and flatly to deny the *incomprehensibility* of God's *essence*[x]. If their successors at this day are of the same mind, let them speak out. It should be observed how differently our adversaries here behave, from what we do when pursued with *consequences*. They deny the *necessary existence* of God the Son. Run them down but to the next *immediate* consequence, *precarious* existence, and they are amazed and confounded: and instead of frankly admitting the *consequence*, they fall to doubling, shifting, equivocating, in a most childish manner, to *disguise* a difficulty which they cannot *answer*[y]. Push them a little further, as making a *creature* of God the Son; and they fall to blessing

[u] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 456, &c.

[x] Ibid. p. 452.

[y] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 545.

themselves upon it. They make the Son a *creature*? No, not they; God forbid. And they will run you on whole pages, to shew how many *quirks* they can invent to avoid giving him the *name* of *creature*, and at the same time to assert the *thing*. Carry the *consequence* a little lower, till their whole scheme begins to shew itself more and more repugnant to the *tenor of Scripture* and all Catholic antiquity; and then what do these gentlemen do, but shut their eyes and stop their ears: they do not understand a word you say; they will not be answerable for *consequences*; they never taught such things, nor think them fit to be *mentioned*. This is their way of management, as often as we go about to pursue the *consequences* of their scheme down as far as they can go; at the same time that we suffer them to exhaust all their *metaphysics*, in drawing any imaginable consequences against the Catholic doctrine, and both attend to them, and answer them, with all Christian fairness, openness, and sincerity[z]. The meanest reader may here see, by this different conduct, where *truth*, where *integrity*, where *reason* is, and where it is not: *truth* does not use to shun the *light*; nor is it any sign of a *good cause* to want so much *art* and *colouring*. And let it not be pretended, that all this shuffling and disguise is only to screen their sentiments from the *popular odium*, and themselves from public *censure*: there may be something in that; and so far perhaps their conduct may appear the more excusable. But there is certainly more in it than that comes to; because the same men can, upon occasion, discover their *low* sentiments of *God* the *Son* very freely[a]; and it is chiefly when they are pressed in dispute, and when they see plainly how hard an argument bears upon them, from *Scripture* and *antiquity*, that they have recourse to *evasion* and *disguise*, and refuse to speak out[b]. But to proceed.

X. "The Doctor frequently appeals from reason and Scrip-
" ture to *authority*. When his argument is reduced to an ex-
" press contradiction, a contradiction in itself, as well as to
" Scripture, then he alleges that the thing he contends for must
" be so *upon the principles of the primitive churches*, (Second De-
" fence, vol. ii. p. 478.) meaning, that it must be so upon his
" own *hypothesis*." *Observations*, p. 115.

[z] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 644, 645.

[a] See a collection of passages in my Supplement to the Case, &c. vol. ii. p. 318, &c.

[b] See instances in the Reply, p. 45, 175, 223, 224, 237, 319, 323, 339, 343, 347, 402.

Let the reader see my words, upon which this gentleman makes his tragical exclamation.

"One substance with one Head cannot make two Gods upon "the principles of the primitive churches: nor are your *meta-* "*physics* strong enough to bear up against their united testimo- "nies, with *Scripture* at the head of them." How is this appealing from *Scripture* to *authority*? So far am I from it, that in another place[c], while I commend the *ancients* for their way of solving the *unity*, as taking the best that human wit could invent or rest upon, yet I declare at the same time, that there is no necessity at all for shewing *how* the three are one: it is sufficient that *Scripture* bears testimony to the *fact*, that so it is; we are not obliged to say *how*. And there also I obviate what this writer here pretends, in his vain confidence of *boasting*, as if he was able to do great things in the way of *natural* reason; by observing that the *adversary* can do nothing in this case, unless he be able to shew (which is impossible) that "no unity what- "ever can be sufficient to make more Persons than one, *one* "*Being, one Substance, one God.*"

XI. "When an argument is worked up to the evidence even "of an *identical* proposition, (which is the essence of demonstra- "tion,) then, *it is contrary* (he says) *to the sentiments of* wiser "*men, who have argued the other way.*" *Observations*, p. 87, 115.

It is very true that I preface my answer to some big pretences of theirs with the words here recited[d]. I suppose the great offence is in reminding them that there have been men *wiser* than they are. As to the *identical* proposition, the *demonstration* here talked of, I shew in the same place[e] that it is built upon nothing but the *equivocal* meaning of *sameness*. Reduce it to *syllogism*, and it will be found a *sophism* with *four terms* in it.

In page the 87th, arguing against the supposition of powers derived and underived being the *same*, he says, "If it were "possible, it would follow, that the supreme power of all, the "power of begetting, or deriving being and powers down to "another, would be no power at all." That is to say, if the *essential* powers of the Godhead be the *same*, then the *personal properties* are lost. But I humbly conceive, that as *union* of

[c] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 433. 434. Compare First Defence, vol. i. p. 464, 465.

[d] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 543. Compare p. 556, 557.

[e] Ibid. p. 543, 544.

substance accounts for the one, the *distinction* of *persons* may account for the other: and this *supreme power* of deriving, &c. amounts to nothing more than a *mode* of existing, or a *relation* of order[f].

N. B. The supreme power of *begetting*, which the author here speaks of, means with him nothing more nor less than the supreme power of *creating*; which is plainly his sense of *begetting*, as may appear from what hath been observed above, p. 24.

XII. "Again, when two very different assertions are affirmed "not to be the same assertion, then he asks, *how do you know?* "Or, *how came you to be wiser in this particular than all the* "*Christian churches early or late?* Who yet never affirmed two "such different assertions to be the same assertion; and if they "had affirmed it, still the assertions would not have been the "same." *Observations*, p. 119.

Let my words appear; [g] "You add, that making *one substance*, "is not making *one God*: to which it is sufficient to say, How "do you know? &c." The thing here maintained is, that upon the principles of the *primitive* and *modern* churches, if the three Persons be *one substance*, they are of consequence *one God*. The assertions in this case are equivalent and tantamount. This is the plain avowed doctrine of the Church ever since the term *substance* came in. They that impugn this doctrine ought first to confute it, if they can. Sometimes indeed I express this primitive doctrine by *one substance* with *one head*, for greater distinction: but *one substance* implies *both*, because the notion of *headship* is taken in with the *union* of substance, as rendering the union *closer*, and making the substance more perfectly *one*[h].

XIII. "When he is told, that it is great presumptuousness "to call the particularities of his own explication, *the doctrine of* "*the blessed Trinity; then he cries out, Great presumption indeed!* "*to believe that the Catholic Church has kept the true faith*; which "are the very words, and the very argument wherewith the "writers of the Church of Rome perpetually insult, and will for "ever *with justice* insult, over all such protestants as endeavour "to discourage all serious inquiry," &c.

This writer, to introduce his weak reflection, is forced to cut

[f] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 545.

[g] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 626.

[h] See above, p. 26.

off part of my sentence, which runs thus: ——" kept the true " faith, while Eunomians and Arians made shipwreck of it." This shews that I was speaking of the Catholic Church justly so called, of the *primitive* times, and before Popery was in being; which observation would have entirely prevented his *sarcasm*, or have discovered the impertinence of it. As to the Church of Rome, I desire no *better*, no *other* argument against her, than the *same* I make use of against the Arians, viz. *Scripture* interpreted by *primitive* and *Catholic* tradition. Down falls *Popery* and *Arianism* too, as soon as ever this principle is admitted. But this author, I conceive, was a little too liberal to Popery, or did not know what he was talking of, when he presumed to intimate, that the *writers of the Church of Rome* can, *with justice*, insult us on that head. I hope it was a slip, and he will retract it when he comes to consider. But here again his *eagerness* overcame him, and carried him too far.

XIV. " It had been alleged, that he who never acts in subjec- " tion, &c.——and every other person *always* acts in subjection to " his will, is *alone* the supreme Governor. In reciting this argu- " ment twice, Dr. Waterland does twice omit the word *always*, in " which the stress of the argument lies." *Observations*, p. 24.

In *abridging*, not *reciting*, the argument, I omitted the word *always*; having indeed no suspicion that any *stress* at all could be laid upon it, but thinking rather that it had been carelessly or thoughtlessly put in by the author. If the *stress* of the argument lies there, the argument is a very poor one, being grounded only upon a *presumption* of a *fact* that can never be proved. I allow indeed, if God the Son antecedently to the *economy*, and *before the world was*, acted in *subjection* to the Father, that then the argument will have some force in it: but as I very well knew that the author never had, never could prove any such thing; so I could not suspect him to be so weak a man as to lay the *stress* of the argument there. I insist upon it, that millions and millions of ages, an eternity, *a parte ante*, had preceded, before ever the Son or Holy Ghost are introduced as acting in *subjection*. Let the author disprove this, and he will do something. I have read of the *glory* which our Lord had with the Father *before the world was*: but never heard any thing of his *then* acting in *subjection* to him: wherefore it does not appear that he *always* did it.

XV. " There is no argument in which Dr. Waterland is more

" *insolent*, or with *less reason*, than in this which follows. There " are, he thinks, as great *difficulties* in his adversary's notion of " the *divine omnipresence*, as there are in his notion of many " equally supreme (*in nature*) independent Persons, constituting " one supreme Governor or Monarch of the universe.——Upon " this *weak* comparison he seems to build all his *hopes*——and " yet the whole of the comparison is as entirely *impertinent*, as " if a man should pretend that to him there are as great difficul- " ties in conceiving *immensity or eternity*, as in conceiving *tran-* " *substantiation*," &c. *Observations*, p. 95.

How *just*, how *civil*, how *pertinent* this representation is, will appear, when I shall have given the reader a true and faithful account of this whole matter from the beginning, which is as follows:

In the year 1704, Dr. Clarke, then but a young man, published his Demonstration (as he is pleased to call it) of the Being and Attributes of God: in which work, not content with the common arguments for the existence, *a posteriori*, he strikes a note higher, and aims at a proof *a priori*; which every man of sense besides knows to be *contradictious* and *impossible*, though he was not aware of it. However, to countenance his pretended Demonstration, he laid hold of the ideas of *immensity* and *eternity*, as *antecedently* forcing themselves upon the minds of all men: and his notion of the divine *immensity* is, that it is infinite *expansion*, or infinite *space*, requiring an infinitely expanded *substratum*, or *subject*; which subject is the very *substance* of God, so expanded. Upon this *hypothesis*, there will be substance and substance, *this* substance and *that* substance, and yet but one *numerical, individual, identical* substance in the whole. *This* part will be one individual identical substance with *that* part: and a thousand several parts will not be so many *substances*, (though every one be *substance*,) but all will be *one substance*. This is Dr. Clarke's avowed doctrine: he sees the consequence, he owns it; as may appear from his own words[i], in answer to the objection. And he must of course admit, that the one individual substance is both one in *kind*, in regard to the distinct parts, and one in

[i] " No matter is *one substance*, but " a heap of substances. And that I " take to be the reason why matter is " a subject incapable of thought, not " because it is *extended*, but its parts " are distinct *substances*, ununited, " and independent on each other: " which (I suppose) is not the case of " *other* substances." *Clarke's Answer to the Sixth Letter*, p. 40.

number also, in regard to the *union* of these parts in the whole. Upon these principles does the Doctor's famed Demonstration of the *existence* proceed; and upon these does it now stand.

I must next observe, that the same Dr. Clarke, in the year 1712, was disposed to publish, and did publish, a very ill book against the received faith of the Church; which he entitled, The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity. He made a pompous show of *texts*, and pretended much to *antiquity* also: but as many as could look through the surface, and penetrate into the work, easily saw that the main strength of his performance rested upon two or three *philosophical* principles, by virtue whereof he was to turn and wrest *Scripture*, and *Fathers* too, to such a sense as he wished for; that is, to the Arian hypothesis. Among his *philosophical* principles, the most considerable of all, and which he oftenest retreated to in distress[k], was this; that the defenders of the *received* doctrine, whenever they should come to explain, must inevitably split either upon *Sabellianism* or *Tritheism*: which presumption he grounded upon this reasoning; that the three Persons must be either *specifically* one, (one substance in *kind* only, while three substances in *number*,) which is *Tritheism*: or else they must be *individually* one substance, one in *number* in the strictest sense, which is plain *Sabellianism*. Which reasoning at length resolves into this principle; that *substance* and *substance*, however united, must always and inevitably make *substances*; and that there cannot possibly be such a thing as *one substance* in *number* and in *kind* too at the same time.

And now it could not but be pleasant enough to observe the Doctor and his friends confuting the Atheists upon this principle, that substance and substance *united* does not make *substances*, and at the same time confuting the Trinitarians upon the contrary supposition. Against Atheists, there might be substance one in *kind* and *number* too: but against the Trinitarians it is downright nonsense and contradiction. Against Atheists, union shall be sufficient to make *sameness*, and *numerical* substance shall be understood with due latitude: but against Trinitarians, the tables shall be turned; *union* shall not make *sameness*, and no sense of *numerical* substance shall serve here but what shall be the very reverse of the other. In a word, the *affirmative* shall serve the Doctor in one cause, and the *negative* in the other:

[k] See my First and Second Defence, Query xxii. vol. i. and ii.

and the self-same principle shall be evidently *true* there, and demonstrably *false* here, to support two several *hypotheses*.

I had observed the thing long ago, before I published a syllable in the controversy: and that I might be the better satisfied, discoursed it sometimes over with friends; which still confirmed me the more in it. Having tried the thing every way, and being secure of that point, a point upon which the main cause, as I easily foresaw, would at length turn, I then proceeded to engage those gentlemen: and as often as they have been retreating to their dilemma about *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*, (their impregnable fortress as they esteemed it,) I have objected to them their *self-contradiction* and *inconsistency*[1]; have retorted upon them their *own* avowed doctrine in another cause; have reminded them of their *former* (their *present*) sentiments in that article, and have sometimes pretty smartly taxed their notorious *prevarication* and *partiality* in the cause of the Trinity; while they insist upon principles here as of undoubted certainty, though they *believe not* a word of them, though they really *disbelieve* them in any cause else. For this I am called *insolent* by the meek and modest Observator: and by the judicious Author of the Remarks my conduct herein has been censured as *ridiculous* and *monstrous*[m]: by which I perceive, that the men are stung somewhere or other, and have sense enough to know when they are *hurt*; but have not learned how to *bear* it. One tells me, that I build *almost all my hopes* upon this discovery: another intimates, how *happily* for me my adversaries had *advanced* their *notion*, because otherwise I should *have had nothing at all to say*[n]. It is a great favour in them to allow that I have *something* at last: let us now examine what *they* have to say: I will reduce it to heads, for distinction sake.

1. They are sometimes inclinable to *disown* any such notion as I have charged upon them. The Author of the Remarks, being a *nameless* man, thinks he may safely say, that he "has "nothing to do with that notion, one way or other[o]." And even the *writer* whom I am now concerned with says, that "it is "by mere conjecture only that Dr. Waterland has taken it to "be his opinion at all[p]." If it be Dr. Clarke that says this, his

[1] See First Defence, vol. i. p. 371, 372, 374, 446, 448, 479. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 423, 433, 539, 625, 646, 689, 697, 698, 708, 709, 713, 714.

[m] Remarks on Dr. Waterland's Second Defence, p. 38.

[n] Remarks, p. 36.

[o] Ibid. p. 14.

[p] Observations, p. 100.

own books confute him: if Mr. Jackson, he *knows* that I am perfectly well acquainted with his real and full sentiments in that question. However, if Dr. Clarke's friends *meanly* desert him here, and in a point too on which his famed Demonstration very much depends; I will endeavour to do the Doctor justice *so far*, and shall not suffer him to be run down in a *right* thing, however I may blame him when I find him *wrong*.

2. Sometimes they complain of me as very unfair to take an advantage of an opinion of *theirs*, and to plead it as *true*, at the same time that I myself judge it to be *erroneous* and *false*[q]. But this is gross misrepresentation. I plead nothing but what I take to be very *true*; namely, that substance and substance in *union* does not always make *substances*; which is Dr. Clarke's doctrine as well as mine; and, if true against Atheists, cannot be *false* against the Trinitarians. Indeed, I do not admit (at least, I *doubt of*) their *hypothesis* about God's *expanded* substance: but their general principle of *union* being sufficient to make *sameness*, and of *united* substance, in things immaterial, being *one substance*, this I heartily close in with, and make no question of its *truth* and *certainty*.

3. They sometimes plead that, at best, this is only *argumentum ad hominem*[r], and that it is therefore mean to insist upon it. Let them then first condemn Dr. Clarke for leading me into it: and when they have done, I will defend the Doctor, *so far*, by the concurring verdict of the whole *Christian world*, by the maxims of *common sense*, and by the prevailing *custom* of speech, which never gives the name of *substances* to any thing, but where the substance is *separate*, or *separable*. And I will further plead, that upon the hypothesis of *extension* this principle must be true; or else there is no such thing as *one substance*, or *one being*, in the world[s]. Further, if I had not such plain and cogent reasons for the truth of this principle; yet since I am here upon the *defensive* only, and am warding off an *objection*, I have a right to *suppose* it *true*, till my adversaries can prove the *contrary*. All these considerations put together are more than enough to answer the pretence of my arguing *ad hominem*.

4. They add further, that their explication of the *omnipresence* is not exactly *parallel* to my notion of the Trinity[t]. Nor did I

[q] See the Remarks, p. 37, &c.
[r] Ibid. p. 13.
[s] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 622, 623, 708.
[t] Remarks, p. 38.

ever pretend that it was *exactly parallel:* I have myself particularly shewn[u] wherein and how far the two cases differ. But, forasmuch as *both* agree in one *general* principle, (which was all that I wanted, and all that I insisted upon,) that substance in *union* with substance does not necessarily make *substances*, they are *so far* parallel: and so long as this principle stands its ground, (which will be as long as *common* sense shall stand,) so long will the *received* doctrine of the *Trinity* stand clear of the most important and most prevailing objection that *metaphysics* could furnish: and the boasted pretence of *no medium* between *Sabellianism* and *Tritheism*, which has been in a manner the *sole* support, the *last* refuge both of Socinians and Arians, is entirely routed and baffled by it. *Hinc illæ lacrymæ*, &c. that I may use now and then a scrap of Latin, as well as our Observator. I pass over several remarks of his, relating to this article, because now the reader will perceive how wide they are of the point in hand; and that they are only the uneasy struggles of a man fast bound and fettered; bearing it with great regret, and very desirous, if possible, to *conceal* it; though he *shews* it so much the more, by the laborious pains he spends upon it.

XVI. "What I suppose the Doctor more strictly means— "is this; that if, from the highest titles given to Christ in Scrip- "ture, he cannot prove the Son to be naturally and necessarily "the God supreme over all; then neither can we, from the "highest titles given to the Father in Scripture, prove him to "be naturally and necessarily the God supreme over all, so as to "have no one above or superior to him in dominion." *Observat.* p. 110.

This *representation* of the case is pretty fair in the main, had but the author in his further process kept close to it, and made no change in it. My argument was this[x]; that Dr. Clarke and his friends, by their artificial elusions of every text brought for the *divinity* of God the Son, had marked out a way for eluding any text that could be brought for the *divinity* of God the Father. To make this plain, let it be premised, (as granted on both sides,) that there is discoverable, by the light of reason, the existence of some eternal, immutable, necessarily existing God: and now the question will be, how we prove from *Scripture* that any particular Person there mentioned is the

[u] First Defence, vol. i. p. 372. 341. Second Defence, vol. ii. p.
[x] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 565, &c.

eternal God, whose existence is proved by *reason*. We urge in favour of God the Son, that he is *God*, according to Scripture in the true and full meaning of the word; therefore he is the *eternal God*, and has no God above him. We urge that he is *Jehovah*, which implies *necessary existence*; therefore, again, he is the *eternal God*, who has no God above him. We plead further, that he is properly *Creator*, since the "heavens are "the works of his hands, &c." therefore again he is the *eternal God*, who has no God above him. We further urge, that he is "over all, God blessed for ever," Rom. ix. 5. And παντοκράτωρ, *Almighty*, or *God over all*, who "is, and was, and is to come," Rev. i. 8.[y] which expressing *necessary existence*, and supreme dominion too, proves further that he is the *eternal God*, &c. The same thing we prove from several *titles*, and *attributes*, and *honours*, being all so many marks and characters of the one true and eternal God. These proofs of the Son's divinity are at the same time applicable to the Father, and so are proofs of the *eternal* divinity both of Father and Son. Now to come to our *Arianizing* gentlemen: they have found out ways and means, artifices, colours, quibbles, distinctions, to elude and frustrate them all. *God* is a word of *office* only[z], not *substance: Jehovah* means only one *faithful to his promises*[a]: παντοκράτωρ, *God over all*, and the like, may bear a *subordinate* sense[b]. Every *title* or *attribute* assigned may admit of a *limited* construction. Well then: what remains to prove the *eternal Godhead* of the Person of the *Father* against any Marcionite, or other heretics that should assert another God *superior* to him? Here is the pinch of the present argument. This gentleman in answer asks, "Does "he by whom God created all things claim as much to be the "first cause of all things, as he that created all things by him? "Does he who came not to do his own will, but the will of him "that sent him, claim as much to have no superior, as he whose "will he was sent to fulfil?" And he has more to the same purpose. To which I answer, that when all the proofs before mentioned of the Son's having no God above him are set aside, I allow that there would remain but very weak and slender presumptions of the Son's being *equal* to the Father, or of his

[y] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 537, 538. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 141, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 562, &c.

[z] Clarke's Reply, p. 110, 200, 301. Scripture Doctrine, p. 296. ed. 1st.

[a] Collection of Queries, p. 19.

[b] Reply, p. 159.

having no God *above* him. But suppose (for argument sake) the Son thus proved to be *inferior* to the *Father*, when the texts before mentioned are all set aside; next shew, that the *eternal God*, known by the light of reason, is not, or may not be, another God *above* them *both*. What I assert is, that the same *elusions*, at least the *same kind* of elusions, will serve to frustrate every argument that has been or can be brought. Let us try the experiment upon those which this gentleman (after the last straining and racking of invention) has been able to produce. He builds his main hopes and confidence upon 1 Cor. viii. 6. "To "us there is one God, the Father, of whom are all things." To which a Marcionite may make answer, that *to us* may not signify to the *whole compass of beings;* neither is there any necessity of interpreting *all things* in an *unlimited* sense, when it may very well bear a *limited* one. And supposing *of whom are all things* (that is, *some* things) to be meant of *creating;* yet since the work of *creating* is allowed not to prove the *essential* divinity of the *Creator*, here is nothing done still. The words *one God* prove nothing: for *God* being a word of *office*, it means little more than *one King*, or *one Ruler*. And so the whole amounts to this only, that to *us* of *this earth*, *this system*, there is *one Ruler*, who made all things in it. How does this prove that our *Ruler* is the *eternal* and *necessarily existing* God? The like may be said of Eph. iv. 6. *One Ruler* over this system, supreme King over *all the earth*, above all, and through all, and in all *that belong to it*. The last thing the gentleman has to offer is, that this *Ruler* claims to have no other *God above him*. This is not without its weight and force, though it has not a tenth part of the force of those arguments I have above mentioned, and which this gentleman knows how to *elude*. By a *little straining*, (as this writer knows how to *strain much* upon occasion,) this may be interpreted in a *subordinate* and *limited* sense, to signify *supreme* in these *his* dominions, having no rulers *here* to control or command him, or, no God of *this kind*, (that is, God by *office* only,) which does not exclude any God of *another* kind, the supreme God of the universe: for it would be *improper to say, that the supreme God has an office*[c]. It is not therefore proved, that there may not be, above him, another God; who is really and truly, and in the *metaphysical* sense, the *eternal* and *necessarily existing* God. This

[c] See Reply, p. 220.

gentleman adds, speaking still of the *Father*, that he is *sent by none*, receives power and authority *from none*, acts by *no one's commission*, fulfils *no one's will*. It is true, it is not said that he is sent by *any*, or receives power from *any* one: and this may afford a probable presumption in favour of his being absolutely without any *superior*, and be as good a proof of it, as a mere *negative* proof can be. But as this is not said, so neither is the *contrary*; or if it were, it might bear a *limited* construction, so that the demonstration at length appears lame and defective.

I should have been very sorry to engage in an argument of this kind, but to convince some persons of the great imprudence, as well as impiety, of throwing aside so many clear, solid, and substantial proofs, which the holy Scripture affords, of the *eternal* divinity of God the *Father*, and resting it at last upon so weak and so precarious a bottom; at the same time introducing such a *wanton* way of eluding and frustrating the plainest texts, that it looks more like burlesquing Scripture, than commenting upon it. I heartily beseech all well-disposed persons to beware of that *pride* of pretended *reason*, and that *levity* of *spirit*, which daily paves the way for *infidelity*, and a contempt of all *religion*; which has spread visibly, and been productive of very ill effects, ever since this new sect has risen up amongst us.

XVII. "The Doctor cannot possibly express *his* (*notion*) in "any words of Scripture: and, when called upon to do it, he "has only this *jesting* answer to make, *Do you imagine that I* "*cannot as easily, or more easily, find Scripture words for mine?* "*But this is trifling*[d]. And again: *You blame me for not ex-* "*pressing my faith in any* Scripture position: *as if every thing I* "*assert as matter of faith were not as much* Scripture position, *ac-* "*cording to my way of understanding Scripture, as yours is to you*[e], "&c.——Undoubtedly it is just as much so; that is, not at all. "For neither one man's nor another man's interpretation, or "way of understanding Scripture, is at all a Scripture position: "but the *texts themselves only are* Scripture positions, with which "no man's interpretation can without the greatest presump- "tuousness be equalled." *Observations*, p. 113.

The *civility* and the *sense* of this worthy passage are both of

[d] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 706. where I add, "Why have you not "laid down your doctrine in *Scripture* "*words*, that I might compare it with "the Doctor's *propositions*, to see how "far they exceed, or come short?"

[e] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 694.

a piece. Why is my answer called a *jesting* answer? I never was more *serious*, nor ever said a thing with better *reason*, than when I called that pretence *trifling*. If nothing will satisfy but *exposing* his weak reasoning at full length, it must be done.

1. In the first place, what has he gained by giving us the *whole of his notion* (as he calls it) in the *very words* of Scripture? The words are, "one Spirit; one Lord; one God and Father "of all, who is above all." Had Dr. Clarke done no more than cited these words, could any man have ever known the *whole of his notion*, or ever suspected him to be an Arian? His *propositions* and *replies* are the things that contain the *whole* of his notion, and not these words, which do not contain it.

2. Again, let but a Socinian understand these words as *he* pleases, and they may as well contain the *whole* of his *notion*. A Sabellian will tell you the same. I shall not despair, *reserving* to myself my own construction, of maintaining my claim also, and making the same words contain the *whole* of my notion. Well then, here will be four *different* or *contrary* positions, and all of them *Scripture positions*, to their respective patrons and abettors. What must we do now? Oh, says the Arian, but *mine* is the *Scripture position*, (for it is in the *very words* of *Scripture*,) yours is *interpretation*. Ridiculous, says the Socinian; are not my words the very *same* with yours, and as good Scripture as yours? I tell you, yours is *interpretation*, and mine only is the *Scripture position*. Hold, I beseech you, gentlemen, says a Sabellian, or any Athanasian, why do you exclude me? I tell you, the words contain *my notion* to a tittle, and they are *Scripture words*; mine therefore is the *Scripture position*.

Now if this writer can end the dispute any other way than by shewing whose is the *best interpretation* of the four, and by admitting that *best interpretation* for the only *Scripture position*; he shall have the reputation of a shrewd man, and the honour of being the author of that sage maxim, that *texts themselves only are Scripture positions*.

3. I cannot help observing further, what a fine handle he has here given for such as adhere to the *letter*, in any instance, against the *sense* of Scripture. For the *letter*, in such a case, upon this gentleman's principles, must pass for the *Scripture position*: and the other being *interpretation* only, or drawn out by *reason* and argument, must not be *equalled* with it, under pain and peril of *presumptuousness*. The Quakers must thank him highly. "Swear

" not at all," say they: Can there be ever a plainer *Scripture position*? Can the opposite party bring any text like it? Can they express their *notion* in *Scripture words* like these? No: their notion can be reckoned only as *interpretation*, and must never be set against a plain *Scripture position*.

An Anthropomorphite will insult over his adversary on the same foot. He will produce many and plain texts, where God is represented with *eyes*, *ears*, *face*, *heart*, *hands*, or *feet*. There are no texts so plain on the other side. The plainest is where it is said, *God is* πνεῦμα, which yet is capable of divers constructions, and every one is only *interpretation*, never to be *equalled* with *Scripture position*.

The Apollinarians, or other heretics, will insult. "The Word " was made flesh:" was *made*, not *took upon him*; and *flesh*, not *man*. They will challenge their adversaries to produce any text so plain on their side, and will value themselves, no doubt, upon the *Scripture position*; to which the *interpretation*, however just or necessary, must not be equalled.

To mention one more, the very Papists will assume upon it, and even in favour of *transubstantiation*. "This is my body," is a Scripture position: and, " Except ye eat the flesh of the " Son of man, and drink his blood, you have no life in you." Let any Protestant produce a *text*, if possible, as full and expressive of his *notion*, as these are of the other; or else let him confess that his is *interpretation* only, which is by no means to be *equalled* with *Scripture position*.

This gentleman is pleased to say, that *transubstantiation* has some colour in the " bare words of Scripture, though," as he adds, " none in the sense." But what is the *sense* till it be drawn out by *interpretation*? The *words*, according to him, are the *Scripture position*; to which no *interpretation* must be *equalled*.

To conclude this head; if this writer will understand by *Scripture position*, the *sense* and *meaning* of Scripture rightly *interpreted*, I shall readily prove to him that my main positions, in regard to the *ever blessed Trinity*, are all *Scripture positions*. But if he means any thing else, let him first answer the Quakers, the Anthropomorphites, the Apollinarians, and Papists, as to the texts alleged; and then we shall take care to answer him about Ephes. iv. 6. or any other *text* he shall please to produce.

He talks much of my putting my " own explications of a doc-

" trine, in the place of the doctrine to be explained;" and spends a whole *observation* upon it. He certainly aims at something in it; though I profess I cannnot well understand what: nor do I think that he himself *distinctly* knows what it is that he means. If he means, that I have put what I have collected from many *texts*, or from the *whole* tenor of *Scripture*, into a narrow compass, or into a *few words*, as *our Church*, as all Christian churches have done; I see no harm in it. If he means, that I substitute my *own doctrine* in the room of the *Church's* doctrine, or of the *Scripture doctrine*, I deny the *charge*, and leave him to prove it at leisure. If he means that I take upon me to call the *received doctrine* the *doctrine of the Trinity*, in opposition to his doctrine, which is not properly the doctrine of a *Trinity*[f], nor *true* doctrine, but *heresy*; I own the fact, and have said enough to justify it. And this gentleman will be hard put to it, to make good his pretended *parallel* between teaching this doctrine, and asserting *transubstantiation*; which is a calumny that he has twice repeated, p. 95, 112, and which he has borrowed from the Papists, though abundantly confuted long ago by learned and judicious hands[g].

XIX. This gentleman represents me (p. 63, 64, and 120.) as changing the word ἀγέννητος into ἀγένητος, in innumerable passages of ancient authors, without any pretence of *manuscripts*; nay, without *any pretence of authority* for so doing. This is great *misrepresentation*: and he is herein guilty at least of *fraudulently* concealing what I do pretend, and what *authority* I had for it. Let but my Second Defence be consulted[h], and it will there be seen, that I had *good reason*, and sufficient *authority*, even for correcting the manuscripts in relation to that *word*; shewing by an *historical deduction*, and *critical* reasons, what the reading ought to be, and what it *anciently* was: which is of much greater weight than the readings of manuscripts (supposing them to agree, which yet is doubtful) in an instance of this kind, where the copyists might so easily mistake, the difference being no more than that of a single or double *letter*. I laid down rules whereby to judge of the *readings* in this case. If this gentleman can either *confute* them, or give *better*, I shall stand corrected. In the mean while, he has been acting an

[f] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 689.

[g] See the Collection of Pamphlets relating to the Popish Controversy.

[h] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 572, &c.

ungenerous and *unrighteous* part, in the *representation* here given, and ought to make satisfaction to his readers for it.

CHAP. III.

Concerning the Author's Flouts, Abuses, declamatory Exclamations, Repartees, &c. in lieu of Answers.

WE shall meet with many instances of this kind in the course of his work: I shall point out some of them in order as they occur.

I. Page 9th, and 10th, to the solutions I had given of his great *objection*, wherein he pleads for a *natural* superiority of dominion over God the Son, and to what I had urged about the Father and Son mutually *glorifying* each other[i]; he is pleased only to say, "If any man who, to say no more, reads seriously "this chapter, (John xvii,) can believe this to be the doctrine of "Christ, I think it can be to no purpose to endeavour to con-"vince him of any thing."

He introduces these words, indeed, with some pretence to *reasoning*; though it is really made up of nothing else but his own shufflings and mistakes. I have never said that the Father *might not have disdained* to have been *incarnate*. He might, he could not but *disdain* to be so; because it was not *proper* nor *congruous* for the *Father*, or *first* Person, to condescend to it. And admitting that it was *possible* for him to have been *incarnate*; it does not follow that the Father could become a *Son*, or the Son *Father*; their relation to each other being *natural*, and *unalterable*.

II. Page the 13th, he is pleased to cite, imperfectly, my words wherein I answer and obviate[k] his pretences from 1 Cor. viii. 6. by reasons drawn from the context, and very plain ones. He tells us, instead of replying, that "the Doctor endeavours to "cover *the reader* with a thick dust of words, that have no sig-"nification;" and that it could scarce "have been believed, that "such a twist of unintelligible words should have dropped from

[i] Expostulatio *clarificationis* dandæ, vicissimque reddendæ, nec Patri quidquam adimit, nec infirmat Filium; sed *eandem divinitatis* ostendit in utroque *virtutem*; cum et clarificari se Filius a Patre oret, et clarificationem Pater non dedignetur a Filio. *Hilar.* p. 814.

[k] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 701.

" the pen of a serious writer." I am sorry for his slowness of apprehension: but I am persuaded rather, that he *understood* the *twist* of words too well to attempt any *answer*.

III. To the objection about the Son's *receiving* dominion, I had shewn[l], how both Father and Son may *receive* dominion, and *increase* of dominion; intimating that *dominion* is an *external relation* which may accrue to any of the *divine* Persons, and is no argument against their *equal* perfection. This gentleman turns it off by *misrepresentation*, (p. 16,) to this purpose; " As " if the Father's receiving the kingdom, &c. was as much an " argument of the Son's supremacy over the Father, as the " Son's receiving," &c. and concludes: " Was ever any thing so " ludicrous upon so important a subject?" Which is first making a ridiculous blunder of his *own*, and then, to shew still greater indecency and levity, beginning the *laugh* himself. I did not plead for any supremacy of the Son *over the Father*; but was shewing, that *economical* conveyance of dominion on one hand, or *economical* reception of dominion on the other, is no bar to *equality* of nature.

IV. To a reply made by me[m], about the sense of *exalting*, (Phil. ii. 9,) which sense I vindicated at large, and then asked, where now is there any appearance of absurdity? to this the author here returns me a *flout*, though in the words of an Apostle: " If any man be ignorant, let him be ignorant." This, he thinks, is the *only proper answer*, p. 19. The next time he is disposed to *jest*, or shew his *wit*, he should be advised to choose some other than *Scripture words* to do it in. I shall endeavour however, that he may not be *ignorant* hereafter, by taking care to inform him, that when I interpret *exalting* in such a sense as men *exalt* God, in opposition to another sense of *exalting* to an *higher* place or dignity, I could not be supposed to mean, that the Father is *inferior* to Christ, as men are *inferior* to God: it must be great *maliciousness* to insinuate that I had any such meaning. But as *inferiors* may exalt *superiors* in the sense of *extolling*, or *praising*; so undoubtedly may *equals* exalt *equals* in the same sense of *extolling*, or *praising*; and thus God the Father *exalted* his *coequal* Son.

V. Upon a remark of mine[n], or rather not *mine*, in relation to the construction of two Greek words, (εἰς δόξαν[o],) this gentle-

[l] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 445, 446. [m] Ibid. p. 549. [n] Ibid. p. 668. [o] Phil. ii. 11.

man, full of himself, breaks out into "wonder, that some men "of great abilities and great learning can never be made to "understand grammar[p]." These men that our *writer* so insults over, as not understanding *grammar*, are, we should know, such men as Beza, Grotius, Schmidius, and the top critics; who unanimously assert that εἰς is often put for ἐν, and some admit it even in this very text. This gentleman is pleased to deny that *one* is ever put for the *other*. I might very justly decline entering into that dispute, because, as it happens, our learned *grammarian* confirms the construction he finds fault with in this text, by the very instance brought to *confute* it; which, if it does not shew want of *grammar*, shews want of *thought*.

His words are: "If I mean to affirm that a man is in the "field, I can with equal propriety of speech say either that he is "ἐν ἀγρῷ, or εἰς ἀγρὸν, because the sense, in *this* case, happens "to be the same whether I say that he is *in* the field, or that "he is *gone*, or *carried*, *into* the field." Admitting this to be so, then I hope εἰς δόξαν may as well signify *in the glory*, because the sense, in *this* case, is the same, whether Christ be said to be *in* the glory, or *gone into* the glory; that glory which he had "before the world was," and into which he *reentered* after his passion and ascension, which is called "entering into his glory," Luke xxiv. 26. This is sufficient for me, in regard to the *text* I am concerned with.

As to this *author's new* rule of *grammar*, (which happens to do him no service,) I may leave it to the mercy of the *critics*; who perhaps may take it for a vain conceit in matter of *criticism*, as he has discovered *many*, both in *divinity* and *philosophy*: the same turn of mind will be apt to shew itself in like instances in all. I know not whether this gentleman will be able, upon the foot of his *new rule*, to give a tolerable account of the use of the preposition εἰς in such examples as here follow: εἰς τὸν κόλπον, John i. 18, εἰς ὃν εὐδόκησεν, Matt. xii. 18. εἰς ᾅδου, (suppl. οἶκον,) Acts ii. 31, εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων, Acts vii. 53, εἰς τὸ γῆρας, Gen. xxi. 2. He must suppose, at least, something understood (as in his other instance, *gone into*, or *carried into*,) beyond what is expressed, to make the *preposition* εἰς stand with *equal propriety*: and so he must solve by an *ellipsis* what others solve by a *change* of *prepositions*. Which at last is changing *one phrase* for *another*

[p] Observations, p. 20.

phrase, or using one *form* of *speech* instead of another which would be clearer and more expressive. To me it seems, that the easier and better account is that which our ablest *critics* hitherto have given; that one *preposition* or *particle* may be, and often is, *put for another:* which may be owing to several accidental causes among the different *idioms* of various languages borrowing one from another. To instance in *quia*, or *quoniam*, for *quod*, by a Grecism: for since it happens that ὅτι may sometimes signify this and sometimes that, these two renderings by degrees come to be used one for the other. The like might be observed in many other cases of the same kind: but I am not willing to weary the reader with *grammatical* niceties, of small importance to the point in hand.

VI. To an assertion of mine, namely, that there was no *impossibility*, in the nature of the thing itself, that the Father should be *incarnate*, (an assertion which all that have professed a *coequal* Trinity have ever held, and still hold,) only it is not so suitable or congruous to the *first* Person to have been so: to this the gentleman replies, "Do not the reader's ears tingle?" And he goes on *declaiming* for a whole page of *repetition*. This is the gentleman, who in his preface enters a *caveat* against making "applications to the passions of the ignorant;" as if he meant to engross the privilege entirely to *himself*.

VII. In the next page, (p. 29,) he seemed disposed to give some answer to an observation of mine, that by voluntary *economy* the exercise of powers *common* to *many* may devolve upon *one* chiefly, and run in his name[q]. After some fruitless labouring, as we may imagine, to make some *reply*, out comes a scrap of Latin, from an old comedy, *Quid est, si hæc contumelia non est?* which, if the reader pleases, he is to take for an *answer*.

VIII. From page 39th to 47th, this writer goes on declaiming about the supposed *absurdity* of the *Father's* appearing according to the *ancients*.

Bishop Bull[r], and after him, I have particularly, fully, and distinctly considered that whole matter, and have answered every thing that has been or can be brought in the way of *reason* or *argument*, against the *divinity* of God the Son from that topic[s]. Yet this writer, applying only to the *passions of the ignorant*, and

[q] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 686.

[r] Bull. D. F. sect. iv. c. 3. Breves Animadv. in Gilb. Cler. p. 1044, &c.

[s] Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 252. Second Def. vol. ii. p. 479 to 485.

roving in generals, displays his talent for eight or nine pages together. And among other Fathers, he is weak enough to bring St. Austin in, as voucher for the *absurdity* of the Father's being *sent, appearing*, &c. For verily, if St. Austin, who undoubtedly believed there was no *natural impossibility* [t], but only great *incongruity* in the thing, could yet use such a strong expression of it as *absurdissime* [u], what consequence can be drawn from the expressions of other *Fathers*, which scarce any of them come up to this? But St. Austin was professedly for the Father's *appearing*, and objects only against his being *sent;* which this writer seems not to know. I have remarked upon him before in relation to Tertullian in this very matter, nor need I add more [x].

IX. There is a sentence in my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 507, (repeated, in sense, p. 512, 513,) which has happened to fall under the displeasure of this gentleman. My words are:

"What has supremacy of office to do with the notion of supreme God? *God* is a word expressing *nature* and *substance:* "he is supreme God, or God supreme, that has no God of a "superior nature above him. Such is *Christ*, even while he "submits and condescends to act ministerially." To the former part of this passage we have the following smart repartee: "What has supremacy of office, or authority and dominion to "do with the notion of supreme man.—Is not *man* (in the same "way of reasoning) a word expressing nature and substance? "*Quam ridicule!*" p. 50. Now, for my part, I never heard of *supreme man. Man* is the word upon which the argument turns; for which reason I have thrown out *supreme King*, or *Governor*, as not pertinent. And as no supremacy of *office* can make one *man* more truly or more properly *man*, or man in a *higher* sense of the word *man;* so it seemeth to me that no supremacy of *office* can make God the Father more truly *God*, or God in a

[t] Solus Pater non legitur missus, quoniam solus non habet *auctorem* a quo genitus sit, vel a quo procedat. Et ideo non propter *naturæ diversitatem*, quæ in Trinitate nulla est, sed propter ipsam *auctoritatem*, solus Pater non dicitur *missus*. Non enim splendor, aut fervor ignem, sed ignis mittit sive splendorem, sive fervorem. *August. contr. Serm. Arian.* c. 4.

[u] Pater non dicitur missus; non enim habet de quo sit, aut ex quo procedat——si voluisset Deus Pater per subjectam creaturam visibiliter apparere, *absurdissime* tamen aut a Filio quem genuit, aut a Spiritu Sancto qui de illo procedit, *missus* diceretur. *August. de Trin.* lib. iv. c. 28, 32.

[x] See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 252. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 480, &c.

higher sense than is God the Son. There was no great reason for the gentleman's bursting out into merriment upon it, with his *quam ridicule:* but perhaps his infirmity, as usual, overcame him.

X. To a well known plea on our side, that God could not be God merely in the sense of *dominion*, having been God from everlasting, and before dominion commenced, the Observator thus speaks: "But is it in reality no character of dominion, "no *relative* character, to have in himself an essential power "from eternity to eternity, of producing what subjects he thinks "fit, and of destroying what subjects he thinks fit, and of pro-"ducing new subjects of his government at pleasure? Was ever "such trifling in serious matters?" Truly, I think not, if the last part be intended for an answer to the first; as any stranger might judge, who knows not that both come from the same hand. This gentleman is so taken up with *grammar*, it seems, that he has forgotten the first elements of *logic;* which will teach him that *relate* and *correlate* always rise and fall together. Where can the *relative* character be, while as yet there is supposed to exist but one *term* of *relation?* It is true, God can make to himself new *relations* by making new *creatures* when he pleases: but when he had as yet, for an *eternity* backwards, no relation to any *creature* at all, none being created, I humbly conceive he was under no such *relative* character, nor had any *dominion;* consequently could not be *God* in the sense of *dominion*[y]. This writer therefore might have spared his *ridicule* for a more proper occasion, had the gaiety of his heart permitted him to think *seriously* of the matter. As to what he has further upon the same question, it is no more than repetition of what I fully answered long ago[z]. And the main of the question was before given up in the Reply[a]: as I observed also in my Second Defence[b].

XI. When this writer comes to the head of worship, (Observat. viii.) he repeats some stale pleas used by the party, and which have all been particularly considered and confuted in my Defences, vol. i. and ii. As to reinforcing the pleas with any new matter, or taking off the force of the answers given, he is

[y] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 517.

[z] First Defence, vol. i. p. 302, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 517, 518.

[a] Reply, p. 119.

[b] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 510, 539, 566.

not solicitous about it. But here a *scoff* and there a *flout* he flings at his adversary. P. 78, he cites a sentence of mine[c] in a *scoffing* manner, calling it an excellent commentary upon two texts, (1 John ii. 1. Hebr. vii. 25.) which texts, he conceives, teach us to "pray to Christ, to pray in heaven for us:" in the mean while taking no notice of what I had said to obviate so low and mean a notion of God the Son, and to cut off the pretence of *creature-worship*. Having gone on with *repetition* as far as he thought proper, he next vouchsafes to take notice that I had made some *replies*: and one of them he *confutes*, by saying, that there will be found in it a *singular dexterity*, p. 81. Another, by saying, "If any serious reader finds any instruction or "improvement in it, it is well," p. 84. A third, by a scrap of Latin, from the Comedian, *Quid cum isto homine facias?* The English of which seems to be, that he has thought every way to come at some solution, is disappointed in all, and *knows not what to do* more; except it be to *flout* and *scoff*, that whatever reputation he and his friends had once gained, by beginning like *serious men*, (in which way I was ready to go on with them,) they may at length throw up, by ending like——

XII. Page the 86th, this *writer* comes to speak of *individuality* and *sameness*; in which I had been beforehand with him, answering all his pretences on that head[d]. Instead of *replying*, he goes on in his way. "*Individuality* and *sameness*," says he, "are "words, it seems, which signify nobody knows what:" because, forsooth, I had exposed his weak pretences to shew what *makes* it, or what its *principle* is. He refers me to his Reply[e], to convince me of the *absurdity* of my *way of talking*. I had seen, I had considered his Reply long ago, and exposed the weakness of it[f]: what pity is it that he is forced to leave it at last helpless, and entirely destitute of any reinforcement.

XIII. He is further angry with me for calling upon him to *explain* his terms[g], particularly *supreme* and *independent*. As to the first of them, he says, (p. 87,) it is "a term which no man, *he* "believes, before Dr. Waterland, misunderstood." Whether I misunderstood it or no, may be a question. I think the English of it is *highest*: and as *high* or *low* may have respect to variety of things, to *place*, to *dignity*, to *dominion*, to *office*, to *order*, to

[c] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 655.
[d] Ibid. p. 618, &c. 556, 707, 708.
[e] Reply, p. 307, 308.
[f] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 619.
[g] Ibid. p. 674.

nature, &c., it was but just in Dr. Waterland to call for an explanation, that so the word *supreme* might be admitted or rejected under proper *distinctions*.

Independent is likewise a word variously understood according to variety of *respects*. God the Son, for instance, is *dependent* on the Father, as being *of him*, and *from him*, and referred up to him: but he is not *dependent* on the Father's *will*, or *pleasure*, being *necessarily existing* as well as the Father. Every Person of the Trinity is *independent* of any thing *ad extra*; but none of them are entirely *independent* of each other, having a *necessary* relation to one another, that they must and cannot but exist *together*, never were, never could be *separate*, or asunder. This is sufficient to justify my calling for an explanation of *independent*. Which this gentleman would not have been offended at, but that it touches him in a tender part: it is breaking through his *coverts*, letting the *world* in upon him, when he has a mind to be *retired*, and to lie concealed under *equivocal* and *ambiguous* terms.

The term *authority* was another *equivocal* word, which I was willing to *distinguish* upon [h]. This writer being extremely desirous of finding a *governor* for God the Son and God the Holy Ghost, says; "As if any man, since the world began, ever did or ever "could mean, by those terms, not power and dominion." It were easy to quote a multitude of writers, ancient and modern, that use the word *authority*, without reference to *dominion*; and who when they ascribe it to the *Father*, as his peculiar, never mean to express any the least *dominion* over the other *two Persons* by it. I content myself here with two only, both quoted in my Second Defence [i], namely, St. Austin and Bishop Pearson. It would be endless to instruct this gentleman in all the *useful* things which he wants to *know*. He does not know, that as early as the days of St. Austin, the very *distinction* which I insist upon, as to the *equivocal* sense of *authority* in this case, was taken notice of, and pleaded against one of his Arian predecessors, Maximin [k]: so little is he acquainted with what men of *letters* have been doing *since the world began*.

Upon this occasion he drops a *maxim*, as he takes it to be,

[h] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 417, 517.

[i] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 516, 630. See other testimonies in Petavius, de Trin. lib. v. c. 5. sect. 11, 12, 13. lib. ii. c. 2. sect. 9. and in Bull. D. F. sect. iv. c. 1. p. 254.

[k] Augustin. cont. Maxim. lib. iii. c. 5, 14.

that "nothing can be the same in kind and in number too." The Author of the Remarks is full of the same thing[l]. I have already hinted, how contradictory this pretended *maxim* is to Dr. Clarke's known and avowed principles in another cause. To answer now more directly, and to cut off their main argument at once; I observe, that though in *finite* things, especially things *corporeal*, those that are one substance in *kind* are more than one substance in *number*; yet the reason is not, because they are *one in kind*, but because they are really *separate*, or *separable* from each other: and so it happens, that while they are one substance *in kind*, they are not one in *number*. But where the substance is neither *separate* nor *separable*, (as in the *divine* Persons,) there unity of *kind* and *number* are consistent, and meet in one: and thus the unity is both *specific* and *individual*, without any the least repugnancy, or appearance of it[m].

XIV. Page the 93rd, we meet with several little efforts to say something, but with a very *ill spirit*, and shewing more of the author's *spleen* than his abilities. He *scoffs* at the advice given him, not to pretend to be *wise* in the deep things of God. He is positive that an *infinitely active* Being can, if he pleases, entirely *cease to act*; that God's *loving* himself, however it may be the prime *mover* in all the divine acts, is *no act at all*; and that God never *naturally* or *necessarily* exerts any *power*; for this wise reason, because in such a case he *can have no power to exert*: that is, because the *will* is the *original* (with this writer) of all *exerting of power*, which was the point in *question*. He has left several very material things I urged upon this head perfectly untouched[n]: but seems to be affronted that any man should *question* whatever he has been pleased to affirm, or should not take his *dictates* for *demonstrations*.

XV. There is a place which I have passed over in p. 62. but deserves to be mentioned under this chapter. I happened to find fault with Dr. Clarke, for pretending to prove the existence of a first Cause, *a priori*[o]: which has no sense without supposing a cause *prior* to the *first*, which is flat *contradiction*. This plain reasoning is called turning the pretended *proof into ridicule*; though, in my notion, *reasoning* is one thing, and *ridiculing* another. However, the gentleman being grievously offended, re-

[l] Remarks, p. 25.
[m] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 620, 671.
[n] Ibid. p. 623, 624.
[o] Ibid. p. 695.

solves to revenge himself in a note. Repeating some words of mine, out of the place I have referred to in my Second Defence, vol. ii. he enters a remark: "These words shew that Dr. "Waterland does not understand what the meaning of a proof "*a priori* is." I should be glad to receive information on this head from our great *dictator* in science: and if he *understands* the thing so well, the reader might have expected some explication of it at his hands, that it might be seen where Dr. Waterland's mistake lay. Till this be done, I will presume to think, that what I said was perfectly right; and that neither Dr. Clarke nor his friends can return any *reply*, more than *abuses* to it. Dr. Cudworth was one that had travelled in the argument as far as any man, and had as good an inclination to prove the *existence a priori*, as Dr. Clarke could have. But he was a wise man, and saw clearly how that matter stood. Let us hear what he says, after many years' thought and meditation. Speaking of what he had done in his last chapter, he has these words: "We therein also demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all "atheism, and the actual existence of a God: we say *demon-* "*strate;* not *a priori*, which is *impossible*, and *contradictious*, but "by necessary inference from principles altogether undeniable[p]." I do not want Dr. Cudworth's or any man's *authority* for a maxim of common sense, and as plain as that *two and two are four:* but the plainer it is, so much the greater wonder that men of parts and abilities could not see it, or are yet *ignorant* of it.

The most knowing men hitherto have been contented with the proofs *a posteriori*, as being sufficient, and the *only* ones that are so. And they have rightly judged, that to pretend more is betraying great ignorance of things, and is exposing the clearest and best cause in the world to the insults of *atheism* and *infidelity*. These gentlemen endeavour to blind this matter by substituting *ground* and *reason* in the room of *cause*. Let them say plainly what they mean by this *cause*, *ground*, or *reason*, or whatever else they please to call it. They will at length find the words either to have *no sense*, or to contain that *absurd sense* of a cause *prior* to the *first*. Is this *ground*, *reason*, &c. the substance itself? The consequence then is, that the substance is the *cause* or ground of *itself*. Is it any *attribute* or *attributes* of that sub-

[p] Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. Preface.

stance? The consequence then is, that *attributes* are the *cause* or *ground* of the *subject* or *substance*. Let them turn it which way they will, the *absurdity* still recurs, till they please to allow, (what is both *sense* and *truth*,) that the *first Cause* is absolutely *uncaused*; and that it is nonsense to talk of any *ground* or *cause* of that substance which is itself the *ground* and *cause* of all things. But it is pleaded (p. 63.) that if God may "exist absolutely "without any ground or reason" (that is, cause) "of existence, "it would follow that he might likewise as well without any "cause or reason cease to exist." Which is as much as to say, that unless there be a cause *prior* to the *first*, which exists *necessarily*, it will follow that the *first Cause* does not exist *necessarily*, but may *cease to be*. What is this, but making the notion of a *first Cause* repugnant, and contradictory to itself; or in short, denying any such thing as a *first Cause*? I think it sufficient to say, that it is the property of the *first Cause* to exist *necessarily*: he must, and cannot but exist from eternity to eternity. If *existence* be considered as an *attribute* of that first Cause, the sole *ground*, *reason*, or *subject* of it is the *substance* itself so existing; which is therefore the support of *that* and of every other *attribute*. All pretended *grounds*, *reasons*, *causes*, &c. in this case, can resolve into nothing but the actual existence of *such* a Being. Prove first *a posteriori*, that it is fact that he does exist; and the *necessary* manner of his existing is proved at the same time. It is nonsense to run up higher for an *antecedent* ground, reason, or cause, after we are come to the top, and can go no higher; unless this writer is disposed to go on *ad infinitum*, and never to come at a *first Cause* at all. But he has been so used, it seems, to talk in this way upon other subjects, that he thinks it *strange* he may not do it here too; and that he may not talk of an *antecedent* reason for what has not any thing *antecedent*, as well as for what has. Such is his great proficiency in *metaphysics*.

I should have been willing to have passed over the Doctor's misconduct in this argument, had it not accidentally fallen in with our present subject. The cause of *Theism*, and his *good intentions*, and, I believe, *very honest* endeavours in it, might have been his *protection*. But since this matter has at length been brought in, and admits of no just *defence*; it is good to acquaint this gentleman, that it will not be carried through, either by confident *dictating*, or by throwing out *abuses*. But I proceed.

XVI. Page the 91st, this gentleman, speaking of me, says as

follows: "Having been told, that whenever the Deity, or divine "nature, [τὸ Θεῖον,] is spoken of as an object of adoration, it is "not by way of accuracy, (as the Doctor had absurdly pretended,) "but on the contrary by a mere figurative way of speaking, put "for God himself, just as we frequently say the *king's majesty*, "not meaning the majesty of the king, but the king himself; "his answer is, that *his affirming the contrary is sufficient against* "*our bare affirmation*. If the reader thinks it so, I am willing "to leave it to him."

That this writer is offended, one may perceive. I shall endeavour to set the matter however in a clear light. In my Defence[q] I have these words:

"God alone is to be worshipped, the Creator in opposition to "all creatures whatever, the τὸ Θεῖον, as Clemens of Alexandria[r] "and Origen[s] sometimes *accurately* express it: which also Ter-"tullian[t] seems to intimate in the words, *quod colimus*, above "cited."

The Author of the Reply having a fancy, that worship cannot be properly said to be paid to the divine, or any *nature*, but to *Person* only, was pleased to put in his answer[u] to what I had said, in the words he has since repeated. To a bare *affirmation* of his, and positively laid down, only to serve an *hypothesis*, I first returned a *counter affirmation*, (disputants, as I thought, being always upon a level in such cases, and never obliged to take each other's *word* for *proof*,) but presently subjoined[x] some remarks and references, about the sense of τὸ Θεῖον in Greek writers, and particularly in Clemens and Origen: from which I had reason to conclude, that τὸ Θεῖον properly signifies the *divine nature*, or *substance*, or God considered substantially as *res divina*, and not according to *personal* characters, acts, or offices. That this was the sense of Clemens, when he speaks of the τὸ Θεῖον, as the object of worship, might appear plainly from the places I referred to; particularly from those I have again noted[y] in my margin. And the reason why both Clemens and Origen chose that expression rather than Θεὸς, was to be more

[q] First Defence, vol. i. p. 420.

[r] Θρησκεύειν τὸ Θεῖον. *Clem. Alex.* p. 778. Ox. ed.

[s] Σέβει τὸ Θεῖον, &c. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 367.

Ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγένητον τοῦ Θεοῦ φύσιν, κἀκείνῳ μόνῳ ἐνορᾶν. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 189.

[t] Quod colimus Deus unus est, &c. *Tertull. Apol.* cap. xvii.

[u] Reply, p. 356.

[x] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 667, 668.

[y] Clem. Alex. p. 50, 836.

emphatical and expressive against Pagan worship offered to things of a frail and corruptible *nature*, to *created* beings. I think, it was paying great respect to this gentleman's *bare affirmation*, to trace the sense of τὸ Θεῖον so far as I did in opposition to it; as may appear by my *references*. And though I threw in a parenthesis, *saving to myself* the just claims of every disputant, he need not have been offended at it, as if it were intended as an *affront* to his *superior* learning or judgment, to set *mine* against it: I had no such thought in it. But however raised and extraordinary his abilities may be, and however *high* an *opinion* he conceives his readers should have of them, he ought nevertheless to have taken some *notice* of what I had pleaded; if not as a *critic*, yet as an *honest man:* and I cannot but think it too *assuming* still, to expect that his bare *dictates* shall have more weight than another's *reasons*.

XVII. To an observation of mine out of Tertullian, that God the Son is an *Angel* and *Messenger*, not by nature but by office[z], he returns me this answer: "Can any man tell what the being "a messenger by nature means[a]?" No: but he may know what an *angel* by *nature* means, which was the word I designed the distinction for, and to which alone it referred; as my argument, and the *quotation* at the bottom, sufficiently shewed: and all the fault was in not throwing the word *Messenger* into brackets. The reason of bringing it in appears from what went before. This is low carping: but no doubt the author intended a smart *repartee*. He has such another piece of smartness in the same page, relating to the word *servility;* which he charges me with adding *deceitfully*, as synonymous to *subjection*[b], because of the *quite different* sense of that word in the *English language*. Whatever sense it be that he speaks of, as to the English, I am sure nobody but himself can mistake *my sense* of it, in the place where I used it, nor think the word *improper*. But this gentleman seems to be so elated upon his skill in *language*, that he can scarce allow others to understand their *mother tongue*.

XVIII. He has some *ingenious* thoughts and *smart* sayings, p. 40, which must not be omitted. They are bestowed upon a passage of mine[c], where I say, that the Father was not to be visible, so much as *per assumptas species*, by *visible symbols*, because he was not to *minister*, or be *incarnate*. The remark

[z] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 479.
[a] Observations, p. 26.
[b] See my Second Def. vol. ii. p. 464.
[c] Ibid. p. 490.

hereupon is: "It seems from these words, that Dr. Waterland "does not suppose the incarnation of Christ to be at all *real*, "but merely a *phantasm, per assumptas species:* this being con- "fessedly the only way in which there was any *natural possibility* "for the Father to be *incarnate*. And accordingly in his expli- "cation of that text, (Phil. ii. 7,) he tells us that Christ emptied "himself in appearance."

I passed over this uncommon turn of his, when I met with it in the Reply[d]. I saw he was strangely lost and bewildered; and I was willing to give him time to recover and recollect. But by his repeating it here, he appears to be very fond of it: and this, no doubt, is one of the arguments which, (as he tell us in his preface,) upon the *most careful review*, he believes to be *strictly and perfectly conclusive*. I am ashamed to answer such impertinencies: but sometimes it must be done. His *first* mistake is, understanding *per assumptas species* of a *phantasm:* but this was to make way for what was to come after, and to answer to *appearance*. His *second* is, in pretending that this was the *only way* that it was *naturally* possible for the Father to be *incarnate*. For neither would this way have amounted to any *incarnation* at all, being only *præludium incarnationis*, as it was anciently called: nor is a *real* incarnation *naturally* less possible than that was. His *third* is, in not distinguishing between the taking up *visible symbols* for a while to *appear* by, and being *personally* united to the *human nature*, which is *incarnation*. His *fourth* is so *gross*, (not to perceive the difference between *veiling the glories of the Godhead*, and *having no real manhood*,) that I can hardly suppose his thoughts were at home when he wrote it. But the word *appearance* seems to have struck his *imagination* at once, and to have made him jump immediately, without any premises, into a marvellous *conclusion*.

XIX. Page the 74th, &c. he undertakes to shew, that, upon his hypothesis, the existence of God the Son is not *precarious*. I could scarce have believed, till I saw the Reply, that any man of tolerable parts or discretion would have engaged in so silly an argument. But there is a necessity for it, it seems: and this is the *second* time that he has resolved to shut his eyes against *common sense*[e] in this very article.

We are to observe, that he denies the *necessary existence* of

[d] Reply, p. 59, 181. [e] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 545.

God the Son; which is directly making his existence *contingent*, which is another word for *precarious*, and is proper to a *creature*.

This gentleman endeavours, p. 75, with a dust of words, to obscure this plain state of the question. At last, he comes a little closer to the point, and begins the debate. "God, says "the Apostle, cannot lie: the only reason why he cannot, is "because he will not." [Note then, that the only reason why God does not or cannot reduce God the Son to *nothing*, is because *he will not.*] "Is therefore the veracity of God a thing "as mutable and *precarious*, because it entirely depends upon "his will, as is the existence of any creature whatever?" But this gentleman should have shewn that God was as much bound up by his own *attributes* to give the Son *existence*, and to *continue* him in it, as he is bound *never to lie*, to make the case parallel: and upon this supposition, God could no more want his Son one moment from all eternity, than he could be ever one moment capable of *lying:* which is making the Son as *necessarily existing*, by *necessary* will, (which this gentleman would call *no will*,) as God's attribute of *veracity* is necessary and immutable. God's *moral* attributes are founded in the *natural* perfections, and are indeed no other than *natural* and *necessary* perfections of the Deity, which he can no more cease to have, than he can cease to be. And even the *rectitude* of his *will* is *natural*, *necessary*, and *unalterable:* and the reason why he never *wills* amiss is because he *cannot*. But not to run further into this point, which is perfectly *remote* and *foreign*, and brought in only for a *blind;* what becomes of the distinction between the *necessary* existence proper to the *divine* Being, and the *precarious* existence proper to *creatures?* If God may be obliged by any of his *moral* attributes of *wisdom*, *goodness*, *veracity*, &c. to preserve the Son in his being; so may he likewise to preserve *angels*, or *men*, or any other *creature:* and is this a reason against calling their existence *precarious?* If it be, then there may be *creatures*, many besides God the Son, whose existence is not *precarious:* and thus the distinction between *necessary* and *precarious* existence is lost. The meaning of *precarious* existence is, *not necessary*, of what might either *never have been*, or may *cease to be*, if God *pleases*. Let this gentleman either *affirm* this of God the Son, or deny it of any *creature* whatever.

This writer, who is used to *wise* questions, asks me, whether the *supreme dominion* of God the Father (that which I found in

voluntary economy) be *precarious?* Undoubtedly every *voluntary* office may cease to be, is not *necessary*, but depending on *pleasure*, and is therefore so far *precarious*. And even as to *natural* dominion, God might *choose* whether he would make any *creatures*; he may choose whether he will *continue* any: that is, he may choose whether he will exercise any such *dominion* at all; for all such *dominion* supposes the existence of *creatures*, over which only such *dominion* is. Supremacy therefore of dominion is as *precarious* as the existence of the *creature:* and if that be not *precarious*, I know not what is so. But, I think, I am over-abundantly civil to this writer to debate a maxim of *common sense* with him. The sum is, that that existence which is *not necessary* is *contingent;* and *contingent* is *precarious*, or depending on *pleasure*, in opposition to what is *naturally* immutable, and *cannot but be:* such is the existence of *God* the *Son* with this writer: therefore his existence is *precarious* in the *same sense*, though perhaps not in the *same degree*, that the existence of any *creature* whatever is called *precarious*. *Q. E. D.*

XX. Page 92nd, this gentleman tells me of "affecting to ex- "press a ridiculous seeming repugnancy in maintaining, that the "same act is certain as being foreknown, uncertain, as depending "on the will of a free agent[f]." I should be glad to see the difficulty dexterously hit off by this *acute* writer, to make us some amends for his failures in other things. He does it, he thinks, in two words; that what depends on the will of a *free agent* may be *certain*, though not *necessary*. But to me it seems that the difficulty stands just where it did: for how is that *certain* which is *not necessary*, which *may* or *may not be;* which is all the meaning of *not necessary*, and which seems to amount to the same with *not certain*, in the present case. And how is that *fixed*, or *certain*, which is yet *floating* and hanging in *suspense*, either *may* or *may not be?* Possibly, some solution may be found for these and the like difficulties: but I am afraid, not by this gentleman, who does not appear hitherto to have gone to the bottom of the subject, or to have *patience* or *coolness* of temper requisite to go through with it.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Quotations *from the Ancients.*

THE 14th *observation* is spent upon this subject: and I shall

[f] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 692, 693.

think it worth the while to bestow a *chapter* upon the same; that as we have seen this gentleman's penetration in matters of *argument*, we may now also see his diligence and accuracy in matters of *learning*. I have had frequent occasion, in both my Defences, to take notice of his superficial acquaintance with the *ancient* Fathers.

1. Sometimes he has endeavoured to put *spurious* or worthless pieces upon us, as being of considerable value and authority. The Apostolical Constitutions[g], Ignatius's larger epistles[h], the Arian Councils of Sirmium[i], Philippopolis[k], and Antioch[l], (instead of the Catholic and approved synods,) and the tenets of Semi-Arians for those of Epiphanius[m]. See the instances of this kind up and down in the Reply[n]. The doing this, unless it be done *ignorantly*, is much the same honesty in the way of *writing*, as the putting off bad wares or damaged goods at the price of good ones in the way of *trading*.

2. Sometimes he has expressed wonder and amazement at me, as if I had been teaching some *new* and *strange* thing, or something merely *scholastic*, when I have been only following the concurring judgment of the ancient Fathers[o].

3. Sometimes you will find him representing a doctrine as unanimously taught by *all the ancients*, when they were *all* directly against it, or *none* clearly for it[p].

4. *False* history and *misreports* of the Fathers have been very ordinary and common with him[q].

5. *Misrepresentations* of the Fathers, as to their real sense and meaning, have been numberless: the greatest part of my labour has been all the way to lay them open and confute them.

6. *Misquotations*, or *deceitful* translations, I have often had occasion to observe and correct[r].

Now this gentleman being very desirous, as it seems, to make

[g] Second Defence, p. 590, 591. 618.
[h] Ibid. p. 590, 591.
[i] Ibid. p. 602, 618.
[k] Ibid. p. 604. [l] Ibid. 618.
[m] Ibid. p. 688.
[n] Reply to Dr. Waterland, &c. p. 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 29, 58, 61, 258, 260, 274, 275, 276, 299, 404, 410.
[o] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 287, 324, 496, 549. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 422, 541.
[p] See these fallacies noted: First Defence, vol. i. p. 295, 332, 470, 484, 485, 503, 536. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 600, 601, 637, 700, 733, 734.
[q] See the same detected: First Defence, vol. i. p. 328, 382, 389, 428, 497, 507, 536, 538, 545, 547. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 389, 391, 429, 439, 459, 481, 489, 491, 495, 498, 537, 541, 563, 564, 618, 714, 717, 728.
[r] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 350, 351, 381, 389, 523, &c. 560. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 444, 473, 485, 595, 597, 618, 641, 674, 737, &c. 755.

reprisals upon me, undertakes to furnish out a whole section of *gross misrepresentations* made by me in my *quotations*. He gives them for a *specimen* only, as he says, and calls them *some few*; being willing the reader should think he had been very *tender* and *compassionate*. The reader perhaps may really think so, when he finds what the sum total of this worthy charge of *gross misrepresentations* amounts to: nothing but an account of some very *fair* and *just* representations set in a bad light, misreported under *false* colours, and called by a wrong *name*. I hope every intelligent reader will apprehend the difference between *making* a charge and *proving* one; between a *false* report and a *true* one; between an unrighteous *calumny* and a *just censure*. I am willing to put the issue entirely upon the justice and merits of the case, upon the *evidence* produced here or there, to justify the charges respectively. Let but the reader compare my remarks on Dr. Clarke's quotations[s] with what this writer would lay to me; and then the difference betwixt the one and the other will be throughly understood. Now to come to particulars: they are twelve in number: which were they all *faults*, it were easy to select hundreds greater out of their pieces. But I confined myself, in my collection, to such only as betrayed manifest *partiality* and *deceit*, or great want of care and exactness.

I. In the first place, he finds fault with my way of *understanding* a passage of Philo, and gives me his own *judgment* against it: which I have as much regard for, as he has for *mine*. The very passage which he cites from Philo, to *confute* my construction, *confirms* it: as it shews that the *Logos* was betwixt the τὸ γενόμενον and ὁ πατὴρ, and was therefore *neither*. And if he is not reckoned with the τὰ γενόμενα, he is of course ἀγένητος.

II. The *second* is my reading ἀγένητος in two places of Justin, where he chooses to read ἀγέννητος. His reasons, it seems, are good to *him*, and mine to *me*, which is the whole matter. I vindicated my *reading* against his exceptions in my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 506, 579: and he has nothing to add by way of reinforcement. A mighty business to found a charge of *gross misrepresentation* upon: he must have been hard put to it, to strain so much for one.

III. A *third* article of my *gross misrepresentations* begins with a *new* invention of his *own*; a very forced interpretation of a

[s] First Defence, vol. i. p. 523, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 737, &c.

passage in Irenæus[t]; which interpretation was never, I believe, thought on by any man before himself, and rests only in strength of imagination. For what if the Father be called Λόγος in that chapter as well as the Son, could Irenæus be there talking of the *emission* or *generation* of the *Father?* If this gentleman will but please to look forwards, as far as page 157. and 158. and view the whole process of the argument, he will see what Irenæus meant by the *Logos*, namely, the *only begotten* of the Father, the same that Isaiah speaks of chap. liii. 8.

This writer also tells me of citing two passages of Irenæus, as containing the Church's notion, when he is ridiculing the notions of the Valentinians: as if a man might not be ridiculing the notion of the Valentinians, and at the same time discover his *own*. Had the author undertaken to vindicate this his *new* and *extraordinary* construction, I should have taken care to consider it at large: but as he has only given a few dark and obscure hints of what he would have, I think it sufficient to refer the reader to my Second Defence[u], and to Irenæus himself[x], and to his learned editor, who has particularly considered his author's meaning[y].

A further complaint against me is for falsely interpreting *non alius et alius*, in Irenæus[z], of *Father* and *Son;* which is so trifling and groundless, that nothing can be more so. He has invented another imaginary construction, peculiar to himself, which he endeavours to help out, by supplying something in Irenæus's text, which the good Father never thought on, and which the whole context strongly reclaims against. See my Second Defence[a], where I cite the passage, with another parallel place of Tertullian. In this way of charging me with *gross misrepresentations*, the author may be copious enough; for *invention* is fruitful.

As to the *fourth* place, all the fault is, that I follow the *common* reading, (*cum Verbo suo*, Iren. p. 183,) though there is *one*

[t] Qui generationem prolativi hominum *Verbi* transferunt in Dei æternum *Verbum*, et prolationis initium donantes et genesim, quemadmodum et suo Verbo. Et in quo distabit *Dei Verbum*, imo magis *ipse Deus*, cum sit *Verbum*, a Verbo hominum, si eandem habuerit ordinationem et emissionem generationis? *Iren.* p. 132. ed. Mass.

[u] Vol. ii. p. 435, 583.

[x] Iren. p. 132, 139. ed. Mass.

[y] Massuet. Dissert. Præv. p. 128.

[z] Non ergo alius erat qui cognoscebatur, et alius qui dicebat; *nemo cognoscit Patrem*, sed unus et idem, omnia subjiciente ei Patre, &c. *Iren.* p. 234. *Mass. Præv. Diss.* p. 131.

[a] Vol. ii. p. 436.

manuscript which leaves out *cum:* a manuscript scarce above 400 years old, and of no great authority[b]. The manuscript is the Arundel, in the library of the Royal Society: I have seen it, and find the *reading* to be as Dr. Grabe represented. But that the reading is "without doubt the truer reading," as the Reply pretends[c], against the faith of all the other manuscripts, about ten in number, several of them much *older*, and most of them more *faithful* in the whole, will not be taken for granted upon a bare *affirmation*.

A *fifth* place of Irenæus by me cited[d], I am willing to leave with the reader: who may please to consider, whether what this writer objects be of any force against what I said; since I did not pretend that the Son did any thing *contrary to*, or *without* the Father's *good pleasure*.

IV. This gentleman proceeds to Clemens Alexandrinus and charges me with *misrepresenting* him. I vindicated my sense of that passage at large before[e], and obviated every pretence to the contrary: nor has this writer so much as attempted to *reply* to what I there urged; except calling a thing *monstrous* be the same with *confuting* it. His repeating here his former opinion about Christ being *representative only*, (which has been so abundantly answered and baffled in both my Defences[f], beyond any just reply,) only shews to what a degree of hardiness a man may arrive by long opposing the *truth*.

There is another place of Clemens[g], as to which he *insists* upon his construction, and I also upon mine[h]; though it is sufficient for me, if mine *may* be true; he should prove, on the other hand, that his *must*. He appeals to all that understand Greek. So do I, and to the *context* likewise. Bishop Bull, Le Nourry, and the learned editor of Clemens, (who, I believe, understood Greek,) had declared beforehand for my construction. Let this gentleman produce his better *vouchers*, if he has any, to support his pretences about *the nature of the Greek tongue:* which he may sometimes happen to mistake, and pretty widely too, as appears by his *versions*. His *translation*, as he calls it, of this very place

[b] See Massuet. præf. p. 8.
[c] Reply, p. 103.
[d] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 447.
[e] Ibid. p. 488.
[f] First Defence, vol. i. p. 294, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 505, &c.
[g] Οὔτ' οὖν φθονοίη ποτ' ἄν τισιν, ὁ πάντας μὲν ἐπ' ἴσης κεκληκὼς, ἐξαιρέτους δὲ τοῖς ἐξαιρέτως πεπιστευκόσιν ἀπονείμας τιμάς. οὐθ' ὑφ' ἑτέρου κωλυθείη ποτ' ἄν, ὁ πάντων κύριος, καὶ μάλιστα ἐξυπηρετῶν τῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ παντοκράτορος θελήματι πατρός. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* vii. cap. 2. p. 832.
[h] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 755.

of Clemens, is no *translation*, but a loose *paraphrase*[i]; and such a one, that no man could ever imagine from it what the Greek words are. Whether I am *right* or no, he is most certainly *wrong* in taking the liberty he has, of *foisting* in words, and altering the *turn* of the expression, to help out his construction. But besides that, the construction itself appears to me somewhat *forced* and *unnatural*, as referring καὶ μάλιστα to the *negative* going before, and to the *first* member of the sentence, rather than the *second*; when in the preceding sentence, of like kind, the *third* part hangs upon the *second*. The most natural construction therefore seems to be this; *Who is Lord of all, etiam maxime serviens*[k], &c. *even when most subservient*, &c. that is, even in his lowest condescension, becoming *incarnate*, which Clemens had been speaking of. In the very next page, resuming the assertion of the Son's being *Lord of all*, he again qualifies it, in like manner, by referring all up to the supreme Father.

V. We now come to Tertullian: where he taxes me with a *misconstruction*; owning however that he had gone before me in the *same*. I must acknowledge I looked upon the construction of that place as *doubtful*, at least; for which reason I had never cited it in my First Defence, or elsewhere, to prove Father and Son *one God*. But finding at length that some learned men so understood the place, and observing that the Reply also came into it, I thought I might then *safely* use it. If it be a mistake, (as probably it may,) it should not however have come under the head of *gross misrepresentations*.

He next charges me with a great neglect, as omitting to take notice of what the Reply had objected to my construction of a place in Tertullian, though I again quote the place. It is unreasonable in the man to expect particular notice of every thing that he has any where occasionally dropped, when he has slipped over many and more material things of mine: but I have accustomed him so much to it, that now he insists upon it. After all, his construction of *suo jure*[l], in Tertullian[m], which he makes to be the same with *sensu sibi proprio*, is so extravagant,

[i] Reply, p. 511. Compare my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 755.

[k] As to the like construction of μάλιστα in Clemens, see p. 138, 250, 436, 443, 620, 759, 821.

[l] Reply, p. 509.

[m] Omnia, inquit, Patris mea sint, cur non et nomina? Cum ergo legis *Deum omnipotentem*, et *altissimum*, et *Deum virtutum*, et *Regem Israelis*, et *qui est*; vide ne per hæc Filius etiam demonstretur; *suo jure* Deus omnipotens, qua Sermo Dei omnipotentis, &c. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* cap. 17.

that it might be safely left with any man that knows Tertullian, or knows Latin. What could Tertullian say less, than that God the Son was God Omnipotent in his *own right*, when he so often proclaims him to be of the *same substance* with the Father? It is not said merely *suo jure* omnipotens, but *suo jure* Deus *omnipotens:* and as the meaning of *suo jure* is well known to all that know Latin; so are Tertullian's principles well known to as many as know him; and that he makes the Son *God* in the *same sense* as the Father is, as partaking of the *same divine substance.* Tertullian therefore could not mean, as this gentleman says, that the Son is God Almighty, *in a sense proper to him*, or *upon a ground peculiar to himself;* since Tertullian's principles plainly make Father and Son God in the *same sense*, and upon the *same ground*, as being of the same *divine substance.* But this he might mean, and this he did mean, that the Son is Almighty God *distinctly*, and in his own *proper Person* and *right;* and not considered as the *Person* of the *Father*, which Praxeas pretended. This gentleman however, by endeavouring to find out some *misinterpretations* of *mine*, does nothing else but discover more and more of his *own.*

He is in the same page (p. 125,) cavilling at a very innocent translation of an Arian passage in my book[n]; where I render *sua virtute, by his own power.* He will have it, that it does not mean the Son's *own power*, but his *Father's*, because supposed to be *given* him: which is nothing but *equivocating* upon the word *own.* The meaning undoubtedly is, that the Son created all things by his own *natural, inherent* power; though supposed to be given him, with his nature, by the Father. And this is all I meant in my *version* of the words: it is observable however, that this gentleman never yet came up so high in his doctrine as the ancient Arians did. They supposed Christ invested with *creative powers* by the Father; which is a great deal more than making him merely an *instrument* in the work of creation.

As to Tertullian's meaning in some passages which this author produced to prove that souls were *consubstantial* with God[o], (according to that writer,) as much as the Son was supposed to be by the Nicene Council; it was so mean, and so unworthy a suggestion, that I thought it proper to vindicate[p] Tertullian, as

[n] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 684.

[o] See Reply, p. 55, 225, 328. Preface, p. 6.

[p] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 459. Compare Pamelii Paradox. Tertullian. n. 3.

falsely charged in that matter. It was of some moment that Tertullian had utterly denied it of *angels;* or even *archangels*, and of the highest order. This the objector takes no notice of. Tertullian denies that the *soul* comes up *usque ad vim divinitatis*, and explains himself inoffensively on that head; as I observed. Nay, he argues through the whole chapter against Marcion's tenet, of the *soul* being *substantia Creatoris*, the substance of (or *consubstantial* with) its *Creator*. Yet this writer here goes on with the same ridiculous charge, founding it upon words that express nothing of it. What the words mean, I intimated at large in the place referred to[q]: and this gentleman makes no reply to it. Why he did not, is best known to himself.

VI. We come next to Origen, whom, it seems, I have greatly injured in rendering μετέδωκε γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς μεγαλειότητος, *hath imparted even his greatness*[r], instead of *has imparted even of his greatness*[s]. But I am sure he has injured Origen a great deal more by suppressing the remaining part of the sentence, which shews what Origen meant, viz. that the Son is *commensurate* with the Father in *greatness*. This was not imparting some small pittance of his greatness, but *equal greatness*, or his *whole* greatness: and this gentleman might have considered that μεταδίδωμι commonly governs a *genitive* case; which is sufficient to take off the force of his *criticism:* though I must own I see but little difference in the two ways of speaking, nor that either of them may not be admitted; provided only that the *whole* sense of Origen in that passage be taken along with it.

As to another place of Origen, this writer desires that my Defence[t] and his Reply[u] may be compared; which I desire also.

The same I say as to a *third* place[x] of Origen.

As to a *fourth* place in Origen, this writer is pleased to stand corrected in respect of his *translation* of it, which I found fault with[y]. As to his further endeavours to defeat the meaning of that place, I am willing to trust them with the reader, after he has seen the passage itself, and what I have said upon it.

[q] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 472. Vid. Tertull. contr. Marc. lib. ii. c. 9.
[r] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 419.
[s] Observations, p. 25, 126.
[t] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 436, 465. Reply to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 216.
[u] Reply, p. 83, 84, 85.
[x] Compare Reply, p. 295, and Observations, p. 63, with my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 587, 677.
[y] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 673, 674.

Another passage of Origen I shall likewise trust with the reader, if he pleases but to look into my Second Defence[z]. This writer here (p. 127,) talks of my construction being "contrary to the nature of all language;" as if the nature of language never admitted any *adjective* to stand alone, the *substantive* being sufficiently intimated from the context. But this is his forward way of talking: and he seems to think he has a right to be believed upon his *word*.

VII. This article concerns Novatian. I have fully expressed myself, as to this author, in many places of my Defences, which the reader that thinks it of importance may please to consult. I forbear any further dispute about the *reading* of a certain passage, till the learned Mr. Welchman's new edition of that author appears, which may probably give us some further light into it.

VIII. The eighth article, instead of proving any *misrepresentation* upon me, only revives the memory of a great one of his *own*[a]; which discovered his small acquaintance with the ancients. As to this writer's exceptions to Hippolytus, I have sufficiently obviated them elsewhere[b]: and one would think that Tertullian's use of the word *Persona*, in the same sense with Hippolytus's πρόσωπον, might have screened the latter from this author's censure in that particular. But supposing I had less to plead for my saying that the Sabellian singularity consisted in making the Godhead μονοπρόσωπος, and that I had expressed it in a phrase that came not into use till the fourth century; can there be a greater mark of *pedantry*, than for a man to take me up, and cavil at the bare *expression*, and to charge me with an *untruth* upon it? How would it look to charge Basil, and Chrysostom, and Theodoret, as reporting a thing *notoriously untrue*, when they represent Sabellius as making the Godhead ἓν πρόσωπον, just as I do? Would not the man be taken for a *jester*, or a very ignorant man, in doing it, as cavilling only at a mode of *expression*? But I proceed.

IX. The author here censures me for rendering μοναρχίας by *unity*, rather than *monarchy*, in a passage of Pope Dionysius[c]. My reasons for so doing, I conceive, were such as these: 1. That the same Dionysius had expressed the same thing a little higher by the word μονάδα, which signifies *unity*: and he seems to have chosen μοναρχίας after, only to vary the phrase. 2. Because in

[z] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 436.
[a] Ibid. p. 541.
[b] Ibid. p. 463, 563.
[c] Ibid. p. 469.

the words immediately preceding, he is speaking of the *union* of Father and Son; by which he solves the difficulty objected, and not by throwing the *oneness* of Godhead upon the Father alone, exclusive of the other Persons. 3. Because τριὰς, *Trinity*, is the word opposed to μοναρχίας in the same sentence; Dionysius shewing that there must be a *Trinity*, and withal an *Unity* (say I) preserved. These reasons made me prefer the word *unity*. When this author has better for the word *monarchy*, and in his sense[d], I shall be ready to accept it, instead of the other.

X. Here I am charged with mistranslating a word in Eusebius, ἠρτημένη, which I render *compacted*[e], that is, *constituted*; which, it seems, is *wonderfully* done. But the *wonder* may cease, if it be considered, 1. That in the same place the *equality* is mentioned as belonging to the *ternary* number, here considered as a figure of the *Trinity*. 2. That the τριὰς is there also made the one ἀρχὴ, *Source* of all things. 3. That the whole τριὰς is said to be ἠρτημένη, *compacted*, as I render it. For had the meaning been that two Persons were dependent on *one*, the epithet would not have been applied to the *whole Trinity*. 4. There is a plain opposition between the τριὰς and the τῶν γενητῶν. Whether these reasons may convince our *writer* or no, I know not: if he pleases, he may go on *wondering* at very *plain* things, to shew his want of *reflection*. He will have it that ἠρτημένη there signifies a *connection* of things, one *depending on* or *derived from* another. He has not thought fit to give us any *translation* of the place, according to his *own sense* of it; but all he says in favour of it is only *misreport* of the use of the word ἄναρχος, as I shall shew hereafter.

The second passage[f] of Eusebius I leave to the reader; this gentleman having no way of eluding my sense of it, but by misrepresenting it, after his manner.

XI. The next relates to Gregory Nyssen[g], where this writer has nothing to shew but chicane. I translate some words that may be seen in the place referred to, thus: "Neither let "us dissolve the immediate connection, by considering the will "in the generation." Upon which my acute censor thus

[d] It is to be noted, that μοναρχία, in this subject, sometimes signifies, not *monarchy*, but unity of *headship*, or *principle*, *source*, or *fountain*, as in Athanasius.

Λεχθείη δὲ ἂν καὶ οὕτως μία ἀρχὴ θεότητος, καὶ οὐ δύο ἀρχαί· ὅθεν κυρίως καὶ μοναρχία ἐστίν. *Athan. Orat.* 4. init.

[e] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 475.

[f] Ibid. p. 496.

[g] Ibid. p. 607, 608.

remarks: as if the author meant to say, that "considering the "*will* of the Father in the generation of the Son, would be a dis-"solving of the immediate connection." No, neither the author nor I meant to say it: the words immediately foregoing shew that we did not; nor does my *translation* imply any such thing. But the meaning is, that the notion of *will* was not to be carried so far as to destroy that necessary *connection*.

XII. As to the passage of Cyril, and my *inference*, as he calls it, from it, (which is not my *inference*, but an inference which is mentioned as having some colour, and at the same time *confuted* by the late learned Benedictine editor, as I observed[h],) this writer might as well have let it alone, unless he had known more of it. Had not that learned editor given us much better arguments against that *inference* than the Observator has, it would be more considerable than he imagines. The reader that desires to know more of this matter may consult the learned Toutée's Dissertation[i], before referred to; and which this writer has fraudulently concealed from the reader, in order to make way for his charge upon me.

My words are these: "If there is any thing to be suspected "of Cyril, it is rather his excluding the Father from being "*Creator*, than the Son from being *efficient:* but the late learned "Benedictine editor has sufficiently cleared up Cyril's orthodoxy "on that head." Now after I had so plainly declared against the *inference*, is it not very unaccountable in this gentleman to *charge* me with it, and in the *manner* he does? "The Doctor's "inference," says he, "from the words of Cyril, is as remarkable "an instance of the strength of prejudice, as (I think) I ever "met with," p. 131. I may much more reasonably say, that this representation is as remarkable an instance of the strength of *malice*, as I ever met with. See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 629, 631, 687, where I take notice of the Father being represented as issuing out *orders* for creating, and the Son as *creating:* which is Cyril's notion also, and which affords some *colour* for the *inference* before mentioned; but *colour* only, and not ground sufficient for it, as I before intimated, acquitting Cyril of it.

I have now run through the whole charge of "very gross "misrepresentations," of which the foregoing instances are the *specimen*, all that this gentleman could find. Nobody doubts of

[h] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 630.
[i] Dissert. iii. de Doctrin. Cyrilli, p. 139, &c.

his inclination to have picked out the very *worst* that my books could any where afford; and these are they. I thank him for them. I could not, I think, have desired a fuller testimony from an *adversary* than this is, of my *fidelity* in the matter of *quotations*; I might almost say, *care* and *exactness* beyond what I had expected. For though I had taken the best care I could, in revising every thing of that kind, and again comparing it with the books themselves, as my papers went through the press, and was certain not to be *wilfully* guilty of any mistake; yet I knew not what an *able critic* might possibly discover after me, in a work that had not long time to lie by, nor had passed through the hands of my judicious and learned friends. But perhaps our Observator has been *negligent* in examining, or is not very *acute*: and so I shall not *assume* upon it.

One thing, I hope, will be observed, that though this writer has *found* no *gross misrepresentations* of mine, he has *made* several of his *own*; which may now be added to the rest above mentioned, under my *second* chapter. And to his former *misreports* of the ancients may be added another great one which he has in p. 130. "It is notorious," says he, "that the word ἄναρχος was always "appropriated to the Father." The contrary is *notorious* to all that know antiquity. Ἄναρχος is very often applied to God the Son, by the Post-Nicene Fathers[k], of the same century with Eusebius, though some years later; and more than once *directly* by the Ante-Nicenes also[l]: as to *indirect* application of it to him, in respect of his *generation* or *existence*, as being ἄναρχος or ἀνάρχως, nothing more common[m]: Eusebius himself is an evidence for it[n]. But why will this positive gentleman make *reports* of antiquity, till he knows more of it?

CHAP. V.

A summary View of the Judgment of the Ancients upon the question, Whether God the Father be *naturally* Ruler and Governor over God the Son.

SINCE the Author of the Observations has been pleased to

[k] Epiphanius passim. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. p. 421, 563, 630. Greg. Nyss. contr. Eunom. lib. i. p. 118.

[l] Τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἐν γενέσει, τὴν ἄχρονον καὶ ἄναρχον ἀρχήν τε καὶ ἀπαρχὴν τῶν ὄντων, τὸν υἱόν. *Clem. Alex.* p. 829. Σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἄναρχον, καὶ ἀειγενὲς, προφαινόμενον αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ λέγουσα σοφία, ἐγὼ ἤμην ᾗ προσέχαιρε. *Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas.* vol. i. p. 254.

[m] Clem. Alex. p. 832. Alexand. Alex. apud Theod. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 19. Cyrill. Hieros. Catech. xi. cap. 13. p. 155. Athanas. vol. i. p. 99, 526.

[n] Euseb. in Psalm. p. 15.

reduce the controversy to this single *question*[o], and to boast highly of the *ancients* as holding the *affirmative*, charging the *negative* as being an unheard of *fiction* and *invention* of mine, with repeated *insults*, and such a degree of groundless *assurance* as is scarce to be paralleled; I say, since he has indulged himself in these peculiar strains, it may not be improper to lay before the reader a summary view of the *ancient* doctrine upon that head. I shall content myself with *references*, for the most part, to my own books; pointing out to the reader such material *quotations*, relating to this question, as lie scattered in several parts, under several heads, in the course of our debate. I shall follow the chronological order of the Fathers, shewing all the way for what reasons I judge that every one respectively was in the same persuasion that I defend, and not in the contrary *hypothesis*.

A. D. 116. Ignatius.

Ignatius did not believe that the *Father* is *naturally* Governor over the Son, but the contrary: because he acknowledged the *consubstantiality*[p], and *coeternity*[q], and *necessary existence*[r] of God the Son. Any *supremacy* of the Father, *consistent* with these doctrines of the *Son*, may be readily admitted. But the adversary has not been able to produce any testimony from him to prove the *natural* dominion of the Father over the Son. What he has pleaded may be seen in the Reply[s], and a confutation of it in my Second Defence[t].

I may just take notice of an incidental remark which this writer drops (p. 63.) to invalidate some of my testimonies for the Son's *necessary existence*. He says that φύσει, or κατὰ φύσιν, does not express *necessary existence*; for man is φύσει, or κατὰ φύσιν ἄνθρωπος. Admitting this, yet φύσει ὢν can never be applied to any thing but what exists *necessarily*: and it may always be *certainly* determined from the *context*, or circumstances, or from the author's usual *phraseology*, what φύσει, or κατὰ φύσιν, signifies in any ancient writer: and this gentleman will not be able to shew that I have misconstrued the phrase so much as in a *single* testimony. Suppose, for instance, *natura bonus* may be

[o] The main thing he lays to my charge is, the denying the alone *natural* dominion, p. 8, 9, 15, 24, 27, 32, 40, 44, 46, 89, 118, 119.

[q] See Bull. Def. F. N. p. 40.

[p] Ibid. p. 174, &c.

[r] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 572.

[s] Reply, p. 261, 294.

[t] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 572, &c. 591, 592.

sometimes applicable to a *man* or an *angel;* yet it may at other times signify *necessary existence* so plainly, that no one can doubt of it: particularly in Tertullian, in this sentence: *Bonus natura Deus solus: qui enim quod est sine initio habet, non institutione habet illud, sed natura,* &c. *Tertull. adv. Marc.* lib. ii. cap. 6.

146. Justin Martyr.

Justin Martyr did not believe that the Father is *naturally* Ruler or Governor over the Son.

1. Because he declares that God the Son is not *another God*[u] besides the Father; at the same time acknowledging the Son to be *God.*

2. Because he asserts the Son's *consubstantiality*[x].

3. Because he gives to God the Son such high and great titles as Scripture appropriates to the *one true* God of Israel[y].

4. Because he teaches the *necessary existence* of God the Son[z].

5. Because he declares for the *worship* of God the Son, yet admitting no worship as due to any but to *God alone*[a].

Any *supremacy* of the *Father, consistent* with these doctrines of the *Son,* may be admitted. But the adversary has not produced any testimony that may not be fairly accounted for upon the foot of *voluntary* economy, or *natural* priority of *order.* The principal pretences from this Father's writings may be seen in the Reply[b], and the *answers* in my Second Defence[c]. Let this gentleman *disprove* the particulars here asserted; or if not, let him *admit* them, and then we need not dispute further.

170. Lucian.

Lucian, or some other contemporary Pagan writer, bears testimony to the faith of the Christians in his time, in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: which means there *one God supreme*[d] in the whole three. This doctrine is not consistent with any *natural* dominion of God the *Father* over God the *Son:* but is rather

[u] See my Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 235, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 439.

[x] See Bull. D. F. p. 65, &c.

[y] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 481.

[z] Ibid. p. 578.

[a] My Sermons, vol. ii. p. 178. Defence, vol. i. p. 418, 423. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 438, 666.

[b] Reply, p. 129, &c. 263, &c. 293, 375.

[c] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 481, &c. 506, 578, 593, &c. 666, 672, &c. Compare Nourrii Apparat. ad Bibl. Max. p. 405, &c. vol. i.

[d] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 179. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 439.

a full and clear testimony for one *common dominion* of all the three Persons.

177. ATHENAGORAS.

Athenagoras could not believe any *natural* rule over God the Son.

1. Because he asserts his *consubstantiality*[e].

2. Because he asserts his *coeternity*[f].

3. Because he makes Father and Son *one God*[g].

4. Because he maintains the Son's *necessary existence*[h].

5. Because he is express for the *common dominion* of both[i].

Nothing can be pleaded on the contrary, but what is easily reconciled by admitting a *temporal* procession, generation, or manifestation of the Son, and a priority of *order* in the Father. The pretences of the Reply[k] are all answered in my Second Defence[l].

181. THEOPHILUS.

For the *consubstantiality* and *coeternity* maintained by this writer, Bishop Bull may be consulted. Besides which, he gives Christ the title of Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς, *God* absolutely so called[m]: and he drops some intimations, by a *similitude* which he makes use of, that Father and Son are *one God*, and have *one dominion*[n]. Objections of the Reply[o] have been considered and answered[p].

187. IRENÆUS.

Irenæus could never believe that the *Father* is *naturally* Governor over the Son.

1. Because he ascribes to God the Son *titles* and *attributes* peculiar to the God of Israel[q], God supreme.

2. Because he asserts his *consubstantiality*, *coeternity*, and *necessary existence*[r].

3. Because he makes Father and Son *one God*[s].

4. Because he expressly excludes any *inferior* God, and clearly intimates that God the Son has no God *above* him[t].

[e] See Bull. D. F. p. 71. Nourrii Appar. vol. i. p. 487.
[f] See Bull. D. F. p. 203. Nourrii Appar. vol. i. p. 489.
[g] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 178. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 439.
[h] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 580.
[i] Ibid. p. 442.
[k] Reply, p. 57, 105, &c. 299.
[l] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 439, &c. 580, &c. 597, 666.
[m] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 485.
[n] Ibid. p. 486.
[o] Reply, p. 114, 142, 270.
[p] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 486, 597, &c.
[q] Ibid. p. 487.
[r] Ibid. p. 582, &c.
[s] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 179. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 436, 443, &c.
[t] See First Defence, vol. i. p. 306. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 450.

There is nothing on the contrary to be pleaded from this author, but what may be fairly and easily reconciled upon the foot of the *economy*, and the natural *order* of the Persons; as hath been particularly shewn[u] in answer to the Reply[x].

192. Clemens of Alexandria.

This ancient writer could never have a thought of *subjecting* God the Son to the natural *rule* and governance of God the Father. For,

1. He asserts the *necessary existence*[y] of the Son, which is an insuperable bar and obstacle to any such *subjection*.

2. He makes him to be the *Jehovah*, the *Almighty God*[z] of the Jews, who had no God above him.

3. He even *equalizes*[a] the Son, that is, *proclaims him equal* to the Father.

4. He gives him the titles ὁ Θεὸς[b], and παντοκράτωρ[c], titles expressive of dominion *supreme*, and such as the Observator would translate *supreme God*, and *supreme Ruler*, whenever spoken of the Father.

5. He makes Father and Son *one God of the whole universe*[d]: which certainly expresses *equality* and union of *dominion*.

6. Lastly, he addresses to both together as *one Lord*[e]; which does not look like addressing to a *Sovereign* and his natural *subject*, but to one God and Lord *supreme*. The Author of the Reply shewed his good wishes and endeavours[f] to *elude* the testimonies: but failed in the performance[g].

200. Tertullian.

Tertullian could never think that the Father is *naturally* the Son's Ruler, or Governor.

1. He admits the *necessary existence* of the *Son*[h].

2. He makes both to be *one substance*, and *one God*[i].

[u] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 430, 434, 435, &c. 487, 557, &c. 582, 583, 599, 667.
[x] Reply, p. 10, 17, 19, 23, 41, 60, 61, 62, 93, &c. 140, 239, 283, 295, 379, 393, 417, 484, 496, 507.
[y] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 584.
[z] Ibid. p. 488.
[a] Ibid. p. 452.
[b] Ibid. p. 520.
[c] Ibid. p. 521, 755.
[d] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 435, 451. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 180.
[e] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 451.
[f] Reply, p. 80, &c. 140, 190, 227, 377.
[g] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 451 to 457, 488, 599.
[h] Ibid. p. 586.
[i] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 181. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 457, 435. Compare p. 489.

3. He rejects with indignation the notion of an *inferior God*[k].

4. He directly and *expressly* asserts the one *power* and dignity of both[l]. The objections made by the Reply[m] are answered at large[n].

225. Hippolytus.

This ancient writer could not suppose God the Son to be *naturally* under the rule of God the Father.

1. Because he makes them both *one God*[o], and consequently one God *supreme*.

2. He asserts the *consubstantiality*[p] and *necessary existence*[q] of God the Son.

3. He joins all the three Persons equally in his *doxology*[r], which can by no means be suitable to a *Sovereign* and his *subjects*.

The objections made by the Reply[s] have been easily solved[t] upon the foot of the *economy*, and distinction of *order*.

249. Origen.

Origen, in his certainly genuine works, no way favours the notion of the *Son's* being *naturally* subject to the Father.

1. He asserts Father and Son to be *one God*[u].

2. He makes but one object of worship[x] of both.

3. He maintains the Son's *necessary existence*[y].

4. He is very express for the *coexistence, coeternity*, and *consubstantiality* of God the Son[z].

5. He asserts that the Son is *commensurate* to the Father, equal in *greatness*[a].

Any possible *supremacy* of the Father, *consistent* with these

[k] First Defence, vol. i. p. 306. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 534.

[l] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 458, 535. Bull. D. F. p. 261. *Statu* ab altero diversum non esse, idem valet atque illud ipsi non esse subditum, sed par et æquale. *Bull.* ibid.

[m] Reply, p. 55, 111, 76.

[n] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 457 to 462, 489.

[o] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 182. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 464, 490. First Defence, vol. i. p. 287.

[p] First Defence, vol. i. p. 488.

[q] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 414.

[r] Ibid. p. 586. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 149. and Hippolytus, vol. ii. p. 18. Fabric.

[s] Reply, p. 13, 16, 20, 39, 61, 65, 91, 117, &c. 509.

[t] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 413, &c. 430, 462, &c. 599, &c.

[u] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 182. Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 215. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 436, 465.

[x] First Defence, vol. i. p. 424. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 673.

[y] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 586.

[z] First Defence, vol. i. p. 286. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 148, 149. See also Bishop Bull.

[a] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 418.

plain and avowed doctrines, will not be scrupled. The Reply[b] has boasted much of Origen the other way, and produced counter-evidences; but such as are either not to be compared with ours for *genuineness* and *certainty*, or such as may be reconciled[c] with the doctrine here mentioned, by allowing a superiority of *office* and *order*. Let him either *disprove* these particulars, or *reconcile* them with his notion of the *alone supremacy*.

250. CYPRIAN.

Cyprian has nothing in favour of the pretended *natural* dominion over God the Son; but the contrary.

1. As including all the three Persons in the *one God*[d].

2. As applying to God the Son the *appropriate* titles of the one true God[e].

The few things which the author of the Reply[f] had to offer are answered in my Second Defence[g].

257. NOVATIAN.

Novatian looks more favourably to the notion of a *natural* superiority of dominion than any writer before him. But as he has several tenets *inconsistent* with such a notion, so what he has that seems most to favour it does not necessarily require any such sense, but may very well bear a candid construction.

1. He maintains *equality*, and *unity* of *substance*[h].

2. He asserts the *eternity*[i] of God the Son; and, as it seems, *eternal* generation[k].

3. He applies such texts to Christ as are intended of the *Jehovah*, and one true God of Israel[l].

These tenets are by no means consistent with a *natural* superiority of *dominion* over God the Son: neither does Novatian assert any *subjection* but what may reasonably be understood of the *economy*, as I have observed[m]. The pretences of the Reply are all distinctly considered in my Second Defence, vol. ii. And though the Observator[n] has since charged me as being

[b] Reply, p. 4, 5, 10, 18, 20, 23, 28, 31, 42, 49, 56, 69, 70, 84, 85, 187, 219, 242, 272, 295, 319, 327, 375, 380, &c. 442, 446, &c.

[c] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 418, 466, 587, &c. 600, 638, &c. 667, 673, &c.

[d] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 183.

[e] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 490. Bull. D.F. p. 131.

[f] Reply, p. 10, 24, 28, 146.

[g] Vol. ii. 491, 678.

[h] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 282, 295, 486, 527. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 477, 492, 745.

[i] First Defence, vol. i. p. 354, &c.

[k] Ibid. p. 356.

[l] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 492, 427.

[m] Ibid. p. 427, 493.

[n] Observations, p. 54.

too hasty, in saying that the ancients never speak of Christ as a *constituted* God, because of a passage of Novatian, where the phrase is *Deus constitutus*; yet he thought proper to *conceal* from the reader what I had said[o] to obviate his construction of that very place.

259. Dionysius of Alexandria.

Dionysius of Alexandria could not be in the *hypothesis* of *natural* rule over God the Son.

1. Because he asserted the *coeternity* of God the Son, in very full and express words[p], and his *eternal*, *beginningless*[q] generation.

2. Because he was as *express* for the *consubstantiality*, name and thing[r].

3. Because he taught the *necessary existence* of the Son, representing it as *necessary* for the Son to *coexist*, as for the Father to *exist*; as may be seen at large in Athanasius. Besides that in *other* words[s] he has also expressed the same thing.

4. He included all the three Persons in the *Monad*, or the *one God*, as I have shewn elsewhere[t]: which is making all together one God *supreme*, directly contrary to the notion of a *natural* superiority of *dominion*. The Reply[u] has some few things to say of this author; which had been long ago obviated by Bishop Bull, and are since answered in my Second Defence[x]. I might observe too, how Dionysius particularly guards[y] against the notion of the Son's being *created* by the Father, which is the only thing that could be a foundation of *natural* dominion.

259. Dionysius of Rome.

This excellent writer is no less full and plain against the hypothesis of *natural* superiority of dominion.

1. By declaring it *blasphemy* to suppose the Son a *creature*[z],

[o] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 555.

[p] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 150.

[q] Ὁ δέ γε Θεὸς αἰώνιόν ἐστι φῶς, οὔτε ἀρξάμενον, οὔτε λῆξόν ποτε, οὐκοῦν αἰώνιον πρόκειται, καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ἄναρχον καὶ ἀειγενὲς προφαινόμενον αὐτοῦ. *Dionys. ap. Athan.* vol. i. p. 254, 258.

[r] Vid. ap. Athanas. vol. i. p. 255, 230.

[s] Μόνος δὲ ὁ υἱὸς ἀεὶ συνὼν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος πληρούμενος, καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ὢν ἐκ τοῦ πατρός. *Apud Athan.* p. 254.

[t] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 185. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 420.

[u] Reply, p. 71, 331.

[x] Vol. ii. p. 419, 420.

[y] Ἐὰν δέ τις τῶν συκοφαντῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἁπάντων ποιητὴν τὸν Θεὸν καὶ δημιουργὸν εἶπον, οἰήται με καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ λέγειν, ἀκουσάτω μου πρότερον πατέρα φήσαντος αὐτὸν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς προσγέγραπται. *Apud Athan.* p. 257.

[z] First Defence, vol. i. p. 357, 487. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 468, 634.

understanding *creature* in the common sense of *precarious*, or *temporal* existence.

2. By teaching the *necessary existence* of God the Son, inasmuch as the Father never was, never *could be* without him[a].

3. By including all the three Persons in the *one true Godhead*[b]. Some little objections of the Reply to the *genuineness* of the piece are abundantly answered in my Second Defence[c].

260. Gregory of Neocæsarea.

This celebrated Father is full and express, in his famous *creed*, against any thing *created*, or *servient*, in the *Trinity*[d]; asserting one undivided *glory* and *dominion* of all the three Persons. There have been *suspicions* raised against the genuineness of this creed; but such as have not been thought of sufficient weight by any of the best *critics*, against the express testimonies of Ruffinus and Gregory Nyssen, confirmed, in some measure, by Nazianzen[e].

Besides what Gregory has in his *creed*, he has some considerable things to the same purpose in another work, written about the year 239, and which is of *unquestioned* authority. The titles and epithets he therein gives to the Son are, *Creator* and *Governor of all things*[f], *really*, or naturally, *united to* the Father[g], the most *perfect living* Word[h]; the last expressions very like to some in his creed, and a *probable* argument of their having the same author.

270. Antiochian Fathers.

The synodical epistle of these Fathers gives to God the Son such *titles* as belong to the *one true God*. But as they have nothing *express* upon our present question on either side, it may be sufficient to have mentioned them, and to refer[i] to what has been said of them.

290. Methodius is express against the Son's being a *creature*, and for *eternal* generation and *immutable* existence[k]: tenets

[a] See Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 469. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 149.

[b] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 184. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 469.

[c] Vol. ii. p. 419, 634.

[d] Οὔτε οὖν κτιστὸν, ἢ δοῦλον ἐν τῇ τριάδι, &c. Τριὰς τελείᾳ, δόξῃ, καὶ ἀϊδιότητι, καὶ βασιλείᾳ μὴ μεριζομένη, μηδὲ ἀναλλοτριομένη. Fabric. ed. p. 224.

[e] Nazianz. Orat. xxxvii. p. 609. Orat. xl. p. 668.

[f] Πάντων δημιουργῷ καὶ κυβερνήτῃ.

[g] Πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀτεχνῶς ἡνωμένος.

[h] Τελειότατον καὶ ζῶντα, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρώτου νοῦ Λόγον ἔμψυχον. *Bull. D. F.* p. 154.

[i] Reply, p. 18, 20, 64, 148, 445. Bull. D. F. p. 158, 199, 263. My Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 491.

[k] First Defence, vol. i. p. 357, 511. Answer to Dr. Whitby, vol. ii. p. 223, 224. Bull. D. F. p. 164, 200.

utterly repugnant to such a *natural* inferiority as is pretended. What the Reply[l] had to object is answered in another place[m].

300. Theognostus is also *express* against the Son's being a *creature*, and for his *consubstantiality*[n]. What the Reply[o] has to object had been abundantly before answered by Bishop Bull.

303. As to Arnobius, little has been pleaded on either side from him. He has some strong expressions which seem to carry the *supremacy* very high: and he has other expressions very full for the *true* and essential divinity of God the Son. Bishop Bull[p] and Le Nourry[q] may be consulted in respect of both the parts, and how to make them *consistent*.

318. Lactantius has been largely considered both in the Reply[r] and in my Second Defence. He makes Father and Son *one God*[s]. He makes both *one substance*[t]. He describes him under the characters of the one true God[u]. He supposes both to be *one object* of worship[x]. He joins the Son with the Father in the same *dominion*, and exempts the Son from the *necessity* of obeying[y]. These tenets are perfectly repugnant to *natural* superiority of *dominion* in the Father only. Nevertheless, he has some *crude* expressions, scarce excusable in a catechumen of his abilities.

322. Alexander of Alexandria.

This venerable Patriarch, defender of the Catholic faith against his Presbyter Arius, shews in his two letters the Church's doctrine in his time. He could not be a friend to any *natural* subjection of God the Son. For,

1. He asserts his *coeternity*, and *inseparability* with the Father.

2. He maintains his *necessary existence*.

3. His *natural* divinity, or *Godhead*, of and from the Father.

4. His *high* or supreme Godhead. Proofs of these particulars may be seen in my Second Defence[z]; where also objections are answered, such as had been offered in the Reply[a]. Hitherto we

[l] Reply, p. 290, 334.
[m] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 600. Bull. D.F. p. 166.
[n] See Bull. D. F. p. 135.
[o] Reply, p. 333.
[p] Bull. D. F. p. 169.
[q] Nourrii Apparat. vol. ii. p. 350.
[r] Reply, p. 49, 55, 63, 86, &c. 119, 388.
[s] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 470, &c.
[t] Ibid. p. 470, 471.
[u] Ibid. p. 493.
[x] Ibid. p. 678.
[y] Ibid. p. 474.
[z] Ibid. p. 421. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 149. First Defence, vol. i. p. 358.
[a] Reply, p. 57, 73, 291, 355, 451, 498.

have not found one man full and express for the *natural* government, or *natural* subjection among the Persons of the sacred Trinity. Several have been here cited who were *expressly* against it: and the rest *implicitly* condemn it; while none, either *directly* or so much as *consequentially*, maintain it. But now I take leave to name a man who did maintain it, and in pretty plain and broad terms.

323. Arius.

Arius, with his confederates, in a letter to Alexander, delivers it for doctrine[b], that God the Father *rules over* God the Son, as being *his God*, and having existed *before* him. Here may Dr. Clarke and his followers see the first lines of their doctrine; which was afterwards filled up and completed by Aetius and Eunomius.

These were the authors and founders of that *natural* supremacy of *dominion* over God the Son, that *natural subjection* and *servitude* of two of the *divine* Persons, which these gentlemen are so eagerly contending for; and which, with as *groundless* and *shameless* a confidence as I ever knew, they presume to father upon the sacred *Scriptures*, upon the ancient *creeds*, and upon the venerable *Doctors* of the Church; against plain *fact*, against the fullest and clearest evidence to the contrary. I shall proceed, a little lower, to shew what reception this Arian conceit met with.

I shall say nothing of Eusebius of Cæsarea, of this time, a *doubtful* man, and of whom it is difficult to determine in the whole[c].

340. Athanasius.

Athanasius, about this time, began to write in the cause against Arius. His Exposition of Faith is of uncertain date: and so I may place it any where from the time he entered the list against the Arians. His doctrine is well known from his many works. I shall cite but one short sentence of his, speaking of God the Son. He is "Ruler supreme, of Ruler supreme:

[b] Ἄρχει γὰρ αὐτοῦ, ὡς Θεὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὤν. *Ap. Athan. de Synod.* vol. ii. p. 730.

Phœbadius well expresses the Arian doctrine of *natural* subjection, at the same time distinguishing it from the Catholic doctrine of *filial* ministration. Subjectum Patri Filium, non Patris et Filii nomine, ut Sancta et Catholica dicit Ecclesia, sed creaturæ conditione, profitemini. *Phœbad. B. P. P.* tom. v. p. 303.

[c] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 494 to 504.

" for whatsoever things the Father bears rule and dominion " over, over the same does the Son also rule and govern [d]."

348. CYRIL of Jerusalem.

The elder Cyril was always looked upon as a very *moderate* man, and not so vehement against the Arians as many others. Yet let us hear how expressly and fully he condemns the doctrine of *natural* subjection in the *Trinity*, [e]owning none other but *voluntary* and *chosen*.

" [f]All things," says he, " are servants of his," (of the Father;) " but his only Son and his own Holy Spirit are exempt from " the all things: and all these servants do, by the one Son, in " the Holy Ghost, serve the Master." [g]In another place the same Cyril says, " The Father has not one glory, and the Son " another, but one and the same." So little countenance had the *alone* supremacy of dominion, or *natural subjection* of two *divine* Persons, at that time.

358. HILARY.

Hilary's doctrine on this head is, that the *subjection* of the Son is *voluntary*, and not by *constraint* [h]; that is to say, it is *economical*, not *natural*. [i]In another place he directly denies that either the Son is *servant* to the Father, or the Father *Lord* over him, save only in respect of the *incarnation* of God the Son: where he expressly again denies any *natural* subjection of God the Son as such.

360. Zeno Veronensis's doctrine, to the same purpose, may be seen in my First Defence [k].

[d] Παντοκράτορα ἐκ παντοκράτορος· πάντων γὰρ ὧν ἄρχει ὁ πατὴρ καὶ κρατεῖ, ἄρχει καὶ κρατεῖ καὶ ὁ υἱός. *Athan. Expos. Fid.* vol. i. p. 99.

[e] Οὐκ ἀναγκαστὴν ὑπακοὴν ἔχων, ἀλλ' αὐτοπροαίρετον εὐπείθειαν· οὐ γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστι, ἵνα ἀνάγκῃ ὑποταγῇ· ἀλλὰ υἱός ἐστιν, ἵνα προαιρέσει καὶ φιλοστοργίᾳ πεισθῇ. *Cyrill. Cat.* xv. n. 30. p. 240.

[f] Τὰ σύμπαντα μὲν δοῦλα αὐτοῦ· εἷς δὲ αὐτοῦ μόνος υἱὸς, καὶ ἐν τὸ ἅγιον αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα ἐκτὸς τούτων πάντων, καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα δοῦλα, διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς υἱοῦ ἐν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι δουλεύει τῷ δεσπότῃ. *Ibid. Cat.* viii. p. 123.

[g] Οὐ γὰρ ἄλλην δόξαν πατὴρ, καὶ ἄλλην υἱὸς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτήν. *Catech.* vi. p. 87.

[h] Subjectio Filii naturæ pietas, subjectio autem cæterorum creationis infirmitas. *Hilar. de Synod.* p. 1195.

[i] *Servus* enim non erat, cum esset secundum Spiritum Deus Dei Filius. Et secundum commune judicium, ubi non est *servus*, neque *Dominus* est. Deus quidem et Pater nativitatis est unigeniti Dei: sed ad id, quod *servus* est, non possumus non nisi tunc ei *Dominum* deputare cum *servus* est: quia si cum ante per *naturam* non erat *servus*, et postea secundum naturam esse quod non erat cœpit; non alia *dominatus* causa intelligenda est, quam quæ exstitit *servitutis*; tunc habens et naturæ dispensatione *Dominum*, cum præbuit ex hominis assumptione se *servum*. *Hilar. de Trin.* lib. xi. p. 1090.

[k] Vol. i. p. 443. Bull. D. F. p. 266.

370. Basil's also, no less full and express against the pretended *natural* dominion on one hand, and *subjection* on the other, is shewn in my Second Defence[l].

375. Gregory Nazianzen's testimony I shall throw into the margin[m]: the same will be a confirmation of the Creed of Thaumaturgus.

380. Gregory Nyssen's doctrine may be seen in my Defences[n], very full to the purpose.

382. I conclude with Ambrose[o], having thus brought the doctrine low enough down. No doubt can be made of the Catholics all the way following to this very time.

These, after *Scripture*, are my authors for that very doctrine which the Observator every where, without the least scruple, charges upon me as my *fiction* and *invention*. Such is his great regard to *truth*, to *decency*, and to common *justice:* such his respect to the English readers, in imposing upon them any the grossest and most palpable *abuses*. Let him, when he is disposed, or when he is able, produce his vouchers from Catholic antiquity, for the *natural* subjection of God the Son, or the *natural* superiority of the Father's *dominion* over him. He may give proof of a superiority of *order* (which I dispute not) or of *office*, which I readily admit: but as to there being any *natural* rule, or *natural* subjection among the *divine* Persons, or within the *Trinity* itself, none of the ancients affirm it; all, either directly or indirectly, *reclaim* against it. He may run up his doctrine to Eunomius, and so on to Arius, where it began. He, I believe, is the first man upon record that ever allowed the *preexistence* and *personality* of the *Logos*, and yet made God the Son, as such, *naturally* subject to the *dominion* of the Father; appointing him a *Governor*, another God *above* him: which was really Arius's sense, and is the plain sense likewise of his *successors* at this day.

[l] Vol. ii. p. 401, 646, 751.

[m] Θεὸν τὸν πατέρα, Θεὸν τὸν υἱὸν, Θεὸν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, τρεῖς ἰδιότητας θεότητα μίαν, δόξῃ καὶ τιμῇ καὶ οὐσίᾳ καὶ βασιλείᾳ μὴ μεριζομένην, ὥς τις τῶν μικρῷ πρόσθεν θεοφόρων ἐφιλοσόφησεν. *Orat.* xxxvii. p. 609.

Οὐδὲν τῆς τριάδος δοῦλον, οὐδὲ κτιστὸν, οὐδὲ ἐπείσακτον, ἥκουσα τῶν σοφῶν τινος λέγοντος. *Orat.* xl. p. 666.

[n] Vol. i. p. 443. Vol. ii. p. 401.

[o] Non sunt enim duo Domini, ubi *Dominatus unus est;* quia Pater in Filio, et Filius in Patre, et ideo *Dominus unus*. *Ambros. de Sp. S.* l. iii. c. 15. p. 686.

THE CONCLUSION.

I HAVE nothing now to do but to take my leave of these gentlemen for this time. If they are disposed to proceed in the way they have now taken, it will be no great trouble to me (while God grants me life and health) to do myself *justice*, as often as I see *needful*; and to support, with God's assistance, the *cause* I have undertaken, as well against *calumnies* now, as against *arguments* before. But I think, since the *argument* is in a manner brought to an end, it is time for these gentlemen to put an end to the *debate* too; lest, after exposing the *weakness* of their *cause*, they may meet with a more *sensible* mortification, by going on to the utmost to expose their *own*.

They have done enough for *Arianism*; and more a great deal than the best cause in the world (though theirs is a very bad one) could ever require. They have omitted nothing likely to *convince*, nothing that could be any way serviceable to *deceive* their readers. They have ransacked the Socinian stores for the eluding and frustrating the Catholic interpretation of *Scripture texts*. They have gone on to *Fathers*: and whatever they could do there, by *wresting* and *straining*, by *mangling*, by *misinterpreting*, by false *rendering*, and the like, they have done their utmost to make them all Arians. And, lest that should not be sufficient, they have attempted the same thing upon the ancient creeds, and even upon *modern* confessions; upon the very Articles and Liturgy of the Church of England. To complete all, having once found out the secret of fetching in what and whom they pleased, they have proceeded further to drag me in with the rest[a], into the very doctrine that I had been largely *confuting*.

They have spared no pains, or art, to *disguise* and colour over their wretched tenets, and to give them the best face and gloss that they could possibly bear. They will not call the Son a *creature*; nay, it was some time before they would say

[a] See Reply, p. 116. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 537.

plainly that he is not *necessarily existing*, till the course of the debate and some pressing straits almost forced it from them; and that not till after some of the plainer and simpler men of the party had first blabbed it out. At last, they would seem not so much to be writing *against* the divinity of God the Son, as *for* the honour of God the *Father*. They do not care to say, they are pleading for the *natural* subjection and servitude of the Son, but it is for the *natural* dominion of the *Father* over him: and they do not commonly choose so much as to say that in plain and broad terms; but they hint it, and mince it, under the words "alone supremacy of the Father's dominion." And for fear that that should be taken hold on, and wrested from them, in due course of argument, they clap in *authority* with *dominion;* that they may have something at least that looks *orthodox*, something that may bear a *colour* upon the foot of *antiquity*, as admitting of a *double* meaning. And they have this further view in *confounding* distinct things together, to make a show as if we admitted no kind of *authority* as *peculiar* to the Father when we deny his *alone* dominion; or that if we *assert* one, we must of course, and at the same time, *assert both*. To carry on the *disguise* still further, they represent their adversaries as teaching that the Father has *no natural supremacy* of authority and dominion *at all;* without taking care to add, (what they ought to add,) *over the Son and Holy Ghost*, to undeceive the reader; who is not perhaps aware that *subjection* they are contriving for *two* of the *divine* Persons, while they put on a *face* of commendable zeal for the *honour* of the *first*. Such is their excessive care not to *shock* their young, timorous disciples; not to make them *wise* at once, but by degrees, after leading them about in their *simplicity* for a time, with their eyes half open.

Besides giving a *fair* gloss and outside to their *own* scheme, they have next studiously endeavoured to *expose* and blacken the *faith received*. It is *Sabellianism*, it is *Tritheism*, it is *scholastic* jargon, it is *metaphysical* reverie, *nonsense*, *absurdity*, *contradiction*, and what not: contrary to *Scripture*, contrary to all the *ancients*, nay, contrary even to *moderns* also: and, to make it look as little and *contemptible* as possible in the eyes of all men, it is at length nothing more than Dr. Waterland's own novel *fiction* and *invention*.

Now I appeal to all serious and thinking men, whether any thing can be done that these men have not done, in favour of

their beloved *Arianism;* and whether they may not now fairly be *excused*, if they should desist, and proceed no further. A great deal less than this, though in ever so *good* a *cause*, might have been sufficient: and had they sung their *liberavi animam* some twelve months backwards, I know not whether any truly *good* and *conscientious* Arian could have thought them *deserters*, or have condemned them for it. Let the *cause* be ever so *right* or just, yet who hath *required it at their hands* that they should pursue it to such hideous lengths? Their design, suppose, is to promote *truth* and *godliness:* let it then be in *God's* own way, and by *truth*, and truth *only*. There can be no necessity of *deceiving*, of *betraying*, of *beguiling* any man even into *truth*, (though this is not *truth*,) by *disguises*, by *misreports*, by making things *appear* what they *are not*, or not suffering them to *appear* what they really *are*. This is going out of the way, wide and far, and defending *truth*, (were it *really* truth,) by making fearful inroads upon *simplicity* and godly *sincerity*, upon moral *honesty* and *probity*.

In conclusion, I must be so just to myself as to say, that considering how I was at first *forced*, in a manner, into *public* controversy, and what kind of a controversy this is, and how *often* and how *anciently* before *decided* by the churches of Christ; I was civil enough in engaging the men so *equally* as I did, and upon so *fair terms*. I expected, I desired nothing, but that they would make the best use they could of their *own understandings*, from which we were promised great things. I invited them to the utmost *freedom*, in discussing every point within the compass of the question; only not to exceed the rules of just and regular debate[b]: that every branch of the cause might have a *new hearing*, and be *reexamined* with all possible strictness and severity. In a word, all I required was, to *dispute fair*, to *drop ambiguous terms*, or *define them*, to contemn every thing but *truth* in the search after *truth*, and to *keep close to the question;* at the same time binding myself up to a careful and constant observance of the same rules.

When their Reply appeared, I presently saw how far those gentlemen were gone off from *just* debate; and how little inclination they had to dispute *fairly* or *regularly*. To prejudice the readers, they began with *charges* and *complaints;* all *trifling*, most *false;* and some such as they themselves could scarce be

[b] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 557, &c.

weak enough to *believe*[c]. I need not say what followed. When I found how the case stood, I reminded them of their misconduct, sometimes raised my style, and treated them with some sharpness, (though with less than they had me, with much less reason,) to let them know that I understood what they were doing, and that if I could not be *confuted*, I would not be *contemned*. As *they* had taken the liberty of *charging* me very often, and very *unfairly*, with things that they *could not* prove; I made the less scruple of charging *them* with what I *could prove*. And this, I hope, the impartial reader will upon examination find, that all the *severity* on my side lies in the *truth* of the things *proved* upon them; while *theirs*, on the other, lies mostly in *invention*, and *abusive* words, which, for want of evidence to support them, must of course return upon their own heads. They appear, in their last pieces especially, to be no great friends to *ceremony*: so that I have reason to believe they will expect the less in return. I had hitherto been so tender of Mr. Jackson, as never to *name* him; though his own friends had done it at full length: particularly the Author of the Catalogue, &c. and Dr. Whitby twice[d], promising the world something very considerable from "the ac- "curate pen of Mr. Jackson." *Accuracy* is a thing which I shall not complain of, but shall ever receive, even from an adversary, with the utmost reverence and respect. I wish this gentleman had shewn something of it; if not in his account of *Scripture* or *Fathers*, (which his *hypothesis* perhaps would not permit,) yet in his *reports* and *representations*, at least, of *my words*, and *my sense*; which might have been expected from a man of *probity*. Whether his writing without a *name* has been his principal encouragement to take the *liberties* he has, I will not be positive: but it is highly probable; because *common prudence*, generally, is a sufficient bar against it, in men that have any *character* to *lose*, any *reputation* to be responsible for it. The just and proper views, or reasons, for a writer's concealing his *name* are, to relieve his *modesty*, or to screen himself from public *censure*; to be *frank* and *open* in debate, and to discuss every point of importance (though against the *received* opinions) with all due *freedom* and *strictness*, like a lover of *truth*. Had the gentlemen I am concerned with gone upon these *views*, or made use of their concealment for these or the like laudable purposes, I should have been perfectly well

[c] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 396.
[d] Whitby's Second Part of his Reply, p. 74, 122.

satisfied. But while they continue their *disguises* as before, and regard nothing less than *frank, fair*, and *open* debate; while the main use they make of their concealment is only to be less solicitous about what they think or write; pelting us from their *coverts* with *misreports*, and slandering in *masquerade:* when this is the case, it concerns a man in his own *defence* to intimate to these gentlemen, that they are not so entirely under *cover* as they may imagine; but that it is their *prudence* still to be a little more upon their *guard*, and to write with more *decency* hereafter, at least, for their own *credit* and *reputation*.

After all, if any reasonable man is disposed to examine this question, or any part of it, with *freedom* and *plainness*, with sincerity and strictness, attending to the *argument*, and representing every thing in a *fair* and *true* light, without *misreport* or *insult;* such a person, though *nameless*, would have a just title to all *tender*, and *candid*, and even *respectful* treatment, from an adversary; and, I am very sure, would never find any other than such from me. I shall ever think it a much greater disgrace to be outdone in *civility*, than in matter of *argument*. The first cannot happen but through a man's own *fault:* the other may; and when it does, there is no real discredit in yielding to the *truth* once made clear. Both sides, if they are good men, are *victorious* in such a case; because both attain the *only* thing that they aimed at, and both share the prize.

A

CRITICAL HISTORY

OF THE

ATHANASIAN CREED:

REPRESENTING

THE OPINIONS

OF

ANCIENTS AND MODERNS CONCERNING IT:

WITH

An Account of the Manuscripts, Versions, *and* Comments, *and such other particulars as are of moment for the determining the* Age, *and* Author, *and* Value *of it, and the Time of its* Reception *in the Christian Churches.*

TO HIS GRACE

WILLIAM

LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK,

PRIMATE OF ENGLAND AND METROPOLITAN.

My Lord,

I AM desirous of sending these papers abroad under your Grace's name, in confidence you will be a Patron to them, as you have been to the Author. I would make their way short and easy to the *public* esteem, by introducing them first into your Grace's acquaintance and good opinion: which if they have once the honour to obtain, I may then be assured that they will be both *useful* to the *world*, and acceptable with all *good men;* the height of my ambition.

The *subject*, my Lord, is the Athanasian Creed, the most accurate system of the Athanasian, that is, the Christian faith; of which your Grace is, by your station and character, by duty and office, and, what is more, by inclination and principle, and real services, the watchful Guardian and Preserver.

The happy fruits of it are visible in the slow and inconsiderable progress that the *new heresy* has been able to make within your *province;* where it died, in a manner, as it first arose, and no sooner began to lift up its head, but sunk down again in shame and confusion: as if the plenty of *good seed* sown had left no room for *tares*, or they could take no root in a *soil* so well *cultivated.*

While your Grace is promoting the honour and interests of our holy faith, in the *eminent* way, by the wisdom of your *counsels*, the authority of your *precepts*, and the brightness of your *high example;* I am endeavouring, in such a way as I can, to contribute something to the same *common cause*, though it be but slight and small, though it be only reviewing the *fences* and surveying the *outworks;* which is the most I pretend to in the *history* here presented.

What advantage *others* may reap from the *publication* will remain in suspense: but I am sure of one to *myself*, (and I lay hold of it with a great deal of pleasure,) the *opportunity* I thereby have of returning my *public* thanks to your Grace for your *public* favours. Though this, my Lord, is but a scanty expression for them, and far short, where the engaging *manner* and *circumstances*, known but to *few*, and not to be understood by *many*, make so considerable an addition in the whole, and almost double the obligation upon,

My Lord,

Your Grace's most obliged,

Most dutiful, and most obedient

Humble Servant,

DANIEL WATERLAND.

Cambridge, Magd. Coll.
Oct. 25, 1723.

THE

PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

WHAT I here present the Reader with, will not require much Preface. The introduction intimates the *design*, and *use*, and *partition* of the Work. The Appendix, which is an additional enlargement beyond my first design, gives account of itself. I subjoin two Indexes, for the ease and convenience of such persons as may be disposed, not only to read these sheets, but to study the subject. I should scarce have thought of making Indexes to so small a treatise, had I not found the like in Tentzelius, upon the same subject, and to a smaller Tract than this is. His were of considerable use to me, as often as I wanted to review any particular *author* or *passage*, or to compare distant parts, relating to the same things, one with another: the benefit therefore which I reaped from his labours, I am willing to pay back to the *public* by mine.

As to the *subject* of the following sheets, I make no question of its well deserving the thoughts and consideration of every studious reader; having before passed through the hands of many the most learned and most judicious men, and such as

would not misemploy their time and pains upon a trifle. As to the present *management* of it, it must be left to the reader to judge of, as he sees cause.

For the *chronology* of the several parts, I have consulted the best authors; endeavouring to fix it with as much accuracy as I could. Wherever I could certainly determine the age of any Tract, *printed* or *manuscript*, to a *year*, I set down that year: where I could not do it, (as in manuscripts one seldom can,) I take any probable year within the compass of time when an Author is known to have *flourished*; or for a manuscript, any probable year within such a *century*, or such a *king's reign* wherein the manuscript is reasonably judged to have been written: and I generally choose a *round* number, rather than otherwise, in such indefinite cases and instances.

Thus for example, first in respect of Authors: there is a comment of Venantius Fortunatus, upon the Athanasian Creed, which I reprint in my Appendix. I cannot fix the age of it to a year, no, nor to twenty years. All that is *certain* is, that it was made between 556, when Fortunatus first went into the Gallican parts, and 599, when he was advanced to the Bishopric of Poictiers. Within this wide compass, I choose the year 570. If any one shall rather choose 580, or 590, I shall not dispute it with him, nor doth any thing very material depend upon it: but if any good reason can be given for taking some other year rather than 570, I shall immediately acquiesce in it.

As to *manuscripts*, it is well known there is no fixing them precisely to a year, merely from the *hand* or *character*: and there are but few, in comparison, that carry their own certain dates with them. The best judges therefore in these matters will think it sufficient to point out the *king's reign*, or sometimes the *century*, wherein a manuscript was written: and in the very ancient ones, above 1000 years old, they will hardly be positive so much as to the *century*, for want of certain discriminating marks between manuscripts of the 5th, 6th, and 7th centuries.

It may be asked then, why I pretend to fix the several *manu-*

scripts, hereafter to be mentioned, to certain years in the margin; those that carry no certain dates, as well as the other that do? I do it for *order* and *regularity*, and for the more *distinct* perception of things; which is much promoted and assisted by this orderly ranging them according to *years*. At the same time the intelligent reader will easily understand where to take a thing as certain, and where to make allowances. It is something like the placing of cities, towns, rivers, &c. in a *map* or a *globe:* they have all their *certain* places there, in such or such precise degrees of *longitude* and *latitude;* which perhaps seldom answer to the strict truth of things, or to a mathematical exactness. But still it serves the purpose very near as well as if every thing had been adjusted with the utmost nicety: and the imagination and memory are mightily relieved by it. Thus much I thought proper to hint in vindication of my *method*, and to prevent any deception on one hand, or misconstruction on the other. I have, I think, upon the whole, generally gone upon the fairest and most probable presumption, and according to the most correct accounts of knowing and accurate men: but if I have any where through inadvertency, or for want of better information, happened to mistake in any material part, the best way of apologizing for it will be to correct it the first opportunity, after notice of it.

As to mere *omissions*, they will appear more or fewer, according to men's different judgments or opinions what to call an *omission*. I might have enlarged, considerably, the first chapter, which treats of the *learned moderns:* though some perhaps will think it too large already, and that it might better have been contracted. I have omitted several *moderns* mentioned by Tentzelius, whose professed design was to take in all: mine is only to take the *principal*, or as many as may suffice to give the Reader a full and distinct *idea* how this matter has stood, with the learned *moderns*, for eighty-five years last past.

In this second edition I have considerably shortened my Appendix, by throwing the several parts of it into the book itself, referring them to their proper places. Some few additional

observations will be found, here and there interspersed, and some *corrections*, of slight moment as to the main thing, (in which I make no alteration,) but contributing in some measure to the perfection and accuracy of the Work.

I conclude with professing, as before, that I shall be very glad if what hath been here done may but prove an useful introduction to more and larger discoveries. If any thing considerable still remains, either in private hands or public repositories; any thing that may be serviceable to clear up some *dark part*, or to correct any *mistake*, or to confirm and illustrate any important *truth* relating to the subject; I shall be very thankful to the person that shall oblige either *me* with private notice, or the *public* with new improvements.

Cambridge, Magd. Coll.
Nov. 1, 1727.

A

CRITICAL HISTORY

OF THE

ATHANASIAN CREED.

THE INTRODUCTION,

SHEWING

The Design and Use of this Treatise: with the Method and Partition of it.

MY design is, to inquire into the *age, author*, and value of that celebrated Confession, which goes under the name of the Athanasian Creed. The *general* approbation it hath long met with in the Christian churches, and the *particular* regard which hath been, early and late, paid to it in our *own*, (while it makes a part of our Liturgy, and stands recommended to us in our Articles,) will, I doubt not, be considerations sufficient to justify an undertaking of this kind: provided only, that the performance be answerable, and that it fall not short of its principal aim, or of the just expectations of the ingenuous and candid readers. No one will expect more of me than my *present* materials, such as I could procure, will furnish me with; nor any greater *certainty* in an essay of this nature, than things of this kind will admit of. If a reasonable diligence has been used in *collecting*, and due pains in *digesting*, and a religious care in *building* thereupon, (more than which I pretend not to,) it may, I hope, be sufficient with all equitable judges.

Many learned and valuable men have been before employed in the same design: but their treatises are mostly in Latin, and some of them very scarce, and hard to come at. I know not that any one hitherto has attempted a just treatise upon the subject in our own language, however useful it might be to the English readers; and the more so at this time, when the controversy about the *Trinity* is now spread abroad among all ranks and degrees of men with us, and the Athanasian Creed become the subject of common and ordinary conversation. For these reasons, I presumed, an English treatise might be most proper and seasonable: though otherwise, to avoid the unseemly mixture of English and Latin, (which will here be necessary,) and because of some parts which none but the *learned* can tolerably judge of; it might be thought more proper rather to have written a Latin treatise, and for the use only of scholars. However, there will be nothing very material but what an English reader may competently understand: and I shall endeavour to lay before him all that has been hitherto usefully observed upon the subject, that he may want nothing which may be conceived of any moment for the enabling him to form a true judgment. What I borrow from others shall be fairly acknowledged as I go along, and referred to its proper author or authors; it being as much my design to give an *historical* account of what others have done, as it is to supply what they have left undone, so far as my present materials, leisure, and opportunities may enable me to do it. Now to present the reader with a sketch of my design, and to shew him how one part is to hang upon another, my method will be as follows:

I. First, in order to give the clearer *idea* of what hath been already done, and of what may be still wanting, I begin with recounting the several conjectures or discoveries of the *learned moderns*.

II. Next, to enter upon the matter itself, and the evidence proper to it, I proceed to lay down the direct *testimonies* of the *ancients*, concerning the *age*, *author*, and *value* of this Creed.

III. To these I subjoin an account of the ancient *comments* upon the same Creed, being but another kind of *ancient testimonies*.

IV. After these follows a brief recital of the most ancient, or otherwise most considerable, *manuscripts* of this Creed, which I have either seen myself or have had notice of from others.

V. After the *manuscripts* of the Creed itself, I inquire also into the ancient *versions* of it, printed or manuscript; which will be also very serviceable to our main design.

VI. I come in the next place to treat of the ancient *reception* of this Creed in the Christian churches; as being a point of great moment, and which may be more *certainly* determined than the time of its *composition*, and may give great light into it.

VII. These preliminaries settled, to introduce to what follows, I then fall directly to the darkest part of all; namely, to the inquiry after the *age* and *author* of the Creed: which I despatch in two distinct chapters.

VIII. Next, I lay before the *learned* reader the Creed itself in its *original* language, with the most considerable various lections; together with *select* passages from ancient writers, either parallel to those of the Creed, or explanatory of it. And, lest the English reader should appear to be neglected, I subjoin the Creed in English with a running English commentary, serving much the same purpose with what is intended by the Latin quotations going before.

IX. I conclude all with a brief vindication of our own Church in receiving, and still retaining this excellent formulary of the Christian faith; answering the most *material* objections which have been made against us, on that account; and shewing the expediency, and even necessity of retaining this form, or something equivalent, for the preservation of the Christian faith against heresies. The Reader, I hope, will excuse it, if in compliance with custom, and to save myself the trouble of circumlocution, I commonly speak of it under the name of the Athanasian Creed; not designing thereby to intimate, either that it is a *Creed* strictly and properly so called, or that it is of Athanasius's composing: both which points will be discussed in the sequel.

CHAP. I.

The Opinions of the learned Moderns concerning the Athanasian Creed.

A. D. 1642. IN reciting the opinions of the learned *moderns*, I need go no higher than Gerard Vossius: who in his treatise De Tribus Symbolis, published in the year 1642, led the way to a more strict and critical inquiry concerning this Creed than had been before attempted. The writers before him, most of them, took it for granted that the Creed was Athanasius's, without troubling themselves with any very particular inquiry into it: and those few who doubted of it, or ascribed it to another, yet entered not closely into the merits of the cause, but went upon loose conjectures rather than upon any just rules of true and solid criticism. It will be sufficient therefore to begin our accounts from Vossius, who, since the time of his writing, has been ever principally mentioned by writers upon the subject, as being the first and most considerable man that has entered deep into it, and treated of it like a critic. He endeavoured to sift the matter thoroughly, as far as he was well able to do from *printed* books: as to *manuscripts*, he either wanted leisure or opportunity to search for them. The result of his inquiries concluded in the following particulars, some of them dubiously, all of them modestly proposed by him. 1. That the Athanasian Creed is not Athanasius's. 2. That it was originally a Latin composure, and of a Latin author or authors. 3. That it was made in the eighth or ninth century, in the time of Pepin, or of Charles the Great; and probably by some French divine. 4. That the first time it was produced, under the name of Athanasius, at least, with any assurance and confidence of it being his, was in the year 1233, when Pope Gregory the IXth's legates pleaded it at Constantinople in favour of the *procession* against the Greeks. 5. That it scarce ever obtained in any of the Christian churches before the year 1000. These were his sentiments when he wrote his treatise De Tribus Symbolis. But in a posthumous piece of his, having then seen what some other learned men had written upon the subject, he was content

to say that the Creed could not be set higher than the year 600[a]. How far Vossius was mistaken in his accounts will appear in the sequel. Thus far must be allowed him, that he managed the argument with great learning and judgment, made a good use of such materials as he was possessed of; and though he was not very happy in determining the *age* of the Creed, or the time of its *reception*, yet he produced so many and such cogent arguments against the Creed's being originally Greek, or being made by Athanasius, that they could never be answered.

1644. The learned Petavius, who in the year 1622 (when he published Epiphanius) had fallen in with the common opinion of this Creed's being Athanasius's, did yet afterward in his treatise of the *Trinity*, published in the year 1644, speak more doubtfully of it; in the mean while positive that it was written in Latin[b].

1647. The next considerable man, and who may be justly called a *first writer* in this argument, as well as Vossius, was our learned Usher. He had a good acquaintance with libraries and manuscripts; and was able from those stores to produce new evidences which Vossius knew not of. In the year 1647, he printed his Latin tract De Symbolis, with a prefatory epistle to Vossius. He there appeals to the testimonies of Ratram of Corbey, and Æneas Bishop of Paris, neither of them at that time made public, as also to Hincmar's of Rheims, (which had been published, but had escaped Vossius's observation,) to prove that this Creed had been confidently cited under the name of Athanasius almost 400 years before the time of Pope Gregory's legates, the time set by Vossius. And further by two manuscripts found in the Cotton Library, he thought he might carry up the antiquity of the Creed to the year 703, or even to 600. In short, he scrupled not to set the date of it above the year 447: for he supposes a council of Spain, held in that year, to have been acquainted with it, and to have borrowed the *Filioque* from it[c]. Thus far he, without any more particular determination about either the *age* or the *author*.

[a] Neque ante annum fuisse sexcentesimum, fuse ostendimus in libro De Symbolis. *Voss. Harm. Evang.* lib. ii. c. 13. p. 215.

[b] Petavius de Trin. lib. vii. c. 8. p. 392.

[c] Usser. de Symbolis, pag. 24. N.B. Usher went upon the supposition that the words, *a Patre, Filioque procedens*, were genuine; and not foisted into the Confession of that Council; as they now appear to have been, after a more careful view of the MSS. of best note, and greatest antiquity.

1647. About the same time Dr. Jeremy Taylor (afterwards Bishop of Down and Connor) published his Liberty of Prophesying, wherein he expresses his doubts whether the Creed be justly ascribed to Athanasius. But as he had never seen Usher's treatise, nor indeed Vossius's, nor was at that time furnished with any proper assistances to enable him to make any accurate inquiries into this matter, it may suffice just to have mentioned him, in regard to the deserved name he has since borne in the learned world.

1653. George Ashwell, B. D. published an English treatise which was printed at Oxford, entitled, Fides Apostolica, asserting the *received authors and authority of the Apostles' Creed.* At the end of which treatise, he has a pretty long Appendix concerning the Athanasian Creed; which is well written, and contains a good summary of what learned men, before him, had advanced upon the subject. His judgment of it is, that it was written in Latin, and by Athanasius himself, about the year 340.

1659. Hamon L'Estrange[d], in his Alliance of Divine Offices, gives his judgment of the Athanasian Creed, that it is not rightly ascribed to Athanasius, but yet ancient, and extant ann. 600 after Christ.

1659. Leo Allatius, about this year, printed his Syntagma de Symbolo S. Athanasii; which no doubt must be a very useful piece, especially in relation to the sentiments of the Greek churches, and the reception of this Creed amongst them: but I have never seen it; only I learn from Tentzelius (who yet could never get a sight of it) and Fabricius, that such a piece was written by Allatius in *modern* Greek, in 12mo. published at Rome 1658 or 1659. It appears to be very scarce, since none of the learned who have since written upon this Creed, have either referred to it, or given extracts out of it, so far as I have observed: excepting only something of that kind at Rome, A.D. 1667, by the College de propaganda Fide[e].

1663. Cardinal Bona, some years after, in his book De Divina Psalmodia, makes frequent mention of this Creed, touches slightly upon the question about its *age* and *author*, takes some cursory notice of what Vossius had said, but nevertheless ascribes it to Athanasius, as being composed by him while in the western

[d] Hamon L'Estrange, Annot. in chap. iv. p. 99.
[e] Vid. Tentzel. Judic. &c. p. 147.

parts, *teste Baronio;* resting his faith upon Baronius as his voucher[f].

1669. Our very learned Bishop Pearson, in his Exposition of the Creed, occasionally delivers his opinion, that the Athanasian Creed was written in Latin, and by some member of the Latin Church[g]; and extant about the year 600. Though the last particular he builds only upon an epistle attributed to Isidore of Seville, and since judged to be spurious.

1675. Joh. Lud. Ruelius, in his second volume, or tome, Conciliorum Illustratorum, has a particular dissertation, about thirty pages in quarto, upon this Creed. He follows Vossius's opinion for the most part, repeating the same arguments[h].

1675. Our next man of eminent character is Paschasius Quesnel, a celebrated French divine. In the year 1675, he published his famous edition of Pope Leo's works, with several very valuable dissertations of his own. His fourteenth contains, among other matters, a particular inquiry about the author of this Creed. He ascribes it to Vigilius Tapsensis, the African[i]; and so well defends his position, that he has almost drawn the learned world after him. He is looked upon as the father of that opinion, because he has so learnedly and handsomely supported it: but he is not the first that espoused it. For Labbe, about fifteen years before, had taken notice of some that had ascribed this Creed to Vigilius, at the same time signifying his dissent from them[k].

1676. The year after Quesnel, Sandius, the famous Arian, printed a second edition of his Nucleus, &c. with an Appendix: wherein he corrects his former judgment[l] of this Creed, taken implicitly from Vossius; and allows, nay, contends and insists upon it, that this Creed was not only known, but known under the name of Athanasius, as high at least as the year 770[m]. He ascribes it, upon conjecture, to one Athanasius, Bishop of Spire in Germany, who died in the year 642.

1678. I ought not to pass over our very learned Cudworth, though he has entered very little into the point before us. He gives his judgment, in passing, of the Creed commonly called

[f] Bona de Divina Psalmod. cap. xvi. sect. 18. p. 864.
[g] Pearson on the Creed, Art. viii. p. 324. ed. 3. art. v. p. 226.
[h] Ruelii Concil. Illustrat. tom. ii. p. 639 to 670.
[i] Quesnel, Dissert. xiv. p. 729, &c.
[k] Labbæi Dissert. de Script. Eccles. tom. ii. p. 477.
[l] Vid. Sandii Nucl. Histor. Eccles. p. 256.
[m] Sandii Append. p. 35.

Athanasian; that it "was written a long time after Athanasius "by some other hand[n]."

1680. Henricus Heideggerus, in his second volume of Select Dissertations, (published at Zurich,) has one whole dissertation, which is the eighteenth, containing near forty pages in quarto. This author takes his account of the Creed mostly from Vossius, does not allow it to be Athanasius's, only called by his name as containing the *Athanasian faith*: and he defends the doctrine of the Creed at large against the objections of Dudithius and other Antitrinitarians; and concludes with a running comment upon the whole.

1681. Wolfgang Gundling, a German writer, the year after, published a small Tract, containing notes upon a little piece relating to the religion of the Greek churches, written by Eustratius Johannides Zialowski. What is chiefly valuable in Gundling is his account of the Greek copies of this Creed, (printed ones I mean,) giving us six of them together. He occasionally expresses his doubts whether the Creed be Athanasius's, or of some later writer[o].

1683. I may next mention our celebrated ecclesiastical historian, Dr. Cave; who about this time published his Lives of the Fathers, and particularly of Athanasius. His account of this Creed is, that it "was never heard of in the world till above "600 years after Athanasius was dead; but barely mentioned "then, and not urged with any confidence till above 200 years "after, when the legates of Pope Gregory the Ninth produced "and pleaded it at Constantinople[p]." The learned Doctor, it is plain, took this account from Vossius, and had never seen Usher's Treatise; which one may justly wonder at. Five years after, in his Historia Literaria, he allows that this Creed had been spoken of by Theodulphus, which was within 436 years of Athanasius: but not a word yet of any elder testimony, or manuscript, though both had been discovered, and publicly taken notice of, before this time. He still contends that the Creed obtained not in the Christian churches before 1000, nor became famous every where before 1233; but inclines nevertheless to ascribe it to Vigilius Tapsensis, who flourished about the year 484[q].

[n] Cudworth, Intellect. Syst. p. 620.

[o] Gundlingii notæ in Eustratii Johannidis Zialowski Delineationem Ecclesiæ Græcæ, p. 68, &c.

[p] Cave, Life of Athanasius, sect. vi. art. 10.

[q] Cave, Histor. Literar. vol. i. p. 146, 371.

1684. Dr. Comber, in his book entitled, A Companion to the Temple, closes in with the old tradition of the Creed being Athanasius's; repeating the most considerable arguments usually pleaded for that persuasion[r].

1684. To him I may subjoin Bishop Beveridge, who perhaps about this time might write his thoughts on the Creed, in his Exposition of our Articles, published after his death. He was so diligent and knowing a man, that had he been to consider this matter in his *later* years, he would certainly have given a more particular and accurate account than that which now appears. He ascribes the Creed to Athanasius, but with some diffidence; and thinks it might have been originally a Greek composition, but that the old Greek copies have been lost, and that the only remaining ones are *versions* from the Latin[s].

1685. Cabassutius, in his Notitia Ecclesiastica, hath a short dissertation about the author of this Creed[t]. He contents himself with repeating Quesnel's arguments, to prove that Athanasius was not the author of it, determining nothing further; save only that it was originally a Latin composure, known and cited by the Council of Autun about the year 670.

1687. The celebrated Dupin, in his Ecclesiastical History, sums up the reasons usually urged to prove the Creed is none of Athanasius's and assents to them. He determines with confidence that it was originally a Latin composition, and not known till the fifth century; repeats Father Quesnel's reasons for ascribing it to Vigilius Tapsensis, and acquiesces in them, as having nothing more certain in this matter[u].

1687. About the same time Tentzelius, a learned Lutheran, published a little treatise upon the subject[x]; setting forth the several opinions of learned men concerning this Creed. He is very full and accurate in his collection, omitting nothing of moment that had been said before him by any of the learned *moderns*, but bringing in some further materials, from his own searches, to add new light to the subject. He determines nothing; but leaves it to the reader to make a judgment as he sees cause from a full view of the pleadings.

[r] Comber, Companion to the Temple, p. 144.

[s] Beveridge on the eighth Article, p. 162.

[t] Cabassutii Notit. Eccles. Dissert. xix. p. 54.

[u] Dupin, Eccles. Histor. vol. ii. p. 35.

[x] Ernesti Tentzelii Judicia Eruditorum de Symb. Athanas. studiose collecta. *Gothæ*, A. D. 1687.

1688. I may place here the learned Pagi, who in his Critick upon Baronius passes his judgment of this Creed[y]: which being the same with Quesnel's, and little more than repetition from him, I need not be more particular about him.

1693. Joseph Antelmi, a learned Paris divine, first began directly to attack Quesnel's opinion; and to sap the reasons on which it was founded. He published a particular Dissertation to that purpose[z], consisting of eighty-five pages in octavo. He ascribes the Creed to Vincentius Lirinensis, who flourished in the year 434.

1695. The famous Tillemont wrote after Antelmius; for he makes mention of his Treatise, and examines his hypothesis: and yet it could not be long after; for he died in the year 1697. He commends Mr. Antelmi's performance as a considerable work; but inclines still rather to Quesnel's opinion. All that he pronounces *certain* is, that the Creed is none of Athanasius's, but yet as old as the *sixth* century, or older[a].

1698. In the year 1698, Montfaucon published his new and accurate edition of Athanasius's works. In the second tome he has an excellent dissertation upon this Creed; the best that is extant, either for *order* and *method*, or for plenty of useful matter. The sum of his judgment is, that the Creed is certainly none of Athanasius's, nor yet Vigilius Tapsensis's, nor sufficiently proved to belong to Vincentius Lirinensis; but probably enough composed about the time of Vincentius, and by a Gallican writer or writers[b].

1698. In the same year, Ludovicus Antonius Muratorius, an Italian writer, published a second tome of Anecdota out of the Ambrosian Library at Milan. Among other manuscripts there, he had met with an ancient Comment upon this Creed, ascribed to Venantius Fortunatus, who was Bishop of Poictiers in France in the sixth century. He publishes the Comment, together with a Dissertation of his own, concerning the author of the Creed:

[y] Pagi, Critic. in Baron. an. 340. n. 6. p. 440.

[z] Josephi Antelmii Disquisitio de Symbolo Athanasiano. Paris. 1693. 8vo.

[a] Tillemont, Mémoires, tom. viii. p. 667.

[b] Symbolum *Quicunque* Athanasio incunctanter abjudicandum arbitramur —— Afro itaque Vigilio nihil est quod symbolum *Quicunque* tribuatur. ——Non ægre quidem concesserim *Vincentii ætate* editam fuisse illam fidei professionem——Haud abs re conjectant viri eruditi in Galliis illud (*symbolum*) fuisse elucubratum. *Montf. Diatrib.* p. 723.

concluding, at length, that Venantius Fortunatus, the *certain* author of the Comment, might possibly be the author of the Creed too. He entirely rejects the opinion of those that would ascribe it to Athanasius, and disapproves of Quesnel's persuasion about Vigilius Tapsensis; but speaks favourably of Antelmi's, as coming nearest to the truth[c].

1712. Fabricius, in his Bibliotheca Græca[d], (highly valued by all men of *letters*,) gives a summary account of the sentiments of the learned relating to this Creed. His conclusion from all is, that thus far may be depended on as *certain*; that the Creed was not composed by Athanasius, but long after, in the fifth century, written originally in Latin, and afterwards translated into Greek.

1712. In the same year, the learned Le Quien published a new edition of Damascen, with Previous Dissertations to it. In the first of these, he has several very considerable remarks, concerning the *age* and *author* of the Athanasian Creed. He appears inclinable to ascribe it to Pope Anastasius I. (who entered upon the Pontificate in the year 398,) because of some ancient testimonies, as well as manuscripts, carrying the name of Anastasius in the title of the Creed: but he is positive that the Creed must be set as high as the age of St. Austin, Vincentius, and Vigilius[e]. And, as Antelmius before had made light of the supposition that the *internal characters* of the Creed shew it to be later than Eutyches; he makes as light of the other supposition of the *internal characters* setting it later than Nestorius.

1714. Natalis Alexander's new edition of his Ecclesiastical History bears date A. D. 1714. He had examined into our present question some years before, (about 1676, when his first edition came abroad,) subscribing to the opinion of Quesnel: and he does not appear to have altered his mind since. He takes notice of Antelmi's opinion, and speaks respectfully of it, as also of the author; but prefers the other hypothesis[f].

1715. I ought not here to omit the late learned Mr. Bingham,

[c] Hæc et similia pluribus pertractavit eruditissimus Anthelmius, cujus opinioni, quorumnam eruditorum suffragia accesserint, me penitus fugit: fateor tamen ad veritatem omnium maxime illam accedere. *Murator.* tom. ii. p. 222.

[d] Fabricii Biblioth. Græca, vol. v. p. 315.

[e] Omnino fateri cogor Augustini, Vincentii, et Vigilii ætate extitisse expositionem Latinam fidei, quæ postmodum Athanasio Magno attribui meruerit. *Le Quien, Dissert.* i. p. 9.

[f] Natal. Alexand. Eccl. Hist. tom. iv. p. 111.

to whom the public has been highly indebted for his Origines Ecclesiasticæ, collected with great judgment, and digested into a clear method. He had a proper occasion to say something of the Athanasian Creed, in passing, and very briefly. He observes, that it was not composed by Athanasius, but by a later, and a Latin writer; and particularly Vigilius Tapsensis; referring to such learned moderns as I have above mentioned for the proof of it; and giving no more than short hints of their reasons[g].

1719. Dr. Clarke of St. James's, in his second edition of his Scripture Doctrine[h], gives us his last thoughts in relation to this Creed. Referring to Dr. Cave, he informs us, that "this "Creed was never seen till about the year 800, near 400 years "after the death of Athanasius," (they are his own words,) "nor was received in the Church till so very late as about the "year 1000." Yet Cave does not say, *was never seen*, (for he himself ascribes it to Vigilius Tapsensis, of the fifth century,) but only that it was not *quoted* before the year 800, or nearly; which yet is a very great mistake. What the learned Doctor intended by saying "about the year 800," and yet only "near "400 years after the death of Athanasius," or, as he elsewhere[i] expresses it, "above 300 years after the death of Athanasius," I do not understand; but must leave to those that can compute the distance between 373 (the latest year that Athanasius is ever supposed to have lived) and the year 800. I am persuaded, the Doctor was thinking, that if Athanasius had lived to the year 400, then the distance had been just 400 years; but as he died 27 years before, the distance must be so much the *less*, when it is quite the *contrary*.

1722. The last man that has given his sentiments in relation to this Creed is Casimirus Oudinus, in his new edition of his Supplement (now called a Commentary) to the Ecclesiastical Writers. I need say no more than that he does not seem to have spent much pains in reexamining this subject, but rests content with his first thoughts; ascribing the Creed, with Quesnel, to Vigilius Tapsensis[k].

These are the principal *moderns* that have fallen within my notice: and of these, the most considerable are Vossius, Usher,

[g] Bingham's Antiq. of the Christian Church, vol. iii. p. 546. &c. Oxf. edit. 1855.

[h] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 379. 2nd edit.

[i] Clarke's Script. Doctr. p. 447. 1st edit.

[k] Vid. Oudin. Commentar. de Script. Eccl. vol. i. p. 345, 1248, 1322.

el, Tentzelius, Antelmius, Tillemont, Montfaucon, Muratorius, and ien; as having particularly studied the subject, and struck new ıto it, either furnishing fresh *materials*, or improving the old by *new* ations. Some perhaps may wish to have the several opinions of oderns thrown into a narrower compass: for which reason I have ıt it not improper to subjoin the following table, which will repre- ll in one view, for the ease and conveniency of every common

Writers.	*Author of the Creed.*	*What Century composed in.*	*What Year composed.*	*When received.*
Vossius.	A Latin Author.		Not bef. 600.	A.D.1000.
Petavius.	Doubtful.			
Bishop Usher.		Vth.	Before 447.	Bef. 852.
Bishop Taylor.	Not Athanasius.			
G. Ashwell.	Athanasius.	IVth.	340.	
L'Estrange.	Not Athanasius.		Before 600.	
Leo Allatius.	Athanasius.	IVth.	340.	
Card. Bona.	Athanasius Alex.	IVth.	340.	
Bishop Pearson.	A Latin Author.		About 600.	
Ruelius.	Not Athanasius.			
Paschas. Quesnel.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	Bef. 670.
Sandius.	Athanasius of Spire.	VIIth.	Before 642.	Bef. 770.
Dr. Cudworth.	Not Athanasius.	After the IVth.		
Heideggerus.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	
Wolf. Gundling.	Doubtful.			
Dr. Cave.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	1000.
Dr. Comber.	Athanasius Alex.	IVth.	336.	
Bishop Beveridge.	Athanasius Alex.	IVth.		Bef. 850.
Cabassutius.	A Latin Author.			Bef. 670.
Dupin.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	
Tentzelius.	Doubtful.			
Pagi.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	570.
Antelmius.	Vincentius Lirinens.	Vth.	Before 450.	
Tillemont.	Not Athanasius.	VIth or sooner.		
Montfaucon.	A Gallican Writer.	Vth.		Bef. 670.
Ant. Muratorius.	Venant. Fortunatus.	VIth.	570.	800.
Fabricius.	A Latin Author.	Vth.		663.
Le Quien.	Anastasius I.	IVth or Vth.	Before 401.	500.
Natal. Alexander.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	
Mr. Bingham.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.		670.
Dr. Clarke.	Doubtful.	VIIth or VIIIth.		1000.
Oudin.	Vigilius Tapsensis.	Vth.	484.	

CHAP. II.

Ancient Testimonies.

HAVING taken a view of the *moderns*, in relation to the Creed, we may now enter upon a detail of the *ancients*, and their *testimonies;* by which the *moderns* must be tried. My design is to lay before the reader all the *original* evidence I can meet with, to give any light either into the *age* or *author* of the Creed, or its *reception* in the Christian churches; that so the reader may be able to judge for himself concerning the *three* particulars now mentioned, which are what I constantly bear in my eye, producing nothing but with a view to one or more of them.

Ancient testimonies have been pretended from Gregory Nazianzen, Gaudentius Brixiensis, St. Austin, and Isidorus Hispalensis, of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries. But they have been since generally and justly exploded by the *learned*, as being either *spurious* or *foreign* to the point; and therefore I conceive it very needless to take any further notice of them. As to *quotations* from our Creed, or *comments* upon it, falling within the compass of the centuries now mentioned; if there be any such, they shall be considered under other heads, distinct from that of *ancient testimonies*, properly so called, to be treated of in this chapter.

670. The oldest of this kind, hitherto discovered, or observed, is that of the Council of Autun in France, under Leodegarius, or St. Leger, the Bishop of the place in the seventh century. There is some dispute about the year when the Council was held, whether in 663, or 666, or 670. The last is most probable, and most generally embraced by learned men. The words of this Council in English run thus: "If any Presbyter, Deacon, "Subdeacon, or Clerk, doth not unreprovably recite the Creed "which the Apostles delivered by inspiration of the Holy "Ghost, and also *the Faith of the holy Prelate Athanasius*, let "him be censured by the Bishop[1]." By *the Faith of Athanasius* is here meant what we now call the Athanasian Creed; as may be reasonably pleaded from the *titles* which this Creed bore in

[1] Si quis Presbyter, Diaconus, Subdiaconus, vel Clericus Symbolum quod Sancto inspirante Spiritu Apostoli tradiderunt, et Fidem Sancti Athanasii Præsulis irreprehensibiliter non recensuerit; ab Episcopo condemnetur. *Augustodun. Synod. Harduin.* tom. iii. p. 1016.

the earlier times, before it came to have the name of a Creed: which *titles* shall be exhibited both from manuscripts and written evidences in the sequel. Yet it must not be dissembled that Papebrochius, a learned man, and whom I find cited with approbation by Muratorius[m], is of opinion, that the *Faith of Athanasius*, here mentioned, means the Nicene Creed, which Athanasius had some hand in, and whereof he was the great defender. I can by no means come into his opinion, or allow any force to his reasonings. He asks, why should the Nicene Creed be omitted, and not mentioned with the Apostles'? And why should the Athanasian, not then used in the Sacred Offices, be recommended so carefully, without a word of the Nicene? I answer, because it does not appear that the Nicene Creed was so much taken notice of at that time in the Gallican churches, while the Apostolical, or Roman Creed, made use of in baptism, in the western churches, instead of the Nicene, (which prevailed in the east,) in a manner superseded it: which no one can wonder at who considers how prevailing and universal the tradition had been in the Latin Church, down from the fifth century at least, that the Apostolical Creed was composed by the twelve Apostles, and therefore as *sacred*, and of as great authority as the inspired writings themselves. Besides that it appears from Hincmar, who will be cited in his place, that it was no strange thing, even so low as his time, about 850, to recommend the Athanasian Creed along with the Apostles', without a word of the Nicene. And why should it be thought any objection against the Athanasian Creed, that it was not at that time received into the Sacred Offices, (supposing it really was not, which may be questioned,) when it is certain that the Nicene was not yet received into the Sacred Offices in France, nor till many years after, about the time of Pepin, or of Charles the Great? There is therefore no force at all in the argument of Papebrochius: but there is this strong prejudice against it, that the *title* there given is a very common title for the Athanasian Creed, and not for the

[m] Atqui, ut eruditissime adnotavit Cl. P. Papebrochius, in Respons. ad Exhibitionem Error. par. 2. art. xiii. n. 3. verbis illis Fidem S. Athanasii, minime Symbolum Athanasium designatur, sed quidem Nicænum, in quo elaborando plurimum insudasse Athanasium verisimile est. Etenim cur Apostolico Symbolo commendato Nicænum prætermisissent Augustodunenses Patres? Cur Athanasiani Symboli cujus tunc nullus erat usus in sacris, cognitionem exegissent, Nicænumque ne uno quidem verbo commemorassent? *Murator. Anecdot.* tom. ii. p. 223.

Nicene. Nor would the Fathers of that Council have been so extravagantly fond of the name of Athanasius, as to think it a greater commendation of the Creed of Nice to call it after him, than to call it the Nicene. There is then no reasonable doubt to be made, but that the Council of Autun, in the Canon, intended the Athanasian Creed; as the best critics and the generality of the learned have hitherto believed.

But there are other objections of real weight against the evidence built upon this Canon. 1. Oudin makes it a question whether there was ever any council held under Leodegarius, a suffragan Bishop under the Archbishop of Lyons, having no *metropolitical* authority[n]. But it may suffice, if the Council was held at Autun, while he was Bishop of the place, a good reason why he should be particularly mentioned; especially considering the worth and fame of the man: to say nothing of the dignity of his see, which from the time of Gregory the Great had been the *second*, or next in dignity to the metropolitical see of Lyons. Nor do I perceive any force in Oudin's objection against St. Leger's holding a *diocesan* synod, (for a *provincial* synod is not pretended,) though he was no *metropolitan*. 2. A stronger objection is, that the Canon we are concerned with cannot be proved to belong to the Council held under Leodegarius. It is not found among the Canons of that Council published by Sirmondus from the manuscripts of the library of the church of Angers, but it is from another collection, out of the library of the monastery of St. Benignus of Dijon, with this title only; Canones Augustodunenses: so that one cannot be certain whether it belongs to the Synod under St. Leger, or to some other Synod of Autun much later. It must be owned that the evidence can amount to no more than probable presumption, or conjecture. Wherefore Dupin[o], Tentzelius[p], Muratorius[q], and Oudin[r], do not scruple to throw it aside as of too suspected credit to build any thing certain upon: and even Quesnel[s] expresses some dissatisfaction about it; only in respect to some great names, such as Sirmondus, Peter le Lande, Godfr. Hermantius, &c. he is willing to acquiesce in it. To whom we may add, Labbe[t], Le Cointu,

[n] Oudin. Comment. de Script. Eccles. tom. i. p. 348.
[o] Dupin, Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 35.
[p] Tentzel. Judic. Erud. p. 61, &c.
[q] Murator. Anecdot. Ambros. tom. ii. p. 223.
[r] Casim. Oudin. vol. i. p. 348.
[s] Quesnel, Dissert. xiv. p. 731.
[t] Labb. Dissert. de Script. Eccles. tom. ii. p. 478.
[u] Le Coint, Annal. Franc. ad ann. 663. n. 22.

Cabassutius[x], Pagi[y], Tillemont[z], Montfaucon[a], Fabricius[b], Harduin[c], and our learned antiquary Mr. Bingham[d]: who all accept it as genuine, but upon *probable* persuasion, rather than *certain* conviction. Neither do I pretend to propose it as clear and undoubted evidence, but probable only, and such as will be much confirmed by other evidences to be mentioned hereafter.

760. Regino, abbot of Prom in Germany, an author of the ninth and tenth century, has, among other collections, some Articles of Inquiry, supposed by Baluzius the editor to be as old, or very nearly, as the age of Boniface, Bishop of Mentz, who died in the year 754. In those Articles there is one to this purpose: "Whether the clergy have by heart Athanasius's "Tract upon the Faith of the Trinity, beginning with *Whosoever* "*will be saved*[e], &c." This testimony I may venture to place about 760, a little after the death of Boniface.

794. The Council of Frankfort, in Germany, in their thirty-third Canon give orders, that "the Catholic Faith of the holy "Trinity, and Lord's Prayer, and Creed, be set forth and "delivered to all[f]."

Vossius[g] understands the Canon of the two Creeds, Nicene and Apostolical. But I know not why the Apostolical, or Roman Creed, should be emphatically called *Symbolum Fidei*, *The Creed*, in opposition to the Nicene; nor why the Nicene should not be called *a Creed*, as well as the other, after the usual way. Besides, that Fides Catholica, &c. has been more peculiarly the *title* of the Athanasian Creed: and it was no uncommon thing, either before or after this time, to recommend it in this manner together with the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed, just as we find here. And nothing could be at that time of greater service against the heresy of Felix and Elipandus, (which occasioned the calling of the Council,) than the Athanasian Creed. For which reasons, till I see better reasons to the con-

[x] Cabassut. Notit. Eccl. Dissert. xix. p. 54.
[y] Pagi Crit. in Baron. ann. 340. n. 6.
[z] Tillemont, Mémoires, vol. viii. p. 668.
[a] Montfauc. Diatrib. p. 720.
[b] Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. v. p. 316.
[c] Harduin. Concil. tom. iii. p. 1016.
[d] Bingham, Origin. Eccl. vol. iii. p. 548, Oxf. edit. 1855.
[e] Si Sermonem Athanasii Episcopi de Fide Sanctæ Trinitatis, cujus initium est, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, memoriter teneat. *Regin. de Discipl. Eccles.* l. 1.
[f] Ut Fides Catholica Sanctæ Trinitatis, et Oratio Dominica, atque Symbolum Fidei omnibus prædicetur, et tradatur. *Concil. Francf.* Can. 33.
[g] Vossius de tribus Symb. Dissert. iii. c. 52. p. 528.

trary, I must be of opinion that the Council of Frankfort in their thirty-third Canon intended the Athanasian Creed, which Charles the Great had a particular respect for, and had presented in form to Pope Adrian I. above twenty years before; as we shall see in another chapter.

809. Theodulphus, Bishop of Orleans in France, has a Treatise of the Holy Ghost, with a preface to Charles the Great, written at a time when the dispute about the *procession* began to make disturbance. He brings several testimonies in favour of the procession *from the Son*, out of Athanasius; and, among others, a pretty large part of the Athanasian Creed, from the words, "The Father is made of none, &c." to "He therefore that will "be saved must thus think of the Trinity[h]," inclusive.

809. An anonymous writer of the same time, and in the same cause, and directing himself to the same Prince, makes the like use of the Athanasian Creed, in the following words; "St. "Athanasius, in the Exposition of the Catholic Faith, which "that great master wrote himself, and which the universal "Church professes, declares the procession of the Holy Ghost "from the Father and Son, thus saying; *The Father is made of* "*none*[i], &c." This I cite upon the credit of Sirmondus in his notes to Theodulphus.

809. It was in the same year that the Latin monks of Mount Olivet wrote their Apologetical Letter to Pope Leo III. justifying their doctrine of the procession *from the Son*, against one John of Jerusalem, a monk too, of another monastery, and of an opposite persuasion. Among other authorities, they appeal to the Faith of Athanasius, that is, to the Creed, as we now call it. This I have from Le Quien, the learned editor of Damascen, who had the copy of that letter from Baluzius, as he there signifies[k].

820. Not long after, Hatto, otherwise called Hetto and Ahyto,

[h] Item idem——*Pater a nullo est factus*, &c. usque ad *Qui vult ergo salvus esse*, &c. *Theodulph. apud Sirmondum Oper.* tom. ii. p. 978.

[i] Incertus autor quem diximus, hoc ipso utens testimonio, Beatus, inquit, Athanasius, in Expositione Catholicæ Fidei, quam ipse egregius Doctor conscripsit, et quam universalis confitetur Ecclesia, processionem Spiritus Sancti *a Patre et Filio* declarat, ita dicens: *Pater a nullo est factus*, &c. *Sirmond. Op.* tom. ii. p. 978. Conf. p. 967.

[k] In Regula Sancti Benedicti quam nobis dedit Filius vester Dominus Karolus, quæ habet fidem scriptam de sancta et inseparabili Trinitate; *Credo Spiritum Sanctum Deum verum ex Patre procedentem et Filio*: et in Dialogo quem nobis vestra sanctitas dare dignata est similiter dicit. Et in Fide S. Athanasii eodem modo dicit. *Monachi de Monte Oliv. apud Le Quien, Dissert. Damasc.* p. 7.

Bishop of Basil in France, composed his Capitular, or Book of Constitutions, for the regulation of the clergy of his diocese. Amongst other good rules, this makes the fourth; "That they "should have the Faith of Athanasius by heart, and recite it at "the *prime* (that is, at *seven o'clock in the morning*) every Lord's "Day[l]."

820. Agobardus of the same time, Archbishop of Lyons, wrote against Felix Orgelitanus; where he occasionally cites part of the Athanasian Creed. His words are: "St. Athanasius says, "that except a man *doth keep* the Catholic faith *whole and un-* "*defiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly*[m]."

852. In the same age flourished the famous Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims; who so often cites or refers to the Creed we are speaking of, as a standing rule of faith, that it may be needless to produce the particular passages. I shall content myself with one only, more considerable than the rest for the use that is to be made of it hereafter. He directs his presbyters "to "learn Athanasius's Treatise of Faith, (beginning with *Whoso-* "*ever will be saved*,) to commit it to memory, to understand its "meaning, and to be able to give it in *common* words[n];" that is, I suppose, in the *vulgar tongue*. He at the same time recommends the Lord's Prayer and (Apostles') Creed[o], as I take it, without mentioning the Nicene: which I particularly remark, for a reason to be seen above. It is further observable, that though Hincmar here gives the Athanasian formulary the name of a Treatise of Faith; yet he elsewhere[p] scruples not to call it (Symbolum) a Creed: and he is, probably, as Sirmondus observes[q], the first writer who gave it the name it bears at this day. Which, I suppose, may have led Oudin into his mistake,

[l] IVto. Ut Fides Sancti Athanasii a sacerdotibus discatur, et ex corde, die Dominico ad *primam* recitetur. *Basil. Capitul. apud Harduin.* tom. iv. p. 1241.

[m] Beatus Athanasius ait; Fidem Catholicam nisi quis integram, inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in æternum peribit. *Agobard. adv. Felic.* cap. 3. ed. Baluz.

[n] Unusquisque presbyterorum Expositionem Symboli atque Orationis Dominicæ, juxta traditionem orthodoxorum patrum plenius discat—— Psalmorum etiam verba, et distinctiones regulariter, et ex corde, cum canticis consuetudinariis pronuntiare sciat. Necnon et Sermonem Athanasii de Fide, cujus initium est, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, memoriæ quisque commendet, sensum illius intelligat, et verbis communibus enuntiare queat. *Hincm. Capit.* i. tom. i. p. 710. ed. Sirmond.

[o] Vid. Hincm. Opusc. ad Hincmar. Laudunensem, tom. ii. p. 473.

[p] Athanasius in Symbolo dicens &c. de Prædestin. tom. i. p. 309.

[q] Sirmond. Not. in Theodulph. p. 978.

that *no writer before Hincmar ever made mention of this Creed*[r]; a mistake, which, though taken notice of by Tentzelius[s] in the year 1687, he has nevertheless again and again repeated in his last edition.

865. In the same age lived Anscharius, monk also of Corbey, and afterwards Archbishop of Hamburgh and Bremen in Germany. Among his dying instructions to his clergy, he left this for one; that they should be careful to recite the Catholic Faith composed by Athanasius[t]. This is reported by Rembertus, the writer of his Life, and successor to him in the same see; who had been likewise monk of Corbey: so that we have here two considerable testimonies in one.

868. Contemporary with these was Æneas, Bishop of Paris, who, in his treatise against the Greeks, quotes the Athanasian Creed under the name of Fides Catholica[u], Catholic Faith, producing the same paragraph of it which Theodulphus had done sixty years before.

868. About the same time, and in the same cause, Ratram, or Bertram, monk of Corbey in France, made the like use of this Creed, calling it, a Treatise of the Faith[x].

871. Adalbertus of this time, upon his nomination to a bishopric in the province of Rheims, was obliged to give in a profession of his faith to Archbishop Hincmar. Among other things, he professes his great regard to the Athanasian Creed, (Sermo Athanasii,) as a Creed *received with great veneration by the Catholic Church*, or being of *customary and venerable use* in it[y]. This testimony is considerable in regard to the *reception* of this Creed; and not before taken notice of, so far as I know, by those that have treated of this argument.

[r] Oudin, Commentar. vol. i. p. 345, 1322.

[s] Tentzel. Judic. Eruditor. p. 144.

[t] Cum instaret obitus, præcepit ut fratres canerent Fidem Catholicam a beato Athanasio compositam. *Anschar. Vit. apud Petr. Lambec. in Append.* lib. i. *Rerum Hamburg.* p. 237.

[u] Sanctus Athanasius, sedis Alexandrinæ Episcopus, &c. —— Item, idem in Fide Catholica, quod Spiritus Sanctus a Patre procedat et Filio, *Pater a nullo est factus*, &c. *Æneas Paris. adv. Græc.* cap. 19.

[x] Beatus Athanasius, Alexandrinus Episcopus, in libello de Fide quem edidit, et omnibus Catholicis proposuit tenendum, inter cætera sic ait; *Pater a nullo est factus, nec creatus, nec genitus*, &c. *Ratr. contra Græcor. oppos.* lib. ii. cap. 3.

[y] In Sermone Beati Athanasii, quem Ecclesia Catholica venerando usu frequentare consuevit, qui ita incipit; *Quicunque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est ut teneat Catholicam fidem.* Professio Adalberti Episcopi Morinensis futuri. *Harduin. Concil.* tom. v. p. 1445.

889. This Creed is again mentioned in the same age by Riculphus Bishop of Soissons in France, in his pastoral charge to the clergy of his diocese. He calls it a Treatise (or Discourse) of Catholic Faith[z]. This I take from Father Harduin's Councils, as also the former, with the dates of both.

960. Ratherius, Bishop of Verona, in Italy in the year 928, and afterwards of Liege in Germany in the year 953, and restored to his see of Verona in the year 955, did after this time write instructions to his clergy of Verona; in which he makes mention of all the three Creeds, Apostolical, Nicene, and Athanasian; obliging his clergy to have them all by heart: which shews that they were all of standing use in his time, in his diocese at least[a].

997. Near the close of this century lived Abbo, or Albo, Abbot of Fleury, or St. Benedict upon the Loire in France. Upon some difference he had with Arnulphus Bishop of Orleans, he wrote an Apology, which he addressed to the two kings of France, Hugh and Robert. In that Apology he has a passage relating to our purpose, running thus: "I thought proper, in "the first place, to speak concerning the Faith: which I have "heard variously sung in alternate choirs, both in France and "in the Church of England. For some, I think, say, in the "Athanasian form, *the Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the* "*Son, neither made, nor created, but proceeding:* who while they "leave out, *nor begotten*, are persuaded that they are the more "conformable to Gregory's Synodical Epistle, wherein it is "written, that the *Holy Ghost is neither unbegotten, nor begotten*, "*but proceeding*[b]." I have taken the liberty of throwing in a

[z] Item monemus, ut unusquisque vestrum Psalmos, et Sermonem Fidei Catholicæ, cujus initium, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, et Canonem Missæ, et cantum, vel compotum, memoriter, et veraciter et correcte tenere studeat. *Riculf. Const.* 5. *Harduin. Concil.* tom. vi. p. 415.

[a] Ipsam Fidem, id est Credulitatem, Dei, trifarie parare memoriter festinetis: hoc est, secundum Symbolum id est Collationem Apostolorum, sicut in Psalteriis correctis invenitur; et illam quæ *ad Missam* canitur; et illam Sancti Athanasii quæ ita incipit; *Quicunque vult salvus esse*——*Sermonem*, ut superius dixi, Athanasii Episcopi de Fide Trinitatis, cujus initium est, *Quicunque vult*, memoriter teneat. *Ratherii Synod. Epist. Harduin. Con.* tom. vi. p. 787.

[b] Primitus de Fide dicendum credidi; quam alternantibus choris et in Francia, et apud Anglorum Ecclesiam variari audivi. Alii enim dicunt, ut arbitror, secundum Athanasium, *Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio non factus, non creatus, sed procedens:* qui dum id quod est *non genitus* subtrahunt, Synodicum Domini Gregorii se sequi credunt, ubi ita est scriptum; *Spiritus Sanctus nec ingenitus est, nec genitus, sed procedens. Abbo Floriacens. Apol. ad Francor. Reges.*

word or two to make the sentence run the clearer. What the author intends is, that some scrupulous persons, both in France and England, recited the Athanasian Creed with some alteration, leaving out two words, to make it agree the better, as they imagined, with Gregory's Synodical instructions. As to their *scruple* herein, and the ground of it, I shall say more of it in a proper place. All I am to observe at present is, that this testimony is full for the custom of alternate singing the Athanasian Creed, at this time, in the French and English Churches. And indeed we shall meet with other as full, and withal earlier evidence of the same custom, when we come to treat of *manuscripts* in the following chapters. To proceed with our ancient testimonies.

1047. In the next century, we meet with Gualdo, a monk of Corbey; who likewise wrote the life of Anscharius, but in *verse*, as Rembertus had before done in *prose*. He also takes some notice of our Creed, ascribing it to Athanasius[c].

1130. In the century following, Honorius, a scholastic divine of the Church of Autun, in his book entitled, The Pearl of the Soul, (which treats of the Sacred or Liturgic Offices,) reckons up the several Creeds of the Church, making in all *four:* namely, the Apostolical, the Nicene, the Constantinopolitan, and the Athanasian. Of the last, he observes, that *it was daily* repeated at the *prime*[d]. He ascribes it to Athanasius of Alexandria in the time of Theodosius: where he is undoubtedly mistaken in his chronology. For, if he means the first Athanasius of Alexandria, he is too early for either of the Theodosius's; and if he means it of the second, he is as much too late. But a slip in chronology might be pardonable in that age: nor does it at all affect the truth of what he attests of his own times.

1146. Otho, Bishop of Frisinghen in Bavaria, may here be taken notice of, as being the first we have met with who pretends to name the *place* where Athanasius is supposed to have made this Creed; Triers, or Treves, in Germany[e]. It is no improbable conjecture of M. Antelmi, that the copy of the Creed found at Treves, being very ancient, or the most ancient of any, and

[c] Catholicamque Fidem quam composuisse beatus
Fertur Athanasius—— *Gualdon. Vit. Ansch. apud Lambec.* p. 322.

[d] Quarto, Fidem *Quicunque vult*, quotidie ad *primam* iterat, quam Athanasius Alexandrinus Episcopus, rogatu Theodosii Imperatoris, edidit. *Honor. Augustod. Gemm. Animæ*, lib. ii. cap. 5. Bibl. PP. tom. xx. p. 1086.

[e] Ibidem manens in Ecclesia Trevirorum sub Maximino ejusdem Ecclesiæ Episcopo, *Quicunque vult*, &c. a quibusdam dicitur edidisse. *Otth. Frising. Chronic.* lib. iv. cap. 7. p. 44. al. p. 75.

from which many others were taken, might first occasion the story of the Creed's being made at Treves, and by Athanasius himself, who by his exile thither might render that place famous for his name to all after-ages.

1171. Arnoldus, in his Chronicle, informs us of an abbot of Brunswick, who attending the Duke of Brunswick, at this time, in his journey into the east, had some disputes with the Greeks at Constantinople, upon the article of *procession*, and pleaded the usual passage out of this Creed; whose words are to be seen in the margin[f]. What is most to be noted is the title of Symbolum Fidei, which now began to be common to this form, as to the other Creeds.

1178. Robertus Paululus, Presbyter of Amiens, in the diocese of Rheims, speaking of the Offices recited at the *prime*, observes that the piety of good Christians had thereunto added the "*Quicunque vult*, that the articles necessary to salvation might "never be forgotten any hour of the day[g]."

1190. Beleth, a celebrated Paris divine, is the oldest writer that takes notice of this Creed's being commonly ascribed to Anastasius; though he himself ascribes it to Athanasius[h]. Tentzelius[i] marks some differences between the *prints* and the *manuscripts* of this author, and betwixt one manuscript and another. But as the difference, though in *words* considerable, is yet very little in the *sense*, it is not material to our present purpose to be more particular about it.

1200. I must not omit Nicolaus Hydruntinus, a native of Otranto in Italy, who sided with the Greeks, and wrote in Greek against the Latins. He understood both languages, and was often interpreter between the Greeks and Latins, in their disputes at Constantinople, Athens, and Thessalonica[k]. He wrote several

[f] Unde Athanasius in Symbolo Fidei: Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens. Ecce Spiritum Sanctum a Patre dicit procedere et a Filio. *Henric. Abb. apud Arnold. Chron. Slavor.* lib. iii. cap. 5. p. 248.

[g] His addidit fidelium devotio, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, ut Articulorum Fidei qui sunt necessarii ad salutem, nulla diei hora obliviscamur. *Rob. Paulul. inter Oper. Hugon. de S. Victor. de Offic. Eccl.* lib. ii. cap. 1. p. 265.

[h] Notandum est quatuor esse Symbola; *minimum* quod a cunctis communiter in quotidiana oratione dicitur, quod Apostoli simul composuerunt. Secundum est quod in *prima* recitatur, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*: quod ab Athanasio Patriarcha Alexandrino contra Arrianos hæreticos compositum est, licet plerique eum Anastasium fuisse falso arbitrentur. *Beleth. de Divin. Offic.* cap. xl. p. 334. ed. Venet.

[i] Tentzel. Judicia Erudit. p. 91.

[k] Vid. Fabric. Bibl. Græc. vol. x. p. 393.

tracts, out of which Leo Allatius has published some fragments. There is one relating to the Athanasian Creed, which must here be taken notice of; being of use for the certifying us that this Creed was extant in Greek at and before his time. It is this: "They (the Greeks) do not know who made the addition to the "Faith of Athanasius, styled Catholic; since the words, *and of* "*the Son*, are not in the Greek (*form,*) nor in the Creed" (of Constantinople[l]).

From this passage we may learn, that there was a Greek copy of the Athanasian Creed at this time; that it wanted the words, *of the Son;* that it was looked upon as Athanasius's; and that the title was, The Catholic Faith of St. Athanasius: which is its most usual title in the Latin copies. I may just hint to the reader, that though both πίστις in the Greek, and *fides* in the Latin, might justly be rendered *creed* in English, rather than *faith*, whenever it stands for a *formulary* or *confession* of faith, as it does here; yet because I should otherwise want another English word for σύμβολον in the Greek, and *symbolum* in the Latin, I therefore reserve the word *creed*, in this case, for distinction sake, to be the rendering of *symbolum*, or σύμβολον, and nothing else. But to proceed.

1230. Alexander of Hales, in Gloucestershire, may here deserve to be mentioned, as shewing what Creeds were then received in England. He reckons up *three* only, not *four*, (as those that make the Nicene and Constantinopolitan to be two;) namely, the Apostles', the Nicene or Constantinopolitan, and the Athanasian[m]: where we may observe, that the Athanasian has the name of a Creed, which yet was not its most usual or common title in those times: only the Schoolmen, for order and method sake, chose to throw it under the head of Creeds.

1233. I am next to take notice of the famed legates of Pope Gregory the IXth, (Haymo, Radolphus, Petrus, and Hugo,) who produced this Creed in their conferences with the Greeks at Constantinople. They asserted it to be Athanasius's, and made by him while an exile in the western parts, and penned in the

[l] Ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀγνοοῦσι, τὶς ὁ προσθήσας ἐν τῇ πίστει τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου, τῇ καθολικῇ λεγομένῃ, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἑλληνικῷ οὐχὶ τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ, περιέχεται, οὔτε ἐν τῷ συμβόλῳ. *Leo Allat. de Consens. Eccl. Occident.* &c. lib. iii. cap. 1. n. 5. p. 887.

[m] Tria sunt Symbola: primum Apostolorum, secundum patrum Nicænorum, quod canitur in Missa, tertium Athanasii. *Alexand. Alens.* par. iii. q. 69. membr. 5.

Latin tongue[n]. They had not assurance enough to pretend that it was a Greek composition: there were too many and too plain reasons to the contrary.

1240. In this age, Walter de Cantilupe, Bishop of Worcester, in his Synodical Constitutions, exhorts his clergy to make themselves competent masters of the Psalm called *Quicunque vult*, and of the greater and smaller Creed, (that is, Nicene and Apostolical,) that they might be able to instruct their people[o]. From whence we may observe, that at this time the Athanasian formulary was distinguished, here amongst us, from the Creeds properly so called; being named a Psalm, and sometimes a Hymn, (as we shall see from other evidences to be produced hereafter,) suitably to the place it held in the Psalters among the other Hymns, Psalms, and Canticles of the Church, being also sung *alternately* in churches, like the other.

1250. We may here also take notice of a just remark made by Thomas Aquinas of this century; that Athanasius, whom he supposes the author of this formulary, did not draw it up in the way of a Creed, but in a *doctrinal form*; which however was admitted by the authority of the Roman see, as containing a complete system of Christian faith[p].

1255. Walter de Kirkham, Bishop of Durham, in his Constitutions, about this time, makes much the same order that Walter Cantilupe had before done, styling the Creed a Psalm also as usual[q].

1286. Johannes Januensis, sometimes styled Johannes Balbus, makes mention of this Creed in his Dictionary, or Catholicon, under the word *symbolum*. He reckons up three Creeds, and in

[n] Ὁ ἅγιος Ἀθανάσιος ὅταν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς δυτικοῖς ἐξόριστος ἦν, ἐν τῇ ἀυθέσει τῆς πίστεως, ἣν τοῖς Λατινικοῖς ῥήμασι διεσάφησεν, οὕτως ἔφη· Ὁ πατὴρ ἀπ' οὐδενός ἐστι, &c. *Definit. Apocris. Greg. IX. Harduin.* tom. vii. p. 157.

[o] Habeat etiam saltem quilibet eorum simplicem intellectum, secundum quod continetur in Psalmo qui dicitur, *Quicunque vult*, et tam in *majori* quam in *minori Symbolo*, ut in his plebem sibi commissam noverint informare. *Walter Wigorn. Const. apud Spelm. Concil.* vol. ii. p. 246.

[p] Athanasius non composuit *manifestationem fidei* per modum Symboli, sed magis per modum cujusdam doctrinæ: sed quia integram fidei veritatem ejus doctrina breviter continebat, auctoritate summi Pontificis est recepta, ut quasi *fidei regula* habeatur. *Thom. Aqu. Secund. Secundæ* qu. i. art. 10. n. 3.

[q] Habeat quoque unusquisque eorum simplicem intellectum fidei, sicut in Symbolo tam majori quam minori; quod est in psalmo, *Quicunque vult*, et etiam *Credo in Deum*, expressius continentur. *Spelm. Conc.* vol. ii. p. 294.

this order, Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian. The name he gives to the last is Symbolum Athanasii, thrice repeated[r].

1287. In a Synod of Exeter, in this century also, we have mention again made of the Athanasian Creed, under the name of a Psalm, and as such distinguished from the two Creeds[s] properly so called: though the name of Psalm was also sometimes given to the Creeds and to the Lord's Prayer[t] likewise, since those also were sung in the Church.

1286. William Durants, or Durandus, the elder, Bishop of Menda in France, recounting the Creeds, makes their number *three;* mentioning the Athanasian in the second place, between the Apostles' and Nicene. He follows the same tradition which Otho Frisingensis did before, that this Creed was made at Triers, or Treves[u]. It is scarce worth noting that some copies here read Anastasius, since the circumstances plainly shew that Athanasius is the man intended, and that Anastasius can be nothing else but a corrupt reading.

1330. Ludolphus Saxo, the Carthusian, numbers three Creeds, with very brief, but good hints of their uses respectively: the Apostles', useful for a short compendious *instruction* in the faith; the Nicene, for fuller *explication;* and the Athanasian, for *guard* or *defence*[x] against heresies.

[r] Tria sunt Symbola; scilicet Apostolorum, quod dicitur in matutinis, in prima, et in completorio: item Nicænum, quod dicitur in diebus Dominicis post Evangelium: item Athanasii, quod dicitur in prima in Dominibis diebus alta voce.——Symbolum autem Athanasii quod contra hæreticos editum est, in *prima* dicitur, quasi jam pulsis hæreticorum tenebris.—— Ad id editum est Symbolum Athanasii quod specialiter contra hæreticos se opposuit. *Johan. Januens. in voce* symbolum.

[s] Articulorum Fidei Christianorum saltem simplicem habeant intellectum, prout in Psalmo, *Quicunque vult*, et in *utroque Symbolo* continentur. *Synod. Exon. Spelm. Conc.* vol. ii. p. 370.

[t] In a MS. of Trinity College, (called *Rythmus Anglicus,*) written about 1180, is a copy of the Apostles' Creed, and another of the Lord's Prayer, with these titles: *The Salm the Me Clepeth Crede: The Salm that is cleped pr nr.* This manner of speaking seems to have been borrowed from the Germans: for Otfridus, as is observed by Lambecius, gives the name of *a Psalm* to the Apostles' Creed. *Lambec. Catal.* vol. ii. p. 760.

[u] Nota, quod triplex est Symbolum. Primum est Symbolum Apostolorum, quod vocatur *Symbolum minus*—— Secundum Symbolum est, *Quicunque vult salvus esse*, &c. ab Athanasio, Patriarcha Alexandrino, in civitate Treviri compositum——Tertium est Nicænum quod——vocatur *Symbolum majus. Gul. Durant. Rational. Divin. Offic.* lib. iv. cap. 25.

[x] Tria sunt Symbola: primum Apostolorum; secundum, Nicæni Concilii; tertium, Athanasii. Primum, factum est ad fidei *instructionem*. Secundum, ad fidei *explanationem*. Tertium, ad fidei *defensionem*. *Ludolph. Sax. de Vit. Christi*, cap. lxxxiii. p. 732.

1337. William of Baldensal, or Boldesale, a German knight, ought here to be mentioned; as being the first writer extant that ascribes the Creed to Eusebius (of Verceil in Piedmont) along with Athanasius. The reason, I presume, was, the better to account for the Creed's being originally Latin. Baldensal's treatise, being the History of Piedmont, wherein he makes the remark, is not yet published, I suppose: but Cardinal Bona informs us that the manuscript was, in his time, in the library of the Duke of Savoy at Turin[y].

1360. Manuel Caleca, a Latinizing Greek, wrote a treatise upon the Principles of the Catholic Faith, published by Combefis, in his new Auctarium to the Bibliotheca Patrum, tome the second, where we find some passages to our present purpose; particularly this, that Caleca ascribes the Creed to Athanasius, and supposes it to have been presented by him to Pope Julius[z]. I know not whether he be not the first writer that mentions that circumstance, nor whether he reports it from others, or from his own invention.

1360. About the same time Johannes Cyparissiota, surnamed *the Wise*, wrote his Decads, which are published in Latin, in the Bibliotheques, of Turrianus's version. What we are to observe from him is, that he cites this Creed in the name of Athanasius, and as if it were made at the Council of Nice[a]. It seems, after it once passed current that Athanasius was the author, there was great variety of conjectures about the place where, and the time when, he composed or presented this Creed.

1439. I shall mention but one more, as late as the Council of Florence, or a little later; and that is Johannes (afterwards Josephus) Plusiadenus, a Latinizing Greek, who wrote a Dialogue in Defence of the Latins. What is observable in him is, that he makes the Creed to have been presented by Athanasius to Pope Liberius, instead of Julius[b].

[y] In hoc autem Symbolo, sive componendo, sive e Græco in Latinum traducendo, adjutorem fuisse Athanasio Eusebium, Vercellensem Episcopum, refert Gulielmus Baldesanus in historia Pedemontana, quæ manuscripta Taurini asservatur in bibliotheca Ducis Sabaudiæ, ex tabulario Vercellensis Ecclesiæ. *Bona de Divin. Psalm.* cap. xvi. sect. 18. p. 864.

[z] *Ταύτην γὰρ ἐὰν μή τις πιστῶς πιστεύσῃ, σωθῆναι οὐ δύναται, ὡς ὁ μέγας Ἀθανάσιος ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἰούλιον πάπαν Ῥώμης τῆς πίστεως ὁμολογία προσέθηκεν.* *Manuel Calec. de Fid.* c. 10. Confer eund. contr. Græc. lib. ii. c. 20.

[a] Magnus Athanasius in Expositione Fidei, in *prima synodo*, ait, &c. *Joan. Cypariss. Decad.* ix. c. 3. Bibl. PP. tom. xxi.

[b] *Ὁ θεῖος τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἱερὸς Ἀθανάσιος, ἐν τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεως, ἣν ἐξέθετο πρὸς Λιβέριον Πάπαν, ἧς ἡ*

I have now come low enough with the *ancient* testimonies, if I may be allowed so to call those of the later times. A few of the first and earliest might have sufficed, had I no other point in view but the mere *antiquity* of the Creed: but, as my design is to treat of its *reception* also, in various places, and at various times, and to lay together several kind of evidences which will require others, both early and late, to clear up and explain them; it was, in a manner, necessary for me to bring my accounts as low as I have here done. Besides that several inferior, incidental questions will fall in our way, for the resolving of which, most of the testimonies I have here cited will be serviceable in their turn; as will appear more fully in the sequel. I have omitted several testimonies of the later centuries, such as I thought might conveniently be spared, either as containing nothing but what we had before from others more ancient, or as being of no use for the clearing up any that we have, or for the settling any point which will come to be discussed in the following sheets. The rule I have set myself in making the collection, and which I have been most careful to observe, was to take in all those, and none but those, which are either valuable for their *antiquity*, or have something *new* and *particular* upon the subject, or may strike some light into any *doubtful question* thereunto relating.

I shall shut up this chapter, as I did the former, with a table, representing in one view the sum and substance of what has been done in it. The several columns will contain the *year* of our Lord, the *authors* here recited, the *country* where they lived, and the *title* or *titles* by them given to the Creed. The *titles* ought to appear in their *original* language wherein they were written; which my English reader may the more easily excuse, since they have most of them been given in English above, where it was more proper to do it. The use of such a table will be seen as often as a reader has a mind to look back to this chapter, or to compare several evidences of different kinds, proving the same thing, one with another.

ἀρχὴ, ὅστις ἀνβούληται σωθῆναι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον φησὶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, &c. *Joan. Plusiad. apud Combefis. not. in Calec.* p. 297.

A.D.	*Authors.*	*Country.*	*Title of the Creed.*
670	Council of Autun	France	Fides Sancti Athanasii Præsulis.
760	Articles Inqu. Regino	Germany	Sermo Athanasii Episcopi de Fide.
794	Counc. Frankfort	Germany	Fides Catholica Sanctæ Trinitatis.
809	Theodulphus	France	
809	Anonymous	France	Expositio Catholicæ Fidei Athanasii.
809	Monks of M. Olivet	Judæa	Fides Sancti Athanasii.
820	Hatto, or Hetto	France	Fides Sancti Athanasii.
820	Agobardus	France	
852	Hincmar	France	Sermo Athanasii de Fide.
			Athanasii Symbolum.
865	Anscharius	Germany	Athanasii Fides Catholica.
868	Bertram	France	Libellus Athanasii de Fide.
868	Æneas Paris.	France	Athanasii Fides Catholica.
871	Adalbertus	France	Sermo Beati Athanasii.
889	Riculphus	France	Sermo Fidei Catholicæ
960	Ratherius	Italy	Sermo Athanasii Ep. de Fide Trinitatis.
997	Abbo, or Albo	France	Fides secundum Athanasium.
1047	Gualdo	France	Fides Catholica Athanasio adscripta.
1130	Honorius	France	Fides *Quicunque vult.*
1146	Otho	Bavaria	Quicunque vult &c.
1171	Duke of Brunswick	Germany	Athanasii Symbolum Fidei.
1178	Robertus Paululus	France	Quicunque vult &c.
1190	Beleth	France	Athanasii Symbolum.
1200	Nic. Hydruntinus	Italy	Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου πίστις ἡ Καθολική.
1230	Alexander Alens.	England	Athanasii Symbolum.
1233	P. Gregory's Legates		Ἔκθεσις τῆς πίστεως.
1240	Walter Cantelupe	England	Psalmus *Quicunque* &c.
1250	Thom. Aquinas	Italy	Athanasii Manifestatio Fidei.
1255	Walter Kirkham	England	Psalmus *Quicunque* &c.
1286	John Januensis	Italy	Symbolum Athanasii.
1286	Durandus	France	Athanasii Symbolum.
1287	Exon. Synod	England	Psalmus *Quicunque.*
1330	Ludolphus	Saxony	Athanasii Symbolum.
1337	Baldensal	Germany	Athanasii Symbolum.
1360	Man. Caleca	Greece	Ἡ τῆς πίστεως ὁμολογία τοῦ Ἀθανασίου.
1360	Joan. Cyparissiota	Greece	Athanasii Expositio Fidei.
1439	Joan. Plusiadenus	Greece	Ἡ τῆς πίστεως ὁμολογία τοῦ Ἀθανασίου.

CHAP. III.

Ancient Commentators and Paraphrasts upon the Athanasian Creed.

ANCIENT *comments*, or *paraphrases*, may be properly mentioned after ancient *testimonies*, being near akin to them, and almost the same thing with them. I call none *ancient* but such as were made before the year 1500; and therefore shall carry my accounts no lower, nor quite so low, as that time.

A. D. 570. The first *comment* to be met with on this Creed is one of the *sixth* century, composed by Venantius Fortunatus, an Italian by birth, but one that travelled into France and Germany, became acquainted with the most eminent scholars and prelates all over the west, and was at length made Bishop of Poictiers in France. His comment on this Creed has been published from a manuscript about 600 years old [x], out of the Ambrosian library at Milan, by Muratorius, in his second tome of Anecdota, in the year 1698. There can be no reasonable doubt but that the comment really belongs to the man whose name it bears. 1. Because in the same book there is also a comment upon the Apostles' Creed [y] ascribed to Fortunatus, and which is known to belong to Venantius Fortunatus, and has been before printed among his other works. 2. Because it appears highly probable from what Venantius Fortunatus has occasionally dropped in his other undoubted works [z], that he was really acquainted with the Athanasian Creed, and borrowed

[x] Est porro nobis in Ambrosiana bibliotheca membranaceus codex annos abhinc ferme sexcentos manu descriptus; ut ex characterum forma, aliisque conjecturis affirmari posse mihi videtur. Heic, præter alia opuscula multa, tres Symboli expositiones habentur, quarum *unam* tantum nunc publici juris facio.

Prima ita inscribitur, Expositio Fidei Catholicæ. Alteri nullus titulus præfixus est. *Postrema* vero hunc præ se fert; *Expositio Fidei Catholicæ Fortunati.*——Fortunatus autem, heic memoratus, alius a Venantio Fortunato non est, quem Insulæ Pictaviensis Ecclesiæ, quem Christianæ poetices ornamenta æternitate donarunt. *Murator. Anecdot.* tom. ii. p. 228.

[y] Expositionem quoque continet (cod. Ambrosianus) Apostolici Symboli, cum hac inscriptione: *Incipit expositio a Fortunato Presbytero conscripta.* Eadem vero est ac edita inter Fortunati opera. Tum sequuntur geminæ ejusdem Symboli explicationes. Tres Orationis Dominicæ, et duæ Athanasiani Symboli expositiones incertis auctoribus scriptæ. Tandem, uti diximus, Expositio Fidei Catholicæ Fortunati legitur. Quocirco quin ad Venantium quoque Fortunatum opusculum hoc sit referendum, nullus dubito. *Murator.* ibid. p. 331.

[z] Præclarum in primordio ponitur cælestis testimonii fundamentum, quia

expressions from it. 3. Because in the expositions of the Apostles' and Athanasian Creeds, there is great similitude of style, thoughts, and expressions; which shews that both are of the same hand, and indeed the other circumstances considered, abundantly proves it. It would burden my margin too much, otherwise it were easy to give at least half a dozen plain specimens, where either the expressions or turn of thought, or both, are exactly parallel. Such as think it of moment to examine, may easily be satisfied by comparing the comment on the Apostles' Creed, in the tenth tome of the last Bibliotheque, with the comment on the Athanasian, in Muratorius. 4. I may add, that the tenor of the whole comment, and the simplicity of the style and thoughts, are very suitable to that age, and more so than to the centuries following. These reasons convince me that this comment belongs to Venantius Fortunatus, composed by him after his going into France, and before he was Bishop of Poictiers: and so we may probably fix the date of it about the year 570, or perhaps higher. There is an older manuscript copy of this comment (as I find by comparing) in the Museum at Oxford, among Junius's manuscripts, number 25[a]. I am obliged to the very worthy and learned Dr. Haywood, for sending me a transcript of it, with a specimen of the *character*. It is reasonably judged to be about 800 years old. It wants, in the beginning, about ten or a dozen lines: in the other parts it agrees with Muratorius's copy, saving only some slight insertions, and such *various lections* as are to be expected in different manuscripts not copied one from the other. From the *two copies* compared may be drawn out a much more correct *comment* than that which Muratorius has given us from *one*; as will be shewn at the end of this work.

I intimated above, that Muratorius supposes this Venantius Fortunatus to be the author, not of the *comment* only, but Creed

salvus esse non poterit, qui recte de salute non crediderit. *Fortunat. Expos. Symb. Apost.* Bibl. PP. tom. x.

Non Deus in carnem versus, Deus accipit artus:
Non se permutans, sed sibi membra levans.
Unus in ambabus naturis, verus in ipsis
Æqualis matri hinc, *par Deitate Patri*.
Non sua *confundens*, sibi nostra sed omnia nectens.
.....
De *Patre* natus habens *divina*, *humanaque matris*,
De Patre sublimis, de genetrice humilis.
Venant. Fortun. lib. viii. carm. 5. Bibl. P. tom. x.

[a] The title, Expositio in Fide Catholica.

also. But his reasons, which plead strongly for the former, are of no force at all in respect of the latter: which he is so sensible of himself, that while he speaks with great assurance of the one, he is very diffident of the other [b]. And indeed, not to mention several other considerations standing in the way of his conjecture, who can imagine Venantius Fortunatus to have been so *vain*, as, after commenting on the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed, to fall to commenting upon a composition of his *own*?

This comment of Fortunatus is a great confirmation of what hath been above cited from the Council of Autun: for if the Creed was noted enough to deserve a *comment* upon it so early as the year 570, no wonder if we find it strongly recommended by that Council in the year 670, a hundred years after. And it is observable that, as that Council recommends the Apostolical and Athanasian Creeds, without saying a word of the Nicene; so Fortunatus, before them, comments upon those two only, taking no notice of the third.

I cannot take leave of this comment, without observing to the reader, that in Pareus's notes on this Creed, I have met with a passage which I am not well able to account for. He cites a *comment* upon this Creed, under the name of Euphronius Presbyter [c], does not say whether from a *print* or a *manuscript*: but the words he produces are in this very comment of Fortunatus. Who this Euphronius is, I can no where find; nor whether an *ancient* or *modern* writer. There was an Euphronius Presbyter, (mentioned by Gregory of Tours,) who lived in the fifth century, and was at length Bishop of Autun: but I never heard of any writings of his, more than an epistle ascribed to him and Lupus of Troyes. There was another Euphronius, who was bishop of Tours, with whom Fortunatus had some intimacy. Whether his name, appearing in any manuscript copy of Fortunatus's tracts, might occasion the mistake, I know not. Bruno's comment has the very same passage which Pareus cites, only in a different order of the words: but neither will this help us to account for its being quoted under the name of Euphronius

[b] Hujus *Symboli* auctor esse potuit Venantius Fortunatus: saltem fuit hujus *Expositionis* auctor. *Murator.* p. 217.

Non ita meis conjecturis plaudo, ut facilius non arbitrer *Expositionem* potius quam *Symbolum* huic auctori tribuendum. *Murator.* p. 231.

[c] Euphronius Presbyter in expositione hujus Symboli Athanasii, Fides, inquit, Catholica, seu universalis, dicitur: Hoc est, recta, quam Ecclesia universa tenere debet. *David. Parei not. ad Symb. Athan.* p. 118. edit. an. 1635. The words are not in the edition of 1627.

Presbyter, which has no similitude with the name of Bruno, Bishop of Wurtzburgh. I would not however omit the mentioning this note of Pareus, because a hint may sometimes lead to useful discoveries; and others may be able to resolve the doubt, though I am not.

852. Our next *Commentator*, or rather *Paraphrast*, is Hincmar of Rheims: not upon the whole Creed, but upon such parts only as he had occasion to cite. For his way is to throw in several words of his own, as explanatory notes, so far as he quotes the Creed[d]: and he sometimes does it more than he ought to have done, to serve a cause against Gothescalcus: which I may hint, in passing; to say more of it would be foreign to our present purpose.

1033. S. Bruno, Bishop of Wurtzburgh in Germany, has a formal comment, and much larger than Fortunatus's, upon the Athanasian Creed. It is at the end of his Psalter, and has been several times printed with it. Father Le Long reckons up six editions[e], in this order: 1. At Nuremberg, in folio A. D. 1494. 2. By Antonius Koberger, in quarto, A. D. 1497. 3. By Cochleus, at Wurtzburgh, in quarto, A. D. 1531. 4. At Leipsic, in quarto, 1533. In the Cologne Bibliotheque, A. D. 1618. tom. xi. 6. In the Lyons Bibl. PP. A. D. 1677. tom. xviii. The *old* editions are scarce, and not easy to be met with. I have seen two of them in our public library of Cambridge, those of 1494 and 1533. There is an elegant one of the former (as I conceive by the description sent me by a learned gentleman) in the Bodleian at Oxford: it is in vellum, in a black and red letter, reserved among the manuscripts, and marked Laud, E. 81. The title, at the beginning, Fides Anastasii; at the end, Fides Athanasii. The two editions of 1497 and 1531 I never saw. I have seen one by Antonius Koberger, in quarto, bearing date A. D. 1494[f], in the Bodleian, marked F. 40. Bishop Usher makes mention of an edition in 1531[g], and seems to have known

[d] Vid. Hincmari Oper. tom. i. p. 452, 464, 469, 552, 553.

[e] Commentarii in totum Psalterium et in Cantica Vet. et Nov. Testamenti, in fol. Norembergæ, 1494. In 4to. per Antonium Koburger 1497. Idem a Joan. Cochleo restitutum in 4to. Herbipoli 1531. Lipsiæ 1533. Bibl. PP. Coloniensis et Lugdunensis. *Le Long, Bibl. Bibl.* tom. ii. p. 654.

[f] Per Antonium Koberger impressum anno incarnationis Deitatis millesimo quadringentesimo, nonagesimo quarto, finit feliciter.

[g] Psalterii editio vulgata Latina, obelis et asteriscis distincta, cum Brunonis Herbipolensis Episcopi commentariis, anno 1531. a Johanne Cochlæo in lucem est emissa. *Usser. de editione LXX Interpr.* p. 104.

of none older. I should have suspected 1531 to be a false print for 1533, had not Le Long confirmed it, that there is such an edition as 1531, and named the *place* where it was printed: though I cannot but observe that he makes a *folio* of it in his first tome[h], and a *quarto* in the second; which is to me an argument that he had never seen it, but perhaps took the hint from Usher. But leaving the *printed* editions of this *comment* of Bruno's, let us next say something of the *manuscripts* of it, and their differences from the *prints*, or from each other. There are many manuscript copies, which I shall mention in order.

1. The first and most valuable manuscript is in the library of Wurtzburgh, as old as the author, left by him as a legacy to that church. The first printed edition (if I mistake not) was taken from that very *original* manuscript[i]; which at the lowest computation must be 680 years old. The title of the Creed, Fides Catholica S. Athanasii Episcopi.

2. There is a *second*, which I have seen in Trinity College in Cambridge, annexed to a Psalter described at large by the learned Mr. Wanley, in his Catalogue[k], and judged by him to have been written about the time of King Stephen. So that this is about a hundred years later than the former, or about 580 years old; no *title* to the Creed.

3. There is a *third*, of much the same age with the former, of some years older, in the Bodleian at Oxford, marked Laud. H. 61. the title of the Creed, Fides Catholica Sancti Athanasii Episcopi.

4. In the Bodleian also is another, (Laud. E. 71. Catal. N. 994.) Athanasii Symbolum cum Glossa. This, as I am certified by a learned gentleman, is Bruno's comment. The title of the Creed, Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi.

5. In Merton College is another, an ancient copy of Bruno's comment. Catal. N. 675–208.

[h] Psalterium vetus obelis et asteriscis distinctum, cum commentariis S. Brunonis, studio Joannis Cochlæi editum, in fol. Herbipoli, 1531. in 4to. Lipsiæ 1533. *Le Long*, tom. i. p. 274.

[i] Posteris filiis suis (S. Bruno) memorabilem et sanctum Psalmorum librum, *ex quo ille impressus est*, sumptuose scriptum, quasi hæreditatis spiritualis non minimam portionem reliquit. Prolog. ad editionem anni 1494. Preciosum istum thesaurum posteritati post se reliquit, et quidem insigni scriptura sumptuose descriptum—— extat donum illud memorabile et conspicuum in locuplete antiquorum voluminum bibliotheca Herbipolensis Ecclesiæ: quod sane religiosa pietate, velut hæreditas quædam hujus Sancti Patris custoditur. *Joan. Coch.* prolog. ad edit. an. 1533.

[k] Wanleii Catalog. MSS. Septentr. p. 168.

6. In St. John Baptist's College, Oxon. (Catal. N. 1874. G. 42. Commentarius in Symbolum Athanasii. By the beginning and concluding words, (a transcript of which has been sent me by a worthy member of that society,) I am well assured that it is Bruno's comment.

7. There is another in Balliol College, (Catal. N. 210. marked B. I.) Athanasii Symbolum cum Commentario.

8. Another I have seen in the Cathedral library at York, which may be 500 years old. No title.

9. There is another, in the library of St. German de Prez, about 500 years old. Montfaucon, having met with it, published it[1] as an *anecdoton*; not knowing that it was Bruno's comment. It is not indeed quite so *full*, nor any thing near so *correct* as the printed copies: but still it is plainly Bruno's comment. The title, Tractatus de Fide Catholica.

10. There is also, in my Lord Oxford's library, a modern manuscript of this comment, written at Augsburg in the year 1547, copied from Bruno's original manuscript, (by order of Charles Peutenger, son to the famous Conrad,) where the title is, Fides Catholica Sancti Anastasii Episcopi. The mistake of Anastasii for Athanasii, we find, had crept into the German copies some centuries before: wherefore this is not to be wondered at. All the older copies, as well as the *original* manuscript, have Athanasii in the *title*, where there is a *title*, and Athanasius in the beginning of the comment.

The manuscripts which I have here recited, all but the first, seem now to be of no great use; if it be true, as I suppose, that the first prints were taken from the very *original* at Wurtzburgh. It is certain that they are very imperfect and incorrect, (I have collated three of them,) in comparison of the *printed* copies: I could not observe above two or three places, and those not very material, where the printed copies seem to have followed a false reading, or may be corrected by those manuscripts. One thing I a little wondered at, that the three manuscripts of St. German's, Trinity College, and York, should all leave out some paragraphs, which appear in the *printed* copies, and the same paragraphs: but I have since found, that those very paragraphs were taken out of Fortunatus's comment, and belong not properly to Bruno's. This, I presume, the first

[1] Montfaucon, Athanas. Oper. tom. ii. p. 735.

copiers understood, and therefore omitted them. Probably Bruno's own copy might at first want them, (though they must have been added soon after,) or if Bruno himself inserted them, yet he had left some mark of distinction, which was understood at that time; though not by the editors of this comment so many years after. But to proceed.

1120. In the next age, the famous Peter Abelard wrote comments upon this Creed: which are printed amongst his other works. The title in the prints is, Petri Abaĕlardi Expositio Fidei, in Symbolum Athanasii. I suspect that the editor has added the latter part, in Symbolum Athanasii, as a hint to the reader. The *comment* is a very short one, scarce three pages in quarto, and, for the age it was wrote in, a pretty good one; though, as I conceive from some flaws in it, printed from a copy not very *correct*.

1170. Of the same century is Hildegarde, the celebrated Abbess of St. Rupert's Mount, near Binghen, on the Rhine. She wrote explications of St. Benedict's Rule, and of the Athanasian Creed: which may be seen, Bibl. PP. tom. xxiii. p. 596.

1210. Simon Tornacensis, Priest of Tournay, in the beginning of the thirteenth century, taught divinity at Paris, with great reputation. His manuscript works are in many libraries: and, among his other writings, there is an Exposition of the Athanasian Creed[m]. Oudin reckons up four manuscript copies of it, in as many distinct libraries, and acquaints us where they are to be found, and of what age they probably are.

1215. Contemporary with the former is Alexander Neckham, an Englishman, Abbot of Cirencester, or Circeter, in Gloucestershire. He wrote a comment on the Athanasian Creed, which is extant in manuscript in the Bodleian at Oxford, (marked E. 7. 8. Catal. N. 2339.) coeval probably with the author.

There is another copy of the same comment, in the Bodleian also, E. 6. 11. n. 2330. The title, Expositio Fidei Catholicæ a Magistro Alexandro edicta. This copy is about fifty years later than the former. It may be of use to note down the first words of the comment[n]. It is drawn up in the scholastic way,

[m] Expositio Symboli, per Simonem Tornacensis Ecclesiæ Canonicum, et Parisiensem Doctorem, quæ sic incipit: Apud Aristotelem argumentum est ratio faciens fidem, sed apud Christum argumentum est fides faciens rationem. *Oudin.* tom. iii. p. 30.

[n] Hæc est enim victoria quæ vincit mundum, fides nostra. Signanter dicit *vult*, et non dicit, *Quicunque salvus erit*.

and is pretty large, making ten folio leaves with double columns, in E. 7, 8. and four folio leaves with three columns, and a very small hand, in E. 6. 11.

1230. Not long after, Alexander Hales, before mentioned, wrote comments upon the same Creed, which are published in his Summa, part the third, under Quæst. 69. His method of commenting is, to raise doubts and scruples all the way he goes, and to answer them in the scholastic form: referring sometimes to the Fathers of the Church, and particularly to St. Austin: to whom he ascribes Gennadius's treatise De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, according to the common error of that time. But I proceed.

1340. There is another commentary upon this Creed, written, as is said, by Richardus Hampolus, Richard Rolle of Hampole, a native of Yorkshire, and a monk of the order of St. Austin. It contains, in a manner, Bruno's comment entire, with several additions and insertions either of the author's own, or such as he had borrowed elsewhere. It has been twice printed, first at Cologne in the year 1536, and afterwards in the Bibliotheca Patrum, Lugdun. tom. xxvi. p. 624.

I am in doubt concerning the author of that comment, having reason to believe that the three copies mentioned by Tentzelius[o], preserved in the Gotha, Basil, and Leipsic libraries, are so many copies of this very comment which passes under the name of Hampole: and yet one of them is judged to be above 500 years older[p] than 1686, which is 150 years before Hampole's days. It is possible that Joachim Fellerus, the compiler of the catalogue of the Leipsic library, might mistake in judging of the age of the manuscript: but it appears much more probable that the editors of that comment were mistaken in ascribing it to Hampole. However that be, I would here observe, that there is in

[o] Tentzel. Jud. Eruditor. Præfat. et p. 224.

[p] Tentzelius writes thus:

Opportune ad manus meas pervenit Responsio Ampl. Felleri, qua rationem codicis Latini Lipsiensis in præfatione a me citati prolixius exposuit. Ait enim, membranaceum istum codicem ante CCCCC annos et ultra, eleganter scriptum videri; additas etiam esse non interlineares tantum notas, sed et marginales utrinque; in *dextro* videlicet et *sinistro* paginarum latere: *Rubricam* autem *Symboli* nostri ita se habere; *Fides Anastasii Papæ*. In *dextro* primæ paginæ hæc legi verba: *Hæc ratio Fidei Catholicæ traditur in veteribus codicibus*, et reliqua, quæ antea ex MS. bibliothecæ ducalis attuli. Unde patet, easdem plane glossas in utroque codice reperiri; præsertim quum in *sinistro* alterius margine, hæc etiam verba legi referat Fellerus: *Hic beatus Anastasius liberum arbitrium posuit*, &c. *Tentzel.* p. 225.

Magdalen College, in Oxford, a comment entitled, Expositio in Symbolum Athanasianum per Januensem, (N. Catal. 2256—115.) which is no other than this very comment that passes in the prints under the name of Richard Hampole. The Catalogue's ascribing it to Januensis was owing, I suppose, to an occasional passage in that manuscript, relating to the Athanasian Creed, cited from Johannes Januensis's Catholicon, or Dictionary, under the word *symbolum*. The comment however, I say, is the same with that which passes for Hampole's, as may plainly appear from the beginning of it, which I have transcribed into the margin[q]; only filling up an *omission* in it, occasioned, as is very common, by the repetition of the same word. There may be a good use made of that manuscript in Magdalen College, for correcting the printed copy, which is very faulty, both in *words* and *order*. The comment ought to begin as it begins in that manuscript; and not with the words, *Hic beatus Athanasius*, as in the prints. The editors did not understand, or did not consider, the nature and composition of that comment. The author, whoever he was, had made two columns, one on each hand, with the Athanasian Creed in the middle. On the *left hand*, which is the first place, he set Bruno's comment, and on the *right hand*, in the other column, he carried down another comment either of his own or borrowed. The first note on the *right hand* was plainly designed for an introduction to the rest, and therefore ought to be set first; though the editor's considering only the position of the notes, began from the *left hand*, with the first words of Bruno's comment. The Oxford copy observes the true natural order, and may very probably be of good use all the way through, for the better digesting and methodizing that comment, or comments, being in reality two comments mixed and blended together.

I should observe of the Oxford copy, that after the comment there is, in the same hand, this note; *Hæc conscripta sunt a quodam antiquo libro*. Possibly this may be of some use for the determining whether that comment be really Hampole's or no. For if

[q] Hæc ratio Fidei Catholicæ traditur etiam in veteribus codicibus a beato Athanasio Alexandrino conscripta. Et puto, quod idcirco tam plano et brevi sermone tradita sit, ut omnibus Catholicis, et minus eruditis, tutamen defensionis præstaret adversus illam tempestatem [quam contrarius ventus, hoc est, Diabolus, excitavit per Arrium; quam tempestatem] qui fugere desiderat, hanc fidei unitatem (al. *veritatem*) integram et inviolabilem teneat. Ita enim incipit ipsum opusculum, dicens, *Quicunque vult salvus*, &c. Hic beatus Athanasius liberum arbitrium posuit, &c.

the manuscript be not much later than 1415, (it must be so late, since it fixes that very date to Dr. Ullerston's Exposition of the Six Psalms,) it may be probably argued that any thing of Hampole's, who flourished but about eighty years before, would not have been called *antiquus liber*, an ancient book. But this I leave to further inquiries, not insisting upon it, since the argument is but probable at the best; and I do not know but the manuscript may be several years later than 1415, though hardly later than the middle of that century. Ullerston is undoubtedly the latest author in that collection. Petrus Florissiensis, or Floreffiensis, (otherwise called Petrus de Harentals,) wrote in 1374[r]: Januensis Gorrham, Lyra, and Hampole are all older than he: the last therefore is Ullerston, who was probably still living when that manuscript was written. But enough of this.

1380. To the Latin comments here mentioned I may add an English one, which I may suppose to be Wickliff's. If it be not his, yet certainly it is of his time, and not far from the middle of the fourteenth century. I will first give some account of this English comment, and then shew both why I ascribe it to Wickliff, and why I do it not with full assurance, but with some degree of diffidence. I first met with it in a manuscript volume (in 12mo) belonging to the library of St. John's College in Cambridge. The volume contains an English version of the Psalms and Hymns of the Church, with the Athanasian Creed produced paragraph by paragraph in Latin, interspersed with an English version of each paragraph, and commented upon quite through, part by part. After the comment, follow Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus, all in old English, without gloss or comment. Now the reasons why I incline to ascribe the comment to Wickliff are these:

1. Dr. Langbaine, of Queen's College in Oxford, in a letter to Bishop Usher, bearing date A. D. 1647, testifies that he had seen such a comment, and that he found it to be Wickliff's, by comparing the beginning of it with Bale[s]. This, very probably, is the same comment; though there is no such manuscript now in Magdalen College, Oxon, as was in Dr. Langbaine's time.

[r] See Oudin, tom. iii. p. 1218.

[s] While I was there, (in Magdalen College Library,) tumbling amongst their books, I light upon an old English comment upon the Psalms, the Hymns of the Church, and Athanasius's Creed; which I presently conjectured (though there be no name to it) to be Wickliff's. And comparing the beginning with Bale, found that I had not erred in the conjecture. *Langbaine, among Usher's Letters*, p. 513.

2. All those parts of Scripture which go before and after this comment, in the same volume, are of the *same version* with that of Wickliff's Bible in the library of Emanuel College, without any difference, (except that St. John's copy, being older, retains the more ancient spelling,) as I am well assured by comparing them together: so that if those parts be Wickliff's, it may appear very probable that the *comment* is his too. Indeed, our very learned Wharton was of opinion, that the version commonly ascribed to Wickliff[t] was really John Trevisa's; who flourished in the time of Richard the Second, was a Cornish man by birth, and Vicar of Berkely in Gloucestershire, about the year 1387[u]: in which year he finished his translation of the Polychronicon. But Mr. Wharton's reasonings in this matter have appeared to others not satisfactory[x], and have in part been confuted[y]. I shall not enter far into that dispute, being almost foreign to my purpose: and it is not very material whether Wickliff or Trevisa (if either) be judged the author of the comment. This only I may observe, by the way, that Mr. Wharton's argument drawn from the Norfolk manuscript of the Gospels, (Cod. 254,) which he is positive belongs to Wickliff, appears to be of some weight, so far as concerns the New Testament; and the inference may reach to several parts of the Old Testament also. Either Mr. Wharton must have been mistaken in ascribing the Norfolk copy to Wickliff, or else, for any thing I see, his argument will stand good. The *characteristic* which he lays down whereby to distinguish Wickliff's version (namely, the frequent insertion of *synonymous* words) will by no means agree with the common version: and then the *specimen* he gives of the two different renderings of Luke ii. 7. is directly contrary[z]. But a fuller discussion of that point may be left with those who have more leisure, and

[t] Wharton Auctarium Histor. Dogmat. p. 425, 426.

[u] In that year he finished his version of Higden's Polychronicon, as the manuscripts testify; and as is plain from its being finished in the thirty-fifth year of Thomas Lord Berkley, the fourth of that name, which agrees exactly with that year, and with no other.

[x] Oudin. Comment. de Scriptor. Eccles. vol. iii. p. 1044.

[y] Vid. Le Long, Bibl. Bibl. vol. i. p. 426.

[z] Wicklefus sic reddit: "And put-
" tide him in a cratche; for place was
" not to him in the comyn stable."
Alter interpres sic: "And leide him
" in a cratche; for there was no place
" to him in no chaumbre." *Wharton*, p. 426.
I have a manuscript of the New Testament, belonging to our college library, which reads Luke ii. 7. according to the first reading, and which has many instances of *synonymous* insertions every where: it is a different version from that which is commonly ascribed to Wickliff.

have more particularly studied it. I am content to suppose that the common version ascribed to Wickliff is really his: perhaps he might give two editions of it[a]; or else Trevisa's may be little more than Wickliff's version, corrected and polished with great liberty, both as to sense and expression, where it appeared needful. That Trevisa really did translate the whole Bible into English is positively asserted by Caxton, in his preface to Trevisa's Translation of Higden's Polychronicon[b]; and by Bale[c], who gives us the first words of the preface to it. To proceed.

3. A third reason I have for the ascribing the comment to Wickliff is, that some parts of it seem to suit exactly with his humour, and manner, and way of thinking; particularly the gird upon popes and cardinals in the close[d].

Nevertheless, I am far from being positive in this matter: much may be offered to take off the force of these reasons, or to counterbalance them. 1. This very comment is annexed to a manuscript *commentary* upon the Psalms and Hymns of the Church, now in Trinity College library in Cambridge: which commentary appears not to be Wickliff's, though supposed to be his by Mr. Wharton[e]. The English version of the Psalms going along with that commentary is not the same with that of Wickliff's Bible: I have compared them. The *commentary*, and *version* too, are reasonably judged to be Hampole's. I find by

[a] Patet, aut antiquiorem fuisse quandam S. Scripturæ translationem Anglicam, aut duplicem fuisse translationis Wiclevianæ editionem. *Wharton. Auctor. Hist. Dogm.* p. 436.

[b] Ranulph monke of Chestre first auctour of this book, and afterward Englished by one Trevisa Vicarye of Barkley; which atte request of one Sr. Thomas Lord Barkley translated this sayd book, the Byble, and Bartylmew de Proprietatibus Rerum out of Latyn into Englysh. *Caxton. Prokemye to his edit.* 1482.

[c] In Anglicum idioma, ad petitionem prædicti sui Domini de Barkeley, transtulit totum bibliorum opus: utrumque Dei Testamentum lib. ii. (His preface beginning) "Ego Jo-"hannes Trevisa Sacerdos." *Bal.* cent. vii. c. 18. p. 518.

N. B. Bale seems to be mistaken in saying that Trevisa continued the Polychr. to 1397. For Trevisa ended with 1357. And Caxton declares that himself continued the history for 103 years further, to 1460.

[d] And algif this Crede accorde unto Prestis, netheles the higher Prelatis, as Popis and Cardynals, and Bisshops shulden more specially kunne this Crede, and teche it to men undir hem. *Comm. on the Athan. Creed.*

Compare some words of Wickliff's Bileve.

I suppose, over this, that the Pope be most oblishid to the keping of the Gospel among all men that liven here; for the Pope is highest Vicar that Christ has here in erth. *Collier, Eccl. Hist.* vol. i. p. 728.

[e] Commentarius in Psalmos, aliosque Sacræ Scripturæ ac Liturgiæ Ecclesiasticæ Hymnos. MS. in Collegio S. Trinitatis Cantab. F. Commentarius in priores 89 Psalmos habetur MS. in Bibliotheca Lambethana. *Wharton. sub Wicklef. Append. ad Cav. H. L.* p. 54.

a note left in a blank page at the beginning, (signed J. Russel,) that there is a copy of this *commentary* in the Royal library, (B. 15. 12.) but imperfect; the *prologue* the very same, and expressly ascribed to Richard of Hampole: from whence it may be justly suspected, that the comment upon the Athanasian Creed at the end, appearing in part, (for two leaves are cut out,) is Hampole's, as well as the rest. There is in Bennet library, in Cambridge, another manuscript copy of the same commentary, (marked 1—1. Catal. p. 69,) with the *comment* upon the Creed entire. The *prologue* I found to be the same as in the other, as also the comment on the *first* Psalm; by which I judge of the rest[f]. The comment on the Canticles at the end is likewise the same; only the Canticles are not all placed in the same *order*. At the bottom of the second leaf of the commentary, there is left this note, by an unknown hand: *Author hujus libri, Richardus, Heremita de Hampole.* Now, if this commentary really be Hampole's, of which I can scarce make any question, it will appear highly probable that the *comment* on the Creed is his too. 2. What favours the suspicion is, that here the *comment* is annexed to other *comments* in like form with itself, and not to mere *versions*, as in the manuscript of St. John's library. Nay, further, this comment on the Creed, as it appears in St. John's copy, has the several parts of the Creed in Latin, and in *red* letter, prefixed to the respective version and comment; just as we find, in Hampole, the several parts of each Psalm exhibited first in Latin, and in *red* letter: which circumstance is of some weight. 3. Add to this, that there are some expressions in the comment on the Creed very like to those which are familiar with the author of that *commentary* on the Psalms: such as these; "It is seid comunly, that ther ben &c. clerkis sein" thus and thus; so that from similitude of style an argument may be drawn in favour of Hampole, as well as for Wickliff. These considerations suffer me not to be positive on the other side. The comment may be Hampole's; or it may be Wickliff's; which latter opinion I the rather incline to for the reasons before given, appearing to me something more forcible than the other. And I may further observe, that there is in Sidney College in Cambridge, a very old copy of Hampole's commentary, which

[f] Q. Whether there be not one or two more copies of the same in the Bodleian. See the Bodleian Manuscripts, in the General Catalogue, N. 2438. 3085.

runs through the Psalms, and all the ordinary Hymns and Canticles, but has no comment upon the Athanasian Creed annexed, though the manuscript appears very whole and entire. This makes me less inclinable to suspect the comment upon the Creed being Hampole's; it is more probably Wickliff's, as I before said. However it be, the comment may be useful: and if it should prove Hampole's, it must be set forty years higher than I have here placed it. The distance of thirty or forty years makes no great alteration in any language: so that merely from the *language*, especially in so small a tract, we can draw no consequence to the *author*; excepting such peculiarities as may have been rather proper to this or that *man*, than to this or that *time*.

1478. To the comments before mentioned I may add one more, a Latin one, printed, as I suppose, about the year 1478, though it carries not its date with it. The author is Peter d'Osma, called in Latin Petrus de Osoma[g], or Petrus Oxomensis, or Uxomensis. The comment makes about seventy pages in quarto, and is drawn up in the scholastic way, with good judgment and accuracy, considering the age it was written in. The book was lent me by Mr. Pownall of Lincoln, a gentleman of known abilities, and particularly curious in searching out and preserving any rare and uncommon pieces, printed or manuscript. I do not find that this *comment* has been at all taken notice of in any of our Bibliotheques, or in any of the catalogues of the books printed before 1500. Even those that give account of the author, yet seem to have known nothing of the printing of this piece. Probably there were but very few copies, and most of them soon destroyed upon the author's falling under censure in the year 1479. The author, if I judge right, was the same Peter Osma who was Professor of Divinity in Salamanca, and adorned the chair with great reputation for many years. He began to be famous about the year 1444, and at length fell under the censure of a provincial synod, held under Alphonsus Carrillus, Archbishop of Toledo, in the year 1479[h]. He was condemned for some positions advanced in a book which he had written upon the subject of *Confession*. The positions, nine in number, are such

[g] Commentaria Magistri Petri de Osoma in Symbolum *Quicunque vult*, &c. finiunt feliciter. Impressaque Parisiis per Magistrum Udulricum, cognomento Gering.

[h] Nicol. Antonii Bibliotheca Hispana Vetus, tom. ii. p. 203.

as every Protestant professes at this day[i], being levelled only at the corruptions of Popery in doctrine and discipline: but the good man was forced to submit and abjure, and to profess an implicit belief in whatsoever was held for faith by the then Pope Sixtus IV. Such, in short, is the account of our author, one of the most learned and valuable men of his time, by confession even of his enemies. At what particular time he composed his comment on the Athanasian Creed, I cannot say; only that it was between 1444 and 1479. I have placed it according to the time it was printed, as nearly as I am able to judge of it.

These are all the *ancient* comments upon the Athanasian Creed that I have hitherto met with or heard of; excepting only such as have no certain *author*, or none mentioned.

Muratorius informs us of two comments without names, which are in manuscript, in the Ambrosian library, near six hundred years old. One of them bears for its title, Expositio Fidei Catholicæ; the other has no title. By the age of the manuscripts (if Muratorius judges rightly thereof) one may be assured that they are distinct and different from any of the *comments* below Abelard: and that they are neither of them the same with Bruno's or Fortunatus's may reasonably be concluded, because Muratorius was well acquainted with both, and would easily have discovered it. Whether either of them may prove to be Abelard's, which has for its title Expositio Fidei, and may suit well with the age of the manuscripts, I know not. Muratorius, while he makes mention of Bruno and Hildegardis, whose comments he had seen, says nothing of Abelard's: so that possibly one of his manuscript comments may prove the same with that. But if neither of them be the same with Abelard's, nor with each other, they must be allowed to pass for two distinct comments, whose *authors* are not yet known.

Nothing now remains, but to close this chapter with a table, as I have the former, representing in one view a summary of what is contained in it.

[i] See the positions and censure in Carranza. *Summ. Concil.* p. 880, &c.

A. D.	*Commentators.*	*Country.*	*Title of Creed.*
570	Venant. Fortunatus	Poictiers	Fides Catholica.
852	Hincmar	Rheims	Symbolum Athanasii.
1033	Bruno	Wurtzburgh	Fides Catholica S. Athan. Episc.
1110	MS. Ambrosian.	Italy	Fides Catholica.
1110	MS. alter Ambros.	Italy	
1120	Pet. Abaelardus	France	Symbolum Athanasii.
1170	S. Hildegardis	France	
1210	Simon Tornacensis	France	Symbolum Athanasii.
1215	Alex. Neckham.	England	Fides Catholica.
1230	Alexander Hales	England	Athanasii Symbolum.
1340	Rich. Hampolus	England	Athanasii Symbolum.
1380	John Wickliff	England	Crede, or Salm, of Attanasie.
1478	Petr. de Osoma	Spain	Athanasii Symbolum.

CHAP. IV.

Latin Manuscripts of the Athanasian Creed.

I CONFINE myself in this chapter to the Latin manuscripts, since the Creed was undoubtedly written originally in Latin; and therefore the manuscripts in any other languages will be more properly treated of in another chapter, among the *versions*. None of the *learned* at this day make any question but that the Creed was originally a Latin composure. This they pretend to be *certain* of, and unanimously agree in; however doubtfully they may speak of other things, or however they may differ in their opinions about the *age* or *author*. Even those, many of them, who have ascribed the Creed to Athanasius, have yet been obliged by plain and irresistible evidence to acknowledge, with the legates of Pope Gregory IXth, that it was originally Latin. The *style* and *phraseology* of the Creed; its early reception among the Latins, while unknown to the Greeks; the *antiquity* and *number* of the Latin manuscripts, and their *agreement* (for the most part) with each other, compared with the *lateness*, *scarceness*, and *disagreement* of the Greek copies, all concur to demonstrate that this Creed was originally a Latin composure, rather than a Greek one: and as to any other language besides these two, none is pretended.

I proceed then to recount the Latin manuscripts as high as we can find any extant, or as have been known to have been extant; and as low as may be necessary or useful to our main design.

A. D. 600. The oldest we have heard of is one mentioned by Bishop Usher, which he had seen in the Cotton library, and which he judged to come up to the *age* of Gregory the Great[1]. This manuscript has often been appealed to since Usher's time,

[1] Latino-Gallicum illud Psalterium in Bibliotheca Cottoniana vidimus: sicut et alia Latina *duo*, longe majoris antiquitatis; in quibus, præter Hymnum hunc (sc. *Te Deum*) sine ullo autoris nomine, Hymni ad Matutinas, titulo inscriptum, et Athanasianum habebatur Symbolum, et Apostolicum totidem omnino quot hodiernum nostrum continens Capitula. In priore, quod Gregorii I. tempore non fuisse recentius, tum ex antiquo picturæ genere colligitur, tum ex literarum forma grandiuscula, Athanasianum quidem, Fidei Catholicæ,——alterum vero Symboli Apostolorum præfert titulum. In posteriore, quod Regis Æthelstani aliquando fuit, Apostolicum, vice versa, Symbolum simpliciter, alterum autem Fides Sancti Athanasii Alexandrini nuncupatur. *Usser. de Symb.* præf. p. 2, 3.

and upon the credit of Usher, by the learned on this subject: as particularly by Comber, L'Estrange, Tentzelius, Tillemont, Le Quien, Muratorius, Natalis Alexander, and perhaps several more. Montfaucon takes notice of Usher's manuscript; but observes that Usher himself allowed the *character to be much later* than the time of Gregory[k]. Which would have been a strange inconsistency in Usher, who forms his argument for the antiquity of the manuscript from the *character* itself, and from the *ancient* kind of *picture*. But Montfaucon is plainly mistaken, confounding what Usher had said of another manuscript, in Bennet library at Cambridge[l], with what he had said of the Cotton manuscript at Westminster. The two manuscripts are very distinct, and different as possible; nor has the Bennet manuscript any Athanasian Creed in it: only its being called Gregory's Psalter occasioned, I suppose, the mistake of making it the same with the other. Tentzelius[m] seems first to have confounded them together: and probably Montfaucon followed him implicitly, not having Usher at hand to consult; which would immediately have discovered the fallacy. Were there no other objection against Usher's manuscript beside what hath been mentioned, all would be well. But it is of greater weight to observe, that there is not, at this day, in the Cotton library any such manuscript copy of the Athanasian Creed; nor indeed any Latin Psalter that can come up to the age of Gregory, or near it. There is an *ancient Psalter* (marked Vespasian A) written in *capitals*, and *illuminated;* and which might perhaps by the *character* be as old as the time of Gregory the Great; were it not reasonable to think, from a charter of King Ethelbald, written in the same hand, and at the same time, and formerly belonging to it[n], that it cannot be set higher than the date of that charter, A. D. 736. But I should here observe, that

[k] Codicum omnium qui hactenus visi memoratique sunt, antiquissimus ille est qui ab Usserio laudatur, ævo Gregorii Magni conscriptus; si tamen ea vere sit ejus MS. ætas: nam addit Usserius, scripturam *ævo Gregorii longe esse posteriorem*. *Montf. Diatr.* p. 721.

[l] In Psalterio Græco Papæ Gregorii, ut præfert titulus (scriptura enim ævo Gregorii longe est posterior) Psalterio videlicet Græco et Romano, Latinis utroque literis descripto, quod in Benedictini, apud Cantabrigienses, collegii bibliotheca est reconditum. *Usser. de Symb.* p. 9.

[m] Tentzelii Judic. Eruditor. p. 49. Et Exercit. Select. p. 29.

[n] Constat vero ex Historia et Synopsi Biblioth. Cottonianæ, quam in ingens reipublicæ literariæ beneficium edidit, amplificandis bonis literis natus, doctissimus Thomas Smithus noster, et indiculo Psalterii Latini in majusculis scripti cum versione Saxonica interlineari, quod notatur Vespasian. A. I. Chartam hanc (Æthelbaldi R. Australium Saxonum) ex isto MS. exscissam esse. Quod etiam il-

that *charter* is not in the *larger* capitals, as the Psalter itself is, but in the *smaller* capitals, the same hand that the several pieces in that manuscript, previous to the Psalter, are written in: and how far this may affect our present argument, I cannot say. Possibly the Psalter itself being in a different hand may be older than those previous pieces; as it is certainly much older than the additional pieces at the end, which are not in *capitals* great or small.

This Psalter has the *Te Deum* annexed to it, with the title of Hymnus ad Matutinum, as Usher's had; and also the Athanasian Creed, with the title of Fides Catholica; but both in a very different and much later hand than that of the Psalter itself; later by several centuries, as the very learned Mr. Wanley[o] judges, who sets the age of the Psalter about 1000 years, but of the Athanasian Creed, &c. at the time of the Norman Conquest. A suspicion, however, may from hence arise, that this very Psalter, with what belongs to it, might be the Psalter, &c. which Usher spake of; especially since there is none other in the Cotton library at all like it. But, on the contrary, it is to be considered, that this manuscript has no Apostolical Creed at all in it, which Usher affirms his to have had: nor has it the Hymnus Matutinus, beginning with *Gloria in excelsis Deo*, which Usher's also had[p]: nor is the Creed in *capitals*, as one would imagine Usher's to have been by what he says of it. Neither is it at all probable, that, if Usher had intended the Psalter now extant in the Cotton, he should give no hint of the Saxon version going along with it; especially considering that it might be made an objection to its antiquity. Nor do I think that so inquisitive a man as Usher could either have been ignorant of the age of Ethelbald, or of his *charter* having been once a part of that manuscript. In his Historia Dogmatica[q], he takes notice of this very Psalter, (now marked Vespasian A,)

lius quum mensura quæ cum foliis illius MS. quadrat, tum etiam *manus* in utroque prorsus *eadem*, tum denique *locus* MSS. unde scissa est, inter folia x et xi. codicem vertentibus ostendit. *Hickes, Dissert. Epist. in Lingu. Septentr. Thesaur.* p. 67.

[o] Vid. Wanleii Catal. MSS. Septentrion. p. 222.

[p] Ad finem veterum Psalteriorum Latinorum, cum Apostolico et Athanasiano Symbolo, etiam Hymnus iste (sc. *Gloria* &c.) habetur adjectus. In antiquissimo Cottoniano *ἀνεπίγραφος* est; in Æthelstaniano proximo, Hymnus in die Dominico ad Matutinas, inscribitur. *Usser. de Symbol.* p. 33.

[q] In Bibliotheca D. Roberti Cotton extat Psalterium Romanum vetustissimum, cum versione interlineari Saxonica: character idem cum charta Æthilbaldi Anglorum Regis, anno 736 data. *Usser. Histo. Dogmat.* p. 104.

and of the Saxon *version* in it, and likewise of its being in the *same hand* with Ethelbald's charter: and there he sets the age of it no higher than the year 736, (that is, above 130 years later than Gregory I,) without the least hint that he had ever mistaken the age of it before, or had thought otherwise of it than he did at the time of his writing this later treatise. These considerations persuade me that Bishop Usher had seen some other manuscript, which has since that time, like many more[r], been lost, or stolen from the Cotton library. He that was so accurate in every tittle of what he says of King Athelstan's Psalter, (mentioned at the same time,) could never have been so negligent, or rather plainly careless, in respect of the other. I conclude therefore, that there really was such a Psalter as Usher describes, with the Athanasian Creed in it; such as he judged to be of the *age* of Gregory I. from more marks than one: and how good a judge he was in those matters is well known to as many as know any thing of that great man. But how far his judgment ought to sway, now the manuscript itself is lost, I must leave with the reader.

660. Next to this of Bishop Usher we may place the famous manuscript of Treves, from which the Colbert manuscript (to be mentioned hereafter in its place) was copied. Mr. Antelmi sets it as high as the year 450, upon a presumption that the Colbert manuscript is as old as the year 600, and that 150 years may reasonably be allowed between the Colbertine copy and that from which it was copied. Tillemont, supposing, or admitting the Colbertine to be near the age that Antelmi mentions, yet thinks fifty years' difference might be sufficient; and that therefore the age of the Treves manuscript might be fixed at 550, or thereabout[s]. But since the Colbert manuscript cannot reasonably be set much higher than 760, as we shall see in its proper place; I shall not pretend to set the Treves manuscript above 660; and that only under the favourable allowance of a probable conjecture. The authority of this manuscript of Treves stands upon the credit of a passage prefixed to the Colbertine copy[t], which declares that the latter was copied from a manuscript found at Treves. It was not a copy of the *entire* Creed,

[r] Vid. Tho. Smithi Præfationem ad Catalog. MSS. Bibl. Cotton.

[s] Tillemont, Mémoires, tom. viii. p. 670.

[t] Hæc inveni Treviris in uno libro scriptum, sic incipiente, "Domini "nostri Jesu Christi et reliqua. Do- "mini nostri Jesu Christi fideliter cre- "dat." *Apud Montf. Diatrib.* p. 728.

but began at the second part which relates to the *incarnation*. For after the words, "believe rightly the incarnation of our "Lord Jesus Christ," (being only part of the foregoing sentence,) follows; "For, the right faith is, that we believe," and so on to the end of the Creed. This remaining part of the Creed is very different from the common copies, and seems to have been so contrived with design, as I shall have occasion to observe more at large in the sequel. And it is to me an argument that the manuscript was written while the Eutychian controversy was at the height, about the end of the fifth century, or beginning of the sixth; though I here set it a great deal lower, because this is not the place to explain that matter fully, nor would I too far indulge a bare *conjecture*. It is sufficient to suppose it written in the seventh century, as it was undoubtedly copied from, as early, if not earlier, than the eighth.

700. After the manuscript of Treves, may justly follow the Ambrosian manuscript, which is in the Ambrosian library at Milan; a copy of which has been published by Muratorius, in his second tome of Anecdota. It was brought thither from the famous monastery of Bobbio, (of High Lombardy, in the Milanese,) founded by Columbanus, A. D. 613. The *character* of the manuscript is Langobardic; and it is judged by Muratorius (who has more particularly examined it) to be above 1000 years old[u]. By his account then, who wrote in the year 1698, we ought to set the age of this manuscript higher than 698. Yet because Montfaucon, who in his travels through Italy had also seen it, puts it no higher than the eighth century[x], we shall be content to place it between the seventh and eighth, or in the year 700, to make it a round number. There are in this manuscript some *readings* different from the common copies; which shall be carefully noted hereafter. It is without any *title*.

703. We may next set down K. Athelstan's Psalter, of which Bishop Usher had taken notice, making it next in age to the

[u] In alio etiam vetustissimo Ambrosianæ biblothecæ codice *ante mille et plures annos* scripto, Symbolum idem sum nactus. *Murator.* tom. i. p. 16.

Cæterum opusculum hoc (Bachiarii Fides) mihi depromptum est ex antiquissimo Ambrosianæ bibilothecæ codice, quem *ante annos minimum mille* conscriptum, characterum forma non dubitanter testatur. Fuit autem olim celebris monasterii Bobiensis, et ex illo in Ambrosianam translatus a magno Card. Frederico Borromæo, &c. *Murator.* tom. ii. p. 8. item p. 224.

[x] Codex VIII. Sæculi, charactere Langobardico, in quo Gennadii liber de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, Bachiarii Fides, Symbolum Athanasii, omnia eadem manu. *Montfauc. Diatr. Ital.* p. 18.

other most ancient one of the age of Gregory I. He and Dr. Grabe both fix the date of it to the year 703, from the *rule* of the *calendar* found in it[y]. Dr. Smith, in his Catalogue of the Cotton manuscripts, inclines to think that the manuscript is later than that time, but taken from one that was really as early as the year 703; the later copyist transcribing (as sometimes has been) the book and the rule word for word, as he found them[z]. Allowing this to have been the case here, (though it be only conjecture,) it may still be true that there was a manuscript of the age of 703, with this Creed in it; from whence the later one, now extant, was copied: which serves our purpose as well, and the rest is not material. But it should not be concealed, that the Psalter (in this manuscript) is in small Italian, and the above mentioned *rule* in a small Saxon hand; which may in some measure weaken the argument drawn from the age of one to the age of the other: so that at length our evidence from this manuscript will be short of *certainty*, and will rise no higher than a fair, probable presumption. I have nothing further to observe, but that the Psalter, wherein this Creed is, is the Gallican Psalter, not the Roman; and the title is, Fides Sancti Athanasii Alexandrini, The Faith of St. Athanasius of Alexandria.

760. We may now take in the Colbertine copy, of which I have before spoken, referring the date of it to the year 760, or thereabout. Montfaucon sets it above the age of Charles the Great[a], allowing it to have been written about the time of Pepin,

[y] Psalterium illud anno æræ nostræ Christianæ 703, longe ante Æthelstani regnantis tempora, ex Regulis Kalendario in libri initio subjunctis scriptum fuisse deprehendi. *Usser. de Symb.* p. 6.

Quod regis Æthelstani fuisse dicitur, atque anno 703 scriptum est. *Grabii Prolegom. in Psalt. Alexandr.* cap. 3.

[z] Hic vero venerandæ antiquitatis liber fere ante mille annos descriptus; ut quibusdam ex Calendario, quod annum Christi 703, certo designat, illic præfixo videtur. Sed cum librarios eandem temporis adnotationem, quæ ad vetustissimos codices proprie et peculiariter spectat, suis exemplaribus apposuisse sæpissime observaverim——an sit ille ipse codex autographus qui tantam præ se ferat ætatem, vel annon potius sæculo, aut circiter, ante tempora Æthelstani descriptus, vix pro certo præstarem; ad posteriorem sententiam faventiori animo inclinaturus. *Smith. Bibl. Cotton. Histor.* p. 44.

[a] Nongentos superat annos Colbertinus codex 784. Saxonicis descriptus literis, et, mea quidem sententia, ante ætatem Caroli Magni editus—— Sunt qui codicem illum 1100 annorum esse adfirmarunt: verum periti quique ævo circiter Pipini exaratum arbitrantur. *Montf. Diatr.* p. 721.

Nec tamen codicis Colbertini auctoritate nititur hæc opinio, quem arbitratur Antelmius 1100 annorum. Etenim (quod pace viri eruditissimi, mihique amicissimi dicatur) multo minoris ætatis codex esse comprobatur; nemo enim peritus cui librum exhibuerim, octavo eum sæculo antiquiorem æstimavit. *Montf. ib.* p. 724.

who began to reign in the year 752. So that I cannot be much out of time in placing it as I have done. It is written in Saxon character, and is imperfect; wanting the first part, above one half of the Creed, just as the manuscript of Treves from which it was copied.

760. The manuscript of St. Germans, at Paris, is entire, and of the same age with the former[b]. It is marked num. 257, and written in a Saxon *letter*, as well as the other. A specimen of the *hand*, with the three first paragraphs of the Creed, may be seen in Mabillon[c]. The title, Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi Alexandriæ. It differs in some places from the common copies, (as shall be noted hereafter,) though not near so much as the Colbert manuscript before mentioned.

772. Next to these is the famous manuscript of Charles the Great, at the end of a Gallican Psalter, written in letters of gold, and presented by Charlemagne, while only King of France, to Pope Adrian I. at his first entrance upon the pontificate, in the year 772. Lambecius in his Catalogue of the Emperor's library at Vienna, where this manuscript is, gives a large account of it[d]. The title is, Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi Alexandrini.

800. There is another manuscript in the Royal library at Paris marked 4908, which Montfaucon judges to be near 900 years old[e]. He wrote in the year 1698. So if we place it in the year 800, we shall want a little of 900 years from that time. He supposes it of very near the same age with the Vienna manuscript. It bears no *title*, nor any name or note of the *author*. It contains no more than the first part of the Creed, as far as the words, *et tamen non tres æterni; sed unus*— the rest is torn off and lost.

850. I may here place a manuscript of Bennet College library in Cambridge, whose age I cannot certainly fix to a year; but by all circumstances it cannot well be supposed later than this time. It is at the end of a Psalter, which by comparing I find

[b] Paris saltem antiquitatis est Sangermanensis noster, num. 257. Saxonicis pariter literis exaratus, qui titulum habet, Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi Alexandriæ. *Montf.* p. 721.

[c] Mabill. de Re Diplom. p. 351.

[d] Lambecii Catal. Biblioth. Vindobonens. lib. ii. cap. 5. p. 261, 296, &c. Carolus Magnus proprio carmine suo testatur se illum codicem summo Pontifici Hadriano I. dono misisse; et quidem, ut ego arbitror, illo ipso anno 772. cujus die decimo Februarii jam memoratus Hadrianus in summum Pontificem electus est. *Lambec. ibid.*

[e] Regius Codex, num. 4908. annorum pene nongentorum, nullum habet *titulum*, nullumque *auctoris* nomen. Æqualis ipsi est, qui memoratur a Lambecio &c. *Montf. ibid.* p. 721.

to be a Gallican Psalter. Bishop Parker left a remark in it about its being in the possession first of one of the Archbishops of Canterbury, and at length conveyed down to the hands of Becket[f], who was Archbishop of Canterbury in the year 1162. The great antiquity of the manuscript appears from the *martyrs*, *confessors*, and *virgins* addressed to in it; all of the early times[g]. There are some few variations in this copy, such as are also found in the most ancient manuscripts of this Creed; particularly the word *et*, frequently inserted before *Spiritus Sanctus*, which has been since erased by some officious hand. The title is observable; Fides Sancti Anasthasii Episcopi: Anasthasii for Athanasii, by a transposition of syllables.

860. Montfaucon informs us of a manuscript in the Colbert library, num. 1339, which once belonged to Charles the Bald[h], who died in the year 877; began to reign 840. It cannot therefore be much amiss to fix upon 860 for the date of it. The title it bears is, Fides Athanasii.

883. There is a *second* manuscript copy of the Athanasian Creed, in the library of Bennet (or Corpus Christi) College, marked N. O. V. It is at the end of a Gallican Psalter, in the same hand, and carrying its certain date with it. It was written in France by order of Count Amadeus, or Achadeus[i]; and in the year 883, as appears from the Litany[k]. The title is, Fides Catholica.

930. Mr. Wanley gives us an account of a Roman Psalter in the Royal library, (formerly of St. James's,) with an interlinear Saxon version to it, written about the time of King Athelstan[l].

[f] Hoc Psalterium [N. X.] laminis argenteis deauratum, et gemmis ornatum, quondam fuit N. Cantuar. Archiep. tandem venit in manus Thomæ Becket quondam Cant. Archiep. quod testatum est in veteri scripto. *Matth. Cant.* Vid. Catal. MSS. C. C. C. C. p. 43.

[g] In Litaniis, Orate pro nobis, Sancte Contestor, Sancte Herasme, Sancte Oswolde, &c. martyres. Sancte Cuthberte, Sancte Germane, Sancte Placide, Sancte Columbane, Sancte Caurentine, &c. confessores. Sancta Brigida, Sancta Eugenia, Sancta Eulalia, Sancta Petronella, &c. virgines. Et non sunt hisce recentiores. *Catal. MSS. Bibl. C. C. C. C.* p. 43.

[h] Colbertinus N. 1339. Qui fuit Karoli Calvi imperatoris, inscribitur; Fides Athanasii. *Montfauc. Diatrib.* p. 721.

[i] Ad finem Psalterii, "Achadeus, "misericordia Dei comes hunc Psal- "terium scribere jussit." *Vid. Catal. MSS.* p. 46.

[k] Oratur, "ut marinum apostolicum "in sancta religione conservare dig- "neris, ut Karlomannum Regem per- "petua prosperitate conservare dig- "neris: ut reginam conservare dig- "neris: ut fulconem episcopum cum "omni grege sibi commisso in tuo "apto servitio conservare digneris." *Vid. Catalog. MSS. C. C. C. C.* p. 47.

[l] Wanleii Catal. MS. Septentr. p. 182.

Among the Canticles at the end, there is also this Creed, under the title of Hymnus Athanasii de Fide Trinitatis, *quem tu concelebrans discutienter intellige:* this is in red ink. The title seems to have been then customary in England, as may be probably argued from a Saxon version (to be hereafter mentioned) of the same age, or very near, and bearing the same title[m].

957. In the Archbishop's library, at Lambeth, there is a Gallican Psalter, written, according to Mr. Wanley[n], in the time of King Edgar, or a little before. At the end, there is the Athanasian Creed in the same ancient hand, with an interlinear Saxon version. The title, Fides Catholica Sancti Athanasii Episcopi.

970. There is another manuscript copy of this Creed, much of the same age with the former, in my Lord Oxford's elegant library, richly furnished with all kinds of curious and valuable manuscripts. This Creed is at the end of a Gallican Psalter, and has an interlinear Saxon version to it. Mr. Wanley, who was so kind as to acquaint me with it, and to favour me with a sight of it, refers it to the time of King Edgar; who began his reign in 959, and died in 975. The title is, Fides Catholica Athanasii Alexandrini Episcopi.

1031. In the Cotton library there is a Gallican Psalter, with Saxon interlined, (marked Vitellius, E. 18.) which Mr. Wanley refers to the year 1031[o]. The Athanasian Creed at the end, as usual, among the other Canticles, bears the title of Fides Catholica Athanasii Episcopi Alexandrini.

1050. In the Norfolk library, now belonging to the Royal Society at London, there is also a Gallican Psalter, whose age is fixed by Mr. Wanley[p] to the time of Edward the Confessor. The Creed is in it, and has an interlinear Saxon version running along with it. The title, Fides Catholica Athanasii Alex.

1064. In Bennet College library is a manuscript copy of this Creed without any title. The Psalter wherein it is, is called Portiforium Oswaldi, and is marked K. 10. An account of the book may be seen in Mr. Wanley, and in the Catalogue.

[m] Hymnus Athanasii de Fide Trinitatis. *Vid. Wottoni Conspectum Brevem Operis Hickesiani*, p. 77.

[n] Wanleii Catal. p. 269. Eadgari regis Anglosaxonum temporibus, aut paulo ante, ut videtur, exaratus. Wharton. Auctarium Historiæ Dogmaticæ, p. 374. Alfredo parum recentior videtur.

[o] Wanleii Catal. p. 222, 224. Smith. Catal. Cotton. p. 101.

[p] Wanleii Catal. MSS. Septentr. p. 291.

1066. I may here place the Cotton manuscript before mentioned, bound up with the Ancient Roman Psalter, marked Vespasian, A; though of a very different and much later hand. The Creed has an interlinear Saxon version, as usual; and its title is, Fides Catholica. Mr. Wanley judges it to be as old as the coming in of the Normans[q].

1066. Of the same age is the Roman Psalter in our public library[r] at Cambridge, with the Latin text in *black* letter, a Saxon version in *red*, and the titles in *green*. The Creed is interlined with Saxon, as well as the Psalter, but has no *title*: for, from this time, I conceive, the *title* began to be left out in some copies, for brevity sake, or because it was thought superfluous.

It will be needless to take notice of any manuscripts below this time, excepting only such as contain something *particular*.

1087. Quesnel[s], and after him Pagi[t], speaks of a manuscript copy of this Creed in a Breviary and Psalter for the use of the monks of mount Cassin, judged to be about 600 years old. This is the same Breviary that Quesnel has made observations upon in another work[u]. And there he fixes the age a little below 1086; *paulo post annum* 1086. The title of the Creed is, Fides Catholica edita ab Athanasio Alexandrinæ sedis Episcopo. There is the like title to the Creed in the Triple Psalter of St. John's College Cambridge, about the same age, or older, (marked B. 18.) Incipit Fides Catholica edita ab Athanasio Archiepiscopo Alexandrinæ civitatis. And there is such another title in a Psalter of the Norfolk library, (N. 155.) Fides Catholica edita a Sancto Athanasio Episcopo. But the hand is modern.

1120. In my Lord Oxford's library I had a sight of a manuscript written in Germany about 600 years ago, for the use of the Church of Augsburg; which bears for its title, Fides Anastasii Episcopi.

1150. In the Norfolk library is a Psalter (marked N. 230.) with an interlinear version Normanno-Gallican: the Psalter is Gallican, and the title of the Creed at the end. Fides Catholica.

1240. Usher takes notice of a copy of this Creed then in the Royal library at St. James's, (formerly belonging to Lewis the Ninth,) the title, Fides Catholica.

[q] Wanleii Catal. p. 222. Smith. Bibl. Cotton. Histor. p. 35.
[r] Wanleii Catal. p. 152.
[s] Quesnel Dissert. xiv. ad Leon. Oper. p. 732.
[t] Pagi, Critic. in Baron. vol. i. p. 441.
[u] Quesnel, Observat. ad Breviarium &c. in Theodor. Pœnitentiale, p. 327.

1300. Montfaucon informs us of a Latin and a French copy of this Creed found in a manuscript about 400 years old; placed in opposite columns. What is remarkable is, that the Latin has for its title Canticum Bonifacii, and the French over against the other, Ce chant St. Anaistaise qui Apostoilles de Rome[x].

1400. In the Bodleian at Oxford there is a manuscript copy of this Creed, (Num. 1204.) which has for its title, Anastasii Expositio Symboli Apostolorum. It is about 300 years old, and belonged once to the Carthusian monks at Mentz. The Carthusians are particularly noted for their more than common veneration for this Creed, reciting it every day at the *prime*, as Cardinal Bona testifies both of them and the Ambrosians[y]; which I remark by the way. I observe that the German copies of this Creed, for five or six hundred years upwards, have most commonly Anastasius instead of Athanasius. I make no question but that this first arose from a mistake of the copyists, and not out of any design. One may perceive that Anastasius is sometimes written where Athanasius of Alexandria must have been intended. I suppose, at first, some copies had accidentally Anasthasius for Athanasius, (as one in Bennet College library mentioned above,) by a transposition of letters or syllables; as easily happens in writing or speaking: thus Phrunutus for Phurnutus, Marivadus for Varimadus, and the like. Now when the copyists had thus introduced Anasthasius, (*Anas-tha* for *Atha-nas*) those that came after left out the *h*, to make it Anastasius, that being a common name, which the other was not. This I thought proper to hint, that it may appear how little reason there is for ascribing this Creed to Anastasius, whether of Rome, or of Antioch, or any other.

I have now run through the manuscripts of greatest note, or use, either for *antiquity*, or for any thing *particular*, to give light to our further inquiries. Two only I have omitted, which have been thought considerable; not so much in themselves, as upon account of the other tracts they were found to be joined with. The one is the manuscript found in the library of Thuanus (Codex Thuaneus) annexed to some tracts which were once supposed to belong to Vigilius Tapsensis, though now certainly known to be none of his. Quesnel was much pleased with the discovery of this manuscript, as favouring his hypothesis about

[x] Montfaucon, Diatrib. p. 722, 727.

[y] Bona de Divin. Psalmod. cap. xviii. p. 897, 900.

Vigilius Tapsensis[z]. And Antelmius has taken some pains in confuting him; shewing that the supposed works of Vigilius are none of his[a], and that if they were, yet no certain argument could be drawn from thence to make Vigilius author of the Creed; since it is a common thing for tracts of several authors, especially if they relate to the same subject, to be tacked to each other.

The *second* manuscript is one that was found annexed to the Fragments of Hilary of Poictiers[b]; which circumstance was thought a reason for ascribing this Creed to Hilary. Vossius first, and after him many others, throw it off as a very slight argument, since the manuscript pretended is very *modern*, nor is the Creed ascribed to Hilary in that manuscript, but only bound up with his Fragments, as any other work might be, however little akin to them. Montfaucon takes notice of this matter in few words[c], Tentzelius more at large[d]. It is sufficient for me just to have hinted it.

Having now given as particular account as was needful of the more ancient Latin manuscripts of this Creed, I may just observe that as to *modern* ones, they are innumerable, there being scarce any manuscript Latin Psalter of modern date but what has the Creed in it, and generally without a *title*. I may next subjoin a table of the manuscripts here recited, representing in one view the *age*, the *title*, the *country* where written, and the kind of *Psalter* wherein found: all which circumstances will be of use to us in our following inquiries. Particularly, as to the

[z] Absoluta dissertationum nostrarum editione, inveni Codicem Thuaneum, in quo Dialogus Vigilii Tapsensis adversus Arianos, Sabellianos, et Photinianos legitur, sub hoc titulo: *Incipit Altercatio Athanasii cum Hæresibus.* Post hunc tractatum habetur Symbolum Nicænum, et formula fidei Ariminensis Concilii, quam proxime sequitur Symbolum Athanasianum cum hac epigraphe: *Fides dicta a Sancto Athanasio Episcopo.* Porro, conjecturæ nostræ de *auctore* hujus *symboli* non parum suffragatur, quod in *antiquissimo* codice illigatum reperiatur opusculo cui nomen Athanasii pariter præfixum legitur, sed quod Vigilii Tapsensis esse indubitatum habetur &c. *Quesnel in Addend.* p. 913.

[a] Vid. Montfauc. Athan. Op. tom. ii. p. 603, 724.

[b] Invenitur id similiter in Fragmentis Hilarii historicis in cod. veteri part. 2. sub finem. *Felckman. Var. Lect. Oper. Athan.* p. 83.

[c] Hilario nonnulli adscriptum voluerunt, quia nimirum in codice quodam exstat post Hilarii Fragmenta. Quasi vero id non vulgo et in plerisque codicibus observetur, ut multa diversorum opera consequenter in manuscriptis describentur. Cum autem in ejusmodi codice post Hilariana opera, nullo præmisso auctoris nomine compareat; hinc, uti jam supra diximus, inferendum, tum exaratum fuisse cum pro Athanasiano nondum vulgo haberetur. *Montf. Diatrib.* p. 723.

[d] Tentzel. Judic. Erud. p. 2, 3, &c.

Psalters, it will be of moment to observe whether they be Roman or Gallican; because from thence we may be able to discover in what places or countries this Creed was first *received*, according to their use of this or that Psalter. But because, perhaps, some readers may be at a loss to know what we mean by those different names of Roman and Gallican Psalters; it may not be improper here to throw in a few previous instructions relating to the different kinds of Latin Psalters, and the *names* they have gone under.

There are four kinds, or sorts, of Latin Psalters; which have passed under the names of Italic, Roman, Gallican, and Hebraic. One of them was before Jerome's time: the three last are all Jerome's; as he had a hand, more or less, in every one of them. I shall treat of them distinctly, in their order, as follows:

1. The Italic Latin Psalter is of the old translation, or version, such as it was before Jerome's time. I shall not enter into the dispute whether it were *one* version or *many*. The common opinion is, that there were several Latin versions before Jerome[e], but one more eminent than the rest called Italic[f], as being received into common use in Italy[g]. However that be, it is become customary, with such as treat of this subject, to speak of all that was extant before Jerome, as of *one version*, under the name of Vetus Vulgata, or Versio Italica. There are *entire* Psalters of this old version, *printed* and *manuscript*[h]; though now no where in use in divine Offices, except such parcels of it as, having been anciently taken into the Roman Missals, or other old Liturgies, remain there still, the people being accustomed to them, and there being no great necessity for changing them: but all the *entire* Psalters in use are of another kind. Martianay, in his edition of Jerome's works, once intended to give us an entire and correct Psalter (with some other of the sacred books) of the old Italic version. But the *various lections* were so many, and

[e] Qui enim scripturas ex Hebræa lingua in linguam Græcam verterunt numerari possunt, Latini autem interpretes nullo modo: ut enim cuique primis fidei temporibus in manus venit codex, et aliquantulum facultatis sibi utriusque linguæ habere videbatur, ausus est interpretari. *August. de Doctr. Christian.* lib. ii. cap. 11. p. 25. tom. iii.

[f] In ipsis autem interpretationibus Itala cæteris præferatur: nam est verborum tenacior cum perspicuitate sententiæ. *August. ibid.* p. 27.

[g] Ecclesia Latina a principio, vel ferme a principio, usa est versione Latina Testamenti Vet. ex Græca τῶν ὁ translatione facta, quæ Itala vulgo dicebatur, quoniam in Italia prius usitata in alias inde Latinorum Ecclesias recipiebatur. *Humphr. Hodius, De Biblior. Text. Origin.* p. 342.

[h] Le Long, Biblioth. Bibl. vol. i. p. 243.

so different, that the work appeared too laborious and difficult, for which reason he then laid it aside[i]. This version, or versions, is what all the Latins used before Jerome; and many also after him, the Africans especially, down to the sixth century at least, or beginning of the seventh.

2. The Roman Psalter is not very different from the old Italic. It is nothing else but that old version cursorily, and in part, corrected by Jerome, in the time of Pope Damasus, A. D. 383. It has had the name of Roman, because the use of it began the soonest, and continued the longest in the Roman Offices. It obtained in Gaul near as soon as at Rome, but was laid aside in the sixth century, when Gregory of Tours[k] introduced the other Psalter, since called Gallican. The Roman Psalter however still obtained at Rome till the time of Pope Pius[l] the Fifth: and it is still used in the Vatican church, and some few churches besides.

3. The Gallican Psalter is Jerome's more correct Latin translation made from Origen's Hexapla[m], or most correct edition of the Greek Septuagint, filled up, where the Greek was supposed faulty, from the Hebrew; distinguished with *obelisks* and *asterisks*, denoting the common Greek version in those places to be either redundant or deficient. Many of the old manuscripts[n] still retain those marks: but more have left them out, I suppose, to save trouble. This more correct Psalter was drawn up by Jerome in the year

[i] Appendicem sacrorum aliquot voluminum, juxta Veterem Vulgatam usu receptam ante Hieronymum, hoc loco edendam statueramus: sed quum operi manus jamjam accederet, tantam inter MSS. Codices *hujus versionis Latinæ* deprehendimus dissonantiam, ut impossibile esset vel solas variantes horum codicum lectiones adnotasse nisi maximo temporis intervallo. Quare ne in sequentem annum differretur editio hujus Divinæ Bibliothecæ, appendicem prædictam latiori operi, ac majori otio reservavimus. *Martian. Not. ad Hieronym.* vol. i. p. 1419.

[k] Psalmos autem cum secundum LXX Interpretes Romani adhuc habeant; Galli et Germanorum aliqui secundum *emendationem* quam Hieronymus Pater de LXX editione composuit, Psalterium cantant: quam Gregorius, Turonensis episcopus, a partibus Romanis mutuatam, in Galliarum dicitur Ecclesias transtulisse. *Walafrid. Strab. de Reb. Eccles.* cap. xxv. p. 690.

[l] Vid. Card. Bona Rerum Liturgic. lib. ii. cap. 3. Humphr. Hod. p. 383. Mabillon. de Curs. Gallican. p. 398.

[m] Vid. Hieron. Epist. ad Sunn. et Fretel. p. 627. ed. Bened. tom. 2.

[n] The Cotton manuscript of 703, and the Benet of 883, Lambeth of 957, Lord Oxford's of 970, and Bruno's own manuscript of 1033: besides many more in France, England, and other countries. Quanta porro fuerit diligentia nostratium in describendo hocce Psalterio, cum asteriscis et obelis, non aliunde testatum volumus quam ex infinita copia Codicum MSS. qui cum talibus distinctionibus supersunt in Gallicanis Bibliothecis. *Martin. Hieronym. Op.* vol. i. Prolegom. ii. c. 5.

389, and obtained first in Gaul about the year 580; or however not later than 595: from which circumstance it came to have the name of Gallican, in contradistinction to the Roman. From Gaul, or France, it passed over into England before the year 597, and into Germany, and Spain, and other countries. The popes of Rome, though they themselves used the other Psalter, yet patiently connived at the use of this in the western churches, and even in Italy; and sometimes privately authorized the use of it in churches and monasteries[o]; till at length it was publicly authorized in the Council of Trent, and introduced a while after into Rome itself by Pius the Fifth. It was admitted in Britain and Ireland before the coming of Augustine the monk, and prevailed after, except in the church of Canterbury[p], which was more immediately under the Archbishop's eye, and more conformable to the Roman Offices, than other parts of the kingdom. It has been said, [q]that this very Gallican Psalter is what we still retain in our Liturgy; called the *reading Psalms*, in contradistinction to the other Psalms in our Bibles, of the new translation. But this is not strictly true: for the old translation, though it be taken in a great measure from the Gallican, has yet many corrections from the Hebrew, (where they were thought wanting,) first, by Coverdale in 1535, and by Coverdale again, 1539, and last of all by Tonstall and Heath, in 1541: according to which edition is the Psalter now used in our Liturgy, as I have learned by comparing: and it had been before taken notice of by Durell[r]. But this in passing.

4. The Hebraic Latin Psalter means Jerome's own translation, immediately from the Hebrew, made in the year 391. This, though otherwise of great esteem, was never used in the public Church Offices[s]. There are but few copies of it, in comparison,

[o] Anno 1369. Urbani V. autoritate sancitum, ut Cassinenses Psalterio Gallicano uterentur. *Montfauc. Diatr. Ital.* p. 331. P. Adrian, long before, had recommended the Gallican Psalter to the Church of Bremen. See below in ch. vi. and C. Bona, p. 506.

[p] Ante adventum Augustini monachi, primi Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis, in Angliam, i. e. ante annum 597, Ecclesiæ Britannicæ et Hibernicæ Psalterium Gallicanum receperant. Augustinus huc a Gregorio M. missus Romanum secum advexit, et Ecclesiæ suæ Cantuariensi tradidit. Sed loco illius invaluit tandem, per omnes ecclesias Anglicas, usus Gallicani. *Hodius, de Text. Bibl. Origin.* p. 384.

[q] Hodiernum in Liturgia Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ retinetur editio Gallicana: at versio illa quæ habetur in Bibliorum voluminibus, quæque pro authentica agnoscitur, ex Hebræo est. *Hod. ibid.* p. 384.

[r] Durell. Eccles. Anglican. Vindic. p. 306.

[s] Tertium est de Hebræo in Latinum quod Ieronymus transtulit de Hebræo in Latinum. Sed non est in

because this Psalter, as before hinted, having never been in common use, like the Roman and Gallican, has been confined to a few hands. We are not to expect an Athanasian Creed in this Psalter, as not being intended for the use of the *choir:* neither are we to expect to meet with it in the Italic Psalters, which are few, and which were grown, or growing, out of use before the Athanasian Creed was brought into the public Offices. But in the Roman and Gallican Psalters we may find it: and it will be of moment to observe in which of them it is found. Indeed, some manuscript Psalters there are, which have the Roman and Gallican together in opposite columns, the Gallican always set first [t]. Others have the Hebraic and Gallican set column-wise as the former: and some have all the *three* versions of Jerome placed in the like order. Dr. Hody informs us of two such manuscripts, to which may be added a *third* now in Trinity College in Cambridge, which has the Athanasian Creed with Bruno's comment in it; as intimated above. Another such *triple* Psalter there is in St. John's College of the same University, as before hinted; and in my Lord Oxford's library is a fine old Latin Bible, where the Psalms appear under all the three versions. Nay, some manuscripts have the Greek also with the other, making a *fourth* column: an account of this last sort may be seen both in Dr. Hody and Le Long [u]. These double, triple, or quadruple Psalters came not in, I presume, before the end of the *tenth* century, or beginning of the *eleventh.* For Berno Augiensis of that time acquaints us with the occasion and use of them, and how they came to be so contrived [x]. When the Roman way of *singing*, first adapted to the Roman Psalter, had

usu Ecclesiæ, sed viri studii literati et sapientes eo utuntur. *Roger. Bacon. apud Hodium de Text. Original.* p. 384.

Hæc autem (versio ex Hebræo) ideo recepta non fuit, quia duæ priores, quotidiano usu in ecclesiis frequentatæ, sine magna divini officii perturbatione non poterant abrogari. *Bona, Rerum Liturg.* lib. ii. cap. 3. p. 506. Vid. etiam Hodium, p. 385.

[t] Hody de Text. Bibl. Original. p. 385.

[u] Le Long, Biblioth. Bibl. vol. i. p. 244.

[x] Inter cætera, ex emendata LXX Interpretum translatione Psal. ex Græco in Latinum vertit (Hieronymus) illudque cantandum omnibus Galliæ, ac quibusdam Germaniæ ecclesiis tradidit. Et ob hoc Gallicanum Psalterium appellavit, Romanis adhuc ex corrupta vulgata editione Psalterium canentibus; ex qua Romani cantum composuerunt, nobisque usum cantandi contradiderunt. Unde accidit quod verba, quæ in diurnis vel nocturnis officiis canendi more modulantur, intermisceantur, et confuse nostris Psalmis inserantur; ut a minus peritis haud facile possit discerni quid *nostræ*, vel *Romanæ* conveniat editioni. Quod pius pater ac peritus magister intuens, *tres editiones* in uno volumine composuit: et Gallicanum Psalterium, quod nos canimus, ordinavit in una columna; in altera Romanum, in tertia Hebræum. *Berno Augiens. Epist. inedit. apud Mabill. de cursu Gallicano*, p. 396. Hodius de Text. Original. p. 382.

been introduced into France and Germany, (which was first done in the eighth century,) in process of time it bred some confusion in the two Psalters, mixing and blending them one with the other; that it was difficult to distinguish which words belonged to this, and which to that. To remedy this inconvenience, a way was found out to have both the Psalters distinctly represented to the eye together, in two several columns: and thus came in the kind of Psalters before mentioned. We easily see why the Gallican used to be set in the *first* column; namely, because those Psalters were contrived by the French and Germans, who made use of the Gallican, and so gave the preference to their own. If I have detained my reader a little too long in this digression about the Psalters; I hope the usefulness of the subject may make him some amends, and be a just apology for it. I now return to our Creed, and what more immediately belongs to it; closing this chapter, as I promised, with a table representing a summary, or short sketch of what hath been done in it.

A.D.	*MSS.*	*Psalters.*	*Titles of the Creed.*
600	Bp. Usher's		Fides Catholica.
660	Treves		
700	Ambrosian		
703	Cotton 1	Gallican	Fides Sancti Athanasii Alexandrini.
760	Colbert 1		
760	St. German's		Fides Sancti Athanasii Episcopi.
772	Vienna	Gallican	Fides Sancti Athanasii Episc. Alexandr.
800	Regius, Paris		
850	Benet Coll. Cant. 1	Gallican	Fides Sancti Anasthasii Episcopi.
860	Colbert 2		Fides Athanasii.
883	Benet C. 2	Gallican	Fides Catholica.
930	St. James's 1	Roman	Hymnus Athanasii.
957	Lambeth	Gallican	Fides Catholica S. Athanasii Episcopi.
970	Harleian 1	Gallican	Fides Catholica Athanasii Alexand. Episc.
1031	Cotton 2	Gallican	Fides Catholica Athanasii Alexand. Episc.
1050	Norfolk 1	Gallican	Fides Catholica Athanasii Alexandrini.
1064	Benet C. 3		
1066	Cotton 3		Fides Catholica.
1066	Cambridge	Roman	
1087	Cassinensis		Fides Catholica edita ab Athanasio &c.
1120	Harleian 2		Fides Anastasii Episcopi.
1150	Norfolk 2	Gallican	Fides Catholica.
1240	St. James's 2		Fides Catholica.
1300	Friars Minors	Gallican	Canticum Bonefacii.
			Ce Chant fust St. Anaistaise qui Apostoilles de Rome.
1400	Bodleian		Anastasii Expositio Symboli Apostolorum.

CHAP. V.

Ancient Versions, printed or manuscript.

SOME account of the ancient versions of the Athanasian Creed may be of use to shew *when* and *where* it has been *received*, and what *value* hath been set upon it, at several times, and in several countries. I shall note the time in the margin, when the *first* version into any language appears to have been made: and I shall rank the versions of the several countries according to the chronological order of those *first* versions respectively.

French Versions.

850. Under the name of *French versions*, I comprehend all versions made at any time into the *vulgar* language then current in France, whatever other name some may please to give them. I beg leave also to comprehend under the same name all *oral* versions delivered by word of mouth, as well as *written* ones: otherwise I am sensible that I ought not to have begun with *French versions*. I do not know that the Gauls or French had any written standing version of this Creed so early as 850, or for several centuries after. Their oldest versions of the Psalter are scarce earlier than the eleventh century [y], and of the *entire* Scripture scarce so early as the twelfth [y]: and we are not to expect a *written* version of the Athanasian Creed more ancient than of their Psalter. But what I mean by setting the *French versions* so high as I here do, is that the Athanasian Creed was, as early as is here said, interpreted out of Latin into the *vulgar* tongue for the use of the people, by the clergy of France, in their *verbal* instructions. This is the same thing, in effect, with a *written* standing version, as supplying the place of it; and is as full a proof of the general *reception* of the Creed, at that time, as the other would be. Now, that the Athanasian Creed was thus interpreted into the *vulgar* tongue in France as early as the year 850, or earlier, I prove from the words of Hincmar, above cited [z], giving orders to the clergy of his province to be able to express this Creed *communibus verbis*, that is, in their *vulgar*, or mother tongue. What that mixed kind of language which they then used should be called, is of no great

[y] See Le Long, Biblioth. Bibl. vol. i. p. 313, &c. [z] See above, p. 123.

moment to our present purpose to inquire. Some perhaps, with Vitus Amerbachius and Bishop Usher[a], will call it Teutonic, or German, because Franks and Germans, being originally the same, spake the same language. But I see no consequence that because Franks and Germans used the same language, therefore Franks and Gauls mixed together must still keep the same; any more than that a mixed nation of Normans and Saxons must all agree either in Norman or Saxon. One would rather expect in such a mixed people, a mixed language too, as usually happens in such cases. As to France in particular, at that time, Mr. Wharton has plainly shewn that the language there spoken was very widely different from the Teutonic, or German.

The Concordate between the two brothers Lewis and Charles, at Strasburg, puts the matter out of dispute: where one expressed himself in the Teutonic, the other in the language then current in France, called Romanensis, or Rustica Romana, corrupt Roman, or Latin[b]; nearer to the Latin than to the German, but a confused mixture of both. Such was the language then vulgarly spoken in France, as appears from the specimen of it given by Wharton from Nithardus. And this I presume is the language into which our Creed was interpreted in Hincmar's time; for which reason I have set the French versions first. If any one shall contend that the Teutonic prevailed then in the *diocese* of Rheims, though not in the other parts of Gaul more remote from Germany, I shall not think it of moment to dispute the point, since it is not material to our present purpose.

As to the French versions, properly so called, *written* standing versions, I have said that none of them reach higher than the eleventh century. Montfaucon gives us one, though imperfect, 600 years old[c]; that is, of the eleventh century, and very near the end of it, about 1098, six hundred years before the time of his writing: and this is the oldest that I have any where found mentioned. Next to which, perhaps we may reckon that in Trinity College in Cambridge; I mean the interlinear version which Mr. Wanley[d] calls Normanno-Gallican, about 580 years old. And next to that, the Norfolk manuscript (N. 230.) before mentioned, about the same age with the other: and Mr. Wanley

[a] Usser. Histor. Dogmat. pag. 111.

[b] Vid. Wharton. Auctar. Histor. Dogmat. p. 344.

[c] Montfaucon, Diatrib. p. 721, 727, 733.

[d] Wanleii Catal. MSS. Septentr. p. 168.

informed me of two more in my Lord Oxford's library. There is one in the Cotton library (Nero, C. 4.) above 500 years old, according to Mr. Wharton[e]. Montfaucon give us another above 400 years old[f]. But it is needless, and foreign to my purpose, to number up all the versions: the *first* in its kind is what will be chiefly serviceable to our following inquiries.

German Versions.

870. As to *written* and standing versions, the German, so far as we find any records, ought to have the first place. There is in the Emperor's library at Vienna[g], a German, or Teutonic version of this Creed made by Otfridus, monk of Weissenberg, in the ninth century: the manuscript, as Lambecius assures us, is coeval with the author. There have been several later German versions, a brief account of which may be seen in Lambecius[h], Tentzelius[i], and Le Long[k]; but more particularly in Tentzelius. It is sufficient to my purpose to have taken notice of the *first*, and most considerable in its kind.

Anglo-Saxon Versions.

930. There have been Anglo-Saxon versions of this Creed as early as the time of K. Athelstan; as appears from the manuscript of the Royal library with an *interlinear* version, noted above; and which I place in 930. The Lambeth manuscript of 957 has also an *interlinear* Saxon version: both which manuscripts confirm the account given of an Anglo-Saxon copy of this Creed printed from a Latin manuscript, interlined with Saxon, out of the Church of Salisbury. The *version* itself seems to have been made about the middle of the tenth century, or about 950; which suits very well with the age of the manuscripts before mentioned. Only, this we may expect, that the Saxon copies of those manuscripts will be found much more *correct* than the Sarum copy, (and so I find that of Lambeth is, having a copy of it by me, which I owe to the civility of the very learned Dr. Wilkins,) being written at a time when the Saxon language was less corrupted, and retained more of its primitive purity;

[e] Wharton. Auctar. Histor. Dogmat. p. 390.
[f] Montf. Diatr. p. 722.
[g] Lambec. Catal. Biblioth. Vindobon. lib. ii. p. 460, 760.
[h] Lambec. Catal. lib. ii. p. 763.
[i] Tentzel. Judic. Erudit. Præf. et p. 226.
[k] Le Long. Biblioth. Biblic. vol. i. p. 376.

whereas the Sarum copy was written[l], as is conjectured, after both Danes and Normans had much altered the language. I before observed, that the title in Dr. Wotton's copy is Hymnus Athanasii, as in St. James's copy: and there is something further worth the noting, which is the rubrick following the title, directing the Creed to be sung *alternately*[m]; which confirms the account given by Abbo Floriacensis of the custom of the Gallican and English churches in that age. But to proceed; from the time we have had any version of this Creed into our country language, we may reasonably conclude that such versions have varied, by little and little, in every age, in proportion to the gradual alteration in our language; till at length the version became such as it stands at this day. Such as are desirous of having a specimen of the Creed in very old English *verse*, may find one in Dr. Hickes's Thesaurus[n]. And they may see a good part of a *prose version* in old English, (though considerably later than the other,) in Wickliff's comment, before mentioned: or an entire version into the English of that time, in a manuscript of Pepys's library now belonging to our College, N. 2498. p. 368. I may here note, that all our Saxon and English versions down to the time of the Reformation, or to the year 1548, were from the Latin only, and not from any Greek copy: and after that time, upon the return of Popery, the old version from the Latin came again into use for a while, as appears by the Primmer set forth by Cardinal Pole in Queen Mary's days, A. D. 1555. But these and the like observations are out of the compass of my design, and so I pass on.

Greek Versions.

I have before intimated that this Creed was originally Latin, and therefore the Greek copies can be no more than *versions*: and they appear to be very *late* also, in comparison to the former,

[l] Versionem istam circiter medium *decimi sæculi* esse factam ipsius sermonis cum puritate (ubi non hallucinatur interpres) conjuncta proprietas ostendit. *Recentius* vero descriptam fuisse, sub Nortmannorum in Angliam adventum, non tantum librarii linguæ Saxonicæ haud gnari recentior manus in qua exaratur, sed pravum illud Anglo Danicum, vel forsan Anglo Nortmannicum, scribendi genus demonstrat. *Wotton. Not. ad Brevem Conspect. Operis Hickesiani*, p. 75.

[m] Hymnus Athanasii, de Fide Trinitatis.

* Quem tu *concelebrans*, discutienter intellige. Incipit de Fide.

On which Dr. Wotton makes this note.

* Ita MS. hoc est, quem tu *antiphonatim*, vel *alternatim* psallens, animo percipe, p. 77.

[n] Hickes. Thesaur. Linguar. Septentr. p. 332.

However, since the Greek is one of the *learned* languages, since the Creed has been ascribed to a Greek author, and has been also supposed by many to have been written in Greek; it will therefore be proper to give as particular and as distinct account as is possible of the Greek version, or versions. Our inquiries here will lie within a little compass: for the Greek copies are neither *many* nor *ancient*. Montfaucon, a very diligent searcher into these matters, frankly professes that he had never seen any Greek copy of this Creed so old as 300 years; nor ever heard of any that was *ancient*[o]. He scruples not to say further, that there had not been yet seen any Greek record, of *certain* and *undoubted* credit, whereby to prove that this Creed had been known to the Greek Church for more than 500 years upwards[p]. He speaks only of Greek records: as to Latin ones, they afford sufficient proof that this Creed was pleaded against the Greeks in the dispute about the *procession*, in the eighth or ninth century at latest, and therefore must have been in some measure known to them. The Greeks and Latins had some dispute on that head in the Synod of Gentilly, not far from Paris, in the year 767, under King Pepin. But perhaps this Creed was not pleaded at that time: at least it does not appear that it was.

It cannot be doubted but that the Greeks had heard something of this Creed from the Latins, as early as the days of Ratram and Æneas Parisiensis; that is, above 850 years ago, when the dispute about the *procession* between the Greeks and Latins was on foot: this the testimonies above cited plainly shew. But this is not enough to prove that the Greek Church had yet any value for this Creed, or that there was then extant any Greek copy of it.

1200. Nicolaus Hydruntinus, cited above, who flourished under Alexius IV. emperor of the east, and Pope Innocent the Third, that is, in round numbers about 1200, he gives us the first notice

[o] Sane nullum vidimus Græcum hujus Symboli codicem qui *trecentorum* sit annorum; nec *antiquum* alium a quopiam visum fuisse novimus. *Montfaucon. Diatrib.* p. 727.

[p] Adjicere non pigeat non visum hactenus fuisse Græcorum quodpiam monumentum (certum scilicet ac indubitatum) quo ab annis plus quingentis notum Ecclesiæ Græcæ fuisse Symbolum, *Quicunque*, possit comprobari. *Montf. ibid.* p. 721.

To the same purpose speaks Combefis of this Creed.

Vix enim extat præterquam in recentiorum collectaneis, librisque eorum polemicis, quibus ipsum vel impugnant, vel etiam defendunt; idque volunt illi qui aiunt *non haberi in Græcorum libris;* non enim sic stupidi videntur ut negent Græce haberi. *Combef. Not. ad Man. Calec.* p. 297.

of this Creed being extant in Greek in his time. He observes, that the article of the *procession from the Son* was not in the Greek copy of this Creed, as neither in the Nicene, blaming the Latins, as I apprehend, for *interpolating* both. The censure was just with respect to the Nicene Creed, but not with respect to the Athanasian, which certainly never wanted that article; as is plain from the agreement of the Latin copies, and the earliest of them, those of a thousand years' date: which I remark by the way. As to our present purpose, this is certain, that some time before Nicolaus of Otranto wrote, the Creed had been translated into Greek, by a Greek, or at least by one that took part with the Greeks in the question about the procession. It can hardly be imagined that Nicolaus had translated it himself, and that he appealed to his *own* version. There must have been a version before undoubtedly: and one can scarce suppose less than 50 or 100 years before, since both the *time* and *author* of it were forgotten, and this Greek version passed with Nicolaus for Athanasius's original. Manuel Caleca[q], who wrote about the year 1360, intimates that there had been Greek copies long before his time, and that the most ancient of all had the article of the procession from *the Son;* and that the older Greeks who wrote against the Latins did not pretend to strike out that article, as those did that came after. Could we depend upon this report, we might then be certain that the Greek copies of the time of Nicolaus Hydruntinus were late in comparison, and that there had been other Greek copies much more ancient. But this I leave to the consideration of the learned. However this fact be, one thing is certain, that the oldest Greek copy could be only a *version*, whether sooner or later.

As to Greek copies now extant in *manuscript*, they are but *few*, and *modern:* I may here give a short account of them, of as many as I have hitherto found mentioned in books, or catalogues of manuscripts.

1. There is one in the Emperor's library at Vienna, said to be in *paper, ancient*, and of *good value*[r]. These words are too

[q] Testantur autem hanc ipsam Fidei Confessionem sancti viri (Athanasii) esse, atque id dictum ita se habere, qui contra Latinos multo ante scripserunt; quam sibi ut adversam frustra labefactare nituntur. Atque, ut intelligi datur, tunc quidem adhuc servabatur; *postmodum* vero pertinaciores ad contradicendum facti, *omnino auferre* voluerunt: etsi modo nihilominus curiose inquirentibus raro, licet in vetustissimis codicibus, ita habere invenitur. *Man. Calec. contr. Græc.* lib. ii. B. PP. tom. xxvi. p. 414.

[r] CCXIV. codex MS. theologicus Græcus est *chartaceus, antiquus*, et

general to fix any certain date upon: one may guess from the *paper* that the manuscript is not very ancient; since *paper* came not into frequent or common use before the thirteenth century. But not to insist upon a disputable argument, (since *cotton* paper, though not common, was however sometimes used as early as the tenth century,) one may judge more certainly from what is written in the same volume, and, I suppose, in the same hand, (for Nesselius makes no distinction,) that the copy of the Creed is not earlier than the middle of the fourteenth century. Maximus Planudes makes a part of the manuscript: he flourished about the year 1340.

2. There is another Greek manuscript of this Creed in the same library, a *paper* one too, and said to be *pretty ancient*, by Nesselius, who gives account of it[s]. From the mention therein made of the Creed's being presented to Pope Julius, I should be apt to conclude that the manuscript is not earlier, nor copied from any earlier than Manuel Caleca's time, or the fourteenth century: but there are other marks, particularly some pieces of Julianus Cardinalis, which demonstrate that the manuscript cannot be much older than the middle of the fifteenth century.

3. Felckman had a manuscript copy of this Creed in Greek, without any *title* to it, or any *author* named[t]. I can say nothing to the age of it, for want of further particulars.

4. Felckman had another manuscript out of the Palatine library, (which library is since transferred partly to the Vatican, the rest to Munich, &c.) with a *title* to it, *σύμβολον τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου*, St. Athanasius's Creed[u]. The *title* alone is a suffi-

bonæ notæ, in 4to. constatque foliis 341.

Continentur eo hæc.

Imo, &c.

2do et quidem a fol. 77. ad fol. 79. S. Athanasii Archiepiscopi Alexandrini Symbolum Fidei, cujus titulus et principium, *Τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου τοῦ μεγάλου. Ὅστις δ' ἂν βούληται σωθῆναι, πρὸ πάντων χρὴ κρατεῖν πίστιν*, &c. *Nessel. Catal.* vol. i. p. 344.

[s] CXCmus codex MS.——est *charta ceus, mediocriter antiquus*, et *bonæ notæ*, in 4to. constatque nunc foliis 332, et ad Johannem Sambucum olim pertinuit. Continentur eo hæc. I. primo, &c.

18° Et quidem a fol. 303. ad fol. 304. S. Athanasii magni, Archiepiscopi Alexandrini, Confessio Catholica Fidei, ad S. Julium Pontificem Romanum; cujus et titulus et principium, *Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀθανασίου τοῦ μεγάλου Ὁμολογία τῆς καθολικῆς πίστεως ἣν ἔδωκε πρὸς Ἰούλιον Πάπαν Ῥώμης. Τῷ θέλοντι σωθῆναι* &c. *Nessel. Catal.* vol. i. p. 281.

[t] Extat hoc Symbolum in nostro codice 2 anonymo, sed absque titulo et nomine auctoris; unde et sic editum. *Felckman. ed. Athanas. Commelin.* p. 83.

Incipit; *Εἴ τις θέλοι σωθῆναι, πρὸ πάντων χρὴ αὐτῷ τὴν καθολικὴν κρατῆσαι πίστιν*, &c.

[u] Invenimus id ipsum etiam post in codice quodam Palatinæ bibliothecæ, expresse Athanasio inscriptum

cient argument of its being *modern*, to any that consider what were the more usual and ancient titles, represented above. It is to be noted that those two manuscript copies are so nearly the same, that they make but *one* copy in print, which has been inserted in all the editions of Athanasius's works after Felckman's, as well as in his, and makes the fifth in Gundlingius[x], who gives us six Greek copies of this Creed. It is observable, that this copy owns not the procession *from the Son*: from whence we may infer that it was not made by the Latins, or however not by any who were not friends to the Greeks.

5. Lazarus Baifius's copy[y], which he had from Venice, in the time of Francis I. in the year 1533, was published by Genebrard, anno 1569. This copy probably was contrived by a Latin, (having the procession *from the Son* in it,) or at least by some *honest* Greek, who would not vary from the *original*. I conclude this Greek copy to be *modern*, from the *title*; for a reason before hinted.

6. There was another manuscript copy[z] of this Creed, which Nicolaus Bryling first printed at Basil, and afterwards H. Stephens in France, in the year 1565. This also must, in all probability, be very *modern*, because of *σύμβολον* in the title. It acknowledges the procession *from the Son*, conformable to the *original*.

7. In the Royal library at Paris, (Numb. 2502,) there is another manuscript Greek copy of this Creed[a], written in the year 1562, published by Genebrard 1569, and said by him to

(licet id recentiores Græci nolint, ut videre est ex epistola Meletii Constantinopolitani Patriarchæ ad Douzam) ex quo etiam discrepantias quasdam notabimus.

Incipit; Εἴ τις θέλει σωθῆναι, πρὸ πάντων χρεία ἐστὶν ἵνα τὴν καθολικὴν κρατήσῃ πίστιν, &c. *Felckman. ibid.*

[x] Gundlingii not. ad Eustrat. et p. 76.

[y] Titulus; Ἔκθεσις ὁμολογίας τῆς καθολικῆς πίστεως τοῦ μεγάλου Ἀθανασίου πατριάρχου Ἀλεξανδρείας πρὸς Ἰούλιον Πάπαν.

Incipit; Ὅστις ἂν βούληται σωθῆναι, πρὸ πάντων χρὴ κρατεῖν τὴν καθολικὴν πίστιν.

[z] Titulus; Σύμβολον τοῦ ἁγίου Ἀθανασίου.

Incipit; Ὅστις βούλεται σωθῆναι, &c.

[a] De Græcis autem codicibus pauca suppetunt dicenda, cum unum tantum nobis inspicere licuerit, scil. Reg. 2502. In quo extat Symbolum superiore sæculo exaratum. *Montf. Diatrib.* p. 722.

Secunda, quam edimus formula, jam olim publici juris facta per Genebrardum anno 1569, quam ait ille esse Ecclesiæ Constantinopolitanæ, extat in regio codice num. 2502. olim ex bibliotheca Johannis Huralti Boistallerii a Carolo IX. Venetias legati, in qua codice hæc leguntur, ante Dialogum S. Athanasii cum Ario—"transcripsit et recognitus liber hic est, ex vetustissimo exemplari cretico; Venetiis anno 1562, impensa facta aureorum X. Zacharias Sacerdos transcripsit et habuit." *Montf. Diatrib.* p. 727.

belong to the Church of Constantinople. This was taken from an older manuscript, but how much older cannot certainly be known[b]. One may imagine from the *title*[c] and *beginning* of it, that the form is the same with one of those in the Emperor's library, and that they were copied one from the other, or both from a third copy. This manuscript acknowledges the procession *from the Son*. I had understood, from Montfaucon's general way of expression, that Genebrard had published his copy from this very manuscript of the Royal library, Num. 2502. But observing that Genebrard's wants some words (ἀΐδιος ὁ πατὴρ, ἀΐδιος ὁ υἱὸς, ἀΐδιον τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον) which Montfaucon's copy has, I conclude that he meant only the *same form*, as to matter and words, for the most part, not the same manuscript.

8. There is another manuscript Greek version, or rather paraphrase of this Creed, having several interpolations, published by Bishop Usher anno 1647, from a copy sent him by Patrick Young. It has been often since printed; in the Councils, in Gundling, and in Montfaucon.

It leaves out the article of procession *from the Son;* from whence we may judge that it was composed by a Greek, or Grecizing Latin. The title insinuates that the Creed was drawn up in the Nicene Council[d]: an opinion entertained by Johan. Cyparissiota, about the year 1360, as observed above. When this story or fiction first came in, I cannot pretend to determine. Bishop Usher speaks of a *very ancient* manuscript, partly in Irish and partly in Latin, which hints at the same thing: but he fixes no date to the manuscript; the words, *very ancient*, are too general to give satisfaction in it. The Creed is there said to have been composed in the Nicene Council, by Eusebius and Dionysius, and a *third* left *nameless*[e], as not being known. The author of that book of Hymns must have been very ignorant, not to know Athanasius, who was undoubtedly the *third* man,

[b] Incertum autem utrum ex illo quod memorat *vetustissimo exemplari* Symbolum etiam sit mutuatus; codex quippe amplæ molis multa et varia complectitur, quæ dubitare licet ex unone codice exscripta fuerint, an ex compluribus. *Montf. ibid.*

[c] Titulus; Τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις Πατρὸς ἡμῶν Ἀθανασίου τοῦ μεγάλου ὁμολογία τῆς καθολικῆς πίστεως ἣν ἔδωκε πρὸς Ἰούλιον Πάπαν Ῥώμης.

Incipit; Τῷ θέλοντι σωθῆναι, &c.

[d] Ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας καὶ οἰκουμενικῆς τῆς ἐν Νικαίᾳ, περὶ πίστεως κατὰ συντομίαν, καὶ πῶς δεῖ πιστεύειν τὸν ἀληθῆ Χριστιανόν. *Usser. de Symb.* p. 26.

[e] In hymnorum, partim Latino partim Hibernico sermone scriptorum, codice vetustissimo —— notatum reperi, trium Episcoporum opera, in eadem Nicæna Synodo illud fuisse compositum, Eusebii, et Dionysii, *et nomen tertii* (sic enim ibi legitur) *nescimus. Usser. de Symb. præf.*

and for whose sake (to account for the Creed's being written in Latin) the whole story seems to have been contrived. By Eusebius must have been intended Eusebius of Verceil in Piedmont, a Latin, and a great friend and intimate of Athanasius: by Dionysius undoubtedly is meant Dionysius Bishop of Milan, of the same time and of the same principles, and well acquainted with Eusebius[f]. Had the contrivers of the fable laid their scene at Alexandria, where Athanasius and this Eusebius, with several other Latins, met together in the year 362, they had made it the more plausible. But let us return to our Greek copies, from which we have a little digressed.

This is observable of the Greek copies in general, that they differ very widely from each other, and therefore cannot be copies of one and the same version. Possibly, three or four of them may be thrown into one, admitting however many *various lections:* but still there will be as many remaining, which cannot be so dealt with, but must be looked upon as distinct and different versions. Such as desire to see all the copies together may find them in Gundling and Montfaucon; four at large, the rest exhibited only by *various lections.* I do not know whether the manuscripts of the Vienna library have been *collated* for any of the *printed* editions: perhaps not; I do not remember that I have met with any mention of them in any of the editors of the printed copies.

It may be of use to set the *printed* editions, after our account of the manuscripts, in chronological order, as distinctly as may be, since we cannot fix the dates of the manuscript copies.

1540. 1. The first printed edition was by Nicolaus Bryling[g], a printer of Basil. My authors have been deficient in not setting down the date of it. I have endeavoured to fix the year, but have not yet been so happy as to come to a certainty in it. Wherefore, I hope, my reader will excuse it, if, rather than set no year at all, I choose one which I know cannot be very much

[f] It seems highly probable, that the whole fable about Eusebius and Dionysius was first raised out of a passage of St. Ambrose, which might be thought to hint some such thing. The words are:

"Itaque ut Eusebius Sanctus prior "levavit vexillum confessionis, ita "beatus Dionysius in exilii locis, "priori martyribus titulo vitam exhalavit." *Ambros. ad Vercellens.* Ep. lxiii. p. 1039.

[g] Quod olim evulgavit Basileæ Nicolaus Bryling; deinde in Gallia anno 1565, Henricus Stephanus. *Genebrard. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 8.

Quam post Nic. Brylingium, et Mich. Neandrum, H. Stephanus in lucem edidit. *Fabric. Bibl. Græc.* vol. v. p. 315.

over or under, because of other pieces printed by the same Bryling about that time. Fabricius mentions Michael Neander as editor of the same copy after Bryling, and before Stephens: but what year is not said. Sebastian Lepusculus's[h] edition of the same was in 1559[i]; and Stephens's in 1565.

1569. 2. The second *printed* copy was taken from the manuscript of Lazarus Baiffius, which he received from Dionysius[k], a Greek, in the year 1533, as before hinted. This was first printed by Genebrard in the year 1569, again in 1585, and oftentimes since. This copy is sometimes called the Dionysian copy: and it is observed by Gundling to differ from the first copy but in *seven* places; and therefore these two have been commonly thrown into one, by the editors of both.

1569. 3. The *third* copy was also first printed by Genebrard, at the same time with the other. It has gone under the name of the Constantinopolitan copy, because Genebrard supposed it to have been in use at Constantinople[l]. It differs considerably from both the other, and is never thrown into one with them, but kept distinct by itself.

1600. 4. The *fourth* is the Commeline, or Felckman's copy, from the Palatine manuscripts, often reprinted with Athanasius's works. This also stands by itself as a distinct version.

1647. 5. The *fifth* was first published by Usher, in the year 1647. This differs extremely from all the rest, having, besides many *variations* and slight insertions, one very large *interpolation*. It hath been often reprinted since Usher's time.

1671. 6. The *sixth* and last was first published by Labbe and Cossart in the second tome of Councils. This copy comes the nearest to the two first, and therefore is sometimes thrown into

[h] Sebastian. Lepusculi compendium Josephi Gorionidis, cum Collectaneis quibusdam, p. 49. *Basil.* 1559.

[i] Nic. Serarius, who wrote in the year 1590, speaking of that first copy printed by Bryling and Stephens, says as follows:

"Quarum prima *vulgata* dici potest, "eo quod hactenus ea sola hic apud "nos, Germania et Gallia, typis evul- "gata fuerit." *Nicol. Serar. de Symb. Athanas. Opusc. Theolog.* tom. ii. p. 9.

[k] Hoc Symbolum reperi in libro Græco MS. de processione Spiritus Sancti, quem Lazaro Baiffio oratori regis Francisci I. apud Venetos, obtulit Dionysius Græcus, Episcopus Zienensis et Firmiensis anno 1533. *Genebr. Comm. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 8.

In manus meas pervenit liber quidam Græcus, de processione Spiritus Sancti, oblatus Lazaro Baiffio claro regis nostri Francisci I. apud Venetos oratori, anno Christi 1533. Quem manu sua elegantissime pinxerat Nicolaus Sophianus Patrum nostrorum ævo vir valde doctus. *Genebr. ibid.* p. 2.

[l] Superius Symbolum, Athanasii verbis aliquantulum immutatis, Constantinopolitani sic Græce legunt, et recitant. *Genebr. ibid.* p. 14.

one with them: but it differs from both in about *forty* places, according to Gundling's computation.

These are all the *printed* copies; which are sometimes called *four*, and sometimes *six: four*, because the *first, second*, and *sixth* may be tolerably thrown into one; *six*, because they may also be kept distinct, and may be reckoned as so many *copies* at least, if not so many several *versions*. So much for the Greek versions of our Creed.

To the versions already mentioned may be added the Sclavonian, of several *dialects*, and, as I conceive, pretty *ancient:* but we have little or no account of them; only, as I shall shew in the sequel, we may be certain that there have been such. There are Italian, Spanish, Irish, and Welsh versions; but whether any that can justly be called *ancient*, I know not. Future searches into libraries may perhaps produce further discoveries. Fabricius makes mention of an Hebrew version of late date, and of an Arabic one still later[m]: but these or the like *modern* versions will be of no use to us in our present inquiries.

CHAP. VI.

Of the reception of the Athanasian Creed *in the Christian Churches.*

FROM the materials here laid down, we may now be able to determine something about the *reception* of the Creed, especially in the western Churches; among which the Churches of France, or Gaul, ought undoubtedly to be named first.

France, or Gaul.

A. D. 550. This Creed obtained in France in the time of Hincmar, or about 850, without all dispute. We may advance higher up to 772: for it was then in Charles the Great's Psalter, among the Hymns of the Church. The Cotton manuscript Psalter, with this Creed in it, will carry us up to 703: and the

[m] Hebraice versum a Julio Marcello Romano MS. in bibliotheca Vaticana memorat Imbonatus in bibl. Latino Hebraica, p. 149. Sed omitto recentiores versiones, ut Arabicam a Nisselio editam Lugd. Bat. 1656. 4to, una cum Cantico Canticor. *Fabric. Bibl. Græc.* v. 5. p. 315. Georgius Nisselius Symbolum Athanasii Arabico idiomate cum Cantico Canticorum Æthiopice et Arabice edito Lugd. Bat. anno 1656, conjunxit ——id tamen non hausit ex codice MS. sed ipse in Arabicum sermonem transtulit. *Tentzel.* p. 125.

Canon of the Council of Autun to 670; at which time the Gallican clergy, at least of the *diocese* of Autun, in the province of Lyons, were obliged to recite this Creed together with the Apostles', under pain of episcopal *censure*. Which shews of how great value and esteem the Creed was at that time, and affords a strong presumption (as Quesnel and Pagi[n] well argue in the case) that it had been in use there long before. There will be some doubt, as I intimated above, about the supposed Canon of the Council of Autun; which will in some measure abate the force of our evidence, and of the argument built upon it. But as it is certain from other evidence, that this Creed was received in the Gallican churches as high as 772 or 703; so it must be owned that this very much confirms the supposition of the Council of Autun: and the concurring circumstances give very great light and strength to each other. But what most of all confirms the foregoing evidence, and the reasoning upon it, is, that Venantius Fortunatus, a full hundred years before the Council of Autun, had met with this Creed in the Gallican parts, and found it then to be in such esteem as to deserve to be *commented* upon, like the Lord's Prayer, and Apostles' Creed: accordingly he wrote comments upon it, as well as upon the other. This wonderfully confirms the reasoning of Quesnel and Pagi, that this Creed must have been in use there near a hundred years before the Council of Autun, that is, as high as 570, about which time Fortunatus flourished and wrote. And considering that this Creed must have been for some time growing into repute, before it could be thought worthy to have such honour paid it, along with the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed; I may perhaps be allowed to set the time of its *reception*, in the Gallican churches, some years higher: reception of it, I mean, as an excellent formulary, or an acknowledged *rule* of *faith*, though not perhaps admitted into their *sacred* Offices. Upon the whole, and upon the strength of the foregoing evidences, we may reasonably

[n] Dubium non est quin multis ante Synodum illam Augustodunensem annis compositum esset, et jam olim per totam Ecclesiam celebre evasisset: nunquam enim sapientissimi præsules id commisissent, ut istam fidei formulam omnium ordinum clericis amplectendam, et *irreprehensibiliter*, ut aiunt, recensendam, Synodali edicto sub *condemnationis pœna* præciverent; imo et illam e regione cum Symbolo Apostolico ponerent, nisi jam *longo usu recepta*, approbata, et inter germanas Magni Athanasii lucubrationes numerata fuisset; quod nisi post plurium annorum seriem fieri vix potuit. *Quesnel, Dis.* xiv. p. 731.

Quare jam ante *centum* fere annis opus illud Athanasio attributum fuerat. *Pagi, Critic. in Baron.* vol. i. p. 441.

conclude, that the reception of this Creed, in the Gallican churches, was at least as early as 670; understanding it of its reception into the public Offices: but understanding it of its reception as a *rule* of *faith*, or an orthodox and excellent formulary and system of *belief*, it may be justly set as high as 550, which is but twenty years, or thereabout, before Fortunatus commented upon it. Le Quien scruples not to set it as high as 500[o].

SPAIN.

630. Next to France, we may mention her near neighbour Spain, which seems to have received this Creed very early, and within less than a hundred years after the time before fixed for its reception in France. As to the truth of the fact, it may be argued two several ways. 1. From the near affinity and relation between the Spanish and Gallican Offices, before either France or Spain had received the Roman. 2. From the fourth Council of Toledo, their quoting passages from this very Creed.

1. As to the first argument, though a *general* one, it must appear of great weight. If the Sacred Offices in France and Spain were in those times the same, or very nearly so; then the reception of this Creed in France will afford a very considerable argument of its reception in Spain also.

Cardinal Bona is very large and diffuse in setting forth the agreement and harmony of the old Gallican Offices with the Spanish, in sundry particulars[p]. And he supposes this uniformity of the two Churches to have been as early, at least, as the days of Gregory Bishop of Tours, who died in the year 595. Mabillon, after him, frequently asserts the same thing[q], and with greater assurance than Bona had done; having met with new and fuller evidences to prove it: only, he dates the agreement of the Spanish Mosarabick Offices with the Gallican, from the third and fourth Councils of Toledo[r], the latter of which was in the year 633. Mr. Dodwell, speaking of the same matter, says, "Nor does Mabillon himself judge it probable that the "innovations attempted by Pope Vigilius in Spain held long, of "what kind soever they were. All Spain was soon after united "in *one form*, and that different from the Romans, and agreeing

[o] Non nisi ex eodem Symbolo, quod jam ante *receptum* esset, Avitus Viennensis——alicubi scribebat &c. *Le Quien, Dissert. Damascen.* p. 98.

[p] Bona, Rerum Liturg. lib. i. cap. 12. p. 372.

[q] Mabillon, de Liturg. Gallican. præf. et lib. i. cap. 3. p. 20, 23.

[r] Mabillon, lib. i. c. 4. p. 32.

" with the Gallican[s]." It is therefore a plain case, that the Gallican and Spanish Offices were very much the same in the beginning of the seventh century, and so continued for some time. If therefore the Gallican churches received the Athanasian Creed into their public Offices before the year 670, it will appear extremely probable that the Spanish received it also, and about the same time. I here make a distinction, as I did before, between receiving the Creed as a *rule* of *faith*, and receiving it into the solemn Offices, to be recited or sung in churches. The *reception* of it, in the first sense, I conceive to have been somewhat earlier in Spain, as well as in France, than its reception in the latter sense. But as different churches in France had anciently different customs, so also was it in Spain: and therefore it is probable that the reception of this Creed into the public Offices was in some churches sooner, and in others later, according to the various rites, customs, and circumstances of the several churches.

But I proceed to the second article, whereby we are to prove the reception of this Creed in Spain.

2. The fourth Council of Toledo cites a considerable part of this Creed, adopting it into their own *Confession*[t]. We may be confident that the Creed did not borrow the expressions from them, but they from the Creed; since we are certain that this Creed was made long before the year 633. The reference to this very Creed appears so plain in the words of that Council, that most of the learned have concluded from thence, that the Spanish Fathers had both seen and approved this Creed. Baronius is positive that the Council took their expressions from it[u]. Calvisius dates the *publication* of the Creed from that Council[x]:

[s] Dodwell of Incense, p. 190.

[t] Nec personas confundimus, nec substantiam separamus. Patrem a nullo factum, vel genitum dicimus: Filium a Patre non factum, sed genitum, asserimus: Spiritum vero Sanctum nec creatum, nec genitum, sed procedentem a Patre et Filio profitemur, ipsum autem Dominum Jesum Christum —— ex substantia Patris ante sæcula genitum —— æqualis Patri secundum divinitatem, minor Patre secundum humanitatem. —— Hæc est Ecclesiæ Catholicæ Fides: hanc confessionem conservamus, atque tenemus. Quam quisquis firmissime custodierit, perpetuam salutem habebit. *Concil. Tolet. IV.* Capitul. 1.

[u] Ex eodem Athanasii Symbolo ea verba primi Capituli Toletani quarti Concilii deducta noscuntur, quibus dicitur, *Patrem a nullo factum*, &c. *Baron. Annal.* tom. iii. p. 436.

[x] Repositum fuit in archivis, nec *publicatum*, nisi, quantum ex historiis conjicere licet, post trecentos fere annos, ubi in Concilio Toletano quarto quædam ex eo translata verba recensentur. *Seth. Calvis. Op. Chronolog.* p. 396.

so also Alstedius[y]. Gavantus, in his comments upon the Roman Breviary, concludes from thence that this Creed had been *read in the Church*, as high as that time[z]. Helvicus[a] falls in with the opinion of Calvisius and Alstedius, grounded upon the expressions of this Council being parallel to those of the Creed. These authors have perhaps carried the point too far, in supposing this a sufficient proof of any *public* reception of the Creed in Spain, at that time, or of its being *read* in their *churches:* but it is clear enough, that the Spanish Fathers had both seen and approved it; otherwise they could not, or would not, have borrowed so plainly from it. Thus much is allowed by most of the learned moderns, as Quesnel[b], Natalis Alexander[c], Montfaucon[d], Tillemont[e], Muratorius, Oudin[f], and others, that the expressions of that Council and this Creed are parallel, and one borrowed from the other, and the words of the Council from the words of the Creed: only, Muratorius hints as if a doubt might be made whether the Council took from the Creed, or the Creed from the Council[g]; which may seem strange in him, who supposes the Creed to have been made by Fortunatus, many years before that Council was held. But, I suppose, he is there speaking of the argument drawn from the words of that Council alone, abstracting from the other circumstance, and previous to the consideration of Fortunatus's comment: otherwise he is guilty of a very great oversight. It appears then, that this

[y] Symbolum Athanasii ab illo scriptum est in Romæ itidem contra Arium. Publicatum est post 300 fere annos in Concilio Toletano, et inde usque ad nostra tempora in Ecclesia usurpatum. *Alsted. Thesaur.* p. 178.

[z] Athanasius dum esset Romæ, scripsit Latine Symbolum——et recitavit coram Pontifice et ei assidentibus, anno 340, ut scribit Baronius; et est illud idem, non mutatum, *legique solitum in Ecclesia*, ante annos nongentos sexaginta. *Vide Annales ad Annum prædictum. Barthol. Gavant. Commentar. in Rubric. Breviarii Romani*, p. 106.

[a] Athanasius Symbolum scribit Romæ, et Concilio offert; non tamen publicatur, nisi post 300 ferme annos in Concilio Toletano. *Helvic. Theatr. Histor. ad an.* 339.

[b] Imo et jam ab anno 633 aliqua ex isto Symbolo descripta mihi videntur in ea Confessione Fidei, quæ edita est a Concilio Toletano 4. habeturque Capit. 1. ejusdem. *Quesnel, Dissert.* xiv. p. 731.

[c] Natal. Alexand. tom. iv. p. 109.

[d] Montfauc. Diatrib. p. 720.

[e] Tillemont, Mémoires, tom. viii. p. 670.

[f] Oudin. Comment. de Script. Eccl. p. 348.

[g] Verum ne majoris quidem momenti sunt verba illa, quæ in Concilii Toletani quarti professione leguntur: quamvis enim phrases nonnullæ ibidem inveniantur Symboli phrasibus oppido similes, attamen ejusmodi non sunt ut iis patribus Symbolum jam innotuisse demonstrent. Quin ex eodem Concilio has formulas quis delibasse videri potest, ut inde Symbolum istud conflaret. *Muratorii Anecdot. Ambros.* tom. ii. p. 223.

Creed was known and approved in Spain as early as 633: and it is observable how exactly this falls in with the time, when the Spanish churches are supposed to have received the Gallican Offices, according to Mabillon's account. Wherefore it is extremely probable, that about this time they received this Creed from the Gallican churches; received it as an orthodox formulary, and an approved *rule* of *faith*. As to their taking it into their *public* Service and Psalmody, I pretend not to set it so high, having no proof that they did *receive* it, in that sense, so early: but as soon as the Gallican churches made it a part of their Psalmody, we may reasonably think that the Spanish did so too; or within a very short time after.

GERMANY.

787. Next to France and Spain, we may mention Germany; not only because of their nearness of situation to France, but also because of their mutual intercourse and affinity with each other. This Creed, very probably, was received in some parts of Germany, soon after it obtained in the Gallican Church. The mutual intercourse of the German and Gallican Churches makes it probable: and the ancient manuscript of the Creed found at Treves, or Triers, in Germany, may persuade the same thing. Our positive evidence is however clear and certain for the reception of the Creed, as early as 870, being then translated by Otfridus into the German or Teutonic language. Anscharius's Instructions to his Clergy (above mentioned) will afford an argument for the reception of this Creed in Germany, from the time of his holding the see of Hamburg, or from 830: and it was received at Basil, as we learn from Hatto, Bishop of the place, before 820. Indeed, I have above referred Basil to France, considering how it stood in Hatto's time, and that it was part of ancient Gaul: but then it was upon the confines of Germany, and has in later times been reckoned to it; and we have good reason to think that the customs of the German churches in the ninth century were nearly the same with those of the Church of Basil in 820. What passed in the council of Frankfort (if I mistake not in my construction of it) may warrant the carrying it up as high as 794. And it was seven years before that, namely in the year 787[h], that Pope Adrian sent to St. Willehad, Bishop of Breme, the famous Psalter

[h] Mabill. Act. Sanct. sæc. iii. part. 2. p. 409.

of Charles the Great[i], with this Creed in it, the same that I have spoken of above. No wonder therefore that Anscharius and Rembertus, afterwards Archbishops of Hamburg and Breme, so very highly valued this Creed. The particular regard paid to this Creed by Charles the Great, in the year 772, may plead perhaps in favour of a more early date: at least, no doubt can be made but as soon as he came to be emperor, if not a great deal sooner, the German churches (as well as the Gallican before) admitted this Creed, even into their *public* Offices. It is of this time that an *anonymous* author cited above, in a tract directed to Charlemagne, then Emperor, says, that this Creed was "professed by the universal Church." We cannot however be mistaken in setting the *reception* of it in Germany, as high as the year 787. So high may pass for *certain* fact: and there is great probability for the running it up many years higher.

ENGLAND.

800. As to our own country, we have clear and positive proof of the Creed's being sung alternately in our churches in the *tenth* century, when Abbo of Fleury, an ear-witness of it, was here; and when the Saxon versions, still extant, were of standing use for the instruction and benefit both of Clergy and people. These evidences alone will prove the *reception* of this Creed in England to have been as early as 950 or 930, or the time of Athelstan, whose Latin Psalter, with the Creed in it, remains to this day. The age of the manuscript *versions* will warrant us thus far: but, possibly, if those *versions* were thoroughly examined by a critic in the Saxon, it might appear that the version or versions were some years older than the manuscripts. But it may be worth the observing further, that among several other ancient professions of faith drawn up by our bishops of the Saxon times there is one of Denebert Bishop of Worcester, presented to Archbishop Athelard in the year 799, which contains in it a considerable part of the Athanasian

[i] Codex iste———in bibliotheca cubiculari summi pontificis Hadriani I. permansit usque ad annum DCCLXXXVIII. quo S. Willehadus ab eodem, cum consensu Caroli M. primus Episcopus Bremensis declaratus est. Tunc videlicet P. P. Hadrianus eundem illum codicem Psalterii, quem ipse in principio pontificatus sui tanquam munus gratulatorium a Carolo Magno acceperat, eadem ratione donavit S. Willehado, ut ille, in novo Episcopatu suo, frueretur usu sacri istius muneris. *Lambec. Catal. Bibl. Vindob.* lib. ii. cap. 5. p. 297.

Creed[k]. From whence may be concluded, that this formulary was well known here and well approved, among the learned at least, in those times. Wherefore, upon the whole, and all circumstances considered, I may presume to name the year 800, or thereabout, for the reception of this Creed in England. Further inquiries may perhaps carry it up higher: but it cannot reasonably be brought lower, and so there I leave it.

Italy.

880. We learn from Ratherius, above cited, that this Creed was in common use in some parts of Italy, particularly in the diocese of Verona in Low Lombardy, in his time; that is, about 960. He then speaks of it as a man would do of a formulary that had been customary amongst them, and of long standing. He exhorts his clergy to make themselves masters of the three Creeds, Apostles', Nicene, and Athanasian; without the least intimation of the last of them being newly introduced. I incline to think that from the time that Lombardy became a province of the French under Charles the Great, (about the year 774,) this Creed obtained there by means of that *prince*, who had so great a value for it, and whose custom it was to disperse it abroad wherever he had any power or influence. He presented it to the pope himself in 772: he delivered it, about the same time, or before, to the monks of Mount Olivet in Jerusalem, of his foundation. And it appears to have been with his consent, or perhaps at his request, that pope Adrian conveyed it to Willehad, the first Bishop of Breme, in 787. These circumstances make it highly probable, that the same Charles the Great introduced this Creed into Lombardy soon after his conquest of it. And indeed nothing could be more serviceable at that time, in a country which had so long before been corrupted with *Arianism*. Add to this, that it appears highly probable that the Gallican Psalter was introduced into the churches of Italy soon after Lombardy became a province under the kings of France: and if their Psalter came in, no doubt but their Creed, then a part of their Psalter, came in with it. Cardinal Bona observes, and seems to wonder at it, that the Gallican Psalter obtained in most parts of Italy in the eleventh

[k] Orthodoxam, Catholicam Apostolicam Fidem, sicut didici, paucis exponam verbis, quia scriptum est, *Quicunque vult salvus esse—&c. Profess. Deneberti Ep. Wigorn. apud Text. Roff.* p. 252.

century[1]. He might very probably have set the date higher, as high perhaps, or very near, as the conquest of Lombardy by Charlemagne. Thus far at least we may reasonably judge, that those parts which were more immediately subject to the kings of France, Verona especially, one of the first cities taken, received the Gallican Psalter sooner than the rest. However, since I here go only upon probabilities, and have no positive proof of the precise time when either the Creed or the Psalter came in, and it might take up some years to introduce them, and settle them there, (new customs generally meeting with difficulties and opposition at the first,) these things considered, I am content to suppose the year 880 for the reception of this Creed in Italy; which is but eighty years higher than Ratherius, and is above one hundred years from the entire conquest of Lombardy by Charles the Great. There may be some reason to suspect that this Creed had been known in Italy, and *received*, at least in some of the monasteries there, near two hundred years before. The manuscript of Bobio, in Langobardick character, and written about the year 700, or sooner, will afford a very strong presumption of it. And if we consider how from the year 637, in the time of Rotharis, one of the Lombard kings of Italy, there had been a constant struggle between the Catholics and Arians, and a succession of *bishops* on both sides kept up, in almost every city of his dominions, for many years together; I say, from these considerations, one might reasonably presume that the Catholics had about that time procured this Creed, together with Bachiarii Fides, and Gennadius's tract, out of the Gallican parts, to arm themselves the better against the spreading heresy. But as this does not amount to a *public reception* of it, nor is the fact so clear as not to be liable to dispute, I pretend not to insist upon it.

Rome.

930. Rome is of distinct consideration from the other parts of Italy, and was always more desirous of imposing her own Offices upon other churches, than of receiving any from them. The *Filioque*, in the Constantinopolitan Creed, had been long admitted into all the other western churches before Rome would accept it; which was not (at least it does not appear that it was) till the middle of the eleventh century, or about 1050. The custom of

[1] Bona, Rerum Liturg. lib. ii. c. 3. p. 506.

reciting the Nicene, or Constantinopolitan Creed, in the Communion Service, had prevailed in Spain, France, and Germany, for several centuries; and was at length but hardly admitted at Rome in the year 1014. It was thought civil enough of the Popes of Rome to allow the other western churches to vary from the Roman customs in any thing: and those other churches could not enjoy that liberty and privilege in quiet, without complying with the Roman Offices in most things besides. The use of the Athanasian Creed was one of those things wherein they were beforehand with the Church of Rome, and in which they were indulged; as was also the use of the Gallican Psalter, which the western churches in general were allowed[m] to have, while the Romans were tenacious of their *own*. But though the Romans retained their own Psalter all the way down to the middle of the sixteenth century; yet they had long before borrowed this Creed from the Gallican, and received it into their Offices. This is certain fact; but as to the precise time when it was first done, it may not be easy to determine. It was, without all question, before Thomas Aquinas's day; who tells us, (as above cited,) that this Creed was "received by the authority of "the Pope:" I wish he had told us *what* Pope. That it was not received into the Roman Offices so soon as the year 809 may be probably argued from a case that then happened, which has been hinted above. The Latin monks of Mount Olivet, (founded by Charles the Great,) in their Apologetical Letter to Pope Leo III, made the best defence they were able of their own practice in their public professing that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the *Son*. They pleaded the open acknowledgment of the same doctrine in Charles the Great's own chapel; and that the same doctrine had been taught them, in St. Gregory's Homilies, and in the Rule of St. Benedict, and in the Athanasian Creed, and in a Dialogue given them by Pope Leo himself[n].

[m] Alexander IV. in sua Constitutione quæ est sexta in Bullario ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini, mandat Priori Generali et reliquis fratribus in Tuscia, ut recitent Officium juxta morem Romanæ Ecclesiæ, excepto Psalterio. *Bona, Rer. Liturg.* lib. ii. c. 3. p. 506.

Sic quoque S. Franciscus, ut testatur Frassenius (Disqu. Bibl. c. vi. s. 1.) illius ordinis frater, in regula suorum præcipit: *Clerici faciant divinum Officium secundum ordinem sanctæ Romanæ Ecclesiæ, excepto Psalterio. Hod. de Text. Bibl.* p. 383. Vid. etiam supra p. 134.

[n] Benignissime pater, dum essem ego Leo, servus vester, ad sancta vestigia vestra, et ad pia vestigia Domni Karoli, piissimi Imperatoris, filiique vestri, audivimus in capella ejus dici in Symbolo Fidei, *qui ex Patre Filioque procedit*. Et in Homilia S. Gregorii, quam nobis filius vester Dom-

Now, had the Athanasian Creed been at that time recited in the public Offices at Rome, those monks who were so particular in every little circumstance pleadable in their favour, could not have failed (especially upon their mentioning the Athanasian Creed) to have pleaded a thing so notorious, and which would have given the greatest countenance and authority possible to them and their doctrine; and must have been of the greatest weight and force with Pope Leo, to whom they were writing, and whose protection they were then seeking, and humbly imploring. From hence then one may reasonably infer, that this Creed was not received into the Roman Offices so early as the year 809. Let us now inquire whether we can fix upon any later time for its coming in.

Genebrard testifies, that in the oldest Roman Breviaries he could meet with or hear of, this Creed always made a part of the Service[o]. But this is too general, nor can we be certain how ancient those oldest Breviaries were, nor whether they belonged to the Roman Church, strictly so called, or to other western churches. And indeed I know not how we can come to any certainty in this matter, unless it be by examining into the Roman Psalters which have this Creed in them. Whenever the Creed came into the Roman Psalters, we may justly conclude, that at the same time it came into the Roman Offices. We have in our public library at Cambridge a Roman Psalter, written for the use of the Church of Canterbury, (as our judicious Mr. Wanley reasonably conjectures[p],) and about the time of the Conquest, or a little before, suppose 1060. The church of Canterbury more especially used the Roman Psalter, as hath been observed above, and was in all things conformable, of old time, to the Roman Offices. Now if this Creed, which had long before been introduced into the Gallician Psalters, did at

nus Karolus Imperator dedit, in parabola Octavarum Paschæ, ubi dixit: *Sed ejus missio ipsa processio est, qui de Patre procedit et Filio.* Et in Regula S. Benedicti, quam nobis dedit filius vester Domnus Karolus,——et in Dialogo quem nobis *vestra sanctitas* dare dignata est, similiter dicit. Et in Fide S. Athanasii eodem modo dicit. *Epist. Monach. Montis Olivet. apud Le Quien, Damasc. Dissert. Præv.* p. 7.

[o] In vetustissimis Romanæ Ecclesiæ ὡρολογίοις (hæc nunc vocamus Breviaria) sub Athanasii nomine ejus ad *primam* recitatio usu recepta est. *Genebr. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 3.

[p] Notandum vero in Litania extare hæc verba: *Ut archiepiscopum nostrum, et omnem congregationem illis commissam, in sancta religione conservare digneris, te rogamus:* quibus pene inducor ut credam hunc cod. olim pertinuisse ad ecclesiam Christi Salvatoris Cantuariæ. *Wanleii Catal.* p. 152.

this time obtain in the Roman also; it is obvious to conclude, that it at the same time made a part of the Roman Offices, even at Rome itself, as well as Canterbury, since one was conformable to the other. This argument may carry us up some years higher: for there is another, an older Roman Psalter, taken notice of above, which has this Creed in it; written about the year 930, in the time of King Athelstan. It is said to have belonged formerly to Archbishop Cranmer. Perhaps this also might have been written for the use of the Church of Canterbury: I know of no Church, amongst us, which at that time used the Roman Psalter, but the Church of Canterbury. However, it is highly improbable that any church which complied so far with Rome, as to use the Roman Psalter, should take this Creed into that Psalter before such time as Rome itself had done the same thing. Upon the strength of this argument, though it be not demonstrative, but probable only, (such as the case will admit of, and such as may very well pass till we can fix upon something more certain,) I say upon the strength of this, I incline to date the *reception* of this Creed at Rome from the *tenth* century, and the beginning of it, about the year 930. From this time forwards, I presume, the Athanasian Creed has been honoured with a *public* recital, among the other sacred Hymns and Church Offices, all over the west. The way has been to recite it at the *prime*, or first hour, (*one o'clock* in the Latin account, with us *seven* in the morning,) every Lord's day[q]; and in some places *every* day[r]. But as the custom of making it only a part of the Sunday Service is the most *ancient*, so has it likewise been the most *general* and *prevailing;* and is at this day the common and constant usage of the churches within the Roman communion. And let this suffice so far as concerns the western churches.

Of the Greek *and* Oriental Churches.

AS to the Greek, or Oriental Churches, I reserved this place for them, that I might not entirely omit them. It has been questioned, whether any of them ever received this Creed at all.

[q] Die Dominico ad *primam* recitetur. *Hatt. Basil.* A. D. 820.

Per omnes occidentis ecclesias Dominicis semper diebus psallitur——in cunctis ecclesiis publice cani præcepta. *Manuel. Calec. Bibl. PP.* tom. xxvi. p. 414.

[r] Fidem, *Quicunque vult*, quotidie ad primam iterat. *Honor. August.* Ad primam dicunt *quotidie* Symbolum Athanasii. *Bona de Carthusianis*, p. 897. *Psalmod.*

Ad primam——quotidie subditur Symbolum Athanasii. *Bona de Ambrosianis*, p. 900. *Divin. Psalmod.*

Vossius[s] seems to have thought that they never have: and so also Combefisius[t]. And Dr. Smith, in his account of the Greek Church, is positive that "as to the Creed of Athanasius, the "Greeks are *wholly strangers to it*[u]."

Nevertheless, I find some very considerable men of a contrary persuasion, and not Romanists only, as Baronius, Spondanus[x], Muratorius[y], Renaudot[z], and others, but Protestants also; as particularly Gundling, whose words I have put into the margin[a]. We may observe however, that thus far is agreed on all hands, that this Creed is not received in *all* the Greek churches; and if it is in *any*, yet it is there differently read in the article of *procession*. It is not pretended that any of the African churches, Alexandrian, Nubian, or Ethiopian, (which are, most of them, of the Jacobite or Eutychian sect,) have received it. So far from it, that they have not (at least the Ethiopian or Abassine churches have not) so much as the Apostles' Creed amongst them, if we may believe Ludolphus[b]: so little are they acquainted with the Latin forms or confessions. Nor is it pretended that the more eastern Christians, belonging to the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem, have any acquaintance with the Athanasian Creed: no not the Maronites, though they

[s] Nec qui nostra ætate Patriarcha Alexandrinus, et Præses Constantinopoleos fuit, pro germano illud Symbolum habuit. Sic enim Meletius litteris suis Constantinopoli, anno 1597, ad Johannem Douzam, Nordovicem datis, et a filio Georgio Douza editis. "Athanasio falso adscriptum Symbo-"lum, cum appendice illa Romanorum "Pontificum adulteratum, luce luci-"dius contestamur." *Voss. de Trib. Symb. Dissert.* ii. c. 20. p. 521.

[t] Combef. not. ad Calec. p. 297. et notatione 48 in vitam Basilii Pseudo-Amphiloch.——*Symbolum Athanasii Græci ut ejus non recipiunt.*

[u] Smith, Account &c. p. 196.

[x] Spondanus epitomizing the words of Baronius, as I find quoted by Tentzelius, p. 152.

Cum autem e Romanæ Ecclesiæ antiquis monumentis, veluti eruderatum emersit in lucem, tum a Latinis omnibus, tum a Græcis æque susceptum est: non ab Ecclesia Constantinopolitana tantum, sed Serviana, Bulgarica, Russica, Moscovitica, et aliis; licet ab eis dempta inde pars illa fuerit, qua Spiritum Sanctum a Patre *Filioque* procedere expressum habetur.

[y] Re vera, non Ecclesia tantum Constantinopolitana, sed Serviana, Bulgarica, Russica, Moscovitica, aliæque ritui Græco addictæ, etsi Athanasiano Symbolo in sacris Liturgiis *utantur*, hanc tamen particulam, *et Filio*, inde exclusere. *Murator.* tom. ii. p. 227.

[z] Quod dicitur Domini Filius assumpsisse hominem &c. rectum est, Symbolo quod Athanasii dicitur, et *a Græcis Latinisque recipitur*, conforme. *Renaud. Orient. Liturg.* vol. ii. p. 643.

[a] Mirari quis possit cur Græci processionem Spiritus Sancti a Filio negent, additionem ad Symbolum Nicænum tam ægre ferant, cum tamen *Symbolum Athanasii recipiant. Gundling. Not. ad Eustrat.* &c. p. 68.

[b] Ludolph. Histor. Æthiop. lib. iii. c. 5. Symbolo Fidei Catholicæ Nicæno communiter utuntur——illo quo nos utimur, uti cæteri orientales, carent: haud levi indicio Apostolos illius autores non esse.

formerly submitted to the see of Rome, and are still supposed to hold communion therewith, and to acknowledge the Pope for their head. All that is pretended, with respect to this Creed, is, that the churches of Constantinople, Servia, Bulgaria, Russia, and Muscovy, acknowledge it as Athanasius's, or make use of it in their common and sacred Offices. And for proof of this, it has been usual to appeal to a passage of Cazanovius, a Polish knight, in a letter of his to Calvin: which letter I have not seen, but find quoted both by Genebrard [c] and Vossius [d], men of opposite principles, and therefore the more safely to be relied on where they agree. But what does Cazanovius confess? That the Greek, Servian, Russian, and Muscovite churches acknowledge the Athanasian Creed as Athanasius's; only *curtailed* (or, as they would say, *corrected*) as to the point of the *procession*. A confession from a Socinian adversary, in this case, is of some weight; and especially if it can be enforced by any corroborating evidence. Let us see then what may be further learned concerning the several churches here named, and the *reception* of this Creed in them. I may take them one by one.

1. To begin with Muscovy, where the matter of fact seems to be most fully attested of any. In the account given of the Lord Carlisle's embassy from King Charles II. to the great Duke of Muscovy, in the year 1663 [e], I meet with this passage, relating to the Muscovites, and their *divine Service*: "The whole Service "is performed by reading of certain Psalms, or chapters in the "Bible: sometimes the Priest adds Athanasius's Creed, or sings "certain hymns, and St. Chrysostom's Homily." In another treatise entitled, Of the Ancient and Modern Religion of the Muscovites, written in French, and printed at Cologne 1698, and since translated into English, there is this account of the Muscovites: that "they receive the Creed of the Apostles, and "that of Nice and Athanasius [f]." These two testimonies are undoubtedly sufficient, so far as concerns Muscovy. Now the

[c] Si Athanasii est, cujusnam illud erit quod nunc Græcorum, Serviorum, Russorum, et Moscorum ecclesiæ sub ejusdem Athanasii titulo retinent, ac pro genuino agnoscunt? *Cazanov. ad Calvin. Epist. apud Genebr. de Symbol. Athanas.* p. 7.

[d] Cazanovius sarmata——etsi multum ei hoc Symbolum displiceat, agnoscit tamen Athanasianum vocari, non in Latina solum Ecclesia, sed etiam in Constantinopolitana, Serviana, Bulgarica, Moscovitica. *Voss. de Symb. Diss.* ii. c. 1. p. 516.

[e] Harris's Complete Collection, &c. vol. ii. p. 181. See also the Duke of Holstein's Travels, ibid. p. 36.

[f] Harris's Collection of Travels, vol. ii. p. 238. See also p. 240, 241.

Muscovites received their religion and their *orders* from the Patriarch of Constantinople, about the tenth century, or beginning of the eleventh: and their receiving of this Creed will be a presumptive argument in favour of its *reception* at Constantinople also, if there be no evident reason against it. That the Muscovites did not receive the Creed from the Latins, but from the Greeks, is very plain, because their copies of the Creed are without the article of the procession *from the Son* [g]. For they pretend that the Latins have *interpolated* the Creed, appealing to their own uncorrupted copies; and they blame the Latins, further, for inserting the *Filioque* into the Nicene [h]. From what hath been said, it appears to be certain fact, that the Muscovites receive the Athanasian Creed: how long they have had it, or how far short of seven hundred years, (reckoning from the time that Christianity was received, or restored amongst them,) I cannot say. I should observe, that the Muscovites always perform their Service in their own *vulgar* tongue, as is allowed on all hands [i]: since then the Athanasian Creed is a part of their Service, they must have had a *version* of it in the Muscovite language, which is a dialect of the Sclavonian. Wherefore this also, after our proof of the thing, may now be added to the other *versions* above mentioned.

2. Russia, as distinguished from Muscovy, must mean Russia Minor, or the Black Russia, a province of Poland. As many as there follow the Greek rites are of the same account with the Muscovites before spoken of: and therefore what has been said of the former, with respect to the use of the Athanasian Creed, will be applicable to these also; and so I need not be more particular about them. The Patriarch of Muscovy ordains their Archbishop, who is therefore subject to him, and follows the same rites and customs: and their language is also a dialect of the Sclavonian, like the other.

[g] Vid. Tentzel. Judic. Erudit. p. 151.

[h] See Harris, ibid. p. 240.

[i] In cæteris autem regionibus, videlicet in Servia, Mysia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Russia Minori regi Poloniæ subdita, in Volhinia, Podolia, et parte quadam Lituaniæ, aliisque finitimis provinciis, ritu Græco divinum peragitur officium, translatis Græcorum typicis in Sclavonicam linguam. Eosdem Græcos ritus, eadem lingua, servant Moscovitæ, quorum regio Russia Major, seu Roxolania nuncupatur &c. *Bona de Divin. Psalmod.* cap. xviii. sect. 17. p. 911. Vid. etiam Usser. Histor. Dogmat. p. 246.

Armeni suo quoque nativo sermone dudum sacra celebrant, tum qui *orthodoxam* fidem retinuerunt, tum Jacobitæ, ut Moscovitæ seu Rutheni, Constantinopolitanæ sedi subjecti, Russico; et alii quidam de quibus panca scimus. *Renaudot. Liturg. Orient.* vol. i. Dissertat. 6. p. 43.

3. Servia, now a large province of the Turkish empire, part of Northern Turkey in Europe, first received Christianity about the year 860, by the means of Cyrill and Methodius, who are said to have invented the Sclavonian letters, and to have translated the Scriptures into the Sclavonian tongue. Cyrill was a Greek, and came from Constantinople: and Methodius was a Greek too, both sent by the Greek emperor to convert the country; which therefore became instructed in the Greek rites and religion. It is not improbable that they should have the Athanasian Creed, as well as the Muscovites and Russians; or perhaps before them, being converted sooner: and they also must have received it from the Greeks, and not from the Latins, because of their varying, in the article of the *procession*, from the western churches.

4. Bulgaria is likewise part of Turkey in Europe, and has been so from the year 1396. Christianity was planted there in the year 845. There were of old great disputes between the two Bishops of Rome and Constantinople, upon the question to whose Patriarchate the Bulgarians did of right belong. In conclusion, about the year 870, the Greek Patriarch prevailed over the Roman, by the interest of the then Emperor of Constantinople. The Bulgarians of consequence fell to the share of the Greek Church, and so have been educated in their rites and customs. Their language is a dialect of the Sclavonian, in which they perform their *sacred* Offices: and therefore, if they make use of the Athanasian Creed, they must be supposed to have it in their own *vulgar* tongue. I have no particular evidence of their using it, beyond what has been mentioned from Cazanovius and the Romish writers; which yet seems to be sufficient, since it has been fully proved that it is used in Muscovy, and in Russia, to whom the Bulgarians are neighbours, and with whom they conform in their other religious rites derived from the same fountain, namely, the Constantinopolitan Greeks.

5. It remains then that we consider the fact in respect of Constantinople itself, and the Greek church there: for this also, as we have seen, has been named with others, as receiving the Athanasian Creed. Genebrard is positive in it, and gives us the very Creed itself, which the Constantinopolitans, as he says, use and recite[k]. He wrote in the year 1569. The truth of his

[k] Superius Symbolum, Athanasii verbis aliquantulum immutatis, Constantinopolitani sic Græce legunt, et recitant. *Genebrard. in Symb. Athan.* p. 14.

report is very much doubted, because the *form*, which he exhibits, acknowledges the procession from *the Son*, which the Constantinopolitans admit not: and even those who, as before seen, assert or allow that they receive this Creed, yet at the same time intimate that it is not the *entire* Creed, but *curtailed* in that article. However, Genebrard might be in the right, as to the main thing, that the Constantinopolitans do receive the Creed, though mistaken in the particular *form:* or possibly some Latinizing Greeks at Constantinople might have one form, and the rest another, and thus all will be well. But let us inquire what further evidence there is of this Creed's having been ever received at Constantinople, and by the Greeks properly so called. An argument thereof may be drawn from the Greek copies that vary from the Latin, in the article of *procession*. For who should draw up and curtail the Greek copies but the Greeks? And why should they be at the trouble of *correcting* (as they will call it) the Creed, if they did not *receive* it? A second argument may be drawn from the Creed's being found in the Horologia belonging to the Greeks; that is, in their Breviaries, (as we should call them,) their books of Service for the *canonical* hours. How should the Creed come in there, unless the Greeks received it into their sacred Offices? As to the fact, Bishop Usher's copy found in such a Breviary is a sufficient evidence: and it is plain from the copy itself, that it was no Latinizing Greek that made it, or used it; since the procession from the *Son* is struck out. Further, this Horologion belonged to a monk of Constantinople[1]; which argues the reception of the Creed in that very *city:* and, as a token of their esteem of it and value for it, it is ascribed to the Nicene Council itself, which all the Greeks receive and respect with the greatest veneration. From hence then it is plain, that the Constantinopolitan Greeks (some of them at least) receive, or have received this Creed, but with some alterations proper to their peculiar tenets in opposition to the Latins. This fact of the Constantinopolitans their receiving this Creed might be further proved from the Confession of Metrophanes Critopulus, (in the year 1620, published in 1667[m],) who admits

[1] In Thecaræ, Constantinopolitani monachi, Græcorum Hymnorum Horologio (a Ravio nostro ex oriente huc advecto) Symbolum hoc, eo quo post finem hujus diatribæ cernitur interpolatum modo, Nicænæ Synodo adscriptum——reperi &c. *Usser. de Symb.* p. 1.

[m] Metrophanis Critopuli, Protosyngeli Constantinopolitani ὁμολογία τῆς ἀνατολικῆς ἐκκλησίας edit. Helmstad. in 4to a Joann. Horneio: vid. cap. i. p. 18. apud Tentzel. p. 150.

the Creed, and looks upon it as owing to a very particular providence, that the Greek copies (as he supposes) have been preserved pure and entire, while the Latin ones have been corrupted or interpolated. We find by Nicolaus Hydruntinus, above cited, that such had been the general persuasion of the Greeks, five hundred years upwards, in relation to this Creed; not rejecting the Creed, but the Latin *interpolation* only, as they take it to be.

Which when I consider, reflecting withal how the Muscovites, Russians, &c. (who derived their religion from the Greeks since the ninth century,) have all come into this Creed, and that no good account has been given of such agreement, except it be that they all received the same form when they first received their religion; I say, when I consider and compare these things together, it cannot but give me a suspicion, that this Creed had been received by the Greeks soon after their first disputes with the Latins about the *procession*; only they took care to strike out a part of it, hoping to solve all by charging the Latins with *interpolation*. Or possibly, the Latin Patriarchs of Constantinople, between the years 1205 and 1260, might first introduce the Creed there. They made use of it, as it seems, then and there in their Offices for the instruction of catechumens; as I learn from a Pontifical of the church of Constantinople, about five hundred years old, published in part by Martène, who gives an account of it[n], and also an extract of the Office relating to catechumens, which I have transcribed[o] into the bottom of the page. It is not improbable that the use of the Creed at Constantinople might first come in such a way: and when it had prevailed there for forty or fifty years, the returning Greeks might think it not improper to continue its use, only taking out the article which concerns the *procession*.

However this be, one thing is certain, and, I think, hath been

[n] Constantinopolitanæ Ecclesiæ Pontificale vetus, ad Latinos ritus accommodatum, cujus character ad annos 500 accedit; scriptum proinde eo tempore quo urbe a Gallis occupata, Latinis ritibus serviebat. Ex bibliotheca R. R. P. P. prædicatorum majoris conventus Parisiensis. *Martene Syllab. Ritual.*

[o] Interrogatio. Fides quid tibi præstat? R. Vitam æternam. Ait ei sacerdos——Fides autem est, ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate venereris, neque confundendo Personas, neque substantiam separando. Alia est enim Persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti: sed horum trium una est, et non nisi una Divinitas. *Exeat ergo de te spiritus malignus* &c. *Martene de Antiq. Eccl. Ritibus*, p. 44, 45.

proved abundantly, that the professed Greeks, even under the Patriarch of Constantinople, have in former times received and still do receive this Creed, with such alterations or corrections as are proper to their principles: and so I understand Dr. Covel[p], where he says, speaking of what is done amongst the Greeks, that "Athanasius's Creed is owned as corrupted;" that is, with such corruptions as the Greeks have made to it. Upon the whole, therefore, I cannot but close in with those many learned Romanists who have affirmed, and still do affirm, that this Creed is *received* both by Greeks and Latins. If the expression be thought too *general*, since it is certain that the Creed is rejected by innumerable Greeks, or more properly Orientalists, in Asia and Africa; as the Cophtes, and Nubians, and Abassines, and Maronites, Armenians, Nestorians, &c., I say, if this be objected, it is to be considered, that the Romanists, under the name of Greeks, mean generally the *orthodox* Greeks only, the Melchite Greeks, or as many as hold communion with the Patriarch of Constantinople; making no account of the rest, as being by their heresies cut off from the Church, and therefore of little or no consideration[q]. Now, in this sense, it is excusable enough to say, that the Creed is received both by Greeks and Latins.

To sum up what hath been said of the *reception* of this Creed: from the foregoing account it appears that its reception has been both *general* and *ancient*. It hath been received by Greeks and Latins all over Europe: and if it hath been little known among the African and Asian churches, the like may be said of the Apostles' Creed, which hath not been admitted, scarce known, in Africa, and but little in Asia[r], except among the Armenians,

[p] Covel, Account of the Greek Church, præf. p. 9. to which I may add a remark of the learned Dr. Hickes, that "this Creed, though of "an uncertain author, was, for its "excellent composure, received into "the Greek and Latin Churches." *Hickes's Serm.* vol. ii. p. 235.

[q] Attamen hoc ævi sub Orientalis Ecclesiæ nomine diversarum nationum orientalium ecclesiæ veniunt; quæ licet a Græca suam cognoscant originem, propter tamen variarum hæresium colluviem et alia præter mores Christianos pessima introducta a Græca longissime absunt. Græci enim illius religionis homines, tanquam a se disjunctos, atque improbissimos, arcent, et detestantur. *Leo Allat. de perpet. Consens. Eccl. Occid. et Orient.* p. 9.

[r] Illo quo nos utimur, uti cæteri orientales, carent (Habessini) haud levi indicio, Apostolos illius autores non esse, quamvis doctrinæ ratione *Apostolicum* recte vocetur. *Ludolph. Hist. Æthiop.* lib. iii. c. 5. n. 19. Ἡμεῖς οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε εἴδομεν σύμβολον τῶν Ἀποστόλων. *Marc. Ephesius in Concil. Florent. ann.* 1439. *Sylv. Syurop. Hist.* sect. vi. c. 6. p. 150.

Symbolum nec ab Apostolis, nec a

who are said to receive it[s]. So that, for *generality* of reception, the Athanasian Creed may vie with any, except the Nicene, or Constantinopolitan, the only *general* Creed common to all the churches. As to the *antiquity* of its reception into the *sacred* Offices, this Creed has been received in several countries, France, Germany, England, Italy, and Rome itself, as soon, or sooner than the Nicene; which is a high commendation of it, as gaining ground by its own intrinsic worth, and without the authority of any *general council* to enforce it. And there is this thing further to be said for it, that while the Nicene and Apostles' Creeds have been growing up to their present perfection in a course of years, or centuries of years, and not completed till about the year 600, this Creed was made and perfected at once, and is more ancient, if considered as an *entire form*, than either of the other; having received its full perfection, while the others wanted theirs. No considerable additions or defalcations have been made to it (it has needed none) since its first compiling, till of late years, and in the Greek Church only; which yet are so far from correcting or amending the form, that they have rendered it so much the less perfect: and the only way of restoring it to its perfection is to restore it to what it was at the first. But I pass on.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Time when, and Place where, the Creed was composed.

HAVING observed *when* and *where* this Creed hath been *received*, we may now ascend higher, and consider *when* and *where* it was *made*. Our inquiries here will be in some measure dark and conjectural; strong probabilities will perhaps be as much as we can reach to: which made it the more necessary for me to begin, as I have, at the lower end, where things are more plain and clear, in hopes to borrow some light to conduct our searches into what remains still dark and obscure. Whatever we have to advance in this chapter must rest upon two things. 1. Upon *external testimony* from ancient citations, manuscripts, comments, versions, and the like, such as have been previously laid down. 2. Upon the *internal characters* of the Creed.

Synodo ulla generali factum est: adhæc, nec in Græc. nec in Orient. ullis Ecclesiis obtinuit, sed in Ecclesia Romana. *Suicer. Thesaur.* p. 1093.

[s] Sir Paul Ricaut, Present State of the Greek Church, p. 409.

1. To begin with the *external* evidence; our *ancient testimonies*, above recited, carry up the antiquity of the Creed as high as the year 670, if the first of them be admitted for genuine; as it reasonably may, notwithstanding some objections. Our *manuscripts*, now extant, will bring us no higher than 700; but such as have been known to be extant may reach up to 660, or even 600. This must be thought very considerable to as many as know how great a *rarity* a manuscript of eleven hundred, or of a thousand years date is; and how few books or tracts there are that can boast of manuscripts of such antiquity. The injuries of time, of dust, and of moths, and above all, the ravages of *war* and destructions of *fire*, have robbed us of the ancient monuments, and left us but very thin remains; that a manuscript of the fourth century is a very great rarity, of the fifth there are very few, and even of the sixth not many. So that our want of manuscripts beyond the sixth or seventh century is no argument against the *antiquity* of the Creed, however certain an argument may be drawn from those we have, so far as they reach. But, beyond all this, we have a comment of the sixth century, of the year 570, or thereabout; and this certain, and unquestionable: which may supersede all our disputes about the *ancient testimonies* or *manuscripts* of more doubtful authority. Here then we stand upon the foot of *external evidence:* the Creed was, about the year 570, considerable enough to be commented upon, like the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed, and together with them. Here is *certain* evidence for the time specified; and *presumptive* for much greater antiquity. For who can imagine that this Creed, or indeed any Creed, should grow into such repute of a sudden, and not rather in a course of years, and a long tract of time? Should we allow one hundred or one hundred and fifty years for it, though it would be *conjecture* only, yet it would not be unreasonable or improbable conjecture. But we will let this matter rest here, and proceed to our other marks of direction.

2. The *internal characters* of the Creed. The Creed contains two principal doctrines; one of the *Trinity*, and the other of the *incarnation*. Possibly from the *manner* wherein these doctrines are there laid down, or from the *words* whereby they are expressed, we may be able to fix the true date of the Creed, or very nearly at least; certain however thus far, that it must be somewhere above 570.

From the doctrine of the *incarnation*, as expressed in this Creed, we may be confident that it is not earlier than the rise of the Apollinarian heresy, which appeared first about the year 360, and grew to a head about 370, or a little later. This Creed is so minute and particular against those heretics, (without naming them, as it is not the way of the Creed to name any,) obviating every cavil, and precluding every evasion or subterfuge, that one cannot suppose it to have been written before the depths of that heresy were perfectly seen into, and the whole secrets of the party disclosed: which we have no reason to think could be before the year 370, if so soon. This consideration alone is to me a sufficient confutation of those who pretend that Athanasius made this Creed either during his banishment at Treves, which ended in the year 338, or during his stay at Rome in the year 343; or that he presented it to Pope Julius, or Pope Liberius, who were both dead before the year 367.

I must add, that Epiphanius[t] marks the very time when the Creeds first began to be enlarged in opposition to the Apollinarian heresy; namely, the tenth year of Valentinian and Valens, and the sixth of Gratian, (it should be seventh,) which falls in with A. D. 373, the very last year of Athanasius's life, according to those that place his death the latest; some say he died a year or two sooner. If therefore he made this Creed at all, it must be about that time. And, indeed, were there no stronger objections against the *antiquity* of the Creed, or against its being made by Athanasius, than the common objection about the supposed condemnation of the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies; I should scarce think it at all improbable that Athanasius should be the author, admitting that he lived to the year 373. For Epiphanius's larger Creed, made about that time, appears to me as full and express against both those heresies, as the Athanasian can be supposed to be, and in some respects more so: and yet neither of those *heresies* were then in being, nor for many years after. But there are many other reasons which convince me that the Athanasian Creed must be placed lower than this time. I take Epiphanius's larger Creed to have been the first that enlarged the article of the *incarnation*, in opposition chiefly to the Apollinarians: and that Creed being drawn up, as Epiphanius expressly testifies, by the joint advice of *all the orthodox bishops*, and the *whole Catholic Church*, became a kind of *rule*, or *model*,

[t] Epiphan. Ancorat. c. 121. p. 123.

for most of the Creeds that came after; among which I reckon the Athanasian.

For, from the doctrine of the *Trinity*, as particularly and minutely drawn out in that Creed, it is to me very plain, that it must be some years later than the Creed of Epiphanius: which will evidently appear to any man who will but be at the pains to compare the two Creeds together.

One very observable particular is the manner of expressing the *Unity* by a singular adjective; *unus æternus, unus immensus*, &c. *one eternal, one incomprehensible*, &c. and the condemning the expression of *tres æterni, tres immensi*, &c. The Greeks never laid down any such rule of expression, never observed or followed it, but have sometimes run counter to it[u]; meaning indeed the very same thing, but not so *expressing* it. As to the Latins, we shall find none of them (at least I have not observed any) coming into that way of expression before Ambrose[x] and Faustinus[y], (in the years 381 and 384,) who are the first that use it, and that but once, or very sparingly; not repeating and inculcating it, like the Athanasian Creed, nor leaving it destitute of explication. But St. Austin, afterwards, in his books of the *Trinity*, in the fifth especially, enlarges in justification of this rule of expression, and is full and copious upon it. His proofs, illustrations, example, and authority gave new strength and credit to this *rule*, which might then pass current, and become fit to appear, without further explication, in a Creed. For this reason, principally, I incline to think that this Creed was not made before St. Austin's books of the Trinity were *public*, (which was not till 416,) or not before 420, or thereabout, to allow some time for his works to be read, considered, approved, and to gain a general esteem. If it be said, that St. Austin might as well copy from this Creed as the Creed from him; I say, no: for the reason is different. Creeds and other the like formularies, which are to be put into every one's hands, and spread round

[u] Τριῶν ἀπείρων ἄπειρον συμφυΐαν. *Nazianz. in Bapt. Orat.* xl. p. 668.

[x] Ergo sanctus Pater, sanctus Filius, sanctus et Spiritus Sanctus: sed *non tres Sancti*, quia unus est Deus sanctus, unus est Dominus. Una est etenim vera sanctitas, sicut una est vera divinitas, una illa vera sanctitas naturalis. *Ambros. de Sp. S.* lib. iii. c. 16. p. 688.

[y] Sed *ne duos omnipotentes* intelligas, prævacendum est: licet enim et Pater sit omnipotens, et Filius, tamen *unus est omnipotens*, sicut et unus est Deus: quia Patris et Filii eadem omnipotentia est, sicut et eadem deitas &c.—— Ostenditur Unitas divinitatis in Patre et Filio, sicut et *omnipotentiæ*, et quicquid omnino *divinæ substantiæ* est; hoc solo differens a Patre Filius, quod ille Pater est, et hic Filius. *Faustin. de Trinit.* c. 3. p. 123, 124.

about, ought not to contain any thing till it has been maturely weighed, long considered, and fully explained, as well as proved, and *generally* acknowledged by the churches of Christ. It is therefore much more reasonable to believe that St. Austin's writings should go first, and a *general* approbation of them in that particular; and then the Creed might conveniently follow, the way being now opened for it[z].

I may observe the like of another article of the Athanasian Creed; namely, the *procession from the Son:* a doctrine entertained indeed both by Greeks and Latins, (as may appear by the testimonies commonly cited for that purpose,) and expressed frequently *in sense*, though rarely *in terms;* but such as came not to be much inculcated or insisted upon, till St. Austin undertook to assert and clear it, and to render it less liable to any dispute hereafter. For which reason the modern Greeks have looked upon him, in a manner, as the *Father* of that doctrine, being at least the principal man that brought it into vogue; however weakly they may pretend that he *invented* it. Thus far is certain, that his elaborate arguments, and solid proofs from *Scripture*, of the truth and of the importance of the doctrine, made it pass the more readily; and gave it credit and authority enough to have a place in a standing Creed or Confession: which is to me another argument of the Creed's being made after St. Austin's writings were well known in the world; in that place, at least, where the Creed was made. From the premises then I presume to infer, that the Athanasian Creed is not earlier than the year 420.

I will next endeavour to shew, that it cannot reasonably be set lower than the Eutychian times, nor later than the Council of Chalcedon, or than the year 451: and this also I shall attempt from the *internal characters* of the Creed, in like manner as above.

1. There is not a word in the Creed directly and plainly expressing *two natures* in Christ, or excluding *one nature:* which

[z] Combefis, speaking to this point, seemed inclinable to suppose that St. Austin had borrowed from the Creed; but correcting himself afterwards, he supposes rather that the Creed borrowed from him. His words are these: "Ejus Symboli, seu Formulæ Fidei, "antiquitatem produnt illi ejus versi- "culi quos totidem verbis habet Au- "gust. in libris de Trinitate et alibi, "quos non aliunde desumpsisse vi- "deatur quam ex eo Symbolo—— "Quanquam nihil vetat dicere ipsum "potius Symboli auctorem ex Augus- "tino, aliisque P. P. sua consarci- "nasse." *Combefis. not. in Man. Calec. Auctar.* tom. ii. p. 296.

critical terms, against the error of Eutyches, are very rarely or never omitted in the Creeds drawn up in the Eutychian times, or the times immediately following. It is true, there is, in the Athanasian Creed, what may be sufficient to obviate or preclude the Eutychian heresy; as there is also in the *larger* Creed of Epiphanius, A. D. 373, and in the works of Nazianzen and Ambrose, about the year 380; and in Pelagius's Creed, A. D. 417; and in the writings of Austin, and Vincentius of Lirins, both before the year 435, many years before Eutyches. The strongest expression of the Creed against the Eutychians, and which has been most frequently urged in this case, is, *Unus omnino, non confusione substantiæ, sed unitate Personæ: One altogether, not by confusion of substance, but by unity of Person:* which yet is used by Vincentius[a], and by Austin[b] too almost in *terms*. And if this be no reason for making either of those authors, or the tracts ascribed to them, later than Eutyches; why shall the like expression be of any force in respect to the Athanasian Creed? There is nothing in the Creed but what was common and ordinary in Catholic writers before the Eutychian times: but there are wanting those *critical*, distinguishing terms of *two natures*, or *one nature*, necessary to be inserted in the Creeds after these times, and never, or very rarely, omitted; which is one reason, and a very considerable one, for setting the date of the Creed higher than 451.

2. Another argument of the same thing, near akin to the former, is, that this Creed makes no mention of Christ being *consubstantial with us* in one nature, as he is *consubstantial* with the *Father* in another: a tenet expressly held by some of the ecclesiastical writers before Eutyches's time: but seldom or never omitted in the Creeds or Confessions about that time, or after. To be convinced of the truth both of this and of the preceding article, one need but look into the Creeds and Formularies of those times: namely, into that of Turribius of Spain in 447, of Flavian of Constantinople, as also of Pope Leo in 449, of the Chalcedon Council in 451, of Pope Felix III. in 485, and Anastasius II. in 496, and of the Church of Alexandria in the same year: as also into those of Pope Hormisdas, and the

[a] Unus autem, non——divinitatis et humanitatis confusione, sed—— unitate Personæ. *Vincent. Lirin.* c. 19. p. 58.

[b] Idem Deus qui homo; *non confusione* naturæ, *sed unitate Personæ*. *August.* tom. v. p. 885.

churches of Syria, and Fulgentius, and the Emperor Justinian, and Pope John II. and Pope Pelagius I. within the sixth century. In all which we shall find either *express* denial of *one nature*, or express affirming of *two natures*, or the doctrine of Christ's *consubstantiality* with us, or all three together, though they are all omitted in the Athanasian Creed. This is to me a second reason for setting our Creed higher than the Eutychian times.

3. I may argue this point further from a passage of the Athanasian Creed, running thus: "One, not by conversion of the "Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the manhood into God." This would not, I conceive, have run in these words, or in this manner, in the Eutychian times. For though the Eutychians were sometimes (as well as the Apollinarians often) charged with the doctrine of a *conversion of the Godhead into flesh*; yet nothing more certain than that the generality of them absolutely disowned and detested any such tenet, teaching rather *a conversion of the manhood into God*, just the reverse. And, by the way, I would here offer it to the learned reader to consider, whether we may not from hence give a probable account of a very noted *variation* observable in many of the most ancient copies of this Creed, which run thus; *Unus autem, non conversione divinitatis in carne, sed assumptione humanitatis in Deo:* where there is *carne* for *carnem*, and *Deo* for *Deum*. A slight alteration in the words, but a very great one in the sense. A change of the Godhead *in the flesh* the Eutychians admitted, by making the *two natures* become *one;* though they allowed not a change *into flesh:* so that by this little alteration of *carne* for *carnem*, the Creed would strike more directly at the Eutychian principles. Then again as to *Deum*, if that reading was to stand, the Creed, instead of confuting the Eutychians, would seem rather to favour them; for they taught that the *manhood* was *assumed into God*, and that in so literal and strict a sense as really to become *God*, or to be absorbed and lost in the divine nature, both natures becoming one *divine* nature. Such a construction might the words of the Creed be liable to. But put *Deo* for *Deum*, and it is entirely defeated: for then the sense is not that the manhood is assumed *into God*, but that God assumed the human nature; which is true, and not liable to any such misconstruction as the other. However this be, as to the variation of the copies, and the reason here assigned for it, (which I offer

only as a probable conjecture to be further inquired into,) yet this is certain, that these words of the Creed, according to the common copies, are not so cautiously or accurately chosen as they might or would have been, had the Creed been drawn up after the Eutychian times.

4. A fourth argument may be drawn from the *similitude* in the Creed, running thus: "As the reasonable soul and flesh is "one man; so God and man is one Christ." This familiar and easy comparison was much made use of by the Catholics, down from the Apollinarian times to the time of Eutyches: by Nazianzen, Austin, Vincentius, Claudianus Mamertus, and others. But no sooner did the Eutychians wrest the comparison to their own sense, pleading for *one nature* in Christ, like as soul and body make *one nature* in man, but the Catholics grew strangely averse to the *similitude*, and rarely made use of it: or when they did, it was either to dispute against it, and condemn it, or else to guard and qualify it with proper cautions and restrictions. Wherefore it is by no means probable that this *similitude* would have been inserted, at such a time, in a Catholic Creed, and there left without guard or caution, for the Eutychians to make an ill use of. This fourth argument I take from the learned and acute Le Quien, whose words may be seen in the margin[c]. And may we not from hence give a probable guess at the reason why the ancient manuscript of Treves, and the Colbertine copied from it, have entirely omitted this *similitude*, throwing in a few words, both before and after, to salve the breach in some measure, and to preserve a connection: which shews that it was no casual omission, but made with design. But I pass on.

These reasons convince me that the Creed was not made so late as the Council of Chalcedon, but before the year 451. It cannot therefore be ascribed to Vigilius Tapsensis in the year 484: not to mention that the *phraseology* of it agrees not with that writer's usual manner of expression, as Le Quien hath

[c] Quod quidem *simile*, quo *theologus* etiam, aliique patres Apollinaristas confutarunt, tanti posthac non fecerunt insequentis seu quinti sæculi desinentis Doctores, ut illud in Expositione Fidei insererent; cum Monophysitæ, Severo præsertim duce, eo vehementius contra Catholicos *pugnarent*, ut *unam* in Christo *naturam* esse ex Deitate et humanitate compositam evincerent. Quinimo omnes ingenii vires explicare coacti sunt, ut varias discrepantias reperirent inter unionem Deitatis cum humanitate in Christo, et unionem animæ cum corpore in homine. *Le Quien, Dissert. Damasc.* p. 10. Confer. Petav. Dogm. Theol. tom. v. lib. iii. cap. 9, 10, &c.

observed [d]. Besides that the principal reasons, on which Quesnel rested his opinion in regard to that author, are now found to have been grounded on a false presumption of certain works being Vigilius's which are none of his [e]. And I may add, that to me there does not appear in Vigilius's pieces any thing of that strength, closeness, and acuteness, which we find in the Athanasian Creed.

But I proceed to shew that this Creed is earlier than even the times of Nestorius, or the Ephesine Council of the year 431. It is certain that this Creed does not condemn the Nestorian heresy in such full, direct, critical terms, as the Catholics found to be necessary against the wiles and subtilties of those men. There is not a word of *the mother of God*, or of *one Son* only, in opposition to *two Sons*, or of *God's* being *born, suffering, dying:* which kind of expressions the Creeds are full of after Nestorius's times, and after the Council of Ephesus, to guard the more certainly against *equivocations*, and to express the Catholic doctrine in strong terms, such as could not be eluded. As to what the Athanasian Creed really does express, and is conceived to strike directly at the Nestorian heresy; it is demonstration that the words are not more full, or expressive, than may be found in elder Creeds, and in the Fathers that wrote against the Apollinarians and others, before ever Nestorius was heard of [f]. I know not how to give my reader a clear and just idea of this whole matter, but by setting down in chronological order the doctrine of the *Incarnation*, as expressed in Catholic writings from the Apollinarian times down to the Nestorian, from the year 373 to the year 431. One thing only I would remark beforehand, to make the following account the clearer, that the

[d] Sunt qui suspicentur expositionem istam fidei fuisse concinnatam a Vigilio Tapsensi, qui scripsisse existimatur libros tres contra Varimadum Arianum: sed ab illorum opinione me deterruit versus iste, *Unus omnino, non confusione substantiæ, sed unitate Personæ.* Nam Vigilius in libris quinque contra Eutychem nusquam *unitatem Personæ* dicit, sed passim, et frequentissime *unionem Personæ*—— Cumque variæ supersint hodie Vigilii Tapsensis Confessiones Fidei de Trinitate et incarnatione, nulla earum similitudo et convenientia cum Symbolo Athanasiano, quoad stylum animadvertitur. *Le Quien, Dissert. Damasc.* p. 9.

[e] Vid. Montf. Diatrib. p. 724. Anthelm. Disquis. p. 33, 34.

[f] Le Quien is beforehand with me in the observation, whose words I may here cite:

"Nec cuiquam negotium facessat, "quod Nestorii et Eutychis hæreses "ea (*Formula*) prius pessundatæ es- "sent, quam ipsarum autores emer- "gerent: alibi siquidem ostensum fuit "SS. Patres, qui contra Apollinarium "calamum strinxerant, disertissimis "etiam verbis amborum impietates "proscripsisse." *Le Quien, Dissert. Damasc.* p. 9.

Apollinarians really held a doctrine very near akin to that which afterwards was called Eutychian; and they maliciously charged the Catholics with that very doctrine which was afterwards called Nestorian: so that the Catholics, in their charge upon the Apollinarians, condemned the Eutychian doctrine long before Eutyches; and, in their defence of themselves, they also condemned the Nestorian tenets before Nestorius. I shall first justify the truth of this remark in both its parts, and then shall proceed further to what I intend.

As to the first part, that the Apollinarians held a doctrine very near akin to that which was afterwards called Eutychian, it is a thing so well known, that I need not cite many testimonies for it. It was one of the commonest charges against the Eutychians, that they had revived the heresy of the Apollinarians[g] in some considerable branches of it: Petavius briefly shews what those branches were[h].

As to the other part of my remark, that the Apollinarians charged the Catholics with the opposite extreme, afterward called Nestorian, that has not been so much observed, but is no less true than the other; as may abundantly appear from the testimonies in the margin[i]; besides others that will occur as we pass along. This also is observed by Le Quien in his Notes to Damascen[k], whereupon he rightly infers, that it will be a false

[g] Eutyches——per impios veterum hæreticorum volutatus errores, tertium Apollinaris dogma delegit; ut negata humanæ carnis atque animæ veritate, totum Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum *unius* asserat esse *naturæ*, tanquam *verbi* Deitas ipsa se in carnem animamque converterit. *Leon. Epist.* xcvii. p. 633. Quesnel. ed. confer Ep. 134. p. 699.

[h] Sane cum et multiplex, et ab autore suo interpolata sæpius Apollinaris hæresis fuerit, ut capite sexto docuimus; ea parte cum isto consensit Eutyches, qua carnem Christi non ex utero sumptam B. Virginis sed e cælo delapsam Apollinaris credidit: tum quatenus uterque *unicam naturam* asseveravit, et utriusque permistam ac confusam substantiam. *Petav. Dogmat. Theol.* tom. v. lib. i. c. 16. p. 37.

[i] Neque vero *alium* Jesum Christum, *alium* Verbum dicimus, ut *nova hæresis calumniatur*, sed eundem, et ante sæcula, et post sæcula, et ante mundum et post Mariam; imo, ex Maria magnum Deum appellamus. *Hieronym. in Tit.* cap. 3. p. 431.

Qui Apollinarii dogmata defendunt, per querimoniam quam adversus nos faciunt sua confirmare conantur, carnale Verbum et Dominum sæculorum, hominis Filium immortalem Filii Deitatem construentes. Proferunt enim quod aliqui quasi Ecclesiæ Catholicæ existentes, *duos* colunt *Filios* in dogmate; unum quidem secundum naturam, alterum autem secundum adoptionem postea acquisitam; nescio a quo talia audientes——nondum enim novi eum qui hæc subloquitur. *Gregor. Nyssen. cit. Concil. V. Collat.* vi. p. 106. Harduin. Vid. etiam Ambros. de Incarn. c. 7. p. 721. Athanas. Epist. ad Epictet. p. 907.

[k] Le Quien, Not. in Damascen. vol. i. p. 95.

conclusion to argue that such or such writings must belong to the Nestorian times, only because of their treating of an *unity* of *Person* in Christ.

These things premised, I now proceed to lay down the doctrine of the *incarnation*, as expressed in Catholic writers from the year 373 down to the year 431, inclusive.

I begin with the larger Creed of Epiphanius, which sets forth the *incarnation* in the following terms:

373. "The Word was made flesh, not by undergoing any "change, nor by converting his Godhead into manhood, but by "co-uniting it into his one holy perfection and Godhead. For "there is *one Lord Jesus Christ*, and not *two*; the same he is "God, the same he Lord, the same he King[l]."

Here we may observe that the Creed guards, just as the Athanasian does, against the two extremes; against the Apollinarian notion of the Godhead being converted into flesh, and against the Apollinarian calumny that the Catholics made *two Christs* instead of one.

380. Gregory Nazianzen, not long after, expresses himself in terms to the like effect: "We divide not the man from the "Godhead, but we make them one and the same (*Person*)—— "If any one imagines Mary not to be the *mother of God*, he has "no part with God.——If any man introduces *two Sons*, one of "God and the Father, and a *second* of the Virgin-mother, and "not one and the same him, let him forfeit the adoption of sons "promised to true believers. For God and man are indeed *two* "*natures*, like as *soul* and *body*: but they are not *two Sons*, nor "(two) Gods[m]."

Here again we find the Nestorian tenets very fully obviated, while Nazianzen is answering the Apollinarian calumny against the Catholics: and at the same time, the Eutychian heresy (afterwards so called) is as plainly precluded, while Nazianzen

[l] Ὁ γὰρ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, οὐ τροπὴν ὑποστὰς, οὐδὲ μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θεότητα εἰς ἀνθρωπότητα· εἰς μίαν συνενώσαντα ἑαυτοῦ ἁγίαν τελειότητά τε καὶ θεότητα· εἷς γάρ ἐστιν Κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς καὶ οὐ δύο, ὁ αὐτὸς Θεὸς, ὁ αὐτὸς Κύριος, ὁ αὐτὸς Βασιλεύς. *Epiph. Ancor.* p. 124. *Petav.*

[m] Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον χωρίζομεν τῆς θεότητος, ἀλλ' ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δογματίζομεν.—— εἴ τις οὐ θεοτόκον τὴν Μαρίαν ὑπολαμβάνει, χωρὶς ἐστὶ τῆς θεότητος.—— εἴ τις εἰσάγει δύο υἱοὺς ἕνα μὲν τὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς, δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἐκ τῆς μητρὸς, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ τῆς υἱοθεσίας ἐκπέσοι τῆς ἐπηγγελμένης τοῖς ὀρθῶς πιστεύουσι. Φύσεις μὲν γὰρ δύο Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, υἱοὶ δὲ οὐ δύο, οὐδὲ θεοί. *Gregor. Nazianz. ad Cledon. Ep.* i. p. 738, 739.

is laying down the Church's faith in *two natures* against the Apollinarians, who made but one.

382. Ambrose, in like manner, confutes the Apollinarians without naming them. "We ought also to condemn those who, in "another extreme, teach not one and the same Son of God, but "that he who is begotten of God the Father is *one*, and he that "is generated of the Virgin *another:* when the Evangelist saith, "that *the Word was made flesh*, to instruct us that there is but "*one Lord Jesus*, not *two*.—There are others risen up who pre-"tend that our Lord's flesh and Godhead are both of *one nature*. "——And when they say that THE WORD was converted into "flesh, hairs, blood, and bones, and changed from its own nature; "after such a pretended change of the divine nature, they may "take the handle to wrest any thing to the weakness of the God-"head, which belongs to the infirmity of the flesh [n]."

Ambrose seems here to intimate as if there were really some at that time who had run into that very error which the Apollinarians charged upon the Catholics, and which was afterwards called Nestorian. However that be, he condemns it in the name of the Catholics; as he condemns also the Apollinarian extreme, which afterwards became Eutychian. There is another passage of Ambrose cited by Theodoret, seemingly so full and express against the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies, that one can hardly be persuaded to think it really Ambroes's. But, on the other hand, it appears to be so well attested, that the late learned editor of Ambrose could not but yield to place it among his genuine works. Tom. ii. p. 729.

417. There is a Creed of Pelagius (as learned men now agree) inserted among the works both of Jerome [o] and Austin [p]. It was made several years before the Nestorian controversy. Our learned Dr. Wall has translated it into English [q], subjoining some excellent notes of his own to it: I shall transcribe as much

[n] Et illos condemnare debemus qui adversa erroris linea, non unum eundemque Filium Dei dicunt, sed *alium* esse qui ex Deo Patre natus sit, *alium* qui sit generatus ex virgine; cum Evangelista dicat quia *Verbum caro factum est*, ut *unum* Dominum Jesum *non duos* crederes——emergunt alii qui carnem Domini dicant et divinitatem *unius* esse *naturæ*—— Deinde, cum isti dicant quia *Verbum* in *carnem*, capillos, sanguinem, et ossa *conversum* est, et a natura propria mutatum est, datur illis locus ut infirmitatem carnis ad infirmitatem Divinitatis, quadam facta divinæ naturæ mutatione, detorqueant. *Ambros. de Incarn.* c. 6.

[o] Hieronym. Oper. tom. v. p. 123. Bened. ed.

[p] Augustin. Oper. tom. v. Append. p. 388.

[q] Wall's History of Infant Baptism, p. 200.

as is to our purpose. "We do in such manner hold that there "is in Christ one Person of the Son, as that we say there are "in him two perfect and entire substances, [*or natures,*] viz. of "the Godhead and of the manhood, which consists of body and "soul.——We do abhor —— the blasphemy of those who go "about by a new interpretation to maintain that since the time "of his taking flesh, all things pertaining to the divine nature "did pass into the man, [*or manhood,*] and so also that all things "belonging to the human nature were transferred into God, "[*or the divine nature.*] From whence would follow, (a thing "no heresy ever offered to affirm,) that both substances, [*or "natures,*] viz. of the divinity and humanity, would by this con-"fusion seem to be extinguished, and to lose their proper state, "and be changed into another thing: so that they who own in "the Son an imperfect God and imperfect man, are to be ac-"counted not to hold truly either God or man."

Dr. Wall hereupon judiciously remarks, that "there wanted "only the accuracy of speaking, which Pelagius had here used, "to clear and settle the dispute between the Nestorians and "Eutychians." I would remark further, that if Pelagius's Creed, in the year 417, had so plainly obviated both the Nestorian and Eutychian heresy, before Nestorius or Eutyches was known; it may easily be conceived that the Athanasian Creed might do the same thing, at or about the same time.

422. I might next shew how St. Austin likewise has expressed himself in as strong terms against both those heresies, as the Athanasian Creed has done: but, because I shall have another occasion to cite the passages, where I draw out a select number of expressions *parallel* to those of the Creed; I may spare myself the trouble of doing it here.

426. I might go on to observe what passed in the case of Leporius, a man of the same principles, in the main, with Nestorius, but some years before him. His recantation treatise, (Libellus Satisfactionis,) supposed to be drawn up by St. Austin in the year 426, would furnish me with many full and strong expressions against the Nestorian principles, beyond any to be met with in the Athanasian Creed; so that there is no just argument to be drawn from any expressions in that Creed, for setting it so low as the Nestorian times.

431. I shall conclude this account with the recital of a Creed made about the same time, or in the same year that the Council

of Ephesus was held against Nestorius. It is the Creed of John, Patriarch of Antioch, approved by Cyril of Alexandria, and thought sufficient to wipe off all suspicion of *Nestorianism* from the author of it. It runs thus: "We confess then that Jesus "Christ our Lord, the only begotten Son of God, is *perfect God* "*and perfect man,* of a *reasonable* soul and body; *born of the* "*Father before the worlds, as touching his Godhead*; the *same* "also in the end of days, for us and for our salvation, (*born*) of "the Virgin Mary, as *touching his manhood*, consubstantial with "us according to his manhood. But there was an union made "of *two natures,* on which account we profess *one Christ*, one "Lord, *one Son.* Conformable to this sense of an union without "confusion, we acknowledge the holy Virgin as *mother of God*, "because that God the *Word* was incarnate and made man, "and from the very conception united to himself a temple which "he had taken of her[r]."

Here we may observe several expressions nearly resembling those of the Athanasian Creed; but withal several others more *particular* and *explicit* against the Nestorian principles than that Creed is: *one Son*, and him *consubstantial with us*, in respect of his manhood; the Virgin, *mother of God*, and the like. Such is the constant strain and tenor of the Creeds, and Confessions, and Catholic writings, treating of the *incarnation*, at this time and after: as might be shewn at large from Cassian about 431, and Vincentius in the year 434, and from Flavian, and Pope Leo I. and others before the Council of Chalcedon. We have therefore very great reason to believe, that the Athanasian Creed was drawn up either before the Nestorian controversy had made much noise in the world, or at least before the compiler had notice of it. The sum then of my argument is this; there is nothing in the Athanasian Creed but what might have been said, and had been said by Catholic writers before the time of Nestorius: but the Creed wants many of those *particular* and *critical*

[r] Confitemur igitur Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, Filium Dei unigenitum, *Deum perfectum et hominem perfectum*, ex anima rationali et corpore; ante sæcula quidem ex Patre natum secundum Deitatem: in fine vero dierum *eundem* propter nos et propter nostram salutem de Maria Virgine secundum humanitatem, *consubstantialem nobis* secundum humanitatem. *Duarum* vero *naturarum* unitio facta est; propter quam *unum Christum*, unum Dominum, *unum Filium* confitemur. Secundum hunc inconfusæ unionis intellectum, confitemur sanctam Virginem *Dei genitricem*, propter quod *Deus Verbum* incarnatus est et inhumanatus, et ex ipsa conceptione subimet univit templum quod ex ipsa suscepit. *Johan. Antioch. Harduin.* tom. i. p. 1558.

expressions, which came into use after that time: therefore, since the *internal* characters of the Creed suit exactly with the Apollinarian times, and not with the Nestorian, it ought to be placed somewhere between Apollinarius and Nestorius, not lower than 430, or 431 at the utmost. And it is some confirmation of what hath been said, that Venantius Fortunatus, who lived in the Eutychian times, and commented upon this Creed about the year 570, as before observed, yet in his comment takes not the least notice of any part of this Creed being opposed to the errors of Nestorius or Eutyches, but only to those elder heresies of Sabellius, Arius, and Apollinarius; whom he specially makes mention of. I persuade myself therefore, that this Creed ought not to be placed lower than 430, or thereabout; and I have before shewn why it should not be set higher than 420; so that now we have brought it within the compass of ten years; where we may let it rest a while, till we consider further what *place*, or *country*, the Creed was most probably composed in; which may help us to settle the time of its date within somewhat stricter and narrower limits than before.

There is great reason to believe that this Creed was made in Gaul. The considerations which persuade us thereto are these following. 1. Its early reception in the Gallican Church, so far as appears, before all other churches. 2. The great esteem and regard *anciently* paid to it by the Gallican Councils and Bishops[s]. 3. The Creed's being first admitted into the Gallican Psalter, and first received in those countries where that Psalter was received, as in Spain, Germany, and England. As the Gallican churches delivered their Psalter to other churches, so is it reasonable to believe that the Creed was received from them likewise. 4. The oldest *version* we hear of is Gallican, in the time of Hincmar. 5. The oldest authors that make mention of it are likewise Gallican: for proof of which I refer to the *ancient testimonies* above. 6. The first that cite the words of it (as it seems) are likewise Gallican. I will here mention two; Avitus of Vienne in Gaul[t], and Cæsarius of Arles[u]: I have set their

[s] Tanti namque apud Gallos Symbolum hoc fuit ut una cum Symbolo Apostolorum memoriæ commendari Presbyteris præcipiat Hincmarus idem in capitulis, *clericis omnibus* Synodus Augustodunensis. *Sirmond. Oper.* vol. ii. p. 978. Conf. Anthelm. p. 30.

[t] The words of Avitus Viennensis, who was Bishop in 490, died in 523. De divinitate Spiritus Sancti, quem *nec factum* legimus, *nec creatum, nec genitum*——Nos vero Spiritum discimus *ex Patre et Filio procedere*—— Sicut est proprium Spiritui Sancto *a*

words in the margin. 7. The oldest commentator upon it, though an Italian by birth and education, had yet travelled into France, and was at length Bishop of Poictiers. 8. The *number* and *antiquity* of the manuscripts of this Creed found in France confirm the same thing: which has made several very learned men subscribe to this opinion[v], that the Athanasian Creed came first from Gaul. And it is certain, that no other country or church in the world has so fair, I may now say, so *clear* a pretence to it: many circumstances concur to make good their title, as we have already seen; and more will appear in my next chapter, when I come to inquire who was the *author*.

Let it be allowed then, for the present, that our Creed was originally Gallican, and made between 420 and 430: we may next consider, whether we cannot come a little nearer towards fixing the time of its composition. We must point out some season when St. Austin's works were known, and studied, and well esteemed of in Gaul; and when the circumstances of the place might the most probably give occasion for the compiling such a Creed. Now it is observable that about the year 426 St. Austin held a very close and intimate correspondence with

Patre Filioque procedere, istud Fides Catholica etiamsi renuentibus non persuaserit, in suæ tamen Disciplinæ Regula non excedit. *Sirmond. Op. Vid. Le Quien, Panopl. contr. Schism. Græc.* p. 241.

Non nisi ex eodem Symbolo, quod jam ante *receptum* esset, Avitus Viennensis alicubi scribebat De Divinitate Sp. S. &c. *Le Quien, Dissert. Damascen.* p. 98.

[u] The words of Cæsarius, who was Bishop in 503, died in 543.

Rogo et admoneo vos, fratres carissimi, ut *Quicunque vult salvus esse, Fidem* rectam et *Catholicam* discat, *firmiter teneat, inviolatamque conservet.*——*Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus et Spiritus Sanctus: sed tamen non tres Dii, sed unus Deus. Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus Sanctus.* Attamen credat unusquisque fidelis quod *Filius æqualis est Patri secundum divinitatem, et minor est Patre secundum humanitatem* carnis, quam de nostro assumpsit. *Cæsar. Arelat. apud August. Op.* tom. v. App. p. 399.

N. B. The editors of St. Austin adjudge this to Cæsarius; as does also Oudinus. *Comment. de Script. Eccl.* vol. i. p. 1348.

[v] Cæterum cum ex allatis supra testimoniis videatur in Galliis primum celebrari cœpisse hoc Symbolum, haud abs re conjectant eruditi viri, in Galliis illud fuisse elucubratum. Quod idem forte suadeat antiquissimus ille in Galliis et in Anglia mos Symboli alternatim concinendi; itemque MSS. Gallicanorum copia et antiquitas. *Montfauc. Diatrib.* p. 726.

E Gallis primum prodiisse Symbolum Athanasianum animadvertimus, tum quod a Gallis scriptoribus ante omnes celebratum, a synodis episcopisque Galliarum receptum, et commendatum antiquitus fuerit, tum etiam quod Treviris in Galliarum metropoli illud lucubratum fuisse opinio increbuerit. Quapropter Pithœus, ac Vossius, aliique eruditissimi viri Gallum hominem Symboli parentem opinati sunt; Antelmius vero, hac potissimum ratione ductus, non Vigilium in Africa Episcopum, sed Vincentium Lirinensem opusculi hujus auctorem affirmavit. *Lud. Murator.* tom. ii. p. 229.

the Gallican churches. Leporius had for some time spread false doctrine in Gaul, chiefly relating to the *incarnation*. His heresy was much the same with what Nestorius's was afterwards. The Gallican bishops censured him; and he was forced to quit his country, having given general offence to all there. He took his leave of Gaul, and passed over into Africa, with several others of the same party and principles: where lighting upon Aurelius, Bishop of Carthage, and St. Austin, he was by them brought to a sense of his error, and induced to sign a full recantation, called Libellus Satisfactionis; whereupon St. Austin, and Aurelius, and other African bishops became intercessors with the bishops of Gaul, in favour of Leporius, that he might be again received and restored by them. One can scarce imagine any more likely time, or more proper occasion, for the compiling such a Creed as the Athanasian is. All the lines and characters of it suit extremely well with the *place*, the *time*, the *occasion*, and other circumstances; which concur to persuade us that the Creed was, in all probability, composed in Gaul, some time between the year 426 and the year 430; so that now we are confined to the narrow compass of four or five years, upon the most probable conjecture, and upon such evidences as a case of this nature can admit of, where more cannot be expected.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Author of the Creed.

IF we have hitherto gone upon sure grounds about the *time* and *place*, we cannot long be at a loss for the *author* of this Creed. Who were the most considerable men, and best qualified for such a work, at that time in Gaul? Antelmius will point out Vincentius Lirinensis. But I have several reasons to persuade me that it was not, or could not be Vincentius. No contemporary of his, nor any ancient writer, ever gives the least hint of his composing such a work. Antelmius supposes it to be after his Commonitory, that is, after 434; which if it had been, we should undoubtedly have found the Creed more particular and explicit against the Nestorian heresy: we should have read in it *Mother of God, one Son* only, and something of *God's* being *born*, suffering, dying, or the like; it cannot therefore be justly ascribed to Vincentius. Not to mention, that

such a work appears to have been much fitter for a *bishop* of a church, than for a private *presbyter*; inasmuch as *bishops* generally were obliged to give an account of their faith, upon their first entrance upon the episcopate: and they had the privilege likewise of making Creeds, and Forms of Prayer, for their respective dioceses: for which reasons, *cæteris paribus*, this Creed ought rather to be ascribed to some *bishop* of that time than to an inferior presbyter. And who more likely to compose such a Creed than Hilary, Bishop of Arles, a celebrated man of that time, and of chief repute in the Gallican Church? His title to it will stand upon the following circumstances:

1. He was made Bishop in Gaul within the time mentioned, about the year 429. 2. He is allowed to have been a man of great parts and capacity, of a neat wit, and elegant style for the age he lived in; insomuch that Livius, a poet, and a celebrated writer of that time, did not scruple to say, that if Austin had come after Hilary, he would have been judged his *inferior*[x]. 3. Gennadius's character of Hilary's writings, that they were *small tracts*[y], but *extremely fine*, suits well with our present supposition: but what most of all confirms and strengthens it, is what Honoratus of Marseilles, the writer of his life, tells us; that Hilary composed an admirable exposition [Symboli Expositio ambienda] of the Creed[z]. He calls it an Exposition of the Creed, (not a Creed,) which is the proper *title* for it, and more proper than that of Symbolum, or Creed, which it now bears. And so we find that it was but very rarely called Symbolum by the ancients; once, I think, by Hincmar, and never after for several centuries:

[x] Quid plura dicam? Nisi dicendi pausa desuper eidem advenisset, sermonem finire non potuerat, tanta gratia exundante, et miraculo et stupore crescente, ut peritissimis desperationem tunc autoribus sæculi ejus inferret oratio: in tantum ut Livius temporis illius poeta, et autor insignis, publice proclamaret; *Si Augustinus post te fuisset, judicaretur inferior.* *Honoratus, in Vita S. Hilarii*, p. 740. edit. Quesnel.

[y] Ingenio vero immortali, aliqua et *parva* edidit, quæ *eruditæ animæ, et fidelis linguæ* indicio sunt; in quibus præcipue &c. *Gennad. de Hilario Arelat.* cap. lxix. p. 32.

[z] Gratia ejus ex his operibus, quæ eodem dicendi impetu concepit, genuit, ornavit, protulit, possit absque hæsitatione dignosci: Vita scilicet antistitis Honorati, Homiliæ in Totius Anni Festivitatibus expeditæ, Symboli Expositio ambienda, epistolarum vero tantus numerus, &c. *Honorat. Vit. Hilar.* p. 740.

N. B. There is some doubt whether Ravennius of Arles, successor to Hilary, or Honoratus of Marseilles be the author of this life: but there is good reason to ascribe it to the latter. See Quesnel, vol. ii. p. 730. and Antelmius, de veris Operibus Leon. M. p. 367.

and when it was, yet it was observed, by Thomas Aquinas, that that was not so proper a name for it, not being composed *per modum Symboli*, in the way of a Creed; as indeed it is not. What the more ancient and usual *titles* were may appear in one view in the tables above. Among others, we sometimes find the title of Expositio Catholicæ Fidei, or yet nearer, Expositio Symboli Apostolorum, An Exposition of the Apostles' Creed, which is as proper a title as any, and not unlike to this of Honoratus. 4. I may further observe, that this Hilary of Arles was a great admirer and follower of St. Austin[a], and had studied his writings; which may account for his often following St. Austin's thoughts in the compiling of the Creed, and sometimes his very *expressions;* and indeed forming the whole composition, in a manner, upon St. Austin's plan, both with respect to the *Trinity* and *Incarnation*. He did not indeed come heartily in to St. Austin's doctrine about Grace, Predestination, Free-will, &c. any more than the other Gallican bishops: but for other points, as Prosper observes, Hilary was entirely in Austin's sentiments. 5. Hence likewise we may account for the similitude of thoughts and expressions between Vincentius Lirinensis, and the author of the Creed; which Antelmius insists much upon to justify his ascribing it to Vincentius. Hilary and Vincentius were contemporaries and countrymen, both of the same monastery in the isle of Lerin, much about the same time: so that it is natural to suppose that they should fall into the like expressions, while treating on the same things; or that Vincentius might affect to copy from so great a man as Hilary, (first Abbot of Lerin, and then Archbishop of Arles,) when writing on the same subject. 6. As to the style of Hilary, though we have but little of his left to compare the Creed with, yet what there is answers very well to the idea one should have of a man that might be able to draw up such a piece. His life of the elder Honoratus, who was his predecessor in the see of Arles, is an excellent performance, and comes nothing short of the character he had raised for wit and eloquence. The style is clear and strong, short and sententious, abounding with anti-

[a] Unum eorum præcipuæ auctoritatis, et spiritualium studiorum virum, Sanctum Hilarium, Arelatensem Episcopum, sciat beatitudo tua *admiratorem*, sectatoremque in *aliis omnibus* tuæ esse doctrinæ: et de hoc quod in querelam trahit, jam pridem apud sanctitatem tuam sensum suum per literas velle conferre. *Prosper ad Augustin. Ep.* ccxxv. p. 825. Bened. ed.

theses, elegant turns, and manly strokes of wit. He does but touch a little, in that piece, upon the subject of the *Trinity*: so that one cannot from thence discover how he would have expressed himself upon that head. Only, that little there is there, is very like to a paragraph in the Athanasian Creed, both for turn and expression. Speaking of Honoratus, or rather to him, in the way of a rhetorical apostrophe, he observes[b] how clear and expressive he had been in his discourses concerning the *Trinity* in the *Godhead*; making the *Persons* distinct, but co-uniting them in *Glory*, *Eternity*, and *Majesty*. Which may remind us of the words of the Athanasian Creed, "there is *one* "*Person of the Father*, &c. but the Godhead of the Father, and "of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all one, *the Glory equal*, "*the Majesty coeternal*." However that be, this we may learn from it, how great a commendation it was, in Hilary's account, to be able to speak clearly and accurately upon the subject of the *Trinity*, and how ambitious he might be of so doing himself: and we know, from his *dying* instructions[c] to his friends about him, how much he had the subject at heart. These, I confess, are but little circumstances: yet they are of some weight along with others more considerable, and therefore ought not to be entirely omitted. What weighs most with me is, that he was, in his time, a man of the greatest authority in the Gallican Church[d], without whose advice, or privity at least, such a Creed would hardly have passed; and that he actually was the author of *such a work* as this is, and which must either be this, or else is lost. This Creed has been sometimes ascribed to the elder Hilary of Poictiers, though neither the *diction*, nor the *matter*,

[b] Quotidianus siquidem in sincerissimis tractatibus confessionis Patris, ac Filii, ac Spiritus Sancti testis fuisti: nec facile tam exerte, tam lucide quisquam de Divinitatis Trinitate disseruit, cum eam *Personis* distingueres, et gloriæ (*gloria*) æternitate, ac majestate sociares. *Hilar. Vit. Honorat.* p. 770. Quesnel. ed.

[c] Among which this is one, and the first.

Fidem Trinitatis immobiliter retinete. *Vit. Hilar.* p. 747.

[d] Quesnel quotes this eulogium of him, from Constantius Presbyter of the same time.

Illustrabatur hæc civitas Hilario sacerdote, multimoda virtute pretioso: erat enim *Fidei igneus torrens*, cælestis eloquii, et præceptionis divinæ operarius indefessus. *Quesnel*, p. 543.

To which may be added one line of his epitaph:

Gemma Sacerdotum, plebisque, orbisque Magister. *Quesnel, ibid.*

Tanta fuit ejus in dicendo vis, ut Silvius Eusebius, Domnulus, auctores coævi, admiratione succensi in hæc verba proruperint: *Non doctrinam, non eloquentiam, sed nescio quid super homines consecutum. Natal. Alexand.* sec. v. cap. 4. art 19. ex Honorati Vit. Hilar. cap. 11.

nor the *manner* of it look any thing like his; only, it seems, this Creed in one manuscript was found tacked to some pieces of that Hilary. I pretend not to draw any argument from hence in favour of our Hilary: though had the manuscript been a very ancient one, or copied from one that was, (neither of which appears,) I should have thought it of some moment; since the similitude of names might possibly have occasioned it.

Having considered such reasons as seem to favour the conjecture about Hilary of Arles; it will next be proper to consider also what may be objected against it.

1. It may be objected, that this Hilary lived to the year 449, saw the rise, progress, and condemnation of the Nestorian heresy, and the beginning at least of the Eutychian. May it not therefore be reasonably presumed that, had he been to compile a Confession of Faith, he would have made it more *full* and *particular* against both those heresies than I have supposed the Creed to be? To this I answer, that the objection would be of weight, if I supposed this Creed to have been made by him in the last years of his life: but as I take it to have been made a little after his entrance upon his episcopate, (to be a rule to his clergy all his time, as well as to satisfy his colleagues of his own orthodoxy,) the objection affects not me. Admit the Creed to have been drawn up by him about the year 429 or 430; and then it is just what it should be, exactly suited to the circumstances of time and place: and as to his enlarging or altering it afterwards, upon the rise of the two heresies, it might not be in his power when once gone out of his hands: nor would it be *necessary*, since both these heresies are sufficiently obviated in this Creed, though not so *explicitly* condemned as in many that came later.

2. It may be asked, how the author's name came to be so studiously concealed even by those that received and admired the Creed; and how it came to take at length the name of Athanasius, rather than of Hilary? I answer: this objection will equally lie against any other author assignable whatever, except Athanasius himself, whom we cannot, with any colour of reason, ascribe it to. It will be as easy to account for the studious concealment of the author's name, supposing it Hilary, as for any other, or perhaps easier. This Hilary had stoutly defended the rights of his see against Pope Leo's encroachments, in the matter of *appeals* and other branches of jurisdiction. This brought the

good man under disfavour and disrepute; as must happen to the best of men when they have persons of greater figure and authority than themselves to contend with, however righteous and clear their cause may be. Besides this, Hilary had entertained a dislike to some of St. Austin's prevailing doctrines about *grace*, growing much in vogue; so that St. Austin's more zealous disciples had a pique against him on that account, and had the less value for his name. The way then to have this Creed pass current, and make it generally received, was to stifle as much as possible the name of the author, and to leave it to stand by its own intrinsic worth and weight. As to the name of Athanasius, I take it to have come thus. Upon the revival of the Arian controversy in Gaul, under the influence of the Burgundian kings, it was obvious to call one side Athanasians, and the other side Arians; and so also to name the orthodox faith the Athanasian Faith, as the other Arian. This Creed therefore, being a summary of the orthodox and Catholic Faith, might in process of time acquire the name of the Athanasian Faith, or Fides Athanasii, in opposition to the contrary scheme, which might as justly be called Fides Arii, or the Arian Faith. The equivocalness of the *title* gave a handle to those that came after to understand it of a form of faith, *composed* by Athanasius; just as the equivocal title of Apostolical given to the Roman Creed occasioned the mistake about its being made by the Apostles. This appears to me the most probable account of the whole matter: and it is very much confirmed by what we see of several tracts, wrote in the fifth and sixth centuries dialogue-wise, where Athanasius is made the mouth of the Catholic side, and Arius of his party, and Photinus of his: not meaning that Athanasius, Arius, and Photinus were really the speakers in those conferences, but the readers were to understand the Athanasian, Arian, and Photinian principles, as being there fairly represented under those leading names.

3. If it be asked further, why this Creed was not cited during the Nestorian and Eutychian controversy, when there was so frequent occasion for it; I answer, partly because the Creed was not *particular* and *explicit* enough to have done much service; but chiefly, because the author had been eclipsed, and his reputation obscured by greater *names* than his, so that his authority had weighed little; and to produce it without a name would have signified less. This objection therefore, though it

might be of great force in the question about Athanasius, is of no weight at all against our present supposition about Hilary of Arles.

These are all the objections which to me occur: and they seem to be so far from weakening the grounds upon which I proceed, that they rather tend to strengthen and confirm them. And though I do not pretend to strict certainty about the *author* of the Creed; yet I persuade myself that none that have been hitherto named have any fairer, or so fair a claim to it as the man I have mentioned. Not Athanasius, nor Hilary of Poictiers, not Eusebius of Verceil, not Pope Anastasius I, nor any of that name; not Vincentius Lirinensis, nor Vigilius Tapsensis, nor Athanasius of Spire, nor Fortunatus, nor Bonifacius, nor any other that has been thought on. From the many conjectures heretofore advanced by learned men, one may perceive that it has been judged to be a thing worth the inquiring after: and as others have taken the liberty of naming such *author* or *authors* as to them appeared most likely to have made the Creed, so have I, in my turn, not scrupling to add one more to the number.

The sum then of what I have presumed to advance upon probable conjecture, in a case which will not admit of full and perfect evidence, is this: that Hilary, once Abbot of Lerins, and next Bishop of Arles, about the year 430 composed the Exposition of Faith which now bears the name of the Athanasian Creed. It was drawn up for the use of the Gallican clergy, and especially for the diocese or province of Arles. It was esteemed, by as many as were acquainted with it, as a valuable summary of the Christian Faith. It seems to have been in the hands of Vincentius, monk of Lerins, before 434, by what he has borrowed from it; and to have been cited in part by Avitus of Vienne, about the year 500, and by Cæsarius of Arles before the year 543. About the year 570, it became famous enough to be commented upon like the Lord's Prayer and Apostles' Creed, and together with them. All this while, and perhaps for several years lower, it had not yet acquired the name of the *Athanasian* Faith, but was simply styled the *Catholic Faith*. But before 670, Athanasius's admired name came in to recommend and adorn it; being in itself also an excellent system of the Athanasian principles of the *Trinity*[e] and *incarnation*, in

[e] Romanæ ego Ecclesiæ quasi Symbolum, incerto autore, existimem, hinc Athanasii dictum et putatum quod dilucide Catholicam, ipsamque Atha-

opposition chiefly to Arians, Macedonians, and Apollinarians. The name of the Faith of Athanasius, in a while, occasioned the mistake of ascribing it to him, as his composition. This gave it authority enough to be cited and appealed to as standard, in the disputes of the middle ages, between Greeks and Latins about the *procession:* and the same admired name, together with the intrinsic worth and value of the form itself, gave it credit enough to be received into the *public* Service in the western churches; first in France, next in Spain, soon after in Germany, England, Italy, and at length in Rome itself; while many other excellent Creeds drawn up in Councils, or recommended by Emperors, yet never arrived to any such honour and esteem as this hath done. The truly good and great author, (as I now suppose him,) though ill used by the then Pope of Rome, and not kindly treated, with respect to his memory, in after-ages, has nevertheless been the mouth of all the western churches, and some eastern too, for a long tract of centuries, in celebrating the glories of the coeternal Trinity. And so may he ever continue, till the Christian churches can find out (which they will not easily do) a juster, or sounder, or more accurate form of faith than this is.

CHAP. IX.

The Creed itself in the Original Language with Parallel Passages from the Fathers.

MY design in this chapter is,

1. To exhibit the Creed in its native language, that is, in Latin, according to the most ancient and most correct copies. The *various lections* will be placed at the bottom, under the Creed: the manuscripts therein referred to shall be denoted by such names or marks as appear above in the table of manuscripts.

2. Opposite to the Creed, in another column, I place *parallel* passages, selected from authors that lived and wrote before 430, principally from St. Austin: and this with design to enforce and illustrate my main argument before insisted on; namely,

nasii Fidem (de *Trinitate*, maxime) complecteretur; cujus inter Catholicos sic spectata fides, ut ejus communio velut tessera Catholici esset; censereturque ejus condemnatio ipsa Nicænæ et Catholicæ Fidei ejuratio; uti se res habuit in Liberio Romano antistite &c. *Combefis. not. in Calec. Nov. Auctar. Patr.* tom. ii. p. 296.

that the Creed contains nothing but what had been asserted, in as full and express words as any words of the Creed are, by Church writers before the time specified.

3. I subjoin under these, at the bottom of the page, some further select passages from Church writers before or after the time mentioned; partly to serve as *comments* upon some places of the Creed, and partly to shew how some writers of the fifth century, Vincentius especially, expressed themselves on the same heads, that the reader may from thence judge whether they appear *prior* to the Creed, or the Creed *prior* to them.

I ought to ask my English reader's pardon for this part; which he may please to pass over, and to go on to the next chapter, intended chiefly for his satisfaction, and to make him some amends for the present interruption: for my design in subjoining an English commentary is to serve much the same purposes with what is here intended by the Latin; though not all of them, but as many as the nature of the thing will allow.

FIDES CATHOLICA.

1. Quicumque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est ut teneat Catholicam Fidem.

2. Quam nisi quisque integram inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in æternum peribit.

Variantes Lectiones.

1. (*salvus esse*) esse salvus. Cod. Ambros. et Fortunat. in MS. Ambros.

2. (*quisque*) quis. Cod. Ambros. (*inviolatamque*) inviolabilemque. Cod. San-germ. (*absque dubio*) deest in Cod. Reg. Paris. (*in æternum peribit*) peribit in æternum. San-germ.

Loca parallela excerpta ex Variis; ante an. 430.

1. *Catholicæ disciplinæ majestate institutum est, ut accedentibus ad Religionem* Fides *persuadeatur* ante omnia. August. tom. viii. p. 64.

Hæc est Fides nostra, quoniam hæc est Fides recta, quæ etiam Catholica nuncupatur. Tom. viii. 729.

2. *Hæretici——Simplici Fide Catholica contenti esse nolunt; quæ* una *parvulis* salus *est.* August. tom. iv. p. 60.

Excerpta ex Patribus.

1. Credamus ergo fratres: hoc est *primum* præceptum, hoc est *initium* religionis et vitæ nostræ, fixum habere cor in *fide. August.* tom. v. p. 195.

2. Catholicorum hoc fere proprium, deposita sanctorum Patrum et commissa servare, damnare profanas novitates: et sicut dixit, et iterum dixit Apostolus: *si quis annunciaverit, præterquam quod acceptum est,* anathemare. *Vincent.* cap. xxxiv. p. 111.

3. Fides autem Catholica hæc est, ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate veneremur:

3. Νῦν δὲ δίδασκε τοσοῦτον εἰδέναι μόνον· μονάδα ἐν τριάδι, καὶ τριάδα ἐν μονάδι προσκυνουμένην, παράδοξον ἔχουσαν καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἕνωσιν. *Greg. Nazianz.* Orat. xxiii. p. 422.

4. Neque confundentes Personas, neque Substantiam separantes.

4. *Et hæc omnia nec* confuse *unum sunt, nec* disjuncte *tria sunt*. Augustin. tom. ii. p. 609.

5. Alia est enim Persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti.

5. *Impietatem Sabellii declinantes, tres Personas expressas sub proprietate distinguimus*— Aliam *Patris*, aliam *Filii*, aliam *Spiritus Sancti*— Personam. Pelagii Symbol. p. 274. apud Lambec. Catal. Bibl. Vindob.

6. Sed Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, una est Divinitas, æqualis Gloria, coæterna Majestas.

6. *Confutantes Arium, unam eandemque dicimus Trinitatis esse substantiam*. Pelag. Symb.

Patris, et Filii et Spiritus Sancti unam Virtutem, unam Substantiam, unam Deitatem, unam Majestatem, unam Gloriam. August. tom. viii. p. 744.

7. Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus Sanctus.

7. Qualis *est Pater secundum Substantiam*, talem *genuit Fi-*

3. Catholica Ecclesia unum Deum in Trinitatis plenitudine, et item Trinitatis æqualitatem in una Divinitate veneratur. *Vincent.* cap. xxii. et c. xviii.

4. Ut neque singularitas substantiæ Personarum confundat proprietatem, neque item Trinitatis distinctio unitatem separet Deitatis. *Vincent.* cap. 22.

5. Quia scilicet alia est Persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti. *Vincent.* cap. 19.

6. Sed tamen Patris et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti non alia et alia, sed una eademque natura. *Vincent.* cap. 19.

7. Qualis immensus est Pater, talis est et Filius, talis est Spiritus Sanctus. Et *Philastr. Hær.* li. p. 106. Conf. p. 178.

5. (*alia Filii*) alia *Persona* Filii. Cod. Ambros. item Fortunat. (*alia Spiritus*) alia *Persona* Sp. Sanct. Cod. Ambros.

6. (*coæterna*) Codd. nonnulli habent *et* coæterna. Deest *et* in Cod. Ambros. et in Fortunat. et Brunon. aliisque multis.

7. (*talis et Spiritus Sanctus.*) Ita Codd. Ambros. Reg. Paris. C.C.C.C.C. 1. Cotton. 1. Jacob. 1. Fortunat. item Cæsarius Arelat. antiquissimus. MSS. recentiores, et editi omittunt *et*.

lium: et Spiritus Sanctus—es ejusdem et ipse Substantiæ cum Patre et Filio. Faustini Fid.

8. Increatus Pater, increatus Filius, increatus et Spiritus Sanctus.

8. *Quicquid* ad seipsum *dicitur Deus, et de singulis personis* singulariter *dicitur, et simul de ipsa Trinitate.* August. tom. viii. p. 838.

9. Immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus et Spiritus Sanctus.

9. *Magnus Pater, magnus Filius, magnus Spiritus Sanctus.* August. tom. viii. p. 837.

10. Æternus Pater, æternus Filius, æternus et Spiritus Sanctus.

10. *Hoc et de* bonitate, *et de* æternitate, *et de* omnipotentia *Dei dictum sit.* August. ibid. p. 839.

Æternus Pater, coæternus Filius, coæternus Spiritus Sanctus. August. tom. v. p. 543.

11. Et tamen non tres æterni, sed unus æternus.

12. Sicut non tres increati, nec tres immensi, sed unus increatus, et unus immensus.

12. *Non tamen tres magni, sed unus magnus.* Aug. tom. viii. p. 837.

13. Similiter, Omnipotens

13. *Itaque Omnipotens Pater,*

8. (*et Spiritus Sanctus.*) Deest vocula *et* in recentioribus codicibus: retinent plerique *antiquiores* hoc in loco, et similiter in subsequentibus, ante *Spiritus Sanctus.* Quæ lectio, opinor, vera est, ab autore Symboli profecta; scilicet, ad majorem emphasim, propter hæresim Macedonianam nondum penitus exstinctam, nostrum autem est Symbolum exhibere quale se primitus habuit.

12. (*unus increatus, et unus immensus.*) Unus immensus et unus increatus. Cod. Ambros.

8. Illud præcipue teneamus, quicquid *ad se* dicitur præstantissima illa et divina sublimitas, *substantialiter* dici; quod autem *ad aliquid* non *substantialiter*, sed *relative:* tantamque vim esse *ejusdem substantiæ* in Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, ut quicquid de singulis ad seipsos dicitur, non *pluraliter* in summa, sed *singulariter* accipiatur. *Augustin.* tom. viii. p. 837.

12. Nec magnos tres dicimus, sed magnum unum, quia non participatione magnitudinis Deus magnus est, sed seipso magno magnus est, quia ipse sua est magnitudo. *August. de Trin.* lib. v. cap. 10.

13. Sed ne *duos Omnipotentes* intelligas præcavendum est: licet enim et Pater sit *Omnipotens*, et Filius, tamen *unus est Omnipotens*, sicut et unus est Deus, quia Patris et Filii *eadem Omnipotentia* est, sicut et eadem Deitas. *Faustin.* p. 123.

Pater, Omnipotens Filius, Omnipotens et Spiritus Sanctus.

14. Et tamen non tres Omnipotentes, sed unus Omnipotens.

15. Ita Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus et Spiritus Sanctus.

16. Et tamen non tres Dii, sed unus est Deus.

17. Ita Dominus Pater, Dominus Filius, Dominus et Spiritus Sanctus.

18. Et tamen non tres Domini, sed unus est Dominus.

19. Quia sicut singillatim unamquamque Personam et

Omnipotens Filius, Omnipotens Spiritus Sanctus. Aug. de Trin. lib. v. cap. 8.

14. *Nec tamen tres Omnipotentes, sed unus Omnipotens.* August. ibid.

15. *Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus.* August. Trin. lib. viii. c. 1. et Serm. 105. p. 542. tom. v.

16. *Nec tamen tres Dii—sed unus Deus.* Aug. ibid.

17. *Sic et* Dominum *si quæras, singulum quemque respondeo*—— August. tom. viii. p. 729.

18. *Sed simul omnes non tres Dominos Deos, sed unum Dominum Deum dico.* August. ibid.

19. *Cum de* singulis *quæritur, unusquisque eorum et Deus, et*

14. (*Et tamen*) deest *tamen* in Cod. Ambros.

16. (*est Deus*) deest *est* in MS. Ambros.

18. (*est Dominus*) deest *est*. Cod. Ambros.

19. (*et Deum et Dominum*) Ita MS. Ambros. et MS. Oxon. Fortunat. rectissime. Cod. Fortunat. Ambros. aliique, tum MSS. tum impressi, habent *Deum* et *Dominum*. Brunonis Cod. et Coll. Joh. MS. *Deum ac Dominum*. San-germanensis, *Dominum*

14. Sicut simul illi tres *unus Deus*, sic simul illi tres *unus omnipotens* est, et *invisibilis unus*, Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus est. *Augustin.* tom. viii. p. 654. Vid. p. 865.

16. *Unus Deus* propter *inseparabilem* Divinitatem; sicut *unus Omnipotens* propter *inseparabilem* Omnipotentiam. *August. de Civit. Dei*, p. 290.

In illa summa Trinitate, quæ incomparabiliter rebus omnibus antecellit, tanta est *inseparabilitas*, ut cum Trinitas hominum non possit dici *unus Homo*, illa *unus Deus* et dicatur et sit. *August. de Trin.* lib. xv. cap. 23.

18. Non sunt enim duo Domini ubi *Dominatus unus* est; quia Pater in Filio, et Filius in Patre, et ideo *Dominus unus*. *Ambros. de Sp. S.* lib. iii. cap. 15. p. 686.

Deum et Dominum confiteri Christiana veritate compellimur; ita tres Deos, aut Dominos, dicere Catholica religione prohibemur.

Omnipotens esse respondeatur; cum vero de omnibus simul, non tres Dii, vel tres Omnipotentes, sed unus Deus Omnipotens. August. de Civit. Dei, lib. xi. c. 24. p. 290.

20. Pater a nullo est factus, nec creatus, nec genitus.

20. *Dicimus Patrem Deum* de nullo. August. tom. v. p. 680.

Non enim habet de quo sit, aut ex quo procedat. Aug. tom. viii. p. 829.

21. Filius a Patre solo est, non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus.

21. *Filius* Patris solius — *hunc quippe de sua substantia* genuit, *non ex nihilo fecit.* Aug. Ep. 170. alias 66.

22. Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio, non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus est, sed procedens.

22. De Filio *Spiritus Sanctus* procedere *reperitur.* August. de Trin. lib. xv. c. 17.

Neque natus est sicut unigenitus, neque factus, &c. Id. lib. v. c. 15. p. 841.

23. Unus ergo Pater, non tres Patres; unus Filius, non

23. *Unus est Pater, non duo vel tres; et unus Filius, non duo*

et Deum. Plerique editi, *Deum aut Dominum.* Quæ lectio, me judice, omnium pessima est. (*aut Dominos*) Ita plerique MSS. et editi: sed nonnulli, *ac* Dominos. (*prohibemur*) MS. Ambr. legit *prohibemus:* male.

22. (*sed procedens*) Cod. Ambros. adjecta habet ista; *Patri et Filio coæternus est.* Glossa, uti videtur, ex margine in textum immissa: nisi forte librarius verba illa ex Bachiarii Fide, quam simul descripserat, huc transtulerit; sive oscitanter, sive majoris elucidationis gratia. *Vid. Bachiar. Fid. apud Murator.* tom. ii. p. 16, 18.

22. Spiritus quoque Sanctus non, sicut creatura, ex nihilo est factus; sed sic a Patre Filioque procedit, ut nec a Filio, nec a Patre sit factus. *August.* ep. 170.

Τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα —— οὔτε γεννητὸν οὔτε κτιστὸν —— ἀλλ' ἐκ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον. *Epiphan.* p. 742.

23. Οὔτε οὖν τρεῖς πατέρες, οὔτε τρεῖς υἱοί, οὔτε τρεῖς παράκλητοι· ἀλλ' εἷς πατὴρ, καὶ εἷς υἱὸς, καὶ εἷς παράκλητος. *Pseud. Ignat. ad Philipp.* c. ii. p. 118. Cotel. ed. Vid. Epiphan. H. 69. p. 742.

tres Filii; unus Spiritus Sanctus, non tres Spiritus Sancti.

24. Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus, sed totæ tres Personæ coæternæ sibi sunt, et coæquales.

25. Ita ut per omnia, sicut jam supra dictum est, et Unitas in Trinitate, et Trinitas in Unitate veneranda sit.

26. Qui vult ergo salvus esse, ita de Trinitate sentiat.

27. Sed necessarium est ad æternam salutem, ut Incarnationem quoque Domini nostri Jesu Christi fideliter credat.

vel tres; et unus amborum Spiritus, non duo vel tres. August. contr. Maxim. p. 729.

24. *In hac Trinitate, non est aliud alio majus, aut minus.* August. tom. v. p. 948.

Nec enim prorsus aliquis in Trinitate gradus: nihil quod inferius, superiusve dici possit. Pelagii Symb.

25. *Vid. supra, in articulo* 3.

26. *Vid. supra, artic.* 2.

27. *Dominus autem manens cum discipulis per quadraginta dies, significare dignatus est quia per istud tempus* necessaria est omnibus Fides Incarnationis

24. (*Et in hac*) deest *et* in Cod. San-germ.

24. Increata et inæstimabilis Trinitas, quæ unius est æternitatis et gloriæ, nec tempus nec gradum vel posterioris recipit vel prioris. *Ambros. de Fid.* lib. iv. c. 11. p. 547.

25. Ita tota Deitas sui perfectione æqualis est, ut exceptis vocabulis quæ proprietatem indicant Personarum, quicquid de una Persona dicitur, de tribus dignissime possit intelligi. *Pelag. Symb.*

26. Si quis hanc Fidem non habet, Catholicus dici non potest, quia Catholicam non tenet Fidem; et ideo alienus est ac profanus, et adversus veritatem rebellis Fides. *S. Ambros. apud Lambec. Catalog. Bibl. Vindob.* lib. ii. p. 268.

27. Ideo conversatio ipsius in carne post resurrectionem per quadraginta dies erat necessaria, ut demonstraret tamdiu esse necessariam Fidem Incarnationis Christi quamdiu in ista vita docetur arca in diluvio fluctuare. *August.* tom. v. p. 1078.

Christi; *quæ infirmis est necessaria.* August. Serm. 264. tom. v. p. 1077.

28. Est ergo Fides recta, ut credamus et confiteamur, quia Dominus noster Jesus Christus, Dei Filius, Deus pariter et Homo est.

28. *Proinde, Christus Jesus, Dei Filius, est et Deus et Homo.* August. Ench. tom. vi. p. 210.

29. Deus est ex substantia Patris ante sæcula genitus: Homo ex substantia Matris in sæculo natus.

29. *Deus ante omnia sæcula: Homo in nostro sæculo — unus Dei Filius, idemque Hominis Filius.* August. ibid.

30. Perfectus Deus, perfectus Homo ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens.

30. *Confitemur in Christo unam esse Filii personam, ut dicamus duas esse* perfectas *atque integras substantias, id est,* Deitatis, *et* Humanitatis *quæ ex anima continetur et corpore.* Pelag. Symb.

31. Æqualis Patri secundum Divinitatem: minor Patre secundum Humanitatem.

31. *Æqualem Patri secundum Divinitatem, minorem autem Patre secundum carnem, hoc est,*

28. (*confiteamur, quia*) Cod. Ambros. atque *editi* nonnulli legunt *quod.* Plures habent *quia.* (*Deus pariter et Homo est*) Ita Codd. Bened. 1. Colbertin. Jacob. 1. et Fortunat. Ambros. et San-germ. legunt, *et Deus pariter et Homo est.* Editi, *Deus et homo est.*

29. (*ex substantia*) Colbertin. *de substantia:* et infra, *de substantia Matris.* (*Homo*) Ambros. Cod. legit *et Homo est.* Fortunat. *et Homo.* Post *Matris,* San-germ. Cod. habet, *in sæculo genitus perfectus Homo.*

29. Idem ex Patre ante sæcula genitus, idem in sæculo ex matre generatus. *Vincent.* c. 19.

30. (*rationali*) *rationabili.* Codd. Ambros. Colbert. et San-germ.

30. Adversus Arium, veram et perfectam *Verbi* Divinitatem; adversus Apollinarem, perfectam Hominis in Christo defendimus veritatem. *August. Op.* tom. v. Append. p. 391.

Perfectus Deus, perfectus Homo: in Deo summa Divinitas, in Homine plena humanitas: quippe quæ animam simul habeat et carnem. *Vincent.* c. 19.

31. (*minor Patre*) *minor Patri.* Colb.

secundum Hominem. Aug. Epist. 137. p. 406.

32. Qui licet Deus sit et Homo, non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus.

32. *Agnoscamus geminam substantiam Christi; divinam scilicet qua æqualis est Patri, humanam qua major est Pater: utrumque autem simul* non duo, sed unus est Christus. Aug. Tract. in Joh. p. 699.

33. Unus autem, non conversione Divinitatis in carnem, sed adsumptione Humanitatis in Deum.

33. *Verbum caro factum est, a Divinitate carne suscepta, non in carnem Divinitate mutata.* August. Enchirid. c. 35.

34. Unus omnino, non confusione Substantiæ, sed unitate Personæ.

34. *Idem Deus qui Homo, et qui Deus idem Homo: non confusione naturæ, sed unitate Personæ.* Aug. tom. v. p. 885.

35. Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est Homo; ita Deus et Homo unus est Christus.

35. *Sicut enim unus est Homo anima rationalis et caro; sic unus est Christus Deus et Homo.* Aug. Tract. in Joh. p. 699.

36. Qui passus est pro salute

36. *Descendit ad inferna, ter-*

32. Deest *et* Colb.

32. *Caro* Christus, et *anima* Christus, et *Verbum* Christus: nec tamen tria hæc tres Christi, sed unus Christus. *August. in Johan.* p. 612.

33. (*in carnem*) *in carne.* MSS. Ambros. Colbert. San-germ. aliique plurimi, et vetusti. Habent etiam *in Deo,* pro *in Deum.* At multi etiam Codices, cum Fortunati Cod. Ambrosiano, receptam lectionem præferunt; quæ utique præferenda videtur. Cod. San-germ. pro *conversione* habet *conversatione.* Cod. Colbert. totam hanc pericopen sic exhibet: *Unus autem, non ex eo quod sit in carne conversa Divinitas, sed quia est in Deo adsumpta dignanter humanitas.*

33. Nemo ergo credat Dei Filium *conversum* et commutatum esse in Hominis Filium; sed potius credamus, et non consumpta divina, et perfecte assumpta humana substantia, manentem Dei Filium factum Hominis Filium. *August.* tom. v. p. 887.

34. (*Unus omnino*) *unus Christus est.* Colbert.

Deus ergo Hominem assumsit, Homo in Deum transivit: non naturæ versibilitate, sicut Apollinaristæ dicunt, sed Dei dignatione. *Gennad. Eccl. Dogm.* c. 2.

34. Unus autem, non ——Divinitatis et humanitatis confusione, sed unitate Personæ. *Vincent. Lir.* c. xix. p. 58.

35. (*Nam sicut* &c.) Totum omittit Cod. Colbertinus. Scilicet, uti credo, ne *simile* illud in erroris sui patrocinium arriperent Monophysitæ. (*rationalis*) *rationabilis.* Ambros.

36. (*Qui passus est pro salute no-*

36. Quis ergo, nisi infidelis, ne-

nostra, descendit ad inferos, tertia die resurrexit a mortuis.

37. Adscendit ad cœlos, sedet ad dexteram Patris; inde venturus judicare vivos et mortuos.

38. Ad cujus adventum omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis, et reddituri sunt de factis propriis rationem.

39. Et qui bona egerunt, ibunt in vitam æternam, qui vero mala, in ignem æternum.

tia die resurrexit a mortuis. Symb. Aquileiæ, apud Ruffin.

37. *Ascendit ad cœlos, sedet ad dexteram Patris; inde venturus judicare vivos et mortuos.* Symb. Roman. Vet.

38. *Resurrectionem etiam carnis confitemur et credimus, ut dicamus nos in eadem qua nunc sumus veritate membrorum esse reparandos.* Pelag. Symb.

39. *Et procedent qui bona fecerunt in resurrectionem vitæ, qui vero mala egerunt in resurrectionem judicii.* Joh. v. 28.

Ibunt hi in supplicium æternum, justi autem in vitam æternam. Matt. xxv. 46.

stra) *Qui secundum fidem nostram passus et mortuus.* Colbert.

(*ad inferos*) *ad infernos.* Cod. Sangerm. *ad inferna.* Fortunat. MS. Oxon. *ad inferna descendens.* Cod. Colbertin.

(*tertia die,*) deest in Cod. Ambros. San-germ. Cotton. 1. Jacob. 1. (*resurrexit*) *surrexit.* Cod. Ambros. Fortunat.

37. (*sedet*) *sedit.* Cod. Ambr. (*dexteram Patris*) Ita Codd. Ambros. et Fortunat. et Symb. Roman. Vet. *dexteram Patris Omnipotentis.* Cod. Sangerm. *dextram Omnipotentis.* Cod. Brunonis. *dexteram Dei Patris sedet, sicut vobis in Symbolo traditum est.* Cod. Colbert. *dexteram Dei Patris Omnipotentis.* Codd. recentiores, cum excusis.

38. (*resurgere habent cum corporibus suis, et*) desunt in Cod. Ambros. Colbertinus legit: *ad cujus adventum erunt omnes homines sine dubio in suis corporibus resurrecturi.* Sed nihil mutamus.

39. (*egerunt*) *egerint.* Cod. Ambros. Totum hunc articulum sic legit Colbertinus: *Ut qui bona egerunt, eant in vitam æternam; qui mala, in ignem æternum.*

(*qui vero*) Cod. Ambros. et Cot-

gaverit fuisse *apud inferos* Christum?——

Quamobrem teneamus firmissime quod fides habet fundatissima auctoritate firmatum——et cætera quæ de illo testatissima veritate conscripta sunt; in quibus etiam hoc est, quod *apud inferos fuit. August.* ep. clxiv. p. 574, 578.

38. Si id resurgere dicitur quod cadit, caro ergo nostra in veritate resurget, sicut in veritate cadit. Et non secundum Origenem, immutatio corporum erit &c. *Gennad. Eccl. Dogmat.* c. 5.

39. Post resurrectionem et judicium, non credamus restitutionem futuram, sicut Origenes delirat, ut dæmones vel impii homines post tormenta quasi suppliciis expurgati, vel *illi* in *angelicam* qua creati sunt re-

40. Hæc est Fides Catholica, quam nisi quisque fideliter, firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit.

40. *Cavete, dilectissimi, ne quis vos ab* Ecclesiæ Catholicæ *Fide ac unitate seducat. Qui enim vobis aliter evangelizaverit præterquam quod accepistis, anathema sit.* Aug. tom. v. p. 592.

ton. 1. omittunt *vero*. Codices nonnulli legunt, *et qui vero*: alii, *et qui mala*.

40. (*quisque*) Cod. Ambros. *unusquisque*. Colbertinus pergit: *Hæc est Fides sancta et catholica, quam omnis homo, qui ad vitam æternam pervenire desiderat, scire integre debet, et fideliter custodire.*

deant dignitatem, vel *isti* justorum societate donentur. *Gennad. ibid.* c. 9.

40. Ὁ ταῦτα πιστεύσας ὡς ἔχει, ὡς γεγένηται, μακάριος· ὁ ταῦτα μὴ πιστεύων ἐναγὴς οὐχ ἧττον τῶν τὸν κύριον σταυρωσάντων. *Pseud. Ignat. ad Philipp.* p. 118.

CHAP. X.

A Commentary on the Athanasian Creed[a].

1. *WHOSOEVER will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith.*

By the words, *before all things*, is meant *in the first place*. Faith goes before *practice*; and is therefore *first* in *order*, though *practice* may be, comparatively, more considerable, and *first* in *value*, as the *end* is above the *means*.

2. *Which Faith, except every one do keep whole*[b] *and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.*

Which faith, that is, the *Catholic Faith* before spoken of, which is another name for the *true* and *right* faith as taught in *Scrip-*

[a] In the Primmer of 1539, and another of 1555, where the version is made from the Latin, and joined with the Popish Service of that time, the English title of the Creed was, The Symbole or Crede of the great Doctour Athanasius, dayly red in the Church.

In King Edward's Prayer Book, A. D. 1549, it is barely entitled, This Confession of our Christian Faith: and it was ordered to be *song*, or *sayed*, upon six feasts in the year. At the revisal of the Common Prayer, in 1552, it was appointed to be used on several feasts in the year, the whole number thirteen. But the *title* still continued the same, till the last review under Charles the Second; when were added thereto, *commonly called the Creed of St. Athanasius*: from which time the running title has been S. Athanasius's Creed, as before *Quicunque vult*, in our Prayer Books.

[b] In King Edward's Prayer Books, and so down to the year 1627, *holy* was read for what is now *whole*. Which I suppose was intended for *wholly*: as one may reasonably imagine from Queen Elizabeth's of 1561, where it is *wholy*: and from the metrical version, which plainly meant *wholly*, by *holy*, answering to *undefiledly*: and it is certain that *holy* was the ancient spelling for what we now write *wholly*.

ture; called *Catholic*, or *universal*, as being held by the *universal* Church of Christ, against which the *gates of hell* shall never *prevail*. The meaning then is, that every one is obliged, under pain of *damnation*, to preserve, as far as in him lies, the *true* and *right* faith, in opposition to those that endeavour to *corrupt* it either by taking from it, or adding to it. That men shall perish eternally for *unbelief*, for *rejecting* the faith in the lump, cannot be doubted; when it is expressly said, (Mark xvi. 16.) "He "that believeth not shall be damned:" and as to rejecting any particular branch, or article of it, it must of consequence be a sin against the *whole;* against *truth* and *peace*, and therefore *damnable* in its own nature, as all *wilful* sins are without repentance. As to the allowances to be made for *invincible* ignorance, prejudice, or other unavoidable infirmities; as they will be pleadable in the case of any other sin, so may they, and will they also be pleadable in this: but it was foreign to the purpose of the Creed to take notice of it in this case *particularly*, when it is *common* to all cases of like nature, and is always *supposed* and *understood*, though not specially mentioned.

3. *And the Catholic Faith is this; That we worship one God in in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity.*

One of the principal branches of the Catholic Faith, and which is of nearest concernment, (since our *worship* depends upon it, and the main body of the Christian religion is bound up in it,) is the doctrine of a *Trinity* in *Unity*, of *three Persons* and *one God*, recommended in our baptism as the object of our *faith*, *hope*, and *worship*. He that takes upon him to corrupt or deprave this most fundamental part of a Christian's faith cannot be *innocent;* it being his bounden duty to maintain and preserve it, as he will answer it another day.

4. *Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance.*

Here would be no need of these particular cautions, or critical terms, in relation to this point, had men been content with the plain primitive faith in its native simplicity. But as there have been a set of men, called Sabellians, who have erroneously taught, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are all *one Person*, who was incarnate, and *suffered*, and rose again; making the *Father* (and Holy Ghost) to have *suffered*, as well as the *Son*, (from thence called *Patripassians,*) hence it becomes necessary to caution every pious Christian against *confounding* the Persons, as those men have done. And as there have been others,

particularly the Arians, who have pretended very falsely, that the three Persons are *three substances*, and of *different* kinds, *divided* from each other, one being *before* the other, existing when the other two were not, as also being *present* where the other two are not present; these false and dangerous tenets having been spread abroad, it is become necessary to give a caution against *dividing the substance*, as these have done, very much to the detriment of sobriety and truth.

5. *For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost.*

The Sabellians therefore were extremely to blame in *confounding* the Persons, and running them into one, taking away the *distinction* of Persons plainly taught in Scripture.

6. *But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the Glory equal, the Majesty coeternal.*

The Arians therefore were equally to blame for *dividing* the *substance* and *Godhead*, in the manner before hinted. To be a little more particular on this head, we may go on to open and explain this *Unity* of Godhead, *equality* of *Glory*, and *coeternity* of Majesty.

7. *Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost.*

That is, as to their *substance* and *Godhead*, there is no difference or inequality amongst them; though there is a difference in respect of some *personal* acts and properties, as shall be observed in its place. In real *dignity* and *perfection* they are *equal* and *undivided*, as in the instances here following:

8. *The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, and the Holy Ghost uncreate.*

These three Persons were never brought into being by the will of another; they are no *creatures*, nor *changeable*, as creatures are; they are all infinitely removed from *dependence* or *precarious* existence, one as much as another, and every one as much as any one: they exist in the highest and most emphatical sense of existing, which is called *necessary existence*, opposed to *contingent* or *precarious* existence. In a word; every Person must, and cannot but exist; and all must exist together, having the same unchangeable perfections.

9. *The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible.*

These words are not a just translation of the Latin original,

though containing as true and just a proposition as the Latin words do. *Immensus* signifies *omnipresent*, rather than *incomprehensible* in the modern sense of incomprehensible. But if by *incomprehensible* be understood, not to be comprehended within any bounds, it will then answer to the Latin pretty nearly. The translator here followed the Greek copy[c], taking perhaps the Greek to be the *original* language wherein the Creed was written. However, some Latins have understood by *immensus*, *incomprehensible*[d], in such a sense as has been hinted.

10. *The Father eternal, the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal.*

None of the Persons ever began to be, nor shall ever cease to be; they always were, they always will be, and must be; the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

11. *And yet they are not three eternals, but one eternal.*

Some account ought to be given of this manner of speaking, because it often occurs in the Creed, and may be thought most apt to offend the malicious, or to mislead the unwary. The way of speaking came in a little after the middle of the fourth century, and then only into the Latin Church; for the Greeks never used it, but taught the *same* things under a *different* form of expression. What Greeks and Latins both intended was, that as the three Persons are *one substance* and *one God*, so every *divine* perfection, and every *substantial* attribute, belonging to any one Person, is *common* to all; and there is nothing *peculiar* to any one but the divine *relations:* to the Father, *paternity*, and whatever it implies or carries with it; to the Son, *filiation;* to the Holy Ghost, *procession*. In this account, *eternity*, *immensity*, *omnipotence*, and the like, being substantial attributes, are common to all the three Persons; who have therefore *one eternity*, *one immensity*, *one omnipotence*, and so on, as *one substance* and *one Godhead:* thus far Greeks and Latins agreed both in

[c] There are two printed Greek copies which read ἀκατάληπτος, Stephens's, first printed by Bryling, and Baifius's, first printed by Genebrard: which two copies are in the main one. Our translators, in 1548, could have seen none but Bryling's, that is, Stephens's copy. The Constantinopolitan copy published by Genebrard reads ἄπειρος; the Palatine copy, by Felckman, ἄμετρος. The Saxon, French, and old English versions exactly follow the Latin original. As does also the Primmer of 1539, set forth by John Bishop of Rochester; and the other later one of 1555, by C. Pole. The first has *unmeasurable*, (where we have *incomprehensible*,) the other has *without measure*.

[d] *Immensus Pater:* non mole, sed potestate omnia concludente. Vel immensus, id est, *incomprehensibilis*. *Abælard. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 368.

doctrine and *expression*. But the Latins, building hereupon, thought it very allowable to go a little further, (which the Greeks did not,) and to express the same thing by saying, of the three Persons, that they are *one eternal, one immense, one omnipotent, one holy, one uncreated*, &c. And this was the current language at the making, and before the making of this Creed. The Arians were the sole occasion of introducing both kinds of expression, which must therefore be interpreted accordingly. *Two* things were designed by them: one, to obviate the Arian tenet, that the three Persons were differing in *kind*, and in *degree*, as being of *unequal* perfections; the other, to obviate the Arian charge, or calumny, upon the Church, as making *three Gods*. In regard to the former, when the Catholics speak of *one Divinity*, they intend *equal* Divinity, not Divinities differing in *kind* or *degree:* and in regard to the latter, they further mean *undivided* and *inseparable* Divinity, not *many* Divinities. The true meaning then, and the full meaning of the expressions of the Creed will be very clear and obvious. The three Persons are *equal* in duration, and *undivided* too; one eternity (one, because *undivided*, and inseparable) is *common* to all, and therefore they are not *three eternals*, but *one eternal*.

The oldest writers who have used this way of expression are, so far as I have observed, Ambrose, Faustinus, and Austin: and their meaning in it is very plain and certain from the places themselves where they make use of it. Fulgentius, who came not long after them, sometimes falls into the same manner of expression[e]; but sparingly, as if he either did not fully attend to it, or had some scruple about it: for his general way is to say, "not three eternal Gods, but one eternal God[f]," instead of the

[e] *Relativa* nomina Trinitatem faciunt, *essentialia* vero nullo modo triplicantur. Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus. Bonus Pater, bonus Filius, bonus Spiritus Sanctus. Pius Pater, pius Filius, pius Spiritus Sanctus. Justus Pater, justus Filius, justus et Spiritus Sanctus. Omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens et Spiritus Sanctus. Et tamen non dicimus nec *tres Deos*, nec *tres bonos*, nec *tres pios*, nec *tres justos*, nec *tres omnipotentes*, sed unum Deum, bonum, pium, justum, omnipotentem, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. *Fulgent. de Trin.* c. ii. p. 330.

[f] Æternus est sine initio Pater, æternus est sine initio Filius, æternus est sine initio Spiritus Sanctus: nec tamen tres *Dii* æterni sed unus æternus *Deus*. *Fulgent. ad Ferrand.* p. 234.

Immensus est Pater, sed immensus est Filius, et immensus est et Spiritus Sanctus: nec tamen tres *Dii* immensi, sed unus *Deus* immensus. *Fulgent. ibid.* p. 232.

Omnipotens est Pater; sed omnipotens est Filius, omnipotens est Spiritus Sanctus: nec tamen tres *Dii* omnipotentes, sed unus Deus omnipotens est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus. *Fulgent. ibid.*

other in the Creed; and so in the like cases. Which indeed is a very insipid and dull way of expressing it, and if applied to every article in the Athanasian Creed, would make it a very flat composition in comparison to what it is. It is true, that all at length resolves into this, that the three Persons are *not three Gods*, but *one God:* this is the ground and foundation, and the other is the superstructure. But then it is a fine and elegant, as well as a solid superstructure; improving the thought, and carrying on a train of new and distinct propositions, and not merely a jejune and sapless repetition of the same thing.

12. *As also there are not three incomprehensibles, nor three uncreated; but one uncreated, and one incomprehensible*[s].

Not three incomprehensibles, &c. as not differing either in *kind* or *degree* of incomprehensibility, nor yet *divided* in those perfections: but one incomprehensible, and one uncreated, one as to the *kind* and *degree* of those attributes, or perfections; and one in *number* too, as much as *union* and *inseparability*, infinitely close and perfect, can be conceived to make, or do really make *one.*

13. *So likewise the Father is Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the Holy Ghost Almighty.*

Equally Almighty every one, without any *difference* or *inequality* in *kind* or *degree.*

14. *And yet they are not three Almighties, but one Almighty.*

One omnipotence, or almightiness, is common to all three; one in *kind* as being of *equal* extent, and equally reaching over all; and one also in *number*, because of the inseparable *union* among the three, in the inward perfection, and outward exercise, or operation.

15. *So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God.*

The whole three persons equally *divine*, and enjoying every perfection belonging to the Godhead.

16. *And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.*

Because the *Godhead*, or *Divinity*, which belongs to one,

[s] Here again, one may perceive what copy our translators followed, namely, Bryling's Greek copy. All the other copies, Greek and Latin, place the words in a different order: *not three uncreated, nor three incomprehensibles, but one uncreated,* &c. Only the Ambrosian Latin copy reads, *not three uncreated, nor three incomprehensibles, (immense,) but one incomprehensible (immense) and one uncreated.*

belongs to all: the same in *kind* because of the equality, and the same in *number* because inseparably one.

17. *So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son Lord, and the Holy Ghost Lord.*

Having the same right of *dominion*, and of *equal* dominion; and equally exercising it, when and where they please.

18. *And yet not three Lords, but one Lord.*

Because one dominion is *common* to all three, jointly possessing, and jointly exercising every branch of it; undividedly and inseparably bearing supreme rule over all.

19. *For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and Lord; so are we forbidden by the Catholic religion to say, There be three Gods or three Lords.*

That is to say, the whole foundation of what hath been before taught rests upon this, that the same Christian *verity*, or *truth*, laid down in Scripture, obliges us to acknowledge every Person distinctly considered to be *God* and *Lord;* and at the same time to reject the notion of *three Gods* or *three Lords:* which being so, all that has been here taught must of course be admitted as true, right, and just. And now, having considered the *equality* and *union* of the three sacred Persons, it may next be proper to consider their *distinction*, as it is set forth to us in Scripture by the several *personal* characters belonging to the *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost.*

20. *The Father is made of none, neither created, nor begotten.*

Were I at liberty to make conjectural emendations, I would here read, *Pater a nullo est: neque factus, nec* &c. *The Father is of none: neither made nor created,* &c. And thus the next article (*The Son is of the Father* alone) would better answer, and the whole would be more elegant. But having met with no copy[h] to countenance such a correction, I must not pretend to it, lest it should appear like correcting the *author.* However, the sense is very plain and obvious. All the three *negatives* here

[h] Lazarus Baifius's copy, in Genebrard, reads ὁ πατὴρ ἀπ' οὐδενός ἐστι. But then it entirely omits ποιητὸς, which, as is plain from what follows in the Creed, ought not to be omitted. Had the copy run thus, ἀπ' οὐδενός ἐστι, οὔτε μὴν ποιητὸς, οὔτε κτιστὸς &c. it would have answered my meaning. Indeed, the first Greek copy in Labbe's Councils, and third in Montfaucon, run in such a way as I suppose: but then I take them to have been patched up from several distinct copies, at the pleasure of the editor or editors: and none of the Latin copies will warrant such a reading.

predicated of the Father amount to this one, that he is absolutely *of none:* this is his peculiar property, his distinguishing character, to be *first* in *order*, and the *head* of every thing; to whom even the *Son* and Holy Ghost are referred, but diversly and in different manner.

21. *The Son is of the Father alone; not made, nor created, but begotten.*

The Son is here said to be of the Father *alone*, in contradistinction to the Holy Ghost, to be named after, who is not of the Father *alone*, but of *both*. The Greeks that struck out the words, *and of the Son*, below, and left the word *alone* here, were not aware of it. This conduct of theirs betrayed a shortness of thought, and at the same time served to shew that the Latins had not been *interpolators* of the Creed, but that the Greeks had been *curtailers*. It must however be owned, that the Greeks who drew up that form which Bishop Usher printed from Junius were wise enough to observe how this matter stood; and therefore struck out the word *alone* here, as well as *and of the Son*, below.

22. *The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son; neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.*

The peculiar and distinguishing character of the Holy Ghost is to *proceed*, and to proceed both from *Father and Son*. Indeed, the Son and Holy Ghost are both *of the Father*, but in a different manner, to us inexplicable; one by the way of *generation*, the other by *procession*, though the word *procession*, in a lax sense, has been sometimes applied to either. However, to proceed *from the Father* and *the Son*, or, as the Greeks will needlessly cavil, *from the Father* by *the Son;* that is peculiar to the *Holy Ghost*. The Greeks and Latins have had many and tedious disputes about the *procession*. One thing is observable, that though the *ancients*, appealed to by both parties, have often said that the Holy Ghost proceeds *from the Father*, without mentioning the *Son*, yet they never said that he proceeded from the Father *alone;* so that the *modern* Greeks have certainly innovated in that article, in *expression* at least, if not in real sense and meaning. As to the Latins, they have this to plead, that none of the *ancients* ever condemned their doctrine; that *many* of them have expressly asserted it; that the Oriental churches themselves rather condemn their taking upon them to add any thing to a Creed formed in a *general council*, than the *doctrine*

itself; that those Greek churches that charge their doctrine as heresy, yet are forced to admit much the same thing, only in different words; and that Scripture itself is plain that the Holy Ghost proceeds at least *by the Son*, if not *from him*; which yet amounts to the same thing.

I should here observe, that some time before the compiling of this Creed, the usual Catholic way of speaking of the Holy Ghost was to say, that he was *nec genitus, nec ingenitus*, neither *begotten* nor *unbegotten*, while this Creed, by barely denying him to be *begotten*, seems to leave room to think that he is *unbegotten*. This raised a scruple in the minds of some, here in England, concerning that part of the Creed, above seven hundred years ago; as we learn from Abbo Floriacensis of that time. For Gregory's Synodicon admitted here, as well as this Creed, had the very expression concerning the Holy Ghost, *nec ingenitus, nec genitus*. It might have been easy to end the dispute, only by distinguishing upon the *equivocal* meaning of the word *ingenitus*. It had been taken from the Greek ἀγένητος, which signifies not barely *unbegotten*, but absolutely *underived:* in this sense the Holy Ghost could not be said to be *ingenitus*. But if it barely means *not begotten*, it may be applied to him, as it is in the Creed. The whole difficulty then arose only from the scantiness of the Latin tongue, in not affording a single word which should fully express the Greek, ἀγένητος, *unoriginate*. *Ingenitus* might tolerably do it; but the word was more commonly taken in a narrower construction. Peter Abelard has hit off the whole difficulty very clearly; whose words therefore I have thrown into the margin[i].

23. *So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.*

Whether this paragraph be borrowed from St. Austin, or from an elder writer under the name of Ignatius, I know not. The foundation of it was laid in 1 Cor. viii. 6. "One God the "Father," and "one Lord Jesus Christ;" to which it was

[i] Solum itaque Patrem *ingenitum* dicimus, hoc est, a seipso non ab alio: unde Augustinus adversus Felicianum Arianum; *Patrem ingenitum dico, quia non processit ab altero*——Aliud itaque dicere est Patrem *ingenitum*, aliud *non genitum*——Spiritus vero Sanctus ipse quoque est *non genitus*—Nec tamen ideo est *ingenitus*, cum ipse ab alio sit, tam a Patre scilicet quam a Filio procedens. Solus itaque Pater *ingenitus* dicitur, sicut solus Filius *genitus*: Spiritus vero Sanctus nec *genitus* est, nec *ingenitus*, sed, ut dictum est, *non genitus*. *Abælard. Introd. ad Theolog.* lib. i. p. 983.

usual to add, after reciting it, *and one Holy Ghost*, to complete the whole number of the divine Persons. The intent and purport of the words, in this Creed, is to set forth the *distinction* of the three *Persons*, and their several *offices* and *characters*: that there is *one Father*, and that he *alone* is *unoriginate*, is *first Person*, is *Head*, &c. and neither the *Son* nor *Holy Ghost* have any share in these titles or characters, to make three *Unoriginates*, three *Heads*, &c. That there is *one Son*, and he alone *begotten*, and afterwards *incarnate*, &c. which *characters* and *offices* belong not to the other two, but are *distinct*, and *appropriate* to one. And there is *one Holy Ghost*, whose *character* is to *proceed*, and whose *office* is to *sanctify*, which character and office are not to be ascribed, in the same sense, to the other two: for that would be *confounding* the personal characters and offices, and making *three Holy Ghosts*, instead of one.

24. *And in this Trinity, none is afore or after other; none is greater or less than another; but the whole three Persons are coeternal together, and coequal.*

The compiler of the Creed now returns to the *equality* and *unity* of the Persons; that he may at length sum up and throw into a short compass what he had said upon the *Trinity*, before he should pass on to the other great article, the *Incarnation*. When it is said, *none is afore or after other*, we are not to understand it of *order*; for the Father is *first*, the Son *second*, and the Holy Ghost *third* in order. Neither are we to understand it of *office*; for the Father is *supreme* in office, while the Son and Holy Ghost condescend to *inferior* offices. But we are to understand it, as the Creed itself explains it, of *duration* and of *dignity*; in which respect, none is *afore* or *after*, none *greater* or *less*, but the whole three *Persons coeternal* and *coequal*.

25. *So that in all things, as is aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped.*

In all things, (*per omnia*,) *as is aforesaid*. One of the Greek copies tacks these words to the former article, making them run thus; *coequal in all things, as aforesaid*. Another Greek copy reads them thus, *coequal in all things: so that in all things, as is now said*, &c. Both interpret the *all things* of the coequality in *all things*. And indeed Venantius Fortunatus, in his comment, long before, seems to have understood *per omnia* in the same way, to signify that the Son is what the Father is, in

all *essential* or *substantial* perfections. And it is favoured both by what goes before and after: for from speaking of the *coeternity* and *coequality*, the author proceeds to say, *So that* in all things, as aforesaid, *the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped*; namely, on account of their perfect *coeternity* and *coequality*: to which he subjoins, *He therefore that will be saved*, &c. Wherefore I incline to the moderate opinion of those who think that the author here does not lay the stress upon every little nicety of explication[k] before given, but upon the main doctrine, of a *coequal* and *coeternal* Trinity. Which is the very construction given by Hincmar, nine hundred years ago, or nearly[l]. And Wickliff's comment upon the same passage, when put into a modern dress, may appear not contemptible. "And so we conclude here, as is before said, that there is "both an Unity of Godhead, and a Trinity of Persons; and "that the Trinity in this Unity is to be worshipped above all "things; and whosoever will be saved must thus think of the "Trinity, if not thus explicitly, (or in every particular,) yet "thus in the general, or implicitly."

26. *He therefore that will be saved must thus think of the Trinity.*

Thus, as consisting of three Persons, *coeternal* and *coequal*, and all *one God*; distinct enough to be *three*, united enough to be *one*; distinct without division, united without confusion.

27. *Furthermore, it is necessary to everlasting salvation, that he also believe rightly*[m] *the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.*

Much depends upon our having true and just sentiments of the *Incarnation*, in which the whole economy of our salvation is nearly concerned. To corrupt and deprave this doctrine is to

[k] Le Quien's ingenuous and handsome reflection, upon the conduct of Pope Gregory the IXth's Legates, may deserve a recital here.

Quamquam non possum quin ingenue fatear nuncios apostolicos consultius facturos fuisse, si ab ejusmodi sententia pronuntianda sibi temperassent; *Qui credit Spiritum Sanctum non procedere ex Filio, in via perditionis est*: tunc quippe temporis Ecclesia Catholica in nulla synodo generali hoc de capite judicium definitorium tulerat. *Panopl. contr. Schism. Græcor.* p. 360.

[l] Et in hac Trinitate nihil est prius, nihil posterius; nihil majus, aut minus; sed totæ tres Personæ coæternæ sibi sunt et coæquales: ita ut *per omnia*, et Unitas Deitatis in Trinitate Personarum, et Trinitas Personarum in Unitate Deitatis veneranda est. *Hincm. de non Trin. Deit.* tom. i. p. 540.

[m] Ὀρθῶς πιστεύσῃ. So Bryling's Greek copy. The Latin copies have *fideliter credat*. Some Greek copies read πιστῶς, or βεβαίως, though two, besides Bryling's, have also ὀρθῶς.

defeat and frustrate, in a great measure, the gospel of Christ, which bringeth salvation; wherefore it is of great moment, of everlasting concernment to us, not to be guilty of doing it ourselves, nor to take part with those that do.

28. *For the right Faith is, that we believe and confess, that our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God and Man.*

There have been heretics who would not allow that our Saviour Christ was *man*, but in such a sense as a shadow, or a picture of a man, may be called a man: and there have been others who would not allow that Christ is *God*, but in such a sense as any *creature* whatever might be called or may be made a God. But all good Christians have ever abhorred those vile tenets, and conformably to Scripture, rightly and justly interpreted, have believed and confessed that Christ is both really God and really man, one *God-man*.

29. *God, of the Substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds; and Man, of the Substance of his Mother, born in the world.*

We are forced to be thus particular and expressive, in the wording of this article, because of the many wiles, equivocations, and disguises of those who endeavour to corrupt the faith. The Arians make of Christ a *created* God, and call him *God* on account only of his *office*, and not of his *nature* or unchangeable substance. For this reason, we are obliged to be particular in expressing his *substance*, as being not *frail, mutable, perishing*, as the substance of creatures is, but eternal and unchangeable, and all one with the Father's. On the other hand, the Apollinarians and other heretics have pretended, either that Christ had no human body at all, or that he brought it with him from heaven, and took it not of the Virgin-Mother: we are therefore forced to be particular in this profession, that he was man *of the substance of his mother:* which, though it be not taught in *express* words, yet is very plainly the sense and meaning of holy Scripture on this article; and was never questioned, till conceited men came to pervert the true doctrine of sacred Writ by false glosses and comments of their own.

30. *Perfect God, and perfect Man of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting.*

Here again, the perverseness of heretics has made it necessary to guard the faith by strong and expressive words that cannot easily be eluded. Christ is *perfect God*, not such a *nominal* im-

perfect God as Arians and Photinians pretend. He is moreover *perfect man*, which it is necessary to insist upon against the Apollinarians, who pretended that he had a *human* body only without any *rational* soul; imagining the *Logos* to have supplied the place of the *rational* or *reasonable* soul: whereas in reality he had both *soul* and *body*, as all men have, and was therefore *perfect man*.

31. *Equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead: and inferior to the Father, as touching his Manhood.*

Which needs no comment.

32. *Who although he be God and Man, yet he is not two, but one Christ.*

This is said, to guard against calumny and misconstruction. For because the Church asserted *two natures* in Christ, whereby he is both *perfect God* and *perfect man*, the Apollinarians, having an hypothesis of their own to serve, pretended that this was making *two Christs*, a *divine Christ* as to one nature, and a *human Christ* in the other: which was a vain thought, since both the natures joined in the one *God-man* make still but *one Christ*, both God and man.

33. *One, not by conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking of the Manhood into God.*

The Apollinarian way of making *one Christ* by confounding the two natures in one, and by subjecting the Godhead to *change*, is here condemned. There is no need of running these injudicious and absurd lengths for solving the difficulty how the two natures make *one Christ:* he did not change his *divine* nature, or convert it into *flesh*, though he be said to have been *made flesh;* he took flesh upon him, he assumed human nature, took man into an union with God, and thus was he *one Christ*.

34. *One altogether, not by confusion of Substance, but by unity of Person.*

We are thus forced to distinguish, with the utmost nicety and accuracy, to obviate the cavils and pretences of heretics. Christ then is *one altogether*, entirely one, though his two natures remain *distinct*. He is not one by *confounding* or *mingling* two natures or substances into one nature or substance, (as the Apollinarians pretended,) but by uniting them both in *one Person;* one I, one He, one Christ, as Scripture every where represents.

35. *For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man; so God and Man is one Christ.*

That is to say, there are two very distinct and different substances in man, a *body* and a *soul*; one material, the other immaterial, one mortal, the other immortal; and both these substances, nevertheless, make up but *one man*. Not by *confounding* or *mingling* those two different substances, (for they are entirely *distinct*, and *different*, and will ever remain so,) but by uniting them in *one Person*. Even so may the two distinct natures, *divine* and *human*, in Christ, make *one Person*; and this is really and truly the case in fact.

36. *Who suffered for our salvation, descended into hell, rose again the third day from the dead.*

The author having finished his explication of the great article of *God incarnate*, now goes on to other parts of the Creed, such as were commonly inserted in the Creeds before. The article of *the descent into hell* had not indeed, at this time, come into the Roman, otherwise called the Apostles' Creed; but it had been inserted in the Creed of Aquileia, and had been all along the standing doctrine of the Church. I shall leave it, as our Church has left it, without any particular interpretation; referring the reader to those who have commented on the Apostles' Creed, and particularly to the much admired author of *the history of it*, who hath exhausted the subject.

37. *He ascended into heaven, he sitteth on the right hand of the Father, God Almighty, from whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead.*

These are all so many articles of the Roman Creed, and probably taken from it: excepting only, that the words *God Almighty* appear not in the most ancient manuscripts; and, very probably, were not originally in this Creed, any more than in the ancient Roman.

38. *At whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies, and shall give account for their own works.*

Here are two very expressive phrases, *all men*, all that have died, or shall die, to obviate the false opinion of a *partial* resurrection; and *with their bodies*, to obviate the notion of those, who either thought that the *soul* only should continue for ever, while the body should be left to perish, or that the *resurrection-body* should be quite of another *matter*, *form*, or *kind*, than what our bodies are here. I have hinted in my Latin notes above, that some words are wanting in the Ambrosian manuscript; and I may here observe further, that in the words of the Creed, as

they commonly run, there is not all the *accuracy* that might have been: for *all men* shall not rise, but only all that *die*. However, it seems that about that time there was some variety of sentiments in respect of that article, as we may learn from Gennadius[n]; which was owing to the different reading of 1 Cor. xv. 51. from whence probably arose some variation in the copies of this Creed. See Pearson on the Apostles' Creed, Artic. 7.

39. *And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil into everlasting fire.*

This is the express doctrine of Scripture, and appears almost in the same words, John v. 28. Matt. xxv. 46. to say nothing of many other texts to the same effect. Yet this article, or rather these two articles, had not gained admittance into the Apostles' Creed so early as the fourth century, the latter of them not at all. But, I suppose, the opinion said to have been started by Origen, that wicked men, and even devils, after a certain revolution, should have their release and restoration, might make it the more necessary, or convenient at least, to insert these articles in the Creeds, and to express the punishment of the damned by the words *eternal fire:* for the Origenists, at that time, denied both the *eternity* of the *fire*, and also its *reality*, as appears from Orosius in St. Austin[o].

40. *This is the Catholic Faith, which except a man believe faithfully*[p], *he cannot be saved.*

This is to be understood, like all other such general propositions, with proper reserves and qualifying constructions. As

[n] Omnium hominum erit resurrectio; si omnium erit, ergo omnes moriuntur, ut mors ab Adam ducta omnibus filiis ejus dominetur, et maneat illud privilegium in Domino, quod de eo specialiter dicitur: *Non dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem.* ——Hanc rationem, maxima patrum turba tradente, suscepimus. Verum quia sunt et alii, æque Catholici et eruditi viri, qui credunt, anima in corpore manente, mutandos ad incorruptionem et immortalitatem eos qui in adventu Domini *vivi* inveniendi sunt, et hoc eis reputari *pro resurrectione* ex mortuis, quod mortalitatem immutatione deponant, non morte; quolibet quis adquiescat modo, non est hæreticus, nisi ex contentione hæreticus fiat. Sufficit enim in Ecclesiæ lege, carnis resurrectionem credere futuram de morte. *Gennad. Eccles. Dogm.* c. 7.

[o] Ignem sane æternum, quo peccatores puniantur, neque esse *ignem verum*, neque *æternum* prædicaverunt, dicentes dictum esse ignem propriæ conscientiæ punitionem, *æternum* autem, juxta etymologiam Græcam, non esse *perpetuum*, &c. *Epist. Orosii ad August. inter Aug. Op.* tom. viii. p. 607.

[p] Πιστῶς πιστεύσῃ. So Bryling's copy, which our translators followed. The Latin copies have *fideliter, firmiterque crediderit.* And the other Greek copies, πιστῶς τε καὶ βεβαίως πιστεύσῃ. Or, ἐκ πίστεως βεβαίως πιστεύσῃ.

for instance, if after laying down a system of Christian morality, it be said, *This is the Christian practice, which except a man faithfully observe and follow, he cannot be saved;* it would be no more than right and just thus to say: but no one could be supposed hereby to exclude any such merciful abatements, or allowances, as shall be made for men's particular circumstances, weaknesses, frailties, ignorance, inability, or the like; or for their *sincere* intentions, and *honest* desires of knowing, and doing the whole will of God; accompanied with a *general* repentance of their *sins*, and a firm reliance upon God's mercy, through the sole merits of Christ Jesus. There can be no doubt, however, but that men are accountable for their *faith*, as well as for their *practice:* and especially if they take upon them to instruct and direct others, trusting to their own strength and parts, against the united judgment and verdict of *whole churches* ancient and modern.

CHAP. XI.

The Church of England vindicated, both as to the receiving and retaining the Athanasian Creed.

THERE would be no occasion for this chapter, had not a late author[q] of name and character, out of his abundant zeal to promote *Arianism*, taken upon him to disparage this excellent form of faith; nay, and to apply, with some earnestness, to *the governors of our Church*, to get it laid aside. He thinks "it "may well deserve the most serious and deliberate consideration "of the governors of the Church, whether it would not be more "advantageous to the true interest of the Christian religion, to "retain only those more indisputable forms[q];" that is, to have this wholly taken away, or at least not imposed in our Articles or Liturgy. Then he subjoins his *reasons:* which because they may be presumed to be the closest and strongest that can be offered on that side, and because they have hitherto stood without any particular confutation on one hand, or retractation on the other, I shall here take upon me to answer them, as briefly as may be.

Objection I.

The first is, that "this Creed is confessed not to be Athana-

[q] Clarke's Script. Doctr. edit. 1st, p. 446, 447.

" sius's, but the composition of an uncertain obscure author, " written in one of the darkest and most ignorant ages of the " Church; having never appeared till about the year 800, nor " been received in the Church till so very late as about the year " 1000."

ANSW. As to the *false facts* contained in this article, I need only refer to the preceding sheets. As to the Creed being none of Athanasius's, which is certainly *true*, it is to be considered, that our Church receives it not upon the *authority* of its compiler, nor determines any thing about its *age* or *author:* but we receive it because the truth of the doctrines contained in it " may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture," as is expressly said in our eighth article. I may add, that the *early* and *general* reception of this Creed by Greeks and Latins, by all the western churches, not only before, but since the *Reformation*, must needs give it a much greater *authority* and *weight* than the single name of Athanasius could do, were it ever so justly to be set to it. Athanasius has left some Creeds and Confessions, undoubtedly his, which yet never have obtained the esteem and reputation that this hath done: because none of them are really of the same intrinsic value, nor capable of doing the like service in the Christian churches. The use of it is, to be a standing fence and preservative against the wiles and equivocations of most kinds of heretics. This was well understood by Luther, when he called it, *a bulwark to the Apostles' Creed*[r]; much to the same purpose with what has been above cited from Ludolphus Saxo[s]. And it was this and the like considerations that have all along made it to be of such high esteem among all the *reformed churches*, from the days of their great leader.

OBJECT. II.

The second reason assigned for laying this form aside is, " that it is so worded, as that many of the *common people* cannot

[r] Athanasii scilicet Symbolum est paulo prolixius, et ad confutandos Arianos hæreticos, aliquanto uberius declarat et illustrat articulum alterum de divinitate Christi Jesu——estque hoc velut propugnaculum primi illius Apostolici Symboli. *Luther. de Trib. Symbol. Oper.* tom. vii. p. 138.

[s] Thus also Alexander of Hales, 100 years before Ludolphus.

Causa multiplicationis Symbolorum fuit triplex: *instructio fidei, veritatis explanatio, erroris exclusio.*——Erroris exclusio, propter hæreses multiplices pullulantes, causa fuit Symboli Athanasii, quod cantatur in prima. *Alexand. Alens.* part. iii. Q. 69. Membr. ii. p. 541. Johan. Januensis in his Catholicon, (an. 1286.) under *symbolum*, says the same thing.

" but be too apt to understand it in a sense favouring either " *Sabellianism* or *Tritheism*."

Answ. This objection is not particularly levelled against this Creed, but against all Creeds containing the doctrine of a *coeternal Trinity in Unity*: it is therefore an objection rather against the *faith* of the *Church*, (which those gentlemen endeavour constantly to run down, under the notion of *Sabellianism* or *Tritheism*,) than against this particular form of expressing it.

I may further add, that the *common people* will be in no danger of running either into *Sabellianism* or *Tritheism*, if they attend to the Creed *itself*, (which fully obviates and confutes both those heresies,) instead of listening to those who first industriously labour to *deceive* them into a false construction of the Creed, and then complain of the *common people's* being *too apt* to misunderstand it. This is not ingenuous nor upright dealing with the *common people*.

Object. III.

A third reason is, that " there are in *this Creed* many phrases, " which——may seem to give *unbelievers* a needless advantage " of objecting against religion; and among *believers* themselves, " cannot but to the *vulgar* have too much the appearance of " contradictions: and sometimes (especially the damnatory " clauses) have given offence to the piousest and most learned " men, insomuch as to have been the principal reason of Mr. " Chillingworth's refusing to subscribe the XXXIX Articles."

Answ. As to *unbelievers* and their *objections*, the *Church* has been always able and willing to answer them; sorry at the same time to find that any, who call themselves Christians, should join with the *unbelievers* in the same trifling objections, thereby giving the *unbelievers* a very *needless advantage*, and the most pernicious encouragement. As to *vulgar* believers, they suspect no *contradictions*, till some, who think themselves above the *vulgar*, labour to create such a suspicion in them. Leave the *vulgar* to their *better* guides, and their true *orthodox* pastors, without endeavouring to *corrupt* or *seduce* them; and then all will be safe and easy.

As to Mr. Chillingworth, he had for a while, it is owned, some scruples upon him, about the *Fourth Commandment as appertaining to Christians*, and about the *damnatory clauses* in the Athanasian Creed; and therefore refused to *subscribe* for a time. This was in the year 1635. But within three years after, upon

more mature consideration, he happily got over his difficulties, and *subscribed*, July the 20th, in the year 1638; as stands upon record in the Office of Sarum, where he was instituted Chancellor of the Church[t].

OBJECT. IV.

A fourth reason offered, not for laying aside this Creed, I suppose, but for the governors' taking it into consideration, is, that "the preface to the Book of Common Prayer declares that "particular forms of divine worship, and rites and ceremonies "appointed to be used therein, being things in their own nature "indifferent and alterable, may, upon the various exigency of "times and occasions, be *changed or altered.*"

ANSW. No doubt but the Church may, if it be thought proper or expedient, throw out all the Creeds out of her *daily Service*, or *Articles*, and retain one only, in the *Office* of *Baptism*, as formerly. But, I suppose, the authors of the preface to the Book of Common Prayer had no thought of excluding any of the *three Creeds* amongst their *alterable forms* of worship, or *rites* and *ceremonies:* nor will the revival of *Arianism* be ever looked upon as one of those *exigencies of times* that shall make it expedient to part with our Creeds; but a reason rather for retaining them the more firmly, or even for taking them in again, had any of them ever been unhappily thrown out.

OBJECT. V.

A further reason pleaded is, that "Scripture alone is suffi-"cient; that the primitive Church was very cautious *about* "multiplying Creeds; that the Council of Ephesus forbad, under "the penalty of an anathema, any other Creed after that of Nice "to be proposed or received in the Church."

ANSW. The whole design and end of Creeds is to preserve the *rule of faith*, as contained in the holy Scriptures, and not in the *false* glosses and corrupt *inventions* of men[u]. And when endeavours are used to *poison* those fountains of truth by ill *com-*

[t] Ego Gulielmus Chillingworth, Clericus, in Artibus Magister, ad Cancellariatum Ecclesiæ Cathedralis Beatæ Mariæ Sarum. una cum Præbenda de Brinworth, alias Bricklesworth, in comitatu Northampton Petriburgensis diœceseos in eadem ecclesia fundata, et eidem Cancellariatui annexa, admittendus et instituendus, omnibus hisce Articulis, et singulis in eisdem contentis volens et ex animo subscribo, et consensum meum eisdem præbeo, vicesimo die Julii, 1638. *Gulielmus Chillingworth.*

[u] Οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔδοξεν ἀνθρώποις συνετέθη τὰ τῆς πίστεως· ἀλλ' ἐκ πάσης γραφῆς τὰ καιριώτατα συλλεχθέντα μίαν ἀναπληροῖ τὴν τῆς πίστεως διδασκαλίαν. *Cyrill. Catech. V.* c. 12. p. 78.

ments and forced constructions, *preservatives* must be thought on to keep the fountain *pure*, and the faith *sound* and *whole*.

As to the *primitive* churches, their constant way was to enlarge their Creeds in proportion to the growth of *heresies*; that so every *corruption* arising to the *faith* of *Christ* might have an immediate *remedy*: without which prudent and wise caution, the faith would have been lost, in a little time, through the wiles and artifices of subtle, intriguing men.

The Council of Ephesus made no order against *new Creeds*, that is, Creeds still more and more enlarged, if there should be occasion, but against a *new faith*, (ἑτέραν πίστιν,) a faith *different* from and *repugnant* to that of Nice, such as was offered by the Nestorians in that Council. This is the *literal* construction, and real *intended* meaning of that decree of the Ephesine Council[x]: though, had they intended it against the receiving any *other form* but the Nicene, all that follows from it is, that they thought no more necessary at *that time*; or that *definitions* in councils, (as in the Council of Chalcedon afterwards,) or *condemnation* of heretical tenets, might suffice, leaving the *baptismal* Creed (all Creeds were such at that time) just as was before. However, the practice of the Church afterwards, in *multiplying* Creeds as need required, at the same time that they acknowledged the Ephesine Council, shews fully how they understood it. Nay, the constant reception of the Constantinopolitan Creed (which is the Nicene *interpolated*, and yet was never understood to be excluded by the Ephesine Canon) shews plainly the sense of the Synod in that matter. It is to be noted, that the Ephesine Council, by Nicene Creed, meant the Nicene strictly so called[y], and which had already been *interpolated* by the Constantinopolitan Council.

Object. VI.

[z]Another plea offered is, that in the year 1689 many wise

[x] Vid. Stephan. de Altimura (i. e. Le Quien) Panopliam contra Schism. Græc. p. 230, 158. et Dissertat. Damascen. p. 14, &c.

[y] Vid. Le Quien, ibid. p. 230. et Dissert. Damascen. p. 18.

[z] Since writing the above, I have received a copy of that very Rubrick, which I shall here add, for the information of the reader, and to put an end to all further dispute upon that head.

"Upon these Feasts, Christmas-
"Day, Easter-Day, Ascension-Day,
"Whit-Sunday, Trinity-Sunday, and
"upon All-Saints, shall be said at
"Morning Prayer, by the minister
"and people standing, instead of the
"Creed, commonly called the Apo-
"stles' Creed, this confession of our
"Christian faith, commonly called the
"Creed of St. Athanasius: the arti-
"cles of which ought to be received
"and believed as being agreeable to

and good prelates of our own (commissioned to *review* and *correct* our Liturgy) "unanimously agreed, that the use of the "Athanasian Creed should no longer be imposed."

Answ. There may be reason to question the truth of this report. There are two accounts which I have seen of this matter; one of Dr. Nichols, the other of Dr. Calamy, which he received of a friend. Dr. Nichols's account runs thus: "Atha- "nasius's Creed being disliked by many, because of the *damna-* "*tory* clauses, it was left to the *minister's* choice, either to use it, "or to change it for the Apostles' Creed[a]." Dr. Calamy's account is thus: "About the Athanasian Creed they came at "last to this conclusion: that lest the wholly rejecting it should "by unreasonable persons be imputed to them as *Socinianism*, "a Rubrick shall be made, setting forth or declaring the *curses* "denounced therein not to be restrained to every particular "article, but intended against those that deny the substance of "the Christian religion in general[b]." Now, from these two accounts compared, it may be reasonable to believe that those wise and good prelates had once drawn up a scheme to be debated and canvassed, in which scheme it was proposed to leave every *minister* at liberty with respect to the Athanasian Creed: but, upon more mature consideration, *they came at last to this conclusion:* to impose the Creed as before, and to qualify the seeming harshness of the *damnatory* clauses by a softening Rubrick. They were therefore, at length, *unanimously agreed* still to *retain* and *impose* this Creed; quite contrary to the Objector's report. And indeed it must have appeared very astonishing in the eyes of all the *reformed* churches, Lutheran and Calvinist, (who have the greatest veneration for this Creed,) to have seen it wholly rejected by the English Clergy, when there had been no precedent before of any one Church in Christendom that had done the like. All that ever received it have constantly retained it, and still retain it. It is further to be considered, that what those very worthy prelates at that time

"the holy Scriptures. And the con- "demning clauses are to be under- "stood as relating only to those who "obstinately deny the substance of "the Christian faith."

This, word for word, is the Rubrick as it was settled and finally agreed on by the commissioners in 1689, and as it stands in the *original* book now in the hands of my Lord Bishop of London. *Novemb.* 7, 1727.

[a] Nicholsii Apparat. ad Defens. Eccl. Angl. p. 95.

[b] Calamy's Life of Baxter, vol. i. p. 455.

intended, sprung from a just and becoming tenderness towards the Dissenters, because of their long *scruples* against the *damnatory* clauses: but there is not the same reason at this day. The wiser and more moderate part of the *dissenting ministers*[c] seem very well reconciled to the *damnatory* clauses, *modestly expounded;* as Dr. Wallis particularly has expounded them, *justly* and *truly*, as well as *modestly*. And I am confident the soberer Dissenters would not, at *this time*, wish to see so excellent and so useful a form of faith laid aside, only to serve the interests of our new Arians. However, since the *damnatory* clauses were the main difficulty, a better way might have been contrived than was then thought on; namely, to have preserved the whole Creed, except those clauses which are separable from it. But the best of all, as I humbly conceive, is what has prevailed, and still obtains, to let it stand as before; since the *damnatory* clauses have been often and sufficiently vindicated by the *Reformed* Churches abroad[d], as well as by our own here.

OBJECT. VII.

It is pleaded further, mostly in the words of Bishop Taylor, that the "Apostles' Creed is the rule of faith," that this only is "necessary to baptism," that what was once "sufficient to "bring men to heaven must be so" now; that there is no occasion for being so *minute* and *particular* in the matter of Creeds; with more to the like purpose.

[c] This Creed, by whomsoever framed, hath been long received in the Church, and looked on as agreeable to the Scriptures, and an excellent explication of the Christian faith. Constantinople, Rome, and the *Reformed* Churches have owned it——our pious and excellent Mr. Baxter, in his Method of Theol. p. 123. speaks thus of it: "In a word, the damnatory sen-"tences excepted, or modestly ex-"pounded," (such a modest explication of the damnatory clauses see in Dr. Wallis, &c.) "I embrace the "Creed commonly called Athana-"sius's, as the best explication of the "Trinity." And in vol. ii. of his Works, p. 132. says he, "I unfeign-"edly account the doctrine of the "Trinity, the sum and kernel of the "Christian religion, as expressed in "our Baptism, and Athanasius's "Creed, the best explication of it I "ever read." *Doctrine of the Trinity stated*, &c. *by some London Ministers*, p. 62, 63.

[d] Tentzelius, a Lutheran, is very smart upon this head against the Arminians, for their objecting to the *damnatory* sentences.

Verum injuste, atque impudenter accusant initium Symboli, quod pridem vindicarunt nostrates theologi. *Dannhawerus in Stylo vindice*, p. 200. Hulsemannus de Auxiliis Gratiæ, p. 218. Kromayerus in Theologia positivo polemica, p. 98, 99. et in Scrutinio Religionum, p. 205. aliique passim. Tentzel. p. 110. To these which Tentzelius has mentioned, I may add David Pareus, (a Calvinist,) in his comment upon this Creed, published at the end of Ursinus's Catechism, A. D. 1634, by Philip Pareus.

ANSW. 1. Dr. Taylor goes upon a false supposition that the Creed called the Apostles' was compiled by the Apostles.

2. He has another *false* presumption, appearing all the way in his reasonings on this head, that the Apostles' Creed has been always the *same* that it is now: whereas learned men know that it was not brought to its present entire form till after the year 600[e]; is nothing else but the baptismal Creed of one particular church, the Church of Rome, and designedly *short* for the ease of those who were to repeat it at baptism. Now when we are told of the Apostles' Creed containing all that is *necessary to salvation*, and *no more than is necessary*; we would gladly know whether it be meant of the *old short Roman Creed*[f], or of the *present one*, considerably *larger:* and if they intend the *old one*, why application is not made to our governors to lay the *new one* aside, or to curtail and reduce it to its primitive size; by leaving out the Belief, or profession of God's being *Creator of heaven and earth*, and of Christ's being *dead*, and of his *descent into hell*, and of the Church being *Catholic*, and of the *communion of saints*, and *life everlasting*, as unnecessary articles of faith. For why may not that suffice *now*, which was *once* sufficient? Or how can any thing be *necessary* at this day, that was not so from the beginning?

3. To set this whole matter right, it ought to be considered, that Creeds were never intended to contain, as it were, *a certain quantity of faith*, as necessary to bring men to heaven, and no more than is necessary. Were this the case, all Creeds ought precisely to have consisted of an *equal* number of articles, and the *same individual* articles: whereas there are no two Creeds any where to be found which answer to such exactness. A plain argument that the Church, in forming of Creeds, early and late,

[e] I know not whether the words, *Maker of heaven and earth*, can be proved, by any *certain* authority, to have come into that Creed before the eighth century: for after the best searches I have been hitherto able to make, I can find no copy (to be depended upon) higher than that time, which has that clause.

[f] The old Roman (or Apostles') Creed was no more than this, as may be seen in Bishop Usher, de Symbol. p. 6 and 9.

"I believe in God the Father "Almighty: and in Jesus Christ his "only Son our Lord; who was born "of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin "Mary; crucified under Pontius "Pilate, and buried, rose again the "third day from the dead, ascended "into heaven, sitteth at the right "hand of the Father, from whence "he shall come to judge the quick "and dead. And in the Holy Ghost, "the holy Church, the remission of "sins, the resurrection of the body. "*Amen.*"

went upon no such view, but upon quite another principle. The design of all was, to keep up as strictly as possible the whole *compages*, or *fabric* of the Christian faith as it stands in Scripture[ε]: and if any *part* came to be attacked, they were then to bend all their cares to succour and relieve that part, in order still to secure the *whole*. Some few of the main *stamina*, or chief lines, were taken care of from the first, and made up the first Creeds; particularly the *doctrine* of the *Trinity* briefly hinted, and scarce any thing more, because the form of baptism led to it. As to other *Articles*, or larger explications of *this*, they came in occasionally, according as this or that part of the Christian faith seemed most to be endangered, and to require present relief. And as this varied in several countries or churches, (some being more disturbed than others, and some with one kind of heresy, others with another,) so the Creeds likewise varied; some insisting particularly upon this article, others upon that, as need required, and all still endeavouring to keep up and maintain one whole and entire system of the Christian faith, according to the true and full meaning of sacred Writ. There is nothing more in it than the very nature and circumstance of the thing necessarily leads to. I may illustrate the case a little further by an easy parallel between matters of *faith* and matters of *practice*. The sum of Christian practice is contained in two brief rules; to *love God*, and *to love one's neighbour;* which comprehend all. No one needs more than this; nor indeed can there be any thing more. But then a perverse man may possibly understand by *God*, not the *true God*, the God of Jews and Christians, but some other of his own devising, or such as has been received by Pagans or heretics: and he may understand by *neighbour* one of his own *country* only, or *tribe*, or *sect*, or *family*. Well then, to obviate any such method of undermining *Christian practice*, it will be necessary to be a little more *particular* than barely to lay down in brief to *love God* and *one's neighbour:* we must add, the *true God*, the God of Jews and Christians, that very God and none else: and as to *neighbour*, we must insist upon it, that it means, not this or that *sect*, *tribe*, *party*, &c. but all mankind. And now our *rule* of *practice* begins to extend and enlarge itself

ε Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐ πάντες δύνανται τὰς γραφὰς ἀναγινώσκειν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἰδιωτεία, τοὺς δὲ ἀσχολία τις ἐμποδίζει πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν· ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀμαθίας ἀπολέσθαι, ἐν ὀλίγοις τοῖς στίχοις τὸ πᾶν δόγμα τῆς πίστεως περιλαμβάνομεν. *Cyrill. Catech. V.* n. 12. p. 78.

beyond its primitive simplicity; but not without reason. To proceed a little further: mistakes and perverse sentiments may arise in the interpreting the word *love*, so as thereby to evacuate and frustrate the primary and fundamental rule: to correct and remove which, it may be necessary still further to *enlarge* the *rule* of *practice*, and to branch it out into many other particulars; which to mention would be needless. Now if such a method as this will of course be necessary to preserve the *essentials* of *practice*; let it not be thought strange if the like has been made use of to preserve the *essentials* of *faith*. There is the same reason and the like occasion for both: and if due care be taken in both, to make all the branches hang naturally upon the primary and fundamental rules, and to adopt no *foreign* ones, as belonging thereunto when they really do not; then there is nothing in this whole affair but a just and prudent care about what most of all deserves it, and such as will be indispensably required in every faithful minister, or steward of the mysteries of God. To return to our point in hand: as more and more of the sacred truths, in process of time, came to be opposed, or brought in question; so Creeds have been enlarged in proportion; and an explicit profession of more and more articles required of every candidate for baptism. And because this was not security sufficient, since many might forget, or not know, or not attend to what they had professed in their baptism, (by themselves or by their sureties,) it was found highly expedient and necessary to insert one or more Creeds in the standing and daily Offices of the Church, to remind people of that faith which they had solemnly engaged to maintain, and to guard the unwary against the wily attempts of heretics to pervert them. This is the plain and true account of Creeds, and of their *use* in the Christian churches. And therefore, if any man would talk sense against the *use* of this or that Creed in any Church, he ought to shew either that it contains such *truths* as no man ever did, or in all probability ever will oppose, (which will be a good argument to prove the Creed *superfluous*,) or that it contains articles which are *not true*, or are at best *doubtful*; which will be a good argument to prove such a Creed *hurtful*. Now, as to the Athanasian form, it will hardly be thought *superfluous*, so long as there are any Arians, Photinians, Sabellians, Macedonians, Apollinarians, Nestorians, or Eutychians in this part of the world: and as to its being *hurtful*, that may then be proved

when it can be shewn that any of those forementioned *heresies* were no *heresies*, or have not been justly condemned.

If it be pleaded that the *vulgar*, knowing little of any of those *heresies*, will therefore know as little of what the Creed means; and so to them it may be at least dry and insipid, if not wholly useless: to this I answer; that there are no kinds of *heretics* but hope to make the *vulgar* understand *their* tenets respectively, and to draw them aside from the *received* faith of the Church: and therefore it behoves the pastors of the Church to have a *standing* form, to guard the people against any such attempts. The *vulgar* will understand, in the general, and as far as is ordinarily to them necessary, the main doctrines of a *Trinity in Unity*, and of *God incarnate:* and as to particular explications, whenever they have occasion to look further, they will find the *true ones* laid down in this Creed; which will be useful to prevent their being imposed upon at any time with *false* ones. If they never have occasion to go further than generals, there is no hurt done to them by *abundant* caution: if they have, here is a direction ready for them to prevent mistakes. It is not pretended that all are capable of seeing through every nicety, or of perceiving the full intent and aim of every part of this form, and what it alludes to. But as many as are capable of being *set wrong* in any one branch, (by the subtilty of seducers,) are as capable of being *kept right* by this *rule* given them: and they will as easily understand *one side* of the question, as they will the *other*. The Christian churches throughout the world, ever since the multiplication of *heresies*, have thought it necessary to guard their people by some such forms as these in standing use amongst them. The Oriental churches, which receive not this Creed into their constant Offices, yet more than supply the want of it, either by other the like Creeds[h], or by their solemn stated Prayers in their Liturgies, wherein they express their *faith* as fully and particularly (or more so[i]) as this Creed does: and they are not so much afraid of *puzzling* and *perplexing* the *vulgar* by doing it, as they are of *betraying* and *exposing* them to the attempts of seducers, should they not do it. For which reason also they frequently direct their prayers to God the *Son*, as well

[h] See the Creed of the Armenians in Sir P. Ricaut, p. 411, &c.

[i] See Ludolphus Histor. Æthiop. lib. iii. c. 5. and Renaudot's Orient. Liturg. passim.

as to God the *Father;* being in that case more solicitous than the Latin churches have been, because they have been oftener disturbed by Arians, and other impugners of Christ's divinity[k].

Upon the whole, I look upon it as exceeding *useful*, and even *necessary*, for every church to have some such *form* as this, or something equivalent, open and common to all its members; that none may be led astray for want of proper caution, and previous instruction in what so nearly concerns the whole structure and fabric of the Christian faith[l]. As to this particular form, it has so long prevailed, and has so well answered the use intended, that, all things considered, there can be no sufficient reason for *changing* any part of it, much less for *laying* the whole *aside*. There are several other Creeds, very good ones, (though somewhat larger,) which, had they been made choice of for *common* use, might possibly have done as well. The Creeds I mean (of which there is a great number) drawn up after the Council of Chalcedon, and purposely contrived to obviate all the *heresies* that ever had infested the Christian Church. But those that dislike this Creed would much more dislike the other; as being still more *particular* and *explicit* in regard to the Nestorian, Eutychian, and Monothelite heresies and equally full and clear for the doctrine of the *Trinity*.

To conclude; as long as there shall be any men left to *oppose* the *doctrines* which this Creed contains, so long will it be *expedient*, and even *necessary* to continue the *use* of it, in order to preserve the rest: and, I suppose, when we have none remaining to find fault with the *doctrines*, there will be none to object against the *use* of the Creed, or so much as to wish to have it laid aside.

[k] Nam cum omnes orationes Latini Canonis, ex vetustissima traditione, ad Deum *Patrem* dirigantur; in Oriente plures ad *Filium:* nempe, quia magis conflictata est Arianorum, et aliorum qui ejus divinitatem impugnabant, contentionibus Orientalis, quam Occidentalis Ecclesia. *Renaudot. de Orient. Liturg.* vol. i. p. 262.

[l] To this purpose speaks Johannes Pappus, in the name of the Lutheran churches, commenting on the Augsburg Confession.

Semper in Ecclesia scriptorum quorundam publicorum usus fuit, quibus doctrinæ divinitus revelatæ de certis capitibus summa comprehenderetur, et contra hæreticos, aliosque adversarios defenderetur. Talia scripta, licet perbrevia, sunt Symbola illa totius Ecclesiæ, omnium hominum consensu recepta, Apostolicum, Nicænum, Athanasianum. *Joan. Papp. Comm. in Confess. August.* fol. 2.

I take this upon the credit of Nic. Serarius, who quotes the passage from Pappus. *Serar. in Symb. Athanas.* p. 9. tom. 2.

AN APPENDIX TO CHAPTER THE THIRD.

570. I INTIMATED above, p. 136. that Fortunatus's comment upon the Athanasian Creed, though before published, might deserve a second publication, and be made much more correct than it appears in Muratorius's second tome of Anecdota.

I have made frequent use of it in the preceding sheets: and now my design in reprinting it is, to let the reader see what the comment is which I so frequently refer to; that so he may judge for himself whether it really be what I suppose, and I think with good reason, a comment of the sixth century, and justly ascribed to Fortunatus. I have endeavoured to make it as correct as possible, by such helps as I could any where procure; which are as follow:

1. The printed copy of it, published by Muratorius from a manuscript of the Ambrosian library, about 600 years old.

2. A manuscript copy from Oxford, found among Franciscus Junius's manuscripts, which appears, by the *character*, to be about 800 years old. As it is older than Muratorius's, so is it also more faithful; and though it has a great many faults both in the *orthography* and *syntax*, owing either to the ignorance of the *age* or of the *copyist*, yet it does not appear to have been *interpolated* like the other, or to have been industriously altered in any part.

3. Besides those two copies of the entire comment, I have had some assistance from such *parcels* of it as are to be met with in writers that have borrowed from it. Bruno's comment furnishes us with some parts which he had taken into his own. But there is, among the supposititious works ascribed to St. Austin, a treatise entitled Sermo de Symbolo[m], which has several scattered fragments of this very comment in it. The whole treatise is a *farrago*, or collection from several other writers; as Ruffinus, Cæsarius, Pope Gregory I, and Ivo Carnotensis. By the last mentioned, one may be assured that the *collection* is not older than the close of the eleventh century; it may be later. It

[m] Augustin. Oper. tom. vi. in Appendice, p. 278. ed. Bened.

will be serviceable however, so far as it goes, for restoring the true readings where our copies are corrupt; which is the use I make of it.

Nothing now remains but to lay before the learned reader Fortunatus's comment in its native language, and therewith to close up our inquiries concerning the Athanasian Creed.

The *various lections*, all that are properly such, are carefully noted at the bottom of the page; that so the reader may judge whether the *text* be what it should be, or correct it, if it appears otherwise. But I should hint, that there are several little variations in the Oxford manuscript, which I take no notice of, as not being properly *various lections*.

1. Such as are merely *orthographical*: as a permutation of letters; using *d* for *t*, in *capud* and *reliquid*, for *caput* and *reliquit*; *e* for *i*, in *trea* for *tria*; and *i* for *e*, in *calit* for *calet*, and the like: *o* for *u* in *servolis*, *p* for *b* in *optenit* for *obtinet*; *v* consonant for *b*, in *enarravit* for *enarrabit*; though such as this last is might be noted among *various lections*, in cases more disputable.

To this head may be referred some antique, and now obsolete spellings: *inmensus* for *immensus*, *inmortalis* for *immortalis*, *inlesus* for *illæsus*, *conlocavit* for *collocavit*, *dinoscitur* for *dignoscitur*, and the like.

2. *Active terminations* of verbs, for *passive*: as *finire* for *finiri*, *cogitare* for *cogitari*; though these may be referred to the former head, being only changing the letter *i* for the letter *e*. *Dominat* for *dominatur* I take notice of among the *various lections*.

3. Faults in the *formation* of *verbs*: as *abstuleret* for *tolleret*, *vivendos* for *viventes*; to which may be added *morsit* for *momordit*, having been long out of use.

4. *Manifest* faults in concord: as *humani carnis*, for *humanæ*; *eodem captivitate*, for *eâdem*. But where there can be any doubt of the construction, I mark such among the *various lections*, leaving the reader to judge of them.

These and other the like niceties are generally neglected in editions of authors; it being both needless and endless to note them. But I was willing to hint something of them in this place, because they may be of use to scholars for the making a judgment of the *value* of a manuscript; and sometimes of the *time* or *place*; as also of the *manner* how a copy was taken, whether by

the *ear* or by the *eye*, from word of mouth, or merely from a *writing* laid before the copyist. Besides that if we can distinguish in the present case, as perhaps a good critic may, the *particularities* of the *author* from those of his *transcribers*; they may possibly afford some additional argument for the ascertaining the *author* of the comment.

EXPOSITIO FIDEI CATHOLICÆ FORTUNATI.[a]

Scripta anno circiter 520.

QUICUNQUE vult salvus esse[b], *ante omnia opus est ut teneat Catholicam Fidem: quam nisi quisque integram, inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in æternum peribit*[c].

Fides dicitur credulitas, sive credentia[d]. [*Primo ergo omnium fides necessaria est, sicut Apostolica docet auctoritas dicens*; sine fide impossibile est placere Deo. *Constat enim neminem ad veram pervenire posse beatitudinem, nisi Deo placeat; et Deo neminem placere posse, nisi per fidem. Fides namque est bonorum omnium fundamentum, fides humanæ salutis initium. Sine hac nemo ad Filiorum Dei potest consortium pervenire; quia sine ipsa nec in hoc seculo quisquam justificationis consequitur gratiam, nec in futuro vitam possidebit æternam. Et si quis heic non ambulaverit per fidem, non perveniet ad speciem beatam Domini nostri Jesu Christi*[e].] Catholica universalis dicitur, id est, recta, quam Ecclesia universa[f] tenere debet. Ecclesia[g] dicitur congregatio Christiano-

[a] Ita se habet titulus in Codice Muratorii. Aliter in Oxoniensi, viz. *Expositio in Fide Catholica*: pro *in Fidem Catholicam*, ex corrupta loquendi ratione apud Scriptores ætatis mediæ.

[b] *Esse salvus*. Cod. Murat.

[c] Posterior hæc Symboli clausula, incipiens a *quam nisi*, non habetur in Cod. Oxoniensi.

[d] Ita Cod. Oxon. prima hæc pericope deest in Murator. Conf. Brun. in Symb.

[e] Quæ uncinulis includuntur, non comparent in MS. Oxoniensi. Nec enim Fortunati videntur esse, sed Alcuini potius; apud quem eadem fere verbatim leguntur. (De Fid. Trin. lib. i. cap. 2. p. 707.) Alcuinus vero maximam partem mutuatus est a Fulgentio. (De Fid. ad Petrum Prolog. p. 500. ed. Paris.) Sed varia exemplaria varie sententiam claudunt. Fulgentius legit, *non perveniet ad speciem*; nec quicquam ultra. Alcuinus, *non perveniet ad speciem beatæ visionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi*. Ab utrisque abit lectio Muratorii.

[f] *Universa Ecclesia*. Cod. Mur. et Brunonis.

[g] Cod. Muratorii habet *quippe*, post *Ecclesia*: quam voculam, utpote ineptam, saltem otiosam, expunximus, fide Cod. Oxoniensis. Conf. Brunon. in hoc loco.

rum, sive conventus populorum. [*Non enim, sicut conventicula hæreticorum, in aliquibus regionum partibus coarctatur, sed per totum terrarum orbem dilatata diffunditur*[h].]

Ut unum Deum in Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate veneremur: et credamus, et colamus, et confiteamur [*Trinitatem in Personis, unitatem in substantia. Hanc quoque Trinitatem Personarum, atque unitatem naturæ propheta Esaias revelatam sibi non tacuit, cum se dicit seraphim vidisse clamantia,* Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus, Dominus Deus Sabaoth. *Ubi prorsus in eo quod dicitur tertio* Sanctus, *Personarum Trinitatem; in eo vero quod semel dicimus* Dominus Deus Sabaoth, *divinæ naturæ cognoscimus unitatem*[i].]

Neque confundentes Personas: ut Sabellius errat, qui ipsum dicit esse Patrem in Persona quem et Filium, ipsum et Spiritum Sanctum. Non ergo confundentes Personas, quia tres omnino Personæ sunt[k]. Est enim gignens, genitus, et[l] procedens. *Gignens* est Pater, qui genuit Filium; Filius est *genitus,* quem genuit Pater; Spiritus Sanctus est *procedens,* quia a Patre et Filio procedit. Pater et Filius coæterni sibi sunt et coæquales; et cooperatores, sicut scriptum est; *Verbo Domini cœli firmati*[m] *sunt,* id est, a Filio Dei creati, *Spiritu*[n] *oris ejus, omnis virtus eorum.* Ubi sub singulari numero, *Spiritus*[o] *ejus* dicit[p], [unitatem substantiæ Deitatis ostendit; ubi sub plurali numero, *omnis virtus eorum* dicit[q],] Trinitatem Personarum aperte demonstrat, quia tres unum sunt, et unum tres.

Neque substantiam separantes: ut Arius garrit, qui sicut tres

[h] Uncis hic inclusa non habentur in Codice Oxoniensi. Verba nimirum sunt, non Fortunati, sed Isidori Hispal. *Orig.* lib. viii. cap. 1.

[i] Quæ uncis comprehensa hic legere est, non comparent in Codice Oxoniensi. Verba sunt Alcuini (de Trin. lib. i. cap. 3. p. 709.) in quo eadem plane, similique ordine invenias. Sunt porro eadem, uno vocabulo dempto, apud Fulgentium (de Fid. ad Petrum, p. 503.) ordine etiam tantum non eodem. Verba autem illa introductoria; (viz. *Trinitatem in Personis, unitatem in substantia*) non leguntur in Fulgentio, nec quidem in Alcuino. Interpolator ipse, uti videtur, ex proprio illa penu deprompta præmisit cæteris. Connexionis forte aliqualis conservandæ gratia.

[k] *Tres Personæ omnino sunt.* Murat.

[l] Deest *et* in Cod. Oxon.

[m] *Formati.* Cod. Oxon. Vid. Symb. Damasi dictum (apud Hieronym. tom. v. p. 122.) unde hæc *noster,* mutatis mutandis, desumpsisse videtur.

[n] *Spiritus.* Cod. Oxon.

[o] Leg. *Spiritu,* uterque vero Codex habet *Spiritus.*

[p] *Dicitur.* Cod. Murat.

[q] Lacunam in Muratorio manifestam (quippe cum desint ea verba uncis inclusa) ex Codice Oxoniensi supplevimus. Scilicet, vox *dicit* proxime recurrens librarii oculos (uti fit) fefellit.

Personas esse dicit, sic et tres substantias esse mentitur[r]. Filium dicit minorem quam Patrem, et creaturam esse; Spiritum Sanctum adhuc minorem quam Filium, et Patri et Filio eum esse administratorem[s] adserit. Non ergo *substantiam separantes*, quia totæ tres Personæ in substantia Deitatis[t] unum sunt.

Alia est enim Persona Patris: quia Pater ingenitus est, eo quod a nullo est genitus. *Alia Persona Filii*, quia Filius a Patre solo est[u] genitus. *Alia Spiritus Sancti*, quia a Patre et Filio Spiritus Sanctus[x] procedens est.

Sed Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti una est Divinitas: id est, Deitas. *Æqualis Gloria:* id est, claritas. *Coæterna Majestas:* Majestas gloria est, claritas, sive potestas[y].

Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus Sanctus. Id est, in Deitate, et Omnipotentia.

Increatus Pater, increatus Filius, increatus et Spiritus Sanctus. Id est, a nullo creatus[z].

Immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus et Spiritus Sanctus. Non est mensurabilis in sua natura, quia inlocalis est,[a] incircumscriptus, ubique totus, ubique præsens, ubique potens.

Æternus Pater, æternus Filius, æternus et Spiritus Sanctus. Id est, non tres æterni, sed in tribus Personis unus Deus æternus, qui sine initio, et sine fine æternus permanet.

Similiter Omnipotens Pater, Omnipotens Filius, Omnipotens et Spiritus Sanctus. Omnipotens dicitur, eo quod omnia potest, et omnium obtinet potestatem[b]. Ergo, si omnia potest, quid est quod non potest? Hoc non potest, quod Omnipotenti non competit posse[c]. Falli non potest, [quia veritas est; infirmari non

[r] Ita clare Cod. Oxon. Aliter Muratorius ex vitioso Codice; *quia tres Personas esse dicit, si et tres substantias esse mentitur.* Sensus impeditus, aut nullus.

[s] *Et Patris et Filii eum administratorem esse adserit.* Cod. Murat. Conf. Brunon.

[t] *Divinitatis.* Cod. Oxon.

[u] *A Patre est solo.* Cod. Oxon.

[x] Desunt *Spiritus Sanctus* in Cod. Murat. quæ tamen retinuimus, tum fide Cod. Oxoniensis, tum quia in antecedentibus *Pater*, et *Filius* bis ponuntur, sicut et hic *Sp. Sanctus.*

[y] Cod. Oxoniensis legit *claritatis, sive potestas.*

[z] Cod. Oxoniensis legit *creati.*

[a] Muratorii exemplar insertum habet *et*, quod delendum esse censui, cum absit a Codice Oxon. et otiosum videatur.

[b] Fortunatus, in sua Exposit. Symb. Apostolici, hæc habet; *Omnipotens vero dicitur, eo quod omnia possit, et omnium obtinet potentatum.* ed. Basil. *obtineat potestatem.* ed. Lugd. Præluserat Ruffinus, in Symbolum.

[c] S. Bruno, hunc opinor locum præ oculis habens, his verbis utitur: *Ergo, si omnia potest, quid est quod non potest? Hoc non potest, quod non convenit omnipotenti posse.* Brun. in Symb. Athanas.

potest,] quia sanitas est[d]; mori non potest, quia immortalis vita est; finiri non potest, quia infinitus et perennis est.

Ita, Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus et Spiritus Sanctus. [Deus nomen est potestatis, non proprietatis[e]]. Proprium nomen est Patris *Pater;* et proprium nomen est[f] Filii *Filius;* et proprium nomen est Spiritus Sancti *Spiritus Sanctus.*

Ita, Dominus Pater, Dominus Filius, Dominus et Spiritus Sanctus. Dominus dicitur, eo quod omnia dominat, et omnium est Dominus dominator[g].

Quia sicut singillatim (id est, sicut distinctim[h]) *unamquamque Personam et*[i] *Deum et Dominum confiteri Christiana veritate compellimur.* Quia si me interrogaveris quid sit[k] Pater, ego respondebo; Deus, et Dominus. Similiter, si me interrogaveris[l] quid sit[m] Filius, ego dicam; Deus, et Dominus. Et si dicis[n], quid est Spiritus Sanctus? Ego dico[o]; Deus, et Dominus. Et in his tribus Personis, non tres Deos, nec tres Dominos, sed in[p] his tribus, sicut jam supra dictum est,[q] unum Deum, et unum Dominum confiteor.

Unus ergo Pater, non tres Patres: id est, quia[r] Pater semper Pater, nec aliquando Filius. *Unus Filius, non tres Filii:* id est, quia Filius semper Filius, nec aliquando Pater. *Unus Spiritus*

[d] Muratorius sententiam mancam, vitiatamque exhibet: *Falli non potest, quia Sanctus est;* omissis intermediis. Scilicet, vocabulum proxime repetitum describentis oculum delusit: et ne nullus inde eliceretur sensus, pro *sanitas* substitutum est *sanctus.* Hæc porro sibimet adoptavit S. Bruno, pauculis mutatis, vel interjectis, ad hunc modum: *Falli non potest, quia veritas et sapientia est; ægrotari aut infirmari non potest, quia sanitas est; mori non potest, quia immortalis est; finiri non potest, quia infinitus et perennis est.*

[e] Deest hæc clausula in Codice Murator. sed confer Symbolum Damasi dictum, quod Gregorii Bœtici creditur, apud August. tom. v. p. 387. Append. item apud Hieronym. tom. v. p. 122.

[f] Deest *est.* Murator. Conf. Brun.

[g] *Dominat,* pro *dominatur,* et cum accusativo, ex vitiata inferioris ævi Latinitate, vel ex scribæ imperitia. Aliter Codex Muratorii, ex Isidori Origin. (lib. vii. cap. 1.) *Dominus dicitur, eo quod dominetur creaturæ cunctæ, vel quod creatura omnis dominatui ejus deserviat.*

[h] *Distinctum.* Oxon. *distincte.* Murat.

[i] Deest *et.* Cod. Murator.

[k] *Quid est.* Murator. Eandem sententiam expressit S. Bruno, his verbis: *Qaia si me interrogaveris quid est Pater, ego respondeo; Deus, et Dominus.*

[l] *Et si me rogaveris.* Cod. Oxon.

[m] *Est.* Murator. Locum sic exhibet S. Bruno: *Similiter, si interrogaveris quid est Filius, ego dico, Deus et Dominus.*

[n] *Dicas.* Murator.

[o] *Dicam.* Murator. Apud Brunonem sic legitur: *Et si dicis, quid est Spiritus Sanctus? Ego respondeo: Deus, et Dominus.*

[p] Deest *in.* Oxon.

[q] *Supra dixi.* Cod. Oxon. Sed Brunonis lectio Muratorii lectionem confirmat.

[r] Codex Oxon. pro *quia* habet *qui,* in hoc loco, et in duobus proxime sequentibus. Utrumlibet elegeris, eodem fere res redit.

Sanctus, non tres Spiritus Sancti: id est, quia Spiritus Sanctus semper est[s] Spiritus Sanctus, nec aliquando Filius, aut Pater. Hæc est proprietas Personarum.

Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius, aut posterius. Quia sicut nunquam Filius sine Patre, sic nunquam fuit Pater sine Filio, sic et nunquam fuit Pater et Filius sine Spiritu Sancto[t]. Cœterna ergo Trinitas, et inseparabilis Unitas, sine initio et sine fine[u].

Nihil majus, aut minus. Æqualitatem Personarum dicit, quia [x]Trinitas æqualis est, et una[y] Deitas, Apostolo docente[z], et dicente: *Per ea, quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur;* et per creaturam Creator intelligitur, secundum has comparationes, et alias quamplures. Sol, candor, et calor, et tria sunt vocabula, et tria unum[a]. Quod candet, hoc calet, et quod calet, hoc candet: tria hæc vocabula res una esse dignoscitur[b]. Ita[c] Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, tres Personæ in Deitate, substantiâ[d] unum sunt; et individua unitas recte creditur. Item de terrenis, vena, fons, fluvius, tria sunt[e] vocabula, et tria unum[f] in sua natura. Ita trium Personarum, Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, substantia et Deitas unum est[g].

Est ergo Fides recta, ut credamus et confiteamur, quia Dominus noster Jesus Christus[h]. Jesus Hebraïce, Latine Salvator dicitur. [Christus Græce, Latine unctus vocatur. Jesus ergo dicitur[i]] eo quod salvat populum: Christus, eo quod Spiritu Sancto divi-

[s] In Cod. Oxon. deest *est.*

[t] Paulo aliter huncce locum expressit auctor Sermonis, inter Augustini opera, (Append. tom. vi. p. 281.) *Quia sicut nunquam Pater sine Filio, nec Filius sine Patre; sic et nunquam fuit Pater et Filius sine Spiritu Sancto.* Sed nihil mutandum contra fidem exemplarium.

[u] In Appendice prædicta, sic legitur: *Cœterna ergo est Sancta Trinitas* &c.

[x] *Sancta Trinitas.* Append.

[y] *Una est Deitas.* Append. *una Deitatis.* Oxon. male.

[z] In Cod. Oxoniensi desunt illa *docente et.* Sed Append. lectionem Muratorii tuetur, alio tamen verborum ordine; *dicente, atque docente.*

[a] Ita Muratorius cum Appendice prædict. Aliter MS. Oxon. viz. *tria sunt nomina, et res una.* Quæ eodem recidunt.

[b] In Appendice sic se habent; *tria hæc vocabula res una cognoscitur.*

[c] *Et* post *ita.* Oxon.

[d] Codices habent *substantiæ,* (quod tamen in Appendice prædicta omittitur prorsus) et comma interponunt post *Personæ.* Prava interpunctio corrigenda est, et levicula mutatione legendum *substantiâ:* quod et vidit et monuit vir quidam amicissimus simul et perspicacissimus.

[e] Appendix legit *hæc,* non *sunt,* Oxon. *tria itemque sunt.*

[f] Oxoniensis, *res una.* Append. cum Muratorio, *unum.*

[g] Ita Murat. et Append. Oxoniensis legit, *substantia, Deitas una est.*

[h] Oxoniensis adjicit, *Dei Filius et homo est.* Inepte hoc loco, quod ex sequentibus patebit.

[i] Muratorii Codex omittit verba illa intermedia, uncis inclusa. Scilicet, illud *dicitur* proxime repetitum amanuensi hic iterum fraudi fuit.

nitus sit[k] delibutus, sicut in ipsius Christi[l] Persona Esaias ait; *Spiritus Domini super me, propter quod unxit me,* &c. Ita et Psalmista de Christo Domino dicit,[m] *unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo lætitiæ præ consortibus tuis.*

Dei Filius, Deus pariter et homo est. Filius a felicitate parentum dicitur: homo ab humo dicitur; id est, de humo[n] factus est.

Deus est[o] *ex substantia Patris ante sæcula genitus.* Id est, Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, splendor de splendore, fortis de forti, virtus de virtute, vita de vita, æternitas de æternitate: per omnia, idem[p] quod Pater in divina substantia hoc est et[q] Filius, Deus enim[r] Pater Deum Filium genuit, non voluntate, neque necessitate, sed natura. Nec quæratur quomodo genuit Filium[s], quod et angeli nesciunt, prophetis est incognitum: unde [t]eximius propheta Esaias dicit; *Generationem ejus quis enarrabit?* Ac si diceret[u], angelorum nullus, prophetarum nemo[x]. Nec inenarrabilis, et inæstimabilis Deus[y] a servulis suis discutiendus est, sed fideliter credendus[z], et pariter diligendus.

Et homo[a] *ex substantia matris, in sæculo natus.* Dei Filius, Verbum Patris,[b] caro factum. [c]Non quod Divinitas mutasset Deitatem, sed adsumpsit humanitatem. Hoc est, Verbum caro factum est, ex utero Virginis veram humanam carnem traxit. Et de utero virginali verus homo, sicut et verus Deus, est in sæculo natus, salva virginitatis gratia; [d] quia mater, quæ genuit, virgo ante partum, et virgo post partum permansit[e].

[k] *Divinitus sit* desunt in Cod. Oxon.

[l] Deest *Christi.* Murator.

[m] Oxoniensis breviter, *Item in Psalmo, unxit* &c. Notandum porro, quod quædam habet Fortunatus noster, in commentario suo in Symbol. Apostol. hisce jam proxime descriptis perquam similia. Confer etiam Ruffin. in Symbol. inter Oper. Hieronym. (tom. v. p. 131.)

[n] *De humo terræ.* Murator.

[o] Non habetur *est* in Murat.

[p] Pro *idem, id est.* Murator.

[q] Deest *et* Cod. Oxon. His quoque gemina fere habes in Exposit. in Symbol. Apostolicum.

[r] Deest *enim* Cod. Oxon. Confer Symb. Damasi dictum.

[s] *Quomodo genitus sit, quod angeli* ——Oxon. At Muratorii lectioni astipulatur Appendix ad Augustin. (tom. vi. p. 279.) et Fortunatus ipse, Expos. in Symb. Apostol.

[t] Unde *et isdem.* Cod. Murat. Conf. Fortunat. in Symb. Apostolicum.

[u] Muratorius habet *dixisset.*

[x] *Angelorum nemo, prophetarum nullus.* Cod. Oxon.

[y] Deest *Deus.* Oxon.

[z] Confer Fortunat. in Symb. Apostol. et Append. apud August. p. 279. et Ruffin. Symb.

[a] *Homo est.* Cod. Oxon.

[b] *Dei Filius, Verbum caro.* Murat. *Dei Filius Verbo Patris caro.* Cod. Oxon. Ex utrisque veram, opinor, lectionem restituimus.

[c] *Et non.* Cod. Murator. Expunximus illud *et,* fide Codicis Oxon.

[d] *Salva virginitatis gratia* desunt in Cod. Oxoniensi.

[e] Ita Cod. Oxon. Muratorius, *quia mater genuit, et virgo mansit ante partum, et post partum.*

In sæculo. Id est, in isto sexto miliario, in quo nunc sumus, [*secula enim generationibus constant, et inde secula, quod sequantur; abeuntibus enim aliis, alia succedunt* [f]]. " Deus et homo Christus " Jesus, unus Dei Filius et ipse Virginis Filius. Quia dum Deitas " in utero Virginis humanitatem adsumpsit, et cum ea per por- " tam Virginis integram, et illæsam, nascendo mundum ingressus " est Virginis Filius; et hominem (*leg.* homo) quem adsumsit, " id (*leg.* idem) est Dei Filium (*leg.* Filius) sicut jam supra dixi- " mus; et Deitas et humanitas in Christo; et Dei Patris pariter " et Virginis Matris Filius."

Perfectus Deus, perfectus homo. Id est, verus Deus, et verus homo. [g] *Ex anima rationali:* et non ut Apollinaris [h] hæreticus dixit primum, quasi Deitas pro anima fuisset in carne Christi; postea, cum per evangelicam auctoritatem fuisset [i] convictus, dixit: *Habuit quidem animam quæ vivificavit corpus, sed non rationalem.* [k] E contrario, dicit qui Catholice sentit; *ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens* [l]: id est, plenus homo, atque perfectus.

Æqualis Patri secundum Divinitatem; minor Patre secundum humanitatem. Id est, secundum formam servi quam adsumere dignatus est.

Qui licet [m] *Deus sit et homo, non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus.* Id est, duæ substantiæ in Christo, Deitas et humanitas, non duæ Personæ, sed una est Persona [n].

Unus autem, non conversione Divinitatis in carnem [o], *sed adsump-*

[f] Non comparent in Codice Oxoniensi. Verba sunt Isidor. Orig. lib. v. cap. 38. Quæ sequuntur proxime, *Deus et homo* &c. usque ad *matris Filius*, desunt omnia in codice Muratorii: ex Oxoniensi solo descripta dedimus. Videntur mihi Fortunati re vera esse, sed librarii culpa (ut alia multa) mirum in modum vitiata; quæ quidem ex *conjectura* aliquatenus corrigere volui, ut Syntaxis saltem sibi constet, donec certiora, et meliora ex Codicibus (si forte supersint aliqui) eruantur. Cæterum, ut Fortunato nostro hæc ascribam, illud suadet maxime, quod in expositione sua in Symbolum Apostolicum gemina fere habet de *porta Virginis*, eisdemque ibi nonnullis phrasibus utitur quibus hic usus est. Confer Symbolum Ruffini, a quo solenne est *nostro* (quippe qui et ipse Aquileiæ olim doctrina Christiana initiatus fuerat) tum verba, tum sententias mutuari.

[g] Deest hæc clausula in Cod. Oxon. ob vocabulum repetitum.

[h] *Paulinaris.* Cod. Oxon. Lectio nata ex sermone simplici et plebeio.

[i] *Fuit.* Cod. Oxon.

[k] *Et e contrario iste dicit.* Murat. Delevimus illa *et*, atque *iste* —— quæ sententiam turbant, fide Codicis Oxoniensis.

[l] *Subsistit.* Cod. Oxon.

[m] *Certe*, loco τοῦ *licet.* Cod. Oxon.

[n] *Est Persona* desunt in Cod. Oxon.

[o] Cod. Oxoniensis habet *carne*, et *Deo:* errore, uti credo, pervetusto, multisque et antiquissimis exemplaribus communi. Quod si verbis in

tione humanitatis in Deum [o]. Id est: non quod Divinitas, quæ immutabilis est, sit conversa in carnem [p]; sed ideo unus, eo quod humanitatem adsumsit, cœpit [q] esse quod non [r] erat, et non amisit quod erat; cœpit esse homo [s] quod antea non fuerat, non amisit Deitatem quæ incommutabilis in æternum permanet [t].

Unus omnino, non confusione substantiæ, sed unitate Personæ. Id est; Divinitas incommutabilis [u] cum homine, quem adsumere dignata [x] est, sicut scriptum est; *Verbum tuum, Domine, in æternum permanet.* Id est, Divinitas cum humanitate; ut diximus duas substantias unam Personam [y] esse in Christo: ut sicut ante adsumptionem [carnis, æterna fuit Trinitas, ita post adsumptionem [z]] humanæ naturæ, vera maneat Trinitas; ne propter adsumptionem humanæ carnis dicatur esse quaternitas, quod absit a Fidelium cordibus, vel sensibus, dici, aut cogitari, cum, ita [a] ut supradictum est, et Unitas in Trinitate, et Trinitas in Unitate veneranda sit.

Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo; ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. Etsi Deus [b], Dei Filius, nostram luteam et mortalem carnem, nostræ redemptionis conditionem [c] adsumpserit, se tamen nullatenus [d] inquinavit, neque naturam Deitatis mutavit. Quia si sol, aut ignis aliquid immundum tetigerit, quod tangit purgat, et se nullatenus coinquinat: ita Deitas sarcinam quoque [e] nostræ humanitatis adsumpsit, se nequaquam

commentario immediate sequentibus (ex Muratorii lectione) steterimus, Fortunatus ipse nobis auctor erit, ut et *Deum*, et *carnem*, pro genuina lectione habeamus.

[p] *Quæ immutabilis et inconvertibilis est, caro; sed* &c. Cod. Oxon.

[q] *Incipit*. Cod. Oxon.

[r] Deest *non*. Cod. Murat. male.

[s] Deest *homo* in Cod. Oxon. perperam, item, *incipit* pro *cœpit*.

[t] Muratorius legit, *quia incommutabilis in æternum permanet*: Cod. Oxoniensis, *quæ immutabilis in æternum permansit*. Ex utrisque tertiam lectionem confecimus; quæ, opinor, cæteris et venustior est, et aptior.

[u] *Immutabilis*. Cod. Oxon.

[x] *Dignatus*. Cod. Oxon.

[y] *Personam* perperam omittit Cod. Oxoniensis.

[z] Desunt in Codice Oxoniensi: prætermissa scilicet festinantis librarii incuria, ob vocem iteratam.

[a] Pro *cum ita*, habet Cod. Oxon. *nisi ita*.

[b] Murator. Cod. omittit *Deus*.

[c] Cod. Oxoniensis, *nostri redemptionis conditionis adsumpsit*. Nescio an melius Muratorius; *nostram luteam, et mortalem carnem nostræ conditionis adsumserit*. Sed levi mutatione, recte incedunt omnia. *Conditio*, apud Scriptores quinti et sexti sæculi, est *servile* onus, opusve.

[d] Cod. Oxon. legit *se nullatenus*. Murator. *Sed tamen se nullatenus*. Noster vero in Exposit. in Symb. Apostol. in simili causa, hac utitur phrasi, *se tamen non inquinat*.

[e] Oxoniensis habet, *Deitas sarcinamque nostræ humanitatis adsumpsit, se nequaquam* &c. Muratorius hoc modo, *Deitas sarcinam, quam ex nostra humanitate adsumpsit, nequaquam coinquinavit*. Lectio frigida prorsus,

coinquinavit, sed nostram naturam carnis,[f] quam adsumpsit, purgavit, et a maculis, et sordibus peccatorum, ac vitiorum expiavit: sicut Esaias ait; *Ipse infirmitates nostras accepit, et ægrotationes portavit.* Ad hoc secundum humanitatem natus est, ut infirmitates nostras acciperet, et ægrotationes portaret: non quod ipse infirmitates, vel ægrotationes in se haberet, quia salus mundi est; sed ut eas a nobis tolleret, dum suæ sacræ passionis gratia, et sacramento[g], chirographo adempto, redemptionem pariter et salutem animarum nobis condonaret.

Qui passus est pro salute nostra. Id est, secundum id quod pati potuit: quod est, secundum humanam naturam; nam secundum Divinitatem, Dei Filius impassibilis est.

Descendit ad inferos[h]. Ut[i] protoplastum Adam[k], et patriarchas, et prophetas, et omnes justos, qui pro originali peccato ibidem detinebantur, liberaret; et de[l] vinculis ipsius[m] peccati absolutos, de eadem captivitate, et[n] infernali[o] loco, suo sanguine redemptos, ad supernam patriam, et ad perpetuæ vitæ gaudia revocaret. Reliqui,[p] qui supra originale peccatum[q] principalia crimina[r] commiserunt, ut adserit Scriptura, in pœnali Tartaro remanserunt: sicut in Persona Christi dictum est per prophetam; *Ero mors tua, o Mors;* id est, morte sua Christus humani generis inimicam Mortem interfecit, et vitam dedit. *Ero morsus tuus, inferne.* Partim[s] momordit infernum, pro parte eorum quos liberavit: partem reliquit, pro parte eorum qui pro principalibus criminibus in tormentis remanserunt.

Surrexit a mortuis primogenitus mortuorum: et alibi Aposto-

et inepta. Juvat huc conferre quæ Fortunatus noster ad Symb. Apost. in eandem sententiam breviter dictavit.

" Quod vero Deus Majestatis de
" Maria in carne natus est, non est
" sordidatus nascendo de Virgine, qui
" non fuit pollutus hominem condens
" de pulvere. Denique sol, aut ignis,
" si lutum inspiciat, quod tetigerit
" purgat, et se tamen non inquinat."

Conf. Ruffin. Symb. p. 133.

[f] *Nostræ naturæ carnem.* Murat.

[g] Muratorius legit, *dum suæ sacræ passionis gratiam, et sacramenta:* nullo sensu. Oxoniensis, *dum suæ sacræ passionis gratiæ* (pro *gratiâ*) *ac Sacramento.*

[h] *Ad inferna.* Cod. Oxon. Q. annon vetustissima hæc fuerit lectio in Symbolo Athanasiano, sicut in Apostolico?

[i] *Qui*, loco τοῦ *ut.* Cod. Oxon. At Sermo de Symbolo, in Append. ad August. (tom. vi. p. 281.) legit, cum Muratorio, *ut.*

[k] *Adam protoplastum.* Append.

[l] *Et ut de.* Append.

[m] *Ipsius* deest. Append.

[n] Deest *et* Cod. Oxon.

[o] *Inferni.* Append.

[p] Muratorius habet *vero* post *reliqui.* Oxon. non agnoscit. nec Append.

[q] Ita legitur in Appendice. Oxoniensis, *supra originale peccato.* Muratorius, *supra originali peccato.*

[r] *Principalem culpam.* Append.

[s] Muratorius, et Oxoniensis, in utroque loco, *Partem.* Appendix, in utroque, *Partim.* Media mihi lectio maxime arridet.

lus dicit; *Ipse primogenitus ex multis fratribus.* Id est, primus a mortuis resurrexit. *Et multa corpora*[t] *sanctorum dormientium cum eo surrexerunt*, sicut evangelica auctoritas[u] dicit: *Sed ipse, qui caput est, prius, deinde qui*[x] *membra sunt continuo.*

Postea *ascendit ad cœlos:* sicut Psalmista ait; *Ascendit*[y] *in altum, captivam duxit captivitatem:* id est, humanam naturam, quæ prius sub peccato venundata fuit, et captivata; eamque redemptam captivam[z] duxit in cœlestem altitudinem; et ad cœlestis Patriæ[a] regnum sempiternum, ubi antea non fuerat, eam[b] collocavit, in gloriam sempiternam.

Sedet ad dexteram Patris: id est, prosperitatem paternam, et in[c] eo honore, quod[d] Deus est.

Inde venturus[e] *judicare vivos et mortuos.* Vivos dicit eos quos tunc adventus Dominicus in corpore viventes invenerit; [et mortuos, jam ante sepultos. Et aliter dicit[f],] vivos *justos*, et mortuos *peccatores*[g].

Ad cujus adventum omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis; et reddituri sunt de factis propriis rationem: et qui bona egerunt, ibunt in vitam æternam; qui vero, mala, in ignem æternum. Hæc est Fides Catholica, quam nisi quisque fideliter, firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit.

[t] Deest *corpora* in Cod. Oxon.

[u] *In evangelica autoritate.* Cod. Oxon.

[x] *Quæ membra.* Cod. Oxon.

[y] *Ascendens.* Murator.

[z] Conf. tractatum anonymi apud Hieronym. tom. v. p. 130. et apud Augustin. tom. viii. p. 69. Append. et Isid. Hisp. p. 560. ed. Paris.

[a] *Cœlestem Patriam.* Cod. Oxon.

[b] *Et* pro *eam.* Murator.

[c] *In* deest. Cod. Oxon.

[d] Mallem *quo*, si per codices liceret; sed et *quod*, adverbialiter hic positum pro *quia*, sensum non incommodum præ se ferre videtur.

[e] *Venturus est.* Murator.

[f] Quantum hic uncis includitur, omittit Codex Oxoniensis. Delusus est fortean librarius per binas literulas *it* bis positas: vel, simili errore deceptus, integram lineam præterierit, dum in proxime sequentem occulos conjecerat.

[g] Operæ pretium est pauca hic subjicere, quæ *noster* habet in expositione sua in Symb. Apostolicum, "*judicaturus vivos et mortuos.* Aliqui dicunt vivos, justos; mortuos vero injustos: aut certe, vivos, quos in corpore invenerit adventus Dominicus, et mortuos, jam sepultos. Nos tamen intelligamus vivos et mortuos, hoc est animas et corpora pariter judicanda." Confer Ruffin. Symb. p. 140. et Method. apud Phot. Cod. 234. p. 932. Isid. Pelus. epist. 222. lib. i. p. 64. Pseud. Ambros. de Trin. p. 331.

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AN ANSWER

TO

SOME QUERIES

PRINTED AT EXON,

RELATING TO

THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY.

AN ANSWER

TO

SOME QUERIES.

QUERY I. Whether the term GOD in the singular number can be proved to be used, in any one place of the Scripture, to denote more persons than one?

ANSW. 1. It is not necessary for the defenders of the received doctrine of a *coessential* Trinity to assert, that the term GOD, in the *singular number, can be proved to be used in Scripture to denote more Persons than one:* for as the Arians suppose *Father* and *Son* to be *two Gods*, though they are never called *two Gods*, or *Gods* in the plural number, through the whole Scripture: so the Catholics may as well suppose that *Father* and *Son* are *one God*, though the term GOD could not be proved to be used to denote more Persons than one. Or if it be said, that the Arians do not suppose *Father* and *Son* to be *two Gods*, whatever pleas they allege to clear themselves of *Ditheism* will as effectually clear the Catholics of *Tritheism;* so that the Catholics will stand at least upon as good a foot as the Arians.

2. It is not necessary even so much as to suppose that the term GOD is ever so used. For admitting that the term GOD in Scripture is always used to denote *one Person* only, all that follows is, that *one Person* only is spoken of, whenever the term GOD is used. Not that there are not other Persons *essentially* and *coeternally* included in him and with him. It may be the method of Scripture, and generally is, when it speaks of GOD, to mean it of *one Person*, yet not *excluding*, but only abstracting from, the consideration of the other two persons included in the same *Godhead*.

3. They may reasonably *suppose* it, after proof of their *general* doctrine, since the doctrine of a *coessential* Trinity of three Persons being divine, and being *one God*, is demonstrable from Scripture, (though too long a subject to be here considered,) we may reasonably *suppose*, that when GOD is spoken of, and neither the context nor any other circumstances do confine the signification of the word, in that place, to one Person only; I say we may reasonably *suppose*, that not one Person only, but all the three Persons are denoted by it. And,

4. They have moreover grounds for it from some particular texts. Gen. i. 26. one God is spoken of, and yet the words run, LET US (in the plural) *make*, and IN OUR *image*. Gen. iii. 22. *one Lord God* is spoken of, and yet it is said, "the man is become "as one of us." The like may be observed of Gen. xi. 7. In Isaiah vi. 3. mention is made of the true God, the *Lord of hosts*, who, by confession of all, is the *Father*; and that the same *Lord of hosts* is also the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*, appears from John xii. 40, 41. and Acts xxviii. 25, 26. which is also intimated even by the Prophet himself introducing the Lord speaking both in the singular and plural. "I heard the voice of the "Lord, saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for US?" Ver. 8.

QUERY 2. Whether we have not the same evidence from the Scripture, that *God* is *one Person*, that we have, that either the *Father*, or the *Son*, or the *Holy Ghost*, is *one Person*.

ANSW. We have the same evidence, that the word GOD is sometimes *used to denote one Person*, that we have, that either the Father, or Son, or Holy Ghost, is one Person. But to conclude from thence, that the word GOD always denotes one *divine Person* only, is just as if we should conclude, that the word *man* always denotes one human person only, purely because it does so *sometimes*, or *most commonly*. It is desired by the Querist, that "some Scripture argument may be alleged to prove any one of the "Trinity to be one distinct Person, which may not with equal "evidence be applied to prove that GOD is one distinct Person." I suppose the Querist means, that the personal characters, *I*, *thou*, *he*, if they prove any one of the TRINITY to be one distinct Person, do equally prove God to be one distinct Person. To which it is answered, that the personal characters, *I*, *thou*, *he*, do not certainly prove, that whatever they are applied to is *one Person*, and no more; for they are often applied in Scripture to

a whole *city*, *tribe*, or *family*, or to the head of a family considered with his whole seed or race. But the personal characters are a good proof of *one distinct* Person, where there are not plain reasons to be given why we should believe they are to be understood of more. Now, since plain reasons may be given, why GOD is *more Persons than one;* and no plain reasons can be given why any *one of the Trinity* is more Persons than one; therefore it is, that the Scripture argument to prove *any one of the Trinity* to be *one Person* does not equally prove that GOD is *one Person.*

QUERY 3. Whether there be any one text of Scripture, which treats of the unity of God, and places it in any other *Person* than the *Father?* It is humbly desired, that some text may be alleged where it is said, the one God is the FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST.

ANSW. It is written, "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the "ends of the earth: for I am God, and there is none else. I "have sworn by myself, the word is gone out of my mouth in "righteousness, and shall not return, That unto me every knee "shall bow, every tongue shall swear." Isaiah xlv. 22, 23. Compare the New Testament. "We shall all stand before the "judgment-seat of Christ; for it is written, As I live, saith the "Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall "confess to God." Rom. xiv. 10, 11. "At the name of Jesus "every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in "earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue "should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God "the Father." Phil. ii. 10, 11. The application of Isaiah xlv. 23. to Christ is manifest from these two passages of St. Paul. It is as manifest, that the Person spoken of in Isaiah is *the only God,* ("I am God, and there is none else.") Therefore Scripture treating of the *unity* of God, places it in another Person besides the *Father*, namely, *in God the Son.* Again, it is plain, in the Old Testament, that the *unity* is placed in the *Jehovah:* but Christ is *Jehovah,* as may be proved from numerous passages, and is now generally confessed. Therefore the *unity* is not placed in the *Person* of the Father *only,* Isaiah vi. 1, 9. with John xii.

The Querist desires some texts where it is said, that the one God is *Father, Son,* and *Holy Ghost.*

This is no where said in one single text, but it is in many

compared together. That *Jehovah* is the *one God*, and that the *one God* is *Jehovah*, is often said in the Old Testament: but the Father is *Jehovah*, the Son *Jehovah*, and the Holy Ghost *Jehovah*; therefore Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one *Jehovah*. Or the one God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Again; it may be proved from Scripture, that *God is one;* and from the same Scripture, that the Father is *God*, the Son is *God*, and the Holy Ghost is *God*. Therefore again, the one God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Compare Isaiah vi. 1, 9, with John xii. 40, 41, and Acts xxviii. 25, 26.

N. B. It is unreasonable to demand any particular text, where it is said, that these three are *one God:* unless our adversaries could produce a text, where it is said, that any two of them are called *two Gods*, or *Gods* in the plural. They pretend no more than Scripture consequences for their doctrine, not express Scripture: and they cannot prove their consequences, when we can ours.

QUERY 4. Whether the same arguments that prove the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be *three distinct Persons*, will not with equal strength conclude they are *three distinct Beings?*

ANSW. No; because all the arguments that prove the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be *three distinct Persons*, prove *only* that they are *three distinct Persons*. Whether *intelligent being* and *person* are *reciprocal*, remains a question as much as ever: or whether three persons may not be one *individual being* is still a question, and must be so; neither can it be resolved at all either way, merely from the nature and reason of the thing itself, for want of a *certain principle of individuation*.

QUERY 5. Whether any man can properly be said to believe that *God* is *three Persons*, and but one intelligent Being, without having some notion of the *difference* he hereby makes between a *person* and an *intelligent being?*

ANSW. Any person may have this notion, that God is not *three separate Persons*, and therefore is not *three intelligent Beings:* but that God is three united Persons, and therefore *one intelligent Being*. The precise *difference* between the idea of a *divine Person*, and that of a *divine intelligent Being*, is, that a *divine Person* is not a *separate Being* independent of all other things. A *divine intelligent Being* is *separate* and *independent* of any thing. The one is *ens relativum*, the other *ens absolutum*. I may add further, that a man may believe the *omnipresence* of God, without

having any distinct notion of the difference between God's being present, *in whole or in part*, with or without *extension*; and of the *divine prescience*, without having any clear notion of the difference between what *certainly will be* and what *certainly must be*; and of *eternity*, without having a clear notion of the difference between *succession* and an *eternal* NOW, and without being able to answer every minute or captious question which may be raised in a point so abstruse, and above human capacity. It is therefore no just objection against the doctrine of the TRINITY, that we are not able perfectly to explain the *modus* or *manner*, how *three Persons* are *one Being*, or *one God*. It is sufficient to know, that the Persons are *distinct* and *real*, as any other *persons* are; but so united withal, as no other persons are or can be; and therefore they are not (like other persons) as many *beings* as persons, but *one being* only.

QUERY 6. Whether (if no difference can be assigned between an *intelligent being* and a *person*) it be not a contradiction to say, that God is *three Persons* and *one Being?* that is, whether it be not all one, as to say, he is *three Persons*, and but *one Person*; or *three Beings*, and but *one Being?*

ANSW. A difference has been assigned in the *answer* to the preceding Query. Nothing is properly called a *being*, but a *separate being*. Thus, those who suppose the *soul*, or the *divine Being* to be *extended*, do not call the *parts* of the *soul*, or of GOD, beings. This I mention, only to shew the nature and usage of language, and what it would be by consent of mankind, on such or such suppositions, be they true or false. Now, since the *three Persons* are conceived to be more intimately united than the parts of any being (though they are not parts) are or can be; it is very right and just, not to call them *three Beings*, but *one Being*. A *separate* person is rightly called an *intelligent being*, because a *separate* person is a *separate being*: but a *person* considered as essentially adhering to, and united with another person, does with that other person make but *one being*; and therefore cannot properly be called a *being*, unless the word *being* admits of two senses: and yet then the one is *proper*, the other *improper*. The Querist therefore runs into a double *fallacy*; first, in making two senses of *being*, *proper* and *improper*, and arguing from one to the other: secondly, in confounding both together, as if they were really but one sense.

QUERY 7. Whether, if the *Father*, *Son*, and *Spirit* are but *one*

Being, it is possible to hold, that the Being of the Son was incarnate, without holding that the *Being* of the *Father* and the *Spirit* was *incarnate?*

Answ. The *Being of the Son* is an improper expression; because it supposes the Son to be a *Being*, (properly so called,) that is, a *separate Being*, which he is not. But *one Person*, the *Person* of the *Son* may be *incarnate*, and the Person of the *Father* or *Holy Ghost* at the same time not incarnate, without any contradiction, because *one person* is not *another person*. Yet it may be said, the *Godhead* is incarnate; i. e. the *divine Being*, as *personalized* in the Son, is incarnate in the *Person* of the Son. These philosophical niceties, in a point so *sublime* and *mysterious*, ought to be neglected and despised. Let any man tell us, whether the *Being* of God is present in heaven, and whether the *same Being* of God is *present* on earth; and let him inform us distinctly what he means by it. Let him say, whether God will be a day older to-morrow than he is to-day, and clear either the *affirmative* or *negative* of all appearance of contradiction. Let him determine whether God be *extended* or *not extended*, and disentangle either side of the question from all appearance of repugnancy. Let him unriddle the mysteries of *eternity*; acquaint us how *eternity* can be *past* unless it was once *present*, or how it could be ever *present* if it never *began*. But enough of this.

Query 8. Whether the *imposing side* can pretend that the consequence they draw from the *unity* of God, and from the *Father* and *Son's being severally called* God, is more clear and certain than the consequence which others draw from the same consideration?

Answ. The *imposing side* (as he calls them) do not argue merely from the *Father* and *Son's being severally called* God; but from the Scriptures describing both one and the other to be God in such a sense as to have a right to be *adored*. Now, in this sense, there cannot be more Gods than one, consistently with the First Commandment, which excludes all but *one God* from religious service and adoration. Any God, after this *one God*, is no *God*, in any true and proper sense: but the Son is the one true God, because he is adorable, and God: and there are not more true and more adorable Gods than one. This *consequence* they take to be *certain* and undeniable: but the consequence which *others* draw, viz. that *Father* and *Son* cannot be called *God* in

the same sense of the word GOD, (for so it should have been expressed by the Querist,) has nothing at all to support it, because the exclusive term cannot be proved to have been intended in *opposition* to God the Son. Or if they be, they must exclude him entirely among the *nominal, fictitious* deities, which is absurd enough. And because those *emphatical* appellations of *one*, or *only* God, applied to the *Father*, are easily accounted for, by admitting a different *manner* of existence, or a *priority* of order, without any recourse to a *different sense* of the word GOD. Besides, the Scripture plainly shews by the *divine titles*, *attributes*, and *glory*, which it ascribes to God the Son, that he is God in the strict and proper sense, and not in any *lower* or *different* sense, as is pretended.

QUERY 9. Whether men being liable to mistake in drawing consequences, modesty should not teach the *imposing side* to be as forward to bear with their *brethren*, as they are to bear with the *imposers*?

ANSW. When it is once declared what is meant by *bearing with their brethren*, this Query may have a determinate answer. As to men's being *liable to mistake*, it is no argument against their being *certain* of many things; and if they be certain of such a truth, and that it is very important, all Christian and prudent methods must be used to maintain and preserve it.

QUERY 10. Whether it is not dangerous rashness to censure men as to their everlasting state, for not believing a doctrine which is not expressly declared in any one place in the Bible?

ANSW. There is no rashness at all in censuring men, as to their everlasting estate, for *disbelieving*, and especially for publicly opposing a doctrine *of so vast importance*, which is both *expressly* and by *necessary consequence* declared in *many places* of Scripture compared together. "If an angel from heaven preach "any other Gospel unto you, than that which we have preached "unto you, let him be accursed." Gal. i. 8.

QUERY 11. Whether they who say, the Son did know the *day and hour* of the last judgment, when he said expressly, that he did not; whether, I say, they do not make Christ to have been guilty of an *equivocation*? And whether such their assertion is not very dangerous, as tending to introduce, by his example, a practice which will destroy all credit among Christians?

ANSW. There was no *equivocation* in saying what was literally true, that the Son, as *Son of man*, did not know the *day and*

hour of the last judgment. The context itself sufficiently limits his denial to his *human nature*. The Querist tells us, that, "according to this way of equivocating, a man (as one observes) "may deny that he saw a thing which he actually saw; meaning, he did not see it with one eye, which he wilfully kept "shut, while he beheld it with the other." But, as one observes, (see Mr. Boyse in his reply to that pretence of Mr. Emlyn's,) in answer to this idle stuff, there might be some colour for the pretence, if a man had two *visive powers*, or *two souls*, as well as *two eyes:* but since he has but one *visive power*, and *one soul*, which *one soul* sees, whether one eye only, or both be open, it would be a downright falsehood to say, I saw not a thing at all, because I saw it but with one eye. But the case is quite different, where there are two *knowing principles*, belonging to two different natures; one of which may *see* or *know*, while the other doth not *see* or *know;* and consequently it may be *denied* of one, which may be *affirmed* of the other. It could not indeed be *absolutely* and *indefinitely* denied of Christ, that he *knew the day:* neither is it so *denied* in Scripture, but in a *certain respect* only, which the reason of the thing and the very *context* determines it to: for it speaks not of the *Son of God* as such, but of the *Son of man*, or of *Christ* considered as *Son of man*.

QUERY 12. Whether, if the *Holy Spirit* be the *supreme God*, he must not have as much right to *give* the *Father*, as the *Father* can have to *give him?* And whether, upon this supposition, it can be proper for Christians to pray to the *Father* to *give* them his Holy Spirit?

ANSW. As to the *rights* and *privileges* among the *sacred Three;* they are best known to themselves. And who are we, that we should pretend to fathom the depths of the *divine nature*, or the *ineffable economy* of the three Persons? Scripture calls the *Spirit*, the Spirit of the *Father*, and not *vice versa*, and directs us to ask the Father to *give* his Spirit to us. This is sufficient for us to *know*, and is a direction to our practice.

QUERY 13. Whether it be an intolerable crime in ministers, and such as deserves *ejectment*, for them to hold, that Christ alone is the *King* of his Church? And that Christians are to receive his words *only*, as the *authentic rule* of their faith, without subjecting their faith to the *authoritative interpretations* of any men upon earth?

ANSW. This Query is too loose and general to admit of any

close determinate answer. I shall only observe, that these gentlemen know at other times how to interpret the *alone King*, or *only Potentate*, so as to leave room for *subordinate* governors. And I know not any one that contends for more, or ever pretends to *equal* themselves to Christ. Arians, perhaps, or Socinians, having brought Christ down to the rank of *creatures*, or of *men*, may in time take upon them farther: but the Trinitarians will never be wanting in their honour to Christ, or the *alone King*, and the *alone God*, not exclusive of, but in conjunction with God the Father and the Holy Ghost; not abridging all or any of the three sacred Persons of the liberty of appointing subordinate ministers, rulers, or governors, to act under them, according to such rules, laws, and measures, as infinite wisdom shall see good and proper.

THE SCRIPTURES

AND

THE ARIANS

COMPARED

IN THEIR ACCOUNTS OF

GOD THE FATHER

AND

GOD THE SON:

BY WAY OF REJOINDER TO A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED,

THE SCRIPTURE AND THE ATHANASIANS COMPARED,
&c.

IN TWO PARTS.

Let them be taken in the crafty wiliness that they have imagined. Psalm x. 2.

THE SCRIPTURES

AND

THE ARIANS

COMPARED, &c.

PART I.

I SHALL lay before the reader the *plain* account of Scripture in one *column*, and the *true* account of what the modern Arian scheme is in the other: which I will endeavour to make as plain as any thing of that nature can be; and leave the reader to judge whether it be agreeable to Scripture or no, and so choose or refuse it after a rational and faithful examination.

SCRIPTURE.	ARIANISM.
There is but one GOD, one *adorable* GOD[a], *Jehovah*[b], and GOD of Israel. Before whom was there no GOD formed, neither will there be *after* him[c]. This one GOD will not give his *glory*	Our modern Arians all *implicitly* or *consequentially* teach, some expressly say[a], that there are more GODS than one: two GODS at least, both of them *adorable*, and to be served with *religious* worship. One of the GODS is supposed to be *after*

[a] Exod. xx. 3. Isa. xliv. 8. xlv. 5. 1 Cor. viii. 4. [b] Deut. vi. 4. Mark xii. 29. Isa. xlv. 21. xlii. 8. [c] Isa. xliii. 10.

[a] The Scriptures and Athanasians Compared, p. 4.

to *another*[d]; that is, will not allow any *other God* to claim the glory of being *adored*, either against him, or with him; being extremely *jealous*[e] of his honour, the honour of being served with *religious* worship, which both under the Old and New Testament was due to GOD alone[f], and by which his superlative MAJESTY and peerless perfections are to be acknowledged[g] through the whole creation.

the other in *duration*[b], and in every perfection. The *greater* GOD has given the *glory* of *religious* worship to the *lesser* GOD; thereby, so far, resigning up his *peculiar* privilege, and his *appropriate* honours: only the glory of being *underived*, which he *cannot* possibly give away if he would, he *will not*[c] (good reason why) part with at any rate. The *sacrifice* of *prayer* and *praise*, however, is *common* to *both* the GODS; who are accordingly to be honoured with the like *outward* acts of worship, to be made *higher* or *lower* worship by the worshipper's *inward intention*; and there are no *outward* acts left whereby common Christians may *visibly* distinguish the *supreme* GOD from the *inferior* GOD; though one be infinitely more excellent than the other; and though reason itself teaches that there ought to be as great a difference between the *outward* honours paid to *this* GOD, and *that* GOD, as there is between *this* GOD and *that* GOD.

SCRIPTURE.

Our Lord JESUS CHRIST is LORD GOD[h], *Jehovah*[i], (a title expressing *necessary existence*

ARIANISM.

Our Lord *Jesus Christ* is by no means *necessarily existing*[d], but *precarious* in existence, and *de-*

[d] Isa. xlii. 8. xlviii. 11. [e] Exod. xx. 5. xxxiv. 14. [f] Matth. iv. 10. Rev. xix. 10. xxii. 9. [g] 2 Kings xix. 15. Isa. xl. 9, 10, &c. xlv. 5, 6, 7. Jer. x. 10, 11, &c. [h] Luke i. 16, 17. John xx. 28. [i] Compare Isa. vi. with John xii. 41. Zech. xii. 10. with John xix. 37. Psalm cii. 25. with Heb. i. 10. Zech. xi. 12. with Matt. xxvii. 9, 10. Isa. xl. 3. with Mark i. 3. Hosea i. 7. with Luke ii. 11.

[b] Mr. Whiston plainly; the rest covertly. [c] Modest Plea, &c. Continued, p. 7. Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 201. [d] Modest Plea, &c. p. 17, 217. Second letter to Dr. Mangey, p. 27.

and all perfection[k],) *True* GOD[l], *Great* GOD[m], and *Mighty* GOD[n], as well as the FATHER. He is moreover *Alpha* and *Omega*, the *Beginning* and the *Ending*, the *First* and the *Last*[o], which is expressive of unlimited *eternity*, and so understood when applied to GOD the FATHER, or to the one GOD of Israel[p]. He is also *the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty*[q], than which nothing higher or stronger can be said even of GOD the FATHER.

[k] Exod. iii. 14. Isa. xlii. 8. xlv. 21. Mal. iii. 6. [l] 1 John v. 20. [m] Tit. ii. 13. [n] Isa. ix. 6. [o] Rev. i. 8, 17. xxii. 13. [p] Isa. xli. 4. xliv. 6. xlviii. 12. Rev. xxi. 6. [q] Rev. i. 8.

pending entirely on the *good pleasure* of the *greater* GOD; who being of course *infinitely* above him, can, consequently, whenever he pleases, make *other Gods* as great, or greater than he is. And though CHRIST be styled JEHOVAH, it means only that he is *faithful to his promises*[e], or that he once *personated*[f] the true JEHOVAH; which any *inferior* angel might have done[g]. And though he be a *great* GOD, and a *true* GOD, and a *mighty* GOD; yet there is *another* GOD, a *greater* GOD, a *truer* [h]GOD, and a *mightier* GOD, by far, than he; to whose *good pleasure* and *free* appointment he owes all his greatness and *divinity*. And though the title of *First* and *Last*, &c. may signify an unlimited *eternity*, when applied to the FATHER, (if the FATHER's eternity be any where revealed in the Old Testament, which is doubtful[i],) yet it must not, it shall not signify any such thing when applied to the SON. And though Rev. i. 8. has been understood by all the primitive churches of GOD the SON, and such application be favoured by the context; yet it shall be understood of the FATHER only; or, at least, shall bear a *subordinate* sense, if understood of the SON. For there are several *metaphysical* reasons about *derived* and *underived*, about *generation, causes, acts, will, indi-*

[e] Collection of Queries, p. 19. [f] The Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 5. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 89. [g] Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 177. [h] Unity of GOD not Inconsistent, &c. p. 34. [i] Collection of Queries, p. 50.

viduals, identicals, &c. which so require, and Scripture must yield to them.

SCRIPTURE.

Our Lord JESUS CHRIST was GOD before any *dominion commenced*, before any *creatures* existed, before the world was[r]. He is *over all* GOD *blessed for ever*[s]: and to him is ascribed glory, praise, and dominion *for ever and ever*[t], jointly also with the FATHER[v]. From whence it is evident, that as he was GOD before the *creation*, before any creature began, and consequently from *all eternity;* so he will be honoured as GOD to *all eternity*.

[r] John i. 1, 2, 3, 10. Coloss. i. 15, 16. [s] Rom. ix. 5. [t] 1 Pet. iv. 11. 2 Pet. iii. 18. Rev. i. 6. Heb. xiii. 21. Heb. i. 8. [v] Rev. v. 12, 13.

ARIANISM.

Some of the modern Arians say, that CHRIST is GOD, in the sense of *dominion:* others make his *exaltation*, after his rising from the dead, to be the sole *foundation of his personal Godhead*[k]. Others suppose his *personating* the FATHER to have been all that his *Godhead* meant before his incarnation[l]. All which accounts must appear miserably vain and presumptuous, as coming vastly short of what St. John has declared of him in respect of what he was antecedently to the *creation*. Sometimes therefore they are pleased to allow that he was GOD *before the world was*, as being *partaker of divine power and glory*[m]. But then they tell us not what they mean by it. Whatever it be, they suppose him to have been *really* stripped and *emptied* of that *glory*, that is, of all the *Godhead* he had of his own; that he sunk his *perfections*, his *power*, and his *wisdom*[n], when he became man; being then really *weaker* and *lower* than the *angels*[o]; so that he ceased for a time to be GOD, and wanted to be made a GOD again after his resurrection[p]: which *Godhead* then obtained, or

[k] Collection of Queries, p. 75. [l] Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, p. 73. edit. 2nd. [m] Ibid. p. 240. [n] Emlyn's Examination of Dr. Bennet, p. 15, 16. [o] Modest Plea, p. 93. Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 15. [p] Collect. of Queries, p. 75. Scripture and Athanasians Comp. p. 16.

regained, is to last no longer than his *mediatorial* kingdom; after the ceasing whereof, it seems, he is to lay down his *Godhead*, and never to be a GOD more to all eternity[q].

SCRIPTURE.

Our blessed Lord is described as having the *divine* attributes, the distinguishing marks and characters of the one true GOD supreme.

1. Knowledge of the heart. He knoweth the *hearts of all men*[w]. It is he that *searcheth the reins and the heart*[x]. He is a *discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart*[y].

2. Omniscience. There is *no creature but what is manifest in his sight: all things are naked and opened to his eyes*[z]. In him are *hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge*[a]. He knoweth *all things*[b].

3. Unchangeable eternity. He is *always the same*[c], *yesterday, to-day, and for ever*[d].

4. Omnipresence. He is Creator *of all things, and by him all things consist*[e]. He is worshipped by the *whole creation*[f]. He is *in the midst*[g] *of all that call upon him.*

5. Omnipotence. He can do all that the FATHER *doth*[h]. He

[w] Acts i. 24. [x] Rev. ii. 23. [y] Heb. iv. 12. [z] Heb. iv. 13. [a] Col. ii. 3. [b] John xvi. 30. xxi. 17. [c] Heb. i. 12. Rev. i. 8. [d] Heb. xiii. 13. [e] Col. i. 17. [f] Rev. v. 8. [g] Matt. v. 20. [h] John v. 19.

ARIANISM.

The modern Arians are pleased to allow, in *words*, that *divine* attributes belong to CHRIST; meaning by *divine*, quite another thing than others mean in this case.

CHRIST is *omniscient*, they say, *relatively*[r]; that is, while *ignorant*[s] of much more than he knows, as he must be if *ignorant* at all: *eternal* also, provided he be not *coeternal*; that is, provided the FATHER be but *infinitely* (as he must be, if at all) more ancient than he: *omnipresent* also, but within *bounds*: *omnipotent*, but by the FATHER'S power, not by his own: *unchangeable*, I think, they never directly say, but the contrary[t]; making his *generation* and *incarnation* arguments of his being subject to *change*. And, indeed, upon the whole, they suppose him the most *changeable* being in the universe, running through more, and more prodigious *changes*, than any other creature ever did, or will do.

[q] Reply to Dr. W. by the Author of Unity, &c. p. 49. Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 16, 17, 22. Peirce's Western Inquis. p. 148, 149. [r] Collect. of Queries, p. 48. [s] Ibid. Unity of GOD not inconsistent, &c. p. 8. [t] Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 271. Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 12, 13. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 145.

and the FATHER are *one*[i]. He is *Almighty*[k].

They criticise away the force of the texts pleaded in favour of the *divine* attributes of CHRIST, till they leave themselves no Scripture proof of the *divinity* of GOD the FATHER; none but what may be eluded by the same, or the like subtleties: as if they were resolved to give up every proof of the FATHER'S real divinity, rather than admit any which may happen to prove as much of GOD the SON. The strength of their objections against the *divine* attributes of CHRIST, consists chiefly in *metaphysical* speculations; that *generation* is an *act*, that every act implies *free choice*, that free choice argues *precarious* existence, and that precarious existence is a contradiction to *divine* attributes, strictly so called. Thus *vain philosophy* is brought in, to overrule the infallible word of GOD.

SCRIPTURE.

Our blessed LORD is *Creator*. He is the LORD *Jehovah*, who in the beginning *laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the works of his hands*[l]. All things were created, not only *by him*[m], as the *efficient* cause, but also *for him*[n], as the *final* cause of all things; in whose glory they all centre and terminate. In him likewise *do all things consist*. The whole universe, all worlds visible and

ARIANISM.

The modern Arians pretend that CHRIST is an *instrument*[u] only in the work of creation; though they do not tell us what they mean by it, nor how it is possible to reconcile their notion to Heb. i. 10. Some of them suppose CHRIST an *inferior* Creator, making *two Creators* in like manner as *two* GODS; one of the *Creators* being himself a *creature*. Others scruple to allow CHRIST to be a *Creator*, saying only that GOD created all things *by him*, or *through him*; and they confusedly mutter several

[i] John x. 30. [k] Rev. i. 8. [l] Heb. i. 10. [m] John i. 3, 10, 11. 1 Cor. viii. 6. Ephes. iii. 9. Heb. i. 2. [n] Coloss. i. 16, 17.

[u] Modest Plea, p. 93. Unity of GOD not Inconsistent, &c. p. 26.

invisible are upheld and sustained by him. He is therefore *Creator*, *Preserver*, and *Governor* of all worlds: than which nothing more august or grand can be said of the one God supreme.

things about the prepositions *by* and *through*; never acquainting us what their precise notion is, nor shewing how it is possible ever to make it consistent with those texts which so expressly ascribe *creative* powers to Christ. Whatever hand they suppose him to have had in *creating*, (which appears to be very little,) they imagine him afterwards *weak* enough to want the assistance of his *creatures*[x], weak enough to be *literally* inferior to the *angels*[y], weak enough to be *passible*[z] and *mutable*; and low enough to be literally *exalted*[a]; which yet they would think *blasphemy* to say of one that is *very GOD*.

Scripture.

The Scriptures say, that *he that built all things is God*[o]; thereby supposing the work of *creating* to be a demonstration of the real *divinity* of the Person who created all things. St. Paul elsewhere intimates that the *creation* of the world is a visible and sensible proof of the *eternal power and Godhead of* its Maker[p]. Creation is every where, in Scripture, represented as a *divine* work, a work peculiar to God alone, setting forth his supreme excellency and unbounded perfections[q]. And

Arianism.

The Arians pretend that the creating the whole universe is in itself no demonstration of *infinite* power, nor any certain argument of the *real* and *necessary* divinity of its maker[b]. It seems a *creature* might create the whole world, visible and invisible. Only, it is observable, that they are sometimes pleased to say, that the Son is *no creature*. No creature, yet *brought into existence*[c], as well as any creature; no creature, but yet *precarious* in existence, as well as

o Heb. iii. 4. p Rom. i. 20. q 2 Kings xix. 15. Job xxvi. 7, &c. Psalm xcvi. 5. xix. l. lxxxix. 11, 12. Isa. xl. 12, 26. xlii. 5. xliii. 1. xlv. 5, 6.

x Modest Plea, p. 93. y Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 15. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 145. Modest Plea, ibid. z Collect. of Queries, p. 143. a Modest Plea, p. 97, 98. b Collect. of Queries, p. 58. Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 249. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 120. c Collect. of Queries, p. 51.

the Gods that have not made the heavens and the earth, they shall perish from the earth[r]. So that if CHRIST be *Creator*, there can be no reasonable doubt made of his real, eternal, and essential *Godhead*: or, if he be not Creator, he cannot be GOD, cannot, upon the Scripture foot, be *adored* or *worshipped* as GOD with any degree of *religious* worship.

SCRIPTURE.

According to *Scripture* no one is to be worshipped who is not GOD by *nature*[s], no *creature* but the *Creator* only[t]. From whence it is evident that there is no *middle* between *Creator* and *creature*, Creator and creature being opposites; so that a creature cannot be Creator, nor Creator a creature. Scripture knows nothing of *creature-*

[r] Jer. x. 11, 12.
[s] Gal. iv. 8.
[t] Rom. i. 25.

any creature; no creature, but yet *dependent* on the *free-will* and *pleasure* of another, as much as any creature; no creature, but yet *ignorant* of much more than he knows, as well as any creature; no creature, but yet capable of *change* from strength to *weakness*, and from weakness to strength again, capable of being made *wiser*, and *happier*, and *better* in every respect, as well as any creature; no creature, but yet having nothing of his *own*, nothing but what he owes to the *gratuity* and *favour* of his Lord and Governor, as much as any creature. Such a *creature*, and *no creature*, they suppose *all things* to have been *created by*; and yet by *all things*, meaning only all *other* things, (for he could not have any hand in creating *himself*,) and by the words *created by*, meaning they know not what. This they call interpreting Scripture, and doing justice to common readers.

ARIANISM.

The modern Arians, after the Pagans and Papists, plead for *creature-worship*; for the *thing*, I mean, but they are frightened at the *name*: and whether to save themselves the *trouble* of answering the many plain and invincible reasons against *creature-worship*, or the *shame* of not being able to talk a word of sense on that head, they pretend[d] not to be pleading

[d] Author of Unity, &c. His Reply to Dr. Waterland, p. 31.

worship; nothing of *inferior, relative*, or *mediate* worship distinct from *divine*; nothing of *two worships* of different *kinds*, either before the Gospel or after. The one fundamental rule of worship, from Genesis down to Revelations, is to worship GOD *alone*, the GOD of Israel, the *Jehovah*, the *Creator, Sustainer, Preserver* of all things. There was never any distinction made of *supreme* and *inferior* sacrifices, vows, oaths, prayers, prostrations. All *religious* worship is GOD's *peculiar*, all of the same nature, and of like import and significancy.

SCRIPTURE.

Christ is to be worshipped with religious worship by *men*[v], by *angels*[w], by *every creature*[x]; either *singly* and by himself, or *jointly* with the FATHER in the *same acts* of worship. He is therefore *God by nature*, and not by *office* only, appointment, for *creature-worship*, all the while they are doing it. They call this kind of worship *inferior* and *mediate* worship: a thing that Scripture knows not of: and what was once sufficient to nonplus the *devil*, they can elude. Upon their principles, any Jew, formerly, might have eluded all the laws of the Old Testament against *idolatry*, might have *sacrificed* to *other* Gods (if supposed subordinate to the one *supreme*) without breaking the *First Commandment*, and without peril of *Polytheism*. They acquit the generality of the Pagans (as many as worshipped *one supreme* GOD) of *Polytheism*[e], or of the worship of many Gods: as they of consequence must, otherwise they condemn themselves. The Pagans then were not Polytheists, but *idolaters* only: and their *idolatry* consisted not in making *Idol-Gods*, but *Idol-Mediators*[f]. A thing which the sacred penmen were never aware of; having constantly laid the charge *wrong* upon the setting up *Idol-Gods*, and never *Idol-Mediators*.

ARIANISM.

The modern Arians teach, that CHRIST is made a GOD by *voluntary* appointment and designation; and are yet ridiculously forced to say, that he is GOD *by nature*[g], and *as truly as man is by nature truly man*[h]:

[v] Acts vii. 59. ix. 14. John v. 23. Rev. v. 8. [w] Heb. i. 6. [x] Rev. v. 13.

[e] Ibid. p. 17, 30. See also Reply to Dr. Waterland's Defence, p. 309. [f] Clarke, Script. Doctrine, p. 344, 2nd edition. Author of Unity, &c. p. 30. [g] Scripture and Athanasians Compared, p. 9. [h] Clarke's Replies, p. 81.

or designation. The worship of him must of consequence stand upon the same foot whereon Scripture has founded all *religious* worship; upon his real and essential *divinity*, his being *God*, *Jehovah*, *Almighty*, &c. which he must be because he is *adorable;* and which if he be, then the worship of him comes within the reason, intent, and even the *letter* of the law about worship. And it is very observable how the *Scripture rule* of worship exactly harmonizes with what the same Scripture teaches of the *divinity* of GOD the SON. For as, on one hand, his claim of *worship* confirms the doctrine of his *divinity;* so, on the other hand, his *divine* titles and *attributes* confirm his claim of *worship:* and thus is Scripture uniform, consistent, and harmonious throughout.

GOD *by nature*, and *truly* GOD, without the *nature* of the *true* GOD; GOD *by nature*, but not *naturally*, or *necessarily* GOD; GOD *by nature*, but having his *nature* before his *dominion;* that is, before his *Godhead* commenced; and he is to continue, after his *dominion*, or *Godhead*, shall expire and be extinct: in a word, GOD *by nature*, as much as man is by nature man, and yet wanting the most *essential* character of GOD, which makes GOD to be God[i].

They found his *worship* on the power of *judging*, and his *mediatorial kingdom*[k], committed to him in time, and in time to cease. Neither his being GOD, before the world was, (John i. 1.) nor his being the *only-begotten*, nor his being *Creator* and *Sustainer* of all things, nor his laying the foundation of the *heavens* and the *earth;* none of these considerations are thought of sufficient weight to found his *worship* upon: but a late *office* of yesterday, and shortly to be laid down; that, and that only is made the foundation of *religious* worship, and such worship as, by all the Scripture accounts, is to continue for *ever and ever:* which they are pleased to understand of the *end of the world* only[l], though the *same phrase* or *phrases* which denote the *continuance* of the FATHER'S worship, are used likewise for the SON'S; and even in the

[i] Ibid. p. 92. [k] Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, Propos. 48, 60, 61. Replies, p. 239. [l] Author of Unity not Inconsistent. His Reply, p. 49.

SCRIPTURE.

The Scriptures ever supposing but *one object* of worship, which is GOD *Supreme*, never give us any rules about *raising* or *lowering* the *intention* of the worshipper, to make the worship *supreme* or *inferior*, as occasion may require. Whatever may be said of a few *speculative* heads, or refined wits, the *vulgar*, it is to be feared, would never be capable of proportioning their *intentions* in such cases; but would often pay *subordinate* worship only, instead of *supreme*, which would be next to *blaspheming*, or *supreme* instead of *subordinate*, which would be *idolatry*.

Scripture never makes any distinction between *offering* and *terminating* worship; but supposes all worship to *terminate* where offered. GOD interprets all *image-worship* and *creature-worship* to terminate on the *image*, or *creature*, notwithstanding any *intention* of the worshipper to *terminate* the worship in him. It is worshipping of the *idol*, the *image*, the *creature*, not the worshipping of GOD, in Scripture style. And indeed how can any act of *idolatry*, any *creature-worship* same *common* doxology, jointly offered to both. Verily, *if these things are not absurdities, it is pity that they should look so like them.*

ARIANISM.

The Arians imagine, that the same *outward* acts of *religious worship* become *higher* or *lower*, according to the *intention* of the worshipper: which is following their own inventions, and putting the matter of *worship* on such a foot as must inevitably run the bulk of mankind either into *idolatry* on one hand, or *profaneness* on the other, as often as they mistake in the just and proper *elevation* of their thoughts or intentions.

They are teaching us also to *offer* worship here, and *terminate* there; which must likewise run the *vulgar* at least into inextricable labyrinths; as perhaps *terminating* the worship in the *inferior* object, when they ought not; or not *offering* when they ought. Besides that, for want of knowing precisely what worship is *inferior* and what *supreme*, what *mediate* and what *ultimate*, they will be often apt to mistake the one for the other: and hence will arise all imaginable *confusion* in sacred offices. In a word, their whole foundation is wrong, since no *inferior* worship can, without blasphemy, be supposed to *terminate* in the *supreme*, nor any *supreme* worship be made to fall upon the *medium*, without *idolatry*. Their *inferior* worship must be *ultimate*, and their *supreme* cannot be *mediate*: so that their

terminate upon GOD, who has absolutely prohibited it, who abhors and detests it? The reason of the thing shews that so it must be: for if worship be paid to an *inferior* object, be it *sovereign* or *inferior* worship, the absurdity is manifest. If it be *sovereign*, then it is plainly *idolatry* to give any part of it to the *inferior* object: if it be *inferior*, it cannot *terminate* in the *supreme* object, who would be *affronted* and *dishonoured* thereby. It must therefore *terminate* in the *inferior* object: and thus a *creature* is honoured with *ultimate* worship, terminating where offered, which is, confessedly, *idolatry*.

SCRIPTURE.

The Scriptures assure us that CHRIST *increased in wisdom*[y], which is to be *literally* understood, as well as his increasing *in stature* is *literal*. He was, at times, afflicted with *grief*: his *soul* was *exceeding sorrowful*[z], and full of *trouble*[a], crying out in great *agonies*[b]. These and the like *weaknesses* and *infirmities* can never reasonably be supposed to suit with the divine *Logos*; who had *wisdom*, *strength*, and *power* sufficient to *create*, *sustain*, and *govern* all worlds. From these two devised *distinctions* necessarily confound and destroy each other; and they must either not worship CHRIST at all, or worship him with *ultimate* worship, even upon their own principles.

ARIANISM.

Our modern Arians persuade themselves, that CHRIST had no *human soul*, but that the *Logos* supplied its place. Some[m] expressly say it; and as many others *mean* it, as bring a charge against the Athanasians of making *two Persons* in one CHRIST: which charge has been brought against us by most[n] of our modern Arians. They are therefore of opinion, that all the *high* things and all the *low* things, spoken in scripture of CHRIST, meet in the one *Logos* clothed with *flesh*. He was once *wise* enough to *make*, or however to *frame* and *model* the whole uni-

[y] Luke ii. 52. [z] Matt. xxvi. 38. Mark xiv. 34. [a] John xi. 33. xii. 27. xiii. 21. [b] Luke xxii. 44. Matt. xxvii. 46. Mark xv. 34.

[m] Whiston, Emlyn, &c. See also Answer to Peirce's Inquisition, p. 34, 35. [n] Morgan, Jackson, Author of the Appeal, &c. and others.

considerations, besides sundry others, the Christian churches have ever firmly believed, that, besides the *Logos*, or divine nature, there was also a *human soul* in CHRIST; which, together with the *Logos* and a human body, made up the whole Person of CHRIST.

verse, (according to some of them,) as well as to support and govern it when made. But upon his taking *flesh*, his *wisdom* and his extraordinary *abilities* departed from him[o]. He became a *child*, a child in *understanding* as well as *stature*; falling, as it were, into a profound lethargy, and suspension of thought. By slow and insensible degrees, he again began to recover; his dormant faculties revived, and thus he *increased in wisdom*; growing up, first, to the perfection of *a wise man*, but not yet arrived to the pitch of an *angel*[p]. In process of time, he became *wise* enough and of sufficient ability to be made a GOD of once more: *His honour and his brightness returned unto him, he was established in his kingdom, and excellent majesty was added unto him.* So saith the Scripture of Nebuchadnezzar, (Dan. iv. 36.) who, if this account be true, was (with reverence be it spoken) none of the least eminent, or least considerable types of CHRIST. But this is not all; the worst is to come. This *mighty* GOD (according to those gentlemen) is at last to lay down, or surrender his *Godhead* and *mightiness*, that is, his *kingdom*; all the kingdom they allow him to have[q]. His *worship*,

[o] Emlyn's Examination of Dr. Bennet, p. 15. See also Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 145. [p] Modest Plea, p. 93. The Scriptures and Athanasians Compared, p. 15. Appeal to a Turk, &c. p. 145. [q] The Scripture and Athanasians, &c. p. 16, 17, 22. Reply to Dr. W. by the Author of

his *divine* honours and robes of majesty are to continue with him no longer than to the *end of the world*[r]. It seems, when his friends and followers are to receive their *crowns*, to have and to hold to all eternity, he is to lose and forfeit his. They must *increase*, but he must *decrease*: they are to grow up, he is to grow down, and sink out of *Godhead*. A shocking thought! to as many as have any just regard for *sacred Writ*, any love or veneration for their *blessed* LORD; and have not lost the grace of *discernment*, and the *spirit* of a *sound mind*, by affecting to be *wiser* than all the churches of GOD.

Unity, &c. p. 49. Peirce's Western Inquisition, p. 148, 149. [r] Reply to Dr. Waterland, by the Author of the Unity, &c. p. 49.

Judge for yourselves what is RIGHT.

PART II.

IN the former part, I have taken the like method as the *writer* of the *pamphlet* had done. Only there is this difference, that whereas he has often charged the Athanasians with things which they neither hold, nor can by any *certain* consequence be proved upon them; I have took care to charge the Arians with nothing but what some or other of them *expressly* maintain, or else what may be fixed upon them by clear and evident *consequence*.

My design, in this Second Part, is to give the common reader a few useful hints, such as may serve to prevent his being imposed upon by the writer of the *pamphlet*, whom I am here answering. I shall throw what I have to say under two heads: one shall contain short *remarks* upon his six *preliminary propo-*

sitions; the other shall be some brief *strictures* upon his two ingenious *columns.*

I. His first *proposition* is intended to prove, that there is but one *infinite Person,* (whom he styles a *Being,*) namely, GOD the FATHER. His Old Testament texts prove, that JEHOVAH (that is, as we say, FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST) is the *only* GOD, and knows no *equal.* The New Testament texts prove, that the FATHER is sometimes styled, by way of eminence, the *one* or *only* GOD; which no man questions.

II. His second *proposition* is to prove, that GOD the FATHER has some titles *common* to him with *men;* such as *Potentate, King, Lord, Saviour,* &c. And that when they are applied to him, they are to be understood in the *highest* and most *absolute* sense. This, I think, he has well proved. And it may pass for a true, but trifling *proposition.*

III. His *third* is to prove, that the name GOD is likewise *common* to GOD the FATHER, *angels,* and *men;* which is true also. But he forgot to observe, that the word GOD is not applied to *angels* or *men* in a *proper* sense, (as the name of *Potentate, King,* or *Lord* may) but in a loose, figurative, *improper* sense only.

IV. His *fourth* is to shew, that the FATHER has some characteristics annexed to the name GOD, which determine him to be the *first Cause.* He is the *high* GOD, *most high* GOD, &c. In proof hereof, he produces about fourteen passages of the Old Testament, which certainly prove all that they prove of the JEHOVAH, or GOD of Israel, in opposition to *nominal* or *reputed* Gods; not of the FATHER only, in opposition to the SON, who is himself JEHOVAH as well as the FATHER. He has also three texts out of the New Testament, which undoubtedly prove that the FATHER is GOD *Most High,* or GOD *Supreme,* (which is equally true of GOD the SON, Rom. ix. 5.) above all *reputed* or *nominal* Gods: but it is not proved that he has any *real,* and *true,* any *adorable* God besides him, or under him.

V. His *fifth* is designed to *reconcile* two *contradictory* propositions, that there are *more* GODS *than one,* and *not more* GODS *than one;* where he comes off very indifferently. For his intent is to intimate that there are more *adorable Gods,* more *true Gods* than one; which is directly repugnant to the Scripture doctrine of *one* GOD. There are many *reputed* or *nominal* Gods;

that is very certain. But more *adorable Gods* than one neither *Law* nor *Gospel* can bear.

VI. His *sixth proposition* carries on the same design with the *fifth*, to make FATHER and SON two *adorable* GODS, and to teach us to serve the *creature* besides the *Creator*, and to pay our homage and acknowledgments to one that by *nature* is no GOD. It will be hard to persuade any into those measures who have the use of their Bibles; which will teach them the contrary, quite through from Genesis down to the Revelations.

Brief Strictures upon his two Columns.

Page 6, he cites some *texts* to prove, that the FATHER alone, *exclusive* of the SON, is the *only* GOD, or *only true* GOD: which the texts neither say nor mean. For the same Scriptures assert that the SON is GOD, *True* GOD, *Great* GOD, JEHOVAH, *Almighty*, &c. as well as the FATHER. Therefore the *exclusive* terms could never be intended in *opposition* to GOD the SON, but to *idols*, or pretended *deities*.

Page 7, he makes a dull harangue about *person* and *essence*; instead of shewing that FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST may not be or are not *one* GOD. This is a *Scriptural* doctrine, independent of the names of *person* or *essence*, and such as was fully believed and taught for a century and more before ever those *terms* came in. Not but that those *terms* are useful, in opposition to the *wiles* and *equivocations* of heretics, which were the first occasion of them: nor are they difficult to understand, whenever considered without prejudice and with an honest mind. But it is enough for common Christians to believe, that FATHER, SON, and HOLY GHOST are all equally *divine*, that *one* is not *another*, nor all together *three* GODS, but *one* GOD: one GOD, into whom we have been *baptized*, and whom we are ever to serve, worship, and adore, with all our heart, mind, and might.

Page 8, he insists much upon the *personal pronouns, I, thou, he:* which can never be proved to be constantly applied in Scripture to none but *single* persons. Besides that the arguments from the *pronouns*, at most, can prove no more than this; that it is the Scripture way to speak but of *one Person* at a time, (be it FATHER, or SON, or HOLY GHOST,) under the title of GOD, LORD, JEHOVAH, &c. tacitly considering the other two Persons as *united to*, or *comprehended in*, that one Person spoken of: which, if it

be the case, is so far from proving that all the three are not one GOD, that it is rather a confirmation of it, that they really are. But we have examples where *one* GOD, or LORD *of hosts*, is mentioned, and yet the expressions are *plural* as to the *Persons*. "GOD said, Let *us* make man in *our* image," Gen. i. 26. "GOD "created man in his own image, in the image of GOD," ver. 27. GOD creates, while more *Persons* than one create: and it is GOD's *image*, which is the image of *more* Persons than one: therefore more Persons than one are included in GOD there mentioned. The like may be shewn of the one LORD *of hosts* mentioned Isa. vi. 3. compared with verse the 8th, and with John xii. 41. and Acts xxviii. 25, 26.

In page 9, he represents it as a strange thing, that the SON should be "that very GOD whose Son he is: the image, and "that which he is the image of." This kind of banter and abuse runs through his whole performance. It is observable, that the force of the cavil lies only in the *expression*. Say, that the SON, a distinct Person, is *united* in *substance* and *Godhead* with GOD the FATHER; and there is no appearance of absurdity in it. Say, that the SON is personally distinct from the FATHER, and yet one GOD with him; and there is nothing strange or shocking in it. But say, *that he is that very* GOD *whose Son he is*, or *that very thing of which he is the image;* and here begins to appear something harsh and odd. What is the reason? Because the words sound as if the SON were the FATHER himself; were *distinct* and *not distinct* at the same time. The Arian notion, of GOD's being but *one Person*, is first insinuated in the phrase, *that very* GOD whose Son he is; and next the Athanasian is feigned to join his notion (inconsistent with the other) thereto: and thus he is made to say things that he never meant. The sophistry lies wholly in the artificial blending of *ideas*. The SON is not *that very Person* whose *Son* he is, nor *that very Person* whose *image* he is: but he is *one* GOD with him; a name *common* to more Persons than one.

Page 10, he takes notice, that GOD *led Jacob* alone, *yet by the hands of Moses and Aaron:* and GOD *created the heavens* alone, *yet* by JESUS CHRIST. He should have added, that if GOD the FATHER be True GOD *alone*, yet it is to be understood, *together with* JESUS CHRIST. The word *alone*, in such instances, is not intended in *opposition* to GOD the SON, but to others: and *exclusive* terms are not always to be interpreted with the utmost rigour.

Page 11, 12, he pretends that CHRIST, before his incarnation, was GOD's *angel*, and *messenger*, and *servant*. He cannot prove *servant* at all; nor *angel*, or *messenger*, from any parts of Scripture but what, in the very same places, declare him to be *Ho Theos*, GOD absolutely, *Jehovah*, LORD GOD, *Almighty* GOD, &c. From whence it is plain, that the name of *angel* concerns only his *office*, not his *nature*; and is an argument only of the SON's voluntary condescension to transact matters between GOD the FATHER and mankind.

Page 12, 13, he has some wise reasonings against the Son's glory being *eclipsed* in the incarnation. He asks, how it could be *eclipsed* from men, who "then beheld his glory more than "ever?" By his argument, if, the first time a man sees the *sun* at all, it should be under a *cloud*, or an *eclipse*, it is therefore under no *cloud*, nor under any *eclipse* to that man. In short, though men "behold his glory more than ever," yet even then his glory was shrouded under the *veil* of flesh, and did not shine out to the full; which if it had, no *mortal* could have looked against it.

Page 12th and 13th, he labours to confound *real* and *essential*, with *outward* and *accidental* glory: and he is marvellously subtile and profound on that head. The short answer is, that one kind of *glory* can never be *increased* or *diminished*, either in FATHER or SON: the other kind of *glory* may admit, and has admitted of *increase* or *diminution*, both in FATHER and SON, and will so again hereafter.

His cavils (p. 13.) about *two Persons*, in CHRIST are built on nothing but his own mistakes of the definition and meaning of the word *person*.

His reasoning about *even* and *odd* (p. 14.) is *odd* enough; to answer a jest with a jest.

Page 15, he has some speculations about CHRIST's being exalted to the *universal dominion of all worlds*, (a likely charge, indeed, for any *creature* to sustain,) and becoming a *Mighty* GOD: as if he had not been as *Mighty* when he *made* the worlds, and when *he laid the foundations of the heavens and the earth.*

Page 16, he observes, that Scripture says nothing of *two kingdoms* of CHRIST. But the Scriptures do speak of a *kingdom* which is to cease at the day of judgment, (1 Cor. xv.) and of a *kingdom* which shall not cease, nor ever have an end, Isa. ix. 7. Dan. xii. 13. Luke i. 33. Heb. i. 8. How to make one kingdom

of *both* may be as difficult, perhaps, as to make the same number *even* and *odd*.

Page 17, he pretends, that the SON is to be *honoured*, only because the FATHER hath *made him* universal Governor of heaven and earth. How is it then that he was GOD, LORD, and *Creator*, before the world was? Are not these things as considerable as any thing that came after? And how is it that he is to be *honoured*, together with the FATHER, and with the same acts of worship, (Rev. v. 13,) to all *eternity*; even after he shall have laid down this *universal kingdom* and *government*, according to our wise author? Surely, if the *sole* foundation of his *honour* ceases, his *honours* should cease with it.

Page 19, he observes, that *the Disciples and* GOD *are one*. I know not whether his *understanding* here failed him most, or his *eyesight*. How does he read the text? "That they all may be "one—that they also may be one in us," John xvii. 21. Not that *they* and *we* may be *one*, not that *they* may be *one with us*; but only, one with each other *in us*.

These few *Strictures* may be sufficient to shew, that the author is not to be depended on, in his representations or reasonings. I designed *brevity*, and therefore I pass over his other fallacies and misconstructions: which are either stale things, such as have been abundantly answered over and over by better hands; or else are too mean and trifling to have been either *objected* on one side, or *answered* on the other, by any that have well studied this controversy.

FIVE LETTERS

TO

MR. STAUNTON.

FIVE LETTERS

TO

MR. STAUNTON.

LETTER I.

SIR,

ABOUT eight weeks ago, I had the favour of a letter from you, together with some papers relating to the subject of the Trinity. I have had no time since, more than to give them a cursory reading. But my month of waiting being September, when, probably, the Prince or young Princesses might be, as usual, at Hampton Court; I thought I might then take an opportunity of waiting upon you, and discoursing with you, before I enter into any epistolary correspondence. I am yet uncertain where the court will be in September. If you can inform yourself where the king's chaplains must wait the next month, I shall be obliged to you for acquainting me with it.

My hands, you must be sensible, are pretty full at present, in maintaining the Catholic cause (allow me so to call it) against the Arians; who seem to be now the most prevailing sect of the Anti-Trinitarians, Socinianism being almost grown obsolete amongst us. Your scheme seems to me to be Socinian in the main; only taking in the preexistence of Christ's human soul, excluding him from worship, and interpreting some texts in the Sabellian way, and not after Socinus. I know not whether my leisure will permit me to examine all the grounds upon which you go, and to give a particular answer to every difficulty you have to urge. But if, upon discoursing with you, the controversy, so far as concerns you, may be shortened, and reduced to two or three points which are most material; I may perhaps

find time hereafter to give you my thoughts upon them in writing. You will consider, in the meanwhile, that you are as much concerned to answer, I mean to yourself, the reasons which I have given for my persuasion, as to require answers to those reasons, which seem to you to favour your principles. The reasons, for instance, which I have given against the Sabellian construction of the first chapter of St. John, are of equal force against yours. And my arguments to prove Christ to be properly Creator, (not to mention several others to prove his Divinity, drawn from his titles, and attributes, and from the form of baptism,) directly strike at your hypothesis, as much as at the Arian. There are many great objections, as you see, lying against your principles; and there are some, not contemptible, against mine also. Weigh both equally, and balance them one against another: this will be the true method to form a right judgment. I believe you to be as sincere and impartial in your inquiries as most men are; making allowance for such prejudices as are often apt to steal upon any of us, without our perceiving it. I wonder a little how one that talks so well about suspending assent where there is not sufficient evidence, can prevail with himself to think that there is any prescription for your scheme of 500 years before the commencement of my scheme. The proof of this fact can never be made good. The contrary is plain and evident. I am in hopes that I have mistook your meaning: if I have, I ask your pardon. I shall add nothing more at present, but my thanks to you for your very civil manner of writing to me; assuring you, that so far as my leisure, abilities, or opportunities permit, I shall be ever ready to give you the best satisfaction I can in any thing relating to this controversy; being,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Aug. 9, 1720.

LETTER II.

SIR,

I CAN now acquaint you, that I shall not be in waiting at Kensington before the 16th of September. I intended to be

there at the beginning of the month; but my wife being ill, I have wrote to my brother chaplains to take care of the first fortnight: and they will be so kind as to do it. I shall be very glad to see you at Kensington any time after the 16th. There are lodgings provided for the chaplains, as I well know, having so found it the last year. The lodgings are in or near the square: which is all that I remember of them.

I thank you for the favour of your last, and again ask your pardon for mistaking your meaning. I shall think my time there very agreeably and usefully spent in friendly debates upon so important a subject. Not that I think either of us shall be able thoroughly to discuss the main question, in a verbal conference, and without books at hand. But we may settle some preliminaries; may throw out several things as agreed on between both; and so prepare the way for a short and clear examination of the matter in debate, to be done afterwards by way of letter. In the interim, I am, with very true and sincere respect,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Aug. 30, 1720.

LETTER III.

SIR,

I HAVE had the favour of two letters from you, and am not unmindful of the promise I made to enter into an epistolary correspondence with you, as far as my leisure may permit, and provided the dispute may be brought into a narrow compass. I might reasonably decline all private conference, having sufficiently done my part in this controversy, till some or other shall undertake, in the same public way, to confute what I have publicly asserted. Yet since you have been pleased to apply yourself to me, with much civility, and with an air of strict sincerity, entreating me not to think it too great a task, though in respect of a single soul, to take particular notice of what you have publicly and privately advanced upon the subject; I shall

not scruple to comply with your desires, so far as may be sufficient to answer the end intended.

The points which, after our conference at Kensington, I promised to go upon, were these: 1. The interpretation of the first of St. John. 2. The question whether Christ be Creator. 3. The point of worship. Under these three is contained all that is material; and upon these the main of the controversy turns. I must insist upon it with you, as a preliminary article, that you confine yourself, for the present at least, within these bounds; avoiding all wanderings and unnecessary diversions, attending to one point only at a time, and contentedly suffering it to be distinctly and fully debated, before we proceed to any new one. You are first to be upon the defensive, and to bear the part of a respondent. You shall have your turn to object afterwards (if we continue our correspondence) what you please to my scheme; but, for the present, you are only to defend your own.

These things premised, I shall now begin with your interpretation of St. John. You construe the words Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος, *God was reason or wisdom.* To which I object as follows:

1. The article ὁ before Λόγος, and the want of the article ὁ before Θεὸς, make one presumption against your interpretation. Please to observe St. John's manner of expressing himself elsewhere, ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστὶν, "God is love," twice, 1 John iv. 8, 16. ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστι, "God is light," 1 John i. 5. Now these are just such propositions as that of yours, *God was wisdom:* wherefore had St. John intended it, he would have expressed it thus; ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἦν. This observation is of weight, not only because of St. John's manner of expressing himself, but also because the Greek idiom requires it. See Erasmus's comment upon the place, who was a good judge in such matters.

2. Another objection against your interpretation is this, that the Λόγος is the principal subject, the theme which the Apostle took to discourse on. He is there shewing what the Λόγος was, not what God the Father was. The Λόγος was in the beginning, the Λόγος was with God, the world was made by the same Λόγος, and so on. The whole first fourteen verses are, in a manner, little else but a description of the several powers and attributes of the Λόγος. Wherefore it is more natural and consonant to understand that the Apostle intended to tell us that the Λόγος was God, than *vice versa:* since the Apostle was recounting the

attributes of the Λόγος, his principal theme, not the attributes of God the Father.

3. I must not forget to add, that all antiquity has construed the words as we do. Now, whether you consider the ancients as the properest judges of the idiom of the language in or near their own times; or whether you consider them as faithful conveyers of the Apostle's meaning, (some having been his immediate disciples, as Ignatius; others having conversed with those that had been,) either way, the verdict of the ancients, especially in so noted and so important a passage of Scripture, ought to be of great weight, and indeed decisive; unless there appeared (as there does none) some plain reason or necessity, in text or context, for another construction. You seem indeed to lay some stress upon this consideration, that, in our way, we construe the words *backwards*. But this is slight. Would you call it construing *backwards*, if we rendered the first sentence, (ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος,) "The Word was in the beginning!" It is not construing backwards, to render πνεῦμα ὁ Θεὸς, "God is "spirit:" John iv. 24. or to render μάρτυς γάρ μου ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς, "God is my witness:" Rom. i. 9. Multitude of like examples may be given, where the different idioms of languages require that the sense should run under a different order of the words.

Your other observation, borrowed from Bishop Pearson, that the Evangelist makes "the last word of the former sentence the "first of that which follows," appears to be of very little moment. By this rule, the second verse should have begun with ὁ Λόγος instead of οὗτος. Or if you answer this by saying, that still οὗτος refers to the last word preceding, then by the same rule δι' αὐτοῦ, in the third verse, should refer to τὸν Θεὸν preceding. But enough of fancies: let us rather attend to dry criticism and strict reasoning.

I proceed to your construction of δι' αὐτοῦ, *by it, or according to it, as in or by an exemplar*. It is sufficient here to observe, that this construction is ungrammatical. The preposition διὰ cannot bear any such sense. The English particle *by* is indeed sometimes so used, but I want some example of any such use of the Greek διά. Give me one, at least, out of Scripture: or I shall be content if you can produce me any either in sacred or profane writer.

Mr. Norris's speculations upon this head I am well acquainted with. They may pass for pretty fancies, and that is all. Allow-

ing the thing itself to be true, yet it neither can be made appear that John has here asserted it, nor was Mr. Norris himself sanguine enough to affirm that he ever intended it. See his preface to part i. p. 14. Add to this, that the *ideal world* is nobody knows what. Strip it of flight and figure, and there is no more in it than this, that God knew all things before he made them: but the modus of it infinitely surpasses all created understanding. If we come to plain good sense, we can conceive nothing of God, but what is either substance or attribute. The *ideal world*, in your hypothesis, must either be the substance of God the Father, that is, God himself, or only some attribute of him. You make it to be his *reason*, or his *wisdom*, and therefore must of consequence suppose it an attribute; and so you say in your first letter, though in the same place you observe that it is "of the substance of God," the meaning of which I should be glad to know distinctly. To me there appears no medium between an *attribute* of God, and God himself. You suppose *wisdom* to be an *attribute*, not God himself precisely considered; and accordingly you say *by it*, not *by him:* so that, at length, allowing only for a small difference in words, your hypothesis falls in with the Sabellian scheme, and I have already confuted it in my first Sermon. However, I shall not scruple to make a little more particular application of what I have there said to your hypothesis.

I argue thus. Either you must understand by the Λόγος, God the Father himself, or an attribute of God the Father: but neither of these suppositions can be reconciled to St. John's Gospel, therefore your scheme falls. If you understand by the Λόγος, God the Father, try if you can make sense of verse the 1st, 2nd, and 14th; if you understand any *attribute* of him, as you seem to do, I object as follows:

1. The *Logos* was *with God*, πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. What accurate writer would not rather have said of an attribute, that it was ἐν τῷ Θεῷ, *in God?* And yet πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν is again repeated.

2. St. John lays some stress upon the *Logos's* being *in the beginning* with God. He repeats, he inculcates it. What need of this, if the *Logos* means only God's wisdom? Can any man doubt whether God was always wise? But there might be some doubt whether any other Person was in the beginning with God the Father; and therefore, if a Person be meant, we see the reason of the Evangelist's repeating it, and laying a stress upon it.

3. The pronoun *οὗτος* (verse the 2nd) put by itself, and beginning a sentence, seems rather to denote a Person than an attribute, and to be more justly rendered *he* than *it*. I know not whether any the like instance can be given of *οὗτος* put absolutely and beginning a sentence, and not denoting a person.

4. Verse the 8th, "He (John the Baptist) was not that light." The *he* here, of whom this is denied, plainly refers to some other *he*, of whom the thing is affirmed. How would it sound to say, *he was not*, but *it* (an attribute of God) *was that light?*

5. Proceed to verse the 11th, and read it in your way, thus: *It came unto its own, and its own received it not.* Where is the sense or the propriety?

6. Go on to verse the 12th. *But as many as received it, to them it gave power to become the sons of God.* Is not the sense flat, and the sentence very odd and unnatural?

7. Lastly, consider verse the 14th. *The Logos* (an attribute of God the Father) *was made flesh, and it tabernacled amongst us, and we beheld its glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father*, &c. Now, how comes *wisdom* or *reason* to be the *only begotten* of the Father, more than *power*, or *goodness*, or any other attribute?

8. St. John in his Revelations seems to have determined, that ὁ Λόγος is the name of a Person, not an *attribute*, the Person of Jesus Christ: Rev. xix. 13.

These are the principal difficulties against your scheme, which at present occur to me. Be pleased to answer them severally and distinctly, or give them up as unanswerable. In the interim, I rest,

SIR,

Your faithful Friend,

And humble Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Oct. 27, 1720.

LETTER IV.

SIR,

I RECEIVED a letter from you, containing some exceptions to the evidence and reasons which I offered against your interpretation of the first chapter of St. John. Your exceptions, or

pleas, I shall examine one by one; and then leave you to judge of what weight they ought to be: charitably believing that you will not industriously deceive your own soul.

1. To my critical reasons your general answer is, that you are illiterate, and pretend not to criticism.

But this plea will be of no service in the case. You correct the English translation, and indeed all the versions that ever were, appealing to the original itself. I shew you from the idiom of the language, from the Apostles' manner of expressing himself elsewhere, and from his principal drift and design through the chapter, that you misconstrue the original, and that the words cannot bear your sense. Now either you are obliged to answer these reasons, or else to own frankly, that you have taken upon you to judge in a point you understand not, have been confident without grounds, and pronounced in the dark. Consider well what St. Peter has observed, namely that the unlearned and unstable wrest the Scriptures to their own destruction, 2 Pet. iii. 16. How know you but this may be your own case, while against the idiom of the tongue, the author's manner of expression, as well as against the wisest and ablest judges ancient or modern, you wrest a passage of such importance to a new and strange meaning?

I do not doubt but an *illiterate* man may be capable of understanding the Gospel: and I hope you are capable of understanding the passage of St. John in the vulgar sense, as well as in any new invented one of your own.

2. To my argument drawn from the sentiments of antiquity, you except, that *if the sense of a text can be fixed*, any different sense of Fathers against it is of no weight.

But what is this to the purpose? Have you *fixed* the sense of the text, that is, *ascertained* it? So far from it, that you have hardly the shadow of a reason, from text or context, to support it. On the contrary, it is rather *fixed* to another sense, as I have shewn you, and given you reasons which you are not able to answer.

3. You plead that the five first verses are a train of progressive propositions, and that generally the predicate of the former is the subject of the succeeding.

I answer, that your rule fails in the very two first propositions, for ὁ Λόγος is the subject in both. It fails again in verse the 2nd, where, by your rule, it should have been ὁ Λόγος,

instead of οὗτος. Your rule is again broke in verse the 3rd, where δι' αὐτοῦ should, by that rule, refer to Θεὸν going before. But enough of fancies.

4. To my argument drawn from St. John's making the *Logos* his principal theme, and his intending to tell us, not what God the Father was, but what the *Logos* was: to this you except, that the Apostle's declaring the *Logos* to be an attribute of God, is declaring what the *Logos* is, and is therefore consonant to the Apostle's design. I answer,

You do not here carefully distinguish between *subject* and *predicate*. When we say, *God is reason*, God is the subject, and *reason* is predicated of him. But when we say, the *Logos is God*, the *Logos* is the subject, and that he is God, is predicated of the *Logos*. Now St. John's scope and design, which runs through the first fourteen verses, is to predicate of the *Logos*, not to predicate of God the Father: wherefore I must still insist upon it, that the Apostle's drift all along is against your construction.

5. You conceive that you have some strength and countenance from the 5th verse, which you desire me to account for. Please to compare John iii. 36. v. 40. x. 10. v. 25, 26. vi. 33, &c. xiv. 11. and especially John viii. 12. xi. 25. Col. iii. 3, 4. You will find Christ to have been the life and light of the world, as being the Author and Fountain of the resurrection, and the Giver of life eternal. Not a word do you meet with about the *ideal world*, which, whether it be a truth or no, has no foundation in Scripture, but is borrowed from the Platonic philosophy.

6. You pass some high commendations on Mr. Norris, reflecting not very kindly (I am sure, without Mr. Norris's good leave) on the clergy in general.

I readily allow all you can say in commendation of that good man. But will you abide by his authority in every thing? If you will, our dispute will be at an end. But it is in vain to contend by authorities instead of reasons. How many authorities might I produce against your sentiments, particularly against your construction of St. John! The whole Christian world, in a manner, from the beginning downwards to this day, not to mention that Mr. Norris, in the main, is of my side of the question, and interprets the Λόγος of a distinct Person, not of God the Father, or any attribute of him.

7. You except to my notion of an *attribute*, and (without un-

derstanding what you say) call it Sabellian. My notion of an attribute is the same that all Divines, whether Sabellian or others, have ever had of it. Power, wisdom, goodness, are attributes of God, not his substance precisely considered: in like manner, as reason is a property of something rational, not the very thing itself precisely considered. They are abstract partial ideas, and are not the very same with the notion of the substance itself. For if you say that power is the substance, and wisdom the substance, and goodness the substance, precisely considered; then power is goodness, and both together are wisdom; and wisdom is omnipresence, &c. and there is no difference between one attribute and another, nor any sense in saying that the substance of God is wise, good, powerful, &c. because it will be only saying, that the substance is substance.

8. You take hold of Bishop Pearson's saying, that God is an attribute of the Λόγος. But it is plain that the Bishop there used the word *attribute* in an improper sense, for *predicate;* meaning only that Θεὸς was predicated of the Λόγος, or, in plain English, that it is there said of the Λόγος, that he was God.

When you speak of wisdom, power, and goodness being *coessential and consubstantial*, you use words either without a meaning, or with a meaning peculiar to yourself. *Things* are with one another *coessential* or *consubstantial,* not properties, nor abstract notions.

As to my rendering John iv. 24, I have the same right to render πνεῦμα *Spirit*, (not a Spirit,) as our translators had to render πνεύματι, in the same verse, *Spirit*, not a Spirit. But that by the way only, having little relation to our present dispute.

As to the preposition διὰ, neither you nor Mr. Norris has given any instance of its ever being used in the exemplary sense. The rest is of no moment.

Thus, Sir, I have, I think, considered every exception in your letter that appears to have any weight. As you are pleased to apply to me under the character of a *Ductor Dubitantium*, so I have endeavoured to answer every the least scruple, that so you may the more readily come into those reasons which I before offered, and which return now upon you in their full force. I beg leave to assure you, that I offer you nothing but what appears to me plain good sense, and sound reason, and such as

has weight with myself as much as I desire it may have with you. I sincerely wish you a right judgment in all things, and remain,

Your Friend and Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Nov. 13, 1720.

LETTER V.

SIR,

I GAVE you time to consider upon what I had before offered, that you might at length give up what you could no longer maintain. It was with me a preliminary article, that we should not run from point to point, to make a rambling and fruitless dispute of it; without settling and clearing any thing. I will not undertake to go through the obscurer parts of the controversy with you, while I find you so unwilling to apprehend plain things. It would be endless for me to explain my meaning every time you mistake it: for every explanation will still want a further explanation, and so on *ad infinitum*. I have neither leisure nor inclination to proceed in this way; nor do I see to what purpose it is. I have shewed my willingness, upon your own earnest request, to serve you in this controversy; but despair of any success in it. The civilest way now is, to break off a correspondence which can serve to no good end. You are well pleased with your own opinions, and I as well satisfied with mine. Which of us has the most reason, we shall both know another day. I am,

SIR,

Your Friend and Servant,

DAN. WATERLAND.

Magd. Coll. Dec. 25, 1720.

A

DISSERTATION

UPON

THE ARGUMENT *A PRIORI*

FOR PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF

A FIRST CAUSE:

IN A

LETTER TO MR. LAW.

A

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THE ARGUMENT *A PRIORI*

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SIR,

WHEN I last had the pleasure of your conversation, in company with one or two more ingenious friends, I remember we soon fell to asking each other, what news from the republic of letters; what fresh pamphlets stirring; what works, relating either to *religion* or *science*, had appeared lately, or were soon likely to appear. Hereupon several things were mentioned, and passed off in discourse: but what we happened more particularly to dwell upon was, the consideration of some metaphysical pieces concerning the proving the existence of a Deity *a priori*, (as the Schools term it,) that is to say, from some supposed *antecedent* necessity, considered as a *ground*, or *reason*, or *foundation*, or *internal cause*, or *formal cause* of the Divine existence. And here, if I remember, we were inquisitive to know what those scholastic terms *imported*, and whether the thought contained in them was entirely *new*, a recent product of the eighteenth century; as also what weight or solidity there was in it: and, if there were none, whether it portended any detriment to *religion* or *science*, and might be worth the opposing or confuting. Upon the debating and canvassing the particulars now mentioned, my opinion then was, and I am since

more and more confirmed in the same, that those who have appeared as advocates for that argument *a priori* seem to have had no clear notion of the thing itself, or of the terms they make use of; that the *thought* however was not a *new thought*, though perhaps it might be justly called a *new tenet*, as having been constantly exploded for many centuries upwards, and never once maintained by *metaphysicians* or *divines;* that moreover it was absolutely untenable, yea and carried its own confutation along with it, as soon as understood; and lastly, that such principles might be prejudicial, in some measure, both to *religion* and *science*, if they should happen to prevail; and that consequently it would be doing good service to both, if due care were taken, in a proper manner, to prevent their growth.

With these sentiments (which seemed also to be pretty nearly the common sentiments of all then present) I departed from you at that time. And no sooner was I returned to my books, and had some vacant leisure on my hands, but I thought of throwing out what occurred to me on those heads into paper, digesting it into a kind of dissertation, which I here send you for your perusal, and which I leave entirely to your disposal. The method, which I have chalked out for myself, in the essay here following, is;

I. To give some *historical* account of what the most eminent *metaphysicians* and *divines* have taught, so far as concerns the point in question.

II. To consider the *argumentative* part, in order to take off the ambiguity of *words*, and thereby to prevent confusion of ideas.

III. To examine into the *tendency* of the new tenets, with respect either to *religion* or *science*.

These three heads will furnish out so many distinct sections or chapters.

CHAP. I.

Containing an Historical View *of what Metaphysicians or Divines have formerly taught, so far as concerns the Argument* a priori *for the Divine existence.*

I SHALL begin with two ancient Theists, both of the same time, or nearly, and both declaring against the possibility of demonstrating *a priori* the existence of a Deity, or first Cause. One of them was a *Christian Divine*, and the other an acute *Pagan Philosopher*.

The Christian Divine was Clemens of Alexandria, who flourished about A.D. 192. He expresses himself thus in Dr. Cudworth's[a] translation:

"God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed of: "because, since the *principle* of every thing is hard to find out, "the *first* and most *ancient* principle of all, which was the cause "to all other things of their being *made*, [*and of their continuance* "*after they were made*,] must need be the hardest of all to be "declared or manifested.—But neither can [God] be apprehended "by any *demonstrative* science: for such science is from things "*before* [in order of nature] and more knowable; whereas "nothing can exist *before* that which is altogether unmade[b] [or "self-existent.]"

The other ancient Theist is Alexander Aphrodisiensis, a celebrated Peripatetic, who flourished between A.D. 199 and 211[c]. After he had proposed an argument for the existence of a first Cause, drawn from the consideration of *motion*, according to the Aristotelic principles, he proceeds to observe as follows: "This argument [or proof] is in the way of *analysis* only, it "being not possible that there should be a [strict] *demonstration* "of the *first principle* of all: wherefore we must here fetch our "beginning from things that are *after* it, and *manifest*, and

[a] Cudworth Intellect. Syst. p. 716.

[b] Ναὶ μὲν ὁ δυσμεταχειριστότατος περὶ Θεοῦ λόγος οὗτός ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως που ἡ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικτος, ἥτις τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένοις εἶναι, ——Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δὲ ἀγενήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει. *Clem. Alex.* p. 696. edit. Oxon.

[c] See an account of him in Fabricius, Bibl. Græc. lib. iv. cap. 25. p. 62.

" thence by way of *analysis* ascend to the proof of that *first* " *nature* which was before them[d]." So Dr. Cudworth renders the passage: and the reflection or comment, which he makes upon what has here been quoted from these two ancient Theists is in these words: " The true meaning of those ancient Theists, " who denied that there could be any *demonstration* of a *God*, " was only this, that the existence of a God could not be " demonstrated *a priori*, himself being the *first Cause* of all " things."

Such were the sentiments of *metaphysicians* and *divines* at that time, founded upon plain and cogent reason, such as must equally hold at all times, and such as seem to evince, not that the existence of a *first Cause* may be demonstrated *a priori*, but rather that it is really demonstrable *a priori*, if not self-evident, that no such proof can be made, being indeed contradictory and impossible, repugnant to the very nature or notion of a *first* Cause. But I shall speak to the *argumentative* part afterwards: I am now upon the *historical*. It is certain that the *Fathers* of the Church, Greek or Latin, never admitted any such proof *a priori* of the divine existence, but either directly or indirectly, either expressly or implicitly, condemned it all along. It would be tedious to enter into a particular detail of their sentiments, in relation to the proof of the existence: I shall content myself with one general observation, that they had not so much as the *terms* or *phrases* of *necessary existence*, or *necessity of existence*, but utterly rejected the very name of *necessity*, as not applicable to the *Deity* at all, understanding it constantly in its ancient, proper, *compulsive* sense[e]. Now it is very well known, that the supposed proof *a priori*, lately contended for, is built in a manner entirely upon the word *necessity*, and instantly sinks without it. For, put *immutable*, or *natural*, or *independent*, or *emphatical* existence, (according to the ancient way,) instead of necessary existence, or *necessity* of existence, and then it is certain that the very *medium* of the whole argument drops and vanishes, and there is not so much as any colour or appearance of the proof left. I say then, since it is undoubted fact that the *Fathers* all along admitted of no such terms as *necessary*, or *necessity*, in this

[d] Ἡ δεῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν. *Aphrodis. Physic. Schol.* lib. i. cap. 1.

[e] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. viii. p. 569, &c. Preface to Sermons, vol. ii.

case, but rejected them as not applicable either to the Divine *existence* or *attributes*; it is very plain that they therewith rejected any such pretended argument *a priori* as has been since raised from those *terms*.

To shew how late it was before *necessity* gained admittance in the Church, and became, as it were, christianized, with respect to our present subject, I may observe that Archbishop Anselm[f] of the eleventh and twelfth century, yea and Alexander Hales[g] of the thirteenth, were yet scrupulous of making use of the term, and were very tender of applying it to the Divine *acts* or *attributes*, except it were with great caution, awe, and reserve; at the same time owning the word to be both harsh and improper. And as to applying it to the Divine *existence*, I do not find that they ventured upon it at all; though others frequently did it afterwards in the decline of the thirteenth century, and downwards, when Aristotle's Metaphysics, translated into barbarous Latin, and the Arabian philosophy, (of Avicen, Averroes, and Algazel,) had paved the way for it[h].

Let us see however how this matter stood after those improper

[f] Deus nihil facit *necessitate*, quia nullo modo *cogitur* aut *prohibetur* aliquid facere. Et cum dicimus Deum aliquid facere quasi *necessitate* vitandæ inhonestatis, quam utique non timet, potius intelligendum est quod facit *necessitate* servandæ honestatis: quæ scilicet *necessitas* non est aliud quam *immutabilitas* honestatis ejus, quam a seipso et non ab alio habet; et idcirco *improprie* dicitur necessitas. *Anselm. Opp.* tom. iii. p. 55.

[g] Ad aliud vero quod objicitur de *necessitate* bonitatis, dicendum est quod nomen *necessitatis* non congrue hic dicitur de Deo. Unde Anselm. *In Deo nulla cadit necessitas.* Necessitas enim videtur dicere *coactionem.* Sed nec est *necessitas utilitatis* a parte sua, sicut habitum est in præcedente autoritate. Si vero dicatur *necessitas congruitatis*, sive *idoneitatis*, sicut tangitur in quadam authoritate, tunc potest dici quod ex *necessitate* bonitatis condidit res. Non tamen videtur congruere quod dicatur *ex necessitate naturæ*: licet enim sit idem bonitas quod natura ejus, tamen si diceretur *ex necessitate naturæ*, videretur poni talis *necessitas* qualis est in rebus naturalibus. In rebus enim naturalibus ignis ex *necessitate naturæ* generat ignem, et homo hominem: non sic autem est cum creaturæ fiunt a Deo. *Alex. Alens.* part. ii. p. 15.

N. B. This author flourished about 1230, died 1245. Albertus Magnus, who flourished about 1260, and died in 1280, made no scruple of applying the word *necessary* or *necessity* (in a sober but new sense) to the Divine *essence* or *existence*: and it is very plain that he learned that language from Aristotle's philosophy, to which he refers for his sense of those terms. See Albert. Mag. Comment. in lib. i. Sentent. Dist. 6. Opp. vol. xiv. p. 121. edit. Ludg.

[h] Quievit autem et siluit philosophia Aristotelis, pro majori parte,—— usque post tempora Mahometi, quando Avicenna et Averroes et cæteri revocaverunt philosophiam Aristotelis in lucem plenam expositionis. Et licet alia logicalia et quædam alia translata fuerunt per Boetium de Græco, tamen tempore Michaelis Scoti, qui annis Dom. 1230. transactis apparuit, deferens librorum Aristotelis partes aliquas, &c. remagnificata est philosophia Aristotelis apud Latinos. *Rog. Bacon*, p. 37. Conf. p. 45, 262, 420.

terms were brought in, and softened into a qualified sense; whether any Schoolmen or others (now they might seem to have some handle for it) ever attempted to draw out any such argument *a priori* for the existence of a first Cause, and to commend the same as true and solid reasoning. I would here observe by the way, that the Schoolmen, though they deservedly lie under a disrepute for their excesses in many things, may yet be justly looked upon as carrying great authority with them in a point of this nature, where they had no bias to mislead them, (being inclined to the side of *Theism*,) and where a question turned upon a right understanding of *technical* terms or phrases, and a thorough acquaintance with *logic* and *metaphysics*; being a matter of pure abstract reasoning. They were undoubtedly great masters in that way: for "where they argued barely upon "the principles of reason," as a very judicious writer observes, "they have often done exceeding well, and have improved "natural reason to an uncommon height[1]." And I will venture to add, that if the sharpest wits of these later days shall undertake, upon their own stock, to furnish out a new scheme of *school divinity*, or *metaphysical theology*, it will be a long while, perhaps some centuries, before they arrive to such perfection in some part as many of the Schoolmen arrived to; unless they shall be content within a while to take those despised Schoolmen into consultation with them, and to extract the best things from them. This I hint by the way, in order to remove prejudices, with respect to my citing (as I am now going to do) Schoolmen in this cause; though I intend not to cite them only, but other the most judicious and learned *divines* and *metaphysicians*, who have come after them, and have entirely agreed in this article with them. However, as I have already intimated, the Schoolmen are most certainly proper judges within their own province, and in a point of *school divinity*: and this which we are now upon is very plainly such, as the pretended argument *a priori* proceeds altogether upon *scholastic* terms, and is managed in a *scholastic* way, and therefore must at length stand or fall by *scholastic* principles and *scholastic* reasonings. These things premised, I may now proceed in the *historical view*, according to order of time, beginning from those days when *necessary existence*, with other the like terms or phrases, had gotten some footing in the Christian theology.

[1] Reflections upon Learning, p. 217, 227.

A. D. 1260. ALBERTUS MAGNUS.

Albertus, surnamed the Great, on account of his great learning and abilities, was one of the most considerable among the *divines* or *metaphysicians* of the age he lived in. He was one of the first (I mean among Christian writers) that took upon him to give God the *metaphysical* title of a *necessary* Being. Yet he presumed not to found any argument *a priori* for the existence upon it, but denied expressly, or in words equivalent, that any argument of that kind could be made. He allows, that upon the foot of mere natural light, God may be known *a posteriori* by the *creatures*, and no otherwise[k]: for he admits it as a true principle, that a *philosopher* can search out God no other way than by the *creatures*, as a *cause* is known from the *effect*[l]. Which amounts to the same with saying, that philosophy affords no proof *a priori*.

A. D. 1270. THOMAS AQUINAS.

From the master or preceptor I may next descend to the scholar, who was almost twenty years younger than Albertus, but died some years before him, namely, in the year 1274. I need say nothing of the fame or the abilities of Aquinas, surnamed (according to the fashion of those times) the Angelical Doctor. He frequently enough makes use of the phrases of *necessary* Being, or *necessity* of *existing*, but yet never builds any argument *a priori* for the existence upon it, but constantly maintains, that every proof of the existence is *a posteriori*, from the effects. In one place he writes thus, "There are two kinds "of *demonstration*. The first is by the *cause*, and has its name "from shewing *why* the thing is, and it proceeds upon some-"thing *simply prior*. The second is by the *effect*, and has its "name from shewing *that* the thing is, and it proceeds upon "things *prior* with *respect to us*.—Now the existence of God, "as it is not knowable *in itself*, is demonstrable *to us* by the "*effects* to us known[m]." That is to say, the existence of God

[k] Posita creatura tanquam *effectu* Dei, necesse est Deum creatorem poni: et sic *a posteriori* ex creatura potest Deus cognosci. *Albert. Magn.* in lib. i. *Sentent.* dist. iii. Opp. tom. xiv. p. 66.

[l] Philosophus non investigat eum in philosophia nisi per *creaturas*, sicut causam per effectum. *Ibid.* p. 55.

[m] Duplex est demonstratio. Una quæ est per *causam*, et dicitur *propter quid*; et hæc est per *priora simpliciter*: alia est per *effectum*, et dicitur demonstratio *quia*; et hæc est per ea

cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, but *a posteriori* only: and so the title of that article explains it[n], in some editions of his Sum. In another work, Aquinas maintains the same thing in words somewhat different, thus: "In arguments brought to "prove the *existence* of the Deity, it is not proper to argue from "the *Divine essence*, or from *what he is*, but instead thereof to "argue from the *effects*, like as in the demonstrations *a posteriori*: "and from some such *effect* is the name of *God* taken[o]." I use a little liberty in rendering his words, to make his sense appear the clearer. It is very plain from both the passages here cited, that he utterly rejected all arguments *a priori* for the proving the *existence* of a Deity. Yet I shall not conceal from you, that he elsewhere argues from *necessary existence* to the *eternity* of the divine Being[p]; which may be thought to be arguing *a priori*: I will not say that it is not arguing *a priori*: but then it is not arguing from *attribute* to *existence*, but from one attribute to another, from existence and one or more attributes before proved, to an attribute not yet proved; which is a fair and just way of reasoning, and may perhaps not improperly be called arguing *a priori*; though some would scruple the giving it that title. However, as to this by-point, I shall have occasion to say more in the sequel, and so may dismiss it for the present, and proceed in my method.

A. D. 1276. ROGER BACON.

Roger Bacon, of the order of Friars Minor, was a person of strong parts and clear judgment, and had perhaps a greater compass of erudition than any other of that age. He was styled the *admirable* Doctor, after the way of giving titles at that time. It will not be improper to shew what his judgment was upon the present question, as he occasionally delivered it.

quæ sunt priora *quoad nos*.——Unde Deum esse secundum quod non est *per se* notum, *quoad nos* demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos. *Aquin. Summ.* q. ii. art. 2. p. 14. edit. Lugd. 1588.

[n] Deum esse, quamvis non *a priori*, *a posteriori* tamen demonstrari potest ex aliquo ejus notiori nobis *effectu*. *Aquin. Summ.* q. ii. art. 2. p. 4. edit. Paris. 1615.

[o] In rationibus autem in quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet assumi pro medio divinam essentiam, sive quidditatem, sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio *effectus*, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus *quia*; et ex hujusmodi effectu sumitur ratio hujus nominis *Deus*. *Aquin. Summ. contr. Gentiles*, lib. i. cap. 12. p. 14. edit. Lugd. 1587.

[p] Oportet ponere aliquod *primum necessarium* quod est *per seipsum* necessarium; et hoc est Deus, cum sit *prima causa* ut dictum est: igitur Deus *æternus* est cum omne *necessarium per se*, sit æternum. *Aquin. contr. Gentil.* lib. i. cap. 14. p. 21.

" In *metaphysics* there can be no *demonstration* made but by " arguing from the *effect:* because things *spiritual* are discovered " by the *sensible effects*, and the *Creator* by the creature, as is " manifest in that science[q]." From which words it is plain that he rejects all pretence to arguing *a priori* in the question of the *existence*, and allows of nothing in that case but the proofs *a posteriori* only.

A. D. 1290. Richardus de Media Villa.

Richard of Middleton was a man famous in his time, dignified with the title of the *solid* Doctor. His determination of the question about proving the existence *a priori* is clear and full; as here follows: " There is one kind of demonstration *propter* " *quid*, [from *antecedent* reason,] in which what belongs to the " subject is demonstrated by its *cause:* and there is another kind " of demonstration *quia*, [from subsequent reason,] in which the " cause is demonstrated by the *effect*. In the former way of " demonstration, I say, we cannot demonstrate the existence of " God, because the Divine existence has no *cause* prior to found " such proof of the existence upon: but in the latter way of " proof from the *effect*, I assert that we can demonstrate the " existence of the Deity by variety of arguments[r]." Here we may observe, as likewise in the three authorities before cited; that it was not through haste, oversight, or forgetfulness, that they avoided arguing *a priori* in that instance, but through deep consideration and judgment. They had all thought of the thing, and very deliberately rejected it, as amounting to a palpable absurdity, making a cause *prior* to the *first*.

I may further take notice, that this author has besides a whole chapter about the conceivable or notional *order* of the Divine attributes well worth the perusal, for the right understanding how, or in what sense, one may be said to argue *a priori* from *existence* to *attributes*, or from *attribute to attribute*.

[q] In metaphysicis non potest fieri demonstratio nisi per effectum: quoniam inveniuntur spiritualia per corporales effectus, et Creator per creaturam, sicut patet in illa scientia. *Rog. Bacon. Opus majus.* p. 62. edit. Jebb. 1733.

[r] Est quædam demonstratio *propter quid*, qua demonstratur passio de subjecto *per causam:* et est quædam demonstratio *quia*, in qua demonstratur causa per *effectum*. Loquendo de prima demonstratione, dico, quod non possumus *demonstrare* Deum esse, quia *esse Dei* causam non habet, per quam possimus ipsum demonstrare de Deo: loquendo de demonstratione quæ est per *effectum*, sic dico quod possumus demonstrare Deum esse multipliciter. *Rich. de Med. Vill.* in *IV. Libr. Sentent.* lib. i. dist. 3. q. 3. p. 41.

I shall cite some parts of that chapter for a specimen[s]: but the whole deserves a reader's careful notice, for the solid judgment appearing in it. The sum is, that the Divine *existence* is considered in the first place, and after that, the *attributes* in their most natural order of conception. And when they are so placed or ranked, we may argue from them in that *order*; and such arguing may, without impropriety, be styled arguing *a priori*, as arguing from something *antecedent*, in natural order of conception, to something *subsequent* in conception to it. I know not whether the judicious author has marshalled the attributes with the utmost exactness, or has assigned to every one of them its most proper place: but he appears to have determined very right in the main point, and to have digested every thing with a kind of masterly hand. Had those matters been considered always with the like care and judgment, there could have been no room for arguing *a priori* to the existence at all, nor for arguing to any *attribute* from any thing conceived as *antecedent*, in order of nature, to the existence. But *existence* and some *attributes* may rationally be conceived as *antecedent*, in order of nature, to *other* attributes: and this kind of arguing *a priori*, which is reasonable, ought not to be confounded with the other, which is manifestly ὕστερον πρότερον, and palpably absurd. But I pass on.

A. D. 1301. Johannes Duns Scotus.

Johannes Duns, surnamed Scotus, and dignified with the title of *Doctor Subtilis*, was considerable enough to support a kind of rivalship against Thomas Aquinas, and to be founder of a new

[s] Non est inconveniens ponere quod inter divina attributa sit aliquis ordo *secundum rationem* intelligendi, in quantum intellectus noster *priorem* conceptionem de uno facit quam de alio. Unde prius in nostra ratione intelligendi est *divinum esse* quam aliquod *attributum* ejus, et *intelligere* quam *velle*, et attributa respicientia *intellectum* priusquam respicientia *voluntatem*.——inter suas perfectiones *priores* sunt, in nostra ratione intelligendi, illæ quæ respiciunt ipsum in quantum est *essentia*, quam illæ quæ respiciunt ipsum in quantum est *vita*: et inter primas, prior est *unitas*, secunda *simplicitas*; communior est enim ratio unitatis quam simplicitatis: omnis enim simplex unum est, sed non convertitur, &c.——Ratio summæ *simplicitatis* et *unitatis* sunt in divina essentia ratio *infinitatis*: et ista tria, ratio *immutabilitatis*; et immutabilitas cum prædictis, sunt ratio *æternitatis*. Unde inferius per divinæ essentiæ *simplicitatem* probabitur in divina essentia esse *infinitas*, et per divinam *simplicitatem* et *infinitatem*, *immutabilitas*, et per immutabilitatem *æternitas*. Inter perfectiones etiam quæ conveniunt Deo in quantum est *vita*, priores sunt illæ, in nostra ratione intelligendi, quæ respiciunt *ipsum intelligere*, quam illæ quæ respiciunt *ipsum velle*; et inter primas, prior *veritas* quam *sapientia*. ——Inter perfectiones quæ respiciunt divinum *velle*, prima est *bonitas*, secunda *misericordia*, tertia *justitia*. *Ricard. de Med. Vill.* lib. i. dist. 2. qu. 4. p. 32, 33.

sect or division among the Schoolmen. However, their difference in other points makes their authority the greater as to those articles in which they agree: and it is certain that both Thomists and Scotists do agree in condemning and rejecting all argumentation *a priori* in proof of the *existence* of a first Cause, as manifestly absurd. Scotus declares in express words, that it is not possible for us to demonstrate as from a cause, or antecedent principle, [*propter quid*] the *existence* of an infinite Being, but that we may demonstrate it *a posteriori*, [demonstratione *quia*] from effects, namely from the *creatures*[t]. He further observes and proves, that the first Cause is absolutely *uncaused*, having neither *external* nor *internal* cause; neither *efficient*, nor *final*, nor *material*, nor *formal*, and consequently none at all. His reasoning is indeed wrapped up in a most wretched style, and very barbarous Latin: but it may perhaps be thrown into intelligible English, and will be found to contain excellent sense. It runs thus: "[u]If the first Cause is above any *efficient* cause, "it must of consequence be absolutely *uncaused*, since it cannot "have any other kind of cause, as *final*, or *material*, or *formal*. "As to *final* cause, that it cannot have any such, is proved thus: "inasmuch as it has no *efficient* cause, it follows of course that it "can have no *final*: because a *final* cause is no more than a "*metaphorical* cause, moving the *efficient* to act; nor does the "existence of the thing so caused essentially depend upon it, as "prior to it, in any other view. Now nothing can be justly "looked upon as a cause in itself, unless the thing caused "essentially depends upon it as prior to it; [which cannot be said "of a final cause.]

[t] De ente infinito non potest demonstrari esse *propter quid* quantum ad nos (licet ex natura terminorum propositio esset demonstrabilis *propter quid*) sed quantum ad nos propositio est demonstrabilis demonstratione *quia*, ex creaturis. *Scot. in Libr. Sentent.* lib. i. dist. 2. qu. 2. p. 28.

[u] Si illud primum est *ineffectibile*, ergo erit *incausabile*; quia non *finibile*, nec *materiabile*, nec *formabile*. Probatur prima consequentia, videlicet quod si est *ineffectibile* ergo non est *finibile*, quia causa *finalis* non causat, nisi quia metaphorice movet ipsum *efficiens* ad efficiendum: nam non alio modo dependet ab ipso essentialiter entitas finiti, ut *a priore*. Nihil autem est causa *per se*, nisi ut ab ipso tanquam *a priore* essentialiter dependet causatum.

Duæ autem aliæ consequentiæ (videlicet, quod si est *ineffectibile*, ergo *immateriabile* et non *formabile*) probantur simul: quia cujus non est causa *extrinseca*, ejus non est causa *intrinseca*. Quia causalitas causæ *extrinsecæ* dicit perfectionem sine imperfectione: causalitas autem causæ *intrinsecæ* necessario requirit *imperfectionem* annexam, quia causa intrinseca est *pars* causati. Ergo, ratio causæ *extrinsecæ* est naturaliter *prior* ratione causæ *intrinsecæ*: negato ergo priore, negatur posterius. *Scot. ibid.* p. 30.

"As to the other two consequences before hinted, (that if a "being has no *efficient* cause, it can have neither *material* nor "*formal*,) they follow of course, and are proved at the same "time: because whatever is without any *external* cause, must "of consequence be without any *internal* one. An *external* "cause carries with it a *perfect* causality, which is more than an "*internal* cause does; for an *internal* cause carries *imperfection* "along with it, as being only a *part* of the thing caused. Where-"fore if there be no room, as in this case, for an *external* cause, "which naturally is *prior* to the internal, much less can there be "any for the *internal* cause, which presupposes the other." I have been forced to render the passage paraphrastically, to make the sense clear, and to do justice to the argument contained in it. It amounts to a demonstration, that a *first cause* must be absolutely, and in every view, *uncaused*. And I judged it worth the noting, because it has been sometimes suggested, that though absolute *necessity* cannot be deemed a cause of a first cause *by way of efficient cause*, yet it may *by way of formal cause* be the ground of that existence[x]. Duns Scotus has here effectually confuted or obviated any such thought, by observing, that every *formal*, every *internal* cause is but a *part*, or a *partial* conception of the thing itself, *presupposing* the thing, and therefore properly not prior in conception to it, nor the cause of it.

He has a second argument in the same place to enforce the former, and it is to this effect: that *internal* or *intrinsic* causes owe their very nature and being as *causes*, or as *constituent* causes, to some *external* efficient; for they are not causes *in themselves*, but by the external *agent* which makes them such[y]. Therefore where there is no external *efficient* cause, there can be no *internal* cause properly so called. The force of the argument, as I understand it, lies here: that *matter* and *form* (called *internal* causes) are, in *themselves* considered, no more than constituent *parts* of the compound, not *causes* of it. It is their supposed relation to some external *agency* which alone makes them carry an idea of *causality* along with them. If therefore we suppose all external *agency* or *efficiency* to be away (as we

[x] See Dr. Clarke's Answer to the Sixth Letter, p. 33. edit. 6th.

[y] Aliter probantur eædem consequentiæ: quia causæ *intrinsecæ* sunt causatæ ab *extrinseca*, vel secundum *esse* earum, vel in quantum *causant* compositum, vel utroque modo. Quia causæ intrinsecæ non *seipsis*, sine *agente*, causant compositum, vel constituunt. *Scot. ibid.* p. 30.

must in this case, respecting the divine Being which has no *efficient* cause,) the very idea of *causality*, as to any *internal* cause, ceases and vanishes at once; it cannot be considered as a *cause* at all[z]. Wherefore, any being that is above having any *efficient* cause is much more above any other kind of *cause*, is absolutely *uncaused*; which was the thing to be proved.

A. D. 1591. GREGORIUS DE VALENTIA.

This writer, in his Commentaries upon Aquinas's Sum, expresses himself fully and clearly to our purpose. "The existence "of God cannot be evidently shewn *a priori*: in this point *all* "*are agreed*. For the existence of the Deity admits of no *cause* "whereby it should be demonstrated *a priori*. Neither can it "be demonstrated from the Divine *essence*, considered as prior "in *conception*. 1. Because the *existence* of a being ought not to "be proved by the *essence* of that being, since the question of "the *existence* [whether any thing is] must precede the other "question concerning the *essence*, [what it is,] as Aquinas "rightly observes. 2. Besides, the essence of God is not suffi-"ciently known to us[a]."

Here it is observable, that this author looked upon it as a ruled point, a thing *universally agreed to*, that there neither was nor could be any demonstration *a priori* of the existence of God. It may be observed also by the way, that the phrase of *demonstratio a priori* was now become a more familiar phrase than formerly. The elder writers which I have cited used to call it *demonstratio propter quid*, answering to the Greek διὰ ὅτι. Both signify a proof drawn from some prior *cause*, or from something naturally, or in the natural order of conception, *antecedent*

[z] The argument may receive some light from a passage in Durandus relating to this head.

Quod compositum ex *materia* et *forma* causam habeat, patet; habet enim duas causas *intrinsecas*, scilicet, *materiam* et *formam*, ex quibus componitur: habet etiam causam *efficientem*, quia unio materiæ et formæ fit per *agens* quod introducit formam in materia. Unde *philosophus*, 8. *Metaphysicæ*, cum quæreret quare ex *materia* et *forma* fit unum, dicit, quod non est aliqua causa, nisi *unum principium* motus, quod est *causa agens*. *Durand.* lib. i. dist. 8. qu. 4. fol. 3. edit. Paris.

[a] Deum esse non potest evidenter demonstrari *a priori*: de hac inter omnes convenit. Nam *Dei esse* nullam habet *causam* per quam *a priori* demonstrari possit: neque etiam id potest demonstrari per *essentiam* et *quidditatem* Dei, tanquam per aliquid prius secundum rationem. 1. Quia *esse* rei non debet demonstrari per *quidditatem* rei, cum quæstio *an sit* prior sit quæstione *quid sit*; ut recte D. Thom. &c. 2. Nam quidditas Dei non satis est nobis nota. *Gregor. de Valent.* tom. i. disp. 1. qu. 2. p. 59. edit. Lugd.

to the thing demonstrated by it[b]. *A posteriori* is just the reverse[c].

A. D. 1600. VASQUEZ.

Gabriel Vasquez, another eminent Schoolman of that time, declares his sentiments to the same purpose; that there can be no demonstration *a priori* of the existence of a Deity, but *a posteriori* only[d].

A. D. 1614. SUAREZ.

Suarez, the famous Schoolman and Jesuit, deserves a more particular consideration, because he really had a strong inclination to make out something that should look like an argument *a priori*, or however should (for ostentation sake, I suppose) be set forth with that *name*: for, in reality, he expressly and absolutely condemned all reasoning *a priori* to the *existence* of a Deity, as others before him had done; and yet by a kind of artificial turn, by interpreting the proof of the *unity* so as to amount to the same with the proof of a *Deity*, he conceived he had done the *thing*, only by changing of *names*. But let us observe how he managed the whole affair: we shall see afterwards what censures were passed upon it by the judicious, though it was mostly a difference in *words*. He states the main question thus: "Whether the existence of God may in some sort "[or in some sense] be demonstrated *a priori*[e]:" and he determines in the affirmative. The whole tenor of his reasoning is as here follows: [f]"We are first to premise, that, absolutely

[b] Demonstratio *a priori* ea est qua probatur effectus per *causam*, sive proximam sive remotam, aut probatur conclusio per aliquod *prius*, sive sit *causa*, sive *antecedens* tantum. *Chauvin. Lexic.* p. 170.

[c] Demonstratio *a posteriori* dicitur illa, qua vel probatur causa per *effectum*, vel conclusio per aliquod *posterius*, sive sit effectus sive consequens. *Chauvin. ibid.*

[d] Deum esse, non potest *a priori* demonstrari: *a posteriori* tamen et per *effectus* demonstrari potest. *Vasq.* q. ii. art. 2. p. 60.

[e] Utrum aliquo modo possit *a priori* demonstrari Deum esse. *Suarez. Metaphys.* tom. ii. disp. 29. sect. 3. p. 28.

[f] Supponendum est, simpliciter loquendo non posse demonstrari *a priori* Deum esse; quia neque Deus habet *causam* sui esse, per quam *a priori* demonstratur, neque si haberet, ita exacte et perfecte a nobis cognoscitur Deus, ut ex propriis principiis (ut sic dicam) illum assequamur. Quo sensu dixit Dionysius, capite septimo *de divinis nominibus*, nos non posse Deum ex propria natura cognoscere.

Quanquam vero hoc ita sit, nihilominus postquam *a posteriori* aliquid de Deo demonstratum sit, possumus ex *uno attributo* demonstrare a priori *aliud*: ut si ex *immensitate*, *v. g.* concludamus *localem immutabilitatem*. Suppono enim ad ratiocinandum *a priori*, modo humano, sufficere distinctionem *rationis* inter attributa.

Resolutio quæstionis. Ad hunc ergo

" speaking, the existence of God *cannot be proved a priori*; as " well because God has *no cause* of his existence whereby it " should be proved *a priori*, as also because if he had, yet we " have no such exact and perfect knowledge of God as might " enable us to trace him up (if I may so speak) to his own " proper principles. To which purpose Dionysius (in his seventh " chapter of the *divine names*) observes, that *we cannot know God* " *according to his proper nature.*

" But though that be so as I have here said, yet notwith- " standing, after we have once demonstrated *a posteriori* some- " thing concerning God, we may go on to demonstrate *a priori* " one *attribute* from another: as for instance, when we infer " *unchangeableness of place* from the *omnipresence* before proved. " I suppose all the while, that a *notional* distinction of the Divine " *attributes* (after an human way of conception) is foundation " sufficient for reasoning *a priori*.

" Now, for the resolution of the *question*, I proceed thus: " having demonstrated *a posteriori*, that God is a *necessary* and " *self-existent* Being, we may be able to prove *a priori* from this " attribute, [of *necessary existence*,] that there cannot be *another* " necessary and self-existent being besides that one; from whence " it follows, that that Being is *God*.

" You will object, that this is proving the *existence* of God " from the *essence* of God before known, (for it is supposed that " the *essence* of God is, that he is a *necessary* and *self-existent* " Being,) which is plainly repugnant; since the question *what* " *he is* presupposes the other question *whether he exists*; as

modum dicendum est: Demonstrato *a posteriori* Deum esse ens *necessarium* et *a se*, ex hoc attributo posse *a priori* demonstrari, præter illud non posse esse *aliud* ens *necessarium* et *a se*, et consequenter demonstrari *Deum* esse.

Dices, Ergo ex *quidditate* Dei cognita, demonstratur Deum esse, quia *quidditas* Dei est quod sit ens *necessarium* et *a se*: hoc autem plane repugnat, quia quæstio *Quid est* supponit quæstionem *An est;* ut recte ad hoc propositum notavit divus Thomas. Part. i. q. 2. art. 2. ad secund.

Respondeo, Formaliter ac proprie loquendo, non demonstrari *esse Dei* per *quidditatem* Dei ut sic, quod recte argumentum probat; sed ex quodam *attributo* (quod re ipsa est essentia Dei, a nobis autem abstractius concipitur ut *modus* entis non-causati) colligi *aliud attributum*, et ita concludi illud ens esse *Deum*. Unde ad concludendum hoc modo, esse *Deum*, sub ratione *Dei*, supponitur esse probatum, dari ens quoddam per se *necessarium*, nimirum ex *effectibus* ejus, et ex negatione processus in infinitum. Atque ita quod primum de hoc ente probatur est *esse;* deinde esse ab intrinseco *necessarium;* hinc esse *unicum* in tali ratione ac modo essendi; ideoque esse *Deum*. Atque in hunc modum prius aliquo modo definitur quæstio *An est*, quam *Quid est*. *Suarez, ibid.* p. 28.

" St. Thomas [Aquinas] has justly observed on this head. Part i. " qu. 2. art. 2.

" I answer, that strictly and properly speaking, we infer not " the existence of God from his *essence*, considered as such, " (which the objection justly excepts to,) but from one certain " *attribute*, (which though really identified with the essence, is yet " conceived abstractedly by us as a *mode* of the Being *uncaused*) " we deduce *another attribute;* and so we at length prove that " that Being is *God*. Wherefore, in order to prove in this way " that *there is a God*, precisely considered as *God*, we suppose it " proved beforehand, that there is a certain Being *necessary* in " himself; proved namely from his *effects*, and from the *absurdity* " of an *infinite* progression. So the first thing we prove of this " Being is, that *he exists;* the next, that he is *necessarily exist-* " *ing;* then, that he is the *only one* existing in such a way; and " so of consequence he is *God*. And thus, after some sort, we " do first determine *whether he exists*, and next the other ques- " tion, *what he is.*"

Thus far the acute and learned Suarez; of whom I have many things to observe, before I go on to other writers; 1. That he appears to have been *ambitious* to make out something that should be *called* an argument *a priori*, and was probably *able* to do *as much* in it as any one before or after him can justly be presumed to be. 2. That the *method* which he took for it, proving first something *a posteriori*, and then proceeding to argue *a priori* for the rest, is very like to that which others have taken since. 3. That he differs however from those later advocates for the argument *a priori* in the main thing of all, and determines expressly against their notion, that *necessity* can be conceived *antecedent* to existence. He looked upon that as flat *absurdity* and *self-contradiction*, utterly repugnant to the nature of a *first Cause;* and so he made no use of *antecedent* necessity, or *internal* cause, or *formal* reason, ground, or foundation, in proving his point: he was too knowing a *logician* and *metaphysician*, to offer any thing of that kind. 4. All that he admits is, that after the *existence* and one or more *attributes* have been proved *a posteriori*, we may then proceed to argue *a priori* for the rest: not from *antecedent* necessity, not from any thing conceived as *prior*, in order of nature, to the *existence* itself; but from the *existence* and one *attribute* or more considered as before proved, and as *prior* in conception to all the

rest. 5. One thing Suarez was very *singular* in, and upon that the whole stress of his cause lies, so far as concerns the making out an argument *a priori* for the *existence* of *God:* he would have it *supposed* that God is not proved to be *God*, till the *unity* is proved; and so he suspends, as it were, the proof of a *Deity* upon the proof of the *unity*. This was an ingenious thought, but too weak to bear. For in that way there could be no room for the question whether *God* be *one*, since the very *name* would imply it: besides, it is universally allowed, that the proof of the *existence* of a *Deity* is both clearer and stronger than any proof of the *unity*, and is sufficiently determined and settled in the first place, before the consideration of the *unity* comes in at all. When we have proved, for instance, that there is an *intelligent*, *eternal*, *self-existent* Being, (one or more,) which is most easily proved from our *own existence;* we have then competently proved that *there is a God*, though we have not yet proved or considered every *attribute* that belongs to him. Such has been the way of *divines* and *metaphysicians*, first to prove the existence of a *Deity*, under that confuse general conception; and next to proceed to the proof of the *unity* and other *attributes* in due place and order: and it is not reasonable to suggest, that if a man should fail in the proof of the *unity*, or of some other Divine *attribute*, (for the reason is the same in all,) that he has therefore failed in his proof of a *Deity*. That would be going against rule, and risking the whole for a part; and, in short, resting the proof of a Deity (the plainest thing in the world) upon very obscure conditions, very unequal terms. But we shall have more of this matter in the sequel, as we take in other later writers, who have directly or indirectly passed their censures upon Suarez for his excesses on this head. 6. Upon the whole, one may observe, that this pretended proof of a *Deity*, as drawn *a priori*, is rather a fetch, or a subtilty of that great man, than any thing solid; a *nominal* proof, rather than a *real* one; or an affected manner of miscalling things by wrong names.

A. D. 1610. CHRISTOPH. GILLIUS.

Contemporary with Suarez lived Christopher Gillius, a Spanish divine and Jesuit, one of a subtle wit and penetrating genius. He has a pretty large chapter [g], spent entirely upon our present

[g] Gillii Commentationes Theologicæ de Essentia et Unitate Dei, lib. i. tract. 8. c. 4. p. 391—396.

question. He takes notice, that there were not wanting some of that time who contended that the existence of a Deity might be proved *a priori*[i]. He had Suarez in his eye, as is plain enough, though he does not name him: because, a little after, he quotes the very words which Suarez had made use of in that argument. He mentions also Scotus, and some of his followers, as aiming at the like conclusion in a more far-fetched and roundabout way[j]: allowing, that if God should extraordinarily or supernaturally *infuse* some higher degrees of knowledge, then some kind of proof *a priori* (however fruitless, and superseded by such *illumination*) might be made from it. See how solicitous and industrious some have been in searching for every appearance of a proof *a priori*, as much as others have been in searching for the philosopher's stone, or for the squaring of the circle, or the like, and with the like success.

Our judicious author first observes, that all pretences of any formal demonstration of that kind had been utterly exploded[k] by the judicious; particularly by Albertus Magnus, and Henricus de Gandavo, and Richardus de Media Villa, and Scotus, and Lyra, and Gasp. Casalius, and many others referred to elsewhere[l]: so that it might be justly looked upon as a ruled point, that no proper demonstration *a priori* could be made of the Divine existence; all such attempts at length resolving either into some *petitio principii*, or some *equivocation* of terms, or other the like fallacy, or foreign subtilty.

He proceeds to examine the question with the utmost strict-

[h] *Nam dicunt recentiores*, qui affirmant *unum* demonstrabilem *a priore*, etiam respectu viatorum, si non per *se primo*, saltem posita cognitione *Dei* acquisita per discursum: quoniam, inquiunt, postquam ex creaturis convincitur Deum esse *ens necessarium*, et *unum*, et *unum*, necessario concluditur *a priore* hunc esse Deum, &c. *Ibid.* p. 391.

[i] Alio modo eandem conclusionem tuetur Scotus in I. dist. 2. qu. 2. Cum Scotistis interpretibus ibidem: Ochamus in I. dist. 3. qu. 4. lit. F. Gabriel. qu. 4. conclus. 3. Rubionius, dist. 2. qu. 1. art. 2. concl. 4. Nam quamvis existiment de lege ordinaria non haberi a nobis demonstrationem *propter quid*, hujus propositionis *Deus est*; censent tamen fieri posse ut demonstretur, si Deus *infunderet* alicui notitiam evidentem eorundem terminorum, vel saltem termini *Dei*, &c. p. 391.

[k] Propositio, *Deus est*, sub neutra acceptatione ex prædictis, est viatoribus de lege formaliter demonstrabilis *a priore*. Hæc est Alberti in Summa, tract. iii. qu. 17. Henrici in Summa, art. xxii. qu. 4. Richardi in I. dist. 3. art. 1. qu. 1. Scoti in I. dist. 2. qu. 2. et quodlibeto 7. Lyrani in Sapient. xiii. Gaspa Casalii, lib. i. de Quadripart. justit. cap. xvi. conclus. 2. Et est de mente doctorum quos referam cap. seq. num. 7. Qui omnes non agnoscunt demonstrationem *Dei* nisi ex *creaturis*. — Notitia vero sumpta ex creaturis non potest esse *a priore*, ut patet. *Gillius, ibid.* p. 392. conf. p. 394.

[l] Gillius, c. v. p. 400.

ness and nicety, traversing it through all its mazes, and unravelling every ambiguity and subtle intricacy, whereby some had endeavoured to support what they would call a demonstration *a priori* in that case; and shewing that none of them sufficiently answered the purpose, or came up to the point[m]. From whence we may remark, that Suarez's attempts that way were not approved by the most judicious divines of his own time, but were condemned by the generality, and even by those of his own order, (for Gillius was a Jesuit,) and that *soon* after: for as his Metaphysics had first appeared in 1600, so this censure of Gillius was finished and licensed in 1606, though not published before 1610.

A. D. 1615. ESTIUS.

At the same time with Gillius lived the learned Estius, who delivered his sentiments of the present question in the manner here following: "[n] As there are, among *logicians*, two "kinds of *demonstration*, one demonstrating the effect from the "*causes*, and the other, the cause from the *effects*; it is manifest, "that the *existence* of a *Deity* cannot be proved in the former "way of demonstration, since no *cause* in any kind can be as-"signed either of *God*, or of his *existing*. But it may be demon-"strated in the latter way, as St. Thomas [Aquinas] rightly "judges, (I. q. 2. art. 2, 3.) and as the Schoolmen upon this "*distinction* do *universally* teach."

[m] Ex his constat firmum non esse fundamentum sententiæ asserentis demonstrari Deum esse *a priore* per rationem *necessitatis*, quoniam non est radix attributorum habentium ordinem ad creaturas: et quamvis esset, cum ipsa non cognoscatur a nobis *a priore*, vel ex terminis evidenter conjuncta cum Deo sub ratione illa attributalis fieri nequit ut eadem demonstratio sit formalis *a priore*.—Primum initium illius demonstrationis sumitur ex cognitione *creaturarum*,—resolvitur in principia cognita ex *posteriore*, et ideo demonstratio non constat formaliter *ex primis*.—Quodnam peto est *ens*, de quo primum probatur *esse?* Ipsene est *Deus*, an vero *ens necessarium?* Si *Deus*, totus discursus sequens erit superfluus, quoniam procedit ad probandum id quod *supponitur* probatum: si *ens necessarium*, aut sumitur secundum absolutam et omnimodam necessitatem, et tunc hoc ipso *supponitur* esse necessarium ab intrinseco; aut, &c.—Ita patet ex illo principio, *ens necessarium est*, nullo modo demonstrari posse *a priore* hanc propos. *Deus est. Gillius*, p. 396.

[n] Cum duplex sit apud dialecticos demonstratio, alia quæ ex *causis* effectum, alia quæ contra ex *effectis* causam monstrat; manifestum est, priori demonstrationis modo non posse doceri Deum esse, cum nec *Dei* nec ejus *existentiæ* possit in *ullo genere* causa proferri. Potest autem demonstrari posteriori modo, quemadmodum recte S. Thom. I. qu. 2. art. 2. et 3. Et in universum scholastici circa hanc distinctionem tradunt. *Estius in Libr. Sentent. Comm.* tom. i. p. 4.

So Cardinal Lugo also, a little later in the same age. Dico tertio, *Deum esse*, non est demonstrabile *a priori*. Sic cum Sancto Thoma, cæteri fere doctores, et latissime Gillius. *Lug.* lib. i. disp. 14. c. 2. s. 8.

A. D. 1627. JOHANNES PUTRANUS.

This writer expresses his judgment in the terms here following[o]:

"Though the existence of a Deity cannot be demonstrated *a* "*priori*, yet it must be allowed, that as to some of the Divine "*attributes*, they may be demonstrated *a priori*.

"1. As to the first particular, it is plain from hence; that "every proof *a priori* proceeds by *causes* either *real* or *virtual*, "or, which comes to the same, by *some prior reason*; but of the "*Divine* existence there are no *causes* real or virtual, nor any "*prior reason*: for *existence* is included in the formal conception "of the *Divine essence*, insomuch that it is impossible to conceive "the Divine essence but as *existing*. The Divine essence is "*being* simply *necessary*: now it is contradictory to the notion "of being simply *necessary*, not to have *existence*; for it is usually "defined, as *that which so exists that it cannot but exist*.

"2. As to the second particular, it is manifest from hence, "that *eternity* is demonstrated from *immutability* in this manner: "*Every thing immutable is eternal: God is immutable: therefore* "*God is eternal*. In like manner, the Divine *ubiquity* is commonly "proved from the *immensity*. And so in many other cases."

The author here well distinguishes between arguing *a priori* from *existence* and *attributes* already proved, to other attributes, and arguing *a priori* from attributes, or from any thing else, to the *existence* itself. The one he allows as just and rational, the other he rejects as manifestly absurd: and so far he is certainly right. Some indeed may scruple to call it arguing *a priori*, when a man argues from *attribute* to *attribute*; conceiving that it should rather be styled arguing *ex absurdo*, and that nothing short of a

[o] Licet *existentia* Deitatis nequeat demonstrari *a priori*, concedendum tamen est de *quibusdam attributis* divinis, quod possint demonstrari *a priori*.

1. Prima pars conclusionis ex eo innotescit, quod demonstratio quælibet *a priori* consurgat ex *causis* vel *veris*, vel certe *virtualibus*, aut, quod idem est, ex *ratione aliqua priori*. Existentiæ autem divinæ *nullæ sunt causæ*, nec *veræ*, nec *virtuales*, nec *ratio prior*: hæc enim includitur in conceptu formali *essentiæ* divinæ, et quidem ita, ut impossible sit concipere *essentiam* divinam quin concipiatur *existens*. Est enim essentia divina ens *simpliciter necessarium*; repugnat autem enti simpliciter necessario, non habere *existentiam*: definitur enim hoc communiter, *id quod ita est ut non esse nequeat*.

2. Posterior vero pars constat ex eo, quod *æternitas* demonstretur per *immutabilitatem*, hoc modo: *Omne immutabile est æternum; Deus est immutabilis: ergo, Deus est æternus. Ubiquitas* etiam divina demonstratur communiter per *immensitatem*; et sic in aliis multis. *Joan. Putean. Opp.* tom. i. part. 1. qu. 3. p. 24.

real (as opposed to *notional*) priority is sufficient to denominate or constitute an argument *a priori*. But that I take to be a fruitless nicety, and such is not worth the insisting upon; for at last it will terminate in a dispute about *words*. It is sufficient, that there is nothing *prior* to the *existence*, no not so much as in order of nature, or notion, or conception; and so all arguing *a priori*, as to that case, is for ever excluded. But as to the other case, the manner of arguing is undoubtedly right, whatever *name* we give to it: and there seems to be no just objection against calling it *a priori*, so long as the *existence* is looked upon as always *first* in conception, and that the most *natural* order of conception be followed in arguing from *attribute* to *attribute*, and the process be not made too *arbitrary*[p].

A. D. 1642. RODERICUS DE ARRIAGA.

This acute metaphysician and divine delivers his sentiments as follows: "The *being* or *existence* of God cannot be demon- "strated *a priori*. So St. Thomas, Albertus, Durandus; and "of our order (of Jesuits) Valentia, Molina, Suarez, and Vas- "quez, whom Tanner mentions and follows[q]." After this, he enters minutely into the merits of the question, assigning his reasons why the *existence* cannot be proved *a priori:* which being much the same with those before mentioned, I choose, for brevity sake, to omit them, and proceed. Only, I may observe, that here are three authors, Durandus, Molina, and Tanner, beyond what I have quoted upon the question: and it is further observable, that he takes in Suarez amongst them, as one that had declared against the argument *a priori;* as indeed he *really* had, though *verbally* he might seem to differ, as I have before

[p] Richardus de Media Villa, in a chapter before referred to, observes well to this purpose, that the *order* of the attributes ought not to be settled in an *arbitrary* manner, but as *reason* requires.

Nec loquor hic *de ordine* qui tantum est ex parte *voluntatis* (quia tali ordine posset, in nostra ratione intelligendi, quandoque unum esse *prius*, quandoque *posterius*, sicut *placeret* nobis) sed loquor de ordine qui est in conceptionibus nostri intellectus intelligentis divina *attributa* secundum illum ordinem secundum quem *magis sunt apta nata* intelligi: et sic intelligendo divinas perfectiones, est talis *ordo* ex parte nostra. Prius enim, secundum rationem intelligendi, intelligimus *divinum esse*, quam aliquam ejus perfectionem; secundo, suum *intelligere;* tertio, suum *velle*. *Ricard. de Med. Vill.* lib. i. p. 32.

[q] Prima conclusio, Deum *esse*, seu *existere*, non potest demonstrari *a priori*. Ita D. Thomas, Albertus, Durandus: et e nostris, Valentia, Molina, Suarez, et Vasquez, quos refert et sequitur Tannerus loco citato. *Roderic. de Arriag.* tom. i. p. 30.

hinted. *So universal* hitherto had been the agreement of *metaphysicians* and *divines* in this article.

A. D. 1644. DIONYSIUS PETAVIUS.

The very learned Petavius is but short upon this question, mentioning it transiently, as it came in his way: but he is too considerable a person to be omitted in this recital. He takes notice, that the *existence* of a *Deity* is not to be proved from any thing *prior* or *antecedent*, but from *effects* only, and *a posteriori*; and from the *absurdities* which lie against the contrary persuasion[r].

A. D. 1652. NATHANAEL CULVERWELL.

I shall now mention a protestant writer of our own of some note in his time. He was Fellow of Emanuel College in Cambridge. In his book, entitled, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, he occasionally drops a few words to our purpose: "There can be no demonstration of him [God] *a* "*priori*; for he is the *first cause*: and all demonstrations "fetched from such *effects* as flow from him, they do only shew "you that he is; they do not open and display the divine "essence[s]," &c.

A. D. 1658. BISHOP BARLOW.

A more considerable writer of our own, so far as concerns the present question, was Thomas Barlow, then fellow of Queen's College, Oxon. and afterwards (A. D. 1675) Bishop of Lincoln. He published some Metaphysical Exercises, wherein he discovers great learning, and no less acuteness. The edition of 1658, which I follow, is the second edition. I shall produce his sentiments at large, because he entered deep into the question, viewed it on every side, and withal passed his censure (though rather too severe) upon the learned Suarez.

He writes thus: "Our knowledge of God, arising from the "light of nature, is not *a priori*, and διʼ ὅτι. The reason is, "because then God could not be *eternal*, if there were any prin-

[r] Verum hæc iisque similia tum nos commoverent, si probationum id genus ageretur quod ex *antecedentibus* et *prioribus* ducitur, ac *demonstrationem* et *scientiam* parit: ejusmodi enim locum in Deo non habent.—Nihilominus ex *effectis* et iis quæ *posteriora* sunt, atque etiam iis ex *incommodis* et *absurdis* quæ in contradicentium altera parte cernuntur, argumenta licet colligere, quibus Deus esse monstretur. *Petav. Dogm. Theolog.* tom. i. lib. 1. c. 1. p. 2, 3.

[s] Culverwell, p. 212.

" ciple *prior* to God: for *eternity*, in the very notion of it, ex-
" cludes any *prior* principle. Consequently, if God be eternal,
" there cannot be any *prior* principle whereby he may be known
" *a priori*.—Were there any principle by which God might be
" known *a priori*, then, 1. God would not be the *first* Original
" and *first Cause*, as having by the supposition another *cause*
" *prior* to him.—2. That supposed *antecedent* principle, by which
" the existence of God should be proved, must be either *external*,
" (of the *final* or *efficient* kind,) or else *internal*, of the *material*
" or *formal* kind. Now it cannot be of the *final* kind, because
" God is the *chief end*, and there cannot be any *higher* final cause,
" whereby to demonstrate *a priori* the existence of God. It
" cannot be of the *efficient* kind; because if God had any ante-
" cedent *efficient* cause, then God would be an *effect*, &c.—Nei-
" ther can it be said, that such prior cause is either *material* or
" *formal*: for the perfect *simplicity* of the Divine nature admits
" not of any such *causes*, as is self-evident: consequently there
" is no room for any *cause* whereby to demonstrate *a priori* the
" existence of a Deity[t]."

Our learned author here enters into the heart of the question, and reasons his way through, like a knowing and judicious man. Only he seems rather too short as to what concerns the two internal *causes*, called *material* and *formal*: but that brevity of his may be competently supplied from what has been said above. under Duns Scotus. I proceed to observe how he animadverts upon Suarez.

" I am aware, that Suarez is of opinion, that we may, in some
" sort, demonstrate *a priori* the existence of a Deity: not by
" the *essence* of God as such, but by some certain *attribute* which

[t] Hæc nostra de Deo cognitio, a lumine naturali orta, non est *a priori* et δι' ὅτι. Ratio est, quia sic Deus non esset *æternus*, modo esset aliquod principium Deo *prius*: ipsa enim *æternitas* intrinseca dicit negationem principii; et per consequens, si Deus sit æternus, non potest esse aliquod principium *prius*, per quod *a priori* cognoscetur.—Si esset aliquod principium quo Deum *a priori* cognosceremus; tum, 1. Deus non esset principium *primum* et *causa prima*, utpote qua alia causa esset *prior*.—2. Principium *prius* ex quo probari possit *a priori* Deum esse, vel erit *externum* (*finale* vel *efficiens*) vel *internum*, scil. *materiale* vel *formale*. Non *primum*, quia cum Deus sit *finis ultimus*, non possit esse causa *finalis prior*, per quam demonstrari possit δι' ὅτι Deum esse. Non *secundum*, quia si Deus habuisset causam *efficientem* priorem, tum Deus esset *effectus*, &c.—Nec dici possit, quod illa causa sit *materialis*, aut *formalis*, summa Dei *simplicitas* tales causas non admittit, ut manifestum est: et per consequens non est *causa ulla*, per quam *a priori* demonstrari possit esse Deum. *Barlow, Exercit. Metaph.* iv. p. 28.

" is *really* the essence of God, only considered by us, in an " abstract way, as a *mode* of the uncaused Being. But, to " say the truth, I approve not this *bold* assertion of the learned " Jesuit. Because it is a manifest contradiction to say, that the " *existence* of God can be proved *a priori* from any attribute " whatever, when every attribute, *as such*, in the very notion of " *it*, denotes something *posterior* to the *essence* of which it is the " *attribute*. For if the attribute be *really* distinct, [from the " essence,] then it is *really* subsequent to it: or if it be only " *notionally* distinct, (which is the case in the *divine* Being,) then " it is likewise *notionally* subsequent to the *essence*, whose attri- " bute it is conceived to be. It is not possible so much as to " imagine any *attribute* but what *presupposes* some *essence* whose " attribute it is. Consequently our knowledge of God's existence " is *a posteriori* only: and of that kind are all the demonstrations " brought by metaphysicians and schoolmen[u]." The learned author here argues the point against Suarez with great strength and acuteness: only he seems to fix an opinion upon Suarez which never was his: for Suarez himself plainly disowned any such arguing *a priori* for the existence, in that crude and gross sense which Barlow appears to take it in, while he is disputing against it. All that Suarez really meant, as I have before hinted, was, that the *unity* might be proved *a priori*, after having proved the existence *a posteriori:* and such proof of the *unity* he improperly called, or erroneously conceived to be, proving the existence of *God a priori*, inasmuch as God should not be deemed to be *God*, till proved to be *one*. Our author afterwards very well confutes that peculiar fancy, which Suarez and some few

[u] Novi quod Suarez putat, nos posse aliquo modo *a priori* demonstrari Deum esse: non per *quidditatem* Dei, ut sic, sed ex quodam *attributo* quod reipsa est *essentia* Dei, a nobis autem abstractius consideratur ut modus entis non causati, &c. Sed ut quod res est dicam, non probo hoc docti Jesuitæ audax pronuntiatum. Quia manifeste implicat Deum esse demonstrari posse *a priori* per attributum quodcunque, cum attributum omne, qua tale, intrinseca dicit aliquid *essentia* illa *posterius* cujus est attributum.—Nam si sit attributum *re* distinctum, tum *re vera* est posterius: si sit attributum solum *ratione* distinctum (quod in *divinis* accedit) tum est etiam *ratione* essentia posterius, cujus attributum concipitur: cum attributum nec fingi posset quin *præsupponitur* essentia aliqua cujus est attributum. Et per consequens *Deum esse* non nisi *a posteriori* cognoscimus; tales enim sunt demonstrationes *omnes* a metaphysicis et scholasticis adducta ad ostendendum Deum esse; ut videre est apud Fran. Suarez. Metaph. p. ii. disp. 29. sect. 2. num. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Aquin. contra Gent. lib. i. c. 13. p. 11. et Ferrariens. ibid. Nazarium in I. P. qu. 2. art. 3. et apud Aquin. I. P. qu. 2. art. 3. et commentatores. *Barlow, ibid.* p. 129, 130. conf. p. 165, 186.

others had countenanced in that article: I say, our author well confutes that notion by observing, that the *existence* of a *Deity* is sufficiently proved, as soon as an *infinite, eternal, uncreated, independent* (he should have added *intelligent*) *Being* is proved; and that the question of the *unity* comes not properly in till afterwards[x]. Valentia had effectually obviated that pretence of Suarez some time before, in what he had said against Cajetan, who had been beforehand with Suarez in that piece of subtilty[y].

One thing further I would observe of Barlow, before I dismiss him, that he was very scrupulous as to admitting that any of the Divine *attributes* might be demonstrated *a priori*. For though he allowed the way of arguing from one attribute before proved, to another not proved, and makes use of it himself more than once; yet considering that the *attributes* are in *reality* (however *notionally* distinguished) identified with the *essence*, he apprehended such reasoning could not justly be accounted reasoning *a priori*[z], since the Divine essence could not be conceived *prior*

[x] Hoc dato, quod non ostendunt Deum esse *unum*, tamen et adhuc erunt argumenta prædicta satis valida, et in demonstrationem thesis antedictæ valitura: quia in præsenti hoc solum demonstrandum suscepimus, nempe esse aliquod ens quod *Deum* dicimus, *infinitum, æternum, increatum*, et *independens*. Sed an hoc ens *unum* sit aut *multiplex*, alterius est loci et quæsiti opus demonstrare. *Barlow, Exercit.* iv. p. 161.

[y] In proposito igitur, cum *Dei* nomen audimus, communiter solemus concipere imperfecte et confuse, vel *primam causam*, vel *primum movens*, vel alia quæ rationes Thomæ concludunt. Quamobrem rationes ejusmodi, quæ scilicet probant esse aliquod *primum movens, efficiens*, &c. etsi non probant *quid*, et *quale* illud sit, scilicet *immateriale, infinitum, unum* numero, &c. satis tamen probant *Deum* esse. Illa enim alia probare, pertinet ad quæstionem de *natura* et *quidditate* divina, et probantur etiam non admodum difficulter, constituta jam veritate *divinæ entitatis*, juxta quæstionem *an est*. Atque hinc fit quod D. Thomas non nisi post expeditam hanc quæstionem *an est*, disputat de *unitate, simplicitate, æternitate*, et aliis ejusmodi perfectionibus divinis, ut videbimus in sequentibus quæstionibus. Quocirca cum Cajetanus hic negat, probari *per se* his rationibus D. Thomæ, Deum esse, eo quod non probatur illis Dei *unitas* et *infinitas;* et concedit tantum, id probari *per accidens*, (ut scilicet ejusmodi rationes concludunt esse quædam prædicata quæ ei rei veritate soli Deo conveniunt,) non satis distinxisse videtur inter quæstionem *an est*, et *quid est*. *Greg. de Valent.* tom. i. p. 64.

[z] Fateor Suarezium et *scholasticos* usitate affirmare *æternitatem* (ut et alia nonnulla *attributa* Dei) demonstrari posse *a priori*, et admittere medium *ratione* prius; ita ut illud *medium* licet *in re ipsa* non sit æternitate prius, tamen quoad modum nostrum *concipiendi*, imperfectum possit esse prius. Sed, ut quod sentio libere proferam, minutias has scholasticas non probo, et tutius esse judico, et Deo dignius, si de Deo et perfectionibus suis loquamur *prout sunt*, non prout ab intellectu nostro fingantur. Et sic rectius dices *æternitatem a priori demonstrari non posse* quia in *re ipsa* ita est prout affirmatur, quam *æternitatem posse a priori demonstrari*, cum in *re ipsa* non ita fit, nec esse possit medium ullum *in re prius*, ut supra demonstravimus. *Barlow, Exercit.* v. p. 187.

to itself. There is certainly weight in the suggestion. But the point is not worth the contesting, as I have before intimated, since it will terminate only in a dispute about *words* or *names*. That it is reasonable and right to argue from *existence* and *attributes* proved, to other attributes not proved, is agreed on all hands: and whether such arguing shall be called reasoning *ab absurdo*, or *a priori*, is not very material. I have hinted above, under what restrictions or cautions I conceive it may be justly termed reasoning *a priori*. But whatever way this by-point, of slight consideration in the main, be determined, the other more material question concerning the arguing *a priori* for the existence, (or for any of the attributes from any thing considered as *antecedent* to the *existence*,) is no way affected by it. For such kind of arguing will undoubtedly be still condemned as wrong, in every view, and in every construction, and upon every the most favourable supposition that can with any colour of reason be made for it.

A. D. 1662. Franciscus Bonæ Spei.

This author likewise declares his judgment, that there can be no demonstration *a priori* of the *existence* of God, and further testifies, that it was then a settled point amongst *all*, about which there was no dispute[a].

A. D. 1678. Dr. Cudworth.

Dr. Cudworth's judgment in this article cannot but be of great weight, as he was a person of eminent learning and abilities, a Protestant writer, and therefore the less apt to take any thing implicitly from the Popish Schoolmen; extremely desirous besides, to draw together every plausible argument, that could with any show of reason be urged for the existence of a Deity, and to make the utmost improvement of them. Notwithstanding all which he frankly declares, in his preface to his great work, his judgment against the argument *a priori*, in these remarkable words: "We do therein also *demonstrate* the absolute impossi-
" bility of all *Atheism*, and the actual existence of a God: we
" say, demonstrate; not *a priori*, which is *impossible* and *contra-*
" *dictious*, but by necessary inference from principles altogether
" undeniable[b]."

[a] Dico, Deum existere demonstrari non potest demonstratione *a priori*: ita *omnes* communiter. *Franc. Bon. Sp.* disp. i. dub. 2.

[b] Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. preface.

In the book itself he has a great deal more to the same purpose, part of which has been cited above; and for the rest I am content to refer the reader to the pages where he will find it[c].

A. D. 1683. LE BLANC.

Le Blanc is another Protestant writer, of great learning and judgment, who freely declares his sentiments against the possibility of demonstrating *a priori* the existence of God. He does it nearly in the same words[d] with Estius above cited; though without taking notice from whom he borrowed them.

A. D. 1690. ARCHBISHOP TILLOTSON.

This great and good Prelate seems to have thought, that neither the *existence* nor the *attributes* of God could be demonstrated *a priori*, falling in with the sentiments of Bishop Barlow, mentioned above. He expresses himself in these words, speaking of the Divine *spirituality:* "This is not to be proved by way "of *demonstration*, (for there is nothing *before* God, or which "can be a *cause* of him,) but by way of *conviction*, by shewing "the absurdity of the contrary[e]."

Again, speaking of the Divine *immensity*, he says, "I have "told you formerly, there being nothing *before* God, nor any "*cause* of his being, his perfections cannot be proved by way of "*demonstration*, but of *conviction*, by shewing the *absurdity* of "the contrary[f]." He repeats the same observation afterwards, applying it to the Divine *eternity*[g]. In a popular discourse, he avoided the Latin and scholastic phrase *a priori*. But it is very plain from his manner of expressing himself, that he meant the same as to say, there could be no demonstration *a priori*, either of the *existence* or *attributes* of the Deity: and that as to the *attributes* in particular, the way of reasoning by a *reductio ad absurdum* was the best we could have, the utmost we could come up to. Indeed, the reducing the contrary persuasion to a flat absurdity is a kind of *demonstration*, and such as the mathematicians

[c] Cudworth, book i. ch. iv. p. 715, 716.

[d] Cum duplex sit demonstratio apud dialecticos, altera quæ ex *causis* effectum, altera vero quæ contra ex *effectis* causam monstrat, manifestum est, priori demonstrationis modo non posse doceri Deum esse, cum nec Dei nec ejus [illegible] nere [illegible] *effectis*. Le Blanc. [illegible]

[e] Tillotson [illegible]

[f] [illegible]

[g] [illegible]

themselves frequently make use of: but then it must be owned, that it is the *lowest* kind of *demonstration*, (as not *directly* and *immediately* inferring the thing to be proved[h],) and comes not up to the perfection of the direct *ostensive* demonstration *a posteriori*, much less to the demonstration *a priori*. It is a good and sufficient proof, but not the highest kind of proof; sufficient for *conviction*, but not amounting to *demonstration* emphatically so called: which is what our judicious Prelate had an eye to, in the distinction which he thrice made use of.

A. D. 1712. MR. HUMPHREY DITTON.

I shall close this historical account with a very good writer and close reasoner, Mr. Humphrey Ditton, who appeared after the time that the *new* tenet of an argument *a priori* had been offered to the world. He either knew not of it, or was not aware of its force: for he determines as the whole stream of *metaphysicians* and *divines* had before done, "that our demon-"strations of the *existence* of a God are *all of them* ὅτι, and *a* "*posteriori*, as proceeding from the effects[i]."

Now, to sum up the amount of this Historical View, it appears at length, that as to the point of demonstrating *a priori* the existence of a Deity, it is no *new thought*, but very *ancient*, and what has been turned and tried every way, and very maturely considered time after time, and as often rejected and thrown aside as contradictory and absurd; by men of the brightest parts and coolest judgment, and men no way *prejudiced* against it, but sincerely disposed to accept it, and make use of it, if it had been capable of serving. It has been frequently and seriously considered by persons of different times and tempers, parties and professions; by *ancients* and *moderns*, by *philosophers* and *divines*, by *Pagans* and *Christians*, by *Fathers* and *Schoolmen*, by *Realists* and *Nominalists*, by *Thomists* and *Scotists*, by *Romanists* and *Reformed*; and by all of them, as it were, with one voice, condemned and exploded. One shall scarce meet with so clear and so universal an agreement for the reception of any article, as there appears to have been for the non-reception of this, among persons every way well qualified to judge of it, and fitly disposed for judging right, and having all the light before them which any one can now have, or which ever could be necessary for

[h] See Ditton on the Resurrection of Christ, p. 135.

[i] See Ditton on the Resurrection of Christ, p. 134.

determining the point, to the entire satisfaction of the *common reason* of mankind. Besides those whom I have mentioned, (to which many more of like kind might be added,) as *expressly* rejecting all demonstration *a priori* in respect of the Divine *existence*, great numbers might be further mentioned, who *tacitly* disregarded it, and made no use of it in proving the *existence* when occasion offered: and they also may be justly looked upon, for the most part, as witnesses against it, since they could not well be totally ignorant of it, nor unwilling to take it in and make the best of it, were it really of any force. For what man of discernment would not prefer an *ostensive* demonstration, where it can be had, before any other of a less perfect kind? Or who would not choose an argument *a priori* to come at his conclusion by, rather than be content to work his way by *effects* only, which, in comparison, is feeling in the dark? Yet such is the method that the ablest and wisest men have taken, aiming no higher: Bishop Ward for instance, in his treatise of the *existence* and *attributes*, and Bishop Wilkins in his, and Bishop Pearson on the same subject, and Dr. Barrow, and Mr. Locke, and Mr. Wollaston; besides a great many more: men that could not have failed to take in the argument *a priori*, had they not been persuaded that there was no soundness, no solidity in it.

If now it should be asked, of what use or service this Historical View can be, in a point of pure reasoning, and not depending at all upon *authorities*; I answer, that it may be serviceable for several good ends and purposes.

1. As it is not merely *historical*, but in part *argumentative* also; as discovering the *reasons* upon which wise men before us have proceeded in forming their judgment upon the question in hand: and possibly those *reasons* may meet with the more favourable attention and reception, on account of the hands they come from. For *demonstration* itself must often be content to borrow all its *relative* force from the instrument of conveyance.

2. It is of use in all questions which have before passed through many hands, and have been often and carefully considered, to look back to what others have thought and determined upon them. For it may reasonably be presumed, in such cases, that the point has been carried to as great perfection as it is capable of, since the extent of *human reason*, in all ages where the light is equal, is very nearly the same. Besides, it seldom

happens, that a single person, who takes upon him to go on *proprio marte*, without consulting others, will be able at once to view the argument on all sides, or to be aware of every difficulty which may occur in it. *Plus vident oculi quam oculus: In a multitude of counsellors there is safety.* I am aware that sometimes attending too much to others may forestall a man's own better judgment, or cramp a good invention. But then, on the other hand, the following one's own thoughts too much, disregarding what others have said or written, is often a means to make a man self-conceited and superficial. The way therefore to avoid both extremes is, to try first how far we can go with our own unassisted inquiries, upon any question of pure abstract reasoning; and afterwards to compare what we have done, with what others have done in the same kind before us.

3. To such as choose to be led by *authority* and *great names*, in points of an abstruse nature, (which they have neither inclination nor leisure to inquire closely into,) it is of use to know on what side the *authority* and the *great names* really are, ancient and modern. And it may reasonably be presumed, that *truth* is with them; unless some fair account can be given, how it came to pass that so many wise and great men, so well prepared to make a true judgment, and so fitly disposed for it, should notwithstanding widely mistake in it.

However, I mention not these things as if any *authority* ought to prevail over clear and cogent *reason*, or as if the question now in hand wanted any *authority* at all to decide or determine it. The same *reasons* which obtained formerly are of equal force now, and are never the worse for the wearing, as time can never alter eternal truths. I proceed therefore to examine this question over again, (as if it had never been debated or considered before,) and to see how it will now stand at the bar of sober and impartial *reason*.

CHAP. II.

Considering the Merits of the Debate about the Argument a priori.

HERE it will be proper to shew, but as briefly as may be, 1. That the supposed argument *a priori* is very *loose* and *precarious*, having nothing in a manner to stand upon, except it be an ill use made of *equivocal* terms or phrases. 2. That it is, moreover, when fully understood, palpably *wrong* and *absurd*. 3. That the

several *pleas* or *excuses* invented for it, are fallacious, and of no real weight.

1. I would observe, that the supposed argument *a priori* is at the best very *loose* and *precarious*, having nothing to stand upon, but an abuse of *equivocal* terms or phrases. The whole seems to amount to little more than the ringing of changes upon the word *necessity*; as shall be seen presently. But because that word is capable of *many* senses, and consequently apt to usher in *many* fallacies; it will be proper here to note the *various* acceptations of that *instrument* of delusion.

Necessity is but of modern date (comparatively speaking) in our language. It comes from the Latin *necessitas*; which, though otherwise *ancient* enough, yet seems to have been brought but late into our present subject[i]. I know not what good the Schools did by introducing it, or by substituting the improper and ambiguous phrases of *necessary existence*, or *necessity* of *existence*, instead of the more ancient and more proper expressions; such as *natural* existence, or *emphatical* existence; or such as *eternal, immutable, unmade, independent, permanent*, and the like. The *new* word *necessity*, as here applied, and as opposed to *precarious* or *contingent*, affords no *new* idea beyond the other, but is apt to excite false conceptions, and to promote false reasoning. But since the mischief is already done, as to the *introducing* this improper Pagan term into Christian theology, and it is now too late to undo it; the only way left to provide against the misapprehensions arising from it, is to *distinguish*, as carefully as we can, the *several* senses which have been commonly affixed to the words *necessary* or *necessity*. The most comprehensive division of *necessity* is into four kinds; *logical, moral, physical*, and *metaphysical*. Let us take those kinds singly in their order, and minutely examine what they mean.

(1.) *Logical* necessity is, where it is an express contradiction to say the contrary[k]. Which resolves into this, that the *same idea*, under different terms, or expressions, is still the *same idea*, and necessarily *agrees* with itself. Thus there is a *necessity* that *man* should be *rational*, as rationality is implied in the general *idea* of *man*. Not that there is any *physical* necessity that this

[i] See above, p. 326, 327, 328.

[k] Necessarium *logicum* est, cum ex terminis repugnat non esse. Sic *necessarium* est, hominem esse rationalem. *Chauvin.* p. 435.

or that man should be so, (for he may cease to be *rational*, or to exist at all,) but there is a *logical* necessity, that the *definition* should agree to the thing *defined*, and that the *idea* expressed by the word *man* should be what it is, while supposed to be so. This kind of *necessity* is otherwise called *necessity* of *predication*; importing an *ideal* and undeniable *connection* between *subject* and *predicate*[l]. As if man is said to be *rational*, or to be an *animal*. To the head of *logical necessity* is to be referred what the Schools call *necessitas consequentis*, and likewise *necessitas consequentiæ*, expressing the indissoluble *connection* between *premises* and *conclusion*[m]; that is, again, between one idea and another, or between proposition and proposition, or one part of a proposition and another part. In short, *logical necessity* is nothing else but a name for the supposed inviolable *connection* between *idea* and *idea*, or between *proposition* and *proposition*, or between *subject* and *predicate*.

(2.) *Moral necessity* imports a *connection*, but not so constant and invariable, between *end* and *means*[n]. As when we say, there is a *necessity* of temperance to preserve health; or if it be said, that man is under a *moral* necessity of doing his duty, as it is a *means* to happiness, his chief *end*. It is called *moral*, in opposition to *physical*, which comes next to be mentioned. If any man is violently forced or compelled to any thing, he is then under a *physical* necessity, and so far ceases to be a *moral* agent.

(3.) *Physical necessity* imports an inviolable *connection* between natural *causes* and *effects*[o]. This is often called *absolute* necessity, in opposition to *moral*, which is not *absolute*, but *conditional*, or *hypothetical*, or liable to some exceptions or limitations. It is called *causal* necessity, when intended to express what influence the *cause* will have in producing the effect: as there is a *causal* necessity for the appearing of light when the sun is risen. An *antecedent* necessity, or a necessity *a priori*, denotes the same thing. But a necessity *a posteriori* is a name intended to express what reference the *effect* has to some cause or causes: as

[l] Necessarium in *prædicando* dicitur, quando datur *necessitas* enuntiationis, seu in enuntiatione. Pendet a *connectione* necessaria *prædicati* cum *subjecto*; id est, ex insolubili harum partium nexu, adeo ut prædicatum non possit negari de subjecto: ut cum dicitur, *Homo est animal*. *Chauvin.* p. 435.

[m] See Chauvin. ibid.

[n] Necessarium *morale* est id sine quo, quamvis absolute fieri possit effectus, nunquam tamen, vel raro fit. *Chauvin. ibid.*

[o] Necessarium *physicum* est, quod ex *causis* naturalibus tale est: ut necessaria est eclipsis solaris ex interpositione lunæ. *Chauv. ibid.*

if there are things *made*, there is a *necessity* of a *maker*. There cannot be *motion* without a *mover*; nor external *light* without a luminous substance.

(4.) The fourth kind of necessity is *metaphysical*, and imports *immutable* existence proper to God only[p]. It is opposed to *mutable*, *precarious*, *contingent*, *dependent* existence. It is the same with what Dr. Cudworth somewhere calls a *necessary schesis* to existence, expressing the inseparable *connection* between the *existence* and the *subject* of it, between *existence* and *essence*. Creatures are considered as coming from *non-existence*, and as being liable to lose the *existence* which they enjoy; therefore their existence is *precarious* and *perishable*. But the Deity never wanted *existence*, never can cease to exist; therefore his existence is *immutable*, *unperishable*, *firm*, *stable*, and *enduring*, (independently) from everlasting to everlasting. This permanency of being is considered as a *mode* of existence, *presupposing* existence, as *modal* being always supposes *pure* being[q]. It may be called *modal* necessity, as expressing that perfect *manner* of existence proper to the Deity: God's *manner* of existing is above all chance, change, or failure. This *modal* necessity, or self-sufficiency, ought to be carefully distinguished from *causal* before mentioned, *metaphysical* from *physical*. Causal necessity is *antecedent*, *effective*, *operative*; modal is *posterior* and *subsequent*, in order of nature and conception, to the *existence* or existing subject, whereof it is the *mode*, and to which it is referred up as to its source or centre, its *substratum* or support.

Having thus competently explained the several kinds of *necessity*, I have one thing to observe of them, that the idea of some sort of firm *connection* runs through them all; and that is the proper general import of the name *necessity*. Connection of *men-*

[p] Necessarium *metaphysicum* est quod immutabiliter existit: ut Deus. *Chauvin. ibid.* p. 435.

[q] *Necessarium* dicitur illud quod *non potest non esse, aut aliter se habere*. Quocunque autem modo definiatur vel describatur, duo importat. Quia, quod non potest non esse dicit *esse*; et præterea negat *desitionem* in esse. Quod vero dicit rem sese aliter habere non posse, rem *præsupponit* esse, eamque existere ait cum *modo* immutabilitatis. Adeo ut *necessarium* formaliter debeat explicari per remotionem *mutabilitatis*, idque ad oppositionem *contingentiæ*. *Chauvin.* p. 434.

Necessitas accipitur pro vehementia essendi illius quod per se et primo est *necesse esse*, quod est Deus, et sic proprie definiri non potest. Describitur tamen et notificatur utcunque, et hoc melius per *affirmationem* quam *negationem*; scilicet per *vehementiam* et *firmitatem* essendi, quam per *impossibilitatem* seu *non-possibilitatem* non essendi. *Bradwardin. de Causa Dei*, p. 678.

tal or *verbal* propositions, or of their respective *parts*, makes up the idea of *logical* necessity. Connection of *end* and *means* makes up the idea of *moral* necessity. Connection of *causes* and *effects* is *physical*. And connection of *existence* and *essence* is *metaphysical* necessity. This last is what our present argument is solely concerned in. It has been sometimes styled *simple* or *absolute* necessity, as opposed to *relative*. For though *physical* necessity may also be called *absolute*, as opposed to *limited* or *conditional*, (as before hinted,) it is not *absolute* as opposed to *relative*; because it stands in the *relation* between causes and effects. But metaphysical necessity has no *relation* to any thing extraneous to the subject of it; it subsists only in the Divine *essence*, considered as inseparably connected with its own *existence*. This is that pure, simple, absolute, transcendental *necessity*, which the later *schoolmen* and *metaphysicians* speak of.

These things premised, I may now proceed to inquire what the argument *a priori* (as it is called) has to stand upon, or how it is supported. The way of coming at it is first to prove *a posteriori* the *existence* of an *independent* Being, thus: *Something now is, therefore something has existed from all eternity*; therefore some one *unchangeable* and *independent* Being, one at least; therefore there is some one *self-existent* or *necessarily existing* Being[r]. Thus far is right and well, for the coming at *necessary existence* in the way of arguing *a posteriori*. Call it *necessity* of *existence*, and then that *necessity* imports a *mode* of the existence before proved, *subsequent*, in order of nature and conception, to the *existence*, and referred up to the *subject* of it. This *modal* necessity is a *property* of the independent Being, denoting his immutable permanency, his infinite stability. But it happens, that the word *necessity* often stands for *causal* and *physical* necessity, (very different from *modal* and *metaphysical*,) and so here begins the first double. The *subsequent* necessity is soon after dropped, and *antecedent* necessity is slipped upon us in its room. Under the cover of an ambiguous name, the *idea* which we began with is first changed for another, altogether new and foreign, and then enters the argument *a priori* with all its train. There is now conceived I know not what *antecedent* necessity, and internal *cause*, and *prior* reason, *ground*, and *foundation* of the independent Being; and all built upon nothing but the

[r] See Dr. Clarke's Demonstration, &c. prop. 1, 2, 3.

equivocation of a word, or a quick *transition* made from *necessity*, considered in the *modal* and *proper* sense, to *necessity* taken in a *causal* and *foreign* meaning. This "necessity," it is said, must be "antecedent, in the natural order of our ideas, to our suppo-"sition of its being[s]." Why must it be *antecedent?* No necessity had been proved before, but what was conceived *subsequent* (in the natural order of our ideas) to the *existence* of the independent Being, being a *mode* of it, and referred up to it: why then must it be *antecedent?* There is no reason at all for it; unless it be that an argument *a priori* required such an *antecedency*, and would drop without it. The supposed *antecedency* in this case appears to be all fancy and fiction, not collected from what went before, by any regular deduction, but *arbitrarily* fetched in, under the umbrage and protection of an *equivocal* name. Put but *immutability* of existence, or *independence*, or *durability*, instead of *necessity* of existence, (which really signifies no more than the other,) and then it will be presently seen how the notion of *antecedency* drops and disappears: which makes it plain, that the notion is here false and foreign, not deducible from any regular train of *ideas*, but brought in, at all adventures, only because the technical term *necessity* admits of *two* senses, and is a serviceable word for the sinking one *idea* and bringing up *another*.

But to favour this new notion of *antecedency*, (so arbitrarily introduced,) it is added, "This necessity must *antecedently* force "itself upon us whether we will or no, even while we are en-"deavouring to suppose that no such being exists. For exam-"ple; when we are endeavouring to suppose, that there is *no* "*being* in the universe that exists *necessarily*, we always find "in our minds, (besides the foregoing demonstration of some-"thing being *self-existent*, from the *impossibility* of every thing's "being *dependent*,) we always find in our minds, I say, some "ideas, as of *infinity* and *eternity;* which to remove, that is, to "suppose no being, no substance in the universe, to which these "attributes, or *modes* of existence, are necessarily inherent, is a "contradiction in the very terms. For modes and attributes "exist only by the existence of the *substance* to which they "belong[t]."

In answer to this paragraph, I may observe briefly, 1. That

[s] Clarke, ibid. p. 14. sixth edition. [t] Clarke, ibid. p. 15.

there is no arguing from *ideal* to *real* existence; unless it could first be shewn, that such *ideas* must have their *objective realities*, and cannot be accounted for, as they pass *within*, except it be by supposing such and such *real* existence, *ad extra*, to answer them. 2. Allowing that we find such *ideas* in our minds, and that they *antecedently* force themselves upon us, this proves no more than a kind of order of *antecedency* in our conceptions, but does not prove any real *antecedency* with respect to the Divine *existence*, as if that were preceded by something *prior* in order of nature to it. 3. Whatever necessity we may find ourselves under as to *conceiving* or *imagining* thus or thus; yet we are under no antecedent necessity of *believing* that these *conceptions* or *imaginations* do infer the existence of a Deity, till it be regularly *proved* to us, or till it can be clearly shewn what certain *connection* there is between *ideas* and *realities*, between *thoughts* and *things*. 4. If such certain *connection* could be proved, yet such proof would not amount to a demonstration *a priori*, being that the process of such an argument is altogether *a posteriori*, from *effects* to *causes*, from things *posterior* to something *antecedent*. For the process runs thus: we have such and such *ideas*, which ideas must have *objective realities* as their cause or ground; and those objective realities, or *real attributes*, must have their *subject*, as all *modes* and *attributes* have: and thus at length by this *analysis*, or in the way of *ascent*, we come up to a *first Cause*, which is *antecedent*, in order of nature, to every *mode* and *attribute* supposed to inhere in it, and to belong to it. So that, even in this way, we can never arrive to any thing which can be justly conceived *prior* or *antecedent*, in order of nature, to the *existence* of a first Cause. It appears then, that *antecedent* necessity is very *arbitrarily* introduced into this subject, having no regular chain of reasoning, no proper connection of ideas, nor indeed any thing, but an *equivocation* upon the word *necessity*, to support or countenance it.

I would next take notice, that the *use* made afterwards of this *antecedent* necessity is altogether as *arbitrary* and *fanciful* as the introducing it. The *uses* it is made to serve are, to prove the *eternity*[v], *omnipresence*[w], and *unity*[x] of the self-existent Being. And here it is observable, that necessity is furnished with *epithets* (all in the *arbitrary* way) just as the occasion requires; *epithets* suitable to the points to be proved. When it is to

[v] Demonstrat. p. 39. [w] Ibid. p. 41. [x] Ibid. p. 44.

prove the *eternity*, then it is to be styled "absolute, not depending " on any thing external, always unalterably the same[y]." When it is to prove the *infinity*, or the *omnipresence*, then it is characterized as being again *absolute* in itself, and "not depending " on any outward cause;" and now it must be *every where*, as well as *always*, unalterably the same; having no relation to *time*, or *place*, or *any thing else*[z]. But when it is to serve for proof of the *unity*, then it is to be *simple*, and *uniform*, and *universal*, without any possible *difference*, *difformity*, or *variety* whatsoever[a]. That is to say, it shall be what the demonstrator pleases to make it, that he may adapt it variously to the various purposes he intended by it. The neater and shorter way would have been, to have denominated it at once an *absolute*, *omnimodous*, *all-perfect* necessity; and then not only *eternity*, and *omnipresence*, and *unity*, but infinite *wisdom*, *power*, and *goodness*, and every *perfection* whatever might have been instantly inferred from it. For it might have been pleaded, that such *necessity* had no relation to one perfection more than to another, being *uniform* and *universal*, extending equally to *all*, and *operating*[b] as much with respect to *every* perfection, as to *any*, having nothing to *limit* it, nothing to *control* it. This reasoning appears equally clear and forcible with the other: and both are alike weak and precarious, having no solid foundation of reason to rest upon; nothing but an obscure unintelligible principle, floating in the mind, and managed at pleasure, to make some *appearance* of *demonstration* in a way wherein none can be had, or to cover a *petitio principii*, which yet betrays itself immediately in every instance.

I have hitherto been observing, that the pretended *antecedent* necessity is arbitrarily *introduced*, and then as arbitrarily *carried on:* and now I am only to remark further, that it is, at length, as arbitrarily *dismissed*. For indeed there is as much reason for going on with it *in infinitum*, as for taking it in at all: and there is no more reason for stopping at *one* fresh antecedent necessity, than for stopping at *five hundred;* nor any more reason for stopping there, than for going on *infinitely*. If every thing that *exists*, and every *circumstance* of it, must have a *reason a priori*, why it *is*, rather than *not*[c], (a supposition which the argument *a priori* is built upon,) then the *antecedent* necessity

[y] Demonstrat. p. 39. [z] Ibid. p. 41. [a] Ibid. p. 44.
[b] See Letters, p. 19, 34. [c] Ibid. p. 33.

itself must have a reason *a priori* to fix and determine it, and that another, and so on infinitely. Wherefore if we admit but one *antecedent* necessity as *prior*, in order of nature, to the *first Cause*, there is no reason at all for stopping at the first remove, or for dismissing the notion of an *antecedent* necessity so soon, or at all. The same thought, the same suggestion, will come over again at every new advance higher in the series of *antecedent* necessities: for every one of them will want a *new* ground, a new *internal cause*, a new *antecedent necessity*, to determine its being; and all for the same reason as the *first Cause* was supposed to want one. Therefore, I say, it is perfectly *arbitrary* and *unaccountable*, to make a full pause at one single *antecedent* necessity, and not to continue and carry on necessities higher and higher, without number and without end. Thus much may suffice for exposing the *precarious* and fanciful nature of the pretended proof *a priori*.

2. But I proceed further to observe, that it is not only *precarious*, but manifestly *absurd*. It is demonstrable *a priori*, that there neither is nor can be any proof *a priori* of the existence of a *first Cause*, because there is no cause *prior* to the *first*[d]. But, to be a little more distinct and particular, imagine something *prior* or *antecedent*, in order of nature or conception, to the *first Cause*, what must that *something* be? There are but three possible suppositions, and all of them flatly contradictory and absurd. Suppose either the *substance* itself, or some *property* of that substance, or something *extrinsic* to both, to be that *antecedent* ground, reason, or foundation, prior in conception to the *first Cause:* they are every one of them uncapable and incompetent for it.

(1.) To begin with the last of them, a *principle extrinsic*. One would think by the turn of the argument, in several passages where it is handled, that the *antecedent* necessity were considered as something *extrinsic* to the first Cause: particularly where it is represented as *operating*[e] every where, and always, so as to make the divine Being *eternal* and *omnipresent*, or the like. And indeed if the words carry any *idea* at all in them, and any *force*

[d] Hæc propositio *Deus est*, non habet *medium* terminum quo *a priore* demonstretur.—Non potest dari medium desumptum a *causa extrinseca*, nam *Deus est*, a seipso, independens omnino ab alia re: non potest etiam sumi medium a *causa materiali intrinseca*, nam hoc non cadit in Deum: non a *formali*, nam in Deitate non est ulla ratio formalis prior *ipso esse divino*, quæ nostro modo intelligendi sit ratio cur Deus sit. *Gillius*, p. 386.

[e] Letters, p. 19, 34.

of argument, they must be so understood; just as we understand them of any external cause producing its effect. But, as an *extrinsic* principle is *absurd* in itself, and is besides expressly rejected[f] by the advocates for the proof *a priori*, I need not here say a word more of it.

(2.) Take we then next the *substance* itself, and consider whether that can be conceived as *prior* or *antecedent* to itself. It is very plain that it cannot: and so much also is confessed on all hands[g], and therefore we may dismiss this article, and proceed.

(3.) The only remaining supposition is, that some *attribute* or *property* of the self-existent Being may be conceived *antecedent*, in order of nature, to the same Being. But that is, if possible, still more *absurd* than the last preceding. An *attribute* is *attributed* to its subject as its ground and support; and a *property*, in the very notion of it, is *proper* to the substance whereunto it belongs, and *subsequent* in order of nature and conception to it. An *antecedent* attribute, or property, is as great a solecism, and almost as flat a contradiction, as an *antecedent subsequency*, or a *subsequent antecedency*, understood in the same sense, and same respect. Every property, or attribute, as such, *presupposes* its subject, and cannot be understood otherwise. To make the property *antecedent* is inverting the natural order, and confounding the idea; and, in short, is denying it to be what it is. The truth of what is here said is so glaring and forcible, that it sometimes extorts the assent even of those who upon other occasions affect to gainsay it. It is confessed, that "the scholastic way "of proving the *existence* of the self-existent Being from the "absolute *perfection* of his nature, is ὕστερον πρότερον· for, [*N.B.*] "all or any perfections *presuppose* existence; which is *petitio* "*principii*[h]." If therefore properties, modes, or attributes in God, be considered as *perfections*, (and it is certain they must,) then by this account they must all or any of them *presuppose* existence. Indeed, it is immediately added, in the same place, "that bare necessity of existence does not presuppose, but infer, "existence." That is to say, if such necessity be supposed to be a principle *extrinsic:* but if it be a *mode* or a *property*, it must *presuppose* the existence of its subject, as certainly and as evidently as it is a *mode* or a *property*. It might perhaps *a posteriori* infer the existence of its subject, as effects may infer a

[f] Letters, p. 32. [g] Letters, p. 33, 40. Demonstration, &c. p. 21.
[h] Letters, p. 33.

cause: but to *infer* in the other way *a priori*, is altogether as impossible as that a *triangle* should be a *square*; which is joining repugnant ideas together.

In another place, it is observed by the same learned author "that the idea of *space* (as also of *time* or *duration*) is an idea "of a certain quality or relation, which not being itself a *sub-*"*stance*, [*N.B.*] necessarily *presupposes* a substance, without "which it could not exist[1]." Now if the *necessity* spoken of be a *property* or *mode*, and not a *substance*, it must, for the very same reason, necessarily *presuppose* a substance without which it could not exist. So true it is, that a *mode*, or *property*, cannot be conceived *antecedent* in order of nature to its *subject*, without running into a flat absurdity, and the greatest confusion of ideas imaginable.

The sum then is, that, to make out an argument *a priori*, there must be a *cause*, or however a *priority* or *antecedency*, brought in to argue upon, and to draw an *inference* from, to the *existence* of a Deity: and yet no sooner is the idea of *cause*, or *priority*, or *antecedency* (though in conception only) introduced, but we immediately subvert the idea of a *property*, and of a *first Cause*. It is a vain thing to insist one while upon the *antecedency*, for the sake of the pretended *demonstration*, and then presently to drop it, by retreating to the idea of a *property*, for the sake of warding off insuperable objections. Either there is no *antecedency* in this case at all, to form the *argument* upon; or, if there be, the *antecedent* principle is no *property*, but a principle *extrinsic*. So then either the *antecedency* must drop, and the *argument a priori* drop with it: or if the *antecedency* be kept up, the idea of a *property* is destroyed instantly, and we are yet to seek for a *first Cause*. Turn we the thing which way we will, the presumed argument *a priori* is all over contradictory and absurd. It is not merely abstruse or unintelligible, but plainly and clearly repugnant to reason, and to itself. It is tacking together disjointed and incompatible ideas, which can never stand together, but must inevitably clash and destroy one another. However, as there is no cause whatever so defenceless and destitute, but that something or other may be pleaded for it, and a skilful advocate may lay colours upon any thing: so it is here. A very ingenious defence has been drawn up for the argument *a priori*, in which we have the spirit and quintessence of what the cause

[1] Letters, p. 25.

can afford[k]. A just reply was made to it some time after[l], by a very good hand, which might save me the labour of saying any thing more to it: but perhaps it may be of service to have the same things represented in different lights; or if it be only abridging what has been said before more at large, even that perhaps may not be altogether without its use. I proceed then,

3. To examine the several *pleas* or *excuses* invented for the support of the argument *a priori*, in order to shew that they are none of them sufficient for the purposes intended. I shall break the discourse into so many distinct *parts*, or *pleas*, for the distinct and methodical conception of the subject.

PLEA I.

"Though it is indeed most evident, that no *thing*, no *being* can "be *prior* to that Being which is the *first Cause* and *original* of "all things; yet there must be in nature a *ground* or *reason*, a "permanent ground or reason, of the *existence* of the first "Cause: otherwise its existence would be owing to, and depend "upon, *mere chance*[m]." To which I answer,

(1.) If by *ground* or *reason* be meant a *cause*, the idea of it is repugnant to the notion of a *first Cause*, which must be absolutely *uncaused*, both with respect to itself and to every thing else. But if by *ground* or *reason* be meant only a ground or reason for *asserting* such existence, that we may readily admit, as meaning only that there is a reason *a posteriori* whereby we prove the truth of the thing that so it is. *Reason* and *ground* are softer names in this case than *cause* is, and may sometimes serve to hide the *absurdity* which appears at once upon the naming of a *cause* prior to the *first*. It may, or rather must be allowed, that there is *a reason for every existence*, a reason of one kind or other, either *a priori* or else *a posteriori*: but it is nevertheless certain, that there is not a reason *a priori* for every thing, because there must be a *first* in the ascending line; as also, on the other hand, there is not a reason *a posteriori* for every thing, because there must be a *last* in the order of descent[n].

[k] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 40, &c.

[l] Dr. Gretton's Review of the Argument *a priori*. Printed for B. Lintot, A. D. 1726. See also Concio ad Clerum, upon the same subject, and by the same author. Cantabrigiæ, 1732.

[m] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 40.

[n] Observa, multas veritates posse *a priori* et *posteriori* simul demonstrari: ut v. g. esse *admirativum*, demonstratur *a priori* per rationale, *a posteriori* vero per risibile. Alias vero esse veritates quæ tantum vel *a priori*,

(2.) Though the *uncaused* Being has neither *ground* nor *cause* to determine its existence, yet it is not *owing to*, or *dependent* upon, *mere chance*, because it is not *owing* or *dependent* at all, but entirely *underived* and *independent*. If the force of the objection lies in this, that unless the existence be *dependent* on something, it cannot be *firm* and *stable*; this amounts to saying, that a *first* cause, or an *independent* existence, is a contradictory notion in itself. It is certain, that if the existence be *dependent* on any thing, it is not the *firmer*, but may be the more *precarious* for being so. The highest possible *stability* is to be absolutely *independent*, absolutely *uncaused*: this is the strongest security against all possible *chances* or *failures*: and therefore it never can be allowed, that assigning it a *cause*, a *ground*, or *foundation*, is *fixing* the existence; when the supposing it to have no *cause*, no *ground*, &c. nor to *need* any, is really the top perfection of being, the very highest and best thing that we can either say or conceive of it.

(3.) But supposing that there might yet remain some *difficulty* in our scheme, (as difficulties there must be in conceiving *eternity*, and in searching the *mysterious* nature and existence of the *unsearchable* Being,) yet if the difficulty be rather *shifted* than taken away, by the expedient here proposed, or if *absurdities* be brought in instead of *difficulties*, how then are we at all relieved by it, or the better for it? That such is the case here, is plain at first sight. For what if we go on to assign a *cause*, a *ground*, or a *foundation* for the *first Cause*, it is but going one step further, and there the same *difficulty* occurs as before, besides several new ones. That *cause*, that *ground*, that *foundation*, that *antecedent* necessity (or whatever else we call it) will still want another *cause*, another *ground*, another *foundation*, another *antecedent* necessity to fix and support it; or else, by the same reasoning, its existence will be *owing to*, and *dependent upon*, *mere chance*[o]. If we still go higher up, to a second or a third remove, or to as many more as we can think on, the same difficulty will haunt us all the way in the wandering progress,

vel *a posteriori* demonstrari possunt: quia cum necessario sistendum sit in aliquo *primo conceptu*, ante quem non sit alius, inde fit, illum non posse demonstrari *a priori*, quia *nullam* habet *causam* sui: e contrario vero etiam sistendum sit in *aliquo ultimo*, post quem non sit alius, inde rursus sequitur, illum non posse demonstrari *a posteriori*, quia (ut supponimus) nihil habet *posterius* se. *Roderic. de Arriag. Curs. Philos.* p. 222.

[o] See Dr. Gretton's Review, p. 15.

and we shall never find rest for the sole of our foot, till we return to the place where we first stepped aside, till we come back to the *first Cause* of all things, and there terminate our inquiries. They that attempt to move but one step higher, are sure to involve themselves in inextricable mazes, and are doubly to blame: first, for inventing a cause *prior* to the *first*, or a reason *higher* than the *highest*; and next, for making that newly-invented support (according to their own argument) owe its existence to mere *chance*. Let the discerning readers therefore judge upon the whole, who it is that makes the Divine existence *contingent* and *precarious*, they or we.

PLEA II.

"The existence of the first Cause is *necessary*, necessary "*absolutely* and in itself; and therefore *that necessity* is *a priori*, "and, in order of nature, the *ground* or *reason* of its existence[p]." To which I reply,

(1.) It is allowed that the existence of the first Cause is *necessary*, not *contingent*: and because that *necessity* is only a *mode* of the *presupposed* existence, therefore it is not *a priori*, or, in order of nature, an *antecedent* ground or reason, but it is *subsequent* and *posterior*, in order of nature and conception, to that whereof it is the *mode*: for all *modes*, as such, are *subsequent* to their *subject*, which is the *ground* and *support* of them.

(2.) Necessity *absolute* (in the *metaphysical* sense, as here used,) is a contradiction to the notion of *antecedent* ground, or *cause*, having no *relation*[q] to any thing of that kind. It imports an inviolable *connection* between the *essence* and the *existence* in a being *uncaused* and *independent*. To make connection the *ground* and *reason* of the *existence*, either means that the essence is the ground of *itself*, or means nothing, amounting only to so many words of amusement.

PLEA III.

"That which exists *necessarily* (or in the idea of which "*existence* and *necessity* are inseparably and necessarily *connected*) "must either therefore be necessary because it *exists*, or else it "must therefore exist, because its existence is *necessary*[r]." I answer,

(1.) It is improper to say, that *existence* and *necessity* are

[p] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 41.
[q] See above, p. 354, 355.
[r] Answer to Seventh Letter, pag. 41.

connected: for since *necessity*, as here applied, imports nothing but *connection*, it amounts to saying, that *existence* and *connection* are so *connected;* whereas, in truth and propriety, the *existence* and the *essence* are what are here supposed to be *connected.* But all the confusion arises from want of distinguishing between *causal* and *modal,* between *physical* and *metaphysical* necessity.

(2.) We do not say, that the first Cause is therefore *necessary* because it *exists*, (for then every thing *existing* would be necessary,) but rather, because it exists in *such a manner*, exists *independently.* Not that *independency* is properly the *cause* of *necessary existence,* or *vice versa*, (for both are but names or expressions for one and the same property or perfection,) but all resolves into this, that God is *what* he is, and such as we prove him, *a posteriori,* to be. We can go no higher than to say, that his nature is *such,* that he exists *independently*, *immutably, necessarily,* as opposed to *contingency.* It is wrong to ask for a *wherefore* in this case: it is supposing no *first Cause* at all. The *plea* sets out upon a false principle, that a *therefore* must be given in every instance assignable, or a reason *a priori* admitted. We have done with reasons *a priori*, as soon as we are arrived to the top of all existence. For as in abstract *necessary* truths, the highest pitch we can come up to is, that the *same idea is the same idea*, or every idea *is what it is;* so in our running up to the top of *real* existence, (as opposed to *ideal,*) the highest pinnacle of all is, that the *same being is the same being,* or *is what it is.* Such then is the nature or perfection of the Deity, that he exists *independently.* To assign a *cause* for that existence, is to make it *less;* it is to suppose it *dependent* on something else: it is destroying with one hand what we build with the other. We pretend not therefore to give a reason *a priori* why God exists necessarily, (for if such reason could be given, it would sink the idea of *necessary* instead of raising it,) but we assign reasons *a posteriori* why we believe and maintain it; which is giving the τὸ ὅτι, not the τὸ διότι, and is all that can be or ought to be given in this case, as is self-evident.

(3.) But suppose we should attempt to go higher up beyond the *first Cause,* to something conceived *prior* or *antecedent* to it, will not the same difficulty recur in every stage of the progression? The same dilemma is applicable to the next higher cause, and to every other, *in infinitum.* For it may still be pleaded,

that such *antecedent ground* must either be necessary because it exists, or else must therefore exist because its existence is *necessary*; and so the mind is again set afloat, without stay or anchor, in an endless pursuit after more and more *antecedent* absolute *necessities*.

Plea IV.

"The *eternity* of God can no otherwise be proved, than by "considering *a priori* the nature of a necessary or self-existent "Cause.——That the first Cause has existed *from eternity*, and "shall exist *to eternity*, cannot be proved from the *temporary* "*phenomena*, but must be demonstrated from the intrinsic nature "of *necessary existence*." I answer,

(1.) The question here is not, by what *other* ways the *eternity* can be proved, but whether it can be proved in this. Be the other proofs, which proceed *a posteriori*, ever so lame or insufficient, their *defects* will be of no service for the healing the *absurdities* of this: so the plea is foreign, and wide of the purpose; unless the design were to plead for the *usefulness* of a proof, which cannot be shewn to be a *proof*.

(2.) The suggestion here offered is not *true*, especially as to God's existing *from eternity*. The natural, regular, and indeed the common way, has been to prove the *eternity* before the *necessary existence*; and that is the very way which the author himself took to come at *necessary existence*[s]: and no one has better answered this *plea* than himself hath done in another place[t].

(3.) If any one were first to prove the *existence* and an *attribute* or two more, and then proceed to demonstrate the *eternity* from the *existence*, &c. before proved, such a method of arguing

[s] Demonstration, prop. ii. p. 11.

[t] "Not to *philosophers* only, but "even to the *meanest capacities*, are "there obvious arguments in *reason*, "to *prove clearly* the necessity of this "Divine perfection, [*eternity*,] and to "set it before them in a practical and "useful light. For since it is in some "degree a perfection *to be*; and a "greater degree of that perfection to "*continue in being*; it is evident, when "we conceive of God the *most perfect* "Being, we must conceive him to be "*infinite* in this *perfection* also, as "well as in others.

"Again: it is evident even to the "meanest capacity, which considers "things at all; that he who first gave "being to all *other* things, could not "possibly have any *beginning* him-"self, and must therefore necessarily "have existed *from all eternity*: and "that he who hath already existed "*from all eternity*, independently, "and *of himself*, cannot possibly be "liable to be deprived of his *being*, "and must therefore necessarily exist "for an eternity to come." *Clarke's Posthumous Sermons*, vol. i. p. 80.

a priori we should not except to, neither do we condemn it[v]. All that we object to is the imagining any *ground, cause*, or *necessity*, (or whatever it be called,) *antecedent*, in order of nature, to the *existence*. One attribute may perhaps rationally be considered as *prior* in conception to another, and *existence* as prior to all[w]: therefore the way of arguing *a priori* from *existence* and *attributes* before proved, to other attributes not yet proved, we may allow of as a rational and just procedure. We distinguish here between arguing *a priori* to attributes, and arguing in like manner to *existence*.

(4.) It is self-evident that nothing can be proved by a *repugnant* notion of *antecedent* necessity, conceived *prior* to the existence: and therefore *eternity*, both *a parte ante* and *a parte post*, must either be proved some other way, or not at all. That it may be proved in another way, and without the help of *antecedent* necessity, (proved, I say, *a posteriori*, yea, and perhaps *a priori* also,) is abundantly manifest from the many excellent treatises which have handled that point at large; and St. Paul himself has testified the same thing; namely, that the *temporary phenomena* are sufficient to make men *clearly see* the *eternal* power and Godhead of their Creator, and to render them *inexcusable* in their disbelief of it, or disregard to it[x].

Plea V.

"If the first Cause exists absolutely without any *ground* or "*reason* of existence, it might as possibly in times past, *without* "*any reason*, have not existed; and may as possibly in times to "come, *without any reason*, cease to exist. Can it be proved "*a posteriori*, that the first Cause of all things will exist to-mor- "row? Or can it be proved any otherwise than by shewing that

[v] The Schoolmen have often taken that method of proving the *eternity*, understanding it to be arguing *a priori*: and it seems that it may properly enough be so styled; though some would scruple to give it that name, because there is no *real order* among the attributes. (See Bp. Barlow on this head, Exercit. iv. p. 183, &c.) But if there may be an order of *conception*, it suffices: and that there may appears very plainly. See Richard. de Media Vill. who handles this question at large, lib. i. distinct. 2. quæst. iv. p. 32. And Gillius, lib. ii. tr. 2. c. 9. p. 538.

[w] Vera *superiora* sunt, quæ in solo *Deo* consistunt; ut Deus est *potens*, *sapiens*, atque *bonus*. Horum autem hæc quidem sunt quodammodo *posteriora* naturaliter, hæc *priora*. Posterius enim est Deum *velle*, quam *cognoscere*; et *cognoscere* quam *esse*: *esse* enim naturaliter hæc præcedit, et universaliter omnia talia *attributa*. *Bradwardin. in Causa Dei*, lib. i. cap. 12. p. 201.

[x] Rom. i. 20.

"*necessity* is a *certain* ground of *future*, as well as of *present* "existence[y]?" I answer,

(1.) By asking, what must be the *certain* ground of that *necessity's* existing? Or how will it be proved that that *prior* necessity will *exist to-morrow*, unless it be by assigning another necessity, and so on infinitely[z]? This kind of reasoning, if it proves any thing, proves that there neither is nor can be a *first Cause:* and so it is choosing to admit a manifest *absurdity*, only to avoid an appearing *difficulty*.

(2.) To answer more directly, it is not possible in the nature of things to have any higher or stronger security as to the *first Cause's* existing *to-morrow* than this; that he never had any *cause, ground,* or *support* of his existence, never *needed* any, being *independent* and *self-sufficient*[a], the prop and stay, the *ground* and *foundation* of all existences. If indeed he himself were to have any *ground, foundation,* or *cause* of his being, we might then have some handle for doubting whether his relation to that ground might continue, or how long it might subsist: but when he is above and beyond all *grounds* and *causes*, we have all the reason in the world to believe, that he is infinitely secure from *change*, is independently the same, "yesterday, to-day, and for ever." It is very odd to think of *ascertaining* his existence by assigning him a *prior cause*, which is the only way to unsettle it, and to make it less certain than it is: but it is a great confirmation of the *truth* of our doctrine in this particular, that every argument formed against it is at length found to stand on its side, and to make for it.

Plea VI.

"When atheistical writers affirm, that the material universe, "and every existing substance in particular, was eternal, abso- "lutely *without* any *ground* or *reason* of existence, can this asser- "tion be confuted by him who shall himself affirm that God "was eternal absolutely, without any *ground* or *reason* of exist- "ence[b]?"

[y] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 42.

[z] See Dr. Gretton's Review, p. 74.

[a] Nam, quod est *a se*, et non *ab alio*, non habet principium durationis. Cum enim in seipso habet sufficiens principium existendi, et existat per *essentiam*, concipi nequit non-existens antequam existat; atque adeo non habet principium durationis. Prætera, id quod non est *ab alio*, non habet in suo esse admistam *potentiam* ad *non esse;* ac proinde non est vertibile in *non esse*, atque adeo est æternum. *Gillius*, p. 1032.

[b] Answer to a Seventh Letter, p. 43.

Answ. Yes, very easily, by shewing that what those men foolishly ascribe to the *material universe* (subject to innumerable changes and imperfections[c]) does and can belong only to some *unchangeable*, *independent* Being, whose existence we can demonstrate *a posteriori*. It is his privilege, and his only, to be above all *ground* or *antecedent* reason of existence, to be absolutely *uncaused*, being indeed the *first Cause*. But those *atheistical* writers, most certainly, never can be solidly confuted by one that shall assert a cause *prior* to the *first:* because it is, in effect, denying any *first Cause* at all, and maintaining an *endless* progression; which is what every *Atheist* would readily come into: not to mention how easy it were for them to play with *antecedent* necessity, (an arbitrary principle,) adapting the same to their own schemes[d].

PLEA VII.

"The *infinity*, or *immensity*, or *omnipresence* of God can no "otherwise be proved, than by considering *a priori* the nature "of a *necessary* or *self-existent* Cause.———That this Author of "nature is himself absolutely *immense* or *infinite*, cannot be "proved from the *finite* phenomena, but must be demonstrated "from the intrinsic nature of a *necessary existence*[e]." To which I rejoin;

(1.) From *antecedent* necessity, or from any thing *prior* to a first Cause, (a notion self-contradictory and palpably absurd,) nothing at all can be proved. So then whatever becomes of other proofs for the *immensity*, it is certain and manifest, that nothing can be done with this, which is no proof at all.

(2.) As to *necessary existence*, soberly and justly understood in the *modal* sense, and as *subsequent* in order of nature to its *subject*, (amounting to the same with *independent*, *immutable*, or *infinitely* durable existence,) we have nothing to object against *arguing* from it, so far as it may carry us, or against calling it arguing *a priori*, as it is inferring one or more *attributes* from *existence* and some attribute or attributes before proved. This is quite another thing from the *argument a priori* contended for, and ought to be carefully distinguished from it: we find no fault with any one's arguing from attribute to attribute; but what we blame is, the arguing from a supposed *ground*, *founda-*

[c] See Wollaston, p. 76.
[d] See Dr. Gretton, p. 21, 22, 23, &c.
[e] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 43.

tion, or internal *cause* of existence, to either existence or attribute.

(3.) As to *immensity*, or *omnipresence*, if the *finite phenomena* are sufficient to prove that it extends to all *real* existence, it suffices: no one, after that, will scruple to admit as large an *infinity* as can be desired, though the proof be not drawn out in mood and figure. Mischief is often done by pretending to strict and rigorous *demonstrations*, where we have no occasion for them, and where the subject is too sublime to go far in, with clear and distinct ideas. Such attempts serve only to make that become matter of *question*, which before was *unquestionable*, while standing only on *reasonable* presumption or *moral* proof.

PLEA VIII.

"If the first Cause exists, absolutely without any *ground* or "*reason* of existence, it may as possibly be *finite* as *infinite*; it "may as possibly be *limited* as *immense*[f]." I answer,

This is repetition of the same argument a little diversified, and so has been sufficiently answered in the articles preceding. But I may briefly observe, that the supposed *ground* or *reason* is so far from securing us that the *first Cause* shall not be *finite* or *limited*, that it seems to endanger it the more, by making it *dependent* upon a *ground*, and subject to a *prior* causality. Besides, what shall secure that *ground* itself from being *finite* and *limited*? Must it be another *ground*, and then another, and so on infinitely? Such reasoning destroys itself[g]. And how are we at all the wiser for being told, that the absolute necessity must be *every where*, or that it must operate *every where* alike[h]? If a *petitio principii* were allowable, it were better to say (and it is as easily said) that the *independent* first Cause must be *every where*, and in *all places* alike; for this is sense at least, if it does not amount to a *proof*: while the other is as much a *petitio principii*, (for who knows *how* or *where* such imaginary cause must operate?) and besides is talking either without *ideas*, or with *contradictory* ideas, as has been often shewn. To be short, our *physical*, *moral*, or *scriptural* proofs, of the *omnipresence* are *clear* enough, and *full* enough, to answer all intents and purposes,

[f] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 43.

[g] See the Plea strongly retorted in Dr. Gretton's Review, p. 80.

[h] Letters, p. 13. Demonstrat. p. 41.

and to satisfy every reasonable mind[i]; as the author allows elsewhere[k].

PLEA IX.

" The *unity* of God, (which, I think, has always been allowed " to be a principle of *natural* religion: otherwise St. Paul could " not justly have blamed the heathen as *inexcusable* in that they " did not retain God in their knowledge, &c.) the *unity* of God, " I say, can no otherwise be demonstrated, than by considering " *a priori* the nature of a *necessary* or *self-existent* Cause. — That " this supreme Author and Governor of this nature, or of these " phenomena, is the Supreme Author and Governor of *universal* " *nature*, cannot be proved by us from our partial and imperfect " knowledge of a *few* phenomena, in that *small part* of the uni- " verse which comes within the reach of our senses, but must be " demonstrated from the intrinsic nature of *necessary existence*[l]." To all which I reply distinctly, as follows:

(1.) It looks not well to make the *unity* a principle of *natural* religion, and at the same time to declare that there is no proof of it from *natural* reason, excepting only this pretended proof *a priori*; which, by the confession of its greatest advocates, is not *capable* of being understood but by a *few* and those very *attentive* minds, never to be made *obvious* to the *generality* of men[m]; which moreover, has been as *universally rejected* by the *learned* who have thought of it, as it has been totally *unknown* to the *vulgar* in all past ages; and which, lastly, is not only an *inconclusive* argument for the *unity*, or for any thing else, but demonstrably *absurd*. If *natural* religion affords no other argument of the *unity* but this now mentioned, it is evident that the *unity* is no *principle* of it.

[i] See Bp. Barlow, Exercitat. vi. p. 283, &c. Bp. Wilkins, Nat. Relig. p. 117, &c.

[k] " It cannot but be evident, even " to the *meanest* capacity, upon care- " ful consideration, that he who *made* " all things, as he could not but be " *before* the things that he made, so " it is not possible but he must be " *present* also with the things that he " made and governs. For things " could not be *made* without the " *actual presence* of the power that " made them; nor can things ever be " *governed* with any certainty, unless " the wisdom that governs them be " *present* with them. Whatever argu- " ments therefore prove the *being* of " God, and his *unerring providence*, " must all be understood to prove " equally likewise his *actual* omnipre- " sence." *Clarke, Posth. Sermons*, vol. i. Serm. 8. p. 173.

[l] Answer to a Seventh Letter, p. 44.

[m] Answer to a Sixth Letter, p. 32.

(2.) It looks still worse to plead St. Paul's authority in this case, who if he thought of the *unity* at all, in the texts cited or referred to, yet certainly had no view to this argument *a priori*, as rendering the heathen *inexcusable*. For how could they be *inexcusable* for not seeing what none but a *few*, and not without very *attentive* minds, can see, what can never be *obvious* to the *generality*, what the wisest and most thoughtful men have constantly rejected as *absurd*, and what plainly and inevitably is so? If St. Paul had any view at all to the proofs of the *unity* in that place, (which is questionable[n],) it was to such only as may be drawn *a posteriori*, (from the *few* phenomena in our *system*, or from *tradition*,) which the plea rejects as *no proofs*[o]. Therefore St. Paul's authority is very improperly alleged to give shelter or countenance to the argument *a priori*.

(3.) Men may be very blamable for not admitting the *unity*, though it be supposed that they have only *moral presumption* or *traditional* proofs of it; because the *greater probability* ought to determine their judgment, and because it is unquestionable matter of duty, in *dubious* cases, to take the *safer* side. There was plain reason for receiving and worshipping *one* God, while there was no apparent reason at all for worshipping *many*, but rather the contrary. Therefore the heathen were blamable in admitting a *plurality*; and yet much more so for admitting *such* a plurality as they did; which St. Paul chiefly alludes to, condemning their *creature worship*[p] as altogether *inexcusable*.

(4.) A distinction should have been made, as in some former articles, between the different ways of arguing *a priori*. It is

[n] See Dr. Gretton, p. 84.

[o] But the learned author elsewhere allows them to be *sufficient*, and so in effect has obviated or answered this plea himself. His words are:

"The plain connection of one thing "upon another, through the whole "material universe, through all parts of "the earth, and in the visible heavens; "the disposition of the air, and sea, "and winds; the motions of the sun, "moon, and stars; and the useful "vicissitudes of seasons, for the re- "gular production of the various "fruits of the earth; have always "been *sufficient* to make it *evidently* "*appear*, even to *mean* capacities. "(had they not been perpetually *pre-* "*judiced* by wrong instruction,) that "all things are under the direction of "*one power*, under the dominion of "*one God*, to whom the whole uni- "verse is uniformly subject. And in "fact,——the *wisest* and *best* men, in "all *heathen* nations, have ever seen, "and in good measure maintained, "this great truth.——But it is with "*greater clearness* from all appear- "ance of doubt, and with *greater* "*assurance* of *authority*, confirming "the dictate of reason, that the *Scrip-* "*ture* sets forth to us this first prin- "ciple of religion." *Clarke, Posth. Serm.* vol. i. Serm. 2. p. 29, 30.

[p] Rom. i. 23, 24, 25. compare Gal. iv. 8.

not amiss to argue for the *unity* from the *existence*, and some one *attribute* or *attributes* (as *omnipotence*, *immensity*, *independence*, &c.) before proved; nor should we scruple the propriety of calling it an argument *a priori*: but as to any arguing from *antecedent* necessity, or from any *ground*, *cause*, or *reason*, considered as *prior* to the existence, (which is the way of arguing now contended for,) that is what we can never admit of. Such *antecedent* absolute *necessity* carries no more idea with it than antecedent absolute *nonentity*; unless it means a *cause* prior to the *first*, which is infinitely absurd.

(5.) Allowing that the *natural* proofs of the *unity* are probable only, not *demonstrative*, and that upon the foot of mere reason it is a tenet rather to be reckoned among the *pia credibilia*, than as a *demonstrated* truth; this is saying no more than what several very wise and good men have made no scruple to confess[q]: and if such be really the case, we are the more obliged to *Scripture* for *ascertaining* to us that great truth, as well as for placing it in a clear and just light. *Demonstrations* (strictly so called) are very good things where they are to be had: but when we cannot come at them, strong *probabilities* may properly supply their place. It is certain, that the bulk of mankind are not fitted for *metaphysical* or mathematical *demonstrations*; nor was it ever intended that *moral* or *theological* matters should be governed by them. Blessed are they, who having neither had *ocular* nor other *demonstration*, but moral *probabilities* only, have yet *believed*. Such conduct is justly accounted rational in

[q] The learned John Gerhard, and John Vossius, cite Gabriel Biel to this purpose, adding their own reflections upon what Biel had said.

Sed Biel (I. Sant. dist. 2. qu. 10. art. 3.) statuit quod tantum *unum* esse Deum, sit *creditum*, et *non-demonstratum* ratione naturali nobis in via possibili. Id nos ita interpretamur; etiamsi ex *naturæ libro* rationes *non contemnendæ* pro *unitate* divinæ essentiæ asserenda erui possint, eas tamen ad fidei πληροφορίαν cordibus nostris ingenerandam, non satis efficaces esse. Ergo mens prius confirmanda est ex *verbo Dei*, et illustribus testimoniis in quibus se Deus generi humano patefecit: postea utiliter potest addi consideratio *philosophicarum* demonstrationum. *Gerhard. Loc. Comm.* tom. i. p. 106.

Dissentit Gabriel Biel, qui ante annos hosce 140 Tubingensi Gymnasio præfuit. Is censet *probabiles* magis rationes esse quam *evidentes* et *certas*.——Verum esto sane, ut solæ non sint ἀποδεικτικαί: at magnum iis pondus addit *traditio* vetus; tum autem quod argumenta isthæc, si non prorsus ἀποδεικτικὰ, saltem usque adeo *probabilia* sint, ut τῆς πολυθείας patroni nihil ullius momenti adferre valeant, cur plusquam unum statuere Deum potius conveniat. *Voss. De Idololatr.* lib. i. cap. 2. p. 6.

Note: There were several other Schoolmen, besides Biel, who would not allow that the *unity* could be demonstrated: see them numbered up in Gillius, lib. ii. tract. 3. cap. 7. p. 575.

secular affairs of greatest moment; and it ought to be so accounted in *religious* also. The adversaries may have a crafty design in requiring more than is *necessary*, and perhaps more than our *faculties* can reach to; and it may often be exposing a good cause, and giving the common enemies a needless advantage, to enter the lists with them upon such *unequal* terms. But this I hint by the way only, and pass on.

PLEA X.

"If the first Cause exists absolutely without any *ground* or "*reason* of existence, it is altogether as possible, and as probable, "and as reasonable to suppose, that there may, *without* any "*reason*, exist *numberless* finite, independent, coexistent first "Causes—in different parts of the immense universe, as that "there should, *without any reason*, exist *one only*, infinite, im-"mense, omnipresent first Cause, Author and Governor of the "whole[r]." To which it may be replied:

(1.) That this amounts to saying, that unless there be a cause *prior* to the *first*, (for a reason *a priori* means a *cause*,) there may as well be *numberless* first Causes as *one:* which is directly arguing, as usual, against the very name and notion of a *first Cause*. But though a first Cause may or must be allowed to be *mysterious* and *incomprehensible*, yet it should not be thus constantly treated as an *impossible* or *contradictory* idea. If there is any such thing as a *first Cause*, it must be *uncaused*, and can have no reason *a priori* for it. Therefore to what purpose is it to dispute how *many* first Causes there might be, when if this way of reasoning be just and conclusive, there could not be so much as *one?*

(2.) The question about the *number* of first Causes can never be determined by taking in *antecedent* necessity; because the same difficulty will always recur, *toties quoties*, about the *number* of antecedent necessities. For if every one of them, in the long progression, has not *another* to fix and determine it, there will still be the like danger of *numberless* antecedent *necessities*[s], or reasons *a priori*, at every remove higher, *in infinitum*.

(3.) Scripture has very plainly and fully determined the question: and both *tradition* and *reason* are on the same side. For though there is not perhaps strict *demonstration*, yet there are

[r] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 44, 45. [s] See Gretton's Review, p. 90.

fair *probabilities*, (as before hinted,) both in the *moral* and *metaphysical* way, well known to Divines: and there is no colour of reason for the contrary side. These are sufficient to build a *rational* belief upon: and with these we ought to rest content.

PLEA XI.

" To argue *a priori* concerning the existence and attributes of " the first Cause is *no absurdity:* for, though no *thing*, no *being* " can indeed be *prior* to the *first* Cause, yet arguments may and " must be drawn from the nature and consequences of that " necessity by which the first Cause exists[t]."

Answ. It is allowed, that arguments may or must be drawn from the nature and consequences of *that necessity by which the first Cause exists*, but not from the nature and consequences of *that necessity by which the first Cause does not exist.* Now the first Cause (if it be proper to say it exists by any necessity) exists by a *modal*, not a *causal* necessity; by a *metaphysical* necessity, not a *physical;* by a necessity *subsequent* in order of nature to the *existence*, (whereof it is the *mode*,) not by any *antecedent* necessity. Therefore let us keep to the idea of *modal* necessity, (meaning *permanency, stability, noncontingency, independency, immutability*, and the like;) I say, let us keep closely to that idea of *modal* necessity, without changing it into *causal;* and then, if any *arguments* can be justly drawn from the nature and *consequences* of it, let them be admitted. But it is very certain and self-evident, that no arguments can be drawn *a priori* to the *existence*, from a *mode* of the same existence, *subsequent* and *posterior*, in conception, to it.

PLEA XII.

" Mathematical *necessary* truths are usually demonstrated *a* " *priori*, and yet nothing is *prior* to truths eternally necessary. " To confine therefore the *use* of the *term* to argumentations " about such things only as have other things *prior* to them in " *time*, is only quibbling about the signification of *words*."

Answ. No one goes about to *confine* the notion of *priority* to priority in *time* only: it is allowed, that there is a priority of *order*, or of *nature*, or of *conception*, where there is no priority in *time.* But it is insisted upon, that there is nothing at all *prior* to the existence of the *first* Cause, in *any sense* of priority what-

[t] Answer to the Seventh Letter, p. 45.

ever; nothing *prior* to it so much as in *conception*, or *order* of *nature*; and therefore there is no arguing *a priori* at all in that case. The insisting upon this is not *quibbling* about *words*, but reasoning justly and soberly about *things*, and things of the greatest *consequence*. The fundamental doctrine of a *first Cause* is directly concerned in it, and several other very important articles hang upon it.

(2.) As to mathematical *necessary* truths, they may be demonstrated *a priori*, as long as there is any other truth *prior* in *conception*, or order of nature, to them: but when once we ascend up to *first* principles or *axioms*, which have no truths *prior* in conception, there is then no more arguing *a priori*, no ascending up *higher* in the scale of ideas, or in the chain of truths[u]. In like manner, as to *real* existence there is a *first*, which is at the top of that scale; and we can go no *higher* than to the *highest*. There all reasoning *a priori* ceases, or ought to do so; because there is no existence *prior*, in order of nature or of conception, to argue from; no possible *causality*, no imaginable *antecedency* to build such reasoning upon. There all our searches must terminate; there our aspiring and wearied thoughts take rest. And though an *uncaused* Being is an unfathomable abyss, and we can scarce forbear asking childishly, *how* and *why*, or for *what reason* it exists, and must exist? yet our recollected thoughts must tell us, that such questions are improper and impertinent, and resolve only into a fond conception or contradictory notion of something still *higher* than the *highest*, and *prior* to the *first*.

Plea XIII.

" To the objection, that an *attribute* cannot be the *ground* or " *reason* of the *existence* of the *substance* itself, (which is always, on " the contrary, the *support* of the *attributes*,) I answer, that in " strictness of speech, *necessity* of *existence* is not an *attribute* in " the sense that attributes are *properly* so styled; but it is (*sui* " *generis*) the *ground* or *foundation* of *existence* both of the " *substance* and of all the attributes[x]."

Answ. The sum of this evasive plea is, that *necessity* of existence (since it is absurd to make an attribute *antecedent*) must be a kind of *attribute* which is no attribute *properly* speaking; an attribute *sui generis*, a privileged attribute, not subject to the or-

[u] See Dr. Gretton's Review, p. 95. [x] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 46.

dinary rules and laws, to which all attributes, *as such*, must be subject: a *postulatum* too large and too arbitrary to be granted by any man that will not be content to take sound for sense, or words and syllables for ideas. Either let this admired *necessity* be called an *attribute*, and acknowledged to be *subsequent* to its *subject*, and then there is an end of the argument *a priori*: or if it must be *antecedent*, for the sake of the argument, let it be called (what it is supposed confusely to be) a *principle extrinsic*, and so it will import a *cause prior* to the *first*. One of these titles it must wear: for there is no breaking the horns of the dilemma; that the said necessity must either be *subsequent* as an attribute, or else a principle *extrinsic*, if it be supposed *antecedent*. The truth is, strictly speaking, *necessity* in this case is not the attribute, but *necessary existence* is; and the *necessity* considered abstractedly, or by itself, is the *mode* of such existence, expressing the *manner* or *perfection* of it. Now certainly, if every *attribute*, in the very notion of it, is *subsequent* to the *substance* whereby it is *supported*; a *mode*, which is still one remove further off, and so much the more *subsequent*, in order of nature and conception, can never be looked upon as *antecedent*, in any view whatever.

PLEA XIV.

"Thus, in other instances, *immensity* is not an *attribute* in "the sense that *wisdom*, *power*, and the like, are strictly so "called, but it is (*sui generis*) a *mode of existence* both of the *sub-*"*stance* and of *all the attributes*. In like manner, *eternity* is not "an *attribute* or *property* in the sense that other attributes, in-"hering in the substance, and supported by it, are properly so "called, but it is (*sui generis*) the *duration* of the existence both "of the *substance* and *of all the attributes*."

(1.) The design of this plea is to intimate, that attributes may be distinguished into several kinds; which is not disputed. Nevertheless all attributes agree in that which makes or denominates them to be *attributes*; namely, in being attributed to some *subject* considered as their *support*, and of course *antecedent* in conception to them.

(2.) As to *immensity* and *eternity*, considered either as *attributes* of the Divine Being, or as *modes* to other attributes, they are under one conception *subsequent* to the *substance*, and under the other conception *subsequent* both to the *substance* and *attri-*

butes; that is to say, still *more subsequent*. And such also is the case of *necessity*, as abstracted from existence, it is a *mode* of existence, and so it is *doubly* subsequent under that formality; which the author himself seems to have been sensible of, and therefore was afraid of calling it a *mode* of existence, though he allows it of the other two.

PLEA XV.

" Attributes or properties, strictly so called, cannot be predi-
" cated one of another: *wisdom* cannot be properly said to be
" *powerful*, or *power* to be *wise*. But *immensity* is a *mode* of
" existence both of the Divine *substance* and of all the *attributes*.
" And *necessity* is the *ground*, or *reason*, or *foundation* of ex-
" istence, both of the Divine substance, and of all the attri-
" butes[y]."

Answ. Existence being *common* to whatever is, no doubt but it may be *predicated* both of the *substance* and the *attributes*: and as *necessity* in this case is a *mode* of the existence, and ought to have been called so as well as *immensity*, and is predicated even of existence, it must of course be predicated of every Divine attribute, because the *existence* which it goes along with, and adheres to, is so predicated. But to infer from thence, that *necessity*, a *mode* of being, is a *ground*, or *reason*, or *foundation* of being, is jumping to a *conclusion* without any *premises*; yea and *against* the premises; because a *mode* of existence *presupposes* existence. To be short, all those words, *ground*, *reason*, *foundation*, internal *cause*, and the like, are only so much foreign language, fetched from another subject, and improperly brought in here; *sounds* and *syllables* only, if they do not mean a *cause prior* to the *first*; flat *contradiction* and palpable *absurdity*, if they do. But the word *necessity* seems to carry a kind of a charm in it to deceive the eye or to beguile the fancy, while by a subtle sort of *legerdemain* it steals away the *true* idea intrusted with it, and returns you a counterfeit for it.

[y] Answer to Seventh Letter, p. 46.

CHAP. III.

Briefly intimating the hurtful *Tendency of insisting so much upon the pretended Argument* a priori, *both with regard to* Religion *and* Science.

IT would not be worth the time or the pains, to confute any *false* notion, were there no *harm* in it, or if it no way tended, directly or indirectly, to the prejudice of the world. But whatever hurts *religion* or *science*, hurts the *public* of course; and that these *new* principles are of ill tendency, in that respect, will appear from diverse considerations, which come now to be mentioned.

1. It may be of ill consequence to rest any *important* and unquestionable truth upon *precarious* principles, too weak to support it. It tends to *expose*, rather than to *serve* the cause so pleaded; to render it *suspected*, rather than to bring *credit* to it; and to give the adversaries a handle for ridicule or triumph. One would not indeed altogether discourage any religious and well meant endeavours to strike *new* light into an important subject, and to confirm established truths by additional topics, or supplemental reinforcements. Were it not for the attempts of that kind, made by lively and enterprising geniuses, time after time, we should, no doubt, have wanted many considerable improvements both in *philosophy* and *theology*, which we rejoice in at this day: and were there not scope given for essays or trials which may happen to fail, (as all cannot hit,) we should scarce have field large enough for those that might be approved, and stand. Nevertheless in truths which have already passed through an infinite number of hands, (such as is the *existence* of a *Deity*,) there is the less occasion for looking after *new* topics. Probably, there are no *new* ones now to be thought on, after the utmost stretch of human faculties has been long exercised upon the subject; but those that appear *new* will be commonly found no other than old exploded speculations. Thus it happened to Des Cartes, who seems to have valued himself for the inventing a *new* argument for the *existence*; and he had several admirers and followers, for a time, of considerable name and figure, who closed in with it, conceiving it to be firm and solid. But within a while it was suspected to be no better than a *paralogism*; and not only so, but was found to have been of *ancient* date too, as early as

Anselm, and confuted afterwards by Thomas Aquinas[a], and others, and at length dropped by all, because it had been weighed in the balance, and proved wanting. So it will rarely happen, that any *new* thought can be offered upon a subject so trite and well nigh exhausted: or, if there should be any *new* topic invented, it will probably be found much short in value and efficacy of the more common ones, which have been of long standing. The *commonest* arguments, in such cases, may be justly looked upon as the *best;* because they have been proved and tried, and have survived many others of inferior note, by reason of their known weight and significancy above the rest. *Opinionum commenta delet dies, naturæ judicia confirmat.* For the maintaining of doctrines, which have been universally received in all places and times, there is more need of *judgment* than *invention,* in making choice of the *best* proofs that have been before offered, rather than offering *new* ones; which will not come up to the other, but are likely to fail upon trial, however they may please for a while by their *novelty.* The more important a cause is, the more need of caution: because there is a particular reverence due to such a cause, and the risk is the greater, if it be made to lean on quirk and subtilty, upon weak and sandy foundations. Now there cannot be a more important cause than the cause of *Theism;* neither can we any where more dangerously give a loose to fancy, than upon that head.

2. It is still worse to rest such a cause upon principles, which are not only too *weak* to bear it, but which also in their obvious natural tendency threaten to *overturn* it: such is really the case with respect to the argument *a priori;* which is so far from establishing the *existence* of a *first Cause,* (the point aimed at,) that it proceeds upon such premises as admit no *first Cause* at all. The *pleas* made for it directly strike at the very notion of a *first Cause,* proving (if they proved any thing) that there can be no such thing as a being *uncaused.* This has been observed over and over in the preceding chapter; and so I need only refer back thither for the proof of what I here say. Such an argument therefore, however piously intended, and offered with very upright views, yet cannot but be looked upon as an argument of

[a] Vid. Parker, Disputat. de Deo, p. 567. Conf. Gillius, lib. i. tract. 8. c. 3. p. 385, &c.
In Gillius may be seen a list of those Schoolmen who adhered to Anselm in that argument; as also a recital of others who appeared against it, and confuted it.

pernicious tendency: and every true lover of *Theism*, who perceives where such reasoning terminates, cannot be too jealous of it. When Des Cartes proposed a new argument (as it was thought) for the existence of a *Deity*, all the hurt of it was, that it fell short of the point, and disserved the cause, only by resting it upon what would not bear: but this other argument, besides its being *inconclusive* for the purpose aimed at, is attended with this further inconvenience, that it proceeds upon principles, which run directly cross to it, and which make it impracticable to prove any *first Cause* at all. For if every cause must have a *cause*, (which is the *maxim* it sets out with, and proceeds upon all the way,) the consequence is inevitable, that there can be no *first Cause*. It is highly proper to declare against so pernicious a maxim, which can tend only to *undermine* the proofs of a *Deity*, instead of *improving* them.

3. There is another circumstance in this matter which deserves consideration, namely, that this pretended demonstration is not only offered as a proof, but is zealously insisted on, and highly magnified above the many solid and standing demonstrations which have hitherto been received and approved by the *common reason* of mankind; as if it were not sufficient to give us a *paralogism* for *demonstration*, but every other *demonstration* (justly and properly so called) must be undervalued and slighted in comparison. For instance, it is alleged that the arguments *a posteriori* (though the best that we have) for the Divine *eternity* and *omnipresence* are short of *proof:* which is not *true*, even in the strictest sense of *demonstrative* proof: and if it were true, yet so long as there is other *sufficient* proof, (such as every reasonable man must readily acquiesce in,) it should not be slightingly spoken of; neither should it be suggested that those attributes *cannot be proved*. The *moral* proofs, after all, if not so strictly *demonstrative* as the *metaphysical*, are yet better suited to common capacities, and apter to persuade the bulk of mankind[b]; and are therefore of more extensive *use*, and consequently

[b] "The proof *a posteriori* is level "to all men's capacities: because there "is an endless *gradation* of *wise* and "*useful* phenomena of nature, from "the most *obvious* to the most *ab-* "*struse;* which afford (at least a "*moral* and *reasonable*) proof of the "being of God, to the several capacities of all unprejudiced men, who "have any probity of mind. And "this is what, I suppose, God expects "(as a *moral* Governor) that moral "agents should be determined by." *Answer to Sixth Letter*, p. 31, 32.

"The proof *a priori* is——capable "of being understood only by a *few*

of more intrinsic *value* than the other. However that be, it is certainly of ill consequence to *depreciate* the solidest arguments hitherto urged in proof of the *existence*, for the sake only of *magnifying* a flight of fancy. When an *imaginary* proof is thus advanced as a *real* one, and not only so, but *superior* to all others, it then becomes more and more *dangerous*, as doing great disservice to the cause of God and religion[c].

4. I must further remark, that this argument *a priori*, or some appendages of it, look not very favourably towards *revealed* religion, particularly as to the article of the *Trinity*; as hath been observed at large by a learned hand[d], and need not here be repeated. This is an additional evidence of the *mischievous* tendency of those false *metaphysics*, which as they do in one view sap the first and fundamental article of *natural* religion, by destroying the notion of a *First Cause*; so do they, in another view, strike at some of the prime fundamentals of the Gospel.

5. Add to this, the mischief done to *true philosophy*, by adopting one *absurd* principle, which may probably draw after it many other, (as one error leads to more,) or may introduce a fallacious way of reasoning, such as may affect *science* in general. For example: in order to maintain *antecedent* necessity, the ideas of *infinity* and *eternity* are fetched in as *antecedently* forcing themselves upon us[e]; and it is supposed to be *intuitively* evident[f], that those *ideas* have their objective realities *ad extra*. Then *space* and *time* are advanced, as amounting to the same with *infinity* and *eternity*, and are supposed really to exist *ad extra*, and as *certainly* as that *twice two* makes *four*: whereupon they are exalted into *modes*, or *attributes*, or *properties* of the *Divine substance*[g], and God himself is imagined to be the *sub-*

" *attentive* minds; because it is of " use only against *learned* and *meta-* " *physical* difficulties." *Ibid.*

[c] What Mr. Locke says, in relation to another sophistical argument for the *existence*, once contended for by the Cartesians, is very applicable in this case:

" It is an ill way of establishing " this truth, and silencing Atheists, to " lay the whole stress of so important a " point upon that sole foundation—— " and out of an over fondness of that " darling invention cashier, or at least " endeavour to invalidate, all other " arguments, and forbid us to hearken " to those proofs, as being weak or " fallacious, which our *own existence* " and the *sensible parts* of the universe " offer so clearly and cogently to our " thoughts, that I deem it impossible " for a considering man to withstand " them." *Locke, Hum. Understand.* book iv. chap. x. sect. 7. Letter i. to Stillingfleet, p. 112.

[d] Dr. Gretton's Preface to his Review, p. 5, 6, &c.

[e] Demonstration, p. 15.

[f] Demonstration, p. 15. Letters, p. 34.

[g] Demonstration, p. 15. Letters, p. 15, 16, 20, 35.

stratum of both[h]. Besides all which, the idea of a *necessarily existing* Being is made to be the idea of a Being, the supposition of whose not existing is an *express contradiction:* and *necessity* is interpreted a *plain impossibility*, or *implying a contradiction*, to suppose the contrary, like the relation of equality between twice *two* and *four*[i]. Nay it is further said; "If I have in my mind "an idea of a thing, and cannot possibly in *my imagination* take "away the idea of that thing as actually existing, any more than "I can change or take away the idea of the equality of *twice two* "to *four*, the *certainty* of the *existence* of that thing is the same, "and stands on the same foundation as the certainty of the "other relation[k]." It is said further, "that *absolute necessity* "(that is, *antecedent*) is the cause of the unalterable proportion "between twice *two* and *four*[l]." Now it is more than probable, that this whole train of suppositions, or assertions, brought in as part of the retinue to wait upon the *argument a priori*, is little else but a train of error and false reasoning. It would be tedious to enter into a large examination of every particular, but I shall make a few strictures upon each.

1. As to the ideas of *infinity* and *eternity*, considered as *antecedently* forcing themselves upon us, there is no truth in it, if it means forcing themselves upon our *reason*, and extorting *assent*. Perhaps they may in some sense force themselves upon the *imagination*, (like many other fancies, or waking dreams,) but as to *believing* that the ideas of *infinity* and *eternity* have objective realities *ad extra*, we are not *forced* to it, *antecedently* or otherwise, till *rational* conviction shall render us *certain* of it.

2. As to the ideas of *space* and *time*, they are not the same ideas with those of *immensity* and *eternity*, but are constantly thought of and spoken of in a very different manner. *Immensity* and *eternity* are considered as *attributes* of something, and spoken of accordingly: whereas *space* and *time* are conceived and spoken after the manner of *substances;* as several other abstract general ideas (*nature*, *fortune*, *death*, &c.) are. *Immense immensity* is an improper expression, is blunder and solecism: but *immense space* carries no impropriety in the expression; which shews that the *ideas* are *different*. So again, *eternal eternity* is mere solecism: but *time eternal* (in the large sense of *time*) is a proper expression. *Space* and *time* are considered not as being themselves *properties*,

[h] Letters, p. 20, 24.
[i] Demonstration, p. 16, 18, 19.
[k] Ibid. p. 20.
[l] Letters, p. 33.

but as being invested with properties: that is, they are considered after the manner of *substances*, as many other abstract ideas are. And because it is certain, that they are not *substances*, (much less can they be *attributes*,) they are, most probably, nothing else but general abstract ideas, *common measures* and *receptacles* formed by the mind, for the better lodgement, rangement, and adjustment of our other ideas.

3. As to existence *ad extra*, it is not to be proved by strength of *imagination*, but by *reasons* proper to the case. So it cannot be justly pretended, that we have *intuitive* evidence. We know and feel our own existence, and from thence can *demonstrate* the existence of God. I say, *demonstrate:* for our knowledge of God here is *demonstrative* only, not *intuitive*, as will be shewn hereafter. We neither *see* nor *feel* space or time as existing *ad extra:* we contemplate nothing but our own *ideas:* and from ideas *within*, to realities *without*, there is no immediate consequence to be drawn; but whatever we may draw, justly, must be worked out by deduction and inference, and perhaps a long chain of reasoning, before we can come at *certainty* as to real *external* existence.

4. To pretend, that our *ideas within* are as necessarily connected with *actual* existence *without*, as the ideas of *twice two* and *four*, is mistaking *imagination* for *reason*, and *association* of ideas for *connection*. That *twice two* is equal to *four*, is as certain as that *the same idea* is *the same idea:* and the *connection* of the idea of *equality* is plain and certain. This is only pronouncing upon the relations of *ideas* with each other, and so far we cannot be mistaken, having a *clear* and *distinct* perception of such relations: but *ideal existence* is not necessarily *connected* with *real existence*, like as *idea* with *idea;* and therefore the comparison here made is wide and foreign. There is no resemblance between the two cases, but they are as different as possible from each other, as much as *fancy* and *fiction* from *truth* and *reason*.

5. To make God the *substratum* of space and time (which really are not *attributes* or *properties*, nor ever spoken of as such) is mere *solecism* and *impropriety* of expression; a certain mark of as great an error in thought. Not to mention many other just objections which lie against the gross notion of an *extended* or *expanded* Deity.

6. *Necessary existence* is inaccurately and preposterously ex-

plained by *impossibility of non-existence:* for the *affirmative* is in order of nature *prior* to the *negative*[m]; and, strictly speaking, the existence is not *necessary*, because non-existence is *impossible;* but on the reverse, non-existence is impossible, because existence, in that instance, is *necessary*, or infinitely *permanent*[n]. The *negative* truth in this case resolves into its correspondent *affirmative*, as into its *principle*, from which it is deduced.

7. In the making the idea of a *necessarily existing* Being to be the idea of one whose *non-existence* is an *express contradiction*, there appears to be a twofold confusion; one between *physical* and *logical* necessity; another between a contradiction *a priori* and a contradiction *a posteriori*. There is in a *necessarily existing* Being a *physical* impossibility of non-existence: which is not the same thing with a *logical* repugnancy, referring to our *ideas* as *contradictory* and *repugnant*. Those two things are distinct, and ought not to have been confounded[o].

A contradiction *a priori* is, when we perceive from the idea of such a *cause*, that it is a contradiction for that cause not to produce such an effect. There is no such contradiction as this comes to in the supposition of the non-existence of a Deity: for we see not *a priori* why he must be; we see no *cause* of it; but, on the contrary, we perceive, that he is absolutely *uncaused*.

But *a posteriori* we find it resolve at length into a *contradiction*, to suppose that no *First Cause* exists: it is a contradiction to our ideas of *cause* and *effect:* for *effects* must have a *cause*, and if something now exists, something always existed, something *independent;* for from *nothing* could arise *nothing*. This

[m] At vero *necessitas* describi vel intelligi haudquaquam potest absque ratione ipsius *esse:* nam *necessarium est, quod non potest non esse.* Quare ipsum *esse* prius est ratione *necessitatis. Gillius,* lib. i. tract. 8. cap. 4. p. 396.

[n] Necessarium nequaquam recte per *possibile,* nec per *impossibile* definitur; nihil enim recte definitur per aliquid *posterius* eo, sicut secundo *Post.* et septimo *Metaph.* demonstratur; sed utrumque istorum est *posterius* necessario. Non ergo recte definitur *necessarium* per hoc quod *non est possibile non esse,* vel per hoc quod *impossibile est non esse.* Ideoque *Avicen.* 1. Metaph. 5. reprobat definitiones antiquorum de *necessario, possibili,* et *impossibili,* eo quod definiebant illa per se invicem *circulando;* ut patet de definitionibus quas ibi recitat ab antiquis, dicitque id quod ex his tribus dignius est intelligi, est *necesse esse;* quoniam *necesse esse* significat vehementiam essendi, *esse* vero notius est quam *non esse: esse* enim cognoscitur per se, *non esse* vero per *esse. Bradwardine, De Causa Dei,* p. 204.

[o] See Dr. Gretton upon the distinction between *logical* and *physical* reason. Review, p. 69.

kind of contradiction *a posteriori* we admit; not the other *a priori*, which is *fiction* only, though much has been built upon it.

8. As to absolute (antecedent) *necessity's* being the cause of the unalterable proportion between twice *two* and *four*, it is all a mistake. There is no *antecedency* in the case. *First* principles and axioms shine by their own light, have nothing *antecedent* to demonstrate them by, are perceived by *intuition*, not *demonstration*; and resolve only into this, that *every thing is what it is*, or *the same idea is the same idea*. The idea of *equality* is the idea of *equality*, and the idea of *twice two* is the idea of *twice two*, and the idea of *four* the idea of *four*: and, as soon as ever the *terms* expressing those ideas are understood, the proposition is admitted of course, requiring no *antecedent* necessity to ascertain it, no *cause* to fix it: it is above all *causes*, being *intuitively*, not *demonstrably* discerned. But enough has been said to shew how the erroneous notion of the argument *a priori* has served to usher in a great deal of confusion and false reasoning in other articles hanging upon it, or ministering to it: so that the letting in that one false principle cannot but tend to the detriment of *science* in general; which I undertook to shew.

And now, to look back to what has been observed in these papers concerning the pretended demonstration *a priori*, the sum is as follows: that the thought is in some sense *old* enough, having been suggested, considered, and rejected by the judicious fifteen hundred years ago: that it has been frequently taken notice of since by the schoolmen and others; and drawn out into public light, but always like a *criminal*, in order to be *condemned*: that though attempts have been made in favour of something under the *name* of an argument *a priori*, yet as to the gross sense of it, in which it is now contended for, (viz. as an *antecedent* ground, reason, foundation, internal cause of the Deity.) it appears not to have met with any professed patrons before the eighteenth century; when probably what former ages had been doing was not remembered, or not duly attended to: that the new countenance given to a notion that had been so long and universally exploded, brought it into some degree of credit and repute, before it was understood: that as soon as it came to be more minutely looked into, it began presently to decline, and to sink as it formerly used to do: that it is now found to carry in it such insuperable absurdities, as must of

course be a bar to its reception in an inquisitive and discerning age: that, lastly, it seems to promise no good to *religion* or *science*, while sapping the fundamental articles of one, and crossing the established principles of the other.

This appears to me to be a *true* report and *fair* account of what concerns the argument *a priori*, after the most attentive and impartial inquiries I have hitherto been able to make into it.

THE IMPORTANCE

OF THE

DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY

ASSERTED, &c.

In necessariis, Unitas: in non-necessariis, Libertas: in omnibus, Prudentia et Charitas.

He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God. John iii. 18.

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THE INTRODUCTION.

THERE has appeared, very lately, a small pamphlet[a] of seventy-six pages, entitled, A Sober and Charitable Disquisition concerning the importance of the Doctrine of the Trinity; endeavouring to shew, that "those in the different schemes "should bear with each other in their different sentiments, *and* "*should not* separate communions." The treatise appears to be written in a good manner, and with a Christian spirit; on which account it deserves the more notice: and the question debated in it is undoubtedly important in every view, whether with regard to *peace* in this life, or *happiness* in the next. And as I have formerly spent some time and pains in discussing the *truth* of that high and holy doctrine, from *Scripture*, *reason*, and *antiquity*; so now I think it concerns me the more, to debate, in like manner, the *importance* of it: which I shall, by God's assistance, endeavour to do, fully and fairly, with all due care and attention, and with all becoming reverence for the subject, as well as respect towards the reader.

[a] Printed for John Gray, at the Cross Keys in the Poultry, near Cheapside, 1732.

N. B. There were several other pieces which preceded, or soon followed it, relating to the same cause.

1. Mr. Nation's Sermon, preached Sept. 8, 1731.
2. A Letter to Mr. Nation, by P. C. 1732.
3. A Vindication of Mr. Nation's Sermon: with a Letter from Mr. Nation.
4. A Letter to the Author of the Vindication: with a Second Letter to Mr. Nation. by P. C.
5. A Reply to Mr. P. C.'s Letter.
6. A Postscript, or a Third Letter to Mr. Nation, by P. C.

Before I enter upon the main debate, it will be proper to clear the way by some preliminary observations concerning the several sorts of persons who *deny* the importance of the doctrine of the Trinity, and their views in doing it; as also concerning the advocates, on the other side, who *assert* the *importance* of that sacred doctrine, and the *general* principles on which they proceed.

I. As to the persons who *deny* the *importance* of the doctrine, they are reducible to three kinds; being either such as *disbelieve* the doctrine itself, or such as are in some *suspense* about it; or, lastly, such as really *assent* to it as *true* doctrine, It is with this last sort only, that our present debate is properly concerned. But yet for the clearer apprehending those three *different* kinds of men, and their *different* views in joining together so far in the same cause, it will not be improper to say something severally and distinctly of each.

1. Those that *disbelieve* the doctrine itself, while they join with others in decrying the *importance* of it, are to be looked upon as a kind of artful men, who think it policy to carry on a scheme gently and leisurely, and to steal upon the unwary by soft and almost insensible degrees—a method which is indeed commonly *slower* in producing the effect, but is the *surer* for being so; as it is less shocking and more insinuating. They are content therefore, at first, to make men *cool* and *indifferent* towards the doctrine; as thinking it a good point gained, and a promising advance made towards the laying it aside. With these views, both Socinians and Arians, who disbelieve the doctrine itself, may yet be content, for a time, to declare only against the *importance* of it. Deists also may join in the same thing, conceiving, that *indifference*, as to a *prime* article of Christianity, may in time draw on the same kind of indifference towards *Christianity* itself. They are *disbelievers* with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity, and with respect also to all *revealed* religion: and they will of course favour and encourage the denial of any *part*, in order to bring on the subversion of the *whole*. However, our present concern is not directly with Deists, nor with such as *deny* the doctrine of the Trinity: for our dispute now is, not about the certainty of *revealed* religion, (which is supposed in our present question,) nor about the *truth* of the doctrine of the Trinity, (which is also *supposed*,) but about the *importance*, *use*, or *value* of it.

2. A *second* sort of persons, before mentioned, are such as

seriously believe Christianity in the general, and do not *disbelieve* the doctrine of the Trinity in particular, but *suspend* their belief of it, and are a kind of *sceptics* on that head. These men deny the *importance* of the doctrine, because they think it *doubtful* whether it be a doctrine of holy Scripture or no: and they judge very rightly in the general, that a stress ought not to be laid upon *uncertainties*, upon things *precarious* and *conjectural*, which cannot be *proved* to the satisfaction of the common reason of mankind. They are right in *thesi*, and wrong in *hypothesi*, as shall be shewn in the sequel. Only I may hint, by the way, that our present debate is not directly with this kind of men: for they are rather to be referred to what has been written for the *truth* of the doctrine, than to what more immediately concerns the *importance* of it. Yet because the presumed *uncertainty* or *doubtfulness* of the doctrine, is by these men made the principal objection against the *importance* of it, and the author of the Sober and Charitable Disquisition seems to lay the main stress of the cause there, quite through his performance; it will be necessary to give that objection a place in this discourse, and to return an answer to it in the general, or so far as may be proper; not to draw the whole controversy about the *truth* of the doctrine into this other question concerning the *importance* of it.

While I am speaking of men *doubtful* in this article, I would be understood of serious and religious men, and not of such persons whose minds are purely *secular*, and who are *indifferent* to every thing but what concerns this world: such persons are of no consideration in our present question; neither are they men proper to be reasoned with, as they have no relish at all for inquiries of this nature. But I proceed.

3. A third kind of men are those that believe the *truth* of the doctrine, but demur to the *importance* of it. And as Episcopius was, in a manner, their father or founder, and great leader, they have been frequently called after him, Episcopians. These are properly the persons whom we have here to dispute with: for they are the men who make the *truth* and the *importance* of the doctrine two distinct questions, admitting the one and rejecting the other, or however demurring to it. The design of this *middle way* was to reconcile parties, if possible, and to favour the Socinians so far, as to condemn their *doctrines* only, without condemning the *men*. But this new and fruitless expedient was very much disliked by all that had any warm and hearty concern for

the true and ancient faith. Such coldness and indifferency, with *regard* to a *prime* article of Christianity, appeared to many to be nothing else but an artful, specious way of betraying it, and likely to do more mischief than an open denial of it. The ablest and soundest Divines, as well Lutheran[b] as Reformed[c], have reclaimed strongly against it, detesting the *neutrality* of the *remonstrant* brethren, as tending to undermine the Gospel of Christ. The Divines of our Church, however otherwise supposed to be against *Calvinism*, and to favour *Arminianism*, yet smartly condemned the *Remonstrants* in that article. Dr. Bull, particularly, appeared against them in a very accurate and learned treatise[d], in the year 1694. And it is worth observing, how Dr. Nicholls afterwards expresses himself, in the name of our whole body. "There is another Arminian doctrine, which "we avoid as *deadly poison*, their assertion that there is *no ne-* "*cessity* of acknowledging three Persons in the divine nature, "nor that Christ in particular is the *eternal Son* of God: this "*heretical* notion our Church abominates and detests, as an "*heinous impiety*, and what was never heard of in the writings "of the primitive Christians[e]." Thus far he, in relation to our Divines of the Church of England.

[b] For the Lutherans, I shall cite Buddeus only, who is as mild and moderate in his censure of Episcopius, as any of them.

Nimio enim concordiæ, dissentientesque tolerandi studio, ea interdum ad fidem et salutem minime necessaria judicavit, quæ *vetus Ecclesia* ipsa, *Scripturæ* suffragio hac in re non destituta, adeo necessaria pronuntiavit, ut æternæ salutis spem non habeat qui ea negare aut impugnare ausus fuerit. *Buddei Isag.* p. 422.

[c] The learned Witsius may speak for the Reformed.

Injurii in Deum *Remonstrantes* sunt, quando palpum obtrusuri, quos plus justo amant, Socinianis, eos describunt quasi qui vitam suam ex Evangelii præscripto sic instituunt, ut *Patrem* in *Filio* ejus colant, et ab utroque *Spiritus Sancti* gratiam sanctis piisque precibus ambire studeant. Quid audiemus tandem? Illine vitam ex *Evangelii præscripto* instituunt, qui *satisfactionem* Christi negantes, *Evangelium* evertunt? Illine *Patrem in Filio* colunt, qui æternum Dei Filium ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον esse calumniantur, quem uti talem adorantes convertunt in *idolum?* Illine *piis precibus* Spiritus Sancti gratiam ambiunt, qui Spiritum Dei *accidens*, et *creaturam*, vel saltem *medium* quid inter Deum et creaturam esse blasphemant? *Wits. in Symb. Apost.* p. 76.

[d] Judicium Ecclesiæ Catholicæ de necessitate credendi, &c.

[e] Nicholls's Defence of the Church of England, part i. chap. 9. Mr. Scrivener, long before, (A. D. 1672.) had passed the like censure:

Hunc [Socinium] non minima ex parte secutus Episcopius, et ipse *antiquitatis* (quod norunt Docti) imperitus, *novam* credendi imo et philosophandi *licentiam*, *regulamque* affectavit: et — *mysteria* Christianæ fidei *summa*, tam singulari et inaudito acumine, vel crasso potius fastu, tractavit, ut non pertimescat *liberos* cuivis fideli eos articulos de S. S. *Trinitate* permittere, absque quibus constans et fœderalis fides docuit, nullum ad vitam immortalem aditum patere Christianis. *Scrivener. Apolog. adv. Dallæum, in Præfat.*

As to the Divines of the *separation*, they are known to have been as zealous as any men could be, for the *necessity* of believing the doctrine of the Trinity, as the *sum* and *kernel of the Christian religion*, the *basis*, or *foundation* of the Christian faith. The testimonies of Mr. Baxter, Mr. Corbet, Dr. Manton, and Dr. Bates, to this purpose, may be seen at one view in a late writer[f]: to those might be added Dr. Owen[g], and Mr. Lob[h], and perhaps many more. In short, all parties and denominations of Christians, who appear to have had the *truth* of the doctrine at heart, or any good degree of zeal for it, have contended equally for the *necessity* of believing it, and have *refused* communion with the impugners of it.

II. I come next to observe something of the *general* principles upon which they build, who assert the *importance* of the doctrine of the Trinity, and who refuse communion with the open impugners of it.

1. They lay it down as a certain and indisputable principle, that there are some Scripture-doctrines of greater *importance* than others: and they generally make their estimate of that greater *importance*, by the relation or connection which any doctrine is conceived to have with Christian *practice* or *worship*, or with the whole economy of man's *salvation* by Christ[i]; or by its being plainly, frequently, or strongly inculcated in holy Scripture. Doctrines of this character are commonly styled *necessaries*, *essentials*, *fundamentals*, *prime verities*, and the like. Not that I mightily like the word *necessary*, in this case, being a word of *equivocal* meaning, and great *ambiguity*, leading to mistakes, and furnishing much matter for cavils. For when we come to ask, necessary to *what*? or, necessary to *whom*? and in what *degree*? then arises perplexity; and there is need of a multitude of *distinctions* to set the matter clear, so as to serve all possible cases. A doctrine may be said to be *necessary* to the being of the *Church*, or to the *salvation* of *some* persons so and so qualified, or to the salvation of *all*: and many questions may arise about the precise *degree* of the necessity in every instance. But it is easily understood how one doctrine may be said to be more *im-*

[f] Mr. Eveleigh's preface to a treatise entitled, The Deity of Christ proved fundamental.

[g] Owen's Vindiciæ Evangelicæ, præf. p. 64.

[h] Growth of Error, p. 3, 50, 69, 75, &c.

[i] See Dr. Sherlock's Vindication of the Defence of Dr. Stillingfleet, printed in 1682, ch. v. p. 256, &c.

portant than another; as more depends upon it, or as it more affects the *vitals* of Christianity, than doctrines of another kind: and we need look no further than to the nature and reason of things, and to the analogy of faith, to be able to distinguish what doctrines are thus *important* in the general, and what not. Yet there is no giving an exact catalogue of those *important* or *fundamental* doctrines; though it is for the most part easy to say of any particular doctrine which may be mentioned, what class it may be reasonably referred to; and whether, or how far, it may be worth contending for. We cannot give a complete catalogue of *virtues*, any more than of *articles* of *faith*, so as to be positive, that those *particular* virtues, and in such a particular *degree*, are necessary to all persons, or to any person that shall be named. The precise *quantity* of *virtue* (if I may so call it) absolutely necessary to salvation, is no more to be defined, than the precise quantity of *faith*. Yet we know, in the general, that *sincere* and *universal* obedience to what God commands (allowing for infirmities) is necessary to salvation: and in like manner, sincere and universal *assent* to what God reveals makes up the other *part* of the terms of acceptance; as *faith* and *obedience* together make up the *whole*.

2. They who assert the *importance* of the doctrine of the Trinity take it for granted, among Christians, that *faith* in the Gospel of Christ is necessary to the salvation of all men who are blessed with Gospel light; and that men shall perish eternally for *unbelief*, for rejecting that Gospel faith, once sufficiently propounded to them: "Go ye into all the world, and preach "the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is bap-"tized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be "damned[k]."

3. They conceive further, that as we are in duty bound to *receive* the Gospel-faith, so are we likewise obliged, and under pain of *damnation*, to preserve it *whole* and *entire*, so far as in us lies; and neither to *deprave* it ourselves, nor to take part with them that do. It is our bounden duty to "hold fast the form "of sound words—in faith and love, which is in Christ Jesus[l]:" to be "sound in the faith[m]:" to "speak things which become

[k] Mark xvi. 15, 16. compare John iii. 36. Revel. xxi. 8.

[l] 2 Timothy i. 13.

[m] Titus i. 13. ii. 2.

" sound doctrine[n]:" to " examine whether *we* be in the faith[o];" and in a word, to " contend earnestly for the faith once delivered " unto the saints[p]." So much for the obligations we lie under, to keep the faith of Christ *whole* and *undefiled*. Next, we are to observe how *dangerous* a thing it is to *corrupt* the true faith in any heinous degree, either by *adding* to it or *taking away* from it. One of the earliest instances of gross corruption by *adding* to the faith of Christ appeared in the converted Jews, or Judaizing Christians, who taught the *necessity* of observing circumcision and the law of Moses together with Christianity. Against those false apostles, who taught such pernicious doctrine, St. Paul drew his pen, looking upon them as subverters of the Gospel of Christ[q]. And he was so zealous in that matter, as to say, " Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other Gospel " unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him " be accursed[r]." Where by *another Gospel* he does not mean another religion substituted in the room of Christianity; (for those false teachers were *Christians* still, not *apostates*;) but some *adulterous* mixtures, tending to evacuate the Gospel-law, and to *frustrate* the *grace* of God[s].

I shall give a *second* instance of gross corruption; not in adding to, but in *taking from* the Christian doctrine, in an article of very great importance. There was in the days of the Apostles, and after, a sect of opiniators, who (whether being ashamed of the cross of Christ, or whether thinking it impossible for *God* to become man[t]) were pleased to deny that Christ Jesus had any *real* humanity, but that he was a kind of walking *phantom*, or *apparition;* had no human flesh, but imposed upon the eyes and other senses of the spectators. These men were afterwards called *Docetæ* and *Phantasiastæ;* which one may well enough render *Visionists*, or *Visionaries*. We are next to take notice how St. John treated them, and what directions he gave to other Christians concerning them. He considered them as deluding teachers, that subverted foundations; and he gave them the name and title of antichrists. " Every spirit that

[n] Tit. ii. 1. 1 Tim. i. 10. 2 Tim. iv. 3.
[o] 2 Cor. xiii. 5. comp. Rev. xiv. 12.
[p] Jude 3. compare 1 Tim. iv. 6.
[q] Gal. i. 6, 7.
[r] Gal. i. 8.
[s] Gal. ii. 21. v. 2.
[t] Alii quoque hæretici usque adeo Christi manifestam amplexati sunt *divinitatem*, ut dixerint illum fuisse sine carne, et totum illi susceptum detraxerint hominem, ne docoquerent in illo *divini* nominis potestatem, &c. *Novat.* c. xxiii. p. 87. edit. Welchman.

"confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of "God: and this is that spirit of antichrist[a]," &c. In another place, speaking of the same men, he says, "Many deceivers are "entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is "come in the flesh: this is a deceiver and an antichrist[x]." It is manifest that he does not point his censure at the Jews, who denied that the Messiah was come; for he speaks of *new* men, that had then lately "entered into the world," whereas the Jews had been from the beginning: besides, that the Jews did not deny that Jesus (or the man called Christ Jesus) had come *in the flesh*. Therefore, I say, St. John levelled not this censure of his against the Jews, but against some Christian heretics of that time, and those particularly that denied our Lord's humanity; in opposition to whom, he exhorts the brethren to "abide "in the doctrine of Christ[y]," and not to receive the gainsayers into their *houses*, nor to salute them with *God speed*, lest they should become thereby *partakers* of their *evil deeds*[z]. By *evil deeds* I understand the overt acts of that *heresy*, the teaching, spreading, and inculcating it. Thus *heresies*, that is, the teaching or promoting of pernicious doctrines, are reckoned among the *works* of the flesh[a] by St. Paul: who also calls false teachers *deceitful workers*[b], and *evil workers*[c]; because the promoting and encouraging of false and dangerous doctrines is a very ill *practice*, a wicked *employ:* which I hint, by the way, for the clearer explication of St. John's meaning in the phrase of *evil deeds*.

I shall mention a *third* Scripture instance of gross corruption in doctrine, which was the denial of a future *resurrection;* dangerous doctrine, subversive of Christianity. St. Paul very solemnly *admonished* the Corinthians[d], to prevent their giving ear to such pernicious suggestions: and he afterwards excommunicated Hymenæus, Philetus, and Alexander, for spreading and propagating them, delivering the men over to Satan, that *they* might *learn not to blaspheme*[e].

From the three instances now mentioned, it may sufficiently appear, that the corrupting or maiming Christianity in its *vitals*, by denying or destroying its prime articles, or fundamental doctrines, is a very *dangerous* thing; and that we are obliged, under pain of damnation, neither to do it ourselves, nor to abet,

[a] 1 John iv. 3. [x] 2 John 7. [c] Philipp. iii. 2. [d] 1 Cor. xv.
[y] 2 John 9. [z] 2 John 11. [e] Compare 1 Tim. i. 20. 2 Tim ii.
[a] Gal. v. 19, 20. [b] 2 Cor. xi. 13. 16, 17, 18.

countenance, or encourage those that do, by communicating with them.

4. But it is further to be observed, that in *slighter matters*, in things not nearly affecting the *vitals* of Christianity, the rule is for Christians to bear with one another; not to divide or separate, but to agree among themselves; so to disagree in harmless opinions, or indifferent rites, as to unite in faith and love, and in Christian fellowship[f]. *Peace* is a very valuable thing, and ought not to be sacrificed even to *truth;* unless such truth be *important*, and much may depend upon it. A man is not obliged, in all cases, to declare all he knows; and if he does declare his sentiments, and knows them to be *true*, yet he need not insist upon them with rigour, if the point contested be of a slight nature or value, in comparison to the Church's *peace.* Let him enjoy his own *liberty* in that case; and let others have theirs too; and so all will be right. Let them *differ* so far, by consent, and yet live together in peace and charity. But then, as to *weightier* matters, it concerns us carefully to observe, that rules of *peace* are but secondary and subordinate to those of *piety* or *charity*, and must veil to them. *Peace* must be broken in this world, whenever it is necessary to do it for the securing *salvation* in the next for ourselves or others: and a breach of peace, in such instances, is obedience to the higher law of *charity*, is conforming to the primary and great commandments, the *love of God*, and the *love of our neighbour*. Therefore *peace*, in such cases, must be sacrificed to *truth* and *charity*, that is, to the honour of God, and the eternal interests of mankind.

These things premised, it remains now only to inquire what kind of a doctrine the doctrine of the *Trinity* is; whether it be of such a slight and indifferent nature as not to be worth the insisting upon at the expense of *peace;* or whether it be of such high value and importance, that it ought to be maintained as an *essential* of Christianity against all opposers. This is the great question now before us, and I shall endeavour to examine into it with due care and application.

The gentlemen who look upon it as a *non-fundamental* have several things to urge, but such as may most of them be reduced to three heads, as follow: 1. That the received doctrine of the Trinity is not *clear* enough to be admitted for a fundamental.

[f] Rom. xiv. xv. Coloss. ii. 16, 17.

2. That it is merely *speculative*, or, however, not *practical* enough to be important. 3. That it is not sufficiently insisted upon in Scripture, as of *necessity* to salvation. Now, in return to these three considerations, I shall endeavour to shew, in so many distinct chapters, that the doctrine is sufficiently *clear*, and also *practical*, and insisted upon likewise in *Scripture*, as much as the nature of the thing needs or requires.

THE IMPORTANCE

OF THE

DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY

ASSERTED, &c.

CHAP. I.

Shewing that the Doctrine of the Trinity is sufficiently CLEAR *to be admitted as a* FUNDAMENTAL *Article.*

CLEAR may be considered in two views, either with respect to the *matter* of the doctrine, or with respect to the *proofs* upon which it rests. Let us examine the thing both ways.

1. It may be suggested, that the doctrine is not *clear*, with regard to the *matter* of it: it is *mysterious* doctrine. Be it so: the tremendous *Deity* is all over *mysterious*, in his *nature* and in his *attributes*, in his *works* and *ways*. It is the property of the *divine* Being to be *unsearchable:* and if he were not so, he would not be *divine*. Must we therefore reject the most certain truths concerning the *Deity*, only because they are *incomprehensible*, when every thing almost belonging to him must be so of course? If so, there is an end, not only of all *revealed* religion, but of *natural* religion too; and we must take our last refuge in downright *Atheism*. There are *mysteries* in the works of nature, as well as in the word of God; and it is as easy to believe both as one. We do not mean by *mysteries*, positions altogether unintelligible, or that carry no idea at all with them: we do not

mean unsensed characters, or empty sounds: but we mean propositions contained in *general* terms, which convey as *general* ideas, not descending to *particulars*. The ideas are *clear*, so far as they go; only they do not reach far enough to satisfy curiosity. They are ideas of *intellect*, for the most part; like the ideas which we form of our own *souls*: for *spiritual* substance, at least, (if any substance,) falls not under *imagination*, but must be *understood*, rather than *imagined*. The same is the case with many *abstract* verities, in *numbers* especially; which are not the less verities for being purely *intellectual*, and beyond all *imagery*. *Reason* contemplates them, and *clearly* too, though *fancy* can lay no hold of them, to draw their picture in the mind. Such, I say, are our ideas of the divine Being, and of a Trinity in Unity; ideas of *intellect*, and *general*; intelligible as far as the thing is revealed, and assented to so far as intelligible. We understand the *general* truths, concerning a *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*: we understand the general nature of an *union* and a *distinction*; and what we understand we believe. As to the minute particulars relating to the *manner* or *modus* of the thing, we understand them not: our *ideas* reach not to them, but stop short in the generals, as our *faith* also does. For our *faith* and our *ideas* keep pace with each other; and we *believe* nothing about *particulars* whereof nothing is *revealed*[a], neither expressly nor consequentially.

Such a *general* assent as I have mentioned is what we give to the truth of the divine perfections, *necessary existence*, *eternity*, *ubiquity*, *prescience*, and the like[b]. Whatever obscurity or defect there is in our ideas of those divine attributes, we think it no good reason for denying either the *general* truths or the *importance* of them. So then, no just objection can be made against the *importance* of any doctrine from its *mysterious* nature. The most mysterious of all are in reality the most important; not because they are mysterious, but because they relate to things *divine*, which must of course be mysterious to weak mortals, and perhaps to all *creatures* whatever. But even mysterious doctrines

[a] See the subject of *mysteries* treated of more at large, either in my First Defence, Qu. xxi. vol. i. p. 453, &c. or in Norris's Account of Reason and Faith, p. 117, 118. or in Mr. Browne's Lecture Sermons for Lady Moyer, p. 257—262.

[b] See my First Defence, Qu. xxi. vol. i. p. 451, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. xxi. p. 692.

have a *bright* side, as well as a *dark* one; and they are *clear* to look upon, though too deep to be *seen through*.

It has been sometimes objected, that however *clear* the doctrine may seem to be to men of parts and learning, yet certainly it cannot be so to *common* Christians. But why not to *common* Christians as well as to others? It is as clear to them as most other high and divine things can be. It is as clear, for instance, as the divine *eternity* or *omnipresence*. Every *common* Christian professing Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be so distinct as not to be one the other, and so united as to be one God, has as clear an idea of what he says, as when he prays, "Our Father "which art in heaven;" or when he repeats after the Psalmist, "Thou art about my path, and about my bed, and spiest out all "my ways[c]." And, I am persuaded, upon examination, he will be as able to give as good an account of the one as he will of the other. The thing is *plain* and *intelligible* in either case, but in the *general* only, not as to the *particular* manner. Ask *how* three are one, and probably both catechumen and catechist will be perfectly at a nonplus: or ask, *how* God is in heaven, and *how* about our *path*, or our *bed*, and they will both be equally confounded. But, by the way, let it be here considered, whether *common* Christians may not often have *clearer* ideas of those things, than the bolder and more inquisitive, because they are content to rest in *generals*, and to stop at what they *understand*, without *darkening* it afterwards by words without knowledge. The notion of *eternity*, for instance, is a clear notion enough to a *common* Christian: but to a person that perplexes himself with nice inquiries about *succession*, or *past* duration, that very first notion which in the general was clear, may become *obscure*, by his blending perplexities with it. The like may be said of *omnipresence*; the *general* notion of it is competently clear: but when a man has been perplexing his thoughts with curious inquiries about a *substantial* or a *virtual* presence, about *extension* or *non-extension*, and the like; I question whether at length he may come away with so clear or just ideas of the main thing as may be found in any *common* Christian. So again as to *divine foreknowledge* and *free-will*, they are both of them clearly understood, as far as they need be, by every plain Christian; while many a conceited scholar, by darkening the subject with too minute

[c] Psalm cxxxix. 2.

inquiries, almost loses the sight of it. In like manner, to apply these instances to our present purpose, *common* Christians may sometimes better preserve the true and right *general* notion of the doctrine of the Trinity, than the more learned inquirers: and it is observable, what Hilary of Poictiers, an honest and a knowing man of the fourth century, testifies, that the *populace* of that time, for the most part, kept the true and right faith in the Trinity[d], when their *ministers*, several of them, by prying too far into it, had the misfortune to lose it.

While I am treating of the case of *common* Christians, I cannot omit the mentioning an artifice much made use of by those who would depreciate the doctrine of the Trinity, as not *clear* enough to be an *important* article: they first enter into all the niceties and perplexities which subtle disputants have ever clogged the subject with, and then they ask, whether *common* Christians can be supposed to see through them. No, certainly: neither need they trouble their heads about them. It is one thing to understand the *doctrine*, and quite another to be masters of the *controversy*. It is not fair dealing with us, to pretend it necessary for every common Christian, if he believes in the Trinity, to form just conceptions of it in every minute particular: for, by the same argument, it might as well be pleaded, that they are not obliged to believe in *God*, nor indeed in any thing. God is without *body*, *parts*, or *passions*, according to the first article of our Church. How many minute perplexing inquiries might there not be raised upon the three particulars now mentioned! And who can assure us that *common* Christians may not be liable to entertain some wrong conceptions in every one of them? Must we therefore say that the *general* doctrine of the existence of a Deity is not *clear* enough to be important doctrine, or that *common* Christians are not bound to receive it as a *necessary* article of their faith? See how far such objections would carry us. But since these objections ought to have no weight at all in other parallel cases, or nearly parallel, they ought certainly to be the less regarded in respect to the doctrine

[d] Et hujus quidem usque adhuc impietatis fraude perficitur, ut jam sub Antichristi sacerdotibus *Christi populus* non occidat, dum hoc putant illi fidei esse quod vocis est. Audiunt *Deum* Christum; putant esse quod dicitur. Audiunt *Filium Dei;* putant in Dei nativitate inesse Dei veritatem. Audiunt *ante tempora;* putant id ipsum ante tempora esse quod *semper est*. Sanctiores aures *plebis*, quam corda sunt sacerdotum. *Hilar. contr. Auxent.* 1266. edit. Bened.

of the ever blessed Trinity. Let but this doctrine have as *fair usage* as other Christian and important doctrines are allowed to have, and then I am persuaded there will be no pretence left for saying, that it is not a *clear* doctrine, clear in the general, clear in the main thing, to any Christian whatever. It is horrible misrepresentation of the case, to pretend as if we taught, that " the eternal interest of every *ploughman* or *mechanic* hangs on " his adjusting the sense of the terms, *nature, person, essence, sub-* " *stance, subsistence, coequality, coessentiality,* and the like." No; those are *technical* terms, most of them, proper to divines and scholars: and not only *ploughmen* and *mechanics*, but very great *scholars* too, lived and died in the conscientious belief of the doctrine of the *Trinity*, long before any of those *terms* came in. They are of use indeed for settling the *controversy* with greater accuracy among Divines, who understand such terms: but the *doctrine* itself *is clear* without them, and does not want them, but stands firm and unshaken, independent of them. Any plain man may easily conceive, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are properly *divine*, are not one the other, and yet are *one God,* by an intimate union; and that the Son in particular, being God and man, is *one Christ.* These prime verities, and whatsoever else is necessarily implied in them, may be conceived to be *right;* and whatsoever is contrary to them, or inconsistent with them, will of consequence be *wrong.* This is enough for any plain Christian to know or believe; and he is not ordinarily obliged to be more minute in his inquiries, or to understand *scholastic* terms. It is not to be expected that *common* Christians should be expert *disputants* in controversies of *faith*, any more than that they should be profound *casuists* in relation to *practice:* yet Christian practice is *necessary* to salvation, and so is Christian *faith* too; and the obligation to *obey* a *general* precept, or to *believe* a *general* truth, is not superseded or evacuated by a man's being unacquainted with terms of art, or by his being liable to mistake in some remote or minute circumstances belonging to the doctrine itself.

To make the thing yet plainer, let us take some *general* rule of Christian practice; the rule, suppose, of *dealing with others as we would be dealt with:* a rule of such *importance,* that, by our Lord's account of it, it is the sum and substance of the *Law and the Prophets*[e]. Surely then, it is a rule designed for *common*

[e] Matt. vii. 12.

Christians, and such as both deserves and requires their most careful notice. Next, let us view this rule under all its minutenesses or particularities; its distinctions, limitations, and explications, with which it is dressed out by knowing and able Divines[f]. Observe thereupon, what an operose business is made of this so plain and familiar rule, what pains are taken to clear it of all seeming repugnancies, to make it *reasonable*, to make it *certain*, to make it *practicable*, and to guard it most effectually against the many *possible* ways, whereby it may be misconstrued, eluded, perverted, frustrated. Are *common* Christians equal to all those niceties, or are they able to grasp them? I conceive, not. And yet I dare be confident that a plain unlettered man, of tolerable sense, and who has not a mind to deceive himself, might be safely trusted with the naked rule, and would but seldom, if ever, either misunderstand it (so far as concerns his own case) or misapply it. He would keep the plain even road, and would scarce believe the man that should tell him that it was strewed with thorns, or that hundreds had been or might be either embarrassed in it or bewildered by it. The same thing is true with respect to the *general* doctrine of the Trinity. For though there are many possible ways of mistaking it, or perverting it, (as there are many *crooked* lines to one *straight*,) and it concerns Divines to guard minutely against all; yet less may suffice for *common* Christians; ordinarily, I mean, at least. The *right faith* in the Trinity is short and plain; and whatever crosses upon it is *wrong: Index est rectum sui, et obliqui;* truth shews itself, and is for the most part to every honest mind a guard sufficient against the mazes of error.

I have dwelt the longer upon this article, because the objection about *common Christians* appears a popular and plausible one, and is often repeated in this cause, though there is really no weight in it. The author of the Sober and Charitable Disquisition need not be in pain for *common Christians*, lest they should not "have skill enough to unite the two natures in Christ "without confounding them, or dividing the Person, in their "apprehensions[g]" They will as easily conceive that God and man is *one Christ*, as that soul and body is one man; and they need not look further. Without troubling themselves at all with

[f] See particularly Archbishop Tillotson's Sermon on Matt. vii. 12. separately published in 1709, and Collier's Essay of Honesty, part iv. p. 56, &c.

[g] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 22.

the names either of *natures* or *persons*, they may joyfully and thankfully remember, that he "who is over all God blessed for "ever[h]," became a *man* for their sakes, and *died* for them, in order to bring them to God. What is there in all this that should either offend or perplex, or should not rather greatly edify *common* Christians? They may be "more accurate in their "thoughts on this head, than the great patriarch and abbot "Nestorius and Eutyches[i]," (for they were not both *patriarchs*, as this author styles them,) because they will indulge their fancies less, and rest in the *general* truth, without drawing a false *modus*, or any *modus* upon it, either to corrupt or to obscure it: they will abide in the true doctrine, without defiling it (as those great men did) with over officious and presumptuous speculations. It may be allowed, that "*common* Christians have "but very little apprehension[k]" of some minute or remote considerations given in by way of answer to as minute and remote objections, in order to clear the doctrine in every punctilio: and in like manner, they have but *very little apprehension* of several such remote considerations thrown in by Divines, in their disputes with Atheists or Deists, in order to clear the doctrine of the *divine being and attributes*, or of the *authority of Scripture*, and to make every thing at length conformable and consistent. But what then? Does it therefore follow, that *common* Christians may not believe in God, or in God's word, or that such belief is not *important*? *Common* Christians believe enough, if they believe the main things under a *general* view, without branching them out into all the minute particulars which depend upon them or belong to them. Let Divines see that every article of faith is clear and consistent throughout, when traversed as far as the acutest objector can carry it: but let *common Christians* be content with every article in its native simplicity, as laid down in Scripture for *edification* of the faithful, and not as it appears in controversial books, or confessions, with all its armour about it, for the conviction or confusion of gainsayers. But I am afraid I have exceeded on this head, and have overburdened the reader. Upon the whole, the doctrine of the Trinity must be allowed to be sufficiently *clear*, as to the *matter* of it.

2. The next consideration is, that it is *clear* also, as to the *proofs* upon which it rests: it may be *clearly proved*, as well as

[h] Rom. ix. 5. [i] See Sober and Charitable &c. p. 22. [k] Ibid. p. 23.

clearly conceived. Indeed, the truth of the doctrine ought to be *supposed* in our present question, as previously known and admitted. Accordingly, our *remonstrant brethren*, who first disputed the *importance* of our doctrine, made no scruple of allowing the *truth* of it, as I have before hinted. They allowed the Scripture proofs to be so far *clear*, as to oblige us to admit the doctrine for a certain truth[l]. Neither are we much beholden to them for this seeming courtesy, since the proofs are so numerous and so cogent, that every ingenuous and sensible man must plainly see, that were *Scripture* alone to decide the question, and no false *philosophy* or *metaphysics* brought in to confound or perplex it, there could scarce be any room left for debate about it. I do not mean that many Scripture texts may not be speciously urged on the other side: but what I mean is, that upon the summing up of the evidence on both sides, and after balancing the whole account, the advantage is so plainly ours, according to all the approved rules of grammar or criticism, that there is nothing at all left on the other side, whereby to turn the scale, except it be some pretended *absurdity*, or absurdities, in point of *reason*, charged upon us, by the help of *dialectical* or *metaphysical* subtilties; which yet, after all, are mere fallacy and sophistry, and have no real strength in them. We must therefore insist upon it as certain fact, that our doctrine is *clear* enough, with respect to the Scripture evidences produced for it. *Scripture*, in its plain, natural, obvious, unforced meaning, says it, and *reason* does not gainsay it: upon these two pillars our cause rests. Upon this bottom Bishop Bull fixes it: "The Antitrini-"tarians can never produce a *demonstrative* reason to prove that "it *cannot be*, and divine revelation assures us that so it is[m]." To the same purpose speaks Mr. Howe: "That there is a "Trinity in the Godhead, of Father, Son, (or Word,) and Holy "Ghost, is the plain obvious sense of so many Scriptures, that "it apparently tends to frustrate the design of the whole "Scripture revelation, and to make it useless, not to admit this "Trinity, or otherwise to understand such Scriptures[n]." In

[l] Hinc colligo, mirum videri non debere, si tribus hisce personis *una eademque natura* divina tribuatur, cum iis scriptura *divina*, istas perfectiones, quæ naturæ divinæ propriæ sunt, tam *exerte* attribuat. *Episcop. Institut.* lib. iv. sect. 2. cap. 32. p. 333.

[m] Bull, Posth. Works, vol. iii. p. 833.

[n] Howe's Calm Discourse of the Trinity in the Godhead, p. 136, 137.

like manner Dr. Burnet of the Charter-House, a noted man, and known to have had as little of a *bigot* in him as any one, says thus: "We are obliged, according to that light which God "hath vouchsafed to us in the dispensation of the Gospel, to "believe and profess that Jesus of Nazareth is the *Messiah*, and "likewise *God*. If we mistake in this faith, the mistake is so "far from being voluntary, that it is *inevitable*. For we follow, "according to the best of our apprehension, the guides which "God hath given us, St. John, and Paul the Apostle. To these "sacred writers we assent and adhere, interpreting them ac-"cording to the *genuine force* and *received use* of words: for "neither Christ nor the abovesaid writers have told us, that "those sacred Oracles were written in any other style, or that "they were to be interpreted in any other manner[o]."

The late learned Professor Franck, of Halle in Saxony, speaking to the Antitrinitarians, expresses himself thus: "Though "you allow the Scriptures of the New Testament, you never-"theless boldly and arrogantly contradict the truth, *clearly* "shining before your eyes, and express testimonies proposed in "such simple and plain words, that even a *child* may read and "understand them[p]."

I cite these testimonies, not in the way of *authority*, but only to give the reader a clearer idea of what the Trinitarians go upon: for they are all, so far, in the same strain, and these testimonies are offered only as samples, whereby to judge of the rest. Any indifferent stander-by may easily perceive what, for the most part, has led the Christian world to contend earnestly for the doctrine of the Trinity; namely, a conscientious dread of dishonouring him whom God the Father has commanded them to honour even as himself, a profound reverence for sacred Writ, and an invincible persuasion that those Scriptures cannot, without the utmost *violence*, and most daring *presumption*, be interpreted otherwise than they interpret them. It would be tedious here to cite the particular texts which we ground our faith upon; and it would be highly improper to fetch in the whole dispute about the *truth* of the doctrine into this other debate, which concerns only the *importance* of it. Therefore

[o] Judgment of Dr. Thomas Burnet, p. 11, 12. printed for Roberts, 1732. See the Original, de Fid. et Offic. cap. viii. p. 134. And compare my seventh Sermon, vol. ii. p. 166, 167, 168.

[p] Franck's Christus sacræ Scripturæ Nucleus, p. 181, 182. translated out of German: printed by Downing, 1732.

referring the readers for the *truth* of the doctrine to other treatises lately printed, in great abundance, and well known, I shall content myself here with hinting two *general* arguments or considerations, such as may give the readers some notion of the irresistible force of our Scripture proofs in this cause.

1. One is, that the proofs which we insist upon cannot be evaded by any approved rules of language or criticism, but the last resort of our opposers commonly is to some *philosophical* principle, some pretended reason, drawn from the supposed nature of the thing, rather than from the Scripture style, or from the force of Scripture expressions. I have observed elsewhere[q], that such has been the method of eluding John i. 1. and several other texts, which are full and express as possible, for the real and proper *divinity* of our Lord. They are eluded, I say, upon this principle, that *person* and *intelligent being* are equivalent and reciprocal; or that there can be *no medium between Tritheism and Sabellianism*, or by something else of like kind: which is running off from the question about the *Scriptural proof* of the doctrine, to the *natural possibility* of the thing; and is not submitting to the obvious and apparent sense of *sacred Writ*, but is tantamount to saying, that no Scriptures can prove it: an evasion which might equally serve for any texts whatever, were they ever so numerous, plain, and express. This kind of conduct on the opposite side, manifestly shews how hard they are pressed upon the foot of *Scripture*; when, in the last result, they remove the cause from *Scripture* to *philosophy*, from considerations of *language*, and *style*, and *propriety* of expression, to a foreign consideration, the *rationale* of the thing. This is a plain token that the *letter* is against them; only they take the *reason* of the *thing* to plead so much in their favour, that it ought to overrule any force of expression. So they lay the main stress upon *metaphysical* subtilties[r]; that is to say, upon *human* conjectures about things naturally *unsearchable*, in opposition to the express declarations of the word of God: which, by the way, is first setting up a *false measure* of truth; and, next, is making a *new rule* of faith. It is a false measure of truth to make *human conception* the standard of it, since there may be a thousand or ten thousand verities, which we cannot account for, or explain

[q] Defence, Qu. xxii. vol. i. p. 464. Second Defence, Qu. xxii. vol. ii. p. 701, &c.

[r] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 464, &c. 554. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 384, 432, 468, 697, 701, 702.

the *manner* of: and it is making a *new rule* of faith, if we resolve to believe nothing but what we can *comprehend*; or if in cases where we can see no plain *contradiction* or *absurdity*, we choose to make the *letter* of Scripture bend to our own conceptions, rather than submit our wisdom to the wisdom of God. But this is not the point which I am now upon; and so it suffices to have briefly hinted it in passing. The use which I intended of the observation in this place, was to intimate the *strength* of our *Scripture proofs*, which drive the adversaries to such extremities.

2. Another yet more affecting and sensible argument of the same thing is, that our antagonists, in eluding the *Scripture proofs* of the divinity of *God the Son*, have scarce left themselves any for the divinity even of *God the Father*; indeed none but what by the same artificial way of eluding may be evaded and frustrated, as well as the other. This is a consideration of great weight, which has been pressed upon them over and over[s], and has never yet received a satisfactory answer. So it remains as a standing evidence of the glaring force of our Scripture proofs, and will ever remain so.

Upon the whole then, the doctrine of the Trinity must be acknowledged *clear* enough with respect to the Scripture proofs upon which it stands; provided always, that there is nothing plainly *repugnant* or *contradictory* in the notion. For, on the other hand, it must be allowed, that were the thing plainly *absurd* or *impossible*, no Scriptures could prove it; but, in such a case, we should be obliged either to deny the authority of such Scriptures, (in whole, or in part,) or to have recourse to *trope* or *figure*, or any *possible* interpretation to solve the difficulty. This is not the case here: and therefore since the doctrine cannot be proved to be *impossible* in the nature of the thing, it is abundantly proved from Scripture to be both *possible* and *true*. Reason never has, never can demonstrate the thing to be impossible: after repeated trials, 1400 years upwards and more, and all to no purpose, that should now be looked upon as a ruled point[t]. I conclude then, from what has been offered in this chapter, that the doctrine of the Trinity is *clear* enough to be *important*, both with respect to the *matter* of it, and the

[s] Defence, vol. i. p. 341. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 565, &c. Third Defence, vol. iii. p. 46, &c. Compare Abbadie on Christ's Divinity, p. 240.

[t] See the state of the question, as to the *possibility* of the doctrine, in Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 762. and in Mr. Browne's Animadversions on two Pieces, p. 5, 6, &c.

Scripture proofs upon which it stands: and therefore its pretended *obscurity*, or *uncertainty*, can be no sufficient reason for throwing it off as a slight or indifferent article, not worth contending for, or insisting upon, as an *essential* of faith, and a term of Christian *communion*.

CHAP. II.

Shewing, that the same Doctrine is no SPECULATIVE *or* NOTIONAL *thing, but strictly* PRACTICAL, *and closely interwoven with the Principles of the* Christian Life.

A *RIGHT* knowledge of God, and a *practice* conformable to it, and both in order to a more complete and blissful *enjoyment*, are not *speculative* or *indifferent* matters, but matters properly practical, and of infinite concernment. If *religious* practice in any measure depends upon a previous *knowledge* of *God*, (as undoubtedly it does,) then certainly, for the like reason, the *perfection* of that practice depends upon the perfection of such knowledge. A general and confuse notion of God may produce as general and confuse rules of demeanour towards him; while a more particular and explicit apprehension of the Deity will of course produce a more particular and explicit service. It is true, where God has not afforded such distinct knowledge, a less perfect service may and must suffice; but wherever much is given much will be required, and from peculiar circumstances will arise peculiar obligations. If God be *Father, Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, the duties owing to God will be duties owing under that trine distinction; which must be paid accordingly: and whoever leaves out any of the three out of his idea of God, comes so far short of honouring God *perfectly*, and of serving him in proportion to the manifestations made of him. Supposing our doctrine *true*, (as we are now to suppose,) there will be duties proper to be paid to the Father as Father, and to the Son as Son, and to the Holy Ghost as the eternal Spirit of both; duties correspondent to their distinct offices and personalities, besides the duties common to all three, considered as one God. In short, the specification of our *worship*, and the right direction of it, are nearly concerned in this doctrine: and therefore, if *worship* be a *practical* matter, this doctrine also is *practical*, and not a point of mere speculation[u]. That worship is a *practical* thing, I

[u] See Dr. Webster's introductory Discourses to Maimburg's History of Arianism, p. 43, &c.

suppose no man of sense will dispute; or if any one does, it must be a dispute only about *words*, and not affecting the main thing: wherefore, it must be altogether wrong to imagine, that the doctrine of the Trinity is purely *notional*, or has no connection with *practice*[x]. If the doctrine be *true*, it is sacrilege, and great impiety, in every Christian to refuse to worship Father, Son, or Holy Ghost: but if the doctrine be *false*, it is *polytheism* and *idolatry* to pay religious worship to any person but the *Father* only. So much depends upon this single article.

The author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition labours this point extremely, for several pages together[y], and has perhaps said as much and as well as the cause will admit of. He endeavours to clear the Arian worshippers of Christ from formal *polytheism;* and to retort the charge upon the *orthodox* worshippers; and so upon consideration that both parties may *mean well*, or in some respects may both *offend*, they may consent to bear with each other, and to unite in Christian fellowship together. But, in my humble opinion, the thought is wide, and the project impracticable. There is no patching up any lasting or rational agreement of that kind, while the parties cannot unite so much as in the object of *divine* worship. He allows, that the opposers of Christ's *Divinity*, (properly so called,) can pay him no more than *inferior* worship, such as if tendered to *God* would manifestly *dishonour* and *degrade* him, would directly *deny him to have* divine *perfections*, and, *instead of honouring him as God, would degrade him into somewhat that is not God*[z]. Can those then who believe Christ to be *God*, and who honour him as such, ever think it *reasonable* or *pious*, to hold communion with men who, by what they call *inferior* worship, do thus *manifestly dishonour and degrade* their God and Saviour, denying his *divine* perfections, *degrading* him into somewhat that is *not God?* Can the Catholic believers ever suffer or connive at such affronts offered (as they must esteem them) to *God blessed for ever?*

[x] Nihil falsius est ea Remonstrantium calumnia, qua articulum de S. S. Trinitate ullum ad *praxin* usum habere inficiantur. Omnis doctrina veritatis, *secundum pietatem est.* Tit. i. 1. Et hæc tam notabilis, tam fundamentalis, non esset? Imo totius fidei, totius veræ religionis scaturigo est. —— Nulla etiam religio est, nisi quis verum Deum colat: non colit verum Deum, sed cerebri sui figmentum, qui non adorat in æquali divinitatis majestate, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum. I nunc, et doctrinam eam ad *praxin* inutilem esse clama, sine qua nulla *fidei* aut *pietatis* Christianæ *praxis* esse potest. *Witsius in Symb. Apost.* p. 76.

[y] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 4—23. [z] Ibid. p. 8, 9.

How can they ever justify either to God, or to the world, or to their own consciences, such a guilty *neutrality* in an affair of the highest consequence, in an article of the last importance? Mutual forbearance in doubtful points of speculative opinion, is very becoming fallible men, in consideration of our common frailty: but it is unreasonable, and morally impracticable, to come to any composition, where the parties differ so widely, and in so material a concern, as the object of divine *worship*. Religious men will be zealous for the honour of their *Lord God*, because they know that they ought to be so; neither will they nor can they countenance any *coldness* or *indifference* in so weighty a concern. *Excessive* heats perhaps may sometimes arise in such cases; for so long as religion is held in esteem, and believed to be *worth* the contending for, there must be contests about it, which may sometimes rise too high: but it is an error on the right hand, and much to be preferred to a cold *indifference*; as a strong athletic constitution, though subject sometimes to fevers, is yet vastly preferable to a constant *lethargy*. To return, the sum is, that the point of *divine* worship is a critical point, a difficulty which cannot be got over, while both sides retain their respective principles; one looking upon the *Son* and *Holy Ghost* as *creatures*, and the other esteeming them as *one God* with the Father. For supposing that both parties were to join in the same solemn acts of *outward* worship offered to Christ, (for that he ought to be *worshipped* both sides allow,) yet since the Catholic side conceive that those *religious* acts are on the other side defiled by an *irreligious* meaning, and amount rather to a solemn mockery of their God and Saviour, than to a respectful remembrance of him; and that they are in *reality*, though not intentionally, flat *polytheism* and *idolatry*; I say, while the Catholic believers are so persuaded, they cannot in prudence or in conscience, in piety to God or charity to men, consent to such known defilements of their solemn service; because it would be directly partaking in other men's sins. If it be said, that they need not judge all *creature-worship* to be *polytheism* and *idolatry*; I answer, they cannot avoid it, while they consider either Scripture itself, or the universal suffrage of antiquity in the best and purest ages. If it be further said, that they need not however think so hardly of *creature-worshippers*, as to charge them with *guilt*, since they may intend well; I answer, that a *good intention* is not sufficient to warrant an *ill thing*: besides that, were they

ever so *guiltless*, yet those of the contrary persuasion could not be so in countenancing by their own communion, what they cannot but look upon as great *impiety* and *profanation*. So, turn we this matter which way we will, the point of *worship* must be a parting point betwixt them, while they retain their opposite sentiments, with regard to the strict and proper *Divinity* of Christ.

I shall not here enter into the debate about *creature-worship*, having distinctly and fully considered it elsewhere[a]: besides, that I may properly wave it, as it is wide and foreign to the cause now in hand. For whether such *creature-worship* be *right* or *wrong*, those that believe in Christ as a *divine* Person cannot join with those that worship him under the notion of a *creature*, and do not worship him as *divine;* because, it has been before intimated, such inferior worship, (whatever else we call it) is *dishonouring* and *degrading* him, and cannot but be rejected with abhorrence by all that seriously believe him to be really and strictly God.

As to what the author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition objects, that possibly some of our own people, who believe Christ to be *God*, may yet consider him merely as *Man*, or as *Mediator*[b], and not as *God*, in their acts of worship, it may be purely a surmise: but however the fact stands, there is no argument in it. We cannot answer for *vulgar* Christians, as to the notions they may possibly entertain even of *God* the *Father* in their worship of him; neither can we be certain, whether sometimes they rise higher than those of an *Anthropomorphite*. But I presume, if any *vulgar* Christians ignorantly or innocently mistake, they are very willing to be set right by their more knowing guides, or by other sensible friends: which makes their case widely different from that of those who take upon them to justify *creature worship* upon principle, and who separate Christ from the *one Godhead* in the worship of him, knowingly, and out of set purpose and design. We are not *involved in guilt*, merely by communicating with persons, whose errors (though perhaps *great*)

[a] Defence, vol. i. Qu. xvi. p. 408. &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. xvi. p. 656, &c. Compare Bull's Primitiva et Apostol. Traditio, c. vi. p. 386, &c. Bishop Smalbroke's Idolatry charged on Arianism. Mr. Abr. Taylor's True Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 69, 448, &c. Dr. Bishop's Sermons, p. 271—281. Archbishop Tillotson's Sermons, vol. i. p. 547, &c. fol. edit.

[b] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 21, 22, 23.

we know nothing of, or who probably would correct them upon better instruction, or the first gentle admonition. *Guilt* is contracted by communicating with those who openly and resolutely corrupt the faith (knowingly or ignorantly) in very important articles. To join with such persons, is partaking in their *impiety*: it is not *charity*, but *men-pleasing*, and betraying a disregard for the *honour* of *God*. But this general question will come over again, and will be more fully debated in a proper place.

Enough has been said to shew, that *Christian-worship* is very nearly concerned in the question about the Trinity; and therefore the doctrine is strictly *practical*, and has a close connection with the Christian life. I declined entering into the main debate about *creature-worship*, for the reasons above hinted. Yet because the author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition has advanced some things upon that article, which every reader may not know how to answer, I shall suggest a few considerations here by the way, to serve as hints or heads of solution to the difficulties objected. 1. If that gentleman means to say, that the outward acts of *civil* homage and *religious* worship are so equivocal and ambiguous, that there is no way left to distinguish them, it is disputing against *fact*, and amounts to telling us, that no one can distinguish in a case where no one can easily mistake, or ever has been mistaken. *Civil* homage is distinguishable from *religious* worship, by the *circumstances*[c] always, and often by the *nature* of the *acts* themselves. That *burning incense* to Daniel[d] was merely *civil* respect, will not be easily proved: neither will the example of an *idolatrous* king, who would have done as much to an image, be sufficient to *justify* it; though the author speaks of it[e], as if both these points were indisputable. 2. Those outward acts, so and so circumstantiated, as to become *religious* worship, are what God has *appropriated* to the *Jehovah*, to the *true God*, in the holy Scriptures of the Old Testament, as *exterior* and *visible* acknowledgments of the *divine* sovereignty over all creatures, and of the *dependence* which creatures have upon their Creator: for the *reasons* which God insists upon, why he, and he only, is to be *worshipped*, are such as exclude all *creatures* whatever, viz. his being *Jehovah*, Creator,

[c] See Stillingfleet's Defence of the Discourse concerning Idolatry in Works, vol. v. p. 344, 357.

[d] Dan. ii. 46.

[e] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 6.

Sustainer, Preserver of all things[f]. 3. To pay these *exterior* services, once so *appropriated* to God, to any *creature*, is *idolizing* the creature, or *deifying* the creature, and is both *idolatry* and *polytheism*. 4. Therefore the paying such *exterior* religious services to Christ, considered as a *creature*, must, according to the whole tenor of the Old Testament, be plain *idolatry* and *polytheism*. 5. The same rule for religious worship obtains under the New Testament, as before under the Old: which appears, as from several other places, so particularly from our Lord's answer to Satan[g], and from the angel's admonitions to St. John in the Revelations[h].

The author of Sober and Charitable &c. asks, why the paying worship to an invisible Being must imply its having *divine* perfections, and therefore must be *divine* worship[i]? The reason is, because God has *appropriated* all such addresses, so and so circumstantiated, to the one Lord *Jehovah*; thereby making them (if they were not in their own nature before) a virtual recognition of *divine* perfections[k]; and therefore they interpretatively amount to *divine* worship. He adds, that "this is "proving the point, by taking it for granted, that none but "God is to be worshipped." No, but it is proving the point in the best manner, and by the strongest evidences, namely, express Scripture evidences, all the way from Genesis down to the Revelations, of such *appropriation* as hath been mentioned. In short then, God has so appropriated religious worship, as to exclude all *creatures* from any share in it: therefore all religious worship is *divine* worship; and therefore to worship Christ, under the notion of a *creature*, is *idolatry* and *polytheism*. So stands this matter, which I have but briefly hinted, to take off this author's exceptions; referring the reader, as above, to other treatises, where the subject is considered at large. Now I return to the point I was upon, the *practical* nature of the doctrine of the Trinity.

Besides the influence which this doctrine has upon *worship*, it may be considered further in a more general view, as tending to form within our minds *dispositions* proper for such state and cir-

[f] Isaiah xl. xlv. 5, 6, 7. 2 Kings xix. 15. Jer. x. 10, 11, 12. Compare my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 43, 44.

[g] Matt. iv. 10.

[h] Rev. xix. 10. xxii. 9. See those texts fully explained in Bishop Bull's Primitiva et Apostolica Traditio, c. vi. p. 388.

[i] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 8.

[k] See preface to my Sermons, vol. ii.

circumstances as we are to expect hereafter. It is an allowed truth, that the good dispositions which men contract in this life are their qualifications for the happiness of the life to come; and that the more refined and raised such their good dispositions are, the more fitly qualified they are for the higher degrees of blessedness in heaven. Put the case then, that the three Persons of the Trinity are equally *divine*, and that a man has been trained up to esteem them accordingly, it cannot be doubted but that he goes out of the world more fitly disposed, in that respect, to be taken into their friendship, and best qualified (other circumstances being equal) for the beatific enjoyment. Consequently, the belief of the doctrine of the Trinity (supposing it *true*) is no slight or insignificant theory, no barren notion or speculation; since it has a direct influence upon the *dispositions* of our minds here, and upon our *happiness* hereafter. I make not this an argument of the *truth* of the doctrine, (for that is not the point I am now upon,) but of the *importance* of it, after admitting it for a sacred truth: and I add, that if it may have such influence upon us, in creating proper *dispositions*, that comes to the same as to say, that it raises and improves our *virtues*, and all virtue is *practical*.

A further consideration of like kind may be drawn from the influence which the same doctrine has upon the *motives* to Christian practice. There are no two motives more affecting or more endearing, or more apt to work upon ingenuous minds, than the *love* of God the Father in sending his beloved Son to redeem us, and the *love* and *condescension* of our blessed Lord, in submitting to be so sent. "God so loved the world, that he gave "his only begotten Son[l]," &c. "In this was manifested the "love of God towards us, because that God sent his only "begotten Son into the world, that we might live through "him[m]." We see here what a stress and emphasis is laid, not merely upon this, that life, eternal life, is the benefit bestowed, but that it is conveyed in such a *manner*, and by such endearing *means*, by the *only begotten Son*. The Socinians, when pressed upon this article, do nothing but trifle and shuffle with us: they fall to magnifying the love of God, in giving us so high, so inestimable a blessing, as *life eternal*. Very true; but does not Scripture, besides that, lay a particular emphasis upon the *means* made use of in conveying the grant? And how is this emphasis

[l] John iii. 16. [m] John iv. 9.

made out upon their hypothesis, that Christ is a mere *man?* But suppose him a *creature*, and the very first and highest of all creatures, before he came down from heaven; yet neither does that supposition sufficiently answer the purpose. For, considering how honourable the service was, and how unconceivably vast and large the reward for it, it might more properly be said, that God *so loved his Son*, that he sent him into the world, in order to *prefer* him to a kind of rivalship with himself, to advance him to *divine* honours, to make the *whole creation* bow before him, and pay him homage and obeisance[n]: and all this as the reward of his sufferings of a few years; great indeed, but not apparently greater than many of his disciples suffered after him, nor "worthy to be compared with the glory[o]" that shall accrue to every good Christian, much less with that immense, that incredible glory which was to accrue to him[p]. Now to me it seems, that the supposing Christ a mere *creature*, is a thought which mightily lessens the force of the Scripture expressions representing God's sending his Son as an act of stupendous love to man, upon account of the dignity of the *Person* by whom that salvation was to be wrought: so that the denying the *Divinity* of Christ robs us in part of one of the most endearing and affecting *motives* to the Christian life. Wherefore in this view also, the doctrine of the Trinity, if true, is both *important* and *practical*, as it raises the *motives* upon which Christian *practice* is built. I do not say, there would be no force in the motive considered in an Arian view, and supposing Christ to have been a most excellent *creature:* but the force of it would be considerably less upon that supposition; and therefore, if the doctrine be a *truth*, it is a truth of some moment in a view to *practice*, as raising and enforcing the *motives* beyond what the other hypothesis does.

So again, the *love of Christ* towards mankind appears in a

[n] Phil. ii. 10. Rev. v. 11, 12, 13. vii. 10.

[o] Rom. viii. 18.

[p] Equidem rem attentius perpendenti liquebit, ex hypothesi sive Sociniana, sive Ariana, Deum in hoc negotio amorem et dilectionem suam potius in *illum ipsum Filium*, quam erga *nos homines* ostendisse. Quid enim? Is qui Christus dicitur, ex mera Dei εὐδοκία et beneplacito in eam gratam electus est, ut post brevem hîc in terris Deo præstitam obedientiam, ex puro puto homine juxta Socinistas, sive ex mera et mutabili *creatura*, ut *Ario-manitæ* dicunt, *Deus* ipse fieret, ac *divinos* honores, non modo a nobis *hominibus*, sed etiam ab ipsis *angelis* atque *archangelis* sibi tribuendos assequeretur, adeoque in alias *creaturas* omnes dominium atque imperium obtineret. *Bull. Judic. Eccl. Cathol.* cap. v. p. 313.

much clearer and stronger light upon the *Trinitarian* principles, than upon the *Antitrinitarian*. For if Christ was in the *form* of *God*, *equal with God*, and *very God*, it was then an act of infinite love and *condescension* in him to become man, and die for us: but if he was no more than a *creature*, it was no surprising condescension to embark in a work so glorious, such as being the Saviour of mankind, and such as would advance him to be *Lord* and *Judge* of the world, to be admired, reverenced, and adored both by men and angels, God himself also glorifying him, and sounding forth his praises through the utmost limits of the universe. Where is the *condescension* of a *creature's* submitting to be thus highly honoured? Or what *creature* could there be, that could *modestly* aspire to it, or might not think it much above his pretensions or highest *ambition*[q]? In short, "to become "man, to suffer and die for the redemption of the world, and to "be made the Lord and Judge both of the quick and of the "dead, can be an act of *condescending* love and goodness only in "*God*. So that to deny the *Divinity* of Christ alters the very "foundations of Christianity, and destroys all the powerful argu-"ments of the love, humility, and condescension of our Lord, "which are the peculiar motives of the Gospel[r]." If either the work of redemption was too big for a *creature* to engage in, or if the honours attending it were too high for a *creature* to aspire after[s], then certainly the very notion of *condescension* is sunk and lost, upon every hypothesis which does not make Christ truly

[q] Addo, neque ipsius *Filii Dei* unigeniti *amorem* et charitatem, ergo nos homines (quæ etiam magnifice passim celebratur in S. Scripturis, ac maxime in loco illo Epistolæ ad Ephes. iii. 18, 19.) clare elucere, nisi concipiamus Filium Dei qui ante sæcula ex Patre genitus est, per quem omnia facta sunt, qui propter nos homines, et propter nostram salutem, descendit de cœlis et incarnatus est, &c. At vero hoc modo ——Filii Dei *eminentissima in figmentum suum dilectio*——, clarissime conspicitur. *Bull. Judic. Eccl.* cap. v. p. 311.

[r] Sherlock's Vindication of the Defence of Stillingfleet, chap. v. p. 268.

[s] Οἰκονομία, quæ ipsi tribuitur, θεολογίαν necessario supponit, ipsamque omnino statuit. Quid enim? Messiam sive Christum prædicant sacræ nostræ literæ et credere nos profitemur omnes, qui sit *animarum sospitator*, qui nobis sit *sapientia, justitia, sanctificatio*, et *redemptio*——, qui preces suorum, ubivis sacrosanctum ejus nomen invocantium, illico exaudiat——, qui Ecclesiæ suæ per universum terrarum orbem disseminatæ, semper præsto sit——, qui Deo Patri. σύνθρονος, et in eadem sede collocatus sit——. Qui denique, in exitu mundi, immensa gloria et majestate refulgens, angelis ministris stipatus, veniet orbem judicaturus, non modo facta omnia, sed et cordis secreta omnium quotquot fuere hominum in lucem prodituros, &c. Hæccine omnia in purum *hominem*, aut *creaturam* aliquam competere? Fidenter dico, qui ita sentiat, non modo contra *fidem*, sed et *rationem* ipsam insanire. *Bull. Judic. Eccl. Cath.* cap. i. p. 291, 292.

and properly God, God eternal. I am very sensible, that while I am arguing for the *importance* of the doctrine, I may seem at the same time to be pleading for the *truth* of it, and so to run unawares into the other question. But the two questions are so nearly allied, that I know not sometimes how to avoid it. The same considerations generally which prove one, must of course obliquely glance at the other also: and every Scripture argument, which intimates the *use* and *importance* of the doctrine, must at least tacitly suppose and insinuate the *truth* of it, and so in effect prove both in one. If Scripture has laid down *motives* which are not naturally or reasonably accounted for, or understood, but upon the supposition of the truth of such a doctrine, then both the doctrine itself and the *practical* nature of it are at the same time insinuated: which I mention here once for all, to prevent confusion, and now proceed to what remains.

The *satisfaction* or *propitiation* for the sins of the world, made by Christ, is of great importance to the Christian life, and seems also to have a close connection with the doctrine of the Trinity. The *truth* of the satisfaction, and the *necessity* there was for it, may be substantially proved *a posteriori* from Scripture itself[t], independent of the doctrine of the Trinity. But after proceeding so far, it will be difficult to clear and extricate that Scripture doctrine, without admitting this other also: because it is not reasonable to think that any *creature* could do more than was his bounden duty to do upon God's requiring it; or that he could by any services or sufferings attain to such a degree of *merit*, as should atone for a world of sinners; or that he should be intrusted with such an office (supposing him otherwise *equal* to it) as would of course draw after it the adoration and homage both of men and angels, The question properly here, is not, whether any thing less than God could pay an *infinite* satisfaction, but whether a *creature* could pay *any*, or could *merit* at all. If it be said, that God might *accept* it as he pleased, it may be said likewise, upon the same principle, that he might accept the *blood* of *bulls* or of *goats*. Yet the Apostle tells us, that "it is not "possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away "sins[u]:" which words appear to resolve the *satisfaction* not merely into God's free acceptance, but into the *intrinsic* value of the

[t] See a late rational and judicious discourse upon the subject, entitled, Jesus Christ the Mediator between God and Man, printed for J. Noon, 1732.

[u] Hebrews x. 4.

sacrifice. And while we rest it upon that foot, I do not see why we may not say, that it is not possible for the blood of any *creature* to take away the sins of the world, since no *creature* can do more than his duty, nor can have any stock of *merit* to spare for other creatures. In this light, the Scripture doctrine of the *satisfaction* infers the *Divinity* of him that made it: and hence it is, that those who have denied our Lord's proper *Divinity* have commonly gone on to deny any proper *satisfaction* also; or while they have admitted it in *words* or in *name*, (as they admit also Christ's *Divinity*,) they have denied the *thing*. Scripture itself seems to resolve the *satisfaction* into the *Divinity* of the Person suffering. It was *Jehovah* that was pierced[x]. It was *God* that purchased the Church with *his own blood*[y]: it was ὁ δεσπότης, the *high Lord* that bought us[z]: it was the *Lord of glory* that was *crucified*[a]. And indeed it is unintelligible, how the blood of a *creature* should make any proper atonement or expiation for sin, as before intimated. This again is another of those arguments, or considerations, which at once insinuate both the *truth* of our doctrine and the *importance* of it. However, if Scripture otherwise testifies that Christ is properly *God*, and if the same Scriptures elsewhere, independently of our present argument, declare that Christ has atoned for us; then from these two propositions put together results this *third*, that a *divine* Person has satisfied for us: consequently, whosoever destroys the *Divinity* of Christ, justly so called, does at the same time destroy the true notion of the *satisfaction* made by him. Hence it appears, at the lowest, that the doctrine of the *Trinity* involves several other important doctrines of Christianity with it, and gives another kind of turn and significancy to them, than what they would have without it: and therefore, most undoubtedly, it is no barren *speculation*, no *indifferent* or slight matter, but a doctrine of the foundation, nearly affecting the very *vitals* of Christianity, and the Christian life.

The author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition has spent several pages[b], to invalidate the argument drawn from the common doctrine of the *satisfaction*; and so I must stop for a while to examine what he says. He thinks it cannot be proved,

[x] Zechar. xii. 10. compared with John xix. 37.

[y] Acts xx. 28. For the reading, consult Mills in loc.

[z] 2 Peter ii. 1. See Taylor's True Scripture Doctrine, p. 391, &c.

[a] 1 Cor. ii. 8.

[b] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 24—35.

that "none but God could make such satisfaction[c]." But I conceive, it may be proved from the *nature of the thing*, that no *creature* could *merit*; and from Scripture, that he who made the satisfaction is *God*, is *Jehovah:* and these two considerations taken together do amount to what we pretend to. He himself allows, the *truth* of our doctrine once proved, as to God's being sacrificed, the *consequence* to be indisputable, that it "was some "way or other necessary[cc]." This indeed is not the *whole* of what we are able to prove, as may appear from what hath been said: but even this is sufficient to our present purpose; namely, that if our doctrine is *true*, it must be *important*, because of the other important doctrines which hang upon it. Therefore the doctrine of the *Trinity* is no *speculative* opinion of slight value or significancy. If it be true, it is worth contending for, and *earnestly* too.

He asks, whether we are sure, "that no being inferior to God "could make full amends to divine justice[d]?" We conceive, with very good reason, that no *creature* could *merit* with God, or do works of *supererogation*. I pass over what he observes about *infinite* satisfaction[e], not affecting the question as here by me stated. He asks, how we can be sure, that God "cannot accept "of the sacrifice of the best and most excellent of created "beings?" I say not, what God *can* or *cannot accept:* I know nothing *a priori* about it. But Scripture, as before observed, rests not this matter upon the foot of divine *acceptance*, but upon the *intrinsic* value of the sacrifice: and when we consider the thing in that view, we say, that a *creature's* services or sufferings carry no proper intrinsic *merit* in them. And we add further, that God *has accepted* no sacrifice less than a *divine* sacrifice, because we prove from other topics, that Christ our passover was strictly *God*, and he was *sacrificed* for us. In short, the question is, not what God might have *accepted*, if he had so pleased, but whether, when he has chosen the way of *expiation*, and the Scriptures lay a particular stress and emphasis upon it, as carrying *intrinsic merit* in it, both real and great, whether this can be justly accounted for, on the supposition that our Lord was no more than a *creature*[f].

[c] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 24.
[cc] Ibid. p. 25.
[d] Ibid. p. 25.
[e] Ibid. p. 25, 26, 27.
[f] Verbo dicam: nulli *creaturæ*, licet excellentissima ea sit, excellentissimoque modo operetur, illud competat, ut vitæ æternæ præmium ei ex *stricto jure* debeatur. Præterquam enim

The author goes on to raise difficulties, and to advance divers subtilties to perplex the notion of a *compound* person: most of them, I conceive, run beyond the mark, and might as soon prove that *soul* and *body* make not *one person*, or man, as that God and man make not the *one Person* of Christ. For example; he pleads that a person compounded of God and man "must be inferior "in dignity to a Person wholly and only divine[g]." By the same argument, a man, being partly *spirit* and partly *body*, is inferior in dignity to the separate soul, which is *wholly and only spirit:* and if there be any force in the argument, I know not how far it may affect the doctrine of a *future resurrection*. Now, we say, that the divine nature loses nothing of its dignity by assuming the *uaman;* but retains all the dignity it before had; and therefore the whole Person becomes not *inferior*. He further pleads, that "it is not God that dies, but God-man." Allowed; but still that Person, that Christ, who is *God*, dies: as when a man dies, that Person (who is *soul*, as well as body) dies. We never suppose that the *Godhead* dies, any more than we imagine that the *soul* dies. He says further, that "the "Person which makes the satisfaction is not a divine Person[h]." How so, when the Person is both *God* and *man* (as he had before allowed) in our scheme? Do we make *two* Persons? He argues next against the *humanity* becoming part of the *Person* of Christ. "Nothing can really be this *who*, but must be the *what* this *who* "is, at the same time." He might as justly argue, that Peter's body cannot be part of Peter, or of the *person* of Peter, together with his soul; because nothing can really be this *who* (Peter's soul) but must be *what* this *who* is, at the same time. Now taking for granted that Peter's *soul* is the *whole* person, the argument is good: and so it is likewise in the other case, taking it for granted, that the *Logos* in union is still the *whole* Person; but this is going upon false suppositions: and he might as soon prove that Peter's body cannot be part of Peter, unless it be his *soul*, as that Christ's *humanity* cannot be part of Christ, unless it be the *Logos*. I can hardly conjecture what the author means, when he says, "That human substance we call John, is

quod bonum æternæ vitæ sit absolutissimum, immensum, infinitum, atque adeo *omnia omnium creaturarum* opera *infinitis* gradibus transcendens; illud etiam Apostoli, *ἐρώτημα* tale est, ut ei a nemine responderi possit: *τίς προέδωκεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀνταποδοθήσεται αὐτῷ*; *Rom.* xi. 35. *Bull. Harmon. Apostol.* Dissert. ii. c. 12. p. 490.

[g] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 29.

[h] Ibid. p. 30.

" really the Person, and nothing else[i]." I thought, that John, or John's person, was made up of *two* substances, *spiritual* and *bodily*: and John, the person of John, dies, though one substance survives. In like manner, Christ the *God-man* dies, though the *Godhead* dies not. He adds, much like to what he had said before, that the " human nature can never be really *he*, unless " he be also the divine nature." Does he mean by *he*, part of the person, or the whole person? If he means *part*, then it amounts to this; the *body* can never be really a part of Peter's person, unless it be Peter's *soul*: or if he means the *whole*, then it comes to this, that the body can never be the *whole person*, unless it be the *soul*. One of the propositions is manifestly against *truth*, and the other is not *sense*: so little can be effected in this way of reasoning. Indeed, all the confusion arises from the want of knowing or considering what the true notion of a *person*, simple or compound, is, of which I have elsewhere treated at large[k], and thither I take leave to refer the reader. In the mean while, I cannot but heartily lament and grieve, to find that serious and sensible men can give their minds to oppose a Scriptural and venerable doctrine, which has stood the test of ages, by such fine-spun subtilties: Zeno's arguments against *motion* might appear weighty in comparison.

But we have more of the same kind still, which I shall reply to very briefly. " The dying humanity can have no such dig- " nity[l]." True, but the dying *Christ* might, and that suffices. " The human nature should really and truly be that divine " Person." No: *part* of the Person is sufficient: the *human* nature constitutes one compound Person with the *divine* nature. " The Logos could not really be man." Why? Was not the Word made flesh? that is, the Word became incarnate, assumed humanity. " Humanity could not be assumed into a real com- " munion of his Person, without being assumed into what that " Person is[m]." He must mean, I presume, without being converted into *Godhead*. But why not, if *bodies* at the general resurrection may be assumed into a *personal* union with *souls*, without ceasing to be *bodies*, or being converted into *spirits*? " For the same thing (*Person*) to be God and man at once, that

[i] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 31.
[k] Second Defence, Query xv. vol. ii. p. 650—653.
[l] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 32.
[m] Ibid. p. 33.

" is, really and truly so, is surely as impossible as transubstan-
" tiation[n]." And yet surely it is not more impossible than for the same *human being* (call him Peter or John) to be both *soul* and *body* at once, *really* and *truly* so; which a man may firmly believe as a certain truth, without admitting *transubstantiation*, a palpablo absurdity. "That man should really and strictly " speaking be a divine Person, or a divine Person man, to me " seems utterly impossible[o]." If he means, that the divine nature is not the human, nor the human divine, he says right, and has no opposer: but if he means, that *divine* substance and *human* substance together, may not make *one Person*, or *one Christ*, let him shew why it is more impossible than for a *spiritual* substance and a *corporeal* substance to make *one person*, or *one man*. He adds, or repeats, that " the death of the man is not the " death of God[oo]." But it is the death of *Christ*, who is God and man. So the death of the *body* is not the death of the *soul;* but it is the death of the *man*, who is both soul and body. Such is the nature of a *personal* union, and such the manner of speaking of it; and it is so obvious and common a case, that none but *philosophers* would mistake it.

The author closes his discourse on this head with observing, that our opposers may carry the point of *satisfaction* as high as we do, and account as handsomely for it. As how? By supposing the Logos to be in as close an union with God, as we suppose Christ's humanity to be with the Logos[p]. Well then, it must be a *personal* union, so as to make the *Father* and the *Logos* one Person. How then? Then " the sufferings of the Logos will be " as much the sufferings of God, and as much an atonement for " sin, as the death of Christ's human nature in *the other* scheme[q]." True: but then the sufferings of the Logos will be the sufferings of the *Father*, (which is the ancient heresy of the Patripassians,) and the same *Person* both pays and accepts the ransom, makes an atonement to *himself;* which is not consonant to *Scripture*, nor to common sense.

The author concludes his account of this matter with this inference, that the men whom he has been pleading for " do not " seem so deeply culpable, nor so dangerously mistaken[r]," as is commonly represented. To me it appears quite the contrary;

[n] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 34. [p] Ibid. p. 34.
[o] Id. ibid. [oo] Id. ibid. [q] Ibid. p. 34, 35. [r] Ibid. p. 35.

and from this very representation of his, whereby he intended to favour them. They are deeply culpable, 1. For making God the Son a *creature*, against the whole tenor of Scripture. 2. For running into *Patripassianism*, to help out *Arianism*; heaping error upon error, heresy upon heresy. 3. For doing it upon the strength only of a few dialectical or metaphysical *subtilties*, scarce worthy to be offered, or so much as named, in so momentous a cause as this is. 4. For making use of such topics against the personal union of *God* and *man*, as might with equal force be urged against the personal union of any *two substances* whatever, and prove (if they prove any thing) that an human person is not made up of *soul* and *body*. 5. For condemning their opposers as void of *charity*, only for their pious, faithful, and extremely *charitable* endeavours to preserve their flocks from being led aside after Satan, from imbibing sentiments subversive of the Gospel of Christ. But I shall have more to say upon the head of *charity* in another chapter. I hope my reader will excuse my digressing thus far (if it may be called a digression) upon the article of *satisfaction*, to attend the *author* who gave the occasion. Now I return.

I have been representing the *practical* nature and *important* uses of the doctrine of the *Trinity*, with respect to *worship*, in which all the *three* Persons are interested; and I have more particularly pressed the *importance* of the doctrine of our Lord's *Divinity*, from *special* considerations relating to the Gospel *motives*, and the nature of the *atonement* made for sins. I ought not here to omit the like *special* considerations concerning the *Holy Spirit*, and the necessity of believing his *Divinity* likewise. I shall choose here to express myself in the excellent words of a celebrated writer, whom I have before quoted more than once. "Our salvation by Christ does not only consist in the *expiation* "of our sins, &c.—but in the *communication of divine grace* and "power to renew and sanctify us: and this is every where in "Scripture attributed to the *Holy Spirit*, as his peculiar office "in the economy of man's salvation. And it must make a *fun-*"*damental change* in the doctrine of divine *grace* and assistance, "to deny the *Divinity* of the *Holy Spirit*. For can a *creature* "be the *universal* spring and fountain of divine grace and life? "Can a finite *creature* be a kind of *universal* soul to the whole "Christian Church, and to every sincere member of it? Can a "*creature* make such close application to our minds, know our

" thoughts, set bounds to our passions, inspire us with new " affections and desires, and be more intimate to us than we " are to ourselves? If a *creature* be the only instrument and " principle of *grace*, we shall soon be tempted, either to deny " the *grace* of God, or to make it only an *external* thing, and " entertain very mean conceits of it. All these *miraculous gifts*, " which were bestowed on the Apostles and primitive Christians, " for the edification of the Church, all the *graces of the Christian* " *life*, are the fruits of the *Spirit*. The *divine Spirit* is the " principle of *immortality* in us, which first gives life to our " souls, and will at the last day raise our dead bodies out of " the dust; works which sufficiently proclaim him to be *God*, " and which we cannot heartily believe, in the *Gospel notion*, if " he be not [u]."

What this excellent writer has here said appears all to be very right and just; and his observation of the doctrine of divine *grace* being likely to suffer much by a denial of the *Divinity* of the Holy Spirit has been too sadly verified in the event. How jejunely, how sparingly, have the abettors of the *new schemes* insisted upon the doctrine of *grace*, and of the invisible workings of the *Holy Spirit*, though Scripture is full of the subject! So that, besides the danger of losing the salutary doctrine of a proper *satisfaction* and *expiation*, we are further in danger of losing the true Scripture notion of *grace*, by the opposition made to the doctrine of the Trinity. I believe I might appeal to the consciences of those gentlemen, whether their gratitude to *Christ*, for what he has done and suffered for us, be not in a manner lost, and swallowed up in their regards to the *Father* for *commanding* and *accepting* it; and whether the notion of the *grace* of the *Holy Spirit* be not entirely absorbed in the thought of the superior *assistance* of God. The effect is natural, and I judge in this case by what I should find in myself. Upon their hypothesis, " the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the " love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost [x]," will amount only to the love of the *Father* thrice told; which supersedes both the other. And when it is said, that the *Father* and *Son* will *make* their *abode with* us [y], and in the same chapter, that the *Holy Ghost* also *will abide* with us *for ever* [z], the two

[u] Sherlock's Vindication of the Defence of Stillingfleet, p. 270, &c.
[x] 2 Cor. xiii. 14. [y] John xiv. 23. [z] John xiv. 16.

creatures superadded to the *Creator* will appear but as ciphers that add nothing to the sum, while in *one* we have all, and there is nothing but that *one* to be at all depended upon. His *presence* alone will supply every thing, and his lustre will so far eclipse both the other Persons, that it will be hard to say (upon the hypothesis I am mentioning) what occasion there would be for them, or what comfort in them. Such is the appearing *change* made in the very form and essence of Christianity by these *new* doctrines, that it seems to lose the very life and soul of it, and by degrees to degenerate into little else but a better kind of *Judaism*, retaining still the *name* of Christianity, but giving up the main things.

While we consider the doctrine of the *Trinity* as interwoven with the very frame and texture of the Christian religion, it appears to me natural to conceive, that the whole scheme and economy of man's redemption was laid with a principal view to it, in order to bring mankind gradually into an acquaintance with the three divine Persons, one God blessed for ever. I would speak with all due modesty, caution, and reverence, as becomes us always in what concerns the unsearchable counsels of Heaven: but I say, there appears to me none so natural or so probable an account of the divine dispensations, from first to last, as what I have just mentioned; namely, that such a *redemption* was provided, such an *expiation* for sins required, such a method of *sanctification* appointed, and then revealed, that so men might know that there are three *divine* Persons, might be apprised how infinitely the world is obliged to them, and might accordingly be both *instructed and incited* to love, honour, and adore them here, because that must be a considerable part of their employment and happiness hereafter. I urge not this as an argument of the *truth* of the doctrine, but as a consideration of great weight, supposing the doctrine *true*, for the recommending it to our affections, and for the raising our ideas of it. The divine dispensations appear both rational and amiable, considered in this light: and if it be not too bold to offer any *rationale* of them, I would humbly presume to say, that there is none so satisfactory as what I have now mentioned. I can see no probable reason why the Church of God should be, as it were, first put under the immediate conduct of the *Father*, then under the *Son*, and last of all under the *Holy Ghost*; nor why the honour of *creating* should be principally ascribed to the *first*,

and the honour of *redemption*, as considerable as creation, to the *second*, and the honour of *illumination*, *sanctification*, and *miraculous gifts*, as considerable as any thing before, to the *third*: I say, I can see no probable reason for these things (when the *Father*, as it should seem, might as well have had the *sole* honour of all) but upon the hypothesis which I have hinted [a].

But however that be, or whatever other reasons divine wisdom, to us unsearchable, might proceed upon in every dispensation towards mankind, certain it is, that the doctrine of the *Trinity*, if true, (as we here suppose,) runs through every part of Christian theology, and gives, as it were, a new force and spirit to it.

I have been proving, from several topics, that this doctrine is *important* and *practical*, no slight, no *speculative* opinion. I shall add but one consideration more, and that a *general* one, applicable to all other articles of faith, and proving them to be *practical* in a large sense of the word, but a *just sense* too, and well deserving our notice. As we are *commanded* to *believe* whatever God reveals, *belief* itself is an instance of *obedience*; and *unbelief*, much more *disbelief*, is *disobedience* to the commands of God. Consequently, unless obedience and disobedience are points of mere *speculation*, there is no room left for any pretence of that kind in the case now before us. Let the *matter* of the belief be otherwise ever so *speculative*, (though it is not the case here,) yet to believe Scripture verities, prime verities especially, is under *precept*, is express duty; and all duty is *practical* in a large sense, as it is paying *obedience* to God's commandments. St. Paul therefore, more than once, speaks of the *obedience of faith* [b], and with great propriety, since *believing* is *obeying* the will of God, and is entitled to a *reward*. It is true, *faith* and

[a] Ac profecto admiranda mihi videtur divinarum Personarum in sacrosanctissima triade *οἰκονομία*, qua unaquaque Persona distincto quasi titulo humanum imprimis genus imperio suo divino obstrinxerit, titulo illi respondente etiam distincta unius cujusque imperii patefactione. *Patrem* colimus sub titulo *Creatoris* hujus universi, qui et ab ipsa mundi *creatione* hominibus innotuerit: *Filium* adoramus sub titulo *Redemptoris* ac *Servatoris* nostri, cujus idcirco divina gloria atque imperium non nisi post peractum in terris humanæ *redemptionis* ac *salutis* negotium fuerit patefactum: *Spiritum* denique *sanctum* veneramur sub titulo *Paracleti*, *Illuminatoris*, et *Sanctificatoris* nostri, cujus adeo divina Majestas demum post descensum ejus in Apostolos primosque Christianos, donorum omne genus copiosissima largitione illustrissimum, clarius emicuerit. Nimirum tum demum Apostoli, idque ex Christi mandato, gentes baptizabant in *plenam atque adunatam Trinitatem*. *Bull. Primitiva Tradit.* c. vi. p. 399.

[b] Rom. i. 5. xv. 18. xvi. 19, 26. Conf. Act. vi. 7. Vid. Wolfii Curæ Philolog. et Criticæ ad Rom. xvi. 19.

obedience (taking *obedience* in a more restrained sense) are often contradistinguished: but interpreting *obedience* in its fullest and most comprehensive meaning; *faith* is properly a *species* of it, another kind of obedience. Faith is a *virtue*, both a moral and a Christian virtue, as a very ingenious and acute writer observes. "As to the nature of *faith*, it is plain that it is a *moral virtue*, "as being that natural homage which the *understanding*, or *will*, "(for I need not here dispute which[c],) pays to God, in receiving "and assenting to what he reveals, upon his bare word, or "authority: it is an *humiliation* of ourselves, and a glorification "of God. And as it is a *moral*, so it is also a *Christian* virtue, "as being a *duty* commanded in the Gospel, and an act of "Christian humility[d]." If it be objected, that *faith* depends entirely upon *evidence*, and therefore is no matter of *choice*, and therefore is no virtue, nor can properly fall under *precept;* I deny that *faith* depends entirely upon *evidence*, though it ought to do so. There are *motives* to assent or dissent, as well as *rational grounds;* and those *motives* often bias and determine the judgment, either without *reason* or against it: not that men can *always* believe what they *will*, but inclination *frequently* has a great hand in their persuasions. Men can lean, and will lean, to the side which they happen to favour, upon *motives* of education, habit, authority, or example; or of interest, vanity, pride, passion, resentment, and the like: and when they so lean to a side, they can be *partial* in examining, *rash* in judging, or *precipitate* in resolving; so that the *will* may much influence *belief*. And as to *unbelief*, or *disbelief*, the influence is still more apparent: for, excepting such glaring facts as force assent by obtruding themselves upon the senses, all other things almost may be slighted and set aside. A man may refuse to *attend* to the clearest *demonstration*, or may industriously perplex it, and never let in the *light* which might convince him of its truth: and what he may do in that case, he may much more easily do in others, where the evidence is not so bright, or strong, or comes not up to perfect demonstration. These things considered, it must be allowed that *faith* has at least a great dependence upon the *will*, if it be not itself an act of the will, as appears most probable. *Diligence* in looking out for evidence, *patience* and *perseverance*

[c] See that point fully discussed in Fiddes's Body of Divinity, vol. i. p. 333, &c.

[d] Norris's Christian Prudence, p. 259.

in attending to it, *honesty* in considering, comparing, balancing, and then determining on the side of truth, these are all matters of *choice*, depending on the *will*; and therefore a right *faith* is a submission of our *wills* in that instance to God. Seeing therefore that *faith* in general is *virtue* and *duty*, and therefore *practical*, it follows most evidently, that faith in the doctrine of the Trinity (supposing the doctrine *true*) is *practical* in its nature, is both moral and Christian *duty*.

Now to sum up briefly what has been done in this chapter; it has been shewn, that the doctrine of the Trinity is of prime consideration for directing and determining our *worship*, and that it influences *Christian practice* many ways, as forming proper *dispositions*, as raising and strengthening the *Gospel motives*, and as enforcing the doctrines of *satisfaction* made by Christ, and of *illumination* and *sanctification* by the Holy Spirit; on all which accounts it appears to be strictly *practical*, and highly *important*: and it has been further intimated, that all duty is practical, and that *faith* is duty; and therefore *this* faith, as well as any other, and because of its important nature, more than many other. I conclude therefore from the premises laid down in this chapter, that the doctrine of the Trinity is *practical* enough to be a *fundamental* article of Christianity.

I must own, there is a narrow kind of sense, and very improper, of the word *practical*, which I have observed in some writers, according to which the doctrine of the Trinity would not be a *practical* doctrine: for they mean by *practical*, what concerns practice between *man* and *man*, and nothing else. Such persons would not scruple to say, that *worship* itself is no *practical* matter: and it must be allowed it is not in that sense; it is not a duty of the *second table*, but of the *first*. It may deserve considering, whether that narrow sense of the word *practical* might not first give rise to the objection, that the doctrine of the Trinity is not *practical*, but *speculative*; conceiving every thing to be *speculative*, excepting the common offices of life which we owe one towards another. Now indeed, according to such interpretation of the words *practical* and *speculative*, we should never affirm that this doctrine is *practical*, or deny that it is *speculative*: for the duties depending upon it are branches of the first and great commandment, the *love of God*, and not of the second, viz. the *love of our neighbour*. But what would all this amount to, more than to a dispute about *words* or *names*? For

we should still insist upon it that our doctrine is *practical*, as much as any duties of the *first table* are practical; which suffices: and so at length, in a just and proper sense of the word, the doctrine of the Trinity is practical enough to be a *fundamental*, if the *love of God* may be justly called a *fundamental*.

But when we speak of the doctrine, we mean it of the *general* doctrine itself, not of the minute circumstances, or appendages of it, which are either of a doubtful nature, or of slighter consideration. For "though it is *necessary* and *essential* to the "Christian faith to acknowledge Father, Son, and Holy Ghost "to be one eternal God, yet there are a great many little subtilties started by over curious and busy heads, which are not "*fundamental* doctrines, and ought not to be thought so. God "forbid that all the nice *distinctions* and *definitions* of the Schools, "about *essence, subsistence, personality*, about *eternal generation* "and *procession*, the difference between *filiation* and *spiration*, "&c. should be reckoned among *fundamentals* of our faith. For "though we understood nothing of these matters, (as indeed "we do not, and it had been happy the Church had never "heard of them,) yet if we believe the *Divinity* of each Person, "we believe enough to understand the doctrine of *salvation*. "And though that fatal dispute between the Greek and Latin "Church, about the *Filioque*, be of more importance than such "*scholastic subtilties*, yet I cannot see that it concerns the *foun*-"*dation* of our faith. For the Greek Church did firmly believe "the *Holy Spirit* to be *true God*, though they would not own "that he proceeded from the Father *and the Son*, but from the "*Father only*. And though we must acknowledge this to be a "*mistake*, yet it is not a *fundamental* mistake: for the doctrine "of salvation is secured by believing the *Holy Spirit* to be *true* "*God*, without defining the *manner* of his *procession*[e]." I may just take notice by the way, that the doctrine of the Trinity hath been but little *befriended* by the *Schoolmen*; rather hurt by them[f], though they did not design it. For, 1. By bringing up all the difficulties and perplexities they could themselves invent, or elsewhere meet with, they furnished out matter for the enemies of the faith to lay hold on; and it was from thence chiefly that the Socinians afterwards borrowed their materials to work

[e] Sherlock's Vindication of the Defence of Stillingfleet, p. 273, 274.

[f] See Dr. Berriman's History of the Trin. Controversy, p. 378, &c.

with. 2. In the next place, by overlarding a plain doctrine with distinctions and subtilties in great abundance, they *disguised* and *obscured* it, that it was not easy to see through the mist they had raised. 3. Further, by thus perplexing and diluting it, they really *weakened* it: for it is much easier to oppose it as it stands tricked up in that scholastic form, than as it stands in *Scripture*, and in the *ancient* Fathers. 4. They brought a kind of scandal and disgrace upon the doctrine, as if it subsisted chiefly upon *scholastic subtilties*: an imputation which the adversaries to the Christian faith have eagerly laid hold on, and often invidiously charged upon the Trinitarians at large; though nothing can be more *false* or *injurious*. The truth is, the very distinguishing character of the *Trinitarians*, in the days of the *Fathers*, was their resting their cause wholly upon *Scripture* and *tradition*; as the distinguishing character of the *Antitrinitarians* was their building mostly upon *logical* or *metaphysical* quirks and subtilties[g]. What a string of those wanton levities have we in Aëtius, preserved and answered by Epiphanius[h], enough to fright any common reader, or to nauseate any man of good sense. The like we have again in Eunomius, answered by Basil, and by Gregor. Nyssen. The Catholics scarce ever ran out into *metaphysical* notions, or expressions, excepting in two cases, and both in the way of *self-defence*. One was, when they were attacked with *false* metaphysics, they then laboured to answer them with *true*, lest the adversaries should triumph on that head, and seduce the populace. The other was, when the scriptural and customary expressions, which were used to convey a *good sense*, and could justly bear no other, were perverted to a *bad one* by equivocation and wile; the Church could then have no so effectual security against false doctrines and false teachers creeping in among them, to corrupt the *faith*, and to beguile the *unwary*, as by adopting some new terms, and chosen expressions, for the supporting *old* truths[i]. This latter case is so naturally represented by a modern writer, that I shall take the freedom to borrow his words, for the sake of laying it in the most lively manner before the reader. "Let me suppose an Arian standing "before you, and submitting himself to your examination, you "ask him, whether he believes Christ to be *God?* He answers

[g] See Socrat. E. H. lib. v. c. 10. Hieron. contr. Lucifer. tom. iv. par. 2. col. 296. ed. Bened.

[h] Epiphan. Hæres. lxxvi. p. 924, &c.

[i] See Dr. Berriman's History of the Trinitarian Controversy, p. 174—179.

" in the *affirmative*. You again inquire, what *kind of God* he " supposes him to be? He replies, such a God as the Bible " makes him. This, you will complain, is *collusive* language; " however, you request him to satisfy you, whether he believes " the Son to be *truly* and *properly* God? To this he saith, *Yes*, " consistently enough with his *own* notion of God, though not " with *yours*. But you further ask, does he believe him to be " *one with the Father?* To this he likewise replies in the *affirma-* " *tive*. You then press him with another question, *How* is he " one with the Father, is he of the *same essence* with the Father? " To this the Arian answers, by asking you what you mean by " *essence?* If you comply with his desire, and explain your " notion of the term, you are *unavoidably* drawn into *metaphysi-* " *cal* points[k]." Thus we see *metaphysical* terms may be sometimes used by the orthodox side, when it is *unavoidable*; that is, when it is necessary to guard against *equivocation* and *disguise*, for the preserving the *true faith*, and for the excluding such *ministers* as would corrupt the Gospel truths, and mislead the people committed to their care. But then it is wrong to blame those honest and conscientious guides for making use of the only remedy which is left them, and which nothing but the utmost necessity, brought upon them by the prevarication of others, would ever make them choose. It is plain by this and the like instances, that they are not fond of *metaphysics*, not so much as of the *terms*: nor would there be any occasion for new words, or any use of them, if many had not learned to undermine the *ancient* faith by affixing *new* and *wrong* ideas to the *ancient* forms. The very nature of the thing speaks itself: and the like methods have been used in most other forms and tests, as daily experience has shewn the necessity of it. Thus, to instance in the common case of *oaths* to a government, they are usually worded in as full and expressive terms as can be devised: and yet that sometimes is not thought sufficient, unless it be further added, *without any equivocation*, or *mental reservation*, or something of like kind. I ask my reader's pardon for digressing a while from the particular point I was upon: but these reflections came naturally in my way, and may perhaps be of use as to the main thing: and now I pass on to a new chapter.

[k] Reply to Mr. P. C.'s Letter, p. 11, 12.

CHAP. III.

Shewing that the Doctrine of the Trinity is sufficiently insisted upon in Scripture to be deemed an Article of prime Importance.

OUR dispute must here be with the Dutch Remonstrants. The most celebrated men amongst them were Episcopius and Limborch. I shall consider them both with care; that it may be seen by the things wherein they agree, what is it that both aim at, and by the points wherein they differ, how both of them were at a loss for any sound principle of reason to proceed upon: and the conclusion which perhaps may naturally result from all will be this; that they had some *motives*, or specious *colours*, for the persuasion which they jointly entertained, but no *rational grounds* for it.

1. I begin with the learned Episcopius, as the principal man. The sum of what his sentiments on this head amount to is, that the doctrine of the Trinity, as to the main substance of it, is *certain* and *clear*, but yet not *necessary* to be believed in order to salvation, nor important enough to justify an *anathema* against the impugners of it, or for the rejecting their communion.

First, I say, he admits our main doctrine as *true* and *certain*, being plainly taught in *Scripture*: this appears from the Confession of the Remonstrants, where the doctrine is taught in full and strong terms[l], as likewise from other places in Episcopius's works[m]. Next, I observe, that in his discussion of the question of the *perspicuity* of Scripture against Bellarmin, he declares the

[l] Cæterum distincte ac relate consideratur Deus sub trina Hypostasi, sive tribus Personis.—Solus Pater originis omnis expers—sed qui Deitatem tamen suam, tum *Filio unigenito*,—tum etiam *Spiritui Sancto—ab æterno* communicavit.—*Filius* ergo et *Spiritus Sanctus* ejusdem cum Patre Deitatis, seu divinæ essentiæ ac naturæ, absolute ac communiter consideratæ, consortes sunt: prout inter alia; maxime probatur ex *divinis* nominibus, seu titulis, item ex *divinis* proprietatibus, et operationibus, quæ utrique in sacris literis *aperte* passim tribuuntur. *Remonstrant. Confes.* c. 3. *apud Episcop. Op.* vol. ii. p. 78.

[m] *Certum* est tribus hisce Personis *Divinitatem*, sive *divinas* perfectiones in Scriptura tribui. *Episcop. Instit.* lib. iv. p. 333.

Mirum non videri debere, si tribus hisce Personis *una eademque natura divina* tribuatur, cum iis Scriptura *divinas* istas perfectiones, quæ naturæ *divinæ* propriæ sunt, tam exerte attribuat. *Episcop. ibid.*

doctrine of the Trinity (such no doubt he must mean as the Remonstrants' Confession, and his own other writings contain) is *clear*, *perspicuous*, and *easy* to be understood[n].

Notwithstanding all this, the same Episcopius was pleased to deny the *necessity* of believing the *eternal generation* of the Son, (which with him appears to be the same with denying his *eternal existence*,) and consequently, the *necessity* of believing the received doctrine of the *Trinity*. And he denied the necessity of so believing, as for several other reasons, so principally for this, because the *Scripture* had neither directly nor indirectly declared the *necessity* of the doctrine, though it had taught the *truth* of it[o].

But then again I must observe of him, that he seems to me, not so properly to have denied the *necessity* of believing that doctrine, (in our sense of *necessity*,) as the *necessity* of pronouncing an *anathema* upon the impugners, which he conceived must follow upon the other, and which he interpreted to such a rigid sense, as to mean sentencing the men directly to *hell fire*, or to everlasting damnation. This last particular was what he chiefly, or solely hesitated upon, when he came to explain: or he would be thought, at least, to mean no more; as appears from his own words, in his answer to the Leyden Divines[p]; as also from

[n] Atqui, ait, Scriptura tradit summa *mysteria*. Quæ, inquam, illa? Primo, ait, de *divina Trinitate*. Atqui ea, prout Scriptura tradit, nego *obscura*, nedum *obscurissima* esse. Addo, ea *clara*, *perspicua*, *et facilia intellectu* esse, prout et quatenus ea in Scriptura traduntur. *Episcop. Instit.* lib. iv. c. 18. p. 269.

[o] Hactenus ergo de *veritate* articuli hujus agimus, restat, ut videamus de ejus *credendi necessitate*.—Argumenta pro parte negante mihi longe videntur præponderare. 1. Quia nuspiam in Scriptura id *necessarium creditu* esse asseritur, nec per bonam nedum necessariam consequentiam ex ea elicitur. *Episcop. Instit.* lib. iv. c. 34. p. 338.

Certum est iis, qui sic errant, in Scripturis nuspiam, nec diserte, neque in terminis, neque per manifestam consequentiam, *anathema* dici. Quod autem in Scripturis non est, etiamsi verissimum sit, necessarium tamen dogma non esse ipsi doctores in synopsi sua adferunt. *Episcop. Opp.* vol. ii. p. 295.

[p] Author iste diserte et in terminis Socinianos inter eos collocat quibus salus abjudicanda non est. Id nuspiam fecerunt Remonstrantes. At *anathema* illis non dicunt. Esto: sed nec negant *anathema* illis dicendum esse. Quid ergo? Ἐπέχουσι, neutrum dicunt.—Ne quid præcipitent, malunt relinquere tam severum ac grave judicium Deo et tempori usque dum causas satis graves habebunt, ut in alteram partem cum certa animi fiducia descendant.——Ex altera parte occurrere vident diram ac funestam *anathematos* atque *æternæ condemnationis* sententiam: a qua tantopere se abhorrere profitentur, ut eam nisi plenissime persuasi ferre non audeant adeoque ferre illicitum sibi credant. *Episcop. Respons. ad Specim. Calumn.* p. 295.

his manner of wording the question in his Institutions[q], and elsewhere[r].

But that Episcopius did not deal fairly and uprightly in this matter may be made appear from several considerations; as, 1. Because he aggravated the business of an *anathema* beyond what he had reason for; which makes it look like pretence. 2. Because he was not consistent with himself, either in his doctrine or conduct. 3. Because he has laid down a very fallacious rule for judging of *necessaries*. 4. Because he has done the like in other instances also, and with as little reason, only to afford shelter for the Socinians.

1. I say, first, he has aggravated the matter of an *anathema* beyond what he had reason for. When St. Paul delivered over to *Satan*, the design of it was kind and salutary, that "the spirit "might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus[s]." If men must not have warning given them of their *evil ways*, all friendly reproof is at an end; and it will be unlawful to tell them, however just or necessary the occasion be, that they are in a dangerous state, and upon the verge of destruction. The declaring such a case publicly, if it be right and true, is an eminent act of charity both to them and to the world.

But further; every *anathema* upon a *doctrine* is not an *anathema*, in Episcopius's sense, upon the *persons* teaching it[t]. The doctrine may be censured as pernicious and detestable, and yet the patrons of it believed to be in a *salvable* state, on account of *invincible* ignorance, or prejudices, or some unhappy *warmth* of temper, or enthusiastic disorder of mind. It is no certain

[q] Utrum scilicet præcise *ad salutem scitu et creditu necessarium* sit, Jesum peculiari isto quem adstruximus modo Filium Dei esse, iisque qui id negant, aut in dubium vocant, ac proinde id confiteri non audent, *anathema* sit dicendum? *Episcop. Institut.* lib. iv. c. 34. p. 338.

[r] Stabat jam animo *Remonstrantium* hæc sententia; nulli doctrinæ, nulli homini *anathema* dicere, nisi cui *Deus* ipse *anathema* dicit, vel expressis verbis, vel sic, ut per consequentiam omni exceptione majorem et cuivis obviam, id Deum dicere colligi possit. Deum non reperiunt *anathema* dicere, &c.——Absit a Remonstrantibus, ut tam promptam habeant spongiam qua ex albo *vitæ æternæ* infinitas animarum alioquin sanctissimarum myriadas expungant, ob ignorantiam earum rerum, quæ sufficiunt ad doctissimi cujusque industriam exercendam ut eas possint intelligere, aut si forte eas intelligant, adeo tenues ac subtiles sunt ut eas persuadere aliis pæne impossibile sit. *Apolog. pro Confess. Remonstrant.* p. 136.

[s] 1 Cor. v. 5.

[t] Distinguendum judicium de *hominibus*, a judicio de *rebus ipsis*. De *hominibus*, præstat judicium cohibere, eosque Dei judicio relinquere, saltem nisi apertissimæ judicandi rationes adsint: de *rebus ipsis*, dogmatibus nempe, cultibus, regimine, ex Dei verbo judicare licet. *Alphons. Turretin. de Articul. Fundament.* p. 39.

consequence, that we must therefore condemn the men to *hell fire*, or presume to erase them in our opinion out of the *Book of Life*, only because we pronounce their doctrines false, or wicked, or subversive of the Gospel[u].

Further, merely renouncing, or refusing *communion* with some persons, may sometimes not amount to any *judicial* censure at all, but may be only taking due care of our own *salvation*, and conscientiously providing that we be not found partakers in other men's sins.

These things considered, it is plain that Episcopius's so tragical exclamations against denouncing an *anathema* upon the Socinian doctrines, or against *renouncing* communion with the men, were carried too far, and aggravated beyond reason. He might have condemned their doctrines as pernicious or dangerous; and he might have declared the doctrine of the *Trinity* highly *important*, or generally *necessary* to salvation, without passing any such *terrible* sentence upon particular men: which yet if he had, might reasonably have been construed as no more than a friendly warning, and a declaration of his sense.

2. I observe further, that he was not very consistent with himself, either in his *doctrine* or his *conduct*, so far as concerns our present article. It appears from the public Confession of himself and friends, and from what I have cited besides, that he held the doctrine of the Trinity, as commonly received, to be *true, certain*, and *clear:* and yet when he comes to justify himself in his refusing to condemn the Socinians, or their doctrines, there he falls to talking of the *obscurity* of those articles which the Socinians rejected, such as few besides the *learned* were able to *understand*, scarcely they, and fewer could believe[x]. Now one would be glad to know of what kind of things he is there speaking. If he intends his reflection upon the *appendages* to the main doctrine, or upon *scholastic subtilties*, (some true and some false,) those were not the things, or however not the *only* things, which any one could blame the Socinians for rejecting; so that this kind of excuse is entirely wide and foreign, and the making use

[u] Adest quippe, et in *vitiis*, atque *peccatis*, ita ut in *ignorantia* atque *erroribus*, duplex remedium: alterum ex parte nostra, nimirum *pœnitentia*, seu generalis seu particularis; alterum a parte Dei, puta ejus *misericordia;* quorum ope ut *peccatis* gravissimis, ita et gravissimis *erroribus* veniæ locum dari posse, a nemine negari potest. *Alphons. Turretin. de Articulis Fundamental.* p. 5.

[x] See the last quotation from the Apology &c.

of it is playing upon his readers: but if he means the *main doctrine* of the Trinity, for the rejecting whereof the Socinians highly deserve censure, why does he here represent it as *obscure*, or scarce credible, when at other times he admits it as a *clear* and a *certain* truth? I see no way of reconciling Episcopius to Episcopius in things so contradictory and inconsistent.

As to his *conduct*, there was a further inconsistency in his condemning the *Calvinistical* doctrines of *absolute predestination* &c. as impiety and blasphemy, and that publicly, and yet refusing to do the like by the Socinian tenets, which certainly had no more claim to favour than the other. And how far was such a censure short of denouncing an *anathema* against the Calvinists for holding them; though at the same time he professed not to pronounce any *anathema* where God had not pronounced one? Where could he find any Scripture *anathema* against *absolute* predestination, (though I must own I dislike the doctrine as well as he,) or where could he find it said in *terms*, or by plain *consequence*, that it is *necessary* to salvation to believe it *conditional*, more than he might find for the belief of the doctrine of the *Trinity* also, if he pleased? His *conduct* therefore appears, in that instance, to have been inconsistent, and not of a piece with itself. It was objected to the Remonstrants[y], that they made *blasphemers* of the Calvinists, but easily passed over the Socinians without such censure: and all the excuse made for it was, that the *Calvinistical* doctrines were very *notorious*, and the Calvinists had been very severe, cruel, and inhuman in their way of supporting them[z]. But surely the Socinian blasphemies

[y] Secundum membrum est, quod Remonstrantes, cum in declaratione sententiam suam de *prædestinatione* et articulis ei annexis declarent, doctrinam Ecclesiarum *Reformatarum* non modo κατ' ἀντίθεσιν rejiciant, sed eam quoque *impietatis* ac *blasphemiæ* condemnant; in hac tamen doctrina (sc. *Trinitatis*) *hæreticos* nullos, aut *hæretica* nulla dogmata improbent, damnent, aut *anathemate* percutiant. *Vid. Apolog. pro Confess. Remonstr.* p. 135.

[z] Nec enim mirum est Remonstrantes doctrinam istam Calvinisticam rejecisse passim in sua *declaratione*, et quæ ex ea consequuntur, *impietates* et *blasphemias* damnasse ex professo, a cæteris autem ex professo damnandis abstinuisse. Istud ut facerent, gravissimas causas habebant: nam sententia ista *hæretica* Calvini jam *nota* erat, vel pueris a furno et lacu redeuntibus: patroni ejus non damnaverant tantum *contrariam veritatem*, sed etiam *intolerabilem* ecclesiis suis judicaverant; professores exauthoraverant &c.——Istam sententiam ut coloribus suis ad vivum depingerent (Remonstrantes) necessarium erat; idque eo magis quod eam, prout jacet, *pestem* credant, et *venenum* religionis omnis, cum qua forte *hæresis* nulla alia comparari mereatur; et tamen nihilominus eam, ut fundamentum et basin religionis pene totius Christianæ statui et propugnari videant. *Apolog. pro Confess.* p. 135, 136.

were as *notorious* as any could be: and how could the *Calvinistical* doctrines (supposing them bad) be ever the worse, or amount to *blasphemy* or *impiety* ever the more, for the cruelty of their patrons and abettors? There is no just or consistent account to be given of this *unequal* conduct, except it be this; that blasphemies of *adversaries* (supposing them such) are real *blasphemies*, and deserve an *anathema;* but blasphemies of *friends*, or of brethren in affliction, are innocent, and deserve no *anathema* at all. When the Remonstrants have said all they can, they will not be able to persuade the Christian world that those *Calvinistical* doctrines (though I take them to be wrong) are worse than the Socinian; or that a charge of horrid *impiety*, *blasphemy*, *pest*, *poison*, and *heresy*, is justifiable in one case, and not in the other: so that upon the whole, it might be very easy to retort upon the Remonstrants their own tragical exclamations against denouncing an *anathema:* for let them but have the direction of it, and they discover no great aversion to it upon *weighty occasions*, as to them appear; and in doctrines which they judge to be of great *importance*, they could be very smart and severe in their *censures*.

3. But the most material thing of all is, to examine Episcopius's rule for determining *necessaries*, which seems to be very fallacious. He would have a thing declared *necessary* in Scripture, either *expressly*, or by plain *consequence*. Here I know not what he would call a *plain consequence:* otherwise indeed, the rule may be very just. I take it, if the *truth* of a doctrine be fully and plainly taught in *Scripture*, and it appears, from the nature and quality of the doctrine itself, that it is *important*, and that much depends upon it, that then Scripture has by *plain consequence* declared the *necessity* of believing such doctrine by declaring its *truth*. If the rule be thus interpreted, then by the same rule the doctrine of the *Trinity* is important in a *Scripture view*, and ought to be reckoned among the *necessaries*. By Episcopius's own account of it, (as before observed,) it is *true*, it is *certain*, it is *clear*, as proved from Scripture; and, by many arguments recounted in the last chapter, it has been shewn that it influences our *worship*, and bears a considerable part in what concerns the *Christian life:* therefore Scripture, in making known this doctrine, has by *plain consequence* taught us the *necessity* of believing it, and the *danger* of rejecting it. If men have the use of their rational faculties, and are able to argue

and infer, they need not be *expressly* told that such a doctrine as that is, is *important* and *weighty*, and *worth* the contending for: let but Scripture once ascertain its *truth*, and every man's common sense will supply the rest.

When St. Paul was minded to convince the Corinthians of the *necessity* of believing the *resurrection* of the dead, he thought it sufficient to shew the connection which that doctrine had with *Christianity* itself; to intimate, that their other *faith was vain* without that, and all *preaching vain*[a]; and that the denying that doctrine was, in effect, denying the whole Christian religion. Therefore that doctrine was *necessary* in the highest degree, as common sense must conclude: the very nature of the doctrine, and its connection with the whole frame and body of revealed religion declared it. The like I say of the doctrine of the Trinity; not that it is necessary in the same *degree* with the doctrine of the resurrection, but in *proportion*, while much depends upon it, though not so much as does upon the other. Indeed neither of them are so *necessary* but that *natural religion* might subsist without them, upon a belief of the *immortality* of the soul[b]: but both are very highly necessary in a Christian light, and in a Scripture view, as both, in their several ways and degrees, support the fabric of Christianity, and the body of revealed religion. If a *right knowledge* of *God*, if *dispositions* suitable to the *heavenly* state we expect, if the regulation and specification of our *worship*, if the due and proper force of *Gospel motives*, if just ideas of the economy of man's *redemption* and *salvation*, and of the doctrine of *grace*; if these and other the like momentous concerns hang upon the true notion of the ever blessed Trinity, can we after that want any particular *text* or *texts*, to declare to us the *necessity* of our believing it? Not but that particular texts may be found which are explicit enough

[a] 1 Cor. xv. 14, 17.

[b] Some very learned men have been of opinion that the same persons who in that time denied the *resurrection*, denied also any future state; which they infer from some reasonings which St. Paul made use of against them. (Vitringa, Observ. Sacr. lib. iv. c. ix. p. 924. Buddeus, Eccl. Apostol. p. 299.) But I much question whether they argue justly on that head, or whether St. Paul reasoned upon their *hypothesis*, or upon some other principles. It seems to me, that all St. Paul's reasonings in that chapter may be accounted for upon this *postulatum*, that if there be no *resurrection*, the *separate soul*, being under the *sentence* and dominion of death, cannot emerge and rise up to life and happiness, but must inevitably *perish* under such state of *punishment*, having no deliverer. But I offer this only as a conjecture, appearing to me not improbable.

upon that head, as I may shew hereafter: but in the mean while I observe, that our cause does not need that additional strength, does not depend upon it.

Besides, I would remark by the way, that a distinction might be properly enough made between a necessity of *believing* a Scripture doctrine, and a necessity of *not denying*, or *not opposing* it: for certainly, a man may be under a stricter obligation *not to deny or oppose* a Scripture verity, than positively to *believe* it; and it is a greater sin publicly to *deny* and *oppose* a sacred truth, than it is merely not to admit it. Yet the Socinians, whom Episcopius was inclined to screen, did not only forbear giving assent to the doctrine, but they *dissented*, and publicly *opposed* it with all possible vigour; nay, and with more wiles and artifices than became plain honest men. Now I take it, that though an explicit knowledge or belief of many *inferior* Scripture truths is not ordinarily required, yet it may be required, and strictly too, not to *deny* or *oppose* even them, supposing them *plain*; because it is, in effect, denying the *veracity* of God, or the *inspiration* of Scripture. I know of no dispensation there is for *denying* and *opposing* any one plain *Scripture truth*, contriving artificial elusions for it, any more than there is for *disobeying* a plain *precept*, in like manner eluding it; nor how a *partial faith*, in such a case, is at all more justifiable than a *partial obedience*: for indeed *disbelief* is *disobedience*, as I observed above. But the observation is much stronger when we find that the truth *denied* and *opposed* is a very *material* truth, one that has much depending upon it, one that lies near the *foundation*. How Episcopius could own it to be a truth, and yet think it no crime, or none deserving a public censure, to *deny* and *oppose* it, is unaccountable. We do not want to have it said in Scripture, that it was *necessary* in particular explicitly to *know* and *believe* it: but certainly, if it be a *truth* revealed by God, as he allows, and not of the slightest kind neither, it was *necessary* not to *deny* or *oppose* it, and the man would deserve the *public censure* of the Church that should presume so to do. Therefore the learned Episcopius has, in this instance, imposed a *false* rule of judging upon us, and such as he himself did not allow of in other cases. For how could he attempt to charge *impiety*, *blasphemy*, and the worst of *heresies* (as he pretends) upon the Calvinists? Was it by citing any Scripture texts which declare the *necessity* of believing the distinguishing doctrines on his side? No; but he endea-

voured to shew that the *Calcinian* doctrine remotely concluded in *impiety, blasphemy, heresy;* and that consideration he supposed sufficient to found his severe charge against the Calvinists upon; though in points more *perplexed* and *obscure*, and less agreed in among Christians ancient and modern, than the doctrine of the *Trinity*. So natural is it for men of the greatest pretended *moderation* to confine it chiefly to their own friends, or party, and to exclude their adversaries from the benefit of it. Faults of this kind will often happen on both sides, while men are men: and the foundation of all is, that men will not agree about *necessaries*, while they agree that there ought to be *unity* so far, and no further. Many reconcilers have thought of various expedients, and different *degrees* of *latitude:* the worst that could be invented is *indifference* to all religions; which is like giving up an *inheritance* and consenting to *starve*, for the saving of trouble and contest about it. But I pass on.

4. A further fault I observed in the learned Episcopius was, that he extended the same fallacious rule to other doctrines of moment, beside this of the *Trinity;* and, as it seems, in order to contrive a shelter for his favourite Socinians. He denied the *necessity* of believing the *divine prescience* as to future contingents[c], though at the same time he admitted the *truth* of the doctrine, in consideration of the *Scripture prophecies*[d]. Indeed, as to the question taken in the precise terms as he has stated it, "whether it be strictly necessary to salvation to know and "believe it," and "whether a man shall forfeit his salvation for "not believing, or not knowing it;" I say, in this precise view, it is hard to know how to answer, since it seems to proceed upon a wrong supposition of a certain quantity of *faith*, or of *explicit knowledge*, as necessary to the salvation of every person; about which we can determine nothing. But put the question, whether the doctrine be not highly *important*, and richly *worth contending for*, or whether the *impugners* of it be not *very much to blame*, deserving *public censure* here and punishment hereafter, for such

[c] Superest ut inquiramus, an ad salutem æternam consequendam, scitu crediturque necessarium sit Deo *præscientiam talem* competere, adeo ut qui Deo eam competere aut negat, aut affirmare non audet, salute æterna propterea excidat? In genere, nos id ad salutem scitu crediturque necessarium esse negamus. 1. Quia nullum necessitatis indicium, aut vestigium ejus in Scriptura reperire est, sive indicium illud dicatur esse *clarus textus*, sive *consequentia* per se evidens.—— Qui contra affirmat, ei incumbit probatio. *Episcop. Institut.* lib. iv. c. 18. p. 302.

[d] Episcop. ibid. c. 17. p. 299, &c.

pernicious doctrine; and then the answer is easy and certain: it is a very *important* doctrine, and the denial of it, especially if *open* and obstinate, highly *criminal*. Episcopius himself allows, that it is *necessary to salvation* to *believe* and *know* that God *foresees* whatever he has *determined* to bring to pass; because God himself strongly insists upon it, as a mark of distinction, whereby he will be proved to be the true God, in opposition to all rival deities[e]. But, with submission, may there not be thousands of illiterate Christians, who have not the *explicit* knowledge of that matter, or may never consider it? Why then is this more *necessary to salvation* (in that strict sense of the phrase) than the other? In truth, neither of them are so in that rigorous sense: but both are highly *important*, and, I conceive, *equally* so; because one implies the other, and they stand or fall together. God must *foreknow* future *contingents*, if he forms decrees long beforehand about them. If he *decreed*, and *foretold* long before, that Judas should be permitted *voluntarily* to betray Christ; he must have *foreseen* likewise that Judas would *voluntarily* do it, and *how* he would do it. There is no accounting for numerous prophecies, without the supposition of God's *foreknowing* future contingents; and since God makes this the distinguishing character of the *true God*, it is in effect disowning the *truth* of *Scripture*, and *denying* the *true* God[f], to deny the *divine* prescience. How then can the Socinians be excused in that matter, especially considering how *presumptuous* they are in it, going upon this *proud* principle, that they are able to *search the Almighty to perfection*, or that nothing is to be believed but what they can *comprehend?* Let but the *modus* of the divine knowledge be admitted as *inscrutable* to weak mortals, and then all diffi-

[e] Quænam ista sint quæ de divina scientia, *omnibus ac singulis scitu creditu que sunt necessaria?* Tenemur scire ac credere, Deum scire ea omnia quæ a divino aliquo decreto suo dependent. ——Ratio est, quia hanc scientiæ perfectionem Deus sibi tanto cum zelo adtribuit, et adtribui vult, ut per eam, et propter eam, se *discernat, discernique* velit, ab omnibus *dæmonibus*, gentiumque *Diis* atque *idolis*, tanquam *verum* unicumque *Deum*, qui *solus* idcirco summo honore, cultu, et obsequio dignus sit, uti videre est ex Isa. xli. 23. *Episcop. Institut.* lib. iv. c. 18. p. 303.

[f] Mr. Lobb, in few words, well represents the case as follows: "From "this notion of theirs, *revealed* re- "ligion receives a wound: for if God "doth not know *future contingents* "how can he *foretell* them? And if "he cannot *foretell* them, of what *use* "is the *prophetical* part of the holy "Scriptures? And if they must be re- "jected as *useless*, will not the Deists "be abundantly gratified? Or if it be "yielded that God doth not *foreknow* "future contingents, it will necessarily "follow, that his knowledge is not *in-* "*finite*, and he cannot be *God*." *Growth of Error*, p. 188.

culties are over with us at once: the *infinite* perfections of the divine Mind ought in this case to silence all objections. But if men will think too *meanly* of *God*, and too *highly* of *themselves*, and from thence proceed to teach such doctrines as undermine the *Scripture prophecies*, and the *divine* perfections, and sap the foundations both of *natural* and *revealed* religion; can there be any just excuse made for such a wanton abuse of liberty, and such unwarrantable conduct in affairs of the last consequence to the *salvation* of mankind! But enough hath been said to shew, that Episcopius's famed rule for judging of *necessaries* is fallacious and wrong, and such as he himself did not proceed by in condemning the Calvinists; though he was disposed to make use of it for favouring the Socinians. The *importance* of any doctrine is not to be judged of merely from the *declarations* of Scripture concerning its *necessity*, but from the nature and quality of the doctrine itself, and the relation it bears to the other parts of *revealed* religion, and from the mischiefs likely to follow upon *opposing* it.

II. From Episcopius, the chief leader, I pass on to his kinsman and follower, the learned Limborch; of whose principles in this cause I shall treat the more briefly, because they are the same in the main with what have been mentioned under the preceding article. His acknowledgment of the *truth* of the common doctrine of the *Trinity* may be inferred from his admitting the common Confession of the Remonstrants, and from what he has asserted in his own works[g]: wherein he sufficiently expresses the main doctrine, (if we are to judge him an honest man,) and proves it too, though not to advantage. It is true, he afterwards drops a suspicious expression[h], which requires a *candid* interpretation to make it bear; and he meanly talks of Petavius's ingenuously *confessing*[i] that some of the Ante-Nicene

[g] Restat jam ut explicemus, quisnam ille sit *Deus* cui *divinam* hanc naturam competere sacræ literæ docent; *Pater* nimirum et *Filius* et *Spiritus Sanctus*. *Limborch. Theol. Christ.* lib. ii. c. xvii. p. 97. Tribus hisce tribuuntur *divinæ* perfectiones: unde concludimus *Deitatem* tribus hisce esse communem. (*Ibid.* p. 98.) Ea de *Jesu Christo* Filio Dei enuntiantur, ex quibus liquet ipsum per veram, attamen arcanam et ineffabilem generationem, Filium Dei extitisse——ante omnia sæcula, et per eam naturæ *divinæ* consortem fuisse, p. 99. Ex hisce colligimus, *essentiam divinam* et Filio et Spiritui Sancto esse communem, p. 102.

[h] Sed et est quædam supereminentia Patris respectu Filii, et Patris ac Filii respectu Spiritus Sancti, ratione *dignitatis* et *potestatis*: dignius siquidem est generare quam generari, spirare quam spirari, p. 102.

[i] Sufficiat hic nobis ingenua Dionysii Petavii, doctoris inter Jesuitas celeberrimi ac doctissimi. *Confessio*, &c. p. 102.

Fathers disowned the *coeternity* and *coequality* of the Son. He did not understand the subtilty of the Jesuit, nor consider that probably it was not so much an *ingenuous confession* of that great man, as a *disingenuous misrepresentation* of his to serve the interest of the *modern* church of Rome[k]. His pretences have been abundantly confuted by Bishop Bull, and several other learned hands.

However, as I said, Limborch has sufficiently expressed the main doctrine, and asserted its *truth:* we are next to observe what he thought of the *necessity* of believing it, or of the *importance* of it. He begins with declaring his scruples against asserting the *necessity* of believing the *eternal filiation* and *Divinity* of God the Son[l], while he admits the *truth*. He conceives it not so necessary as the owning *Jesus* to be the *Messiah*. Supposing it be not, yet it may be *necessary* notwithstanding. But if it can be proved that the *Messiah* predicted in the Old Testament is there described under such characters as can belong only to *God*, (as certainly it may,) then it will be as necessary to believe him to be *God*, as to believe him to be the *Messiah*, because he cannot be the *Messiah*, unless he be also *God*[m]. However, as I before said, admitting that one of these doctrines is more *necessary* or more *important* than the other, (though they are in just consequence inseparable,) yet both may be *fundamentals* notwithstanding. He goes on to speak of the *obscurity* of the doctrine, which is abusing it; because though the thing is *mysterious*, and the *manner* obscure, yet the main doctrine is as *clear* as can be desired, as clear as any doctrines concerning the *divine* nature or attributes; clear in the *general*, clear so far as we are bound to *believe*. See above. He was aware of this answer; and therefore he endeavours next to evade the force of it. He owns the plea, with respect to some other fundamental doctrines, that the *main substance* of them may be *clear*, while the *circumstantials* only are obscure: and he instances in that of the *resurrection of*

[k] See preface to my Second Defence, vol. ii. Bull. Proem. sect. viii. p. 6. Grab. Præfat. ad Bulli Opp. Nelson's Life of Bull, p. 287.

[l] Credimus nos, alibi doceri Personam hanc esse Filium Dei respectu *naturæ divinæ* ac filiationis *æternæ*.—— Quandiu nobis ea Scripturæ loca non occurrunt quibus *naturæ divinæ* cum humana unio perinde *fidei salutaris* objectum *necessarium* statuitur atque officium *Christi* de *Jesu* credendum est, nos, licet *veritatem* illam amplectamur, eam tamen ut *creditu ad salutem necessariam* definire non audemus. *Limborch*, lib. v. cap. 9. p. 413.

[m] Vid. Bull. Judic. Eccl. Cathol. cap. vii. sect. 5. and Second Letter to Mr. Nation, by P. C. p. 9.

the dead, which he says is *clear*, and *necessary* to be believed; but whether the bodies will be *numerically the same*, he thinks is not clear, nor a *necessary* article of faith. This is a point which I need not here debate; we may admit the instance for argument sake, and now let us apply it, and see how far the same reasoning will bear. We receive the doctrine of the resurrection, considered in a *general* undeterminate view; we define not the precise *manner*; and we admit the eternal *Divinity* of God the Son, and the union of all three in one Godhead, not defining the *manner* of the union or distinction: so far the cases appear parallel: only indeed the resurrection is a matter that falls under *imagination*, the other belongs only to pure *intellect*. But now comes on the stress of the question: he asserts, that the *obscurity* lies not in the *circumstantials* of the doctrine of the Trinity, but in the very *substance* of it. That we deny; and Episcopius himself denied it, (unless he greatly prevaricated) as observed above. And how will the assertion be proved? The Professor attempts it, by throwing our main doctrine into *scholastic* terms[n], that so it may instantly carry the face of *obscurity* in the very *words*: this is not dealing fairly with us. He does not choose to express it so himself in other places, where he admits the *verity* of the doctrine, and where he declares his own faith; neither did Episcopius, or the common Confession of the Remonstrants, so express it. Why then must they choose one way of expression for declaring the *truth* of the doctrine, and another for rejecting the *necessity* of it, except it be to serve a turn? The learned Professor, instead of saying *one Jehovah*, or *one God*, or *one Godhead*, here chooses the phrase of *one numerical essence*: which is a late scholastic phrase, and faulty more ways than one: first, because the terms themselves are *technical* terms, and no way necessary to the Christian faith; and next, because they carry an *equivocation* in them; and the proposition can neither be admitted nor rejected, till it be carefully *distinguished*. *Numerical* essence in a Sabellian sense is heresy: in another sense, it is a *truth* darkly expressed. That the Persons are *one God*, *one Jehovah*, is of the *substance* of the doctrine; but that they should be de-

[n] Alia vero est ratio eorum dogmatum quæ non in *circumstantiis* quibusdam, sed in *seipsis* suaque substantia, *obscuritatem* involvunt: quale est dogma de SS. Trinitate, quod tres distinctæ Personæ, una generans, altera genita, tertia spirata sint *unica numero essentia*——. Quod statim primo suo conceptu varias involvit difficultates quæ a dogmate ipso separari nullatenus possint. *Limborch*, lib. v. cap. 9. p. 414.

nominated one *numerical* essence, is not. For, first, it is a question, whether the divine Unity ought to be brought under our distinctions about *numerical* and *specific*, contrived for expressing things *finite:* and if it should, it is still another question, in what precise sense of the word *numerical* (which is an equivocal term) the proposition can be allowed. Both these questions are *circumstantials*, and furnishing matter for strife about *words* and *names*, not at all affecting the main thing[o]: and the *obscurity* here complained of lies not in the doctrine itself, but in the *unfair* manner of expressing it, to give some colour for the complaint: if any person, instead of such a plain expression as *God's presence every where*, should call it, *the infinite expansion or diffusion of the divine essence*, it would be unfair and wrong in two views; first, as the terms are *scholastic*, when plainer words would better serve the purposes of truth; and next, as it is running the reader into an obscure speculation about *expansion*, what it means, and in what sense it may be admitted. Any doctrines whatever may thus be involved in *obscurities*, by clothing them in dark and *equivocal* terms, or by so contriving them as to bring in something of the *modus* into the main doctrine, when it ought to be entirely left out, either as unknown, or as not material[p]. I am sensible that the phrase of *numerical essence* has long obtained in the Schools, and is capable of a good sense: but yet *essence* of *essence* (ever since that term came in) was always Catholic doctrine, as *God* of *God;* and *numerical essence*, a more modern phrase, must be so explained as to agree with the other, and to exclude a Sabellian sense. Otherwise it is no doctrine of ours, but an ancient *heresy*. But enough has been said to shew that the learned Limborch has used a little too much *art*, in representing our doctrine as *obscure*, only by the clouds raised from an *obscure* expression. The doctrine itself is otherwise *clear* enough, as I have before manifested at large: and every plain Christian will understand as clearly what he means when he says, the "three divine Persons are one God," as when he says, there

[o] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. xxiii. p. 708, &c.

[p] Sæpe *res ipsa* fundamentalis esse potest, *modus* vero rei, et *circumstantiæ* minime fundamentales. Etenim cum res ipsa tantum *in genere* revelata est, et tanquam *necessaria* a Deo imposita, tunc certe *res ipsa* tantum pro fundamento habenda est, non vero *modus* et *circumstantiæ* quæ pari evidentia, aut cum simili necessitatis charactere revelata non sunt. Et re vera, paucissimæ sunt res, præsertim in *divinis*, quarum *modum* et *circumstantias* perfecte noscamus. *Alphons. Turret. de Fundament.* p. 20.

will be "a resurrection of the dead[q]." Both the expressions are large and indefinite, wrapped up in *generals*; not descending to the *minute* circumstances belonging to this and that, but abstracting from them, and leaving them undetermined.

I meet with nothing more in Limborch deserving any particular answer. He has indeed some additional considerations in the same place, but such as amount only to mere *assertions* without *proofs*, viz. that it is sufficient to believe in *Jesus* as the *Messiah*, and that our faith respects the *office*, not the *Person*; that it is enough to consider him as *Mediator*, and the like; all precarious assertions taking for granted the matter in question, not to mention that the ancient and true notion of Christ as *Mediator* implies his *Divinity*, and supposes him to be both truly *God* and truly *man*[r]. Strange, that a person of his great abilities could persuade himself, that the believing in Christ as to his several offices of *Prophet*, *Priest*, and *King*, should be necessary[s], and yet that believing in him as a *divine* Prophet, a *divine* Priest, and a *divine* King, (though the fact be *true* that he is so,) should be of little or no significancy. One might as easily believe that the *soul* is of no consideration to the body, as that our Lord's *Divinity*, which runs through all his offices, and must enliven and invigorate every part, should be of no consideration, or slight, to a *Christian's faith* in these offices. But this great man, as well as his greater predecessor, had his *prejudices*; and both of them had imbibed a very false notion of the ancient churches, as if they had not constantly insisted upon the *necessity* of believing the doctrine of the Trinity, or had not condemned the contrary opinions as *heretical*. That was Episcopius's firm persuasion, and he insisted much upon it[t], having taken up the opinion too hastily from misrepresentations made of the *Fathers* by some moderns, not being himself acquainted, to any degree of perfection, with that kind of learning[u]. And the like may be justly suspected of Limborch also, who trusted to Petavius in that matter, as I have already intimated. Had their surmise in that particular been just, I could not so much have blamed them for the rest. For to make any thing *necessary* at this time of day

[q] Lib. v. cap. 9. p. 414.

[r] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. xvi. p. 657, 658.

[s] Cum itaque objectum fidei Christianæ proprie respiciat *munera* Christi, eorem fides ac professio etiam *necessaria est*. *Limb.* lib. v. cap. 9. p. 415.

[t] Episcop. Inst. lib. iv. cap. 34. p. 339, 340. Respons. ad Specim. Calumn. p. 295.

[u] Vid. Bull. Præmonit. ad Lector. de necessitat. credend.

which *anciently* was not so, or to conceive that the most pure and *primitive* churches failed in *necessaries*, is too bold and shocking a thought for any candid considerate man to entertain. But both Episcopius and his disciple were much *deceived* in that affair, as hath been abundantly shewn by Bishop Bull; and as I shall endeavour also to make plain to the English reader before I have done. And then it will the more easily be admitted, that the *necessity* of the doctrine is sufficiently inculcated in Scripture, when it appears that the ancient churches collected such *necessity* from the same Scripture.

I have not yet mentioned any particular texts declaring such necessity, nor do I think it needful, because the *truth* of *such* a doctrine infers its necessity to as many as the doctrine is revealed to. But yet I may observe, that the institution of baptism in the name of *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* carries with it a very sensible and affecting argument of the *importance* of the doctrine. It is indeed, when considered in all its views, a strong proof of the *truth* of the doctrine, as might be shewn at large, and often has been[x]: but supposing the *truth* proved sufficiently from *other* texts, then there cannot be a more convincing argument of the *importance* of it than this; that our blessed Lord himself has recommended it as the prime and leading doctrine, without the explicit mention whereof a man cannot be made a Christian; that he has conveyed it to us in that solemn form, that most distinguished manner to every disciple of Christ, as the first thing proper for him to be acquainted with, deserving and requiring his most early thoughts and care, and also his constant and tenderest devotion ever after. On this foundation was the Church itself erected, and stands to this day. What stronger or more effectual method could have been devised to proclaim the *necessity* and high *importance* of this great article? A consideration which may receive yet further *light* and *strength*, by looking into antiquity, and there observing what a stress was laid upon the *interrogatories* in baptism, and how this article made up the principal part, if not the *whole* of the first Creed, and what particular care was taken to instruct the candidates in this important doctrine previously to baptism: but what relates to

[x] See my Sermons at St. Paul's, Serm. viii. vol. ii. p. 172, &c. Bishop Stillingfleet's Vindication of the Trinity, p. 177, &c. 299, &c. Vitringa, Observat. Sacr. tom. ii. cap. 22. p. 813—826. Dr. Trapp's Lecture Sermon. p. 100—104. Mr. Abraham Taylor's True Script. Doct. p. 91, &c. to which may be added, Basil, de Spiritu Sancto, cap. ix.—xv. xxvii.

antiquity will more properly come in under a distinct chapter designed for that purpose. I forbear likewise to insist upon another Scripture argument of great force, which St. John's writings afford me; because that also may more conveniently be reserved for another place in these papers.

I have now run through the three several heads of debate which I undertook; shewing, in so many distinct chapters, that the received doctrine of the Trinity is both *clear* and *practical*, and sufficiently inculcated in Scripture to be esteemed an article of high *importance*, an *essential* of Christianity, a *fundamental* doctrine of the Gospel, diffusing itself through the whole of our religion, and being, as it were, the very life and spirit of it. It remains now to be inquired, how we ought to behave towards those who openly reject or impugn it, or take part with them that do.

CHAP. IV.

Shewing, that communion ought not to be held with men that openly reject the fundamental Doctrines of Christianity, and persist in so doing.

THIS may be argued two ways; first, from express Scripture texts; and next, from the very *nature* and *reason* of the thing considered upon Scripture principles.

1. I begin with Scripture texts. St. Paul's instructions to the Romans in such cases is: "Mark them which cause divisions "and offences contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned; "and avoid them: for they that are such serve not our Lord "Jesus Christ, but their own belly; and by good words and fair "speeches deceive the hearts of the simple[y]." The offenders here pointed at were most probably[z] the Judaizing false teachers, those that preach up circumcision and the observance of the law as *necessary* to salvation; a doctrine subversive of the grace of the Gospel, as observed above. The Apostle therefore exhorts his Christian converts to *mark* them, that is, to *beware* of them, in order to *avoid* them, and to preserve themselves from the infection of their pernicious doctrine. And as he wrote by the *Spirit* of God, and had the gift of *discerning* the

[y] Rom. xvi. 17, 18.

[z] See Grotius, and Whitby, and Wolfius, upon the place: and Vitringa, Observat. Sacr. lib. iv. cap. 9. Buddæi Eccles. Apostol. p. 121.

spirits of men, he could tell his converts, with a certain and well grounded assurance, the insides of the men; that they were men of carnal minds and profligate consciences, using fair and plausible speeches to beguile others, for their *own* humour, or pleasure, or interest, or vanity. Such indeed is the *general* character of *heresiarchs* of all kinds: but yet without very clear and sufficient grounds appearing in overt acts, men ought not to take upon them the liberty of an Apostle, in pronouncing upon the *inward motives* which *heretics* are led by: it is sufficient to pass sentence upon the quality of the doctrine, and to condemn it as subversive of the Gospel, (if it really be so,) and to renounce *communion* with its open favourers and abettors; so much at least is manifestly implied in the advice given to *avoid* them, or turn from them. Receive them not as *ministers of Christ*, nor own them as *brethren:* for they *serve not the Lord Jesus Christ;* but their fair speeches and false colourings are fitted to *deceive* unwary souls. Therefore avoid them, shun them, discountenance them, and that *openly:* for so *they which are approved* will *be made manifest*[a], and not otherwise.

The same Apostle pointing to the same *heretics* elsewhere says, "There be some that trouble you, and would pervert "[subvert] the Gospel of Christ. But though we, or an angel "from heaven, preach any other Gospel unto you than that "which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. As we "said before, so say I now again, If any man preach any other "Gospel unto you than that ye have received, let him be "accursed[b]." How strongly here does the Apostle guard against admitting *new* doctrines, (subversive of the old,) through a common weakness incident to mankind, having men's *persons in admiration*, on account of their parts or learning, or their appearing goodness, sanctity, sobriety. Though "we or an "angel from heaven" should presume to do any such wicked thing, "let him be accursed;" words very expressive and poignant, in order to correct the *weakness* before mentioned; and another also near akin to it, the natural fondness many have for *novelties*. And I may further observe, that in such cases we have no concern at all with the *virtues* or *good qualities* of false teachers, be they ever so *real* or *great:* if they *corrupt* the *faith* in any gross instance, that is reason sufficient for *refusing* communion

[a] 1 Cor. xi. 19. [b] Gal. i. 7, 8, 9.

with them, though they were otherwise bright as angels. A consideration worth the noting, for the obviating some popular prejudices on this head. I need not here enter into the dispute, whether the words ἀνάθεμα ἔστω amount to a solemn *curse*, or are only a *form of excommunication*[c]. If we take it in the first and most rigorous sense, it seems proper only to an *Apostle* or *Prophet*, thus solemnly to curse or *bless* in the name of the Lord. But as the Christian Church afterwards[d] often used the same form in their *excommunications*, the milder sense appears most probable. However that be, this solemn sentence of the Apostle amounts at least to a strict injunction or warning to all Christians, that they should not communicate with persons who corrupt the *faith*, (either by adding to it or taking from it,) in any gross manner, which may be justly interpreted a *subversion* of the Gospel of Christ. Such attempts are to be held in the utmost abhorrence, and the authors of them shunned as seducers and false apostles. It cannot well be supposed, that less than this is implied in the words of the Apostle.

He goes on to say, speaking of the same persons in the same Epistle, "He that troubleth you shall bear his judgment, whoso-"ever he be[e]." "I would they were even cut off that trouble you[f]." Which last words I understand, with many judicious interpreters, of *excommunication*; and it is confirmed by what is said in the same place, "a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump[g];" intimating the reason why the Apostle wished to have those false teachers *cut off* from the communion of Christians, viz. to prevent the contagion spreading further. I am aware, that some very learned men[h] dislike the interpretation I have mentioned, but upon a very slender reason, as to me appears. They think the Apostle would not have *wished* for it only, but would have *commanded* it in virtue of his *apostolical* authority. It is true, he might have done it: but who knows for how many, or for what *prudential* reasons, he might forbear for a time, and be content at that juncture only to throw out a wish, in order to prepare the Galatians for it, and to incline them by slow and gentle methods to concur the more readily with it, when it should be

[c] See Buddæus, Eccles. Apostol. p. 808, 809.

[d] See Suicer. Thesaurus in voc. ἀνάθεμα. Bingham's Antiq. of the Christian Church, lib. xvi. cap. 2, 8, 16, 17.

[e] Gal. v. 10.

[f] Gal. v. 12.

[g] Gal. v. 9. compare 1 Cor. v. 6, 7.

[h] Elsner. in loc. p. 196. Buddæus, Eccles. Apostol. p. 808. Wolfius, Curæ Philolog. et Crit. vol. ii. p. 772.

absolutely necessary. It is not to be presumed, that *excommunication*, or a formal renouncing of communion, are things to be precipitated at all adventures, or that there may not often be good reasons for delay, that so an affair of the highest consequence may be conducted with the utmost prudence. I am of opinion, that besides the mischievous nature of the heresy itself, several other circumstances of time, place, and persons, ought to have their weight in consultations relating to Church discipline upon offenders. But I pass on.

St. Paul gives advice to Timothy in the words here following; "These things teach and exhort. If any man teach otherwise, "and consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our "Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to "godliness; he is proud, &c.—from such withdraw thyself[i]." Perhaps the rendering and the sense would run better thus: [k]*If any man teach otherwise, and consent not to the wholesome words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness*, if he is puffed up, knowing nothing, but doating *about questions*, &c. *from such withdraw thyself*. It is a disputable point, what particular sect or set of false teachers the Apostle here refers to, whether Judaizers or Gnostics, or others distinct from both. But one thing is plain, which is sufficient to our present purpose, that the Apostle exhorts Timothy to *withdraw* from them, and that in order either to discountenance their false doctrines, or to preserve himself and others from receiving contagion by them. To the same purpose is what the Apostle again says to Timothy:

"Shun profane and vain babblings: for they will increase "unto more ungodliness. And their word will eat as doth a "canker: of whom is Hymenæus and Philetus; who concerning "the truth have erred, saying that the resurrection is past "already; and overthrow the faith of some[l]." The heads and patrons of the heresy here mentioned the Apostle had *excommunicated* before, delivering them over unto *Satan*, to stop their blaspheming[m]. They appear to have been persons who believed the Scriptures of the Old Testament, but misinterpreted them, *allegorizing* away the doctrine of the *resurrection*, resolving it all into figure and metaphor[n]. The *delivering* over *unto Satan*

[i] 1 Tim. vi. 2—5.
[k] Vid. Vitringa, Observat. Sacr. tom. i. p. 220.
[l] 2 Tim. ii. 16, 17, 18.
[m] 1 Tim. i. 20.
[n] Vid. Vitringa, Observ. Sacr. lib. iv. cap. 9. p. 925. Buddæus, Eccles. Apostol. p. 300.

seems to have been a form of excommunication, declaring the person reduced to the state of an *heathen:* and in the *apostolical* age it was accompanied with *supernatural* or miraculous effects upon the bodies of the persons so delivered[o]: though it may be supposed that such effects might last beyond the apostolic age, because other *miraculous* gifts certainly did so. I am well aware of the disputes which have been among persons of the best learning[p] about the precise meaning of the phrase, whether it signified *excommunication,* or an appendage to it. I have chosen that interpretation which appears most probable[q]. I must own, there is a notion which appears to run through the debates of several learned men on this head, and which I cannot well understand. They seem to take it for granted that excommunication is a *punishment of the soul.* I easily conceive it to be a *spiritual* punishment, as not being a *corporal* one, and as inflicted by a *spiritual,* that is, ecclesiastical authority: but how it is properly a punishment of the *soul,* I apprehend not. Its design is *salutary,* and the effect also often *salutary;* so that it is rather *medicinal* than *penal,* with respect to the *soul:* but this by the way only. It would be too large a digression here, to consider that point in such a manner as it deserves to be considered.

I go on to other texts, and shall take one by the way, which though not precisely to the point I am upon, yet is not altogether foreign. "There are many unruly and vain talkers and "deceivers, specially they of the circumcision: whose mouths "must be stopped, who subvert whole houses, teaching things "which they ought not, for filthy lucre's sake——rebuke them "sharply, that they may be sound in the faith[r]." We may here observe the ardent zeal of the Apostle against false teachers, who corrupted the *faith,* and how great a stress he lays upon being *sound* in principles. But he does not give orders for excommunicating those *deceivers* directly, but to *admonish* them first, and that with some sharpness, in order to shame them, and silence them, and bring them back to the true faith. From all which one may collect these following considerations, which

[o] 1 Cor. v. 5. see commentators.

[p] A summary account of them may be seen in Wolfius's Curæ Philolog. et Crit. ad 1 Cor. v. 5. p. 367. or in Bingham's Eccles. Antiq. lib. xvi. cap. 2. sect. 15.

[q] See Bishop Potter's Church Government, p. 371, &c. Dr. Rogers's Review of a Discourse of the Visible &c. p. 392.

[r] Tit. i. 10, 11, 13.

may be of some use to us: 1. That religion is not a *personal* thing, which every man may new model or alter for himself, without *rebuke* from his fellow *Christians*, or from the governors of the Church. It is the joint patrimony of the whole community, and every man more or less is accountable to his neighbour for any *waste* made in it. It is the *common concern*, and every one in his station and degree must give a helping hand to preserve it in its native purity. 2. That the teaching and propagating of *false* doctrines may subvert *whole houses*, and do a great deal of mischief: so that *truth* is not always a gainer by unrestrained liberties of that kind. 3. That *sharp* rebukes are very proper in such cases, and are no breaches of charity, but the truest instances of brotherly affection and love. 4. That *admonitions* and *increpations* should first be tried, even in case of great corruption in doctrine, rather than come to extremities at once: a rule expressly taught us in what I am next going to cite.

"A man that is an heretic, after the first and second admonition, "reject; knowing that he that is such is subverted, and sinneth, "being condemned of himself[s]." This text will deserve a more particular examination, containing much in it directly belonging to the point in hand. Wherefore I shall handle the several parts of it the more distinctly. 1. "A man that is an heretic." Here the first question is, who, or what is an *heretic?* To which I answer in the general, not every one that mistakes in judgment, though in matters of great *importance*, in points *fundamental*, but he that openly *espouses* such fundamental error. That I take to be the true and full notion of an *heretic*, according to the Scripture idea of it. Dr. Whitby adds to the definition, the espousing it "out of disgust, pride, envy, or some worldly "principle[t]," and "against his conscience[u]." Indeed that may generally be the case; but that those several particulars are necessary to the definition of *heretic* is not to be allowed him by any means, for the reasons here following:

1. By that rule, there would be no certain knowing, in most cases, who is an *heretic*, or who not, since there is no looking into the *heart:* and how then could we at all observe the Scripture rule of *avoiding* or *rejecting* heretics?

2. There is as much *danger*, or *more*, when a blind *enthusiast*,

[s] Tit. iii. 10, 11. [t] Whitby on Gal. v. 19. [u] W[illegible]

or any person of *invincible* ignorance or prejudice, espouses *false* doctrines, and *corrupts* the faith, as when evil-minded men do the same thing out of *envy*, *pride*, &c. and *against* their own *consciences:* and what shall be done in such cases? The way certainly is, to censure the doctrine as *heresy*, and to do all that *prudence* and *charity* prescribes for the preventing such well meaning but mad teachers from seducing the flock of Christ. It is not possible for men accurately to distinguish one case from the other; and therefore one general rule must serve for both. God will distinguish at the last day. In the mean time, all proper care must be taken to guard against the threatening mischief. For the *poison* of the doctrine, by whomsoever spread, or upon whatsoever principle, is just the same; only, if it comes from a man otherwise honest, pious, sober, &c. it is likely to insinuate itself deeper, and spread the wider. I say then, *heresy* lies in *espousing pernicious doctrines:* that we can judge of, and by that rule can understand how to proceed. The other way involves all in darkness, and leaves a matter of the greatest consequence to the utmost uncertainty. But let us examine what the learned author before mentioned had to plead in behalf of his notion. The strength of all lies chiefly in the word αὐτοκατάκριτος, *self-condemned*, here used by the *Apostle;* as if no man could be an *heretic* that is not *self-condemned*, or does not go against his own *judgment* and *conscience*. But I observe, that the Apostle directs Titus to admonish a *heretic* once and again. It is supposed that Titus might know a *heretic*, viz. by his espousing some doctrine subversive of the Gospel: for how could it be certainly known, whether the man *believed himself*, or taught *contrary* to his own *judgment?* If, after being twice *admonished* for teaching such pernicious doctrine, he should still persist, then he was to be looked upon as αὐτοκατάκριτος, *self-condemned*. It could no longer be pure *ignorance* or *thoughtlessness*, after two several warnings, but must now be looked upon as matter of his own choice or election[v], as mere *wilfulness* and *obstinacy* for him to persist in opposition to the *truth*. When I say, against the *truth*, I suppose that to have been a clear case to the admonisher before the *first admonition*, otherwise there had not been room for admonition at all. Admonish *a man that is an heretic;* not a man that is really no heretic, which

[v] Ideo et *sibi damnatum* dixit *hæreticum*, quia et in quo damnatur sibi elegit. *Tertull. de Præscript. Hæret.* cap. 6.

would be contumelious and injurious. And if he persists after two admonitions, then look upon him as αὐτοκατάκριτος, self-condemned, and *reject* him. It is plain enough from the whole tenor of this passage, that αὐτοκατάκριτος, whatever it means, does not belong to the definition of an *heretic* as such, but to that of an *admonished* and still *obstinate* heretic. He is supposed a *heretic* before, and therefore was to be *admonished* once; if need should be, again: and then, if he persisted, he was to be looked upon as *desperate* and incorrigible; and therefore to be *rejected* utterly[x]. There is indeed something elliptical in the sentence: *knowing that he that is such;* as much as to say, knowing that he who continues such *after two admonitions* is now *without excuse*[y], and, as it were, passes sentence upon *himself*, either as voluntarily *cutting* himself *off* from the Church, by an open revolt[z], or as rendering himself *incapable* of the privileges and blessings that belong to it, by renouncing its *faith;* which, in a just construction, is *judging* or declaring himself *unworthy*[a] of the blessings tendered. I have been the longer in explaining this text, because the real meaning and purport of it has been frequently misunderstood, or misrepresented. Now I return to Dr. Whitby.

He pleads, "that the Apostle saith not to Titus, Do thou "*convince* or inform him of his *error*, but, Do thou *admonish* "him of his fault: which shews, that the crime lay not in his "*head* or his *mistaken judgment*, (for that can never be corrected "by *admonition*, but only by *instruction*,) but that it lay in the "irregularity of his affections, and the perverseness of his will[b]." But what if the fault lay in *heart* and *head* both, as indeed all

[x] Quare autem post primam et secundam correptionem *devitandus* sit, reddit causas, dicens: quod *subversus est ejusmodi, et peccat, quum sit a semetipso damnatus.* Qui enim semel bisque correptus, audito errore suo, non vult corrigi, errare existimat corrigentem: et e contrario se ad pugnas et jurgia verborum parans, eum vult *lucrifacere* a quo docetur. *Hieron.* in loc. vol. iv. p. 439.

[y] Ἀναπολόγητος. See Suicer. Thesaur. in αὐτοκατάκριτος.

[z] Hic enim *reus sibi* erit, qui non ab Episcopo ejectus, sed sponte de Ecclesia profugus, et hæretica præsumptione a *semetipso* damnatus. *Cypr. Epist.* lxix. p. 182. edit. Oxon.

Propterea vero *a semetipso* dicitur esse *damnatus;* quia fornicator, adulter, homicida, et cætera vitia per sacerdotes de Ecclesia propelluntur: *hæretici* autem in *semetipsos* sententiam ferunt, suo arbitrio de Ecclesia recedentes: quæ recessio, propriæ conscientiæ videtur esse damnatio. *Hieron.* in loc. p. 439. Compare Hammond upon the text.

[a] See Acts xiii. 46. so Irenæus—est *a semetipso damnatus*, resistens et repugnans saluti suæ, quod faciunt omnes hæretici. *Iren. adver. Hær.* lib. iii. c. 1. p. 174. Massuet.

[b] Whitby on Tit. iii. 10.

faults do? *Omnis peccans ignorat*, is a true maxim. There is some error always in *judgment*, before there is an error in *practice*; for evil, as *evil*, cannot be chosen. The fault therefore of an *heretic*, really such, is, that some corrupt affection (I except the case of *invincible* infirmity) misleads him first to pass a *rash* precipitate judgment; and next to *espouse* that judgment openly. And lastly, (if he proceeds so far,) to *persist* in it against all advices or admonitions to the contrary. The *heart* perverts the *head*; and both conspire in the same false judgment and conduct. The good Doctor pleads further: "No man who acts "according to his judgment, how erroneous soever it may be, is "*self-condemned* in that action[c]." Yes, if he made a *rash* judgment, and *might* have known or done *better*, he is *self-condemned*: for he condemns others who judge *rashly* and *wrongly*, when they might and ought to have judged better; and so of course he *condemns himself*, by the same sentence[d]. There are two kinds of *self-condemnation*, one *direct* and *explicit*, the other *indirect*, *implicit*, *virtual*, *consequential*. As to *direct* self-condemnation, few fall into it: for men are so *partial* towards their own failings, that they seldom see their own *false* judgment, or *wrong* conduct, and as seldom *condemn themselves* for either. It is their fault that they do not: such *self-condemnation* would be commendable, and a good step towards recovery: it is not such *self-condemnation* as that, that the Apostle speaks of. There is too little of it every where; *presumption* and *self-applause* are the foibles of mankind. And they will easily take care in most cases not to be *self-condemned*, though condemned by all the world besides. It is not *self-condemnation* in this sense that makes an ill man, or aggravates a fault, but the want of it[e]. The other kind of *self-condemnation*, which I call *indirect*, is what the Apostle may point to as an aggravating circumstance of *heresy*, after two admonitions. The man *justifies* himself in opposition to *truth* and *good counsel*, does not *condemn* himself *directly*, when he ought to do it, and amend: but he condemns himself *indirectly*, as acting against the *law of his mind*, against that general law by which he *condemns* others, and justly, whenever they allow themselves in *wrong* things, and *ought* to know better. This is his condemnation, that he approves in a particular instance through *partiality*, what himself in the general

[c] Whitby on Tit. iii. 10. [d] See Rom. ii. 1. [e] See Hammond upon the text.

condemns. All *sinners*, in this sense, are *self-condemned*; and so are *heretics* also among the rest. Indeed, all that do not make a proper use of their *rational* faculties, when they may and ought to do it, are thus *self-condemned*: and their own awakened consciences will rise up against them at the last day, as men guilty of great prevarication and *self-repugnancy*, for allowing in *themselves* what they otherwise disallow and condemn. "Out of "thine own mouth will I judge thee, thou wicked servant," will then be the sentence due to all, who having been *twice* admonished of *corrupting* the faith, repented not of it, but persevered in their errors both of *judgment* and *practice*, when they might have known better.

I defined *heresy*, not merely a *mistake of judgment*, (though in fundamentals,) but *espousing* such erroneous judgment, either teaching and disseminating it, or openly supporting and assisting those that do, siding with them in it. This I conceive to be the true Scripture notion of *heresy*[f]. Nevertheless, an *erroneous judgment* in fundamentals has more commonly passed under the name of *heresy*, and is undoubtedly a great *fault*, whatever name we call it by. It is running counter to all those texts which recommend *zeal* and *earnestness* for the *true* faith: for how can a man, *consistently* with himself, be zealous for what he either *disbelieves* or assents not to? It is likewise running cross to all those texts which exhort to *sound faith*, or which command us to *hold fast what is good*, or forbid the being *tossed to and fro* with every *wind of doctrine*, and the like. Whether such fault shall be called *heresy* or no, is only disputing about a name: but that it is in itself (particular circumstances excepted) a great offence against God, cannot be doubted; and it naturally leads to worse.

2. Having largely treated of the nature and notion of *heresy*, and what properly denominates any man a *heretic*, I am next to say something of what is meant by *rejecting* such persons. After all prudent and proper means have been used to *reclaim* them, or *silence* them, and they still persist in their *heresy*, either teaching or otherwise espousing false and pernicious doctrines; then the rule of the Apostle is to reject them, or cast them off, if they have not before cast off themselves. The text does not say, *excommunicate* them; for that would not be necessary, when

[f] 1 Cor. xi. 19. Gal. v. 20. 2 Pet. ii. 1.

they have excommunicated themselves: but it says, *shun* them, *avoid* them, *reject* them; which, in case they do not cast themselves out, implies and infers a command to *exclude* them: so that the text, by that *general* expression, seems to have provided for both the cases.

But I must here again take notice of Dr. Whitby's mistakes and false reasonings. He was sensible, that according to his loose definition of *heresy*, there would be no knowing, for the most part, who is guilty of it, or who ought to be condemned for it: he produces the objection himself, and afterwards endeavours lamely to answer it. "It is objected," says he, "that there be "few who oppose the truth *wittingly*, and they are only *known* "*to God*, not to the Church; which therefore cannot *admonish*, "*avoid*, or *excommunicate* them[g]." An insuperable objection against his notion, shewing that it terminates in a flat contradiction to *Scripture*, and to the plainest reason. Well, how does he reply to it? The sum of his answer is, "That Titus might "have the *discerning of spirits*, a gift belonging to those times: "and the Church that was in the days of the Apostles could "easily know, whether the doctrines which others taught in "opposition to them were indeed doctrines received from the "Apostles or not: if they were not, they who taught them must "know they received no such doctrine from them, and so must "be *self-condemned* in teaching it as received from them, or as "the faith once delivered to the saints[h]." Never was there a looser reply in so momentous a cause. For, 1. this amounts to saying, that all the precepts about *admonishing*, *avoiding*, or *excommunicating* of heretics, and of consequence, all the other precepts about preserving *sound* doctrine, or *contending* earnestly for the faith, expired in a great measure as soon as the miraculous gifts, or gift of *discerning spirits* ceased. The precepts from that time forwards became impracticable, because nobody now could know what was *heresy*, or who *heretics*, since they could not see into men's *hearts*. Though heretics might *subvert whole houses*, (and now more than ever, when there should be no *Apostle* living to control them,) and though their *words might eat as doth a canker*; yet the Church is left without remedy: the pastors and guardians of it must not presume to *excommunicate*, or *avoid*, or *admonish* persons as *heretics*, unless they can first prove them

[g] Whitby on Titus iii. 10. [h] Ibid.

heretics, or *ill-designing* men: but if it be certain that they are led by an *erroneous conscience*, they must not be *censured* at all, but treated as good men and fellow Christians. "So that we "are commanded to *avoid* a *heretic*; but this *heretic* is such a "sort of a creature as nobody can ever find out, or distinguish "from one he is to *treat as a brother*. But suppose this *heretic* "should tell us, that he *did not believe what himself affirmed*, "then indeed he would be *self-condemned*, and we might know "it: but he must be a fool of a *heretic* who would declare this, "unless he intended to *recant* and *renounce* his *errors*: and "whenever he did this, he would no longer be a *heretic*, no longer "to be *avoided*; and therefore being *self-condemned* in this "sense, would be so far from a reason why we should *avoid* him, "that it would be a reason why we should *not avoid* him: but "*treat him as a brother*[i]." 2. From the same principles it will follow, that the whole *discipline* of the Church, after the time that the gift of *discerning of spirits* ceased, so far as concerned *heretics*, was rash and unwarrantable: which no wise man will presume to say or think. 3. It further follows, that, be *heresies* ever so rife, and the *faith* ever so much endangered, there is no remedy for it: we cannot *know* in these times (though the Scriptures are allowed to be *clear* and *perfect*) what the doctrines of the Apostles were, or "whether the doctrines which others teach "in opposition to them are indeed doctrines received from the "Apostles or not:" however, if we may know that, yet without knowing men's *hearts* too, all our *zeal* for the ancient faith is fruitless and vain.

Such are the absurdities which the learned Doctor inevitably runs into, only for the sake of a false favourite notion he had unwarily imbibed. The truth of the whole matter is, we have nothing to do with the *inward* motives or views of heretics. The *mischief* lies in the *false doctrines* which they teach and propagate: and upon that account, and that only, they are to be *admonished, avoided, censured*, in order to prevent the *subverting whole houses*, and the like. Possibly such false teachers may *intend well*: of that God is judge: but the *faith* of *Christ*, and the *salvation* of souls, must not be sacrificed even to the known *good intentions* of any man or men whatever; no, nor to the preaching even of an *angel from heaven*, were it a possible supposition. But it may be objected; What! must *innocent* men suffer

[i] Rogers's Review of the Visible and Invisible Church, p. 409.

for the sake of any good? Is that *justice* or *equity?* I answer, that they are *innocent* in this case, through an *erroneous conscience,* and *invincible* ignorance, is more than man knows or can know: of that God is judge. But that *corrupting* the *faith* is not an *innocent* practice, (considered in itself,) but a very *ill thing,* every one knows, or ought to know; and that is the rule for *men* to go by in judging, because they can go by no other; and it is in the main both a safe and a certain rule. And if it may sometimes happen, that discerning and upright judges may condemn a man who is *innocent* in God's sight, (because of some *unconquerable* infirmity,) while *guilty* in the eyes of man, this cannot be remedied. The good proceeding from such *censures* vastly overbalances it. And what if, after all, *spiritual* censures (for of such only I am speaking) should happen to fall upon such a person, he may be in some measure hurt in his *reputation* by it, and that is all: and possibly hereupon his errors, before *invincible* through ignorance, may be removed by wholesome *instruction* and *admonitions,* and so he is befriended in it, and may now come to have a covenant right to happiness, who before stood only in *uncovenanted mercy.* For though God will *condemn* no man for what he could not help; yet he has *promised* no man a reward who ever so *ignorantly* corrupts the *faith* of the Gospel. But it is said of the unlearned and *unstable,* that when they *wrest* the *Scriptures,* it is to their own *destruction.* I have dwelt the longer upon this argument, because it appears to me to be a very weighty affair, and not so well considered by many as it ought to be. I now proceed in order to some other *texts,* relating to the *avoiding* heretics.

St. John's advice in that case, touched upon before, is, "If "there come any one unto you, and bring not this doctrine," (the doctrine of Christ in a material article,) "receive him not "into your house, neither bid him God speed: for he that "biddeth him God speed is partaker of his evil deeds[k]." The Apostle here forbids a Christian to *salute*[l] a man that perverts the Gospel in such a certain article, being a *fundamental* one: what article he spoke of, I have intimated above. It is observed by interpreters, that denying a person the common forms of *salutation* was the same with looking upon him as *excommunicate*[m]. And so these words of the Apostle carry in them the

[k] 2 John 10, 11. [l] Χαίρειν αὐτῷ μὴ λέγετε. [m] See Hammond and Whitby.

force of an excommunication, with respect to the *heretics* there pointed to, and the force of a prohibition, with respect to other Christians, who are hereby forbidden to receive such *heretics* into their houses, or to pay them so much as common civilities. This precept of the Apostle may be further illustrated by his own practice, recorded by Irenæus, who had the information at second hand from Polycarp, a disciple of St. John's; that St. John once meeting with Cerinthus at the bath, retired instantly without bathing; for fear, said he, lest the bath should fall, by reason of Cerinthus's being there, the *enemy to truth* [n]. The like story is there also told of Polycarp himself, with regard to another such *heretic*, namely, Marcion. And Irenæus's just reflection upon the whole is very observable in these words: "So extremely cautious were the Apostles and their followers "to have no communication, no, not so much as in discourse, "with any man that adulterated the truth [o]." A conduct, which, as he remarks, was conformable to St. Paul's rule, Tit. iii. 10. The reader will take notice by the way, that though Cerinthus and Marcion might be otherwise ill men, and might perhaps act upon *bad motives*, yet the stress of the thing lay not there; but it was their being *enemies* to *truth*, and their *adulterating the truth*, (in points fundamental,) which made them so abhorred, and their company so detested by wise and holy men. No matter what their *motives* were, or their *morals* in other respects: they *corrupted* the *faith* of Christ, and in effect *subverted* the *Gospel:* that was enough to render them detestable in the eyes of all men who sincerely loved and valued *sound* faith.

The bishops of Pergamus and Thyatira are reproved by our Lord for *suffering*, that is, for not ejecting the Balaamites or Nicolaitans, who taught false doctrine, relating to the fundamentals of Christian *practice:* they taught the lawfulness of *fornication*, and of *eating things offered to idols*. That was a heresy in doctrinals, immediately affecting the *agenda* of Christianity, the *moral* commands of *Scripture;* which they very probably

[n] Καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκηκοότες αὐτοῦ, ὅτι Ἰωάννης, ὁ τοῦ Κυρίου μαθητὴς, ἐν τῇ Ἐφέσῳ πορευθεὶς λούσασθαι, καὶ ἰδὼν ἔσω Κήρινθον, ἐξήλατο τοῦ βαλανείου μὴ λουσάμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπειπών· φύγωμεν, μὴ καὶ τὸ βαλανεῖον συμπέσῃ, ἔνδον ὄντος Κηρίνθου, τοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐχθροῦ. *Iren.* lib. iii. c. 3. p. 177. Bened. alias 204. Grab. Conf. Euseb. Eccl. H. lib. iii. c. 28. p. 123. Theodoret. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. c. 3. p. 220.

[o] Τοσαύτην οἱ Ἀπόστολοι καὶ οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτῶν ἔσχον εὐλάβειαν, πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ μεχρὶ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τινὶ τῶν παραχαρασσόντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς καὶ Παῦλος ἔφησεν· αἱρετικὸν ἄνθρωπον, κ. τ. λ. *Iren. ibid.*

misinterpreted and perverted, much after the same manner as others perverted such texts as contain the *credenda*, matters of *faith* strictly so called. There is not much difference in the main between the two cases; excepting that one is more *gross* and *scandalous*, and shews itself in more *sensible* effects. There is the same presumptuous tampering with *Scripture*, the same kind of *artificial* elusions, the like wire-drawing of *texts* in both cases: and there is likewise the same kind of *unbelief* or *disbelief* of *God's* sacred word, only in different articles, and the like opposition to *Gospel truths*, only to different purposes. If any man through mere *weakness of judgment* should have imbibed the doctrine of the Nicolaitans, but resolving at the same time never to divulge it, nor practise upon it, I see not what harm a bare opinion, and owing only to infirmity, would do him, while dormant and without effect. But if any person, through the like weakness of judgment, should entertain low and degrading notions of his God and Saviour, though he should never divulge it, he would suffer some harm by it with respect to his *religious* services, which would be thereby rendered *less perfect*. For in that case, the *ill effect* so far is inseparable from the *false opinion;* though I doubt not but all merciful allowances would be made for it. But as the *criminal* part in the former case would lie chiefly in *practising* upon the persuasion, or in *divulging* it to the hurt of other persons, so in this latter also, the most criminal circumstance would be the *espousing* and publicly *supporting* such false persuasion to the detriment of religion. For if he who shall break one of the *least moral commandments*, and shall *teach men so*, shall be called *least in the kingdom of heaven*, (Matt. v. 19.) it must be a very dangerous experiment for any man to presume to *teach* any thing contrary to the Gospel of Christ in the *main* articles of *faith* or *doctrine*, because the *Christian life* is nearly concerned in both, and the honour of God and religion are bound up with them. And the pastors or guardians of the Christian religion ought no more to *suffer* any notorious insults upon the great *credenda* of our most holy religion, than upon the *agenda:* since both rest upon the same foundation, have a close connection with each other, and are, for the most part, likely to stand or fall together.

II. I have now proved from direct Scripture-texts, that it is the duty of Christians to refuse communion with those who corrupt the faith of Christ in points *fundamental*, and persist in so

doing, after proper cautions and admonitions given them. I am in the next place to enforce the doctrine yet further, by considerations drawn from the very nature and reason of the thing, upon Scripture principles. *Piety* towards God, *charity* towards other men, and *justice* towards our own souls, all conspire to recommend and authorize such conduct.

1. I say, *piety towards God* requires such a conduct. For can it be thought, that when the high Lord and Governor of the universe vouchsafes to speak to us from heaven, and to reveal truths of *importance*, that good men ought patiently to bear the perverting of those sacred truths, or the adulterating of those heavenly instructions. Earthly governors would resent the putting *false* constructions upon their laws or edicts, or the *wresting* them to quite different purpose from what they were intended for, to deceive and mislead their people: how much more shall the God of heaven resent any indignities of that kind! It is the cause of God and religion, to rescue the word of God from perverse glosses and comments, and to preserve it in its native *purity* and perfection. To admit those who corrupt and deprave its sense in any gross manner to the common honours and privileges of fellow Christians, would be the ready way to introduce all imaginable *confusion* in faith and worship, and to *deface* Christianity to such a degree, that common Christians at least could not know how or where to find it. For example: had the Cerinthians, Ebionites, Marcionites, Valentinians, Manichees, and other sects too numerous to mention, been all admitted as *fellow Christians*, Christianity must have been looked upon as the most uncertain, unconstant, inconsistent thing in the world: and both the religion itself, and the Scriptures which contain it, would very probably have been lost before now, or have come down to us so mangled, adulterated, disguised, that no one could know what to depend upon as true and sincere, either as to words or sense. The discriminating of heretics from faithful Christians, and therewith preserving the *unity* of the Church and the *purity* of doctrine, has been a principal means of fixing the Christian religion in its most material articles, and of supporting the *honour* of it against all its enemies without, whether Jews, Pagans, or mere infidels. So necessary was it to discountenance all attempts for subverting or perverting the truth as it was in Christ Jesus, and to separate the *clean* from the *unclean*, by rejecting heretics, as unworthy of Christian communion, or

even of the name of Christians, except it were in a very large sense.

2. As *piety* towards God, and *reverence* towards his sacred word, required such conduct; so likewise did *charity* towards men; charity towards the *offenders*, and charity towards all mankind. It was a *charitable* office towards the corruptors of the faith of Christ, to reject and disown them, in order to make them *ashamed* [p], and to bring them to repentance, that so their souls "might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus [q]." It is true, that it often failed of having this *salutary* effect, as the judgments of God also often fail, and where they do not cure they irritate and harden, and render worse, which is no argument against the *salutary* nature of the remedy, but shews only the incurable disorder of the patient. Indeed St. Paul does distinguish his coming *with* the *rod* of excommunication, from his coming in "love and in the spirit of meekness [r]:" not as if such discipline were not an instance of *love*, or were not perfectly consistent with a *spirit of meekness*, but it was not love in every view, or in every sense of the word, like the love shewn towards the *faithful* in all the outward expressions of approbation and friendliness; for the case did not admit of it. It was love mingled with *wholesome severity*, the truer love for being so mingled, when the necessity of the case required it: *wounds* they were, but of a *friend* still, and in a case where the *kindest* of friends could not otherwise shew themselves kinder than by so doing. *Meekness* it was not, under that precise formality, but consistent with all that could be called *Christian meekness:* for to forbear *sharpness* and severity, in such a case, is not *meekness*, but *tameness*, and a Laodicean lukewarmness. So that the exercise of proper discipline, in such instances, is in reality fervent *love* and *charity* towards the offenders themselves, in a *spiritual* view, but expressing itself in the harsher way, the only way left for it towards men in their circumstances. *Palliating* medicines would be *cruel* and *barbarous* applications, when *corrosives* are the only means left to recover the patient, and to effect the cure [s]. Upon the whole therefore, *charity* towards the *offenders* themselves requires such a conduct as I have been mentioning.

[p] 2 Thess. iii. 14.
[q] 1 Cor. v. 5.
[r] 1 Cor. iv. 21.
[s] The objections made to the method, as *not proper*, are abundantly answered by a very learned Prelate, Potter on Church-Government, p. 399, &c.

There can be less appearance for any question, whether it be not also *charity* towards all men besides. It is charity towards the *ignorant*, as carrying *instruction* along with it; charity towards the *unwary*, as giving them *warning* to stand off from infection; charity towards the *confirmed* Christians, as encouraging them still more, and preserving them from insults; charity towards the *whole Church*, as supporting both their *unity* and *purity*; charity towards *all mankind*, towards them that are *without*, as it is recommending pure religion to them in the most advantageous light, obviating their most plausible calumnies, and giving them less occasion to *blaspheme*.

3. I observe, in the third place, that *justice* to our own souls requires, that we use all prudent and proper endeavours to discountenance *heresies*, by refusing communion with their open favourers and abettors. For otherwise, as John speaks, we become *partakers of their evil doings*. To own them as fellow Christians, is to take their guilt upon ourselves, or greater; I say, *greater*, because supposing them so far innocent as honestly to follow their own judgment, yet while we are of a contrary judgment, it cannot but be *guilty* practice and conduct in us, and very *great* too, to smother our sentiments, or not to bear our testimony in such a way as Christ has appointed, against all notorious corruptions either of *faith*, or *worship*, or *doctrine*. It appears then sufficiently, both from Scripture directly, and from the very nature and reason of the thing, that it is our bounden duty to refuse communion with those that persist in *opposing* the *fundamental* articles of our most holy religion. I am aware that several objections have been made, and will be made, to what Christ has ordered and the Church has all along practised as concerning our conduct in this article: for what is there so just, so rational, or so commendable, that may not be objected to? However, in order to satisfy reasonable men at least, I design a distinct chapter for the further clearing up the question in hand.

CHAP. V.

Objections removed, and some vulgar mistakes rectified.

HAVING laid down our principles, and the grounds upon which we go, our next concern is to remove or obviate whatever threatens to overturn them, or to lessen their force, lest any

weak objections on one side, left unanswered, may prevail more with some persons than the strongest arguments on the other. I proceed then to the business.

I. It may have been sometimes invidiously suggested, that the insisting so strongly upon the *necessity* of believing, or however of not opposing this doctrine, is carrying matters to an *immoderate* height, and tends to provoke others to run into a contrary *extreme* out of a kind of indignation, and excessive renitence. The plea is smooth and specious, and appears to carry a fair show of *lenity* and *moderation* in it, which are virtues much to be admired; but in reality it contains little, as here applied, more than artful abuse, and such as is frequently played with in other the like cases. For the purpose: if any person is disposed to undermine the *inspiration* of sacred Writ, he begins commonly with complaints of the stiffness and dogmaticalness of common Divines, which prejudice men of freer thoughts, as is pretended, against Scripture itself, and almost force them into another extreme. So again, if any man has a mind to relax the strictness of the Gospel-rule, and to bring it down to his taste, he falls to declaiming against the excessive rigour of religionists, which frighten many sober persons, as is said, from embracing religion. Complaints of that kind may sometimes be just, but they are oftener mere artifice. It will be proper to examine, in the first place, what truth there is in the suggestions brought about our running into *extremes*. Without all question, *extremes* are carefully to be avoided in every thing: *extreme cold* may be as bad as *extreme heat:* and *extreme lenity* is a fault, as much as *extreme severity*. But the thing to be proved is, that the insisting upon the doctrine of the Trinity, as an *essential* article, is an *extreme*, or that it is not in reality the true and *golden mean* between rigour on one hand and lukewarmness on the other. It may be true, that the insisting upon this doctrine may have that *accidental* effect, to prejudice weak minds the more against it, or against religion itself. In like manner, the insisting upon the doctrine of the *cross*, the duty of *self-denial*, and the necessity of *universal* righteousness, may have prejudiced many against Christianity, and yet daily do so. But still if the doctrine be both *true* and *important*, it must be taught and inculcated: and the question is not in such cases, whether many may not be offended or scandalized at any doctrine, but whether the doctrine be such as ought to be insisted upon. For, as a very

judicious and learned Prelate[t] has appositely observed, "St. "Paul has plainly taught us how we ought to conduct ourselves "in such cases. He knew very well that Jew and Gentile took "great offence at the doctrine of a *crucified Saviour*, and he "could not but see that Christianity would be more favourably "entertained by both, if that *offence* were removed, and the "Gospel reduced to a scheme of *mere morality*, ratified by a "person sent from God, and enforced by stronger assurances of "rewards and punishments than had ever been given before. "But, notwithstanding all this, *we*, says he, *preach Christ crucified*, "*unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness*[u]." The reason is plain: for the ministers of Christ are under special direction, and must not dare to prevaricate in their sacred employment. They must never presume to betray the *truth* of the Gospel with any view to prevent *offence:* for such offence is *taken*, not *given*, and is therefore of no moment. They only are to bear the blame, who are causelessly *offended* at what they ought to receive with the profoundest respect and veneration.

I may here also take notice, that when some persons of more warmth than wisdom have gone upon what they call *healing* measures, in order to reconcile many (as they supposed) to Christianity shortened and curtailed in its prime articles, they have been for the most part miserably disappointed. Their unwarrantable *concessions*, instead of making more Christians, (*half Christians* I should say,) have only made more *infidels*. And it was natural to think that such would the result be. For when once the advocates for religion begin to recede beyond what they have warrant for, they give very great advantage to the enemy, who may then modestly expect to draw them on further, upon the same motive, or principle, which had before carried them too far. For if they yield to *importunity*, rather than to *reason*, in one case, why not in another? Or if the first step taken out of the way could appear *rational*, why not a *second*, and a *third*, and so on, till there be no end of wandering? It is frequently the fate of those over-complying gentlemen, that while they stoop too low in hopes to fetch others up, they are themselves dragged down, and can never recover it. They are insensibly carried over to the party towards which they lean; and instead of preserving a balance, (which they lost in the first

[t] Bishop of London, in his Charge of May 28, 1730, p. 28.
[u] 1 Cor. i. 23.

decline,) they are at length found to run in with the other extreme. The *Episcopian* neutrality seldom stays long, before it passes over into *Arianism* or *Socinianism*; and these again easily degenerate into *Deism* and *Atheism*. It is much to be questioned whether *mysteries*, after all, are really the things which are most apt to offend the fashionable world: the *purity* of the Gospel precepts is the hardest of digestion; and one *Commandment*, very probably, may make greater difficulty than many *Creeds*. But the principal reason for striking at *mysteries* first is, because it is more *decent* to begin there; and after a *breach* once made in the main fabric, it is easy to go on to a total subversion. The Deists, in their turn, take up the same topics of *moderation* and *lenity*: "Let not the men of *faith* "despise the men of *reason*; and again, let not the men of *rea-* "*son* despise the men of *faith*, so long as both agree in the "*substantial* duties:" this is the cant. And truly, if *moderation* is to stand for *yielding* and *complying*, be it right or wrong, and if that be all the rule we have to go by, I do not see that the men argue amiss. But surely we must stop somewhere: and where can we better stop than at *necessaries*, at *truths*, and *important* truths? For things of that value ought never to be sacrificed to any temporal considerations, or to any views of a false and short-lived peace.

From hence it may be inferred, that it is not owing to any *immoderate* rigours of the more cautious Divines, if *infidelity* happens to gain ground, but to the *immoderate* and *extravagant* concessions of those who are not so careful as they should be to keep up the ancient faith in its first purity and perfection. Accordingly it may be observed, how the *unbelievers* caress and compliment those complying gentlemen who meet them half way, while they are perpetually inveighing against the stiff Divines, as they call them, whom they can make no advantage of. They know their friends from their foes: and it may be learned from them how the case stands: *Fas est et ab hoste doceri.*

To illustrate and confirm the general observations, let the reader reflect a little upon the unhappy conduct of Socinus, and the upshot of it. He had contrived a system for his friends to abide by, and he hoped they would rest there: but many of them, upon the same principles, whereby he had led them so far, resolved to go further, throwing off the *worship* of *Christ*, in consequence of their mean opinion they had entertained of him.

Socinus reclaimed, remonstrated, cried out aloud, hoping to stop their progress by his *earnestness*, (for he had yielded too much before to talk of reason now,) and to fetch them back; but all to no purpose. He represented to them the dreadful consequences of discarding the *divine worship* of Christ: "That it "was rendering the whole Christian religion *weak* and *precarious*, "was sapping the main *foundation* of their *faith* and *hope*, and "grievously offending God the *Father*, and *Christ Jesus*[x]: that "he had never yet met with any man of true piety and godliness who durst venture upon it, but that he knew several of "them who had thereupon turned Epicureans, or downright "Atheists[y]." All which was true: but why could not he have seen that *Atheism* hung at the end of the chain, till he came to the last link? Never did man more expose himself than Socinus did in that instance. For indeed the throwing off the *divine worship* of Christ was but the natural and inevitable consequence of his scheme, if one would act consistently: and the next consequence to that was *Deism* or *Atheism*, by his own account. So it was plainly telling the world that he had drawn his disciples into a labyrinth, and knew not how to extricate them. To go back was a mortifying thought to vain men; to go forwards was to plunge into downright *Atheism*. Such generally is the fate of the self-opinionated, who will not listen to sober counsels in time, but precipitately strike off from the right way to follow they know not what, or to fix they know not where. I might mention those amongst us who began with Christianity not Mysterious[z], and in a few years after settled in *Pantheism*[a], little short of the broadest *Atheism*: and others might be named,

[x] Ipsius Christi universa religio in *dubium* revocetur, aut saltem *mutationi* et *fini* in hoc ipso seculo obnoxia redditur; summum et præstantissimum nostræ *spei* et *fidei* in Deum *fundamentum* nobis eripitur; ac denique, ne omnia hinc provenientia mala et incommoda, quæ innumerabilia sunt, enumerare hic nunc velle videar, in ipsum *Christum* et *Deum Patrem* gravissime peccatur. *Socin. ad Radec. Epist.* iii. p. 387.

[y] Socinus. "Quotquot ego vidi "adorationis Christi oppugnatores, "omnes tandem in Atheismum sunt "prolapsi; quod et tibi accidet, nisi "sententiam mutaveris."

Non dixit Socinus, omnes quos ipse vidisset adorationis Christi oppugnatores tandem in *Atheismum* fuisse prolapsos; sed neminem se ex istorum numero adhuc novisse, qui Christiana pietate et vitæ sanctimonia esset præditus; imo nonnullos ex ipsis se vidisse aut scivisse Epicureos, et plane Atheos factos. Nec mirum esse, cum hæc ad *Epicureismum* et *Atheismum* homini Christi sacris initiato via compendiaria quædam foret. *Disput. inter. F. S. et Christian. Franken.* p. 772, 773.

[z] A book published with that title, A. D. 1696.

[a] The Pantheisticon, published A. D. 1720.

who, from finding fault with the Council of Nice for *corrupting* Christianity[b], (as they fondly supposed,) have gradually, and in a course of years, come to reject Christianity itself, as *needless* and *useless*, and all revealed religion as mere *rubbish*[c]. When once men break off from the reverence due to Sacred Writ, and to the eminent lights of the best and purest ages, they roll downwards apace, and very rarely recover it. For if they were not strong enough to stand at first upon *plain* and *firm* ground, how shall they keep steady afterwards upon *declivity?* I say then, that the blame lies not upon those who abide unmovable in the old and well-tried doctrine of the Trinity, but upon those that are soon shaken in mind, and depart from it. To adhere firmly to it is not rigour, but constancy: and to forsake it, or to grow *indifferent* towards it, is not prudence or moderation, but unmanly levity and wantonness, or something worse.

II. It is sometimes pleaded, that *a wicked life is the worst heresy*, intimating as if breaches made in our most holy *faith* were of slight consideration, so long as a man lives a good *moral* life in other respects. I readily allow that a *wicked life* is the *worst* thing imaginable: but I conceive further, that the spreading and propagating of corrupt doctrines is leading a *wicked life*, in the strictest sense. I speak not of mere mistakes in judgment, but of *espousing* and *propagating* them; corrupting the faith in important articles, and diffusing such corruptions. A life so spent is a *wicked life*, if opposing divine truths, undermining the Gospel, and subverting souls be *wicked* attempts, as they undoubtedly are. It must be owned, that a *good life* is every thing to a Christian: but what does a *good* life consist of? Universal righteousness in *faith* and *manners*. Therefore to talk of a man's leading a *good life* while he is corrupting the faith and disseminating pernicious doctrines, is talking contradictions. As to the *sincerity* or *good meaning* of the men who do it, that shall be considered under another article: I speak now of the *nature* and *quality* of the thing, abstracted from the circumstances of the person: and I say, it is *wickedness* and a perfect contradiction to a *good life*. It is *evil in itself*, and the *iniquity* of it is fixed in the nature and reason of things.

Some have seemed to wonder[d] why commonly a warmer zeal

[b] Rights of the Christian Church, p. 196, &c. published 1706.

[c] Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 421. published 1730.

[d] The author of the Defence of Scripture as the only Standard of

should be shewn against *heresies*, than against ordinary *immoralities*: the wonder will presently cease, if the case be but rightly stated. Ask, whether one that commits *fornication*, or one that *teaches* and inculcates it as lawful practice, is the *wickeder* man? Here the case is plain, that the *heretic* who takes pains to spread such dissolute doctrine, and to debauch the principles of the age, is incomparably a viler man than he that barely perpetrates the sin. So then it must be allowed, that an *heretic* in *morality* is infinitely a greater sinner than one who through his lusts and passions merely leads an *immoral* life.

So as to *faith*, ask, whether a man that perverts any material article, either carelessly or through some prejudice, but lets it go no further, or one that does the same thing, and then takes upon him to *teach* and *inculcate* the erroneous doctrine to others; I say, ask which of the two is the *wickeder* man? The latter, undoubtedly. He is the *heretic* in teaching and patronizing a corruption of faith, while the other who corrupts it only for himself is no formal *heretic*, as I conceive, in strict propriety of speech[e], though not a good man. Thus, while we compare an *heretic* in *morality* with a man merely immoral; or an *heretic* in *faith* with a man that is merely a *misbeliever*; it is obvious to perceive, that there is much greater malignity in those that *teach* or *espouse* what they ought not, than in those that merely believe wrong, or do wrong: because the leaders and abettors of any ill thing diffuse the mischief all around; the other let it die with them. Thus far, I presume, is plain and clear.

After thus comparing kind with kind, let us next take them, as it were, across, and compare the *heretic* in *faith* with an *immoral* man, in the common sense of the word. We will allow, that an *heretic* in matters of mere *revelation* is not so bad a man, generally speaking, as an *heretic* in *morality*; but still he may be a much worse man, or, to speak plainer, may do a great

Faith is one of those wonderers, (p. 40.) But he entirely mistakes the case, opposing *imperfection in knowledge*, which is his soft name for heresy, to *imperfection in practice*: whereas heresy is not barely imperfection in knowledge, but it is *evil practice*; for spreading pernicious doctrines is a fault in the *conduct of life*. Therefore the opposition lies between *one evil practice* and *another*, and the question is, which is worst.

[e] Qui sententiam suam, quamvis falsam atque perversam, nulla pertinaci animositate defendunt, præsertim quam non audacia præsumptionis suæ pepererunt, sed a seductis atque in errorem lapsis parentibus acceperunt; quærunt autem cauta solicitudine veritatem, corrigi parati cum invenerint, nequaquam sunt inter *hæreticos* deputandi. *Augustin. Epist.* xliii. p. 88. ed. Benedict.

deal more *mischief* by his *doctrine*, than the immoral man may do by his *example*. For besides his propagating *dangerous* errors, subverting souls, it is further to be considered, that he sets himself up as a *rival* teacher, in opposition to the *faithful* ministers of Christ: he weakens their hands, frustrates their pious labours, perverts their flocks, lessens their esteem in the eyes of their people, gives the common enemy a handle to insult and blaspheme, raises a kind of flame and war in the Church, and remotely administers to all immorality and dissoluteness of manners, by taking off the influence of the best instructions of their more knowing and more edifying guides. These are no slight mischiefs, but great, and wide, and often of long continuance, and in several respects irreparable[f]. Therefore let it not be thought strange, if the most holy and excellent men have ever expressed the greatest detestation of all attempts of that kind. Scarcely is a man excusable for advancing even a *truth*, to the detriment of public *peace*, if it be of a slight nature, not worth the contending for, or such as might innocently be dropped: but to advance *falsehoods*, (and in points very *material*, tending to create infinite disturbances here, as well as to betray many to perdition hereafter; these are crimes *unpardonable*, if the authors see what they do; and if they do not, yet their guilt remains, if they *might see*, and will not. However, the nature and quality of the thing is not altered by their seeing or not seeing: for *heresy* is still *heresy*, though a man intends well, as much as *persecution* is still *persecution*, though a person thinks and believes that he *does God service* in it. Let it not therefore be imagined, that *false teachers* are to be numbered among the *smaller* offenders, or that they are not, generally speaking, the greatest of sinners. Accordingly, we find our blessed Lord never shewed a keener resentment against any men whatever,

[f] Mr. Bayle describes it thus: "I "do not know where we can find out "crimes which are not of a less hein- "ous nature than that of rending the "mystical body of Jesus Christ, that "spouse which he has redeemed with "his blood, that mother which begets "us to God, which nourishes us with "the milk of that wisdom which is "without guile, which leads us to "everlasting bliss. What fouler "crime can we think of, than rebel- "ling against such a mother, than "defaming her all the world over, "endeavouring to stir up her children "against her, tearing them from her "bosom by millions, to drag them, "as much as in us lies, into everlast- "ing flames, them and their posterity "from generation to generation? "Where can we find the first-rate "high treason against the divine "Majesty, unless in instances of this "kind?" *Supplem. to Philosoph. Commentary*, pref. p. 517.

than against *false prophets*[g], or those who taught *false doctrines*[h] in opposition to *divine* truths. I interpret *false prophets* so as to include *false teachers*, such at least as corrupt *sound* doctrine in any *fundamental* article: and so Grotius and Hammond interpret, like judicious and knowing men. But Dr. Whitby, disliking that construction, advances some odd speculations of his own to pervert the true meaning of the texts. He pleads that *all false teachers*[i], all that assert any thing wrong, are not included. Perhaps not: but yet *all* that manifestly pervert the *faith* in any great degree may be included notwithstanding; yea, and must be, by parity of reason. He pretends it to be *ridiculous*, to judge of *false* teachers by *false* doctrines. But how can we judge better of a *false* teacher, than by the *falsehood* of what he teaches? It is the very rule which St. John lays down[k], and so does St. Paul[l]; which might have deterred any considering man from calling it *ridiculous*. Besides, in the very reason of the thing, what rule could be pitched upon either *surer* or *wiser*? False teachers would pretend extraordinary endowments of *learning* perhaps, or *sanctity*, or *piety*, and an affectionate concern for the happiness of those whom they should address themselves to: but they might be detected by *their fruits*[m]. For if their *doctrine* should be found *contrary* to the doctrine of Christ, that is *conviction* at once, and all their glozing pretences are worth nothing. They are *false* prophets, because their doctrines are *false:* what can be a plainer proof of it? Neither is it any objection to this, that our Lord afterwards speaks of *doing the will of his Father*, and of *working iniquity:* for maintaining the *truth* is *doing* God's *will;* and corrupting or resisting it, is *working iniquity*. Therefore let

[g] Matt. viii. 15. xxiv. 24. Mark xiii. 22. Compare Acts xx. 29, 30. See Grotius and Hammond on Matt. vii. 15.

[h] Matt. xv. 4—9.

[i] Whitby on Matt. vii. 15.

[k] 1 John iv. 2, 3. 2 John 9, 10, 11.

[l] 1 Cor. xii. 3.

[m] Ἄρα γε ἐκ τῶν καρπῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιγνώσεσθε αὐτούς. ἱκανὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ τὰ δυσαγῆ καὶ παμμίαρα δόγματα τὸν οἰκεῖον ἐπιδεῖξαι πατέρα· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ καρποῦ, φησὶ, τὸ δένδρον γινώσκεται. *Theodorit. Hæret.* Fab. lib. iii. p. 226.

Sed quid ait Salvator? *Ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos*, id est, cum cœperint divinas illas voces non jam proferre tantum, sed etiam exponere, nec adhuc jactare solum, sed etiam interpretari; tunc amaritudo illa, tunc acerbitas, tunc rabies intelligetur, tunc novitium virus exhalabitur, tunc prophanæ novitates aperientur; tunc primum scindi sepem videas, tunc transferri patrum terminos, tunc catholicam fidem cædi, tunc ecclesiasticum dogma lacerari. *Vincent. Lirinens. Commonit.* cap. 36.

this be *included* at least among other *bad fruits*, other works of iniquity; for it is properly such. Dr. Whitby pretends further, that *false prophets* is not a name for *false teachers* at large, or for *heretics*: that appears to be his meaning. But yet certain it is from the New Testament, and from some of the texts which he himself produces, that it is. St. Peter makes the name of *false prophets* equivalent to that of *false teachers*, who should *bring in damnable heresies*[m]. And St. John gives the name of *false prophets*[n] to the *heretics* of his time; namely, to the *Docetæ*, and *Cerinthians*, and others of like stamp, as I have partly observed already, and shall more fully shew in a succeeding chapter. Therefore it is right to interpret the *false prophets* which our Lord speaks of, in such a sense as to include all *heretics*, all *false teachers*, who in any grievous manner, or degree, should pervert the Gospel of Christ. And so the primitive Fathers interpret our Lord's words[o].

As our Lord himself made use of a particular sharpness of expression against *false* teachers, or *heretics*, so also did his Apostles after him. St. Paul has done it very often against those *grievous wolves*, (as he calls them,) which may appear in some measure from what has been cited above: I shall only refer to some noted texts[p] to avoid prolixity; but observing also in passing, that though St. Paul delivered an *immoral* man over to *Satan*[q] for his incontinence, yet he did not use so strong an expression as *anathema*, or *accursed*, which he pronounced upon heretics[r]. St. Peter is exceeding tart against some *false teachers* of his days[s], who "privily brought in damnable heresies, even "denying the Lord that bought them." They also taught men to sit loose from all decent rule and order, and, under pretence of *Christian liberty*, to run riot in luxury and dissolute behaviour. They were *heretics* in *morality* as well as in *faith*, and of the worst kind: and therefore what is said of them is not applicable to other *false teachers* in the same *degree*, but in *proportion* to

[m] 2 Pet. ii. 1.
[n] 1 John iv. 1.
[o] Justin Martyr. Dialog. p. 100, 101, 249. edit. Jebb. alias 208, 316. Thirlby. Tertullian. Præscript. c. iv. xliv. Cyrill. Hierosol. Catech. iv. 1. Hieronym. in Matt. vii. 15. xxiv. 24. Athanas. ad Episc. Ægypti et Lib. p. 270, 272. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. l. iii. præf. p. 225.
[p] Acts xx. 29, 30. Rom. xvi. 17, 18. Gal. i. 8, 9. v. 10, 12. 1 Tim. i. 19, 20. iv. 1, 2, 3. vi. 3, 4, 5. 2 Tim. ii. 16, 17, 18. 2 Tim. iii. 1—9. Tit. i. 10—16. iii. 10, 11.
[q] 1 Cor. v. 5.
[r] Gal. i. 8, 9.
[s] 2 Pet. ii. 1, 2, 3.

the malignity of their respeetive *heresy*. The Nicolaitans, I suppose, were the men whom St. Peter pointed to[t]. I hinted that they were heretics in *faith*, because their doctrine, relating to God and *Christ*, was much the same with that of Cerinthus, as Irenæus testifies of them[u]: and thus we may easily understand why St. Peter says of them, that they "denied the Lord "that bought them." St. Jude expresses himself with uncommon warmth against the same *false teachers*, whom St. Peter had before censured[x]. St. John, who was all love, and meekness, and charity, yet severely lashes the *heretics* of his times, either such as denied Christ's *humanity*, or such as impugned his *divinity;* which I shall shew in due time and place. The names which he bestows upon them are as follows; *antichrists*[y], *liars*[z], *seducers*[a], *false prophets*[b], *deceivers*[c]. He scrupled not to go wandering upon the mountains in quest of a wicked robber, a captain of a gang, in order to recover him to Christ; and he did recover him[d]: but with the heretic Cerinthus, a corrupter of the *truth*, he would not stay under the same roof[e]: by which it may appear, how much he detested *heresies* above common *immoralities*. His disciple Ignatius, an apostolical man, was exactly of the same sentiments. "For," says he, (speaking of them that commit adultery, and the like,) "they that *corrupt* "(debauch) families, *shall not inherit the kingdom of God:* there- "fore, if they who do such things according to the flesh, perish; "how much more he, who by his pernicious doctrine corrupts "that divine *faith*, for the which *Jesus Christ* was crucified! "Such a man so *defiled* shall go into fire unquenchable; and so "also shall he that hearkens unto him[f]." See from hence how this holy Bishop, soon after a *martyr*, abominated *heresies* beyond even great *immoralities*, as being of more diffusive and more lasting malignity, and not destroying men's bodies, but subverting their souls. His scholar Polycarp, another eminent

[t] Vid. Buddæus Eccles. Apostol. p. 600.

[u] Iren. lib. iii. cap. 11. Conf. Buddæus Eccles. Apostol. p. 367, 383, 406.

[x] Vid. Buddæus Eccles. Apostol. p. 594.

[y] 1 John ii. 18, 22. iv. 3. 2 John 7.

[z] 1 John ii. 22.

[a] 1 John ii. 26.

[b] 1 John iv. 1.

[c] 2 John 7.

[d] Euseb. E. H. lib. iii. c. 23. Clem. Alex. p. 959. ed. Ox.

[e] See above, p. 469.

[f] Οἱ οἰκοφθόροι βασιλείαν Θεοῦ οὐ κληρονομήσουσιν· εἰ οὖν οἱ κατὰ σάρκα ταῦτα πράσσοντες ἀπέθανον, πόσῳ μᾶλλον ἐὰν πίστιν Θεοῦ ἐν κακῇ διδασκαλίᾳ φθείρῃ, ὑπὲρ ἧς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐσταυρώθη; ὁ τοιοῦτος ῥυπαρὸς γενόμενος, εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἄσβεστον χωρήσει, ὁμοίως καὶ ἀκούων αὐτοῦ. *Ignat. ad Ephes.* c. 16.

Bishop of those times, was a man of exemplary severity against all kinds of *sinners*, but against none so much as against Marcion, a noted heretic, whom he calls the *first-born of Satan*[g]. I shall mention but one authority more, the very pious and holy St. Cyprian, of the third century. He argues the point at length, that a *heretic* is a much wickeder man than one that lapsed into *idolatry* under persecution. He states the comparison to this effect: "This is a worse crime than that which the lapsers may "seem to have committed, who yet do a severe penance for "their crime, and implore the mercy of God by a long and "plenary satisfaction. The one seeks to the Church, and "humbly entreats her favour, the other resists the Church, and "proclaims open war against her. The one has the excuse of "*necessity*, the other is retained by his own wilfulness only. "He that lapses only hurts *himself*; but he that endeavours to "make a heresy or schism, draws *many* after him. Here is "only the loss of *one soul*; but there a multitude are endangered. "The lapser is sensible that he has done amiss, and therefore "mourns and laments for it: but the other proudly swells in "his crime, pleases himself in his misconduct, divides the "children from their mother, draws away the sheep from the "pastor, and disturbs the sacraments of God: and whereas a "*lapser* sins but once, the other sins daily[h]."

From the authorities I have given, it may abundantly appear that *Christ* and his Apostles, and their followers, have, in a very distinguishing manner, expressed their abhorrence of *false prophets, false apostles, false teachers*; that is to say, of *heretics*, and their open favourers or abettors. It is true, there may be great difference between *heresy* and *heresy*; and what is said of heresies in general is not applicable in the same measure or degree to every heresy in particular, but in *proportion* only: in the mean while however it is evident, that *heresy* is not a thing of slight moment, but a crime of the first magnitude, if understood to mean the *espousing* of *false* doctrines, tending to corrupt either *faith* or *morals* in any considerable instances. But I suppose, they who think lightly of it, mean only some ignorant or careless

[g] Polycarpus Marcioni aliquando occurrunti sibi et dicenti, cognoscis nos? Respondit, cognosco te *primogenitum Satanæ*. Tantum Apostoli et horum discipuli habuerunt timorem, ut nec verbo communicarent alicui eorum qui adulteraverant veritatem. *Iren.* lib. iii. c. 3. Conf. Euseb. E. H. lib. iv. c. 14. The like is observed of Justin and Irenæus, by Ittigius Histor. Eccles. Sæc. ii. p. 91.

[h] Cyprian. de Unitat. Eccl. p. 117.

mistake in judgment, which a man keeps to himself, and disturbs not the world with: which indeed does not amount to *heresy*, (as I have more than once said,) does not make a *heretic*. Heresy lies not merely in the inward thought, but in the overt acts, either *teaching* pernicious doctrines, or supporting and encouraging them that do. Heresy so considered is *evil doing*[i], and is condemned among the *works* of the *flesh*[k]. So then, instead of saying, that *a wicked life is the worst heresy*, which is scarce *sense*, I should choose rather to say, what is both *sense* and *truth*, (generally speaking,) that *a life of heresy is a most wicked life:* it is joining with *Satan* and his emissaries, in a formed opposition to God and his Church, is complicated *impiety* and *immorality*.

III. But it will be pleaded further, that such as teach *false* doctrines may be very *sincere;* and their *sincerity* will be their protection before the awful tribunal, or however ought to screen them from censure here. But it behoves us to consider well of this so sovereign a preservative, that we may not trust too far to it; because if it should fail at last, there is nothing then left to depend on. *Sincerity*, I observe, is a very equivocal ambiguous term, used in more senses than one: and therefore, before I enter deeper into the subject, I would distinguish it into two kinds. 1. *Sincerity*, as opposed to *hypocrisy* and *pretence*. 2. Sincerity, as opposed to *prejudice* and *partiality*. There is no discoursing clearly upon the point, without attending carefully to this distinction. Next then let us examine how the present question about the *iniquity* of teaching false doctrines, or the *justice* of *censuring* them, is at all affected by what is pleaded of the *sincerity* of the teachers, taking sincerity either in this or in that sense.

1. Consider we, first, *sincerity*, as opposed to *hypocrisy* and *pretence*. Suppose the teachers of false doctrine to be *verily persuaded* in their minds and consciences, that such their doctrine is *true*, and their conduct *right*, and that they *ought* to teach it: this is bringing the matter to the case of an *erroneous* conscience, upon our present supposition, that their doctrine is *false*, and ours *true*. Well then, what does an *erroneous* conscience amount to? Will it justify men in *evil* practices? or is it sufficient to bear them out against censure from others? No, by no means. Time was, when many thought it their duty to *kill* Christ's

[i] 2 John 11. [k] Gal. v. 20.

disciples; they believed it to be *doing God service*[l]: and yet nobody can doubt but those *sincere* men so far were guilty of *murder*, and no one can think it an hard censure upon them to declare so. St. Paul in particular, before his conversion, "verily "thought with himself, that *he* ought to do many things contrary "to the name of Jesus[m]:" and yet how often did he afterwards condemn himself as a *sinner*, for doing those very things; because indeed he had done wickedly, in persecuting the *truth*, in persecuting the *Church* of *God*, when he might have been better informed. The like may be said, when men *sincerely* deny and oppose the important truths of the Gospel, and by their heresies give great disturbance, and do infinite mischief to God's Church. Their being verily *persuaded* that *truth* is on their side, or that they are doing *right*, if it may be somewhat of excuse as a mitigating circumstance, yet is no justification of their conduct, before God or man. They are impugners of divine truths notwithstanding, and subverters of souls; and therefore condemned by God, and liable to all such *censures* from man, as Scripture ordains in case of *heresy*. So then, *sincerity*, in the first sense of the word, as opposed to *guile*, or *hypocrisy*, is of no avail in this matter. It changes not the nature of things, nor the rules of conduct: we are as much obliged to *admonish*, to *avoid*, to *reject* a man that thus *sincerely* corrupts the faith, and seduces common Christians, as the man that does it in *guile*, and against his own conscience: because indeed, though the *iniquity* may not be altogether so great, yet *iniquity* it is; and because the *mischief*, either way, is the same, and it is our bounden duty to guard against it. I must further add, that Scripture mentions a case of *God's* sending upon men "strong delusion," in the way of judicial infatuation, "that they should believe a lie[n]," and "that they all "might be damned who believe not the truth, but have pleasure "in unrighteousness." Now, by the rule of *sincerity*, (in this first sense,) even such abandoned creatures as the Apostle there speaks of might plead *not guilty*, as teaching nothing but what they *really* believe, nothing which they *condemn themselves* for, or conceive to be *false*. They teach and propagate *lies*, but they *believe* them to be *true* all the while. There is no uncharitableness in judging[o], that all who propagate *Deism* and *infidelity* in

[l] John xvi. 2.
[m] Acts xxvi. 9.
[n] 2 Thess. ii. 11, 12.
[o] John iii. 19. 2 Cor. iv. 3, 4. Heb. x. 26—31. 2 Pet. ii. 20, 21, 22.

a Christian country (renouncing their *baptism*) are under such *judicial* blindness, if they *really* believe the *lies* which they are so industrious to spread: and their pretended *sincerity*, in that case, is no alleviation of their crime, but the worst symptom of it. Therefore *sincerity* in this sense, as signifying only *believing* what one *teaches*, can scarce amount to a telerable plea by itself, since it is what may be found in men of a seared conscience and a reprobate mind.

2. Let us next consider the second sense of *sincerity*, as opposed to *prejudice* and *partiality*, and see whether, or how far, that alters the case, more than the other. But here a difficulty occurs at the first mention of it; how will it be *proved?* I do not say merely to other men, but how will it be proved to a man's self? If a man pleads his *sincerity* in this case, he ought to *know* that he has it, or he does but trifle with himself and others. He is to prove that he has no *prepossession*, no *bias*, no *leaning* to a side: he is to prove that he has used all due *diligence* in looking out for evidence; that neither *haste*, nor *sloth*, nor *impatience* has hindered: he is to prove, that he has used all proper *care* and *exactness* in *comparing* and *balancing* the reasons and arguments on both sides: in short, he is to prove, that he has neither *designedly* nor *carelessly* left out any thing in the account, nor at length made a conclusion upon any other view, or motive, but that *reason* and *truth* so required: for submitting to *reason*, without any bias, that is *sincerity*. When he has proved this, he has proved himself *sincere*, and then he is justified. But I humbly conceive, that the shorter and plainer way would be to say, that he has examined the question, weighed the reasons, and thereupon finds that his judgment is *right* and *well-grounded*, and therefore he abides by it: for that is what the whole comes to; and so the proof of our *sincerity*, in this second sense of the word, resolves at length into the merits of the main cause. He that has *reason* on his side, (I except the case of unavoidable incapacity,) he is the *sincere* man: for if any person jumps to a conclusion without premises, or lays more weight upon it than his *reasons* will support; it is plain that there is something besides *reason*, which sways him, and which determines him. Be it warmth of temper, be it weariness and impatience, be it partial fondness for novelty, be it what it will; if it is not *reason*, it is *prejudice* and *partiality*, (I except against unavoidable incapacity,) and the man is not *sincere* in the strict

sense; which yet is the only sense that can be at all to the purpose. One might say then to such a person who pleads his *sincerity*, prove it, and we admit of it: *sincerity* without *reasons* to prove it is a *dead* sincerity. And we may here apply what St. James says in another case, with a very little change: "Shew "me thy *sincerity* without *thy reasons*, and I will shew thee my "*sincerity* by my *reasons*." He that *proves* his point best proves his *sincerity*. There is no other way for it, unless a man will plead *ignorance* or *incapacity;* and then why is he confident? The sum therefore of all is, that the question about *sincerity* resolves at length into the main question in debate, and is to be decided by it. There might seem at first hearing to be something in the plea of *sincerity;* and indeed, taking it in the first sense, it might be certainly *known* to a man's self, if it could be of any service to him in the cause: but it is a point acknowledged on all hands, that a man's being thus *sincerely* a *sinner* does not make him a *saint*. As to *sincerity* in the latter sense, that would be of service to us, if it could be proved[p]; but to *prove* it, is the same as to prove that *truth* and *reason* are on our side; that we are *clear* in the matter, and go upon *sure* grounds. So then, the pleading *sincerity*, in the present case, is only fetching a compass, to come round about again to the place where we set out. For all turns at last upon this; who has the *best reasons* to support his persuasion? If they who oppose the doctrine of the Trinity teach *false* and *pernicious* doctrine, and it can be *proved* upon them, we are right in condemning them, and in refusing communion with them. We have no occasion to inquire into their *sincerity;* which, in whatever sense we take it, is an insignificant plea, and such as ought to be thrown out on both sides, serving only for amusement, diverting them from the business in hand.

It was upon these or the like considerations that I took occasion to say formerly: "We have nothing to do to inquire after "your *sincerity*, of which God is Judge. Neither *civil* judica- "tures nor *ecclesiastical* courts ever proceed upon that bottom. "Our business is, not to consider the *sincerity* of the men, but "the *nature, quality*, and *tendency* of the doctrine. There have "been sincere Photinians, sincere Samosatenians, sincere Sa- "bellians, sincere Papists, sincere Jews and Mahometans.

[p] See Rogers's Discourse of the Invisible Church. p. 22, 23. 3rd edition. Rogers's Review, p. 109.

"And indeed, what sects are there that have not *sincere* men "amongst them[q]?" To which I may now briefly add, that all sects have *many* who are *sincere* in the *first* sense of the word, and have *some*, probably, in the *second* sense also, but known to God only, who alone can judge how far their prejudices are *insuperable*, or their ignorance *unavoidable*. I was willing to repeat here what I had asserted in another place, because there is a gentleman to whom this plain doctrine has appeared *not a little surprising*[r]. And thereupon he has been pleased to ask, "Is "the Doctor willing to be responsible, at last, for the nature, "quality, and tendency of all his notions?" To which I answer, willing or not willing, every man is *responsible*, at last, for the doctrines he teaches. And if they are *false* and *pernicious*, (unless the error were unavoidable,) they fall under the same condemnation with those *idle words*, of which *account* must be *given* at the *day of judgment*[s]. But, that I also may ask a question in my turn, is that gentleman willing to be *responsible* for his *sincerity*, that is to say, for his *impartiality* in every view, free from all *biases* or *prejudices*? Or is he *sure* that he has no *culpable* neglects, no *precipitation* of judgment to charge himself with? When he can be able to say, he *knows* he has not, I presume I may as reasonably say, I *know* what the nature, quality, and tendency of a doctrine is: and I conceive, this is a much *surer* and *safer* rule to judge by, than what he proposes. A *well grounded* assurance must be had, either of our own strict *sincerity* and *unprejudiced* reason, or else of the *truth* and *justice* of what we espouse. Now, I conceive, in the general, it is much easier to come at the *latter*, than at the *former*, nay, and that the natural and regular process is to *prove* the *former* by the *latter*. The gentleman asks further, "Is it impossible for him "to be mistaken in any of his inquiries into truth?" I know, it is very possible for frail and fallible men to be mistaken in what they *say*, though not in what they *prove:* and therefore one would take care to advance nothing as of moment to be believed, but upon *clear* and *sure* grounds, such as the reason of mankind ought to submit to. But this I shall say more to under another head. However, to return him a question, as before: *Is it impossible for him to be mistaken* (or rather, is it not very natural and easy for him to mistake) in judging of his *sincerity?* I under-

[q] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 388. [r] Reply to Mr. P. C.'s Letter, p. 52.
[s] Matt. xii. 36.

stand it in the sense of *impartiality*, the only sense pertinent to the cause in hand. It is further asked; "May not some "things which he has, or however shall hereafter advance, differ, "*in some sort*, from the ideas in the divine Mind?" Here the terms, *some things, shall hereafter*, and *in some sort*, are so obscure and indefinite, that there is no returning a definitive answer, more than this; that what God has *revealed* concerning the *Trinity* is, no doubt, agreeable to the *divine Mind:* and that is all that we contend for, appealing to Scripture for it. However, here again, I presume, we can be at least as *sure* that our doctrine answers the *ideas* of the *divine Mind*, as we can be that our *sincerity* is such as God sees no flaws in. So the question returns; which method may we best trust to? which is the surest and safest rule to judge by? By a man's knowing *himself* perfectly, or by his knowing the truth of things?

The author proceeds to tell us, that *sincerity* is a proper thing to be inquired after in such cases, and that *civil judicatures* at least do it, when any person is arraigned. But do they ever inquire whether the person arraigned might believe it *lawful* to *steal* in case of necessity, or might judge it his *duty* to affront the government, or to talk treason against the crown? If the plea of *sincerity* were to be admitted in such cases, it would never fail to be pleaded: we should then have new employment for juries, to sit upon men's hearts; and the *verdict*, of course, would be brought in for the criminal, unless he were weak enough to confess malice prepense, and that he acted against *conscience*. The law of the land, and the law of common sense too, has taken a shorter, wiser way, which is to presume that when a man has done an ill thing, he either *knew* that it was *evil*, or else *ought* to have known it. *Ignorantia juris non excusat delictum*, is, I think, the fundamental maxim they go upon. Every man is obliged to know his duty; and it is at his own peril, if he mistakes the *law* he is to be judged by[t]. What room then is

[t] Mr. Bayle, in few words, well illustrates this article. "There is good "reason for not excusing an *ignorance* "*of right* at human tribunals: for "though it may possibly happen that "a man is *honestly* and *innocently* ig- "norant of what the laws of the land "ordain; yet as the judges cannot "discern whether he speaks *sincerely* "or no, they cannot take up with his "excuse, for fear of the disorders "which might happen upon it; since a "world of malefactors and disturbers "of the public peace might make use "of the same justification. Therefore, "to prevent a general evil, they will "make no exception to this general "rule, *Ignorantia juris non excusat*. "This may possibly be unjust and "very hard upon particular persons;

there for the plea of *sincerity*? But the gentleman observes, that the "characters of such as are impeached *are often* inquired into, "*and have* great weight." Yes, in order to judge whether they are guilty of the *fact*, and how far it was designed and wilful. But, I believe, if it should appear that the *offender* transgressed upon *principle*, and persisted in it, not sensible of any fault, but taking upon him to be *wiser* than the *laws* or the *court*, and to correct his *judges*, such *sincerity* so pleaded would be so far from alleviating the crime, or mitigating the sentence, that it would do just the reverse: and the court would be obliged to judge according to the *nature*, and *quality*, and *tendency* of the fact committed, and not by the mistaken sentiments of the person arraigned. I return therefore to what I before said, that in the question which concerns our behaviour towards the impugners of the Christian faith, we have nothing to do to consider the *sincerity* of the men, but the quality of their doctrine. As to the rest, God is Judge: and he will make all reasonable and merciful allowances for *unavoidable* failings.

But is it not hard and severe censure, (may some say,) to condemn those *sincere* men who mean as *honestly* as we can do, and to make their *guilt* the ground of renouncing communion with them[u]? I answer: this is not a fair representation. That they are as *sincere* as we are in one sense, as *believing* what they teach, we admit; and it is nothing to the purpose: that they are *sincere*, as it signifies *impartial*, is the point to be *tried*; and it depends upon the issue of the main cause. In the mean while, we make not their *guilt* the formal cause of condemning them, but their *corrupt doctrine*, which indeed generally carries guilt with it, but more or less according to the circumstances and capacities of the persons. Therefore we say not how *deep* their *guilt* is; of that God is judge: but this we say, that we should ourselves be guilty in a very high degree, if we either taught such doctrines, or did not fully and plainly condemn them, refusing communion with such as openly and resolutely *espouse* them.

" but it is necessary to sacrifice some-
" thing to the good of society.
" This is undoubtedly the reason
" why *human* tribunals admit no ex-
" cuse upon an *ignorance of right*:
" but let us beware imagining that
" *God* proceeds by the same reason:
" as he is the *Searcher of hearts*, he
" knows most assuredly, whether such
" or such a person be under an *invin-*
" *cible* ignorance of *right*; and if he
" be, absolves him as freely as if the
" ignorance were only of *fact*." *Bayle, Supplem. to Philosoph. Comment.* p. 589, 590. Compare Rogers's Review &c. p. 104.

[u] See Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 14, 23, 39, 40, 42, 44, 47.

What we do in this case is not so properly damning others, not passing any peremptory judgment of their final estate, (to their own *Master* they stand or fall,) but it is conscientiously discharging a weighty trust, cautiously providing, first, for our own salvation, and next for the salvation also of as many as we have any concern with. If our adversaries be *honest* and *conscientious*, so much the better for them, and we heartily wish they may be found such before the high tribunal. We approve of what Salvian very mildly and tenderly says, in respect to this very case, so far as concerns all that conscientiously, and in the integrity of their hearts, differ from us: "They are *heretics*, but do not "know that they are so. In short, they are *heretics* in our judg- "ment, not so in their own: for they esteem themselves such "good Catholics, that they even throw upon us the infamous "charge of *heresy*. Such therefore as they are to us, we are to "them. We *know assuredly* that they are injurious to the *divine* "generation of the *Son of God*, in making him *inferior* to the "Father: they, on the other hand, *think* us injurious to the "*Father* in believing them both *equal*. *Truth* is on our side; "but they *presume* it is on theirs. We in reality *honour God*; "but they *think* their opinion does him most honour. They are "indeed *undutiful* to God, but this they esteem a great *duty* of "religion. They are *impious*, but they believe it true *piety*. "They *err* therefore, but they err with an *honest* mind: not out "of any hatred to God, but with affection to him, designing "thereby to honour and shew their love to the Lord. Though "they have not the *right faith*, yet they think they have a per- "fect *love of God*. How they shall be *punished*, at the day of "judgment, for this their error of a *false* persuasion, no one can "know, except the Judge[x]." Thus far we can go in our *charity* towards them: but our *charitable* dispositions towards their *persons* ought never to bribe us to think favourably of their *principles*, or move us to desert the proper defence of *Gospel truths*, or hinder us from declaring that the corrupting the faith of Christ is in its own nature a *wicked* thing, is *detestable* practice.

It will not be improper here to make mention of a noted and useful distinction of sin or wickedness, into *material* and *formal*; one conceived to go along with the *matter* of the transgression

[x] Salvian. de Gubernat. Dei, p. 100.

considered in the abstract, the other conceived to make the *person* formally a transgressor and a wicked man. I dare not say, that every one who openly maintains the worst part of *Popery*, or *Judaism*, or *Mahometism*, is *formally* a wicked man: I know not how far *invincible* ignorance, or *unavoidable* incapacity, or *unconquerable* prejudices, (owing, suppose, to *education*, or to a degree of *enthusiasm*, or other particular circumstances,) may be pleadable in his favour: but still, after all the most candid allowances that can be made, I should not scruple to censure his opinions as *wicked*, (*materially* considered,) his doctrines impious, and his attempts to propagate them *vile* and *execrable*. They are truly so in the nature of the *thing*, abstracted from the circumstances of the *person:* and to a man that has the full and free use of his faculties, and opportunities suitable, they are crimes of the first magnitude, and ought to be censured as such. The gentlemen with whom I am now debating this point will not scruple to declare as much, with respect to the doctrine of *persecution*, and they are very severe against St. Paul[y] for practising upon it, though he was, in one sense, perfectly *sincere*, *honest*, and *pious*[z] (so far as concerned his then present sentiments) in what he did. He went upon the doctrine of the Old Testament, in relation to *false prophets* and *blasphemers*, was right in his general principle, but wrong in the application. He acted not out of *envy*, *malice*, or other *secular* motives, like the Jews who crucified Christ: a *new* case happened which he had not considered so well as he might: he was so over-officious to do his presumed *duty*, that he stayed not to examine strictly whether it was *duty* or no; so eager and impatient to *serve God*, in his way, that he considered not whether it was really *serving* him, or the *contrary*. This appears to have been his case; and a pitiable case it was. I question whether the corrupters of the Christian faith, many of them, could claim for themselves so fair an apology. Yet St. Paul was to blame, because the thing was evil in itself, and by the use of due care he might have known it. The same I say of *sincere* teachers of bad doctrines: the thing is *evil* in itself, and, generally speaking, they may, by a right use of their faculties, know that it is so. But whether they may or may

[y] Vindication of Mr. Nation's Sermon, p. 35, &c. Reply to P. C.'s Letter, p. 40, &c.

[z] P. C.'s Letter to the Author of the Vindication, p. 38, &c. Rogers's Visible and Invisible Church, p. 24, 25.

not, it concerns us not to inquire: it is enough for us that their doctrine is *false* and *dangerous*, tending to subvert the Gospel of Christ.

IV. But it will be further objected, that we all along take for granted that our doctrines are *true*, and theirs *false*: and why are we so confident in this matter, unless we think ourselves *infallible*? The author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition is pleased to intimate, that though we will not *own ourselves infallible*, yet *in fact we avow it*[a]. He endeavours to prove the charge thus; "In the point in which you are *certain*, you are "*infallible*, and wherein you pretend to be *certain*, you do equally "pretend to *infallibility*: for *certainty* is, *cui non potest subesse* "*falsum*. You must have evidence for a point in which you "pretend to be *certain*, not only to put the matter out of doubt, "but enough to assure you a mistake is *impossible*. I am *infal-* "*libly* certain two and two are four—it must be, and cannot be "otherwise; without such evidence there is no *certainty*: and "where error is *impossible*, *there is infallibility*[b]. Nor can I see "that any thing short of downright *infallibility* can justify the "behaviour, (of the Trinitarians,) if that can. But to disclaim "*infallibility* in words, and claim it in fact, is too common a "practice, though no very commendable one[c]. It is question- "able whether either side have such evidence as will justify "them in thinking a mistake *impossible*; without which there "is no *proper certainty*; and if there be not, there is room for "mutual charity and forbearance[d]."

I do not think it kind or fair in this instance, to bring in the word *infallibility*, where it has plainly nothing to do, only to throw an oblique reflection upon some persons who are far from deserving it: that is not a *sober* or a *charitable* method of debate. The sum of his argument, when the colours are taken off, is no more than this; that if we have not *demonstration*, as clear as in *mathematics* or *metaphysics*, on our side of the question, we ought not to insist upon it so far as to make it a term of communion. Now, suppose we should say we have, (though we say no such thing,) yet would that be what the world has been used to call *claiming infallibility*, or *pretending to be infallible*? Would it not be very wrong to say, that a man pretends to be *infallible*, only because he is very certain that the propositions in Euclid are

[a] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 37.
[b] Ibid. p. 37. [c] Ibid. p. 39. [d] Ibid. p. 38.

infallibly true? Such an unmanly playing with words is unbecoming in any cause, much more in this. The infallibility of *science*, resting upon the nature of things, and the supposed truth of our rational faculties, is quite another thing from *personal infallibility* supposed to be an extraordinary gift from heaven, to a *pope*, or a *council*, or to a *church* at large. Things so distinct ought not to have been confounded. Whatever *certainty* we pretend to, we rest it entirely upon the *proofs* we produce, for the world to judge of, and not upon any *personal* endowments. How foreign therefore, and beside the mark, must it appear, to speak of our pretending to be *infallible!* Indeed, the Papists have a hundred times told us, that we can have no *proper certainty* without *infallibility:* and if that were true, there is an end of the *Reformation* at once. The ground and basis upon which the Protestant name stands, and without which it would sink instantly, is, that there may be a *proper certainty* in matters of faith, doctrine, and discipline, without *infallibility*. They that endeavour to sap this true principle, undermine the foundation upon which we rest, and betray the clearest and best cause in the world, to *Papists* on one hand, and to *sceptics* on the other. I take this matter to be of exceeding great moment, and therefore shall not scruple the pains of considering it at large. I shall first represent the answers which have been given to the objection, (as urged by Papists,) in the words of our judicious Chillingworth: and I shall next consider what answer may be proper to give to the same objection, in the main, as dressed up anew by adversaries from another quarter.

1. Mr. Chillingworth writes thus: "Though we pretend not "to *certain* means of not erring in interpreting *all* Scripture, "particularly such places as are *obscure* and *ambiguous*, yet this, "methinks, should be no impediment, but that we may have "*certain* means of not erring in and about the sense of those "places which are so *plain* and *clear* that they need no inter- "preters: and in such we say our faith is contained. If you "ask me, how I can be *sure* that I know the true meaning of "these places? I ask you again, can you be *sure* that you un- "derstand what I or any man else says?—God be thanked that "we have sufficient means to be *certain* enough of the truth of "our faith: but the privilege of not being in *possibility* of erring, "that we challenge not, because we have as little reason as you "to do so, and you have none at all. If you ask, seeing we

" may *possibly* err, how can we be *assured* we *do not?* I ask you " again, seeing your *eyesight* may deceive you, how can you be " *sure* you see the sun when you do see it[e]? A pretty sophism! " That whosoever *possibly* may err, cannot be *certain* that he " *doth not* err. A *judge* may *possibly* err in judgment, can he " therefore never have *assurance* that he hath judged right? A " *traveller* may possibly mistake his way, must I therefore be " doubtful whether I am in the right way from my hall to my " chamber? or can our *London carrier* have no *certainty*, in the " middle of the day, when he is sober and in his wits, that he is " in the way to London? These, you see, are right worthy con- " sequences, and yet they are as like to your own, as an egg to " an egg, or milk to milk[f].

" Methinks, so subtle a man as you are should easily appre- " hend a wide difference between *authority* to do a thing, and " *infallibility* in doing it. The former, the Doctor, together " with the Article of the Church of England, attributeth to the " Church, nay, to particular churches, and I subscribe to his " opinion: that is, an *authority* of determining controversies of " faith, according to plain and evident *Scripture* and *universal* " tradition; and *infallibility*, while they proceed according to " this rule. As if there should arise an *heretic* that should call " in question Christ's passion and resurrection, the Church had " *authority* to determine this controversy, and *infallible* direction " how to do it, and to *excommunicate* this man, if he should per- " sist in his error[g].

" The ground of your error here is, your not distinguishing " between *actual certainty* and *absolute infallibility*. *Geometri-* " *cians* are not *infallible* in their own science; yet they are very " *certain* of what they see *demonstrated:* and *carpenters* are not " *infallible*, yet *certain* of the straightness of those things which " agree with their rule and square. So though the Church be " not *infallibly* certain that in all her definitions, whereof some " are about disputable and ambiguous matters, she shall pro- " ceed according to her rule; yet being *certain* of the infallibility " of her rule, and that in this or that thing she doth manifestly " proceed according to it; she may be *certain* of the truth of " some particular decrees, and yet not certain that she shall " never decree but what is true[h].

[e] Chillingworth, p. 99, 100. [f] Ibid. p. 104, 105.
[g] Ibid. p. 105. [h] Ibid. p. 125.

" Though, the Church being not *infallible*, I cannot believe her " in every thing *she says*, yet I can and must believe her in every " thing *she proves*, either by *Scripture*, *reason*, or *universal* tra- " dition, be it fundamental or not fundamental.—Though she " *may err* in some things, yet she *does not err* in what she *proves*, " though it be not fundamental[i]. Protestants, believing Scrip- " ture to be the word of God, may be *certain* enough of the " truth and certainty of it. For what if they say the Catholic " Church, much more themselves, may possibly err in some un- " fundamental points, is it therefore consequent, they can be " *certain* of none such? What if a wiser man than I may mistake " the sense of some obscure place of Aristotle, may I not there- " fore, without any arrogance or inconsequence, conceive myself " *certain* that I understand him in some *plain* places which " carry their sense before them?—We pretend not at all to any " assurance that we *cannot err*, but only to a sufficient certainty " that we *do not err*, but rightly understand those things that " are *plain*, whether fundamental or not fundamental. That " God is, and is a rewarder of them that seek him: that &c.— " These we conceive both *true*, because the Scripture says so, " and truths *fundamental*, because they are *necessary parts* of the " Gospel, whereof our Saviour says, *Qui non crediderit, damna-* " *bitur*.

" I do heartily acknowledge and believe the Articles of our " faith to be in themselves truths as *certain* and *infallible* as the " very common principles of *geometry* or *metaphysics*: but that " there is required of us a *knowledge* of them and an adherence " to them, as *certain* as that of *sense* or *science*; that such a " *certainty* is required of us under pain of damnation, so that no " man can hope to be in a state of salvation but he that finds " in himself such a *degree* of faith, such a *strength* of adherence: " this I have already demonstrated to be a great error, and of " dangerous and pernicious consequence[k].

" Though I deny that it is required of us to be certain in the " highest degree, *infallibly* certain, of the truth of the things " which we *believe*, for this were to *know* and not *believe*, neither " is it *possible* unless our evidence of it, be it natural or super- " natural, were of the *highest* degree,) yet I deny not but we " ought to be and may be *infallibly certain* that we are to believe

[i] Chillingworth, p. 133, 134. [k] Ibid. p. 140, 141—290.

" the religion of Christ. For, 1. this is most *certain*, that we " are in all things to do according to *wisdom* and *reason*, rather " than against it. 2. This is as *certain*, that *wisdom* and *reason* " require that we should believe those things which are by " many degrees *more credible and probable* than the contrary. " 3. This is as *certain*, that to every man who considers impar- " tially what great things may be said for the truth of Christi- " anity, and what poor things they are which may be said " against it, either for any other religion, or for none at all, it " cannot but appear by many degrees *more credible* that the " Christian religion is *true*, than the contrary. And from all " these premises this conclusion evidently follows, that it is *in-* " *fallibly certain* that we are firmly to believe the truth of the " Christian religion.—There is an abundance of arguments " exceedingly credible, inducing men to believe the truth of " Christianity: I say, so credible, that though they cannot " make us *evidently see* what we *believe*, yet they evidently con- " vince, that in *true wisdom* and *prudence* the articles of it " deserve credit, and ought to be accepted as things *revealed* by " God[1]."

I have laid these several passages together, drawn out of this excellent writer: by which it may appear what kind of *certainty* is professed by Protestants, and how much the Protestant cause depends upon that single article. The sum is, that though we have not strict *mathematical* demonstration for matters of *belief*, so as to make *faith* and *science* the same thing, yet we have such a *certainty* as leaves no reasonable room for doubt, such as is sufficient to build *saving faith* upon, and as much *authority* also as is necessary to support it. And thus we get clear of Popish subtilty and sophistry, shewing that there is a medium, namely, *moral certainty*, between *scepticism* on one hand, and papal *infallibility* on the other.

2. No sooner are we thus relieved on that hand, but presently we are attacked from another quarter, and with the same artillery as before, only a little differently managed, as it is now to serve different purposes. For here again it is alleged, that with-

[1] Chillingworth, p. 295. alias p. 254. Compare Stillingfleet's Rational Account, p. i. chap. vi. p. 178, &c. 187, &c. 196. chap. vii. 205, &c. Compare also Mr. Cumming, who has very fully and solidly treated this argument. Dissertat. on Scripture Consequences, p. 61—76. Considerations, &c. p. 315—321.

out either *infallibility* or *demonstration* we can have no *proper certainty*, nor any just *authority* to declare matters of faith, or to insist upon them as *terms* of *communion:* and the conclusion here aimed at, or what must naturally follow, is, to sit *loose* to every thing, unconcerned for the faith of Christ, cold and indifferent towards the great truths of the Gospel. Deists here and Papists there combine together to oppose the *truth*, and both extremes meet in one. But let us examine how our *new* adversaries manage. Their whole strength lies in one single dilemma, thus: "Either you have *certainty*, or you have not: if you pre-"tend to *certainty*, that is claiming *infallibility;* if you re-"nounce *certainty*, you have *no authority* to determine *faith*, "or prescribe terms of communion." We answer by distinguishing the *kinds* and *degrees* of certainty, and therefore do say, that though we claim not *infallibility*, yet we do claim *certainty* sufficient to guard against *scepticism* or *heresy*, and to maintain just *authority*.

I shall first examine the invidious charge of our claiming *infallibility*. The author of the Sober and Charitable Disquisition intimates, as before said, that we disclaim it in *words*, but in *fact* avow it. The same thing has been said by a multitude of other writers: I shall cite one only for a sample, because he has urged it as ingeniously and sarcastically as a man could well do, in a Dedication to the Pope. "Your Holiness is not per-"haps aware, how near the churches of us Protestants have at "length come to those privileges and perfections which you "boast of as peculiar to your *own*.—You *cannot err* in any thing "you determine, and we *never do:* that is, in other words, you "are *infallible*, and we *always in the right*[m]." It may hereupon be observed, how this witty gentleman takes upon him to ridicule a very necessary distinction, between an assurance that we *cannot err*, and a sufficient certainty that *we do not err:* a distinction, which the judicious Chillingworth laid all imaginable stress upon, perceiving that the whole *Protestant cause* depended upon it. For if we cannot have sufficient *certainty* that in several things, relating to faith and worship, we *do not err*, how do we justify our separation from the Church of Rome? If we are not *certain* that therein we *do not err*, then neither are we *certain* that she *has erred*, and that there was a *just* cause for

[m] Steel's Dedication to the Pope, p. 2.

leaving her; but all must resolve into humour, fancy, fickleness, and unsupported persuasion. It was this very principle of a sufficient certainty, that we *do not err* in what we *prove*, which rescued us from the tyranny of those who pretend that they *cannot err* in whatever they *define*. The difference between those two is so great, and so palpable, that one would think it must argue either very slow faculties, or a perverse temper of mind, for any person to confound them. However, to give a more distinct idea of the two cases, I shall endeavour to represent the difference to the eye in one view, in two opposite columns, corresponding to each other.

Popish Infallibility.	*Protestant Certainty.*
1. The Church *simply* infallible in what she defines.	1. The Church *morally* certain in what she *proves*.
2. The Church *says so*, is the last resort, and decisive.	2. Not because the Church *says it*, but because *Scripture* and *reason* by her mouth declare it.
3. Submit to *authority* in all instances whatever: for authority here stands for *proof*.	3. Submit to *authority* in such instances only, where you see no *good reason* to the contrary; for then it is *reasonable* so to do.
4. Absolute implicit faith in *man*.	4. Absolute implicit faith in *God* only.
5. Examination *superfluous* and *dangerous:* prove nothing, swallow every thing.	5. Examination allowed and approved: prove all things, hold fast that which is good.
6. The subject obeys the *interpreter* at all adventures, and submits as to an infallible verity.	6. The subject obeys his own *reason* in submitting to what is *proved*, and what the reason of mankind ought not to reject.
7. Be a thing ever so *unreasonable* or plainly *false*, (*transubstantiation* for instance,) it must be received as divine, though a *human* decision.	7. Nothing ordered to be received, but upon the foot of *reason* and *Scripture*, with great tenderness to *private* judgment: only taking for granted, that our *faculties* are *true*, and may, in things plainly proved, be depended upon.

From this summary view it may sufficiently appear, that there is a very wide difference between the pretended *papal infallibility* and *Protestant certainty:* and that as the one is contrived to introduce and perpetuate all imaginable errors, so the other is undoubtedly the surest way to exclude all *pernicious* errors, at least, and to preserve the most weighty truths.

The ground of what I call Protestant certainty is *moral evidence:* which, though it comes not up to *infallibility,* or to the evidence of *demonstration,* yet is *certain* enough for all the purposes of *faith,* or of a competent *authority* to maintain *true* doctrine. "Our Church," as a judicious writer says, "nowhere "makes *infallible certainty* of assent a necessary condition of "faith, it being sufficient to make faith certain, if our *rule* be "*infallible,* and that applied with *moral evidence*[n]."

Moral evidence, for the most part, governs the great affairs of the world, while *rigid demonstration* serves rather for the entertainment of contemplative men, than for the uses of common *life.* And since God has so ordered both our religious and secular affairs, as to lay us under a necessity of submitting, in most cases, to *moral evidence,* he has thereby bound it upon us as a *duty;* so that if "we have not strict *demonstration* for what we *believe,* yet "it is *demonstration* that our evidence is such as must command "our assent, under pain of incurring the *divine* displeasure." As to the nature, and quality, and force of *moral evidence* in general, I refer the reader, for satisfaction, to an excellent writer, who has distinctly and fully considered it[o]. I shall content myself with making only a few occasional observations.

It seems to me a prejudice done to religion, that the *learned* and *philosophical* sense of the words *probable* and *certain,* (so different from the common *vulgar* sense of both,) has been so often made use of by Divines. When a common Christian hears it said, that it is only *probable,* not absolutely *certain,* that Christ lived or died; or that the Christian religion is true, or the like; how must it astonish him, or afflict him! In the vulgar use of the words *probable* and *certain,* it is a shocking thought; though in the *scholastic sense* all may be right, as there is no rigid or scientifical demonstration of any matter of fact, or of any article of pure faith: and every thing short of that the schools are pleased to call *probable* only, not *certain.* If we were to hear any one,

[n] Puller's Moderation of the Church of England, p. 142.

[o] Ditton on the Resurrection of Christ, part ii. p. 93, &c.

in ordinary conversation, say, that it is *probable*, not *certain*, that there is such a city as Rome, Paris, or Constantinople, would not the man be thought mad? Or if he were to say further, that it is *probable* only, not *certain*, that there was once such a prince as Alexander, or Julius Cæsar, or William the Conqueror, or Henry the Eighth, should we take him to be right in his wits? And yet it is in such a sense only that Divines mean it, when they say that the Christian religion is *probably*, not *certainly* true; understanding at the same time, that it is as *certain* as any ancient fact can be, fully, perfectly, indisputably *certain*, according to what the world generally means by *certain*. I should think, therefore, it were better to leave off the *scholastic* way, (which must needs give offence, and which few understand,) and to adapt our phrases to the common acceptation, as also to Scripture language. Look the Scripture through for the meaning of the word *certain* and *certainty*, and you will find that it stands for *certainty* of *facts*, which is *proper certainty*, when properly proved: and it is but sinking the idea, and confounding common hearers or readers, to discredit it with the low names of *probable* and *probability*; which, in common speech, scarce rise higher than *doubtful*. I chose to mention this the rather, because I find that *infidels* have taken advantage of those expressions to run down Christianity as not *certain*, but barely *probable* [p]. And how that must sound to a common English reader, let any man judge.

I would observe further, that the like mischiefs may sometimes follow from an improper use of the word *believe*. Were any one to say, he *believes* there is such a country as France, or such a person as a Pope of Rome, he would presently be asked, why? can he *doubt* of it? That expression of *believing* commonly carries in it an idea of *doubtfulness*, and is used to denote a *diffident* assent. But when we would express any fact of which we have no doubt, we say we *know* it, or are *certain* of it. So here again there appears to be a difference between the language of the *literati* and common speech, while the same ideas are not affixed to the same words, here and there. However, this latter case will not be apt to breed so much confusion as the former, though it may create some: which might perhaps be prevented by the addition of an *adverb*, when we are speaking of matters of faith, saying we *assuredly* believe, or *undoubtedly* believe, thus and thus.

[p] See Christianity as old as the Creation, chap. xii. p. 184.

Now to return to the author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition[q]. He objects to us, that we have not a *proper certainty* of what we believe, like as we have of what we *know*, as that *two* and *two* are *four*. It is granted, we have not. Belief is not strictly *science*, nor faith *vision*: what then? In his sense of *proper certainty*, there is no certainty that the sun *shines* when we see it, nor that fire *warms* when we feel it, nor that there is any such thing as the *sun* in the firmament, nor indeed any *material world*: for, I apprehend, philosophers are agreed that there is no strict *demonstration* of these things[r]. Have these things therefore no *proper certainty?* Yes, they have, and such as ordinarily makes stronger impressions than *abstract* reasonings, or *ideal* speculations, and are more out of the reach of all *doubt* to the bulk of mankind. So say I likewise of matters of faith; they have a *proper certainty*, such as things of that kind admit of, such as is fitted to common capacities, such as the world is governed by, such as passes for *undoubted certainty* in common language and common estimation, such as God has *ordained* for our use, and has *obliged* us to follow, and such as both our *present* interests and our *eternal* happiness are made to depend upon. So much for the *certainty* of matters of faith, considered in the general.

As to the particular point now before us, the *certainty* of it stands thus: we are *morally* and *indubitably* certain of the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity. And though we presume not to say, or to think, that we *may not* or *cannot* misconstrue Scripture, yet we have many and strong reasons to persuade us that in this instance we *do not*: and therefore it is *infallibly* certain, (as Mr. Chillingworth well argues with respect to Christianity in general,) that we *ought* firmly to believe it; because *wisdom* and *reason* require that we should *believe* those things which are by many degrees *more credible and probable* than the contrary. Thus have we *sure* and *safe* grounds to go upon[s]. And as we

[q] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 37.

[r] See Clarke's Notes upon Rohault, part i. c. 2.

[s] I may here observe something of Mr. Bayle. In his Philosophical Commentary, (part i. p. 337, &c.) after taking notice, that the Romanists have perpetually reproached the Protestants as destitute of any *well-grounded certainty*, and that the Protestants had answered the objection a *thousand times over*; he adds, that it never was *fully* answered, *never can be*, in the common way, only it may be irresistibly retorted upon Papists: and the conclusion he at length rests in is, that God requires no more than *a sincere and diligent search after truth*. Mr. Bayle is so far right; but he forgot to

are in strict duty bound to receive it as a *revealed* truth, so, because it is a very *important* one, an article of the *foundation*, we are as strictly bound to *preserve* it, and earnestly to *contend* for it: and because one very proper means of *preserving* it, as well as of keeping ourselves *pure*, is to refuse *communion* (according to the general direction of Scripture in such cases) with those that openly impugn it, therefore a necessity is laid upon us so to act, and woe is unto us if we act otherwise. But we do not therefore say, as is unkindly insinuated, *that there is not room left for mutual charity:* for we verily are persuaded, yea, and assuredly know, that our so acting is *charity* both to the *faithful* and *unfaithful*, and towards all mankind; and that the charging it as a breach of *charity* is hard and *uncharitable* censure, is judging according to *appearance* only, not according to *truth*.

All depends upon this, that men take care, in every thing of moment, to go upon *sure grounds*, to *know* what they do. That is the very thing which chiefly distinguishes *resolution* from *obstinacy*, *orthodoxy* from *heresy*, *wisdom* from *rashness*, and *righteousness* from *iniquity*. God has given us *rational* faculties to discern *truth* from *error*, and *right* from *wrong:* and we ought to be well *assured*, in whatsoever we teach, as of moment, that we have made that use of our faculties which we *ought* to have done, to discern between good and evil. It is not our *persuasion* that can justify us; there are many *fond* persuasions; and we

tell us how we may arrive at a *well-grounded certainty* of that fact, that we have made a *sincere and diligent search*, without prejudice or bias, without any culpable *sloth* and *negligence* in inquiring, or *precipitancy* in judging. There is no *mathematical* or *metaphysical* certainty as to this fact, which by him is made the main thing. *Moral certainty* is the utmost that any one can here pretend to, and that not so *great* as we can have of *matters of faith;* neither can our *sincerity* be any way so *certainly* proved, as by the *evidence* we produce for the doctrines we maintain. Therefore Mr. Bayle commits a fallacy, or is guilty of great forgetfulness, in making a *well-grounded* certainty of our *sincerity* the last resource, rather than the other; for generally speaking, it is not so *sure* or so *firm* a ground to rest on, as the *reasons* of things, or the *merits* of a cause. For considering how *obscure* the search is into the inmost springs of action, or persuasion, which are very involved and intricate, how *careless* men are apt to be in the examination, and how liable also to be imposed upon by *self-flattery;* I say, these things considered, it is much *safer* to rely upon the *moral certainty* appearing in things, than upon any pretended certainty we may conceive of our own *sincerity*. I believe, the fallacy in this case has been chiefly owing to the equivocal meaning of the word *sincerity:* for because in one sense, as opposed to *hypocrisy*, a man may easily *know* he is *sincere* when he is so; it has been too hastily concluded, that he may as easily *know* it in the other sense of the word, as opposed to *prejudice* or *partiality*.

are not commanded merely to obey our *persuasions*, (though we ought not to go against them,) but to obey the *truth*. It is not merely our *sincerity* that can support us, for of that we know nothing, in any just and proper sense, but by the *right* and *reason* of the cause; and we are not commanded to hold fast our *sincere errors*, but to hold fast *that which is good*.

But what, will some ask, do we then pretend to *know* that our doctrine is true? Is *faith* advanced into *knowledge?* To this I answer, that we *know*, not *scientifically*, but with *moral* certainty, which is *knowing* according to use of common speech; and though we do not strictly *know* what we merely *believe*, yet we *know* that we have such *moral* evidence for what we believe as binds us to the belief of it. In this sense, we *know* what we do, and we have a *well-grounded* assurance that what we do is *right*, which is our justification. And this is what we ought always to have (I speak more particularly of *guides* and *teachers*) in points of *importance*, and where it is not allowed to *suspend*. Cannot we *know*, for instance, that a Deist is rash in rejecting all *revealed religion?* Yes, we *know* it as certainly, as that it would be rash to deny that there is any such city as Rome or Constantinople; or that there ever were such men as Virgil, Horace, or Cicero. Cannot we *know* that a Jew is much in the wrong to deny that the Messias is come? Yes, we *know* it as assuredly, as that a man would be in the wrong to deny that the twelve Cæsars lived some centuries ago. Cannot we *know* that the Popish doctrines of *transubstantiation*, *image-worship*, service in an *unknown* tongue, and the like, are not *primitive Christianity?* Yea, we *know* it as evidently, as that modern Rome is not ancient Rome, or that London is not Canterbury. Cannot one *know* that the Socinian interpretation of John i. 1. or of Hebr. i. 10. or of the texts relating to Christ's *preexistence*, is not the mind of Scripture? Yea, one may *know* it as certainly, as that a *counter* is not the king's *coin*, or that a *monster* is not a *man*. I give these instances to shew, that it is not merely *persuasion* or *sincerity* that we have to plead for our faith, but *certainty* and *well-grounded* assurance; such as is judged sufficient for *wise* and *considerate* men to go upon, and conduct themselves by, in *secular* affairs of greatest consequence. We have no occasion for *infallibility* to support us in such a claim: common reason suffices, taking in the proper *helps*, and making the due use of them with humility and care,

with sobriety and godly fear[u]. Having gone through the most material objections I had met with, I may now proceed to the slighter and less considerable, but dispatching them in fewer words.

V. It has been sometimes invidiously suggested, that our zeal and constancy in contending so earnestly for what we call *faith*, is bearing hard upon our Christian brethren of an opposite persuasion, is afflicting and oppressing them, and, in short, is *persecution* and *Popery*. It can scarcely be conceived that any sensible men should seriously advance such odd fancies, or that they mean any thing more by them than rhetorication and flourish. Yet certain it is that such things have been offered with a *serious* air, and by men of no mean parts: I shall give some examples. One writes thus: "The humour of *creed making* " and *creed imposing* is one of the *most grievous* instances of " *persecution*, and the grand source of every other kind of it. If " it be only their *good opinion* of us that our fellow *Christians* " suspend upon our non-assent to their *confessions* of *faith*, they, " in a very *inhuman* and *unchristian* way, *persecute* us. It is in " itself *barbarous*," says Mr. Marvel, "for these faith-stretchers, " whosoever they be, to put men's consciences upon the *torture*, " to rack them to the length of their own notions[x]." This declamatory talk has been gravely, solidly, and satisfactorily answered by a very good writer[y]: and yet the objector chose rather to declaim again upon the same head, for several pages together[z], than to quit his false reasonings, or acknowledge his

[u] But here again it may be asked, may not a Jew, a Deist, a Papist, a Socinian, or an Arian, with equal confidence say that he *knows* he is in the right? He may so, and probably will. Yet *truth* and *falsehood* have a *real* distinction in nature, and depend not on fond conceits, or strength of *persuasion*. If any man presumes to say, he *knows*, when he does not know, he deceives himself, and is *guilty* before God; unless some *unavoidable* incapacity, or *unconquerable* prejudice, which God only is judge of, makes him *innocent*. And in that case it is not because he delivers his *real* persuasion, (for it may be *impious* as to the *matter* of it,) not because it is *well-grounded*, for he only *thinks* it is; but it is because of his *infirmity*, which himself neither *sees* nor *knows*, (if he did, he would correct it,) that God acquits him. How much any of us may stand in need of such merciful allowances, we cannot say: but in the mean while, all we have to look to, or to trust to, is to be as watchful and careful that we go upon *sure grounds*, as if no such allowances might be made us. Such *wary conduct* is well enough understood and practised in *temporal* affairs, where any thing considerable is depending: the like we are to observe in *spiritual*.

[x] Occasional Paper, vol. ii. numb. 1. p. 12, &c.

[y] Preface to the Westminster Confession, p. 96—104.

[z] Defence of the Scripture as the only Standard of Faith, by the Author of the Occasional Paper, p. 35—40.

mistakes. To say the best of it, it is a very wanton way of talking in a subject of the last importance, and is making a jest of the liberties of mankind here, and of their happiness hereafter. If those gentlemen have been so *inhumanly* and *barbarously* persecuted, how is it that they have not yet assumed the title of *martyrs* or *confessors?* For *persecution* and *martyrdom* are a kind of correlates, which suppose and imply each other. And what is that *inhuman* torture, that *barbarous* persecution, which they have endured? Have they had trial of *cruel mockings* and *scourgings*, of *bonds* and *imprisonment?* Have they wandered about in *sheepskins* or *goatskins*, in *dens* or *caves* of the earth, for the sake of *truth* and *godliness?* No, but good Christians have *suspended* their *good opinion* of them; that is the grievance. And for what? Not for *thinking* as they please, (for thoughts are free,) but for overt acts of *heresy*, or perhaps *blasphemy;* for making *public* appeals to the people, in order to draw them off from listening to their better guides, to seduce them from the *faith* they have been baptized into, and to impose upon them such doctrines as must endanger their everlasting salvation. The kind and charitable endeavours of good men, whose province it is to prevent such fatal mischiefs in the mildest and gentlest way, (such as Christ himself has prescribed;)—these are the *inhuman* and *unchristian* persecutions which those gentlemen complain of. But to be a little more particular, they must not take it amiss to be told, in return to their odd complaint; 1. That they are guilty of a most intolerable abuse of words and names, in speaking of *rack, torture,* and *persecution*, where, even by their own account, there is not so much as a semblance of them: for it amounts, after all, only to the *suspending* our *good opinion* of them. 2. In this way of giving *new* and *wrong* names to things, they may, if they please, make the primitive churches also, and martyrs, yea, and Christ and his Apostles, *persecutors*. The primitive discipline, by their account, will be most of it *persecution;* and so, instead of ten *heathen* persecutions, (as they are commonly reckoned,) they may increase the number of persecutions to five hundred or more, and call them *Christian* persecutions, or rather *unchristian* ones, for that, it seems, is the name for them. 3. It is wrong in these gentlemen to furnish the Papists with fresh topics for *real* persecution. For since it will follow from this account, that *persecution* is *Scripture doctrine*, it may be pleaded, that Papal *persecutions* differ in *kind* only, or *degree*, from the other,

but in the main are warranted by the New Testament itself, and by the universal practice of the Church in the best and purest ages. 4. This will likewise be furnishing *infidels* with new arguments against *Christianity*, as it is a *persecuting* religion: for it is certain, that the pretended *persecution* here complained of is such as Scripture itself prescribes, as I have before proved. 5. But to come yet closer up to those complainants, let it be considered, whether they are not themselves the real *persecutors*, guilty of that very crime which they charge upon the churches of God. To *revile* men for doing their bounden duty, to load them with *reproaches* for *righteousness'* sake, to *libel* and *defame* them for maintaining the *faith* of Christ in a *Christian* way, to *seduce* their flocks from them, and to demand at the same time to be caressed and honoured as *fellow Christians;* these are grievous *impositions* and *oppressions*, and may amount to *persecution*, properly so called. They that refuse to conform to *order*, who submit not to *sound* words and wholesome doctrine, who give unnecessary disturbance, and assume more than belongs to them; they are the invaders of liberty, the *oppressors* and *persecutors* of religious and righteous men.

It will be said, perhaps, that *creed makers* and *creed imposers*, as such, assume more than belongs to them. But if that be a fault, it is a fault common to all parties: for they who impugn the doctrines of the Church are themselves as much *creed makers*, and *creed imposers*, by their appeals to the people, and by their *imposing* their own doctrines on the public in a clamorous way, (and generally with satire and invective upon all that dislike them,) as others are who impose their creeds in a more regular and authoritative manner. Much has been said against *creed making*, by many who have as long creeds as others, only not the same creeds, and who are as confident in dictating, and as dogmatical in defining, and as eager to impose their own sentiments, as it is possible for men to be. The question, properly, is not, whether there shall be *creeds* or no; for all parties are for them, under one shape or other, and always will be: but the real matter in controversy is, who shall have the *drawing* of them, or who shall *impose* them: and when men declaim against *imposing* of creeds, the secret meaning of all seems to be, that they like not that such a power or privilege should be lodged in any hands but their own. However, the fault lies not in imposing *creeds*, (where there is a competent authority,) but in impos-

ing *false* doctrine for *true:* and therefore the complaint is wide, while it runs only in generals, against all *creed making,* and against *impositions* at large, especially as practised in the Protestant churches. We pretend not to impose articles of faith in an *arbitrary* manner, or to require any implicit belief in the *Church:* we require no man to receive them for *true,* because they are *ours,* but because they carry their *evidences* along with them, and will bear *examining.*

But it will be said, that the *Protestant* churches, however, do determine beforehand, that every person upon examination *ought* to find these things true which they have formed into *creeds* or *articles.* They do so as to the main things at least; and where is the harm? It is no more than presuming that there are some things so *certain,* that the reason of mankind *ought* to submit to them, and that those things which they have defined are of that kind. To illustrate this matter further, we may put a few cases: let the propositions, suppose, of Euclid be given into any man's hand to examine, there will be no presumption in telling him beforehand that he will find them true: and if he afterwards says the contrary, it will be no breach of charity or ill manners to tell him, that either he has not duly examined them, or is not sincere in his report, or labours under an incapacity. Thus far will readily be allowed with respect to propositions of *mathematical* or *metaphysical* certainty: we may reasonably determine beforehand, in such instances, that they will be found *true,* upon a due examination, where capacity is not wanting. The like may be said of an *account,* which has been carefully cast up, and *proved* by the never-failing rules of art: if any man comes after, and pretends to find an error in it, one may be assured beforehand that the error is his *own,* and that he has been guilty of some neglect in the casting it up. Apply this reasoning to cases of *moral certainty:* some of them are so plain, that a man may have as well grounded an assurance there as any where. Let the question be about the truth of *Christianity* in general: a point so clear and so certain, that there is no uncharitableness in judging that the person who brings in a verdict against it has never fully and *sincerely* examined, or labours under some unconquerable infirmity. The like may be affirmed with respect to many particular doctrines contained in our *Creeds* or *Articles.* There is such a degree of *moral evidence* to attest them, that the reason of mankind *ought* to receive them. Now the imposing

such doctrines, in those whose province it properly is, is not *assuming*, but is discharging a weighty trust: and this is quite another thing from the *Popish* way of imposing what they please, forbidding men to *examine*, or so much as to *doubt* of what they *define*; because their Church, they say, is *infallible*. Our way supposes that men ought to *examine*, (if capable,) in order to know that the doctrine proposed is *true*: and we judge, with reason, that if they examine with care, and decide with impartiality, they cannot think otherwise of it. The foundations we go upon are, that *reason* is *reason* with every man; that human faculties are *true*; and that there is such a thing as moral *certainty*, and that it is *ground sufficient* for the governors of the Church to rest their own faith upon, and to hold out their light to others committed to their charge, and for whom they are so far responsible. Indeed, if the Church-governors should happen to administer *poison*, instead of *wholesome* food, there will then be reason for complaint: but let not the complaint run against *creed making* or *creed imposing* in the general, (which is foreign and impertinent,) but let the particulars be *specified*, wherein they have rigorously imposed something *false*, or at least *doubtful*; and if the charge can be made good against them, they then ought with the same zeal to throw such article out, as they keep the rest in. Upon the whole, there is neither *persecution* nor *Popery* merely in imposing *creeds*, &c. under pain of Church censures, or exclusion from the ministerial function: but there is good order and discipline in it, such as Christ and his Apostles have commanded, and the Church in the best and purest ages has observed, and such as is necessary to keep the unity of the faith in the bond of peace.

VI. There is another objection near akin to the former, namely, that for Church-governors to direct men what to believe, and to exclude them from the Christian Church for impugning such *belief*, is *assuming* a kind of *dominion over the faith and consciences of other persons*. To which I answer; men may call those powers which Christ has left with his Church by what *invidious names* they please, but they cannot thereby alter the nature of things. That Christ has appointed his ministers as guardians of the *faith*, and has empowered them to *excommunicate* the impugners of it, is a very plain case: and this is all that any Protestant churches plead for. Whether it should be called *assuming dominion over the faith and consciences of men*, (since it

is assuming no more than Christ has commanded,) let the objectors consider. The objection is worded in ambiguous terms, which carry no certain or determinate ideas: the very phrase of *having dominion* over one's *faith*, though a Scripture phrase, is of obscure meaning; and it is hard to know whether St. Paul, who has used the phrase[a], disclaimed all such dominion, or only declined the use of it in some circumstances. If it means, prescribing to others *arbitrarily* for one's own pleasure or advantage, not pursuant to Christ's directions, (as some interpret[b],) then St. Paul disclaimed it absolutely: but if it means only the exercise of the power of *excommunication*, such as St. Paul did exercise over Hymenæus and Alexander, (for so others interpret[c],) then St. Paul only declined the use of it in some particular circumstances. Whatever the phrase means, this is certain, that the *Protestant* churches claim no more than a *directive* or *instructive* power over men's *faith* or *consciences*: Church censure and discipline affect only the overt acts[d], the *speaking, writing, teaching* perverse things, not the *thinking* or *conceiving* them: for how can a man be *censured* for private *thoughts*, which no one knows but himself? But if any persons presume to *teach* false doctrine, and endeavour to draw disciples after them, then indeed they are accountable to the *Church*, as much as another kind of offenders are accountable to the *State*. Christianity is a *social* religion, and the members of it are bound to submit, in their external behaviour, to the rules of the *society*, under pain of forfeiting the outward *privileges* of it. And with what modesty, decency, or consistency, can any man claim a right of *perverting* his fellow Christians as he pleases, and at the same time deny others a right of doing what in them lies to preserve their people from falling into the snares laid for them?

[a] 2 Cor. i. 24.

[b] See Grotius and Hammond.

[c] See Whitby and Wells.

[d] "The laws of the Church regard "only the *external* conduct. They "do not require the *inward* belief of "the mind in articles of faith, or the "*secret grace* of the heart in moral "duties. These things the ministers "of Christ *teach* and *exhort*, but do "not *command*. But the actions "which they prescribe by their laws "are such *external* performances as "are the *visible* signs, the natural and "proper expressions of such *inward* "acts and dispositions of soul as "*Christ* has commanded. And these "laws they do not affirm to have any "further obligation on the *conscience*, "than as the performance directed "by them is a proper sign and ex-"pression of such an inward disposi-"tion of the heart as *Christ* requires, "and consequently is agreeable and "subservient to his law. And when "even the action is thus qualified, "they do not pretend that the *con-"science* is obliged by their law, but "by Christ's." *Rogers, of the Visible Church*, p. 101.

It is to very little purpose for seducers to plead, that their *consciences* are oppressed by Church censures, or their *liberty* restrained: for would not the *consciences* of better men be more oppressed, and their *liberty* restrained, if they were obliged tamely to sit by and look on, while their flocks are torn from them, not permitted to make use of those *spiritual* powers which God has put into their hands? Either therefore let the adversaries be content to keep their thoughts to themselves, and then nobody can have *dominion* over their faith at all; or if they resolve to usurp upon others, and to take all advantages for spreading *false* doctrines, let them not be offended, if the guides of souls, whose peculiar charge it is, use their best endeavours, in a proper manner, to apply such preservatives as Scripture directs in those cases. This is not taking cognizance of the *inner man*, but of the *outward* behaviour only; and that so far as such outward behaviour affects the prosperity or safety of the whole community, and might be of dangerous consequence to the *peace* of the *Church*, the *purity* of the Christian *faith*, the *honour* of *God* and *religion*, and the *everlasting* interests of mankind. Now, can the guarding, in a Christian manner, against such fatal mischiefs, be properly or justly styled affecting *dominion* over others? Or is it not rather making use of a power which God has given them, to hinder others from exercising a lawless dominion over Christians, and over the Church of God? Say that the Church is *fallible*, what then? Are her adversaries *infallible*? Or are they less liable to abuse their *liberty* than the Church is to misemploy her *authority*? But enough of this.

VII. There is another objection, of more weight than the former, namely, that the censuring of *heretics* may often provoke them to return the like censures; and thus a kind of reciprocation of censures may be carried on to the great disturbance of the public peace, and the destruction of Christian charity. A late writer expresses the thing in a very lively manner, but somewhat overstrained, thus: "May not Arians, in their turn, "think you guilty of as great sin, in opposing what they call "the truth? And may not Christians, on all sides, in so great "and indeed necessary difference of opinions, rant and bluster "against one another for the same reason, and bring their con-"stant accusations against those who cannot think and say as "they do, for *denying* the faith; or against those who have the "same notions with themselves for *betraying* it? But what then?

"Would not Christian churches become cockpits, or fencing "stages[e]?" In reply to what is here urged, I will not so far disguise my sentiments, as not to allow that it is a consideration of some moment: but yet there are other considerations of still greater moment, which must preponderate, and weigh down the scale. It is very certain, that *ungodly* men, for a cloak, will make use of the same pleas, and claim the same privileges, as *righteous* men do: and an *erroneous* conscience may honestly (if *invincibly* ignorant) usurp the same rights which a well-grounded faith has a clear title to. But still there is a very wide difference between *true* and *false*, between *right* and *wrong:* and it is no argument against the *use* of proper methods in a *righteous* cause, that others may *abuse* the same methods in a cause of a very contrary nature and quality. But I shall debate this point more distinctly, both from *Scripture* and *reason*, as it is a point of some moment.

1. Let us consider what light we can have from Scripture. It is fact, that the power of *excommunication* began to be misemployed, and to be turned against the Church itself, even in the times of the Apostles: for Diotrephes, loving to have the preeminence, *cast* some persons *out of the Church*[f], very unwarrantably, and even in defiance of St. John himself: yet that *usurpation* of power, or *abuse* of power, did not move St. John to condemn the *use* of it in a proper way. So far from it, that he threatened to repay Diotrephes in his kind, to excommunicate or depose him, for his so rashly *censuring* other persons. "Wherefore, if I come, I will remember his deeds which he "doth, prating against us with malicious words[g]." We may observe likewise, from St. John's Second Epistle[h], and from the charges given to the churches of Pergamus and Thyatira[i], that the use of *excommunication* was to be retained in the Church, and was recommended from heaven by our Lord himself. And if it be said, that the Nicolaitans were an abominable sect, that alters not the case at all, so far as the present objection is concerned: for the more wicked any sect was, the more likely to retaliate upon the Church, and to make all possible disturbance when provoked to it. Notwithstanding all which, that accidental inconvenience, of a misapplication of power, was not judged con-

[e] Reply to Mr. P. C.'s Letter, p. 44.
[f] 3 John 10.
[g] 3 John 10. See Bishop Potter on Church Government, p. 380.
[h] 2 John 10, 11.
[i] Revel. ii. 14, 15, 20.

siderable enough to counterbalance the great advantages and important uses of the same power rightly employed. And as we have the authority of an *Apostle*, who had the Spirit of God to direct him in what he wrote, and in what he did; this alone may be sufficient to determine the point in question. For whatever we may be apt to imagine, (upon a superficial or limited view of circumstances,) it is certain, that *infinite* wisdom cannot err, and therefore by that direction we ought to abide. St. Paul seems to have left us a general rule for all cases of this nature, in these words: "Stand fast in one spirit, with one mind, striving "together for the faith of the Gospel, and in nothing terrified by "your adversaries[k], &c."

2. As to the reason of the thing, it is a known rule, that when there is a *necessity* on one hand, it is in vain to plead *inconveniences* on the other. God has sent mankind a charter of salvation: it is *necessary*, above all things, that this charter be preserved inviolable; that it should not be falsified, perverted, frustrated. There will always be some or other, set on by the grand enemy of mankind, who will be labouring to corrupt and adulterate it, either adding to it, or taking from it; and if such practices are suffered to go on without rebuke, there is an end of Christianity. Here lies the *necessity* of watching against all such attempts, and strenuously resisting them; which cannot be done effectually without condemning the authors, and in the last result separating from them. Hence may arise mutual contentions and bickerings: let them bear the blame who give the offence, and are aggressors in the contests. Truths of everlasting moment must be supported, whether with *peace* or without. The Apostles were censured as men that *turned the world upside down*[l]: the fault was in the *world*, and not in *them*. Their errand was *important* enough for the risking such a consequence. Our blessed Lord himself predicted what the *accidental* effect would be of the preaching of the Gospel; that it would "set a man "at variance against his father, and the daughter against the "mother[m]," and so on; which perhaps, in ridicule, might be called making *cockpits*, or *fencing stages*: but the Gospel was *worth* it, and carried more than enough in it to make mankind amends. As long as religion is held in any *value* or *esteem*, and meets with *opposers*, it must occasion *warm* disputes: who would wish that

[k] Philipp. i. 27, 28. [l] Acts xvii. 6. [m] Matt. x. 35.

it should not? What remedy is there for it, while men are men, which is not infinitely worse than the disease? A total *contempt* of religion might end all disputes about it, nothing else will: and even then men's quarrels would not be *fewer*, but *more;* only they would be about matters of another kind, about every thing they should *value* or *esteem*. Upon the whole, it is better, I suppose, that we should have *some* religion, though we often contend about it, than to have *none at all*, and to quarrel ten times oftener about *trifles*. It has been complained of, and has been thought to be a shrewd remark, that *ecclesiastical history* is made up of little else but *religious contests* and *animosities of churchmen*. But, pray, what is the *history* of *mankind*, but a history of wars and contentions about something or other, which they had a tender *concern* for? And it would be strange indeed, if a history of *religion*, the greatest *concern* of all, should not contain many contests. Who could believe that men had *any religion*, if during the state of the Church *militant*, and while there is like to be great *opposition*, there should be no *warmth* or *vivacity* shewn in defence of it? But this I have hinted more than once already. Now to return to our point. Though the *censuring* of men that corrupt the faith may provoke, may increase ill blood, &c. yet it *must* be done: and to decline it, when necessary, is a culpable moderation, a blamable timidity. And it is further to be considered, that though rejecting some persons from the communion of the Church may inflame the quarrel between the Church and its adversaries, yet it tends to preserve and promote the *peace* of its members within: therefore St. Paul prescribes this very remedy, for the securing the *peace* of the Church: "Mark them "which cause divisions and offences, contrary to the doctrine "which ye have learned, and avoid them[n]." So that though in some sense or respect, strict order and discipline may *accidentally* heighten differences, yet its true and natural tendency is *peace;* which it serves and promotes in one view, much more than it obstructs or disserves it in another. The *objection* therefore is grounded upon a false presumption, that *peace* suffers *upon the whole* by such conduct; which we deny: for, upon a just balancing of the account, peace is very much befriended by it[o], and true and proper *Christian peace* could not long subsist without it.

[n] Rom. xvi. 17.

[o] See Rogers's Review, p. 290, 291.

However, I allow there is so much weight in the objection which I have been answering, that the consideration of it ought to make us exceeding cautious and deliberate as to the steps we take, and the heights we proceed to, in all cases of that nature: not to multiply *necessaries* without or beyond reason; not to divide upon indifferent *rites, customs, ceremonies*, as Pope Victor is known to have done; nor upon *dubious* points of discipline, as Pope Stephen did: who had indeed *right* on his side, as to the matter in dispute, but pushed it too rigorously; and St. Cyprian, though mistaken, was yet the *wiser, humbler*, and *better* man. Where the main cause is both *clear* and *weighty*, yet even there many *prudential* cautions should be taken; not to suspect any persons without sufficient evidence; not to be prying and inquisitive into their retired sentiments; (*ministers* only excepted, or *candidates* for the *ministry*, whose faith should be strictly inquired into [p] before they be allowed;) not to proceed to rigours with any man, till all gentle measures have been first tried; nor to break communion with any who do not openly espouse and pertinaciously abet false and pernicious doctrines. These, I apprehend, are the prudential cautions proper in such cases: and there may be more of like kind, which every man's common reason and discretion may supply. If *truth* and *peace* can be maintained together, that is the most desirable conjunction which a good man can wish for: but if human affairs will not always admit of both, then the rule is, out of two evils to choose the least, or of two advantages to prefer the greatest. Where *divine* truths and *human* customs or dictates clash, we must "obey God rather than man:" in other cases, civility and tenderness towards all men is true obedience towards God. It requires good judgment to discern, under various circumstances, the true and precise boundaries between sinful *men-pleasing* and Christian *charity:* but this is certain, we are as much (yea, and more) obliged to maintain the *fundamentals* of *faith*, as to keep up *peace*. And it would be but an ill way to preserve *peace*, (if it might be called peace,) by forfeiting our *Christianity;* or to enlarge *Christian* communion, by receiving those who, in a strict and proper sense, are not *Christians* [q]. "Unity is not to be pur-" chased at so dear a rate. It were a thing much to be desired,

[p] 1 Tim. iii. 9, 10. v. 22.
[q] Vid. Suicer. in voce Χριστιανὸς, p. 1540, 1541. Bingham, Antiq. b. i. c. iii. s. 4.

" that there were no divisions; yet difference of opinions touch-
" ing things controverted is rather to be chosen than unanimous
" concord in damned errors: as it is better for men to go to
" heaven by divers ways, or rather by divers paths of the same
" way, than in the same path to go on peaceably to hell. *Amica*
" *pax, magis amica veritas*[r]."

VIII. It has been sometimes pleaded, in bar to the principles which we have before asserted, " that no one ought to be ex-
" cluded from Christian communion, whatever his faith be, pro-
" vided he acknowledges sacred Writ for his rule, and is ready
" to admit any creeds or confessions drawn up entirely in
" Scripture terms." To which I answer, that a man who never declares his faith otherwise than in *Scripture words* is very safe from censure, and can never be excluded from Christian communion for *heresy*. It is the maintaining doctrines contrary to Scripture, in points fundamental, which makes a *heretic;* and therefore if a man never *interprets* it at all, but barely repeats the words, he is perfectly secure so far; and no one can condemn him. If this then be all that the plea aims at, it is foreign and impertinent to the cause in hand.

But if the meaning of the plea be this, that though a man teaches any wild doctrines whatever, yet if he does but father those doctrines upon sacred Writ, by any feigned and forced construction, (acknowledging Scripture all the while as his rule of faith,) he ought to be received as a fellow Christian; I say, if this be the plea, it is so manifestly absurd and ridiculous, at the first hearing, that it can scarce deserve a serious answer. For does the faith of Christ lie in *words* only, or in *things*[s]? or is the repeating of the bare *letter* of Scripture, after a man has spirited away the *sense*, delivering *divine* truths, or contradicting and defeating them? To make the case plainer, I shall illustrate it by a resembling instance. Franciscus a Sancta Clara, a known Papist, (who published his book A. D. 1634,) contrived to make our XXXIX Articles speak his own sentiments, reconciling them with great dexterity, and most amazing subtilty, to the Council of Trent. Now, put the question, whether upon his thus

[r] Chillingworth, p. 218.

[s] Nulla vox divina ita dissoluta est et diffusa, ut *verba* tantum defendantur, et *ratio verborum* non constituatur. *Tertullian. de Præscript.* c. 9.
Nec sibi blandiantur [hæretici] si de Scripturarum capitulis videntur sibi affirmare quod dicunt, quum et diabolus de scripturis aliqua sit loquutus; et scripturæ non in legendo consistant, sed in intelligendo. *Hieronym. Dial. adv. Lucifer.* p. 386.

professing his faith in *Protestant* terms, *popishly* interpreted, he could justly claim every privilege of a Church of England man! and whether we were bound to receive him as a *fellow Protestant?* A very little share of common sense, I presume, will be sufficient to determine the question in the negative. The like I say of any person who interprets our Christian charter to an Anti-Christian sense: he has no more right to be admitted as a *fellow Christian*, than the other had to be received as *a fellow Protestant*. For though both admit the same *words* or *forms* which we do, yet so long as they teach things directly *contrary* to those very words or forms rightly understood, they are chargeable with *false* doctrine, in our account; and their teaching such doctrine in a manner so *insidious* and *fradulent* is so far from alleviating their guilt, that it greatly enhances it. It may be said perhaps, in the way of reply, that the famous Abbot of St. Clare knew that he perverted the true meaning and intent of our Articles, while those that pervert the sense of Scripture may believe that they justly interpret it. If that be the case, it is true that it will make a difference: but I have no occasion to consider that difference here, being foreign to the present point. For supposing the perverters of Scripture to do it ever so wickedly and fraudulently, yet they may make use of the same plea, that they are ready to profess their faith in *Scripture words*, and therefore ought not to be excluded from Christian communion. A Valentinian, a Montanist, a Muggletonian, or any other wild sectary, by this rule, might equally claim Christian communion, provided he does not reject *Scripture* itself, and turn *infidel*. Now a plea which thus manifestly overshoots the mark ought to be rejected as an absurd plea, like as an argument which proves too much ought to be thrown aside as worth nothing. Those who *undesignedly* pervert Scripture should have something better to plead than their retaining the *words* of Scripture: otherwise their plea reaches no further than theirs does who *industriously* do the same thing; for they also retain the same *words*. Upon the whole therefore, a man's retaining the bare *letter* of Scripture, while he corrupts the *sense*, is no sufficient reason for receiving him to Christian communion. For he is not only chargeable with *denying* the *faith*, as much as if he had rejected the text itself[t], but with perverting the *words*,

[t] Tantum veritati obstrepit adulter sensus, quantum et corruptor stilus. *Tertull. de Præscript.* c. 17.

and defeating the *sense*, while he professes an outward veneration for both. I cannot better express this whole matter than a late excellent Divine of our Church has done, in the words here following: "It is not barely repeating so many *words*, but the "assenting to the *proposition* expressed by those words, which "Christ requires.—The *proposition* affirmed or denied in Christ's "words is the doctrine of Christ. He therefore who will not "believe the *proposition* affirmed in Christ's words, ought to be "looked upon by the Church as an *heathen and a publican*.—Let "us take for instance these propositions; *Jesus is the Christ; "he was crucified; rose again from the dead:* every word and "sentence of Scripture, in which these articles are delivered, the "most heretical among the Quakers will profess their assent to; "but then they mean only this, that *Christ is an internal principle "of light within them*, that his *crucifixion* and *resurrection* are "nothing else but the *mortification* and *regeneration* of every "believer.—Now are these the doctrines of Christ, or are they "not? If they are not, if they are *contrary* to the doctrines of "Christ, then the persons understanding these Scriptures in "such a sense may justly be looked upon as *heathens* and *publi-"cans;* and, notwithstanding their readiness to *profess the words "of Scripture*, unfit to be admitted or continued in the Church[u]." Thus far Dr. Rogers, whose words I take to be a just and full answer to the objection I have been examining. The reader will observe, that I have not been considering how far *Scripture words* may or may not be proper in Creeds, Tests, Confessions, and the like, and in what cases it may be prudent or necessary to express the Scripture sense in phrases suited to times, places, and circumstances: questions of that kind fall not within my present argument, but have been largely and thoroughly treated of by others[x]. All I am concerned to shew is, that if any persons are found to pervert the *sense* of Scripture in any notorious manner, so as thereby to undermine the *essentials* of faith, their pretending a high regard for the *authority* of sacred Writ, or for the *letter* of it, is not reason sufficient for receiving them as fellow Christians.

IX. There is one objection more, which might have been brought in as an appendage to *objection* the *second*, had I sooner

[u] Rogers's Review, p. 399, 400.

[x] Preface to the Westminster Confession, p. 105—142. Stebbing's Rational Inquiry, p. 19—56. Rogers's Review, p. 395—411.

thought of it, but may conveniently enough have a distinct consideration here; namely, that the charging *heresy* as a crime of the first magnitude, seems to give too much countenance to the *sanguinary* proceedings of Papists against it. The objection runs thus: "If these charges against them are just, and their "fellow creatures have any authority to chastise them for such "enormities, I cannot see why the Romish Church should be "blamed for *roasting* such accursed villains (as the Arians) "among other heretics. If we think a traitor against an earthly "potentate worthy of *death*, how much more one who vilifies "the Lord of heaven and earth! Is a *murderer* of an earthly "father obnoxious to death, and shall such a viper as this "escape[y]? If civil power have authority to punish heretics, "such a villain deserves far severer penalties to be inflicted on "him, than multitudes of others whose injuries to their neigh-"bours expose them, by our statute-laws, to the gallows[z]." The sum of this argument, so far as it may be called an argument, amounts to thus much; that it is wrong to charge *heresy* in general, or *Arianism* in particular, with *wickedness* and *impiety* to any high degree, since it is neither *felony* nor *treason:* or if it be as *bad,* or *worse* than *either*, then the Papists are justified in all their *sanguinary* proceedings, which among Protestants is confessedly absurd. To which I answer, that the objection proceeds upon several *false* suppositions or suggestions: as 1. That those who plead only for *spiritual reproofs or censures* are pleading at the same time for *civil penalties.* 2. That the magnitude of crimes is to be measured by what passes in *civil* courts. 3. That *civil* courts look strictly to the *demerits* of the criminal, and not rather to the *necessities* of State. In opposition to these and the like mistakes, I observe:

1. That *Scripture* itself warrants and commands spiritual reproofs and censures; which is a point very foreign to that of *civil* penalties. St. Jude, St. Peter, St. John, St. Paul, and Christ himself, are often very sharp and poignant in their *reproofs* and *censures*, where they had no thought of exposing the offenders to *civil* penalties, or of justifying any *sanguinary* proceedings. St. Jude scruples not to call the heretics of his time *ungodly men, deniers of the only Lord God, and our Lord Jesus Christ, filthy dreamers, despisers of dominion, followers of Cain,*

[y] Vindication of Mr. Nation's Sermon, p. 12. Compare Mr. P. C.'s Letter in answer, p. 23, 24.

[z] Reply to Mr. P. C.'s Letter, p. 21.

Balaam, and Core, raging waves of the sea, foaming out their own shame, wandering stars, to whom is reserved the blackness of darkness for ever: and yet, amidst all this severe but just reproof, or satire, I presume he never would have advised the correcting them by *fire* and *fagot*. St. Peter treats the same men with the like sharpness of style in his Second Epistle: but it would be injurious to conclude from thence that he was for *sanguinary* measures. St. John, in his Epistles gives very hard names to heretics, calling them *antichrists*, &c. yet this does not prove that he was for using any *violent* methods with them. St. Paul describes the heretics of his time in very black characters, such as they deserved, yea, and pronounced them *accursed;* and yet it does not appear that he would have approved the *roasting* of them, had they been much greater *villains* than they were. *Shaming* them, *humbling* them, and bringing them to *repentance*, that their "souls might be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus," was the utmost hurt he intended them. Our blessed Lord himself rebuked many with great sharpness, calling them *hypocrites, blind guides, children of hell, fools, whited sepulchres, serpents, vipers*[a], and the like: and yet it does not appear that he would have approved any violent and sanguinary proceedings with those very persons. Therefore it is wrong to furnish the Romanists with arguments for their *cruelties;* as if *civil* penalties were *just*, wherever smart *rebukes* are proper; or as if it were warrantable to punish according to the *degree* of wickedness, though the wickedness be of such a kind as falls not properly under *civil* cognizance.

2. There may be crimes much greater than *felony* or *treason;* such as *apostasy*, (which is "crucifying the Son of God afresh, "and putting him to an open shame,") *blasphemy* against the Holy Ghost, and some kinds of *heresy*. Certainly, it may be lawful for Christian Divines to set forth those wickednesses in their proper colours, and they ought to do it: though at the same time they may desire that the offenders in such sort may rather *live* to repent, than suffer *death*, or any *civil* penalties. And what if *felons*, or *traitors* against the State, be punished with *death?* It does not from thence follow that they are the *greatest* of sinners; but reasons of government require, that crimes which more particularly affect the State should be

[a] See Matt. xxiii.

punished by the State: the rest are left to the *censures* of the Church, and the righteous judgment of God.

3. And I must further observe, that civil penalties look not merely at the *demerits* of the criminal, but the *necessities* of the civil community. Civil governors do not, cannot observe any exact proportion: God only can do it in his final retributions. *Theft* and *murder* are crimes of a different magnitude; yet they are equally liable to *capital* penalties. As to *heresies* of such a kind, they may be greater sins than either in God's sight: but it is not so *necessary* for a State to take cognizance of them, unless they break in upon *civil* peace. *Felonies* hurt many innocent men who have no possible way to escape: none can be hurt by *heresies* (after proper warning given) but by their *own consent*. And therefore if *spiritual censures*, reproofs, admonitions, and other the like preservatives, be duly applied, those are ordinarily sufficient in cases of this nature: for if any, after such warnings given, will still listen to *deceivers*, and run in with them, they perish with their eyes open, and may take the blame to themselves. I mention this as one reason among many, why *heresies*, though supposed to be crimes of the first magnitude, yet ought to be treated in a milder way than crimes against the State. And I shall subjoin another reason to enforce the former, namely, that when we speak of heresies as heinous crimes, we mean as *materially* considered, not determining whether the men are *formally* so wicked as those expressions amount to: which again makes a sensible difference between this case and the other of *felonies* or *treasons*, where the offenders commonly sin directly against *conscience*, and cannot plead so much as a *good* meaning or design. However, that favourable presumption, pleadable in excuse for *heresies*, ought to be no bar to *spiritual* censures. For if the persons offend *wilfully*, then no censure of that kind can be thought severe: and if they offend *ignorantly*, such awakening admonitions may be of great use to them to recover them from their stupid lethargy. And if the effect answers, they are delivered from a doubtful state, which at most could promise them *pardon* only, or rest them upon uncovenanted mercy, to a state of well-grounded hope and joy, entitling them to a reward: but this I hinted before. Upon the whole, there appears no force in the objection, that *heretics* ought either to be punished with death, or *not censured* as *blasphemers* and *grievous* sinners. *Extremes* are always wrong, whether of mildness

or severity: and there is a medium between taking *violent* measures with them, and treating them as *fellow Christians*. The sin of *corrupting* the faith, *dividing* the Church, and *seducing* the people, cannot easily be too much aggravated, in order to create a just *abhorrence* of it: and it is the more necessary, because ordinarily men are not so apprehensive of the heinousness of this sin, as they are of the iniquity of *treason*, or *felony*, or gross *immoralities*.

I have now finished what I intended as to the argumentative part: but it remains still to confirm the main thing by the *judgment* and *practice* of the *ancients*, who may be properly called in, and will be found to be of considerable weight in the controversy: if the Scripture be plain to us now, in all things *necessary*, the same Scripture was undoubtedly *plain* to them, and to them more especially: and therefore, their *judgment* or *practice* cannot but be of *use* to us, if it be only to render *plain* things still *plainer*, as there are degrees of plainness.

After I had finished this chapter, I had the pleasure of reading Mr. Ball's little treatise of 33 octavo pages, in answer to most of the same *objections*[b] which I have been considering. If I may be allowed to give my judgment of it, it is written with great strength and solidity, without colouring or disguises, and is extremely well suited to common capacities. One shall not easily find more good sense and close argument in so short a compass. The Sober and Charitable Disquisition, as I apprehend, was intended by way of reply to that pamphlet of Mr. Ball's. But every discerning reader, who shall compare the two performances together, will easily perceive the difference between *artificial* logic and *natural*, between laboured *subtilties* and plain naked *truth*.

CHAP. VI.

A summary View of the Judgment and Practice of the primitive Churches, in Relation to the Necessity of believing the Doctrine of the Trinity.

THE very judicious and learned Bp. Bull has represented this matter in the fullest and clearest light, in a set treatise,

[b] An Answer to some common Objections made against those Ministers in the West, who have appeared in Defence of the Doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity and its Importance. Written with all plainness, for the use of private Christians, by John Ball. Exon: printed by A. Brice, &c. A. D. 1727.

professedly written by way of reply to Episcopius, as I have before hinted in the entrance. To him therefore I refer such readers as will be at the pains to look thoroughly into the subject of this chapter; while I content myself with giving a summary view of the main things, interspersing here and there a few slight observations, which may be, as it were, supplemental to that great work. There are three ways of coming at the sentiments of the primitive Church, as to the *necessity* or *importance* of believing any doctrine: 1. By consulting the ancient Creeds, conceived to take in the most *important* articles of faith, when rightly understood. 2. By observing what doctrines were all along condemned as *impious* and *heretical*. 3. By collecting the testimonies of *Fathers* declaring their *own* sentiments, or the *Church's*, or both, as to what doctrines are *important*, or what opinions pernicious and dangerous.

I. I shall begin with Creeds. Here it is observable, that the doctrine of the Trinity, implicit or express, always made an article in the ancient Creeds: nay, several learned men have conceived, that in the earliest times it made up the *whole*[c]. Episcopius himself was of opinion that the ancient baptismal Creed was no more than this: "I believe in God the Father, "Son, and Holy Ghost[d]." He designed, by the observation, to serve his own *hypothesis*, viz. that the divine eternal generation of the Son was not inserted in the Creeds from the beginning. But he did not consider how much at the same time he disserved his own cause another way, by making the doctrine of the Trinity so *important*, as to have been the *sole* article, (if I may so speak,) or entire matter of the first Creeds. Nothing can be stronger for that doctrine than that the ancient Creeds should be comprised in these few words: "I believe in God the Father, Son, "and Holy Ghost;" since it is declaring the sacred Three to be the *one God*[e], and recommending that faith as the *prime* thing,

[c] Bull. Judic. Eccl. Cathol. cap. iii. s. 3. p. 308. cap. vi. s. 80. p. 331. Wall, Hist. of Inf. Baptism, part ii. cap. 9. sect. 11. p. 491.

[d] Antiquissimum, quodque in prima baptismi administratione jam inde ab ipsis apostolorum temporibus usitabatur, hoc erat: *Credo in Deum Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum;* nempe ad præscriptam ab ipso *Jesu* formulam. *Episcop. Institut.* lib. iv. c. 34. p. 340.

[e] Perspicuum est in hac formula, *Credo in Deum, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum,* vocem *Deum* ἀπὸ κοινοῦ ad omnes tres, nempe *Patrem, Filium et Spiritum Sanctum* referri. Quod Græci adhuc clarius exprimunt; Πιστεύω εἰς τὸν Θεὸν, τὸν Πατέρα, τὸν Υἱὸν, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα. Ita sane hanc brevem confessionem veteres intellexere. Hinc Tertullianus (adv. Prax. cap. 13.) communem Christianorum de Patre, Filio, et Spiritu Sancto

or the *one thing* necessary, without which no man could be a Christian. Bp. Bull very justly observes, that the short Creed now mentioned expressed the doctrine of the Trinity in a clearer, closer, and stronger manner than some of the more enlarged Creeds afterwards did. For the inserting of additional articles, time after time, carried the words *Son* and *Holy Ghost* so far off from the word *God*, that it might look as if that high title, which belonged indifferently to all three, was there applied to the *Father* only: though the compilers of those larger Creeds really designed the same *common* application of the name *God*, as before[f]. From hence therefore it appears, that allowing Episcopius the supposition which he goes upon, in relation to the short concise form of the first baptismal Creed, yet it is so far from favouring his cause, that it makes against him; since that form so worded carries in it a confession of the *three* divine Persons being the *one true God* of Christians: and if the Creed in the first age contained no more, then that very doctrine must have been looked upon, from the beginning, as the sum and substance of Christianity.

As to the question about the *length* of the apostolical Creeds, or the *number* of articles they contained, learned men may offer their conjectures, and have done it[g]: but perhaps, after all, we have not sufficient light to determine any thing with *certainty*. What I at present apprehend of that matter, I shall express distinctly, in the particulars here following. 1. It appears to me not improbable, that the earliest Creeds, as they took their rise from the form of baptism, contained little or nothing beyond it. There is a short Creed of that kind still extant in Cyril[h],

fidem exponens, ait: *et Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spiritus Sanctus Deus, et Deus unusquisque.* Cyprianus itidem, &c. *Bull. Judic.* cap. iv. sect. 3. p. 308.

[f] Mihi sane videtur in his paucis verbis: *Credo in Deum Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum,* magnam illam veritatem, nempe Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, *unum* esse cum Patre *Deum,* aliquatenus clarius exprimi quam in fusioribus quibusdam symbolis quæ subsecuta sunt. Nam per additamenta illa post verba, *Credo in Deum Patrem,* et adjectiones post mentionem *Filii,* non repetita voce *Deum* in articulis de Filio, et Spiritu Sancto, videri potest, et nonnullis visum est, *Dei* appellatio ad solum Patrem pertinere; plane contra mentem ac sententiam eorum qui latiora illa symbola condiderunt. *Bull. ibid.* p. 309.

[g] See Critical History of the Creed, p. 33, &c. Grabe in Annotatis ad Bulli Judic. cap. 4, 5, 6. Bingham, Eccles. Antiq. lib. x. cap. 3. sect. 7. Rogers's Review &c. p. 261—271. Berriman's Historical Account &c. p. 21, &c. Buddæi Isagoge, vol. i. p. 441, &c.

[h] Πιστεύω εἰς τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ εἰς τὸν Υἱὸν, καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, καὶ εἰς ἓν βάπτισμα μετανοίας. *Catech. Mystag.* i. n. 6.

comprehending but one single article, besides the article of the Trinity. And I may observe, that the shorter form of the Roman Creed, (called the Apostles',) published by Usher[i], seems to carry some marks of its having been formerly shorter, by its bringing in the article of the Holy Ghost in this abrupt manner, "and in the Holy Ghost:" words which came in very aptly in the primitive form, when they immediately followed "and in the "Son;" but which would appear abrupt, after several new insertions made between the two articles. Wherefore, to salve that appearing abruptness, the Church afterwards striking out *and*, inserted *I believe* in that place, making the article run, as it does at this day, "I believe in the Holy Ghost, &c." This observable circumstance relating to that Creed is a confirmation of the opinion, that the *first* Creeds (in some places at least) were of such a kind as Episcopius mentions. 2. It appears to me further probable, that when the Creeds ran in that short concise form, yet the *interrogatories* to and *answers* of the *catechumens* at baptism were fuller and more explicit. Tertullian takes notice, that the *responses* in baptism were then somewhat larger than the model laid down by Christ[k], meaning, than the *form* of *baptism:* and he refers the enlargement of the *responses* to immemorial custom or tradition. Firmilian of the third century speaks of the [l]Symbol, or Creed of the *Trinity*, and of the prescribed *ecclesiastical interrogation*, and seems to make them *distinct*, supposing that the Symbol of the Trinity contained less than the other. But if the *whole* ran under the name of the Creed of the Trinity, even that shews what was looked upon as the *principal* thing in the Creed, giving denomination to the *whole:* and it affords a probable argument that, at first, the *whole* was comprised in it. 3. It is not unlikely that some of the *additional* articles might have been inserted into the Creeds, in the very age of the Apostles, in opposition to the *heresies* then breaking out. The *hypothesis* appears to me much more probable than that such articles should be inserted in opposition to *Paganism* or *Judaism*. It was needless to caution the new converts against *Paganism* or *Judaism*, which they had formally renounced; but it might be necessary to guard them against

[i] Usher de Symbolis, p. 6, 9.

[k] Dehinc ter mergitamur, amplius aliquid respondentes quam Dominus in Evangelio determinavit. *Tertull. de Coron.* c. iii. p. 102.

[l] Cui nec *Symbolum Trinitatis*, nec *interrogatio* legitima et ecclesiastica defuit. *Cyprian. Opp.* Ep. lxxv. p. 223.

false Christians, who pretended to follow the same *rule of faith*, and to admit the same *Scriptures*. This supposition much better accounts for the article of "Maker of heaven and earth," being so long omitted in the Roman Creed, (perhaps for six or seven centuries,) though it was inserted in other Creeds, where *heresies* gave occasion for it[m]. And this also best accounts for the observable variety in the *additional* articles to the ancient Creeds: because the several churches adopted those articles which suited their then present circumstances, according as they found the faith of Christ most endangered in this or that particular[n] by the *heresies* then and there reigning. I pretend not to propose this as *certain* fact, but as a *probable*, or the most probable opinion[o]. The sum of the whole matter seems to be well and justly expressed by a celebrated writer, as follows: "Not long "after the Apostles' days, and even in the apostolic age itself, "several *heresies* sprung up in the Church, subversive of the *funda-* "*mentals* of Christianity: to prevent the malignant effects "whereof, and to hinder such *heretics* from an undiscernible "mixing themselves with the *orthodox* Christians, as also to "establish and strengthen the true believers in the *necessary* "*truths* of the Christian religion, the Christian verities opposite "to those *heresies* were inserted in the Creed; and, together with "those other articles which had without intermission been con- "stantly used from the time of the Apostles, were proposed to "the assent and belief of all persons who came to be baptized[p]."

Now, to return to the doctrine of the Trinity, it is very certain that that always made either the *whole* or the *principal* part of the first Creeds: and therefore in every view, and upon all hypotheses, it must have been looked upon as a *prime* verity, a *fundamental* doctrine of *Christianity*. But it may be pleaded perhaps, (as indeed it has been pleaded of old time[q], as well as since,) that the ancient Creeds are not *explicit* as to the doctrine

[m] See Critical History of the Apostles' Creed, p. 96—106.

[n] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 190, &c. Critical History of the Athanasian Creed, vol. iii. p. 253.

[o] Proxime illi citra controversiam ad verum accedunt, qui symbolum hocce (Romanum) ex solenni baptismi formula, qua baptizandi, se credere profitebantur, in *Deum Patrem, Filium*, et *Spiritum Sanctum*, enatum existimant; ita quidem, ut subinde additamenta quædam, *hæreticorum*, qui ecclesiam turbabant, erroribus opposita adjicerentur, donec in eam, qua hodie conspicitur, formam exsurgeret. *Buddæi Isagog.* vol. i. p. 443.

[p] Critical History of the Apostles' Creed, p. 38.

[q] See Austin de Fide et Symbolo, cap. i. p. 151. tom. vi. Bened. edit. Fulgentius in Fragment. xxxvi. p. 652. edit. Paris.

of the *Trinity*, in the commonly received sense. To which the answer, in short, is this: that though all the ancient Creeds are not equally *explicit* in that doctrine, (and good reasons may be assigned why they are not,) yet even those which are least explicit do however contain the main doctrine briefly wrapped up, provided they are but interpreted according to the real meaning and intent of the compilers, as they ought to be.

1. I say, *first*, that all the ancient Creeds are not equally *explicit*; for which good reasons may be assigned, as shall be seen presently. Some of the early Creeds are very full and *explicit* in the doctrine, considering the time when they were made, long before the Trinitarian controversy was come to any such height as it grew up to afterwards. The Creed of Jerusalem preserved by Cyril, (the most [r]ancient perhaps of any now extant,) is very express for the *Divinity* of God the Son, in these words: "And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son "of God, *true God*, begotten of the Father *before all ages*; by "whom all things were made[s]." Expressions which seem directly pointed at the Cerinthians, and others, who in the earliest times opposed the *Divinity* of Christ[t].

There is Creed, or fragment of a Creed, in Irenæus, which plainly enough intimates the real and proper *Divinity* both of the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*. I shall cite such parts of it as are most to our purpose. "There is one God omnipotent, who "made all things (out of nothing) by his *Word*—not by *angels* "or by *powers* separate from his own mind; for the God of all "*needs* nothing, but by his own *Word* and *Spirit* makes, orders, "and governs all things, and gives being to all[u]." Here the reader will observe, that the *Word* and *Spirit*, the *Son* and the *Holy Ghost*, are manifestly distinguished from all *creatures*, from all the things *made*: and it is the known doctrine of Irenæus, that the *Word* and *Spirit* are the very *self* of the *Father*[x] in a

[r] Bull. Judic. Eccles. cap. vi. n. 5. p. 325. Toutée in Cyrill. Hierosol. p. 82.

[s] Καὶ εἰς ἑνὰ Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ μονογενῆ, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων· δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο. *Cyril. Hierosol.* p. 159. Conf. 114, 137, 149.

[t] Vid. Bull. Judic. Eccl. c. vi. n. 16. p. 330.

[u] Unus Deus omnipotens qui omnia condidit per *Verbum* suum—non per angelos, neque per virtutes abscissas ab ejus sententia; nihil enim *indiget* omnium Deus: sed per *Verbum* et *Spiritum* suum omnia faciens, et disponens, et gubernans, et omnibus esse præstans. *Iren.* lib. i. cap. 22. p. 98. Bened. edit.

[x] Fecit ea per *semetipsum*, hoc est, per *Verbum* et *Sapientiam* suam: adest enim ei semper *Verbum* et *Sapientia*, Filius et Spiritus, per quos, et in qui-

qualified sense, reckoned to him, included in him. But let the reader, who desires fuller satisfaction, take along with him [y] Mr. Alexander's excellent observations upon this and two or three more the like places of Irenæus, and he will find how strong an attestation they amount to, to prove that the doctrine of the Trinity, as now received, was then looked upon as the *summary and groundwork of all that Christians believed.* There is another Creed of Irenæus, wherein the *Divinity* of Christ, the doctrine of *God incarnate*, is expressed in strong terms. *Christum Jesum Dei Filium: qui propter eminentissimam erga* figmentum suum *dilectionem, eam quæ esset ex virgine generationem sustinuit, ipse* per se hominem adunans Deo, &c. *Iren.* lib. iii. c. 4.

There is a like Creed in Tertullian, fully expressing the *Divinity* of God the *Son*, and obliquely intimating the *Divinity* of the *Holy Ghost;* which however is known to be Tertullian's express doctrine elsewhere, in more places than one [z]. His Creed runs thus:

" We believe in one God, but under this *dispensation,* which " we call the *economy*, that the one God hath a *Son*, which is his " *Word*, who proceeded from him, by whom *all things* were " made, and without whom nothing was made. He was sent " from the Father to the Virgin, and was born of her, both *God* " and *man*, Son of *man*, and Son of *God*—who afterwards, ac- " cording to his promise, sent from the Father the *Holy Ghost*, " the Comforter, the Sanctifier of the faith of those who believe " in the *Father*, and the *Son*, and the *Holy Ghost.* This is the " rule which has come down to us from the beginning of the " Gospel[a]."

In the next century we have the famous Creed of Gregory Bishop of Neocæsarea, commonly called Thaumaturgus, on the account of the many *miracles* which God wrought by him. The Creed is as express and explicit as possible for the doctrine of

bus, omnia libere et sponte fecit, p. 253. Fecit ea per *semetipsum*, hoc est per *Verbum* et *Sapientiam* suam, p. 163.

[y] Alexander's Essay on Irenæus, p. 19. Printed for J. Clark and R. Hett, 1727.

[z] Tertull. contr. Prax. cap. 9, 13, 30.

[a] Unicum quidem Deum credimus, sub hac tamen dispensatione; quam οἰκονομίαν dicimus, ut unici Dei sit et Filius, Sermo ipsius, qui ex ipso processerit, *per quem omnia facta sunt, et sine quo factum est nihil.* Hunc missum a Patre in Virginem, et ex ea natum hominem et Deum, *Filium hominis* et *Filium Dei*, et cognominatum *Jesum Christum.*——Qui exinde miserit, secundum promissionem suam, a Patre *Spiritum Sanctum*, Paracletum, Sanctificatorem fidei eorum qui credunt in *Patrem* et *Filium* et *Spiritum Sanctum.* Hanc regulam ab initio Evangelii decucurrisse, &c. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. ii. p. 5, 6. Welchm. edit.

the Trinity, drawn up probably for the obviating all extremes of that time, whether of Samosatenians or Sabellians. Some have questioned the genuineness of it, but without sufficient cause[b]. I shall here set it down at full length, as follows:

"There is *one God*, Father of the living *Word*, the substantial "*Wisdom*, and *Power*, and eternal express image: perfect "parent of one perfect, Father of the only begotten Son. There "is *one Lord*, one of one, God of God, the express character "and image of the Godhead, the effective *Word*, the *Wisdom* "that grasps the system of the universe, and the *Power* that "made every creature, true Son of the true Father, invisible of "invisible, incorruptible of incorruptible, immortal of immortal, "and eternal of eternal. And there is *one Holy Ghost*, having "his subsistence from God, and shining forth by the Son. [viz. "to mankind,] perfect image of the perfect Son, life causal of "all living, the holy fountain, essential sanctity, author of all "sanctification: in whom God the Father is manifested, who is "above all, and in all, and God the Son, who is through all. A "perfect Trinity, undivided, unseparated in glory, eternity, and "dominion. There is therefore nothing created or servile in this "Trinity, nothing adventitious, that once was not, and came in "after: for the *Father* was never without the *Son*, nor the *Son* "without the *Spirit*, but this Trinity abides the same, un-"changeable and invariable for ever[c]." This is the so much celebrated Creed, of which some stories have been told more than we are bound to believe, by Gregory Nyssen: but misreports in circumstances do not invalidate the main thing. I have

[b] The genuineness of the Creed is maintained by Bishop Bull, Defen. F. N. sect. ii. c. 12. p. 137. Fabricius B. Gr. vol. v. p. 249. Opp. Hippol. vol. ii. p. 224. Dr. Berriman's Historical Account, p. 138, &c. Mr. Abr. Taylor, True Script. Doctrine, p. 128, &c.

[c] Εἷς Θεὸς, πατὴρ λόγου ζῶντος, σοφίας ὑφιστώσης, καὶ δυνάμεως, καὶ χαρακτῆρος ἀϊδίου· τέλειος, τελείου γεννήτωρ, πατὴρ υἱοῦ μονογενοῦς. εἷς κύριος, μόνος ἐκ μόνου, Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ· ὁ χαρακτὴρ καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς θεότητος, λόγος ἐνεργος, σοφία τῆς τῶν ὅλων συστάσεως περιεκτικὴ, καὶ δύναμις τῆς ὅλης κτίσεως ποιητικὴ, υἱὸς ἀληθινὸς ἀληθινοῦ πατρὸς, ἀόρατος ἀοράτου, καὶ ἄφθαρτος ἀφθάρτου, καὶ ἀθάνατος ἀθανάτου, καὶ ἀΐδιος ἀϊδίου. Καὶ ἐν πνεῦμα ἅγιον, ἐκ Θεοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχον, καὶ δι' υἱοῦ πεφηνὸς. [δηλαδὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] εἰκὼν τοῦ υἱοῦ τελείου τελεία, ζωὴ ζώντων αἰτία, πηγὴ ἁγία, ἁγιότης ἁγιασμοῦ χορηγὸς, ἐν ᾧ φανεροῦται Θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ Θεὸς ὁ υἱὸς ὁ διὰ πάντων. Τριὰς τελεία, δόξῃ καὶ ἀϊδιότητι καὶ βασιλείᾳ μὴ μεριζομένη μηδὲ ἀπαλλοτριουμένη. οὔτε οὖν κτιστόν τι ἢ δοῦλον ἐν τῇ τριάδι, οὔτε ἐπείσακτόν τι, ὡς πρότερον μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρχον, ὕστερον δὲ ἐπεισελθόν. οὔτε οὖν ἐνέλιπέ ποτε υἱὸς πατρὶ, οὔτε υἱῷ πνεῦμα, ἀλλ' ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος ἡ αὐτὴ τριὰς ἀεί. *Greg. Thaumaturgi Symbolum apud Gregor. Nyssen. in Vit. Gregor. Opp.* tom. ii. p. 978, 979.

inclosed a small part of it within brackets, looking upon it as a marginal gloss, made by some ignorant sciolist, and afterwards foisted into the text. I owe the observation to Le Quien, who has confirmed it with substantial reasons[d], in his edition of Damascen.

If it should now be asked, why other Creeds, elder than this, should not be equally *explicit*, as to the doctrine of the Trinity, or why the western formularies were not as minute and express as some of the eastern; the answer is short and easy: there was not the same occasion. *Heresies* were more or less prevalent at different times, and in different places; and Creeds varied accordingly. The east was more infested with them than the west: and therefore the eastern Creeds were larger and more explicit, generally, than the western. And when some churches had formed their Creeds, and made it customary for the *catechumens* to recite them publicly, they might not afterwards think it proper to alter the forms which the people had long been used to, without the greatest necessity. Such is Ruffinus's account of this matter[e]. And I may add, that there was no absolute necessity of enlarging the baptismal Creeds as often as *heresies* arose in the Church; because the defects of the shorter Creeds might be competently supplied another way; namely, by very particular instructions and cautions given to the candidates for baptism, in the Catechetical Lectures contrived for that purpose: of which I have treated sufficiently elsewhere[f], and need not here repeat.

2. But I am further to observe, that even those *shorter* Creeds, such particularly as the Roman, though not so *explicit* in the article of the Trinity as the *eastern* Creeds, do yet contain the sum and substance of the doctrine in full and strong terms; provided only that they be interpreted according to the true and certain meaning of the compilers, as they ought to be. The Creeds of the Church ought most certainly to be interpreted according to the mind of the *Church*, and not by any after-

[d] Mich. Le Quien, in Dissertat. Damascen. tom. i. p. 2.

[e] In diversis ecclesiis, aliqua in his verbis inveniuntur adjecta: in ecclesia tamen urbis Romæ hoc non deprehenditur factum. Quod ego propterea esse arbitror, quod neque *hæresis* ulla illic sumsit exordium; et mos ibi servatur antiquus, eos qui gratiam baptismi suscepturi sunt, publice, id est, fidelium populo audienti symbolum reddere, et utique adjectionem unius saltem sermonis, eorum qui præcesserunt in fide non admittit auditus. In cæteris autem locis, quantum intelligi datur, *propter nonnullos hæreticos*, addita quædam videntur, per quæ novellæ doctrinæ sensus crederetur excludi. *Ruffin. in Symbol.* p. 17. edit. Ox. Conf. Bull. Judic. Eccl. c. v. p. 312.

[f] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 189, &c.

thoughts of *heretics*[g]. For though the Scripture, properly, is the rule for *receiving* any Creed, or any doctrine, yet it is not the rule of *interpretation*; but words, phrases, and formularies, must be interpreted according to their received use, and the known sense of the compilers and imposers[h]. The very judicious author of the Critical History has expressed the same sentiments very fully and clearly, as follows: "Although nothing contained "therein must be *believed* any further than it agrees with the "holy Scriptures, yet the *intended sense* of the greatest part "thereof is not to be fetched from thence, but from the *writings* "of the *Fathers*, and from those *heresies* against whom it (the "Creed) was designed: which expression may, at the first hear-"ing, be perhaps esteemed by some too hasty and inconsiderate: "but the nature of the thing, well reflected on, makes it evident, "and beyond contradiction. And if the authority of others "before me will be more valued, and better received, it will be "no difficult task to produce several who have affirmed the "same thing. But at present I shall content myself with the "testimony of Monsieur Jurieu, a French Divine now living, "who writes in express terms, that for his part, *he is persuaded*, "*that we must not seek the* SENSE of the articles of the Apostles' "*Creed in the* SCRIPTURES, *but in the* INTENTION of those that "composed it[i]."

From what has been said, it ought to be admitted as a clear case, or a ruled point, that the Creeds of the *Church* should be interpreted according to the mind of the *Church*; and the mind of the Church is to be learned chiefly from the *writings* of the *Fathers*. And while we proceed by this rule, it is manifest that the ancient Creeds, whether of the larger or shorter kind, do express the doctrine of the Trinity, as commonly received at this day. The Roman Creed for instance, even in its shorter form, (as it stood in and before the fourth century,) fully expresses the true and proper Divinity of Christ; indirectly, in calling the first Person *Father*, and directly, in calling the second

[g] Quid refert si quis hesternus *hæreticus* verba aliter explicari posse contendat? Symbola certe *Ecclesiæ* ex ipso *Ecclesiæ* sensu, non ex hæreticorum cerebello exponenda sint. Quod posterius si fieret, Deum immortalem! quam cito, ex omnibus fidei nostræ articulis, ne unus quidem nobis satis sanus atque integer relinqueretur. Symbola Ecclesiæ non tenet qui aliter quam Ecclesia intelligit. *Bull. Judic. Eccl.* cap. v. p. 322.

[h] See the Case of Arian Subscription Considered, vol. ii. p. 297, 298. Remarks on Dr. Clarke's Exposition of the Catechism, p. 25. edit. 3rd.

[i] Critical History of the Apostles' Creed, p. 42. edit. 4th.

Person *only Son*. The very name of *Father*, applied in the Creed to the first Person, intimates the relation he bears to a *Son*, of the same nature with him, existing of him, and from him, and with him. This is an observation frequently occurring in the Post-Nicene writers, who derived it from the more early Fathers, as I shall make appear presently. Fulgentius argues, that the *Divinity* of the *Son* is sufficiently intimated in the *Creed*, by the first article's acknowledging God to be a *Father*; inasmuch as *Father* and *Son* must be allowed to be of the *same nature*, and *equal* in all essential perfections[k]. Ruffinus, before him, argues in like manner, and so interprets the first article of the Creed[l]. Hilary, before them both, expresses the same thought more than once, and insists upon it as of great weight[m]. The Greek writers are full of the same notion, asserting God to be a *Father*, and from that principle inferring the *coequality* and proper *Divinity* of Christ his Son. Gregory Nyssen, in his first oration against Eunomius, expresses the thing thus[n]: "He "says, there is one only God Almighty: if he means a *Father*

[k] Cum enim quisque se dicit credere in Deum *Patrem* omnipotentem, hoc ipsum quod in Deum *Patrem* dicit, sicut in eo veritatem naturalis divinitatis, ita veritatem naturalis quoque paternitatis, et ex hac veritatem etiam naturalis generationis ostendit.—— Totum igitur in se habet illa generatio divina quicquid in se habet Dei Patris æterna substantia. Proinde sufficiebat ut diceretur de *Patre* solo, quicquid æqualiter intelligendum esset de *Filio*: Pater enim sic *omnipotentem* Filium genuit, sicut est ipse *Pater omnipotens*. —— Omnia igitur quæ Deo *Patri* dantur in Symbolo, ipso uno *Filii* nomine, naturaliter tribuuntur et Filio. *Fulgent. Fragment.* xxxvi. p. 652.

[l] *Patrem* cum audis, *Filii* intellige Patrem, qui Filius supradictæ sit imago substantiæ.——Hoc ergo ipso nomine quo Deus ipse *Pater* appellatur, cum Patre pariter subsistere etiam *Filius* demonstratur. —— Est ergo Deus *Pater verus* tanquam veritatis Pater, non extrinsecus *creans*, sed ex eo quod ipse est, *Filium* generans, &c. *Ruffin. in Symbol.* p. 18. ed. Ox.

[m] Cum *Patris* nomen auditur, nunquid natura *Filii* non continetur in nomine?——Neque enim *Filius* est cui alia ac dissimilis erit a *Patre* substantia, *Hilar. de Trin.* p. 789. Ecclesiæ Fides solum verum Deum *Patrem* confessa, confitetur et Christum. —— Per id enim Christum confessa Deum verum est, quod solum verum Deum confessa sit *Patrem*.—— Non enim unigenito Deo naturæ demutationem naturalis nativitas intulit: nec qui ex subsistente Deo secundum divinæ generationis naturam Deus subsistit, ab eo qui solus verus Deus est, separabilis est veritate naturæ, p. 1006. Conf. 860, 938, 1163. ed. Benedict.

[n] Εἷς γάρ ἐστι, φησὶ, καὶ μόνος Θεὸς παντοκράτωρ. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸν πατέρα διὰ τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος προσηγορίας ἐνδείκνυται, ἡμέτερον λέγει τὸν λόγον, καὶ οὐκ ἀλλότριον· εἰ δὲ ἄλλον τινὰ παρὰ τὸν πατέρα νοεῖ παντοκράτορα, καὶ τὴν περιτομὴν εἰ δοκεῖ κηρυσσέτω, ὁ τῶν δογμάτων τῶν Ἰουδαϊκῶν προστάτης. τῶν γὰρ Χριστιανῶν ἡ πίστις πρὸς τὸν πατέρα βλέπει. πάντα δέ ἐστιν ὁ πατὴρ· ὕψιστος, παντοκράτωρ, βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλευόντων, κύριος τῶν κυριευόντων, καὶ πάντα ὅσα τῆς ὑψηλῆς ἔχεται σημασίας, τοῦ πατρός ἐστιν ἴδια· τὰ δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐστι πάντα· ὥστε τούτου ὄντος, κἀκεῖνα δεχόμεθα, κ. τ. λ. *Gregor. Nyssen. Orat.* I. p. 15.

" under the name of *Almighty*, he says the same that we do, " and nothing different; but if he intends it of an Almighty " who is not a *Father*, he may preach up *circumcision* if he " pleases, along with his other Jewish tenets. The faith of " *Christians* looks to a *Father*. The Father indeed is all; he is " *Most High, Almighty, King of kings*, and *Lord of lords*; what- " ever titles sound high or great, they belong to the *Father*; " and all things that are the *Father's* belong to the *Son*. Allow " but this, and we admit the other." To the same purpose speaks Athanasius, that the professing our belief in God, as a *Father*, is at the same time acknowledging the *Divinity* of the *Son*[o]. And the like is observed by Cyril of Jerusalem, in his Exposition of the first article of the Creed[p].

The authors which I have cited, and to which more might be added[q], are all Post-Nicenes; but they very well understood the true and genuine principles of their Catholic predecessors, and are so many presumptive evidences of the doctrine of the Ante-Nicene Church, when, though writing on different occasions and in distant places, they fall in so unanimously with the same way of thinking. Besides, testimonies may be cited from the Ante-Nicene writers themselves, expressing the same notion. Dionysius of Alexandria, who flourished about the middle of the third century, intimates the same thing thus: " The *Father* being eter- " nal, the *Son* must be eternal too, light of light.—The names by " me mentioned are undivided and inseparable: when I named " the *Father*, before I mentioned the *Son*, I signified the Son in " the *Father*.—If any of my false accusers suspect, that, because " I called God Creator and former of *all things*, I made him " Creator of Christ, let him consider, that I before styled him " *Father*, and so the *Son* was included in *him*[r]," &c. Here we may observe, how this early and excellent writer argues from the

[o] Ὁ δὲ τὸν Θεὸν πατέρα λέγων, εὐθὺς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν υἱὸν σημαίνει, καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοήσει ὅτι υἱοῦ ὄντος, διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὰ γινόμενα ἐκτίσθη πάντα. *Athanas. de Decret. Synod. Nic.* p. 236. Benedict.

[p] Πατέρα τὸν Θεὸν ὀνομάσαμεν, ἵνα ἅμα τῷ νοεῖν πατέρα, νοήσομεν καὶ τὸν υἱόν· υἱοῦ γὰρ καὶ πατρὸς οὐδέν ἐστι μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων. *Cyril. Hierosol. Catech.* vii. n. 3. *cont. Catech.* vii. n. 1.

[q] See others cited and referred to in the Critical History of the Apostles' Creed, p. 77, 78.

[r] Ὄντος οὖν αἰωνίου τοῦ πατρὸς, αἰώνιος ὁ υἱός ἐστι, φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς ὤν·—— τῶν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεχθέντων ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον ἀχώριστόν ἐστι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τοῦ πλησίον. πατέρα εἶπον, καὶ πρὶν ἐπαγάγω τὸν υἱὸν ἐσήμανα καὶ τοῦτον ἐν τῷ πατρί.——Ἐὰν δέ τις τῶν συκοφαντῶν ἐπειδὰν τῶν ἁπάντων ποιητὴν τὸν Θεὸν καὶ δημιουργὸν εἶπον, οἴηταί με καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ λέγειν, ἀκουσάτω μου πρότερον πατέρα φήσαντος αὐτὸν, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς προσγέγραπται. *Dionys. Alex. apud Athanas. de Sententia Dionysii*, p. 254, 257.

very name and relation of *Father*, that Christ could not be a *creature*, in like manner as the Post-Nicene writers (before cited) argue from the same title applied to the first Person in the Creed. So that if we interpret the Creed according to the strict sense which the ancients had of the term *Father*, that very title indirectly asserts the *Divinity* of *Christ*, since God is thereby understood to be the *Father* of Christ[s], and not his *Creator*, as of angels or men.

But the same thing will be more directly proved from the title of *Son*, or *only Son*, applied to the second Person of the Trinity, in the Creed: for all the Fathers, both Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene, constantly understood that title, as applied to Christ, to be expressive of his real and proper *Divinity*, of his partaking of the same nature and Godhead with the *Father*, whose *only Son* he is. Bishop Bull, in reply to Episcopius, has largely insisted upon this argument, proving that the title of μονογενὴς, *only begotten*, or *only Son*, in the Creed, denotes the real and eternal Divinity of Christ. He proves it, 1. from such places of Scripture where that title is applied to Christ. 2. From the strict force and propriety of the expression itself. 3. From the order and texture of the Creed. 4. From the universal and constant interpretation of the ancients[t]. I may refer to Bishop Bull, and others that have come after him, for proof that the title of *Son of God*, or *only begotten Son*, in Scripture, cannot reasonably be understood either of our Lord's *miraculous conception* by the Holy Ghost, or of his *Messiahship*, or of his being the *first begotten* from the *dead*, or of his receiving all power, and his being *appointed heir* of all things: none of these circumstances singly considered, nor all together, will be sufficient to account for the title of *only Son*, or *only begotten*; but there is a necessity of looking higher up to the preexistent and divine nature of the *Word*, who was in the beginning *with God*, and was himself *very God*, before the creation, and from all eternity[u].

[s] Compare the Creed of Gregory Thaumaturgus, cited above, where the term *Father* is interpreted in the same high sense, and as implying the real and essential *Divinity* of the Son.

[t] In Symbolo Romano Christum dici Dei *Filium unicum*, sive *unigenitum* (τὸν μονογενῆ) respectu divinæ suæ naturæ, qua non modo ante Mariam, sed etiam ante omnia secula ex et cum Deo Patre extitit, probatu facile est: 1. Ex locis Scripturæ ubi vox μονογενὴς reperitur Christo tributa. 2. Ex vi et proprietate ipsius vocis. 3. Ex ordine et contextu verborum in Symbolo ipso. 4. Denique ex constante ac perpetuo Catholicæ Ecclesiæ sensu atque interpretatione. *Bull. Judic. Eccl.* cap. v. p. 313.

[u] See Bull. Judic. Eccl. cap. v. p. 313—320. Dr. Sherlock's Scripture Proofs of our Saviour's Divinity, p. 161—183. Remarks on Dr. Clarke's Exposition of the Catechism, p. 44—48.

Angels and *men* have been called *sons of God*, in an improper and metaphorical sense; but they have never been styled *only begotten*, nor indeed *sons* in any such emphatical and distinguishing manner as Christ is. They are sons by *adoption*, or faint resemblance: he is truly, properly, and eminently *Son of God*, and therefore *God*, as every son of man is therefore truly *man*[x]. Novatian speaks the sense of all the Ante-Nicene Fathers in that article: I forbear to produce their testimonies here, having done it elsewhere[y]: there is not a more noted principle or maxim among the earliest writers of the Church than this, that Christ is truly, properly, essentially God, because he is properly *Son of God*. The sum then is, that the Apostles' Creed, in styling Christ *only Son*, or *only begotten*, has expressed his *coeternal Divinity* in such terms as were constantly and universally understood by the ancient churches to carry that idea with them. Therefore the very learned Bishop Stillingfleet had good reason to say, "that although the Apostles' Creed does "not in *express* words declare the Divinity of the three Persons "in the Unity of the divine essence; yet taking the sense of "those articles as the Christian Church understood them from "the Apostles' times, then we have as full and clear evidence of "this doctrine, as we have that we received the Scriptures from "them[z]." The result of what has been said under the present article is, that whether we take the longer or the shorter Creeds of the ancient churches, whether those that are most explicit or those that are least so, all of them contained the *doctrine of the Trinity*, either as their *whole* subject-matter, or as their *principal* part: and therefore, so far as the Creeds of the ancient Church can be of use to shew that any point of doctrine was judged *important* or *fundamental*, we have full proof that the doctrine we are speaking of was looked upon as an *essential* of Christianity in the best and purest ages.

It must indeed be owned, that it never was the intention of Creeds to furnish out any *complete catalogue* of fundamentals[a], and so it would be very wrong to argue and infer *negatively*, that such an article was not in this or in that Creed, and therefore

[x] Ut enim præscripsit ipsa natura *hominem* credendum esse, qui ex *homine* sit; ita eadem natura præscribit et *Deum* credendum esse, qui ex *Deo* sit: ne si non et *Deus* fuerit cum ex *Deo* sit, jam nec *homo* sit licet ex *homine* fuerit. *Novat.* cap. xi. p. 31. edit. Welchm.

[y] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 192.

[z] Stillingfleet on the Trinity, chap. ix. p. 229.

[a] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 188—190. Critical History of the Athanasian Creed, vol. iii. p. 252, &c.

was not judged a *fundamental* by the compilers, (for by that rule, neither the article of God's being *Maker of heaven and earth*, nor that of *life everlasting*, would be fundamental, having both been omitted in the old Roman Creed,) but it may be right enough to argue and infer *positively*, that such an article was inserted in the Creeds, and was therefore judged to be a *fundamental*, or of great *importance*; since none could be admitted to Christian baptism, in such or such places, in the early times, without an open and explicit profession of it. So much for the head of Creeds.

II. Another way of knowing the sentiments of the ancient Church, in relation to the *necessity* of believing the doctrine of the *Trinity*, is to observe what *censures* were passed upon the open impugners of it. For if it was accounted *heresy*, pernicious and deadly *heresy*, to oppose that doctrine, in whole or in part, then it is plain that the doctrine was judged *important*, was looked upon as an *essential* of the Gospel faith. Among the impugners of that doctrine, in the article of Christ's *Divinity*, have been commonly reckoned these seven: 1. Cerinthus, 2. Ebion, 3. Theodotus, 4. Artemon, 5. Beryllus, 6. Paul of Samosata, 7. Arius. Of whom I shall treat in their order, as briefly as may be consistent with perspicuity.

A. D. 60. CERINTHUS.

Cerinthus lived in the apostolic age, was an impugner of our Lord's *Divinity*, and was condemned for it, probably, by St. John himself, and by the whole Church of that time and after: therefore the article of Christ's *Divinity* was then looked upon as a *fundamental* article. This is the sum of what I maintain under this head: I now come to the distinct proof of the several particulars.

1. That Cerinthus lived in the apostolic age is a fact so well attested by great variety of ancient evidences, (some of which will come up presently,) that it ought to pass for a certain and manifest truth. Yet a late learned foreigner[b], having a private hypothesis to serve, has called the fact in question, as some few others before him had also done[c]. His reasons have been considered and answered by learned hands[d]; to whom I refer the

[b] Frederic. Adolph. Lampe, in Comment. in S. Johan. Proleg. lib. ii. cap. 3. p. 181, &c.

[c] Vid. Buddæus in Eccles. Apost. p. 411.

[d] Taylor's True Scripture Doctrine, p. 263. Buddæus, Eccl. Apostol. p. 412—419.

reader, rather than enter into a needless dispute. Irenæus is an authority so early, and so express for Cerinthus's [e]flourishing in St. John's time, that it is alone sufficient to remove all doubt of the fact. Indeed Epiphanius[f] and Philastrius[g] place Cerinthus so high in the apostolic age, that they suppose him to have given great disturbance to St. Peter and St. Paul, and to have occasioned the calling of the first council at Jerusalem, A. D. 49, recorded in the Acts[h]. But there is reason to suspect the truth of that report[i], and therefore I am content to place Cerinthus some years lower, but early enough to have spread his heresies before St. John wrote his Epistles, and even before St. Paul wrote some of his.

2. Cerinthus held many errors: but the only one I am concerned to take notice of is, his denying the *Divinity* of Christ. That he did so is plainly asserted by the ancient author of the Appendix to Tertullian's book of Prescription[k]. But Irenæus, a more early and a more accurate writer, will give us the truest and most distinct account of what Cerinthus held with respect to the *Divinity* of our blessed Lord. The sum of this heresy in that point was, that *Jesus* and *Christ* were two Persons: *Jesus* a mere man, conceived in the natural way, of Joseph and Mary; and *Christ* a celestial spirit, which descended from above, and resided in the man *Jesus*, not constantly, but occasionally, from his baptism to his crucifixion[l]. Whatever view we take this doctrine of Cerinthus in, it is denying the proper *Divinity* of our blessed Lord. The man *Jesus*, upon his principles, could not be *divine* at all, having no constant or personal union with what descended from above: and as to that *spiritual* substance, called *Christ*, which was supposed, some time, to reside in him, even that was not properly *divine*, according to

[e] Irenæus, lib. iii. cap. 3. 11.

[f] Epiphan. Hæres. xxviii. n. 2. p. 111.

[g] Philastr. Hæres. xxxvi. p. 80. edit. Fabric.

[h] Acts xv.

[i] Vid. Buddæus, Eccles. Apostol. p. 113, 196.

[k] Cerinthus——Christum ex semine Joseph natum proponit, hominem illum tantummodo sine *Divinitate* contendens. *Tertull. de Præscript.* cap. lxviii. p. 221. Rigalt.

[l] Cerinthus autem quidam in Asia ——*Jesum* subjecit, non ex virgine natum (impossibile enim hoc ei visum est) fuisse autem eum Joseph et Mariæ filium, similiter ut reliqui omnes homines, et plus potuisse justitia et prudentia et sapientia ab hominibus: et post baptismum descendisse in eum, ab ea principalitate quæ est super omnia, *Christum* figura columbæ, et tunc annuntiasse incognitum Patrem, et virtutes perfecisse: in fine autem revolasse iterum *Christum* de *Jesu*, et *Jesum* passum esse et resurrexisse, *Christum* autem impassibilem perseverasse, existentem spiritalem. *Iren.* lib. i. cap. 26. p. 105. Bened. Conf. Epiphan. Hæres. xxviii. p. 110.

Cerinthus. The most that he said of it was, that it was *spiritual*, and *impassible* because spiritual; he does not say because *divine*. He separates him from the *principality* that is *over all*, that is to say, from *God supreme*, and therefore could not look upon him as properly *divine*. I may further observe, that his doctrine of the *Logos*, or *Word*, was, that he was Son, not of *God supreme*, but of the *only begotten*[m], one remove still further off from *God* most high. And since he thus distinguished him from the *only begotten*, who was alone supposed to *know* the Father immediately, it is plain he could not look upon the *Word* as strictly *divine*. Add to this, that Epiphanius, speaking of some of the Ebionites, (who were near allied to the Cerinthians, and borrowed much of their doctrine from them,) says, that they supposed their *Christ* to have descended from heaven, being a *spirit*, and first *created* of all, higher than the angels, and bearing rule over all; which afterwards assumed a body[n]. This description of *Christ* from above seems to answer pretty nearly to Cerinthus's notion of a *spiritual substance*, called *Christ*, so descending and residing in *Jesus*; and is a confirmation of what I am pleading for, viz. that Cerinthus did not look upon *Christ* as *divine*, (in any capacity,) but as a *creature* only. So then, whether we consider Cerinthus as making *Jesus* a mere man, or as supposing the *Christ* (sometimes residing in *Jesus*) to be an inferior *Æon*, produced in time, and the offspring of *silence*[o], or, in short, a *creature*; either way he plainly impugned the true and proper *Divinity* of Jesus Christ.

3. The next thing to be considered is, what kind of reception such his doctrine met with in the Church of Christ. We have good reason to believe that it was condemned as *antichristian* doctrine, by the Bishops of Asia, and by St. John himself. Indeed our proofs of this matter are of the conjectural kind: but they are not without their weight, if they amount to rational presumptions or strong probabilities. If it can be probably argued from *external* evidence, that St. John wrote his Gospel,

[m] Et initium quidem esse *monogenem*, *Logon* autem verum Filium unigeniti. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 11. p. 188.

[n] Ἄλλοι δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν ἄνωθεν μὲν ὄντα, πρὸ πάντων δὲ κτισθέντα, πνεῦμα ὄντα, καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀγγέλους ὄντα, πάντων τε κυριεύοντα, καὶ Χριστὸν λέγεσθαι, τὸν ἐκεῖσε δὲ αἰῶνα κεκληρῶσθαι. *Epiphan. Hæres.* xxx. cap. 3. p. 127. Conf. Vitringa, Observat. Sacr. lib. v. cap. 12. sect. 7. p. 146. edit. ult.

[o] See Bishop Bull. Def. F. N. sect. iii. cap. 1. p. 160, et Greg. Nazianz. Orat. xxiii. p. 414.

or Epistles, in direct opposition to the tenets of Cerinthus, and if the *internal* characters of his writings themselves confirm the report; then both these circumstances concurring in the same thing will together amount to as fair a proof of what we pretend, as matters of this nature will generally admit of.

That St. John wrote his *Gospel* with a view to confute Cerinthus, among other false teachers, is attested first by Irenæus[p], who was a disciple of Polycarp, and who flourished within less than a century of St. John's time. He is very particular in the account, observing what special errors of the same Cerinthus and others the Apostle had an eye to in the penning of his Gospel.

Our next author to Irenæus is Victorinus Petavionensis, who flourished about A. D. 290. He reports that the Bishops of Asia, being alarmed at the pernicious doctrines then disseminated by Valentinus, Cerinthus, and Ebion, came in a body to St. John, importuning him to bear his testimony against them[q]. The author, probably, mistakes in bringing in Valentinus so early: but that will not invalidate his report as to the other two, or as to the main thing. Some doubts have been raised about the genuineness of that treatise ascribed to Victorinus: but Dr. Grabe seems to have well taken off the only material exception to it[r]: to him therefore I refer the reader.

Our next author is Jerome, who twice tells the same story, with some particular circumstances, not so plainly intimated

[p] Hanc fidem annuncians Joannes Domini discipulus, volens per Evangelii annunciationem auferre eum qui a Cerintho inseminatus erat hominibus errorem, et multo prius ab his qui dicuntur Nicolaitæ, qui sunt vulsio ejus, quæ falso cognominatur scientia, ut confunderet eos, et suaderet, quoniam *unus Deus* qui omnia fecit per *Verbum* suum; et non, quemadmodum illi dicunt, alterum quidem fabricatorem, alium autem Patrem Domini; et alium quidem fabricatoris Filium, alterum vero de superioribus *Christum*, quem et impassibilem perseverasse, descendentem in *Jesum* Filium fabricatoris, et iterum revolasse in suum pleroma; et initium quidem esse Monogenem, *Logon* autem verum Filium *unigeniti;* et eam conditionem, quæ est secundum nos, non a primo Deo factam, sed a *virtute* aliqua valde deorsum subjecta, et abscissa ab eorum communicatione, quæ sunt invisibilia et innominabilia: omnia igitur talia circumscribere volens discipulus Domini, et regulam veritatis constituere in Ecclesia,——sic inchoavit in ea, quæ est secundum Evangelium, doctrina: *In principio erat Verbum*, &c. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 11. p. 188.

[q] Cum essent Valentinus, et Cerinthus, et Ebion, et cæteri scholæ Satanæ diffusi per orbem, convenerunt ad illum de finitimis provinciis omnes, et compulerunt ut ipse testimonium scriberet. *Victorin. in Apocalyps. Bibl. PP.* tom. i. p. 576. alias tom. iii. p. 418.

[r] Grabe, Spicileg. vol. ii. p. 45.

elsewhere; once in his prologue to his Commentaries on St. Matthew[s], and again in his book of Ecclesiastical Writers[t]. He does not say, in particular, from whence he had his accounts: but he was a learned man, conversant in books, and he intimates that he had his intelligence from ecclesiastical memoirs.

Epiphanius of the same time testifies more than once, that St. John wrote against Cerinthus and Ebion, who had taught that Christ was a mere man [u]. It is some confirmation of this, what Irenæus relates of St. John's meeting with Cerinthus at the bath, (as I have before noted,) and running from him with disdain. It shews, at least, that St. John and he were contemporaries, and that the Apostle well understood his principles, and detested them.

The main of the account may receive some further confirmation from what Julian, the apostate Emperor, was pleased to observe, (thirty years or more before St. Jerome,) that John perceiving how that the persuasion of *Christ's* being *God* prevailed mightily among the Christians dispersed through many cities of Greece and Italy, did then take upon him to assert the same doctrine in his Gospel, with a view to humour them, and to get himself reputation [x]. Here then we have a plain confession from a vehement adversary, which confession of his (ridicule and banter

[s] Johannes Apostolus et Evangelista——quum esset in Asia, et jam tunc hæreticorum semina pullularent Cerinthi, Ebionis, et cæterorum qui negant Christum in carne venisse (quos et ipse in epistola sua *antichristos* vocat, et Apostolus Paulus frequenter percutit) coactus est ab omnibus pene tunc Asiæ Episcopis, et multarum Ecclesiarum legationibus, de *divinitate* Salvatoris altius scribere, et ad ipsum, ut ita dicam, Dei *Verbum*, non tam audaci, quam felici temeritate prorumpere. Et ecclesiastica narrat historia, quum a fratribus cogeretur ut scriberet, ita facturum se respondisse, si indicto jejunio in commune omnes Deum precarentur: quo expleto, revelatione saturatus, in illud proœmium cœlo veniens eructavit: *In principio erat Verbum*, &c. *Hieronym. Prolog. in Matt.* p. 3. opp. tom. iv. edit. Bened.

[t] Joannes, novissimus omnium scripsit Evangelium, rogatus ab Asiæ Episcopis, adversus Cerinthum aliosque hæreticos, et maxime tunc Ebionitarum dogma consurgens; qui asserunt Christum ante Mariam non fuisse: unde et compulsus est *divinam* ejus nativitatem edicere. *Hieron. de Viris illustrib.* c. ix. p. 54, 55. Fabric.

[u] Ἔνθα γὰρ τὸν Χριστὸν ἐκ παρατριβῆς ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκήρυττεν ὁ Ἐβίων καὶ ὁ Κήρινθος, καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτοὺς, φημὶ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, ἐκεῖ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἀνέτειλε τῷ κόσμῳ ταύτην τὴν ἀγίαν βοτάνην, εἴτουν θάμνον τὴν ἀποδιώξασαν τὸν ὄφιν, καὶ λύσασαν τὴν τοῦ Διαβόλου τυραννίδα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἅγιος Ἰωάννης. κ. τ. λ. *Epiphan. Hæres.* li. 2. p. 423. Conf. p. 424, 433, 434. Hær. lxix. p. 747.

[x] Ὁ χρηστὸς Ἰωάννης, αἰσθόμενος ἤδη, πολὺ πλῆθος ἐαλωκὸς ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν Ἑλληνίδων καὶ Ἰταλιωτίδων πόλεων ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς νόσου· ἀκούων δὲ, οἶμαι, καὶ τὰ μνήματα Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου, λάθρα μὲν, ἀκούων δὲ ὅμως αὐτὰ θεραπευόμενα, πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν [τὸν Ἰησοῦν Θεόν]. *Julian. apud Cyril.* lib. x. p. 327. edit. Lips.

apart) amounts to this; that the generality of Christians, as early as the apostolic age, were exceedingly zealous for the doctrine of Christ's *Divinity*, and that St. John himself commended them for it, encouraged them in it, and wrote his Gospel to confirm it. Julian, very probably, had learned it from incontestable monuments of antiquity; and since he could not disown the fact, he endeavoured, in his ludicrous way, to turn the whole into ridicule. He says nothing indeed of Cerinthus or Ebion, as he had no occasion: but yet this story of his, as he has told it, falls in with the other accounts in the main thing; for which reason I have mentioned it. Such is the *external* evidence we have to prove, that St. John, at the request of the bishops and churches of that time, wrote his Gospel to establish the faith of Christians in our Lord's *Divinity*, against Cerinthus and Ebion, or other false teachers who opposed it [y].

The truth of the fact will be much confirmed from the *internal* characters of St. John's writings: and this will fully appear by comparing his expressions with Cerinthus's tenets, observing, all the way, how aptly they answer in that respect, directly confronting and overturning the principles of that heresiarch and his followers.

IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD. That is to say, at the *creation* of all things (ἐν ἀρχῇ, as in Genesis) the *Word* existed [z]: therefore he was before any creature; not only before Joseph and Mary, but even before any such created *Æon* as Cerinthus had talked of, whether called the *Word* or *Christ*.

AND THE WORD WAS WITH GOD. Not a separate *Æon*, inferior to God, and distant from God, (like to what Cerinthus supposed of the *Demiurgus*, the Maker or Framer of the world [a],) not estranged from God, but united to him, and abiding with him [b], while personally distinct from him.

[y] The very learned Vitringa has objected to this account, as to some circumstances. Observ. Sacr. lib. v. c. 10. sect. 7, 8. But he is well answered by Buddæus, Eccl. Apostol. p. 419, &c.

[z] *Δύναται μέν τοιγε τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄνομα λαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ἀρχῆς, μανθανόντων ἡμῶν διὰ τῶν λεγομένων, ὅτι πρεσβύτερος ὁ Λόγος τῶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γενομένων ἦν. Origen. Comment. in Joan.* p. 50. Conf. Buddæus, Eccl. Apostolica, p. 430, 438. Bull. Judic. Eccl. c. ii. sect. 4. p. 294.

[a] Irenæus, lib. i. c. 26. p. 105. lib. iii. c. 11. p. 188. Pseudo-Tertullian. de Præscript. Hæret. Append. p. 221. Epiphan. Hæres. xxviii. n. 1. p. 110.

[b] *Καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. καὶ ταυτὸν ῥῆμα, τὸ ἦν, τοῦ Λόγου καταγορεῖται, ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν, καὶ ὅτι πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἦν, οὔτε τῆς ἀρχῆς χοριζόμενος, οὔτε τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπολειπόμενος. Origen. in Joan.* p. 44.

AND THE WORD WAS GOD. Not a mere *man*, as Cerinthus asserted of *Jesus*, nor a *creature*, as Cerinthus imagined of *Christ*, or of the *Word*, but *very God*[c].

THE SAME WAS IN THE BEGINNING WITH GOD. This is resuming what had been said before, after a kind of break, to connect it the more closely with the account of the creation, (which the Apostle was just going to mention,) and to inculcate the more strongly, against Cerinthus, that he *by whom all things were made* was no distant, inferior *Æon*, estranged from God, and unacquainted with him, but one that had been always *with* the supreme Father.

ALL THINGS WERE MADE BY HIM. By the *Word*. Not by an inferior *Demiurgus*, not by any separate *powers*, not by *angels*, (as the Cerinthians taught[d],) not by any creature-creator, but by the *Word* himself, very God, and one with God[e].

AND WITHOUT HIM WAS NOT ANY THING MADE THAT WAS MADE. Not the *lower* world only, but the *upper* world also; not the material and *visible* world only, but the world of *invisibles*, the celestial spirits, angels and archangels, they also were made by the same *Word;* for there was nothing made without him[f]. "By "him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are "in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or do-"minions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created "by him, and for him[g]." So writes St. Paul, the best inter-

[c] Addit, *et Deus erat Verbum;* illud, non minus quam ipsum Patrem, verum summumque Deum esse significans. Atque istud quidem Cerinthi commentis e diametro est oppositum, quippe qui per τὸν Λόγον, sive *Christum*, equidem substantiam quandam *Spiritalem* eamque humana natura præstantiorem, neutiquam autem ὑπόστασιν quandam *divinam* quæ et ipsa *Deus* esset, intelligebat. *Buddæi Eccles. Apostolica*, p. 438.

[d] Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. c. 3. lib. v. c. 9. Augustin. de Hæres. c. viii. Epiphan. Hæres. 28. 1. Philastr. Hær. 36, p. 77. Pseudo-Tertullian. Præscript. c. 68. Damascen. Hær. 28.

[e] *Omnia per illud* (Verbum) *facta sunt*. Commentis Cerinthianis est oppositum: non enim a *fabricatore* quodam mundi, a Deo primo diverso, sed a Λόγῳ ὑποστατικῷ, qui et ipse verus summusque Deus sit, mundum huncce et omnia quæ in eo sunt, condita esse, verbis istis docet. *Buddæi Eccles. Apostol.* p. 438. Conf. Vitring. Observ. Sacr. lib. v. c. 13. s. 4. p. 155.

[f] In eodem commate, contra eosdem hæreticos addit, *et absque eo factum est nihil*. Quæ verba, qui intentionem Apostoli non attenderit, nihil aliud quam inanem ταυτολογίαν continere suspicetur. Sed nimirum hæretici isti (ut recte Grotius) alium volebant opificem eorum quæ cernimus, sive mundi hujus *aspectabilis;* alios rerum *invisibilium*, et quæ super hunc mundum sunt, in suo quemque pleromate: nihil igitur eorum quæ facta sunt, ex operibus τοῦ Λόγου excipit Joannes. *Bull. Judic. Eccles.* c. ii. p. 294.

[g] Coloss. i. 19. See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 56—59.

preter of what we have in St. John, as writing by the same Spirit, and with the same views, and probably against the very same men. Indeed, there is not in the whole New Testament any thing of a more sublime and exalted strain, concerning the personal dignity of our blessed Lord, than what we find in the first chapter to the Colossians, from the fifteenth to the nineteenth verse inclusive; and in the second, from verse the second to the tenth. Those passages come the nearest of any to St. John's divine *proeme*, and are only to be matched with it. It would be too great a digression here, to shew how those so emphatical expressions of St. Paul are all particularly fitted to confront the tenets of Cerinthus, as if chosen for that very purpose, and directly pointed at them: but the learned reader, who is disposed to examine into the fact, may consult a very judicious foreigner, who has drawn that matter out at length, expounding what St. Paul has said in those two chapters, in a very clear and excellent manner, by the opposition which it carries in it all the way to the Cerinthian heresy [h]. I return to St. John.

IN HIM WAS LIFE, AND THE LIFE WAS THE LIGHT OF MEN. The same *Word* was *life*, the Λόγος and ζωὴ, both one [i]. There was no occasion therefore for subtlely distinguishing the *Word* and *life* into two *Æons*, as some did.

AND THE LIGHT SHINETH IN DARKNESS, AND THE DARKNESS COMETH NOT UPON IT. So I render the verse, conformable to the rendering of the same Greek verb, καταλαμβάνω, by our translators, in another place of this same Gospel [k]. The Apostle, as I conceive, in this fifth verse of his first chapter, alludes to the prevailing error of the Gnostics, and of all that sort of men [l]; who had adopted the ancient Magian notion of a *good God* and an *evil God*, the first called *Light*, and the other *Darkness*: which two they supposed to be under perpetual struggles, and *obstructed* by each other. In opposition, probably, to those Magian

[h] Buddæus, Eccles. Apostolica, p. 468—487.

[i] Hunc ipsum Λόγον esse vitam hominis; otiosam innuens illorum subtilitatem, qui in systemate divinarum emanationum, ζωὴν *vitam*, a Λόγῳ distinguebant, eidemque subordinabant. *Vitringa in Prolog. Evangel. Johan. Observ. Sacr.* lib. v. c. 13. p. 180.

[k] John xii. 35. Vid. Bos. Exercitat. in Johan. p. 54, 55.

[l] Vid. Vitringa, Observat. Sacr. lib. v. c. 13. p. 136. Epiphanius, speaking of the Gnosticism of those times, derives it in part from the perplexity which those men were under in the question about the *origin of evil*. *Epiphan. Hæres.* xxiv. 6.

principles, St. John here asserts, that the *Word*, the true *light*, was much superior to any such pretended rival power. In him was no *darkness* at all[m]: no such opposite *power* could come upon him, to obstruct his purposes, or defeat his good and great designs.

HE WAS IN THE WORLD, AND THE WORLD HAD BEEN MADE BY HIM, BUT THE WORLD KNEW HIM NOT. So I translate, for greater accuracy and perspicuity. HE CAME UNTO HIS OWN, AND HIS OWN RECEIVED HIM NOT. These two verses manifestly confront several of the Gnostic principles, viz. that the world was made by an *inferior* and *evil* God, an angel called *Demiurgus*; and that Christ came into another person's work, or province, not into his *own*, when he manifested himself to the world[n]; and that he did not so manifest himself before his incarnation. Those several errors seem to be directly pointed at, and confuted by what the Evangelist has taught in those two verses[o]. But of the true interpretation of those two verses, I have treated more largely elsewhere[p].

AND THE WORD WAS MADE FLESH, became personally united with the man *Jesus*; AND DWELT AMONG US, resided constantly in the human nature so assumed. Very emphatical and pointed expressions, searching to the root of every heresy almost of that time, so far as concerned the person of Christ: for none of them would admit the *Word made flesh*, or *God made man*[q]. Such sentiments agreed not with their vain philosophy; they deemed the thing to be *incredible*[r]. The Cerinthians admitted that a celestial spirit descended occasionally upon Jesus; but they

[m] "God is light, and in him is no "darkness at all," 1 John i. 5.

[n] Scilicet Cerinthi et aliorum omnium hæreticorum, qui mundi hujus conditorem a summo Deo separabant, hæc fuit notissima sententia, Christum servatorem nostrum a summa omnium *principalitate* in hunc mundum venisse tanquam in *alienum opus*; idque ut homines a domino et servitute conditoris universi in nescio quam libertatem (licentiam rectius dixeris) vindicaret. *Bull. Judic. Eccles.* cap. ii. sect. 4. p. 294. Conf. Iren. lib. iii. c. 11. et lib. v. c. 18.

[o] Docet itaque semper illum in mundo fuisse, et a primo rerum ortu, et generis humani instauratione, se in Ecclesia, quam in mundo habuit, manifestasse, et ut *lucem veram* suos illuminasse; etiamsi a maxima mundi parte, et ab ipsis Judæis carnalibus *agnitus non sit*: explodens erroneam illorum hypothesin qui Filium Dei ante suam ἐνανθρώπησιν se in mundo non *manifestasse*, neque illi *cognitum* fuisse, asserebant. *Vitringa, Observ. Sacr.* vol. iii. p. 180.

[p] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 51, 52, 53.

[q] Secundum autem nullam sententiam hæreticorum, *Verbum Dei caro factum est*. *Iren.* lib. iii. c. 11. p. 189. Conf. Bull. Judic. Eccl. c. ii. sect. 4. p. 194.

[r] Incredibile præsumpserant Deum carnem. *Tertull. contr. Marcion.* lib. iii. c. 8. p. 401. Conf. Just. Mart. Dial. p. 140, 204. edit. Jebb.

neither allowed that spirit to be *personally* united with Jesus, nor to be properly *divine*, as St. John teaches: so that in two respects those words of the Apostle confute their principles[s].

AND WE BEHELD HIS GLORY, THE GLORY AS OF THE ONLY BEGOTTEN OF THE FATHER, &c. Words diametrically opposite to Cerinthus's hypothesis[t], which made the *Logos* not the *only begotten* of the Father, but a remove further off, viz. the *Son* of the only begotten, as before observed.

AND OF HIS FULNESS HAVE ALL WE RECEIVED, AND GRACE FOR GRACE. The expression, *of his fulness*, [ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ,] is very observable. The Gnostics in general, and the Cerinthians in particular, were wont to talk much of the πλήρωμα, or *fulness*; by which they meant a fictitious plenitude of the Deity, in which the whole race of *Æons* was supposed to subsist, and into which *spiritual* men (such as they esteemed themselves) should hereafter be received. It was the doctrine of the Valentinians, (and probably of the elder Gnostics also,) that they were themselves of the *spiritual* seed, had *constant grace*, and could not fail of being admitted into the *plenitude* above[u]; while others were in their esteem *carnal*, had *grace* but sparingly, or occasionally, and that not to bring them so high as the *plenitude*, but to an intermediate station only. But St. John here asserts[x], that *all* Christians equally and indifferently, all believers at large, have received of the *plenitude*, or fulness of the divine *Logos*; and that not sparingly, but in the largest measure, *grace upon grace*, accumulated grace[y]: or rather, grace following in constant succession, *grace for grace*; that is, new succours coming on as quick as the former should wear off or cease, or *new* supplies

[s] Dum dicit *Verbum caro factum. et habitavit inter nos*; significat ipsum istum Λόγον, qui *Filius Dei*, simulque *verus* ac *summus Deus*, erat, quemque tam multis descripserat verbis, *carnem factum*, hoc est, humanam naturam, non ad certum tempus, sed perpetuo, indissolubili, et inseparabili nexu adsumsisse. *Budd. Eccl. Apost.* p. 440.

[t] Indicat eundem istum Λόγον, qui caro factus erat, etiam esse *unigenitum Patris*: adeoque discrimen illud quod Cerinthiani inter μονογενῆ sive *unigenitum*, et Λόγον sive *Verbum*, constituebant, explodit. *Buddæus, ibid.* p. 440.

[u] Iren. lib. i. c. 6. p. 31.

[x] Docte denique ex hujus unigeniti et primogeniti Dei Filii πληρώματι (qua notione Gnostici uti consueverunt) *omnes* accipere *gratiam pro gratia*, omnes omnis generis et ordinis in Christum credentes, ejusdem in hac vita participes esse *gratiæ*, et ad ejusdem *gloriæ* spem vocatos esse: neutiquam vero ita se rem habere ut Gnostici jactitabant, *solos* suæ sectæ homines, et suæ imbutos philosophiæ mysteriis, ad summam illam felicitatem primi *pleromatis* divinitatis adspirare posse, reliquorum credentium animabus inferioris et *medii* generis beatitudinis statum destinatum esse. *Vitringa, Obs. Sacr.* lib. v. c. 13. p. 155, 156.

[y] See Bull. Harmon. Apostol. Dissert. ii. c. 11. p. 481.

for the *old* ones past and gone[z], without failure or intermission. Our present rendering, *grace for grace*, is literal, and just; provided only we understand it thus, that whenever one grace ceases or expires, another comes in its place, and is given us *for* the former, or in lieu of the former.

I have now run through the *proeme* of St. John's Gospel, endeavouring all the way to shew how aptly the expressions suit with the supposition which I here go upon, that it was penned with a particular view to the heresies of Cerinthus and Ebion; to say nothing of Simon Magus, or the Gnostics of those times: for though I have chiefly, or in a manner solely, made Cerinthus's heresy the subject of this article, yet I would be understood to include any other heretics of the same time, or before him, so far as they fell in with the same common errors.

Let us now pass on to St. John's First Epistle, in order to consider whether that likewise may not be naturally interpreted the same way; so that one and the same key may serve for both.

Irenæus seems to say, that St. John pointed his Epistle[a] against the same. Tertullian also intimates, that St. John directed some parts of his *Epistle* against the Ebionites[b]. And St. Jerome insinuates, that he pointed his censure both against Cerinthus and Ebion, marking them out as *antichrists* in his Epistle[c]. If we come to examine the *Epistle* itself, we shall easily perceive, that a great part of it was levelled, not so much against Jews or Pagans, as against *false Christians*, against the *heretics* of that time, Simonians, perhaps, or Cerinthians, or Ebionites, or Nicolaitans, or all of them, according as his expressions here or there are particularly pointed. The two principal errors which he there censures were, the denial of Christ's being *come in the flesh*[d], and the disowning that *Jesus* was *Christ*[e]. The *Docetæ*, (as they were afterwards called,) the

[z] Vid. Gataker. Adversar. Sacr. c. xxvii. Anonymi Fortuita Sacra, p. 80, 81, &c. Suicer. Thesaur. in χάρις, p. 1497.

[a] Igitur et omnes extra dispositionem sunt, qui, sub obtentu agnitionis, alterum quidem *Jesum* intelligunt, alterum autem *Christum*, et alterum *unigenitum*, &c.—Quos Joannes in prædicta Epistola fugere eos præcepit, &c. ibid. p. 207.

[b] At in Epistola eos maxime *antichristos* vocat, qui Christum negarent in carne venisse, et qui non putarent *Jesum esse Filium Dei*. Illud Marcion, hoc Hebion vindicavit. *Tertull. Præscript.* c. 33. p. 214.

[c] See the whole passage cited above, p. 541.

[d] 1 John iv. 3. compare 2 John 7.

[e] 1 John ii. 22.

followers of Simon Magus, denied *Christ's* real *humanity*, making him a mere *phantom*, *shadow* or *apparition*, a walking ghost, as I observed above[f]. And the Cerinthians, making a distinction between *Jesus* and *Christ*, did not allow that both were one person. Against those chiefly St. John wrote his Epistle. He speaks of *antichrists* newly risen up[g]; which could not be intended of Jews or Pagans, who had opposed the Gospel all along: and he speaks of men that had been of the Church, but had apostatized from it; "they went out from us, but "they were not of us[h]." Let us now proceed to the explication of those passages in St. John's Epistle which relate to our purpose.

The Apostle observes, that THE WORD OF LIFE (or the *Word* in whom *was life*, John i. 4.) WAS FROM THE BEGINNING[i]; conformable to what he says in the entrance to his Gospel, and in opposition both to Cerinthus and Ebion, who made *Jesus* a mere *man*, and who either denied any preexisting substantial *Logos*, or, at most, supposed him to stand foremost in the rank of *creatures*. The Apostle further styles the same *Logos* ETERNAL LIFE[k], to intimate his *eternal* existence, in opposition to the same heretics. He adds, WHICH WAS WITH THE FATHER, parallel to what he says in his Gospel, *was with God*, and which has been explained above[l].

In the second chapter of the same Epistle, the Apostle describes the *antichristian* heretics of that time as DENYING THAT JESUS IS CHRIST; which amounted to the same with DENYING THE FATHER AND THE SON[m]; because WHOSOEVER DENIETH THE SON, THE SAME HATH NOT THE FATHER[n]. Cerinthus denied that *Jesus* was *Christ*, dividing *Christ* from *Jesus*, as before explained: and he of consequence denied *the Son*, because he allowed not that *Jesus* was personally united with the *Word*, the eternal *Son of God*, nor that that *Logos* which he speaks of was the *only begot-*

[f] See above, p. 401, 482.
[g] 1 John ii. 18. 22. iv. 3. 2 John 7.
[h] 1 John ii. 19.
[i] 1 John i. 1.
[k] 1 John i. 2. compare 1 John v. 20.
[l] See above, p. 542. Conf. Tertull. contr. Prax. c. xv. Bull. Judic. Eccles. c. ii. sect. 5. p. 295.
[m] 1 John ii. 22.
[n] 1 John ii. 23. Apostoli verba—— commune Cerinthi et Ebionis dogma manifeste perstringunt, nam illi ambo *Jesum* esse *verum Dei Filium* ante Mariam, adeoque ante res omnes creatas ex Deo Patre natum omnino negabant, ac proinde, Apostolo judice, neque *Deum Patrem* re vera confessi sunt: siquidem a revelato Evangelio, nemo potest Deum *Patrem* rite colere aut credere, nisi qui Deum Filium simul amplectatur. *Bull. Judic. Eccl.* c. ii. sect. 5. p. 296.

ten of the Father, being *Son* only of the only begotten, according to his scheme: so that he totally disowned the *divine* Sonship both of *Jesus* and *Christ*, and by such denial denied both the *Father* and *Son*[o].

The Apostle goes on to say, WHOSOEVER SHALL CONFESS THAT JESUS IS THE SON OF GOD, GOD DWELLETH IN HIM, AND HE IN GOD[p]. Where again he manifestly strikes at the Cerinthian and Ebionite principles, which allowed not *Jesus* to be *the Son of God*, in any true and proper sense, such as St. John lays down in several places of his writings, but particularly in the entrance to his *Gospel*[q], as explained above.

In the chapter next following, the Apostle repeats the same thing as before, or uses words to the same effect: WHOSOEVER BELIEVETH THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST IS BORN OF GOD[r]: and soon after adds, WHO IS HE THAT OVERCOMETH THE WORLD, BUT HE THAT BELIEVETH THAT JESUS IS THE SON OF GOD[s]? Here lay the main stress, to believe that *Jesus*, who was truly and really man, was as truly and really the eternal *Son of God*[t]. The Apostle, in the next verse, seems to point at the *Docetæ*, as he had before done in the same Epistle[u], being equally concerned to maintain that Christ had real *flesh*, as that he had real *Divinity*; that so the faith of the Gospel might stand upon this firm foundation, that the eternal Son of God became Son of man for the salvation of mankind. Hereupon therefore the Apostle, in defence of Christ's real *humanity*, says, THIS IS HE THAT CAME BY WATER AND BLOOD[x].

[o] Dum enim Cerinthiani negabant *Jesum* esse *Christum*, per veram scilicet perpetuamque unionem; *Christum* insuper Filium Dei verum et *unigenitum* inficiebantur; perinde hoc erat ac si et *Patrem* et *Filium* negassent, cum, ut recte Joannes dicit, *Qui Filium negat, nec Patrem habeat.*—Eo ipso enim, dum negabant *Jesum esse Christum*, nec ipsum quoque *Christum* pro *Dei Filio* agnoscebant, non poterant non multo magis negare, *Jesum* esse *Filium* Dei. *Buddæi Eccles. Apostol.* p. 445.

[p] 1 John iv. 15. compare iii. 23.

[q] Non est dubitandum quin Apostolus his verbis confessionem exigat illius *Filii Dei* quem ipse ex parte supra in hac Epistola prædicaverat, et plenius in Evangelio suo declarat: nempe Filii Dei, qui sit Dei Patris Λόγος, qui *in principio* erat, et *apud Deum* erat, et *Deus ipse erat*, per quem *omnia facta sunt*, &c.—Hujusmodi vero Dei Filium *Jesum* nostrum esse, non confessus est Cerinthus, neque post ipsum Ebion. *Bull. Judic.* c. ii. sect. 9. p. 297.

[r] 1 John v. 1.

[s] 1 John. v. 5.

[t] Quia præ aliis maxime tunc cresceret Cerinthi hæresis, ideo Apostolus fidem illam qua creditur *Jesum* esse *Dei Filium*, passim in hac Epistola commendat, urget, inculcat. *Bull. ibid.* p. 297.

[u] 1 John iv. 2, 3. compare 2 John 7. and see Bull. Judic. p. 296. Buddæi Eccl. Apostol. p. 550, &c.

[x] 1 John v. 6.

What he elsewhere expresses by his *coming in the flesh*[y], here he expresses more emphatically, by his *coming* in or by *water* and *blood;* alluding to what Christ shed at his *passion*, as a proof that he had then a real body, and was really *man*, not a spectre, phantom, or apparition, as some heretics pretended. It is to be noted, that the ancient *visionaries*, (who were the Simonians, Menandrians, Saturnilians, and Basilidians,) being ashamed perhaps to confess Christ crucified[z], contrived any wild supposition imaginable to evade it. Basilides pretended that Christ himself did not suffer, but that Simon of Cyrene was crucified in his room[a]. The elder *Docetæ* had not so happy a talent at inventing, but were content to say, that Christ had no *real* body, and suffered in appearance only, imposing upon the eyes of the spectators. In opposition probably to that kind of men, (of which there might be many in the apostolic age,) the Apostle here emphatically observes, that Christ came by *water* and *blood:* for his shedding both *water* and *blood* out of his side, at his passion, was a demonstration that there was a *real* body then hanging upon the cross, not a *phantom*, or a *spiritual* substance. Which very argument is well urged by Irenæus[b] and Novatian[c], in proof of the same thing, against the *Docetæ*. As St. John is the only Evangelist who has related that circumstance of the passion[d], so it is observable how particular a stress he lays upon it; immediately subjoining, in confirmation of it, AND HE THAT SAW IT (meaning himself perhaps, or else the *soldier* that pierced our Lord[e]) *bare record*, AND HIS RECORD IS TRUE, &c. And he confirms it further from two *prophecies* out of the Old Testament. Wherefore it is the more probable that, in his *Epistle* before, he alluded to that circumstance, and in proof of

[y] 1 John i. 1, 2. iv. 2, 3. 2 John 7. compare 1 Tim. iii. 16. 1 Pet. iii. 18. iv. 1.

[z] Hence it is that Polycarp joins both together in the same reproof: πᾶς γὰρ, ὃς ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθέναι, ἀντίχριστός ἐστι· καὶ ὃς ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇ τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ σταυροῦ, ἐκ τοῦ Διαβόλου ἐστί. *Polycarp. Epist.* c. 7.

[a] Irenæus lib. i. c. 24. alias 22. p. 101. Epiphan. xxiv. 3. Philastr. c. xxxii. p. 68. Augustin. de Hæres. n. iv. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. i. c. 4.

[b] Quomodo autem, cum *caro* non esset, sed *pareret* (i.e. *appareret*) quasi homo, crucifixus est, et a latere ejus puncto *sanguis* exiit et *aqua? Iren.* lib. iv. c. 33. (alias 57.) p. 271.

[c] Sanguis idcirco de manibus ac pedibus, atque ipso latere demanavit, ut nostri consors corporis probaretur, dum occasûs nostri legibus moritur. *Novat.* c. x. p. 31. edit. Welchm.

[d] John xix. 34.

[e] See Dodwell. Dissert. in Iren. i. p. 39.

Christ's *humanity*. But St. John strengthens the argument further, by superadding the consideration of the testimony of the *Spirit*. AND THERE IS THE SPIRIT ALSO BEARING WITNESS BECAUSE THE SPIRIT IS TRUTH[f] *itself*, is essential truth. The Spirit residing in the Church, and working in believers by supernatural graces, bears testimony to the doctrine taught by the Apostles, and believed by the Church; particularly to the doctrine here spoken of, viz. that Christ the *Son of God* became *Son of man* for the salvation of mankind.

The Apostle, having said that the *Spirit is truth*, or essential truth, (which was giving him a title common to *God the Father*, and to *Christ*,) in order to obviate any misapprehension or offence, accounts for what he had said, and reconciles it, by declaring presently, that the *Father*, and the *Word*, and the *Spirit* are all *one*, are equally *truth* itself: FOR THERE ARE THREE THAT BEAR RECORD IN HEAVEN, THE FATHER, THE WORD, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT; AND THESE THREE ARE ONE[g]. Therefore it was as right to say that the *Spirit is truth*, as it might be to say it either of *Father* or *Son*, since they are all *one*. That point being cleared, the Apostle then returns[h] to speak of the *Spirit*, the *water*, and the *blood*, as testifying the same thing to mankind which is testified above to the angels in heaven. And the *Spirit* is now particularly mentioned as bearing witness in earth, (rather than the *Father* or the *Son*,) because, since the time of Christ's ascension, the Church has been under the special *economy* of the Holy Spirit, who was to *guide* the Apostles, and the churches after them, *into all truth*[i].

I know it has been objected, that this way of reckoning the *Spirit* twice is reducing the *six* witnesses to *five*. Now, indeed, if the text had called them *six* witnesses, there would have been some force in the objection: but as it is mere fancy and presumption to make them *six*, we may take the liberty to think, that the *fifth* twice told will fully answer all that the text mentions.

The Apostle having said thus much of the testimony of the *Spirit*, who is one with the *Father*, comes next to make the proper application of it, enforcing it still further, by directly calling it the *testimony of God:* IF WE RECEIVE THE WITNESS OF MEN, THE WITNESS OF GOD IS GREATER; FOR THIS IS THE WITNESS OF

[f] 1 John v. 6. [g] 1 John v. 7. [h] 1 John v. 8. [i] 1 John xvi. 13.

GOD, WHICH HE HATH TESTIFIED OF HIS SON[k]—THAT GOD HATH GIVEN TO US ETERNAL LIFE, AND THIS LIFE IS IN HIS SON[l]. This is the burden of the whole *Epistle*, the sum and substance of what the Apostle aims at quite through[m], that God had been pleased to reconcile the world unto himself by the mediation of his own *divine* Son *made man*. This was what the *water* and the *blood* testified in part, and what the *Spirit* of God, one with God, more abundantly testifies in the whole[n].

I was willing thus occasionally to explain that celebrated passage, concerning the *three Witnesses*, which has been the subject of long and warm debates, both as to the genuineness of the text, and the connection of it with the rest, upon which hangs the true interpretation. The exposition which I have given appears to me just and natural, supposing the text to be genuine: and I conceive that the genuineness thereof has been sufficiently maintained by a great many able hands[o]; and particularly by a late learned and accurate writer[p], to whose useful labours I refer the reader for satisfaction; and now I return.

The Apostle, in the close, remarkably sums up all in these strong and chosen words: WE KNOW THAT THE SON OF GOD IS COME, AND HATH GIVEN US AN UNDERSTANDING, THAT WE MAY KNOW HIM THAT IS TRUE, AND WE ARE IN HIM THAT IS TRUE, EVEN IN HIS SON JESUS CHRIST. THIS IS THE TRUE GOD, AND ETERNAL LIFE[q]. I need not here stand to prove, that the title of *true God*, in this text, is to be understood of Christ, because I have done it elsewhere[r]: but I would observe further, how aptly every word is chosen to obviate the erroneous tenets of Cerinthus, and of other the like false teachers of those times. *The Son of God:* not the

[k] 1 John v. 9. [l] 1 John v. 11.

[m] Hæc est summa: omnem doctorem qui confessus fuerit *unum Jesum Christum, verum Dei Filium*, propter hominum salutem *vere hominem factum*, ex Deo esse (nimirum ea parte, qua id confitetur et docet, ut recte *Estius*) contra pro *Pseudo-Propheta* atque *antichristo* habendum esse, quisquis hoc confessus non fuerit. *Bull. Judic. Eccl.* c. ii. s. 9. p. 297.

[n] Immo quæ deinceps, ver. 6, 7, 8. de *tribus Testibus*, in cœlo pariter ac in terra, docet, huc præcipue comparata esse videntur, ut ostendat *Jesum esse Filium Dei*, quod Cerinthiani, ut diximus, negabant. Hinc concludit: Si hominum *testimonium admittimus, Dei testimonium majus est.* Quodnam est hoc Dei testimonium? Respondet: *Atque hoc est, quod Deus de Filio suo testimonium dixit. Buddæus, Eccl. Apostol.* p. 446.

[o] See most of them numbered up in Taylor's True Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 32.

[p] Mr. Twells, Critical Examination of the New Text and Version of the New Testament, part ii. p. 123—154.

[q] 1 John v. 20.

[r] Sermons, vol. ii. p. 130, &c. Compare Taylor's True Scripture Doctrine, p. 282, &c. Dr. Bishop's Eight Sermons, p. 56, &c.

Son of Joseph and Mary, nor the Son of the *only begotten*, but the immediate *Son of God;* related to God as a *son* to a *father*, not as a *creature* to his Lord and Maker. He *is come*, come in the flesh, and not merely to reside for a time, or occasionally, and to fly off again, but to abide and dwell with man, clothed with humanity. We are *in him that is true*, in the true Father, by *his Son* Jesus Christ: who is the *true God;* not an inferior *power* or *angel*, (such as Cerinthus supposed the *Demiurgus* to be,) not a created *Æon*, the offspring of the *Monogenes*, or of *Silence*, as Cerinthus fondly imagined the *Logos* to be; but *true God*, one with the Father. *And eternal life*, the same that had been with the Father from the beginning, before any thing was created, consequently from all eternity.

I have now gone through both the *Epistle* and *Gospel* of St. John, pointing out the most observable passages in both, which concerned the present question. The sum of what I have advanced under this article is, that St. John most apparently levelled a great part of his First Epistle against the Cerinthian doctrines; and that it may be strongly argued, from evidences *external* and *internal*, that he wrote the *proeme* to his Gospel with the same or the like views. It appears further, that in his Epistle particularly he has asserted the *necessity* of believing our Lord's *divine* Sonship, his proper *Divinity*, under pain of being excluded heaven and happiness: "Whosoever denieth the Son, "the same hath not the Father." Whosoever denies Christ to be Son of God, (in St. John's sense of *Son*, a Son that was *always* with God, and is *God*,) is a *liar* and *antichrist*, denying both *the Father and the Son*[s]. The conclusion therefore from all is, that the denying our blessed Lord's real *Divinity* is *heresy* and *antichristianism*, much to be abhorred by every disciple of Christ, according to the infallible decision of an inspired Apostle[t]. Many were the evasions and subterfuges of self-opinionated men, who thought it a thing *incredible* that the *divine Word*

[s] 1 John ii. 22, 23.

[t] Hæc autem ideo fusius prosecutus sum, quod hinc non modo ex antiquissimorum Patrum monumentis, sed etiam ex *scriptis Apostolicis*, omnibus liqueat, fuisse in ipso *Apostolorum* ævo, qui Christi Domini nostri *Divinitatem* negarunt, quique eo nomine pro *hæreticis*, adeoque pro *antichristis* (tantum aberat ut *fratres* et *vera Ecclesiæ membra* censerentur) ab *Apostolis* habiti fuerint. Præterea, hinc quoque clare elucet, doctrinam de Filii Dei ἐνσαρκώσει, sive de Christo θεανθρώπῳ, *vero Deo* et *vero homine*, ut a nascente Evangelio varie a variis hæreticis impugnata fuit, ita ab Ecclesiæ veris Pastoribus, modis omnibus omnique studio, tanquam *fidei Christianæ Caput et Fundamentum ipsum*, religiosissime semper conservatam et custoditam fuisse. *Bull. Judic. Eccl.* p. 298.

should put on *flesh*, or *God* become *man*, and who chose rather to pass censure upon the *wisdom* of *Heaven*, than suspect their *own*: but sober and modest men resigned up their *faith* to *divine* revelation, as was their bounden duty to do; and among the foremost of those was our blessed Apostle. So now, besides the *reason* of *things*, taking in what the Scriptures have declared of the *truth* of our doctrine, and besides the true and natural import of the form of *baptism*, (urged above,) we have moreover the determination of St. John himself, for the *importance* of the doctrine of our Lord's *Divinity*, and of consequence, for the doctrine of a coequal and coeternal Trinity.

But supposing it might be reasonably doubted (though I see not how it can) whether we have rightly interpreted St. John as to the main thing, or whether Cerinthus and others of like principles were directly struck at by him; yet still we may be able to maintain our point another way, by shewing at least that the ancient churches, next succeeding the Apostles, and the churches after, did condemn Cerinthus and Ebion, and all others who denied our Lord's *real* and proper *Divinity*. And I may here observe, before I go further, that if what I have offered about St. John's condemning the doctrine of Cerinthus be just, it may be considered as looking *forwards*, and condemning the principles of the Ebionites also, whom I am next to mention: and so, on the other hand, what I shall have to say of the Ebionites, and their being condemned by the Church, may be understood to look *backwards*, equally affecting the Cerinthians so far as they agreed in the same common sentiments. Indeed, Bishop Bull had considered both together, and in a *scriptural* view, as I have hitherto considered Cerinthus singly: but I apprehended that if one were taken in a *scriptural*, and the other in an *ecclesiastical* view, the two parts would reflect light and strength one upon another, and the whole would be both more *destinct* and more *complete*. I proceed then to consider the Ebionites, as censured by the *Church*, in the *second* and *third* centuries, for denying our Lord's *Divinity*; though, if what I have before advanced be true, they were fully condemned before for the same, even within the *apostolic age*, as well as the Cerinthians.

A. D. 72. EBION.

From Cerinthus the master I pass on to Ebion, his *disciple*

and successor[u]; so called, I suppose, because of his being Cerinthus's admirer and follower in some things. They seem to have been contemporaries, both of the *apostolic* age, though Ebion, perhaps, the younger or later of the two. I follow Epiphanius chiefly in placing Ebion as I do[x], a little after the time of the destruction of Jerusalem. But if he flourished ten or twenty years later, or began to spread his heresy but a little before St. John wrote his Gospel, (that is, before A. D. 97,) as Jerome seems to have thought, that will make no difference with respect to the main thing which I am upon.

Neither is it very material, whether there ever was such a person as Ebion, founder of the sect, or whether the Ebionites took their name from their mean condition, or from their poor and abject notions, rather than from any leader called Ebion. But as the *ancients* in general do assert there was such a man[y], though some few of them may seem to contradict it, I cannot but esteem their testimonies as much more weighty than the conjectures of some learned *moderns*[z], though specious, to the contrary: besides that other as learned and judicious moderns[a] have well defended the *ancient* persuasion, and have sufficiently replied to the common exceptions made to it. Wherefore, there remains very little room for doubt or scruple as to the truth of the fact, that there was formerly such a person as Ebion, founder of the sect of the Ebionites.

The Ebionites, as all allow, denied any proper *Divinity* of Christ. Some of them indeed admitted that he was born of a

[u] Hujus successor Hebion fuit, Cerintho non in omni parte consentiens. *Pseudo-Tertullian. Præscript.* cap. xlviii. p. 221.

Hebion discipulus Cerinthi, in multis ei similiter errans, &c. *Philastr. Hæres.* xxxvii. p. 81.

Cerinthum, et hujus successorem Ebionem. *Hieronym. Dial. contr. Lucifer.* p. 304.

[x] Epiphan. Hær. xxx. 2.

[y] Tertullian. Præscript. cap. x. xxxiii. de Carn. Christi, c. xiv. xviii. Virg. Veland. c. vi. Victorinus Petavion. in Apocalyps. Alexand. Alexandr. Epist. Synod. apud Theodorit. E. H. lib. i. cap. 4. p. 15. Hilarius, p. 779, 789, 799, 916, 919. edit. Bened. Ruffin. in Symbol. p. 27. Theodorit. Hæret. Fabul. p. 188, 218. Epiphan. Hæres. xxx. 2. et passim. Philastr. Hær. xxxvii. p. 81. Hieron. contr. Lucifer. p. 304. et in Isai. i. 3. p. 10. adv. Helvid. p. 141. et alibi. Augustin. Epist. ad Hieronym. lxxii. p. 195. ed. Bened.

[z] See the most of them numbered up in Ittigius de Hæres. primi Secul. p. 303. Buddæus, Eccles. Apostol. p. 492.

[a] Bull. Judic. Eccles. cap. ii. sect. 17. p. 303. Fabricius in not. ad Philastr. p. 81, &c. Mosheim. Observ. Sacr. lib. i. c. 5. Et in Vindic. cont. Toland. c. 7. Buddæus, Eccles. Apostol. p. 491, &c. Berriman, Serm. p. 48.

virgin[b]; but most of them, the elder Ebionites especially, denied even that[c], and none of them confessed his true Godhead. I shall not here stand to enumerate or clear their sentiments, because they are well known; besides that they will appear distinctly in the sequel, as I run through the Ante-Nicene writers in order, who have condemned the Ebionites by name, or at least have condemned their principles, as amounting to *heresy*.

A. D. 107. I shall begin with Ignatius, an eminent personage, a disciple of St. John, and by him ordained Bishop of Antioch, and who afterwards died a martyr, either in 116 or 107. Accounts differ as to the time: I choose, with the learned Mosheim[d], to take the earlier date, according to the Acts of his martyrdom, being as probable as the other. Ignatius does not mention the Ebionites by name; but he plainly enough condemns their principles, in more places than one.

In his Epistle to the Ephesians, he commends their unity of *faith* and *doctrine*, inasmuch as they walked according to *truth*, and no *heresy* dwelt with them[e]. Then he proceeds to speak of *heretics*, as follows: "Some are wont to bear about them "the name [of Christ] in wicked craftiness, while they commit "things unworthy of God: whom it behoves you to avoid as "you would wild beasts. For they are a kind of fell dogs that "will bite you unawares: you should be upon your guard "against them, as they are next to *incurable*. There is one "*Physician* fleshly and spiritual, *made* and *not made*, God incar-"nate, in mortality true life, both of *Mary* and of *God*, first "passible, and then impassible, [Jesus Christ our Lord,] let no "one therefore deceive you; as hitherto you are not deceived, "but are wholly of God[f]."

These words of Ignatius, in their general view, strike at all

[b] Vid. Origen. contr. Cels. lib. v. p. 272. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. c. 1. p. 219.

[c] Vid. Irenæus, lib. iii. c. 21. p. 215. lib. v. c. 1. p. 292. Tertullian. de Carn. Christi, c. xiv. p. 319. Eusebius, Eccl. H. lib. iii. c. 27. Epiphan. Hær. xxx. p. 125. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. c. 1. p. 218. Philastr. Hæres. xxxvii. p. 82.

[d] Mosheim. Vindiciæ Antiquæ contr. Toland. c. viii. p. 230.

[e] Ignat. Epist. ad Ephes. c. 6.

[f] Εἰώθασι γάρ τινες δόλῳ πονηρῷ τὸ ὄνομα περιφέρειν, ἀλλά τινα πράσσοντες ἀνάξια Θεοῦ. οὓς δεῖ ὑμᾶς ὡς θηρία ἐκκλίνειν· εἰσὶν γὰρ κύνες λυσσῶντες, λαθροδῆκται· οὓς δεῖ ὑμᾶς φυλάσσεσθαι ὄντας δυσθεραπεύτους. εἷς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικός τε καὶ πνευματικός, γενητὸς καὶ ἀγένητος, ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος Θεός, ἐν θανάτῳ ζωὴ ἀληθινή, καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ, πρῶτον παθητὸς καὶ τοτε ἀπαθής.—μὴ οὖν τις ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατάτω, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐξαπατᾶσθε, ὅλοι ὄντες Θεοῦ. *Ignat. ad Ephes.* 7, 8.

the heresies of that time, which any way tended to undermine the doctrine of *God incarnate*, whether by impugning Christ's *humanity* or *Divinity*: and as the Ebionites and Cerinthians were among those that impugned our Lord's *Divinity*, the censure here given must of course affect them. Some of the expressions seem to be particularly pointed at them. *Made and not made*: the words *not made* directly confront both those heresies[g]. So also the words *God incarnate*, God coming in the flesh. Then again, *of Mary and of God*: those heretics would have said, of Mary and of Joseph; none of them would then have said, *of God*. Let the reader observe, that Ignatius here plainly excludes all such heretics from salvation, since they had rejected the only *Physician* that could *heal* them, Christ *God-man*, by denying the union of *God* and *man* in him[h]. The principles which this truly primitive and apostolical writer goes upon are, 1. That the *salutary* doctrine of redemption is, that the reconciliation of God and man is wrought by a Mediator who is both *God* and *man*. 2. That denying and opposing that doctrine is, in effect, renouncing all claim to the benefit of it, since it is reasonable to think, that when God reveals his good and gracious designs towards mankind, they who will not give credit to them shall have no part in them. St. John himself seems to go upon the same general principle, where he says, "Whoso-"ever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father[i]." He that throws up the *belief* of the privileges granted, does interpretatively throw up the *privileges* themselves: this is a maxim which appears to run through the writings of all the Fathers, where they are treating of *heresies*; and we shall find more of it as we pass along.

In the same Epistle, the same heavenly man, after expressing his detestation of heresies in very strong words, which I have quoted above[k], proceeds to set down the faith of the Church with respect to the *Incarnation* of the Son of God, in these remarkable lines: "For Jesus Christ, *our God*, was conceived of

[g] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 572. Bull. Def. F. N. sect. ii. c. 2. p. 39. Judic. Eccl. cap. i. n. 1. p. 286.

[h] Nulla est hominibus salus, nisi per *unicum* animarum *medicum*, Christum *Deum* et *hominem*, Deum inter hominesque *Mediatorem*. At isti hujusmodi medicum et Mediatorem nullum agnoscunt, nullum volunt: itaque plane deplorata est ipsorum salus, nisi scilicet ab hæresi sua tandem ferio resipiscant, ac Deum Filium pro sua salute incarnatum atque hominem factum amplectantur, atque omni obsequio venerentur. *Bull. Judic. Eccles.* p. 286.

[i] 1 John ii. 23.

[k] See above, p. 556.

" Mary, according to the divine dispensation, being of the seed " of David, and of the *Holy Spirit*[l]." Against the impugners of this doctrine, the good man, in the same place, threatens hell and damnation[m]: so little was he acquainted with that *neutrality* and *indifference* which has since too much prevailed. Yet he was a person of admirable *lenity* in his temper, and of a most exalted *charity;* which he proved by that very instance, since nothing could have extorted those expressions from him but a most ardent zeal for the salvation of souls[n].

A. D. 155. Justin, the *philosopher*, afterwards *martyr*, is our next considerable writer. His real and great concern for the doctrine of our Lord's *Divinity* appears all the way through his famous Dialogue with Trypho the Jew; being the relation of a conference he had held at Ephesus with that most celebrated Rabbi[o]. He makes no express mention of the Ebionites, and so does not condemn them by *name;* but he does it more than once, by necessary inference and implication. I forbear to cite the places, choosing rather, for brevity sake, to refer the reader to Bishop Bull, who has produced them at length, and descanted properly upon them[p].

But there is one passage in Justin which requires a more particular consideration, because the Socinians and Remonstrants have frequently boasted of it, and do so to this day, as proving, in their opinion, that those who disowned Christ's proper *Divinity*, or even *preexistence*, were tolerated in the primitive Church, were received as brethren and fellow Christians. This pretence has been largely and solidly confuted by Bishop Bull; and as there is scarce room for adding any thing, (the question being

[l] Ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς ἡμῶν, Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστὸς, ἐκυοφορήθη ὑπὸ Μαρίας, κατ' οἰκονομίαν Θεοῦ, ἐκ σπέρματος μὲν Δαβὶδ, πνεύματος δὲ ἁγίου. *Ignat. ad Ephes.* c. 18.

[m] Ὁ τοιοῦτος, ῥυπαρὸς γενόμενος, εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ ἄσβεστον χωρήσει, ὁμοίως καὶ ἀκούων αὐτοῦ. cap. 16.

[n] In seductores, et seductos istos intonat, et ignem ipsis inextinguibilem minatur vir alioqui mitissimus, quod primam religionis Christianæ veritatem, cujus præcipue στύλος καὶ ἑδραίωμα esse debet, monente Apostolo, omnis vera Christi Ecclesia——nempe *magnum illud pietatis mysterium, Deum in carne manifestatum* fuisse convellere niterentur. Qui istam impietatem moliti sunt, duo fuere, Ignatii ætate, hæreticorum genera, sibi invicem non minus quam veritati repugnantium. Alii divinam quandam servatori nostro naturam attribuentes, *humanam* prorsus ipsi detraxerunt——qua in hæresi fuere Simoniani, Menandriani, Saturniniani, aliique, quos propterea omnes Δοκητὰς et Φαντασιαστὰς posterior ætas appellavit: alii contra, humanam tantum in Domino Jesu naturam agnoscebant, ut Cerinthiani, et Ebionæi. Utra hæresis perniciosior fuerit, haud facile dictu. *Bull. Judic.* c. i. p. 287.

[o] Euseb. E. H. lib. iv. c. 18.

[p] Bull. Judic. Eccles. cap. vii. s. 11, 12. p. 349, &c.

in a manner exhausted,) so neither is there much need of any reinforcement. But it may be of some use to recapitulate what that learned Prelate has said, as also to take some brief notice of what the adversaries have since attempted, in order to depreciate and disparage it, instead of making any just reply to it. I shall first cite the whole passage of Justin, and then give a summary account of Bishop Bull's reasonings upon it, that the reader may then judge for himself as to the force of them. Trypho the Jew, in the Dialogue, having a little before told Justin, that his doctrine concerning Christ (that he was *God before the world*, and afterwards became *man*, and of a *virgin*) appeared to him a very great paradox, and contrary to common sense, Justin replies as follows[q]: "I am very sensible that this "account will look like a paradox, and more especially to those "of your nation, who are in no disposition either to apprehend "or follow the things of God, but the dictates only of your own "Rabbins, as God himself proclaims[r]. Nevertheless (said I to "Trypho) my argument does not fall, as to his being the *Messiah* "of God, though I should not be able to prove that the Son of "the Maker of the universe *preexisted*, being *God*, and was born "a man of the *Virgin*: but after it has been once fully proved "that he is the *Messiah* of God, (whatever else he be,) though "I should not further demonstrate his *preexistence*, and his con-"descending to become man of like passions with us, taking "flesh upon him according to the Father's good pleasure, all "that you can justly say is, that I am so far in an error; but "you should not hereupon deny that he is the *Christ*, appearing "as a man born of human parents, and approving himself as the

[q] Οἶδ' ὅτι παράδοξος ὁ λόγος δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ὑμῶν, οἵτινες τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὔτε νοῆσαι οὔτε ποιῆσαι ποτὲ βεβούλησθε, ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ὑμῶν, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς βοᾷ. ἤδη μέντοι, ὦ Τρύφων, εἶπον, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται τὸ τοιοῦτον [τοῦτον] εἶναι Χριστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐὰν ἀποδεῖξαι μὴ δύνωμαι ὅτι καὶ προϋπῆρχεν υἱὸς τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῶν ὅλων, Θεὸς ὤν, καὶ γεγέννηται ἄνθρωπος διὰ τῆς παρθένου. ἀλλὰ ἐκ παντὸς ἀποδεικνυμένου ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅστις οὗτος ἔσται· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀποδεικνύω ὅτι προϋπῆρχε, καὶ γεννηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος ὁμοιοπαθὴς ἡμῖν, σάρκα ἔχων, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς βουλὴν ὑπέμεινεν, ἐν τούτῳ πεπλανῆσθαί με μόνον λέγειν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀρνεῖσθαι ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς, ἐὰν φαίνηται ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γεννηθεὶς, καὶ ἐκλογῇ γενόμενος εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι ἀποδεικνύηται. καὶ γάρ εἰσί τινες, ὦ φίλοι, ἔλεγον, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου [ὑμετέρου] γένους ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτὸν Χριστὸν εἶναι, ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενόμενον ἀποφαινομένοι· οἷς οὐ συντίθεμαι, οὐδ' ἂν πλεῖστοι ταῦτά μοι δοξάσαντες εἶποιεν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀνθρωπείοις διδάγμασι κεκελεύσμεθα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς διὰ τῶν μακαρίων προφητῶν κηρυχθεῖσι, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ διδαχθεῖσι. *Just. Dial.* p. 140. Jebb. 234. Thirlby.

[r] Isa. xxix. 13.

" chosen *Messiah*. For, said I, my good friends, some there " are of our profession (*of your nation*[s]) who, acknowledging him " to be the *Messiah*, yet conceive of him as of a man born of hu- " man parents: whom however I assent not to, no, not though " there were ever so many concurring to tell me so [t]; since we " are commanded by Christ himself not to submit to the doc- " trines of men, but to what the holy Prophets have delivered, " and himself hath taught us."

This is the famous passage, from whence (as I have said) the Socinians and Remonstrants have endeavoured to draw an argument for *neutrality* or *indifference* concerning the article of Christ's *Divinity*; imagining that the impugners of that doctrine were received by Justin and the Church in his time as brethren and fellow Christians. But there is nothing in this paragraph of Justin to support such fancies. Let it be observed in the first place, that the persons whom Justin here speaks of, as believing in *Jesus* as the *Messiah*, but denying his birth of a *virgin*, and his *preexistence*, were most certainly the Ebionites of his time. Their hypothesis, and theirs only, exactly answers the description here given; as Bishop Bull has demonstrated at large [u]. This premised, we may now proceed to lay down the *arguments* urged by Bishop Bull against the construction offered by the Remonstrants, and next subjoin a summary of the *solutions* he has given in answer to their objections.

1. As the passage itself in Justin is very far from declaring in express terms, or by any *certain* consequence, what some collect from it, so it is very unlikely that Justin should be *singular* in his sentiments on that head, directly thwarting the sentiments of Ignatius before him, of Irenæus and Tertullian of the same century with him, and, in short, of all the ancients besides

[s] Ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑμετέρου γένους is undoubtedly the true reading; warranted by the *propriety* of the expression, and Justin's usual *phraseology*, and the whole turn and *texture* of the sentence. See Bull. Judic. Eccl. cap. vii. sect. 6. p. 346. Thirlby in locum.

Nevertheless, one might perhaps, in prudence, wave this just criticism, since nothing depends upon it, as to the main cause, (except it be to make Justin write sense so far,) but the insisting upon it gives the adversaries a handle for dropping the *material* things, and making some show of an opposition upon this bye point, as if all depended upon it.

[t] I prefer the rendering here given before the common one, taking the hint from the ingenious Mr. Thirlby in his notes upon the passage. The common rendering is; *neither would it be admitted by the generality* [of Christians,] *who are in my sentiments*: the sense is flat.

[u] Bull. Judic. Eccles. cap. vii. sect. 8. p. 347.

him, who have constantly condemned those Ebionite principles as pernicious and heretical[x].

2. The argument drawn from this passage by our adversaries, if it proves any thing at all, proves *too much*; which is a certain sign that it is faulty: for it proves that even those who denied our Lord's birth of a *virgin* (a truth attested to by the *Prophets* and *Evangelists*, and most religiously held by the ancient *Church*) were received as *fellow Christians*; which is highly absurd[y].

3. It is very observable, that the Ebionites rejected three of the Gospels, receiving only St. Matthew's, (or what they called so,) and that curtailed. They rejected likewise all St. Paul's writings, reproaching him as an apostate[z]. How unlikely is it that Justin should own such reprobates as those were for fellow Christians! Episcopius was himself sensible of this difficulty, and could not but acknowledge it plainly absurd, that Justin, and the Church of his time, should hold any communion with such an ungodly race of men as the Ebionites were[a]. What salvo therefore had he for it? None, but the denying that Justin was there speaking of the Ebionites; though it is a plain case that he was: therefore Episcopius was here caught in his own snare, as Bishop Bull justly observes, retorting his own concessions upon him with irresistible force[b].

4. Add to this, that the Liturgies then used in the Church were so full and express for the *Divinity* of Christ, that there is no likelihood that the Ebionites should join in them; neither could they do it without solemn mockery. See this argument drawn out at large in Bishop Bull[c].

5. If the Church would have communicated with the Ebionites,

[x] See Bull. Judic. cap. vii. sect. 5. p. 345.

[y] Qui enim hic a Justino notantur dogmatistæ, Servatorem nostrum, non modo *hominem* tantum, sed *hominem ex hominibus* genitum, hoc est, ex viri et fœminæ concubitu, communi hominum more, natum esse affirmarunt. Hinc igitur, si recte ex hoc loco Remonstrantes argumentantur, sequetur, Justinum ecclesiamque Justini tempore, cum iis qui susque deque habita sacrorum *Evangelistarum* autoritate, spretaque Apostolicæ et Catholicæ Ecclesiæ constanti concordique traditione Christum hominem ex Maria Virgine natum esse negare ausi sunt, communionem coluisse: quod quisquis serio sibi persuaserit, ad Anticyras plane relegandus est. *Bull. ibid.* sect. iii. p. 343.

[z] Ebionæi——solo eo quod est secundum Matthæum Evangelio utuntur, et Apostolum Paulum recusant, apostatam eum legis dicentes. *Iren.* lib. i. c. 26. Conf. Epiphan. Hær. xxx. 13. Euseb. E. H. lib. iii. c. 27. Origen. contra Cels. lib. v. p. 274. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. cap. 1.

[a] Vid. Respons. ad Specim. Calumn. p. 296.

[b] Vid. Bull. Append. ad cap. vii. sect. 9. p. 357.

[c] Bull. ibid. p. 353.

the Ebionites would not with them; and therefore Justin could never have intended to call them *brethren*. See this also explained at large in Bishop Bull[d]. These are the reasons which that incomparable Prelate has urged against the Socinian or Episcopian construction of the passage in Justin. But as it is not always sufficient to demonstrate a *truth*, and leave it to shift for itself, without *reconciling* it, and *clearing* it from *objections*; we may next go on to specify the solutions given to the difficulties pleaded on the other side.

1. It is pleaded, that, according to Justin, a person might reasonably be supposed the *Messiah*, though no more than a *man*. But to this it is answered, that Justin no where asserts that such a thing could be supposed consistently with *Scripture* or *good sense*. No; his constant doctrine is, and which he every where labours and contends for, that the *Messiah* is and must be God[e]. But since the Jews, with whom he was disputing, had taken up low notions of their expected *Messiah*, Justin urged it against Trypho, as an argument to *him*, and such as upon his principles he could not gainsay, that he might receive *Jesus* (as his Ebionite countrymen had done) for the *Messiah*, though he disowned his *Godhead*. So there was no necessity for his continuing in *Judaism*, though he would not admit the *Divinity* of Jesus.

2. It is pleaded, that those impugners of Christ's *Divinity* are styled *men of our profession*, that is, Christians; and therefore he admitted them as fellow Christians. To say nothing here of the *truer* reading, (*men of your nation*,) there is no consequence in the argument. The Ebionites were Christians in a large sense, men of Christian *profession*, nominal Christians; as Justin allowed the worst of heretics to be[f]: and this is all he could mean by allowing the Ebionites to be Christians[g].

3. It is pleaded, that Justin signified his dissent from them very faintly and coldly, (*whom I assent not to*,) expressing no detestation or abhorrence of the men, or of their principles. To which it may be answered, 1. That he expresses himself as strongly here as he does in another cause of great moment,

[d] Bull. ibid. p. 349. Conf. p. 346.
[e] See this explained at large in Bull, c. vii. p. 344, 345.
[f] Vid. Dialog. p. 100, 244, 245. Jebb. alias 208, 311, 312. Apolog. i. p. 43. edit. Thirlby.
[g] Vid. Bull. Judic. cap. vii. sect. 6. p. 346.

against those who denied that the world was created[h]. 2. As Justin here expressed no abhorrence, so neither did he express any *approbation* of them; as his way was when he *dissented* from [i]persons of the Church, with whom he held communion: so we may fairly set one *negative* argument against another. 3. There might be special reasons why, in that particular case, he did not launch out into satire and invective against the Ebionites. He was endeavouring to persuade Trypho to come so far at least as the Ebionites had done, rather than continue an hardened and desperate Jew: it would have been highly improper, in the conducting an argument of that kind[k], to have fallen severely upon the Ebionites, whose tenets he was making so good use of[l]. 4. Yet even in that very passage he gave oblique intimations of his heartily disapproving the Ebionite principles. He rebukes Trypho and his associates with some tartness, as shutting their eyes against the *truth*, and being slow to perceive the *things of God*, for their not admitting the *Divinity* of Jesus Christ, so fully proved from the Old Testament: what then could he think of the Ebionites, who had both Old Testament and New before them, and yet rejected their Lord's Divinity[m]? Then again, in the close of the same passage, Justin plainly enough intimates, that those who denied Christ's *Divinity* or birth of a *virgin* rejected the doctrine of the *Church*, and of the *Prophets*, and of *Christ* himself, to follow *human* inventions, or doctrines of men[n]. So if Justin did not condemn the Ebionites with hard words, he did it with hard arguments, which were altogether as forcible, and served his purpose better. Upon the whole therefore, nothing can be inferred from this passage of Justin, to countenance the receiving of the Ebionites, or their successors, to Christian communion: the contrary is evident as the light. And indeed it would be hard to say for what purpose Justin wrote that very Dialogue, (the main substance whereof is taken up in proving the *Divinity* of Christ,) if after all he thought it

[h] Ἢ καὶ τὸν κόσμον σὺ ἀγένητον λέγεις; εἰσὶν οἱ λέγοντες, οὐ μέντοι γε αὐτοῖς συγκατατίθεμαι ἐγώ. *Just. Dial.* p. 20. alias 148.

[i] Vid. Justin. Dial. p. 243. alias 311.

[k] See Thirlby upon the passage, p. 243.

[l] See a like argument urged by Novatian from the doctrine of the Docetæ; which he heartily detested, but yet contented himself, in that instance, while making use of it, with saying, *Quod tamen nos non probamus*, (c. 23.) which was sufficient: more would have been there and then improper.

[m] Compare Bull, cap. vii. sect. 4. p. 344.

[n] Ibid. p. 347.

an article of slight moment, and such as was not of weight sufficient to be made a term of Christian communion. But enough of this.

Bishop Bull's answer to Episcopius has met with the esteem of the learned world[o], and nothing like a just reply has been attempted since: only Le Clerc, above twenty years after, writing an Ecclesiastical History[p], was pleased, in passing, to make some brief strictures upon it, and to bring up again some of the former pretences, which had long been exploded. He deals more in hints and insinuations than in arguments, or direct assertions, like one who had an inclination to put some fallacy upon his readers, but at the same time to provide for a retreat. He hints, [q]that the persons whom Justin there speaks of might be Nazaræans. He was very sensible where the difficulty pressed, if they were supposed to be Ebionites; as Bishop Bull had fully proved them to have been. But whether they are to be called Ebionites or Nazaræans, they were undoubtedly men that denied Christ's *Divinity* and his birth of a *virgin*, (as before shewn,) and were therefore *heretics* in ecclesiastical account. As to Nazaræans, about whom so much has been boasted of late[r], it will be soon enough to consider how far Justin had a view to them, when it can be proved, that their principles, with respect to Christ, were the same with those which Justin there condemns: a hard thing to make out[s].

Le Clerc would appear to doubt whether the persons pointed to in Justin really denied Christ's *divine nature* or no. It is as plain as possible that they did. But however, if they did not, then there is an end of all the Remonstrant pretences at once: and there is not so much as colour left for saying, that Justin held communion with the impugners of Christ's *Divinity*.

He goes on to observe how mildly and softly Justin treated them[t], above common *heretics*, whom he allowed not to be

[o] See Nelson's Life of Bull, p. 383, &c.

[p] Published A. D. 1716.

[q] Non constare an ii, seu Nazaræi, seu quicunque alii fuerint, negarent, Præter *hominem ex hominibus natum*, quidquam in *Jesu* fuisse; hoc est, divinam ejus naturam rejicerent, neque enim perspicue hic loquitur Justinus. *Cleric. Eccles. Histor.* p. 635.

[r] By Zuicker, Sandius, Toland, Artemonius, and others.

[s] Vid. Mosheim, Vindic. Antiq. Discipl. advers. Toland. cap. 5, 6. Buddæus, Eccles. Apostol. p. 545—550. Mosheim, Histor. Eccles. Sæc. i. part. 2. sect. i. c. 4. p. 99. Conf. Buddæus, Eccles. Apostol. p. 547. Bull. Judic. Eccl. cap. ii. sect. 13—16. Primit. Trad. cap. i. sect. 6—10. Huetius in not. ad Origen. Comment. p. 74. Le Quien, Dissert. Damascen. vii. p. 94, &c.

[t] Eum minime in eos invectum, ut

Christians. This is the old Episcopian plea[u], which had been abundantly answered by Bishop Bull, as Le Clerc well knew; though he took no notice. Neither does it appear that Justin believed the Ebionites (of whom he speaks) to have been Christians in any other sense than as other *heretics* were, that is, *nominal* Christians, as I have observed above.

He proceeds to say, that it cannot be determined, for want of ancient evidences, how far those Nazaræans (for so he chooses to call them) were *tolerated*[x]. Directly false, or sophistical. Indeed, as to Nazaræans, since it is disputable who or what they were, or how far orthodox[y], (accounts being different, and sometimes repugnant,) it may be disputable how they were received by other Christians: but as to such persons as Justin speaks of, (whatever name we assign them,) men that denied Christ's *Divinity* and *miraculous* conception, it is a very clear case, and fully attested by many and undoubted evidences, that they never were *received* by the Church of Christ, but constantly rejected as *antichrists* and *heretics*. And this is all that we need contend for: the rest is only playing with words and names, and is mere amusement, wide of the point in hand.

He goes on to infer, that since Justin was so *moderate* in that case, there is no reason now for condemning the Socinians or others that impugn Christ's *Divinity:* that is plainly his drift and meaning, only a little covertly expressed[z]. So, though he had neither answered nor considered the reasons offered by Bishop Bull against any such inference from Justin's words, nor

in Basilidianos, Saturnilianos, Valentinianos, et Marcionitas, quos Christianos fuisse negat. *Ibid.* p. 635.

[u] Respons. ad Specim. Calumn. p. 296.

[x] Sed quatenus eos ferrent alii Christiani, aut qui ipsi se erga alios gererent, ob veterum monumentorum penuriam, nobis non constat. p. 636.

[y] Though I say *disputable*, because very learned men have been much divided about the Nazaræans, yet I make no question myself, but the Nazaræans were the remains of the first Christians of Jerusalem, were entirely orthodox in the article of Christ's *Divinity*, and directly opposite to the Ebionites. So far, at least, Bishop Bull and Le Quien have, in my judgment, clearly and satisfactorily proved. So that to obtrude the Nazaræans upon us here, instead of Ebionites, is only raising a mist, to confound weak readers.

[z] Interim cum Justinus de ejusmodi hominibus, non exiguo errore laborantibus, tanta verborum *moderatione* loquatur, invidia non est iis facienda, qui *Jesum* non tantum *Messiam*, sed etiam a Spiritu Sancto, præter naturæ ordinem, conceptum credentes, totumque Novum Testamentum admittentes, et ad ejus normam mores componentes, æternis suppliciis addicere non audent; eo tantum quod in arduo capite, de *divina* Christi natura, a ceteris dissentiant, quia eam in Novi Testamenti libris doceri non putant. *Clerici Eccles. Hist.* p. 636.

the *solutions* given to the *objections* before made, nor indeed had advanced any thing beyond mere surmises and shuffles; yet he draws the same *conclusion* which the Remonstrants had before done, as if he had proved his point to satisfaction.

But lest he should seem entirely to have passed over Bishop Bull's performance, he singles out a bye-point[a] (not material in respect of the main thing) to contest with him. It is the emendation of a word which Bishop Bull had offered, and justified, like a judicious writer and a true critic, to make his author speak sense, rather than to support the main cause, which did not need it: I say, Le Clerc singles out that to dispute upon, and that is all. And even there he is entirely wrong, as has been abundantly shewn by a learned hand[b]; for which reason I shall say no more of it. But allowing those gentlemen their absurd *reading*, the cause stands just where it did; and they are as far off as ever from being able to prove from that passage in Justin Martyr, that the Socinians should be received as *fellow Christians*.

I had almost forgot to take notice of two insinuations dropped by Le Clerc in their favour, viz. that they receive the *whole Canon*, (which the Ebionites did not,) and they lead good *moral lives*. As to the first, it is only maintaining their *heresy* with greater *art* and more exquisite *subtilty*, and in a way which may do the more *mischief*, because the *poison* is concealed: the ancient heretics were *plainer* men. Besides, any one who has seen the Five Letters of Inspiration, and knows also what freedom that author has taken with the *sacred writers*, in his comments and elsewhere, will conceive no high opinion of his veneration for the *Scriptures*: it is keeping them indeed, for the saving of appearances, but in order to *expose* them the more insidiously.

As to a good *moral life*, that is, a *partial obedience*, it avails nothing, while maintaining of heresies is itself *immoral practice*, both against God and man: besides that the natural consequence of *Socinianism* is *Deism*; which leads to all *immorality*. And this distant, and almost insensible way of introducing *Deism* is the most dangerous of any: for thousands perhaps may be thus led by slow and almost imperceptible degrees into it, who could not have been brought to it by the shorter, coarser methods. But I pass on.

[a] Clerici Eccles. Histor. p. 636. [b] Thirlby, in Notis ad Just. Mart. p. 234.

There is another gentleman, who, after Le Clerc, has appeared on the same side. He calls himself Artemonius in his last piece[c], as in another, long before, Lucas Mellierus, and is known to be Samuel Crellius, descended from the famous John Crellius. He hath here acted a more ungenerous part than Le Clerc himself had done. He pretends, *first*, that Le Clerc (who had scarce touched the main things, as I have shewn) had *confuted* Bishop Bull; and next insinuates, that the Bishop had laid *violent* hands upon the text of Justin, only to serve his hypothesis: which is untrue in both its parts. For the Bishop's correction is undoubtedly right: or if it were not, yet nothing depends upon it, the main cause being perfectly secure without it. In the last place, he takes notice of Mr. Thirlby's Reply to Le Clerc, and contents himself with a kind of faint promise to make some rejoinder[d]. I shall only remark, that when a person so well disposed for any *impracticable* undertaking (as appears by his strange attempt[e] upon John i. 1.) declines venturing, and *promises* only, and that faintly too, where he has a strong inclination, it is a certain sign that he apprehends more difficulty than ordinary; and that while he *verbally* triumphed over Bishop Bull, he was wiser than to engage in close dispute.

The reader, I hope, will pardon me for dwelling so long upon this passage in Justin. I thought it worth the considering with some care: and I have endeavoured to be as short as the nature of the question would permit me to be. I am sensible, after all, that I have not taken compass enough to do full justice to it; and therefore I entreat the reader, who would have entire satisfaction about it, to consult Bishop Bull himself, in whom he will find it.

[c] Initium Evangelii S. Joannis restitutum per L. M. Artemonium, A. D. 1726.

[d] Post Apostolorum tempora, pro Christianis in Ecclesia tolerandis [Ebionæi] habebantur; ut ex illo celebri apud Justinum Martyrem, in Dial. cum Tryphone, loco p. 267. est manifestum. Quem Georg. Bullus magno conatu frustra convellere nititur, et *violentam* ei infert manum, vocem ἡμετέρου, quia suæ hypothesi est contraria, in ὑμετέρου mutans, confutatus etiam a celeberr. Clerico Hist. Eccl. ad Ann. cxl. Cui quidem vir clariss. Styanus Thirlby pro Bullo respondit: Verum sint quæ Thirlbyo reponi, et præterea plura in hanc rem afferri possent: quod fortasse aliquando fiet, &c. *Artemonius*, p. 516.

[e] It is an attempt to make an emendation (Θεοῦ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, instead of Θεὸς ἦν ὁ Λόγος) against all the *manuscripts* of the New Testament, against all the *versions*, against all the *quotations* from antiquity, in a very *critical* passage, (where, if any where, some remains of such a reading would have been preserved among Ebionites, Samosatenians, Arians, or others, had it ever been known,) by mere dint of *wit*, and force of *fancy*, without any foundation of *reason* or *authority*.

A. D. 176. About this time[f], very probably, the famous Irenæus wrote his treatise against *heresies:* and he is the first that condemns the Ebionites by name; and that not merely for being *immoral* men, nor merely for rejecting a great part of the *sacred Canon*, neither yet for denying Christ's birth of a *virgin*, but for impugning Christ's *Divinity*. He excludes them from Church-Communion, and from a state of grace and salvation, chiefly, or solely, upon that score. He writes thus: "The "spiritual man will pass judgment also upon the Ebionites. "How can they be saved, unless it was God (ὁ Θεὸς) that "wrought their salvation on earth? or how shall man come to "God, if God had not come to man[g]?" Irenæus here lays the charge upon the fundamental error of the Ebionites, their rejecting Christ's *Divinity;* an error which they had imbibed from their countrymen the Jews, and brought with them into Christianity. And this was the principal ground and reason of their rejecting some of the Gospels, particularly St. John's: for they had not yet learned the art of reconciling the doctrine of the New Testament with their principles. Irenæus excludes the men from *salvation* for their *disbelief*, abstracting from the consideration of *invincible* ignorance or *sincerity;* which would be impertinently brought in with respect to *this* or *that* particular case, since it is *common* to all, and makes no difference as to the abstract nature of things, or our judgment thereupon: for we are to judge by what we know, leaving things *secret* to God. The Ebionites are here censured as rejecting *salvation*, because they rejected the *belief* of the *divine* methods appointed for it; agreeable to a maxim before laid down by Ignatius, and before him by St. John, as I have observed above[h].

Before I proceed further with Irenæus, I would here take notice by the way, how considerable a person he was. He is said to have been near the *Apostles'* times[i]; for indeed he was born in or near that age[k], and was advanced in[l] years when he

[f] Vid. Oudin. de Scriptor. Eccles. vol. i. p. 207. Dodwell. Dissert. iv. 360. Fabric. Bibl. Gr. lib. v. c. 1. p. 66.

[g] Ἀνακρινεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἡβιώνους· πῶς δύνανται σωθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐργασάμενος: ἢ πῶς ἄνθρωπος χωρήσει εἰς Θεὸν, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐχωρήθη εἰς ἄνθρωπον; *Iren.* lib. iv. c. 33, alias 53.

[h] See above, p. 557.

[i] Ὁ ἐγγὺς τῶν Ἀποστόλων γενόμενος. *Basil. de Sp. S.* c. 29. Ὁ τῶν Ἀποστόλων διάδοχος. *Theodorit. Hæret. Fab.* lib. ii. cap. 2. *Epiphan. Hær. H.* xxiv. 8. Vir Apostolicorum temporum. *Hieron. Epist.* liii. *ad Theodorum*, p. 581.

[k] See Dodwell. Dissert. in Iren. Diss. iii. p. 229.

[l] Dodwell. Dissert. iv. p. 291. Oudin. vol. i. p. 207.

wrote his book against heresies. The *charismata*, the *miraculous* gifts, were common in his days, and he himself a witness of them in many instances. The gifts of *healing* (as restoring *sight* to the *blind*, and *hearing* to the *deaf*, and *limbs* to the *cripple*, yea, and *life* to the *dead*) continued in the Church to his time; besides the gift of *tongues*, and of *prophecy*, and of casting out *devils*, and the like[m]. He speaks twice of raising the *dead*, and in one place very emphatically thus: "And now, as I before said, the "*dead* have *risen*, and have continued with us many years[n]:" those very gifts are what Irenæus more than once appeals to, as proofs of the true faith resting in the Church, in opposition to *heretics* who had not the extraordinary graces, but were detected in their imposture whenever they pretended to them[o]. He lays it down as a rule and a maxim, that *truth* then went along with the *Church*, because the *Spirit* of truth rested upon it[p]; which is the argument St. Paul himself uses to the like purpose[q]: and it was a very good one at that time, and as circumstances then stood[r]. But I return.

Irenæus, in another place, smartly reproves the Ebionites for denying Christ's *Divinity*, and his birth of a *virgin*[s]. "*God* " therefore became man, and the *Lord* himself saved us, giving " the sign of the *Virgin:* and not as some now say, who presume " to interpret the Scripture, *Behold a young woman shall be with* " *child, and shall bear a son;* as Theodotion the Ephesian, and " Aquila of Pontus, both of them Jewish proselytes, interpret. " Whom the Ebionites following, pretend he was begotten of

[m] Vid. Iren. lib. ii. c. 31. p. 164. alias c. 56. p. 188. lib. ii. c. 32, alias 57. lib. v. c. 6.

[n] Ἤδη δὲ, καθὼς ἔφαμεν, καὶ νεκροὶ ἠγέρθησαν, καὶ παρέμειναν σὺν ἡμῖν ἱκανοῖς ἔτεσι. lib. ii. cap. 32. p. 166. Conf. Dodwell. Dissert. ii. p. 165, &c.

[o] Iren. lib. ii. cap. 31, 32.

[p] Ubi enim Ecclesia, ibi et *Spiritus Dei*, et ubi *Spiritus Dei* illic Ecclesia, et omnis gratia: Spiritus autem veritas. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 24, alias 40.

[q] Gal. iii. 2.

[r] Nihil ergo prorsus video quod in hoc Irenæi nostri testimonio desiderare possint adversarii. Ut enim Ecclesiis *omnibus* sic *solis* datas fuisse *gratias* testatur Irenæus, nullis nimirum *hæreticorum* aliorumve quorumcunque infidelium conventiculis. Inde sequitur, ut *falsam* fuisse hæreticorum fidem, sic contra Ecclesiæ *orthodoxam*, divino constitisse testimonio. Quæ utinam cogitarent Sociniani, aliique hodierni omnes a primævorum Christianorum doctrina in fide novatores. *Dodwell. Diss.* ii. p. 168.

[s] Ὁ Θεὸς οὖν ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο. καὶ αὐτὸς Κύριος ἔσωσεν ἡμᾶς, δοὺς τὸ τῆς παρθένου σημεῖον. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἔνιοι φασὶ τῶν νῦν μεθερμηνεύειν τολμώντων τὴν γραφήν· ἰδοὺ ἡ νεᾶνις ἐν γαστρὶ ἕξει, καὶ τέξεται υἱὸν, ὡς Θεοδοτίων ἡρμήνευσεν ὁ Ἐφέσιος, καὶ Ἀκύλας ὁ Ποντικὸς, ἀμφότεροι Ἰουδαῖοι προσήλυτοι. οἷς κατακολουθήσαντες οἱ Ἐβιωναῖοι, ἐκ τοῦ Ἰωσὴφ αὐτὸν γεγενῆσθαι φάσκουσι, tantam dispositionem Dei dissolventes, quantum ad ipsos est, frustrantes prophetarum testimonium quod operatus est Deus. *Iren.* lib. iii. cap. 21, alias 24.

" Joseph, thereby dissolving, so far as in them lies, that so im-
" portant dispensation of God, and frustrating the prediction of
" the Prophets which God has brought about." Here it is observable how strong the expression is, *God* (ὁ Θεὸς) *became man*, and the *Lord* himself saved us. So far in opposition to the Ebionites, with respect to their denial of Christ's *Divinity*: the rest relates to their denial of his *miraculous* conception. Could any one judge from his smart reproof of them in the close, that those men were received as *Christian brethren* in that age? Absurd and incredible.

I would only take notice further, that some over censorious critics have suspected that Irenæus was here out in his chronology, and inconsistent with himself, in making the Ebionites to be *followers* of Aquila and Theodotion. But Irenæus is to be understood of the Ebionites of his own time only[t]. The sect had subsisted long before, but now received fresh countenance and encouragement from the versions of Aquila and Theodotion, which they greedily closed in with, as favouring their *heresy*.

There is a third passage in Irenæus, where he again falls upon the Ebionites, for their opposing Christ's *Divinity*, and birth of a *virgin*[u]. " Vain also are the Ebionites, in not receiving the
" *union of God and man*, by faith, into their souls, but persisting
" still in the old leaven of [common] generation: for they will
" not understand, that the *Holy Spirit* came upon Mary, and
" the *power of the Highest overshadowed her*, and therefore that
" which was born of her is *holy*, and is the *Son* of the *Highest*,
" of God the Father of all, who wrought his incarnation, and
" manifested a *new* generation; that as by the first generation

[t] Vid. Mosheim. Vindic. Antiq. cap. vii. p. 179, 180.

[u] Vani autem et Ebionæi, unitionem Dei et hominis, per fidem non recipientes in suam animam, sed in veteri generationis perseverantes fermento; neque intelligere volentes, quoniam *Spiritus Sanctus* advenit in Mariam, et *virtus Altissimi* obumbravit eam: quapropter et quod generatum est, *Sanctum* est, et *Filius Altissimi*, Dei Patris omnium, qui operatus est incarnationem ejus, et novam ostendit generationem; uti quemadmodum per priorem generationem mortem hæreditavimus, sic per generationem hanc hæreditaremus vitam. Reprobant itaque hi commixtionem *vini cœlestis*, et solam *aquam sæcularem* volunt esse, non recipientes *Deum* ad commixtionem suam; perseverantes autem in eo qui victus est, Adam, et projectus est de Paradiso: non contemplantes, quoniam quemadmodum ab initio plasmationis nostræ in Adam, ea quæ fuit a Deo adspiratio vitæ, unita plasmati, animavit hominem, et animal rationale ostendit; sic in fine, *Verbum Patris* et *Spiritus Dei* adunitus antiquæ substantiæ plasmationis Adæ, viventem et perfectum effecit hominem, capientem perfectum Patrem: ut quemadmodum in animali omnes mortui sumus, sic in spiritali omnes vivificemur. *Iren.* lib. v. cap. 1. p. 239, alias p. 394.

" we had inherited *death*, so by this other generation we might " inherit *life*. They then reject the mixture of *heavenly wine*, " content to be no more than *earthly water*, not taking *God* into " their mixture, but abiding only in Adam, who was vanquished " and expelled Paradise. They consider not, that, as at the " beginning of our formation in Adam, the breath of life from " God, united with the frame, enlivened the man, and rendered " him a rational creature; so at the end, the *Word* of the " Father and *Spirit* of *God*, united with the old substance of " Adam's formation, has made a living and perfect man compre- " hending the perfect Father; that as in the *natural* man we are " all dead, so in the *spiritual* man we may all be made alive."

Here we are to observe, that Irenæus judged the Ebionites to be in a dangerous or desperate state, on the account of their not admitting the *union of God and man* in the Person of Christ, on account of their not taking the *divine* nature in, to supply the imperfections of the human, the *Word* of the Father, the *Spirit* of God, to enliven and exalt the human nature, the old Adam. I may remark by the way, that Irenæus here seems to understand *Spirit of God*, and *Holy Spirit* before, of the second Person, of the *Logos* himself coming down upon the *Virgin*. So the earliest Fathers commonly do[x], interpreting Luke i. 35. to that sense: which I the rather note, because so their asserting Christ's birth of a *virgin*, and his preexisting as *Spirit of God*,

[x] Hoc ergo corpus, in quod inductus est Spiritus Sanctus, &c. *Herm.* lib. iii. Simil. v. cap. 6.

Ὃν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον πνεῦμα, ἐγένετο σάρξ. *Clem. Ep.* ii. cap. 9.

Τὸ πνεῦμα οὖν, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις, ἢ τὸν Λόγον. *Just. Mart. Apol.* i. p. 54, alias 75.

Προελθὼν δὲ ὁ Λόγος, δημιουργίας αἴτιος, ἔπειτα καὶ ἑαυτὸν γεννᾷ, ὅταν ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ γένηται. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* lib. v. p. 654.

Qua autem *Spiritus Dei* et *virtus Altissimi*, non potest infra angelos haberi. *Tertull. de Carn. Christi*, cap. xiv.

Ecce, inquiunt, ab angelo prædicatum est, *propterea quod nascetur Sanctum, vocabitur Filius Dei*: caro itaque nata est, caro utique erit Filius Dei. Immo, de *Spiritu Dei* dictum est. Certe enim de *Spiritu Sancto* Virgo concepit; et quod concepit, id peperit: id ergo nasci habebat quod erat conceptum et pariendum; id est *Spiritus*, cujus et vocabitur nomen *Emmanuel*, quod est interpretatum *nobiscum Deus*. Caro autem *Deus* non est, ut de illa dictum sit *quod nascetur Sanctum, vocabitur Filius Dei*, sed ille qui in ea natus est, *Deus*—— Quis Deus in eo natus? Sermo et Spiritus. *Tertull. contr. Prax.* cap. xxvii.

Verbum Dei incarnatum per *Spiritum* illum de quo angelus refert, *Spiritus veniet in te*, &c.——ut principalitas nominis istius, *Filius Dei*, in *Spiritu* sit Domini qui descendit et venit. *Novat.* cap. xx.

Hic in Virgine labitur, carne *Spiritus Sanctus* induitur. *Cyprian. de Idolor. Vanit.* sic cod. German. et 4. MSS. Pamel.

Descendens itaque de cœlo *Sanctus ille Spiritus*, sanctam Virginem, cujus utero se insinuaret, elegit. *Lactant.* lib. iv. cap. 12.

and *God*, amounted to the same thing. For the reason given by St. Luke, (or rather by the *angel* in St. Luke,) why Mary should conceive, though she knew not a man, is, that the *Holy Spirit should come upon her*, that the *power of the Highest* [δύναμις ὑψίστου] should *overshadow* her: so that, after this, to deny the birth of a *virgin* amounted, in construction, to the same with denying any such coming of an *Holy Spirit* upon Mary, any divine preexistence of Christ. And hence, I conceive, it is, that we so often find in the ancient Fathers those two doctrines so linked together, or so intermingled with each other, that they appear, in a manner, but as the same thing twice told, or the same doctrine diversely expressed. The Ebionites denied the descent of the *Logos* upon Mary: they rejected the *divine* part in Christ, admitting only the *human*. This is what Irenæus calls rejecting the *heavenly wine*, (alluding to their celebrating the Eucharist in *water* only, without *wine*[y],) not receiving *God* into their mixture, but contenting themselves with the earthly Adam, who was cast out of Paradise; intimating that the Ebionites should as certainly be excluded *heaven*. The thought which Irenæus goes upon may be illustrated from a passage in Hippolytus, which, speaking of *Christ*, runs thus: "As it was "prophesied beforehand, so he manifested himself of the *Virgin* "and *Holy Spirit;* made a *new man*, (a second Adam,) having "an *heavenly* nature of the Father, as he is the *Logos*, and "having an *earthly* one, as of the *old* Adam, incarnate of a "virgin. He came into the world, and manifested himself as "God[z]." But to return to Irenæus, it is very plain that he looked upon the reconciliation of God and man as depending entirely upon the Mediator's being *both* in one[a]: and in how strict a sense he understood Christ to be *God* is well known to as many as know any thing of Irenæus. But if the English reader desires further satisfaction on that head, he may have it abundantly from Mr. Alexander's Essay on Irenæus[b], a very judicious and faithful performance, a finished piece in its kind. I heartily wish that that learned gentleman had leisure,

[y] Epiphan. Hær. xxx. 16.

[z] Καθ' ὃν οὖν τρόπον ἐκηρύχθη, κατὰ τοῦτον καὶ παρὼν ἐφανέρωσεν ἑαυτὸν ἐκ παρθένου καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος, καινὸς ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος· τὸ μὲν οὐράνιον ἔχων τὸ πατρῷον ὡς Λόγος, τὸ δὲ ἐπίγειον, ὡς ἐκ παλαιοῦ Ἀδὰμ διὰ παρθένου σαρκούμενος. οὗτος προελθὼν εἰς κόσμον Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη. κ. τ. λ. *Hippolyt. contr. Noët.* cap. xvii. p. 18, 19. Conf. Tertull. de Carn. Christi, cap. xvii.

[a] Vid. Iren. lib. iii. cap. 18, alias 20.

[b] Printed for John Clarke and Richard Hett, A. D. 1727.

as he has abilities, to draw out more of the Fathers in the same way.

A. D. 206. Tertullian reckons the Ebionites among the *antichrists*, for denying *Jesus* to be *Son of God*[c], that is, for impugning the *Divinity* of Christ: for that Tertullian understood the phrase of *Son of God*, as applied to Christ, to mean the same as *God of God*[d], is plain from all his writings. And what he must think of the dangerous state the Ebionites were in, by their heresy in that article, may appear sufficiently from a maxim he lays down, that none have *life* who believe not in the *Son*, and none believe in the Son, who admit not that he is a *Son*[e] in such a sense as he had mentioned.

He again censures the Ebionites, as making Christ a *mere man*, and denying that he is the *Son of God*[f]. Where it is observable, he passes over in silence their denying his birth of a *virgin*, or condemns both their positions in one, as resolving into the same error. However, the stress of his censure lies upon their impugning Christ's *divine* Sonship, that is, his real and proper *Divinity:* for such was Tertullian's sense of *Son of God*, as I before intimated.

In another place, he speaks of the Ebionites as denying Christ's birth of a *virgin*, but makes that amount to denying his being *Son of God*[g], in his high sense of that phrase. And the reason why the denial of the one implied the denial of the other (in his way of arguing, common to other Fathers) seems

[c] At in Epistola eos maxime *antichristos* vocat qui Christum negarent in carne venisse, et qui non putarent Jesum esse *Filium Dei:* illud Marcion, hoc Hebion vindicavit. *Tertull. Præscript.* cod. xxxiii.

[d] Hunc ex Deo prolatum dicimus, et prolatione generatum, et idcirco *Filium Dei* et *Deum* dictum, ex unitate substantiæ.——Ita de Spiritu Spiritus, et *de Deo Deus*, ut lumen de lumine accensum.——Quod de Deo profectum est, *Deus* est, et *Dei Filius*, et unus ambo. Ita de Spiritu Spiritus, et *de Deo Deus*, &c. *Tertull. Apol.* cap. xxi.

[e] Qui *Filium* non habet, nec *vitam* habet: non habet autem Filium, qui eum alium quam *Filium* credit. *Cont. Prax.* cap. xxx.

[f] Qua autem *Spiritus* Dei, et *virtus Altissimi*, non potest infra angelos haberi, *Deus* scilicet et *Dei Filius*. Quanto ergo dum hominem gestat minor angelis factus est tanto non, dum angelum gestat. Poterit hæc opinio *Hebioni* convenire, qui *nudum hominem* et tantum ex semine David, id est non et *Dei Filium* constituit Jesum. *Tertullian. de Carn. Christi*, cap. xiv.

[g] Non competebat ex semine humano *Dei Filium* nasci, ne si totus esset Filius hominis, non esset et *Dei Filius*, nihilque haberet amplius Solomone, et amplius Jona, et de Hebionis opinione credendus erat. Ergo jam *Dei Filius* ex Patris Dei semine, id est Spiritu; vacabat enim viri semen apud habentem Dei semen. *Tertull. de Carn. Christi*, cap. xviii.

to have been this; that it would have been utterly *unworthy*[h] of the *Son of God* to have taken *man* upon him, except it were by a *virgin:* therefore the denial of the mother's *virginity* amounted to a denial of *God's* being born of her; it was making it *absurd.* From whence we see a further reason of what I before hinted, that the two false positions of the Ebionites were considered as near allied, and were condemned in one, as hanging both together, and perhaps one invented for the sake of the other[i]. The denying the *miraculous* conception was, by inference and implication, denying Christ's *Divinity,* as the affirming of the one was conceived to amount to affirming the other. But the later Ebionites, (as we shall see,) having a mind to reform their scheme, contrived at length to admit the *miraculous* conception, and still rejected our Lord's *Divinity:* which was retaining the main substance of their *heresy,* but under a better appearance than before. We shall observe presently what the Church of Christ thought of them after that new reform.

A. D. 249. Origen is the first that takes notice of the Ebionites as divided into *two sorts*[k], one denying, as before, Christ's birth of a virgin, the other admitting it. But still he reckons *both* among the pretended Christians[l], and introduces them among other *heretics*[m]. But whether or no he charged them with *heresy* on account of their denying our Lord's *Divinity,* would not certainly appear, if he had not expressed himself more fully in some other of his writings. In his Comment upon St. Matthew he takes the like notice of the two sorts of Ebionites, charging both as rejecting Christ's *Divinity*[n], and as *poor* in faith[o] towards Christ Jesus; alluding to their name, which signifies the same as *poor.* But Pamphilus, in his Apology for Origen, pro-

[h] Ante omnia autem commendanda erit ratio quæ præfuit, ut *Dei Filius* de *Virgine* nasceretur. *Nove* nasci debebat *novæ* nativitatis dedicator.—— Concepit igitur *Virgo* et peperit *Emanuelem,* nobiscum Deum. Hæc est nativitas *nova* dum homo nascitur in Deo, in quo homine Deus natus est; carne antiqui seminis suscepta sine semine antiquo, ut illam novo semine, id est spiritaliter [fort. *spiritali*] reformaret, exclusis antiquitatis sordibus, expiatam. *Tertull. de Carn. Christi,* cap. xvii.

[i] See what the learned Vitringa says of Cerinthus's denying the miraculous conception, Observat. Sacr. lib. v. cap. 12. sect. 6. p. 145, 146. edit. ult.

[k] Οὗτοι δὲ εἰσὶν οἱ διττοὶ Ἐβιοναῖοι, ἤτοι ἐκ παρθένου ὁμολογοῦντες ὁμοίως ἡμῖν τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ἢ οὐχ οὕτω γεγέννησθαι, ἀλλ' ὡς τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀνθρώπους. *Orig. contr. Cels.* p. 272. Conf. Comment. in Matth. p. 427.

[l] Orig. ibid. p. 272.

[m] Ibid. 271, 272, 274.

[n] Οὐ μὴν καὶ μετὰ τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ θεολογίας. *Comm. in Matth.* p. 427.

[o] Τῷ Ἐβιοναίῳ πτωχεύοντι περὶ τὴν εἰς Ἰησοῦν πίστιν. *Ibid.* 428.

duces some passages of his, out of his Comments on the Epistle to Titus, where he condemns the Ebionites more expressly as *heretics*, for their denying Christ's *Divinity*[p]. As to any doubt which may be made about Pamphilus's Apology, (appearing only in Ruffinus's version,) and the credit due to it, I refer the reader to Bishop Bull, who has largely discussed that question, and has sufficiently maintained the authority of that *version*[q]. As to Origen's own orthodoxy in the article of Christ's *Divinity*, it has been abundantly vindicated, and cleared from all reasonable exception[r].

A. D. 290. I shall add but one writer more, Victorinus Petavionensis, before referred to as saying, that St. John wrote his Gospel against Ebion, among others who were of the *school of Satan*[s]. It is very plain, by his manner of expression, that he looked upon Ebion as a very ill man and an *heretic*, being of Satan's school, and condemned by the Apostle himself. And considering how particular St. John is in setting forth the *Divinity* of Christ, we cannot doubt but Victorinus's censure of Ebion respects that article.

I might add many testimonies of Post-Nicene Fathers, to confirm what I have been proving, namely, that the Ebionites were constantly looked upon as *heretics* for denying our Lord's *Divinity*. But I choose to go no lower than the Ante-Nicene writers, because they are sufficient, and they are the less to be excepted to; and I am willing also to consult the ease of my readers, as well as to spare myself needless trouble. I am aware of a passage in St. Jerome, which seems to say, that the Ebionites and Cerinthians were condemned as *heretics* upon another account, not relating to our Lord's *Divinity*[t]: and I observe,

[p] Quid vero sit *hæreticus* homo, pro viribus nostris, secundum quod sentire possumus, describamus. Omnis qui se Christo credere profitetur et tamen alium Deum Legis et Prophetarum, alium Evangeliorum Deum dicit, &c.——hujusmodi homines *hæreticos* designamus——unum idemque credendum est de eo qui de Domino nostro Jesu Christo falsi aliquid senserit: sive secundum eos qui dicunt eum ex Joseph et Maria natum, sicut sunt Hebionitæ et Valentiniani; sive secundum eos qui primogenitum eum negant et *totius creaturæ Deum*, et *Verbum*, et *Sapientiam* quæ est initium viarum Dei, antequam aliquid fieret ante sæcula fundatam, atque ante omnes colles generatam, sed *hominem* solum eum credentes. *Pamphil. Apolog.* p. 226. edit. Bened. Conf. Comment. in Joann. p. 397.

[q] Bull. Def. F. N. sect. ii. cap. 9. p. 114, &c.

[r] Bishop Bull, sect. ii. cap. 9. Compare my Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. xii. p. 638, &c.

[s] See above, p. 540.

[t] Si hoc verum est, in Cerinthi et Ebionis hæresim delabimur, qui credentes in Christo propter hoc solum a patribus anathematizati sunt, quod

that the learned Le Clerc has endeavoured to make use of it[u] for the supporting a favourite hypothesis, which he appears too fond of. But it is very certain, that Jerome's words in that place, if interpreted with utmost rigour, are a perfect contradiction to all antiquity, and to what himself has asserted in other places of his works[x]. Some therefore have greatly blamed St. Jerome[y] for prevaricating in the contradictory account he here gives; while others, more kindly, and, I think, more justly, have endeavoured to bring him off by a candid construction[z]. Whichever way we take, there is nothing concerned in it, except it be St. Jerome's character: for as to the cause we are upon, it is too firmly established by the ecclesiastical writers in general, and even Jerome in particular, (as I before hinted,) to be at all weakened by this single passage to the contrary, if it were contrary.

Having shewn above, as I humbly conceive, that the Cerinthians (with whom I would be understood to include the Ebionites) were condemned by St. John himself for impugning our Lord's Divinity, and having proved further, that the Ebionites (with whom I would be understood to include the Cerinthians) were condemned all along in the Church for the first three centuries; the conclusion I now draw is, that both Cerinthians and Ebionites stand condemned from the days of the Apostles, and downwards, for the opposition they made to that important doctrine. After this, it will be less needful to prove that others also were condemned in like manner for the like opposition to the same doctrine. But since the doing it may tend in some measure to confirm what has been said, I shall go on to mention other impugners of our Lord's *Divinity* within the three first centuries, and a little further: only, I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible in the account, not to weary the reader.

legis cerimonias Christi Evangelio miscuerunt, et sic nova confessi sunt, ut vetera non amitterent. Quid dicam de Ebionitis qui Christianos esse se simulant? Usque hodie per totas orientis synagogas inter Judæos hæresis est quæ dicitur Minæorum, et a Pharisæis nunc usque damnatur; quos vulgo Nazaræos nuncupant, qui credunt in Christum *Filium Dei*, natum de Virgine Maria, et eum dicunt esse qui sub Pontio Pilato passus est et resurrexit, in quem et nos credimus. Sed dum volunt et Judæi esse et Christiani, nec Judæi sunt nec Christiani. *Hieronym. ad August. Ep.* lxxiv. Opp. tom. iv. 623. Bened.

[u] Clerici Eccles. Histor. p. 477.

[x] See two passages, quoted above, p. 540, 541: and compare Hieronym. contr. Helvid. tom. iv. p. 140.

[y] Mosheim. Vindic. Antiq. contr. Toland. p. 164.

[z] Bull. Judic. Eccl. cap. ii. sect. 13. p. 300. Remarks on Christianity as Old &c. with respect to Ecclesiastical Antiquity: first part continued, p. 78, 79.

A.D. 195. THEODOTUS.

Theodotus, a citizen of Byzantium, by trade a currier, but a man of parts, and competently furnished with secular learning, having denied his Saviour in time of persecution, and being afterwards upbraided for it, as one that had denied his *God;* to extenuate the offence, he pretended that he had not denied *God,* but *man*[a], for that Christ was no more. A miserable salvo for a guilty practice; which, instead of lessening his crime, enhanced it yet more, and was so far from removing the just obloquy he before lay under, that it served only to edge and enforce it. However, he hereupon became the reviver of an *old* heresy, or the ringleader of a *new* one, (*new* in dress and circumstances,) and soon after called by the new name of the *God-denying apostasy*[b]. The first account we have of this matter is from a nameless author in Eusebius, reasonably supposed, upon comparing other testimonies[c], to have been Caius, the Roman Presbyter, who flourished about A.D. 214. Learned men have inquired how Caius could say that Theodotus was *founder* of the *heresy*[d], and the *first* that made Christ a *mere man,* when it is certain and manifest, that both Cerinthians and Ebionites had done it before him. Some say plainly that Caius was guilty of a blunder[e]: which indeed is cutting the dispute short, and may be a good way, if there be not a better. Others say that Theodotus was really the first that made Jesus a *mere man,* for that the Cerinthians and Ebionites, before, admitted of a *superior* nature, a *spirit* assistant from above, residing at times in *Jesus,* which made him more than a common man[f]. But it will be difficult to prove, either that Ebion was in the same scheme with Cerinthus, as to the doctrine of *Æons,* and as to the dividing of *Jesus* from *Christ,* or that he was not exactly in the same principles which Theodotus espoused, as to making Christ a *mere man.* Eusebius's account of the Ebionites, and their tenets[g],

[a] Epiphan. Hær. liv. i. Augustin. Hær. 33. Philastr. Hær. cap. 1. Damascen. Hær. 54. Synodic. Pappi. cap. iii. Pseudo-Tertullian. Præscript. cap. liii. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. cap. 5.

[b] Ἀρνησίθεος ἀποστασία. *Euseb. H. E.* lib. v. cap. 28.

[c] Vid. Pearson, Vindic. Ignat. part. ii. p. 23. Opp. Posth. p. 147, &c. Cave, Histor. Literar. vol. i. p. 65.

[d] Τὸν ἀρχηγὸν καὶ πατέρα ταύτης τῆς Ἀρνησιθέου ἀποστασίας——πρῶτον εἰπόντα ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν Χριστόν.——τὸν τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης εὑρετήν. *Euseb. ibid.*

[e] Ittigius de Hæresiarchis, sect. ii. cap. 15. p. 261.

[f] Vitringa, Observat. Sacr. lib. v. cap. 10. p. 128. edit. ult.

[g] Euseb. E. H. lib. iii. cap. 27.

seems to represent their scheme as being exactly the same in that respect; and Theodorit is very express for its being so[h]: only Theodotus's was a little more refined than that of the ancienter Ebionites, because he allowed the *miraculous* conception or birth of a *virgin*, which they denied. However, both they and he supposed Christ a *mere* man: and therefore he was not the *first* that taught it. Some therefore think that Theodotus is said to be *first*, because he was the first among the Gentile Christians[i]; for Cerinthus and Ebion were of Jewish extract: which account appears fair and plausible. But I conceive, after all, that Caius was not considering in that place, who in the Church had first taught that Christ was a *mere man*, but who had been the founder of such a particular sect, called Theodotians, or Artemonians, and who had first taught them to *deny* Christ, under the pretence of his being a *mere man*. Theodotus, plainly, was their founder and leader: he was at the head of that *revolt*, the *first* man that undertook to conduct it, and to support it upon that principle. The other accounts of Theodotus lead to this sense, and in the main say the same thing that Caius does. Epiphanius takes notice, that all the other *Christians* who were apprehended and brought to the question along with Theodotus, honestly *confessed* Christ, and suffered[k]: he was the *only* man of the company that presumed to *deny* him, afterwards inventing an odd salvo for it, being more of an artist in his way[l], than others were. No one else, at that time, and upon that occasion, durst venture to deny his *God:* he was the *first* that then broke the ice, and led the way[m], instructing others to say after him, that it was not denying *God*, but *man*. I know not whether, in one particular, he may not be thought to have exceeded the irreverence and impiety of Ebion, namely, in his calling Christ a *mere man*, considered even in his state of

[h] Ὁ δὲ Κήρινθος τὸν μὲν Ἰησοῦν ἐξ Ἰωσὴφ καὶ Μαρίας ἔφησε, γεννηθῆναι κατὰ κοινὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον, ἄνωθεν δὲ τὸν Χριστὸν κατεληλυθότα ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰησοῦν. Ἐβιοναῖοι δὲ καὶ Θεοδοτιανοὶ, καὶ Ἀρτεμονιανοὶ, καὶ Φωτινιανοὶ ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰρήκασεν ἐκ τῆς παρθένου τὸν Χριστὸν γεγεννῆσθαι. *Theodorit. Hæret. Fab.* lib. v. cap. 11. p. 278.

[i] Bull. Judic. cap. iii. sect. 1. p. 304.

[k] Epiphan. Hær. liv. p. 1.

[l] Οὗτος ἐν παιδείᾳ Ἑλληνικῇ ἄκρος γενόμενος, ἅμα δὲ ἄλλοις τῶν ἐν ἡμέραις τοῦ τότε διωγμοῦ μόνος ἐκπεσὼν, μαρτυρησάντων ἐκείνων διὰ Θεόν. *Damascen. Hæres.* 54.

[m] Theodotus quidam, Byzantinus genere, denegator Christi Dei nostri in persecutione extitit Salvatoris; qui *cœpit dicere*, docens ita: communis homo erat, ut omnes homines, Christus. *Philastr. Hær.* 50.

Doctrinam *introduxit*, qua Christum hominem tantummodo diceret, Deum autem illum negaret. *Pseudo-Tertullian.* cap. liii.

exaltation, when he abjured him. Ebion would have called him *God*, so considered, as having been then *deified*, according to his way of thinking [n]. But Caius probably had no view to any such nicety of distinction, but intended only to say, that Theodotus was the *founder* of a *new* sect, called afterwards by his name, and teacher also of a *new* doctrine; *new* as to the circumstances and application, though, as to the main substance of it, borrowed from the Ebionites before him, or more particularly from the Alogi, a branch of the Ebionites [o].

Having seen that Theodotus was an impugner of our Lord's *Divinity*, we are next to observe, that he was condemned immediately by the Church for it. He was excommunicated by Victor then Bishop of Rome, as an *heresiarch:* so the same Caius relates [p]. A sentence approved by the churches of Christ: otherwise Victor himself would have been condemned for it, as he was greatly blamed for misapplying the ecclesiastical censure in a case of another nature, relating to the time for keeping Easter. The churches and bishops of those times were exceeding watchful and jealous of any *abuses* of power in particular churches or men. They were as checks one upon another, that nothing of moment should be done by any, which had not the consent of the rest. This conduct obliged every one to observe the strictest caution in any affair of general concern, and it tended to keep up the exactest harmony and unanimity in the several churches. But I return.

Hippolytus of the third century takes notice, in passing, of this Theodotus, as a person that falsified the truth, and perverted Scripture, in order to countenance his erroneous doctrine about Christ's being a *mere man* [q]. He compares the heretic Noëtus with Theodotus, to make Noëtus the more odious for following such a leader in his manner of writing: so that it is plain enough what Hippolytus thought of Theodotus.

[n] See Hilary de Trin. lib. ii. n. 4. p. 789. Epiphan. Hær. xxx. n. 18. p. 142.

[o] Θεοδοτός τις, ἀπόσπασμα ὑπάρχων ἐκ τῆς προειρημένης Ἀλόγου αἱρέσεως. *Epiphan. Hær.* liv.

[p] Βίκτωρ τὸν σκυτέα Θεόδοτον, τὸν ἀρχηγὸν καὶ πατέρα ταύτης τῆς ἀρνησιθέου ἀποστασίας ἀπεκήρυξε τῆς κοινωνίας——ἀπέβαλε Θεόδοτον τὸν τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης εὑρετήν. *Euseb.* lib. v. cap. 28. Conf. Theodor. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. cap. 5.

[q] Καὶ ταῦτα βούλονται οὕτω διηγεῖσθαι καὶ αὐτοῖς μονόκωλα χρώμενοι, ὃν τρόπον Θεόδοτος ἄνθρωπον συνιστᾷν ψιλὸν βουλόμενος. ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐκεῖνοί τε νενοήκασιν ἀληθὲς, οὔθ' οὗτοι, καθὼς αὐταὶ αἱ γραφαὶ ἐλέγχουσιν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀμαθίαν, μαρτυροῦσαι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. *Hippol. contr. Noët.* cap. iii. p. 7. Conf. Epiphan. Hær. lvii. 2.

The same Theodotus is numbered also in the list of *heretics*[r] by the writer of the Appendix to Tertullian's book of Prescription. That Appendix is supposed by some[s] to be little else but an extract from our Hippolytus's Treatise against Heresies. However that be, the piece is ancient, and of good value[t]. Theodotus is there charged as a *blasphemer* against Christ, for denying him to be *God*, though he allowed his birth of a *virgin*. It was the *God-denying* heresy: and therein lay its essential malignity. Had he said that Christ was an *angel*, or an *archangel*, or the highest of all *creatures*, it would have been treating our Lord with something more of respect; but still it would have come infinitely short of his real dignity, and of the faith of the Church concerning him, from the beginning. This I observe, lest any favourer of *Arianism* should falsely surmise, that the censures passed upon Theodotus and such other impugners of Christ's Divinity, do not affect those who make Christ a glorious *creature*, but those only who suppose him a *mere man*: whereas, in truth, Theodotus and the rest were condemned for the impugning Christ's proper and essential *Divinity*; a fault *common* to them and the Arians, so that both are concluded under the same censure.

I may further add, that the conduct of the Church, with respect to the Praxeans, Noëtians, and Sabellians, is a demonstration of the truth of what I say. Those men charged the Church as teaching three Gods[u]. Then would have been the time, and must have been, for the Church to declare, (had they ever meant it,) that the Father *only* is God, and the Son and Holy Ghost *creatures*. But they studiously and conscientiously avoided it, as one sees in Hippolytus and Tertullian, and others. And if any man uncautiously, in debate, happened but to let fall any expressions which seemed to lean that way, (as appeared in the famous case of Dionysius of Alexandria,) the Church of that time would not bear it, but rejected every thing of that kind with abhorrence. They distinguished themselves off from *Sabel-*

[r] Accedit his Theodotus Byzantius, qui postea quam pro Christi nomine comprehensus negavit, in Christum *blasphemare* non destitit, doctrinam enim *introduxit* qua Christum *hominem* tantummodo diceret, *Deum* autem illum negaret: ex Spiritu quidem Sancto, natum ex Virgine, sed hominem solitarium atque nudum, nulla alia præ cæteris, nisi sola justitiæ auctoritate. *Pseudo-Tertullian.* cap. liii.

[s] Allix, Fathers vindicated touching the Trinity, p. 99.

[t] Vid. Dodwell. Dissert. de Success. Pontif. p. 216.

[u] Tertullian. contr. Prax. cap. iii. Epiphan. Hær. lvii. 62.

lianism, but so as to avoid the other extreme, afterwards called *Arianism:* a plain sign and proof[x] that the proper *Divinity* of Christ was what they aimed to support. I may observe also by the way, that the Sabellian objection all along supposed and implied, that the *Godhead* of the *Holy Ghost*, as well as of the *Son*, was the then received doctrine. But I return.

There was another Theodotus, surnamed *Trapezita*, (the *Banker*,) who was a disciple of the former, and who endeavoured to refine upon his scheme, by the addition of some odd conceits concerning Melchizedec. I shall only observe further, that as from the elder Theodotus some were named Theodotians, so from the junior Theodotus others were called Melchizedecians[y].

A. D. 205. ARTEMON.

Artemon, otherwise called Artemas, was a disciple of Theodotus, a reviver or promoter of the same heresy. He appears to have been a very warm man, and of vast assurance; or his followers, at least, were such. For they confidently gave it out, that their doctrine was as old as the *Apostles*[z], and that the doctrine of Christ's Divinity began with Pope Zephyrin, that is, about A. D. 198. Such ignorance, if it was mere ignorance, was pitiable: but there is too much reason to suspect that they knew better. The nameless author in Eusebius (supposed to be Caius) well urges[a], that besides the *holy Scriptures*, older than all, there were the works of Justin and Miltiades, of Tatian and Clemens, of Irenæus and Melito, and a great many more, defenders of Christ's *Divinity*, directly confronting their wild report, and plainly proving to the world, that it was mere fiction and romance, too improbable to be offered even to the lowest of the populace. And as to their pleading that Pope Victor, the immediate predecessor of Zephyrin, was on their side of the question, he confutes them at once, by observing, that Victor was the very person who had excommunicated Theodotus, their founder and leader, for that very doctrine which they espoused[b]. All I have further to observe of these confident men, is, that they were *censured* by the Church of their time, and not admitted

[x] See this argument excellently drawn out by Mr. Thirlby, Def. of the Answ. p. 36, &c.

[y] Vid. Euseb. lib. v. cap. 28. Le Quien, Not. ad Damascen. Hær. lxiv. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. cap. 6.

[z] Euseb. lib. v. cap. 28. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. cap. 4.

[a] Euseb. E. H. lib. v. cap. 28.

[b] Ἦσαν δὲ οὗτοι ἄμφω Θεοδότου τοῦ σκυτέως μαθηταὶ, τοῦ πρώτου ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ φρονήσει, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀφροσύνῃ, ἀφορισθέντος τῆς κοινωνίας ὑπὸ Βίκτορος, ὡς ἔφην, τοῦ τότε ἐπισκόπου.

to communion among faithful Christians. That may reasonably be inferred from what Caius says, as before mentioned. But it appears further from what passed some years after, in the case of Paul of Samosata, when the Antiochian Fathers censured him for *heresy*, and sent him to seek communion, if he pleased, with the Artemonians[c], whose sentiments he had taken into, and whose *execrable heresy* (so they call it[d]) he had revived. To which agrees what Athanasius says, speaking of the Arian heresy: This heresy, says he, was looked upon as *detestable*, before the Council of Nice, when Artemas advanced it[e].

A. D. 242. BERYLLUS.

Beryllus, Bishop of Bostra in Arabia, has been reputed one of those that once denied the *Divinity* of Christ; and therefore Bishop Bull takes him in among the rest[f]. But yet strictly speaking, the charge against him was not that he denied the *Divinity* of Christ, but his *proper Divinity*[g]: by which I understand his *personal* Divinity, or *divine* personality. For Beryllus's notion was, that the man *Christ Jesus* was the whole person, a mere human person, which had indeed a *divine Person* residing in him, viz. the person of the *Father*. So Beryllus's doctrine was a kind of *Sabellianism*; which however, in strictness, amounts to a denial of Christ's *Divinity*. For while it allows him no distinct *divine* personality, all that remains is, the *man* Christ with the *Father* indwelling; which at length resolves into the same doctrine, in the main, with what Cerinthus, Ebion, Theodotus, and Artemon taught as to the proper person of *Jesus*. It is denying his divine *Sonship*, and divine *personality*, which, in effect, is denying his proper *Divinity*. I the rather note this, because from hence it may appear, that the Church's condemning Praxeas, Noëtus, and Sabellius, as guilty of *heresy*, proceeded from the same pious zeal for the *Divinity* of Christ, as their condemnation of Cerinthus, Ebion, &c. before: for both were intended to preserve that important article, and to secure the baptismal faith in a *real* and *divine* Trinity. Tertullian was sharp enough to see, that the Praxean doctrine, under colour of

[c] Τῷ δὲ Ἀρτεμᾷ οὗτος ἐπιστελλέτω· καὶ οἱ τὰ Ἀρτεμᾶ φρονοῦντες, τούτῳ κοινωνείτωσαν. *Euseb. H. E.* lib. vii. c. 30.

[d] Τῇ μιαρᾷ αἱρέσει τῇ Ἀρτεμᾷ. *Euseb. ibid.*

[e] Πρὸ τῆς Νικαίας, ἡ αἵρεσις ἦν βδελυκτὴ, ὅτε ταύτην Ἀρτεμᾶς κατεβάλλετο. *Athanas. de Synod.* p. 733. edit. Bened.

[f] Bull. Judic. c. ii. p. 305.

[g] Μηδὲ μὲν θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν. *Euseb. E. H.* lib. vi. c. 33.

magnifying Christ, by advancing him into the *same personality* with the Father, in reality left no *distinct* Son at all, more than the man *Jesus*, and so fell in with Valentinus's notion, (he might have said, Cerinthus's also,) which separated *Jesus* from *Christ*, dividing them into two persons[h]. All the difference is, that Cerinthus or Valentinus supposed the *Christ* from above to be some *Æon*, or inferior *power*, residing occasionally with the man *Jesus*; while the Praxeans substituted *God the Father* instead of that supposed *Æon*, making him the *Christ* from above, conceived to inhabit at times the same man *Jesus*. Which as it comes very near the old Ebionite notion, so is it exactly the same with what several of the foreign Socinians, and most of our English ones, have maintained in late times. Indeed, the Praxeans were charged as *Patripassians*, which is a charge that does not affect the modern Socinians: but I apprehend, from the passage of Tertullian just cited, that the Praxeans, to get off from *Patripassianism*, learned at length to divide the *Persons* of Father and Son, and then the Father could be considered only as inhabiting *Jesus*, a mere man, and a distinct person from him. *Sabellianism*, and *Photinianism*, and *Socinianism*, do in reality come at length into one; all resolving into *Judaism*: for the fundamental error of them all is, the denying the *divine Sonship* and personal Divinity of Christ; rejecting the eternal substantial *Logos*, who was with the Father before the world was, and is God from everlasting to everlasting. I say then, that the zeal shewn by the ancient Church against the Sabellians of all denominations, (as well as their zeal against the more direct impugners of Christ's *Divinity*,) is a very strong argument of their judging the doctrine of a coeternal Trinity to be an *essential* of the Gospel. They intended much the same thing by animadverting upon those or these; for they saw plainly, that the *Divinity* of Christ, considered as a real Person, was as much *undermined by Sabellianism*, as it was *attacked* by the other. Many and various have been the ways of evading and eluding these two

[h] Undique enim obducti distinctione *Patris* et *Filii*—aliter eam ad suam nihilominus sententiam interpretari conantur: ut æque in *una Persona* utrumque distinguant Patrem et Filium; dicentes Filium *carnem* esse, id est *hominem*, id est *Jesum*; Patrem autem *Spiritum*, id est *Deum*, id est *Christum*. Et qui unum eundemque contendunt Patrem et Filium, jam incipiunt *dividere* illos potius quam *unare*. Si enim *alius* est Jesus, *alius* Christus, alius erit Filius, alius Pater; quia Filius *Jesus*, et Pater Christus. Talem monarchiam apud Valentinum fortasse didicerunt, *duos* facere *Jesum* et *Christum*. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. 27.

prime verities, viz. that three *real* Persons are *one God*, and that God and man is *one Christ:* but watchful and honest Christians still kept their eyes fixed upon those sacred truths, and would never admit any doctrine as *true*, which was *contrary* to them, or as *sufficient*, that was *short* of them. If any one denied Christ's *humanity*, (as the *Docetæ*, or *Phantasiastæ*,) that was manifestly false doctrine, to be rejected at once: but if another admitted his *humanity*, and stopped there, that was *short* and *insufficient*. If it was added, (as by Cerinthus,) that a *celestial* substance or spirit rested sometimes upon *Jesus*, that was true, but still *short* of the whole truth in more respects than one. If it were said, *constantly* residing, that was better, but still very *insufficient*. If to that were added, *personally united*, that came nearer up to the full truth, but still was evasive and short. Say, *divine substance personally* united with the human: that comes nearer to the point than any of the former; but still there is room for evasion, because it might mean the *Father;* and then it amounts to *Sabellianism* only, and *Patripassianism*. Add, therefore, that such *divine* substance is *personally* distinct from the *Father* and the *Holy Spirit*, and then it is confessing three *real* and *divine* Persons in one Godhead, which is the *whole* truth. The several kinds of *heresies* which have affected this Scripture truth, are but the various wanderings of *human* imagination. Truth is simple and uniform, while error is almost infinite. But I return to Beryllus.

The error which Beryllus unhappily split upon, was the denying a *real* distinction of *divine* Persons, as I before observed; which in direct consequence made Christ *Jesus* a mere *man*, in whom the *Father* dwelt. The bishops of the neighbouring sees were alarmed at the doctrine, and met in Synod to condemn the heresy, and the teacher of it. But the great Origen being called in to debate and clear the point in question, Beryllus was made sensible of his error, and being a person of a pious and an humble mind, he honestly retracted it[i]: and it is further to be observed, that he loved his instructor Origen ever after, and was sincerely thankful to him[k] for affording him so much new light (new to *him*) in a question of the greatest importance. A rare example of godly *sincerity*, and true Christian *humility*. His mistake had shewn some weakness of judgment; but his recovery mani-

[i] Euseb. E. H. lib. vi. c. 33. [k] Hieronym. Eccles. Script. lxx. p. 138. edit. Fabric.

fested great strength of mind, and a good command over himself and his own passions.

A.D. 265. PAUL of Samosata.

Paul of Samosata, Bishop of Antioch, was of a temper and character very different from what we have mentioned in the last article: he gave the churches fresh occasion for exerting their pious zeal in behalf of our Lord's *Divinity*. He was impeached for heresy in a council of Antioch, A.D. 265, and distinguished himself off at that time, and escaped without censure; but in another council, A.D. 270, he was again accused, and convicted, and thereupon deposed. He is charged by the council which condemned him, with reviving the heresy of Artemon, with denying his *Lord* and *God*, with disowning any *Son of God* from heaven, preaching up a *detestable heresy*, a *damnable doctrine*, and the like[l]. The sum of his heresy, upon comparing the best accounts, appears to be this: that there is but one *real* Person in the Godhead, viz. the *Father*[m]; that the *Logos* is a mere attribute, quality, power, or operation, nothing real and substantial[n]; and that Christ, as it follows of consequence, is a mere *man*[o]. His scheme appears to have been, in substance, little different from the Sabellian[p]: but the stress of the charge against him rested upon this, that he had denied his Lord's *Divinity*; and therefore his heresy was called, like Theodotus's and Artemon's before, the *God-denying wickedness*[q].

A. D. 317. ARIUS.

I cannot well conclude this view of Antiquity, with respect to the *heresies* against Christ's *Divinity*, without throwing in a word or two about the famous Arius, and his condemnation for proclaiming God the Son a *creature*, therein denying his Lord's real and proper *Divinity*, as much as any before him. Alexander, then Bishop of Alexandria, in his Epistle to the other Alexander of Byzantium or Constantinople, (about A.D. 321,) charges the Arians with denying their Saviour's *Divinity*[r], and with

[l] Euseb. E. H. lib. vii. c. 30.

[m] Vid. Athanas. contr. Apollinar. p. 942. Epiphan. Hær. lxv. 1. 3.

[n] Epiphan. Hær. lxv. 1. Philastr. lxiv. p. 126.

[o] Euseb. E.H. lib. vii. c. 27. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. p. 223. Augustin. Hær. 44. Damascen. Hæres. lxv.

[p] See my First Defence, vol. i. Query xxiii. p. 479. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 718. Dr. Berriman's Historical Account, p. 144, &c.

[q] Ἀρνησίθεος κακία. Euseb. lib. vii. c. 29.

[r] Theodorit. Eccles. Hist. cap. iv. p. 9. edit. Vales.

reviving the heresy of Ebion, Artemon, and Paul of Samosata[s]. Not that the Arian scheme was exactly the same with any of those three, (for there are degrees of variation from truth, and many wrong ways to one right,) but it fell in with them all in the main thing, and in which the principal malignity of their heresies consisted, namely, in the rejecting the true *Godhead* of Christ. I shall say nothing of the synodical censures passed upon Arius and his adherents, at the first opening of the heresy. In the year 325 he was condemned, in more solemn form, by the famous Council of Nice, by three hundred and eighteen bishops called from all parts of the Christian world, seventeen only of the number scrupling it for a time, and at last two only or three dissenting. They condemned his sentiments, as amounting to *impiety*, *madness*, *blasphemy*, such as they almost trembled to hear[t]; which appears by the Council's letter after his condemnation. Their sentence in that cause carried the greater weight in it, as the Council was *general*, called together out of Europe, Asia, and Africa, from all parts of the empire[u]; as it was upon the matter *free*, and under no secular awe or influences; and lastly, as it was made up of the *wisest*, *worthiest*, and every way *excellent* prelates[x] which the Christian world could then furnish. The determination of so venerable a council gave a considerable check to *Arianism*, and always carried great force with it; though it did not so quash the controversy as finally to put an end to it, any more than the *Council* of the *Apostles* at Jerusalem[y] (A. D. 49.) put an end to the dispute about the necessity of imposing circumcision[z]. But as that first council had its use in the Church, and very great use, notwithstanding the repeated oppositions made to it, so had this other also, and has to this day. Divine wisdom has appointed no certain *effective* remedies for the *perverseness* of man, but has provided *sufficient* means for the instruction and direction of the *humble* and *modest*, and well designing.

Some persons have suggested, that the Council of Ariminum (held in 359,) consisting of four hundred bishops or more[a], may

[s] Theodorit. ibid. p. 14.

[t] Ἅπαντα ἀναθεμάτισεν ἡ ἁγία σύνοδος, οὐδὲ ὅσον ἀκοῦσαι τῆς ἀσεβοῦς δόξης, ἢ ἀπονοίας, καὶ τῶν βλασφήμων ῥημάτων ἀνασχομένη. *Apud Socr.* lib. i. c. 9.

[u] Euseb. de Vit. Constantin. lib. iii. c. 7.

[x] Ibid. lib. iii. c. 9.

[y] Acts xv.

[z] See Buddæus, Eccl. Apost. p. 114, 294, &c.

[a] Athanas. de Synod. 720, 749. Sulpic. Sever. p. 267. Socr. E. H. lib. iv. c. 17.

properly be mentioned on the other side, as a counterbalance to the Council of Nice: but there is no comparison betwixt them, when the circumstances are duly considered. For, 1. the Council of Rimini, or Ariminum, was not *general*, being of the *west* only. 2. It was not *free*, being greatly menaced, distressed, and overawed by the Emperor Constantius[b]. 3. Out of the number of four hundred, there were but eighty Arians[c], at the utmost: the other three hundred and twenty, or more, were really orthodox men, induced by artifices to subscribe a creed which they understood in a good sense[d], but which, being worded in general terms, was capable of being perverted to a bad one. The deep dissimulation, at that time used by the Arian managers, procured them the advantage only of a short-lived triumph. For no sooner did the orthodox side perceive how they had been imposed upon, and what use was to be made of it, but they declared to the world their own good meaning, and the perfidiousness of the opposite party. But of this I have treated more largely elsewhere[e]. It was of that time that St. Jerome speaks, when he pleasantly says, that the "whole *Christian* world "groaned," (viz. under the slander thrown upon them by their adversaries,) "and wondered to see itself become all over "Arian[f]:" that is to say, they wondered at the assurance of the Arians, in so imposing upon the Catholics, and in *representing them to be* the very reverse of what they were[g]. The learned Mr. Bingham understood these matters well, and has expressed them justly and fully in these few lines[h]. "The "Arians put an equivocal and poisonous sense upon them, (*the "words of the Council*,) giving out, after the Council was ended, "that they had not only abolished the word *consubstantial*, but "with it condemned the *Nicene faith* also: which was strange

[b] Athanas. ad Afros, 892, 893. Socrat. E. H. lib. ii. c. 37. Sozom. lib. iv. c. 19. Hilar. Pictav. 1242. ed. Bened.

[c] Ariani non amplius quam octoginta: reliqui nostrarum partium erant. *Sulpic. Sever.* lib. ii. c. 56.

[d] Sonabant verba pietatem, et inter tanta mella præconii, nemo venenum insertum putabat. *Hieron. contr. Lucifer.*

[e] See my Defence, vol. i. Query xxix. p. 547, 548. Answer to Whitby, vol. ii. p. 212. Compare Berriman's Histor. Account, p. 228, &c.

[f] Ingemuit totus orbis, et Arianum se esse miratus est. *Hieronym. contr. Lucifer.* p. 300.

[g] Concurrebant Episcopi, qui Ariminensibus dolis irretiti, *sine conscientia* hæretici ferebantur, contestantes corpus Domini, et quicquid in Ecclesia sanctum est, se nihil mali in sua fide suspicatos. *Hieron. ibid.* 301.

[h] Bingham's Antiquities, b. vi. ch. 3. s. 10. Compare Dr. Berriman, Hist. Acc. p. 228, &c.

" surprising news to the bishops that had been at Ariminum. " Then says St. Jerome, *Ingemuit totus orbis, et Arianum se esse* " *miratus est: The whole world groaned, and was amazed to think* " *she should be reputed Arian.* That is, the Catholic bishops of " the whole world (for there were three hundred[i] of them " present at the Council) were amazed to find themselves so " abused, and represented as Arian, when they never intended " in the least to confirm the Arian doctrine." But as to the extent of the *Nicene faith*, both at that time and after, I have spoken more particularly of it in another place[k], and need not here repeat. Only the reader may permit me to sum up the whole in the same words, or nearly as before. " There never " was a council on the Arian side so *free*, so *large*, so in every " respect *unexceptionable*, as the Council of Nice was: but what- " ever opposition was made to it, was carried on with such " wiles and subtleties and refined artifices, (to say nothing of " *cruelties*,) as every honest man would be ashamed of: and not- " withstanding all that the Arians could do, they were not able " long to maintain their ground; but the men who sustained " the shock, and kept up the credit of the *Nicene faith*, were not " only the most *numerous*, but appear to have been as *wise*, and " as *judicious*, and as *pious* men as ever the Church was adorned " with since the times of the Apostles[l]."

From what hath been said under the present article, it is manifest, that the impugners of our Lord's *Divinity* have been all along condemned as guilty of *heresy* for the first three centuries and more; so that as far as the constant judgment and practice of the Church in their *decrees* and *censures*, during that time, can be conceived to bear weight, the doctrine of our Lord's true and proper *Divinity*, and of consequence, the doctrine of a real

[i] He might have said, three hundred and twenty. But I believe Jerome meant more than that three hundred and twenty by the *totus orbis*: he meant all the *orthodox;* for all of them suffered in the slander raised against their brethren, most of them as orthodox as themselves: so it affected them all, and all were amazed at the *injurious* aspersion. This place therefore of Jerome, rightly understood, is so far from saying, that the *whole world* was then Arian, that it is saying the contrary; namely, that the whole world was Anti-arian: for by *totus orbis* he manifestly there means the *orthodox*, who had been slandered as Arian, and were really Anti-arian. They were the *whole world* in his account, the Arians being but few in comparison.

[k] Defence, vol. i. Query xxix. p. 547—550.

[l] See this Council defended more at large by Dr. Berriman, in his Remarks on Mr. Chandler, p. 19—42. and in his Review of the Remarks, p. 28—41.

and coeternal *Trinity*, must be looked upon as a *fundamental* of the Christian faith.

III. Besides what has been pleaded upon the *first* topic relating to *creeds*, and upon the *second* relating to *heretics;* there is yet a *third* head to go upon, namely, the sentiments of Ante-Nicene Fathers, such as they have occasionally delivered in their writings, distinct from what they have reported either of *creeds* or *heresies*. And these are what I am next going to produce, according to order of time, to shew what they thought of the *necessity* or *importance* of faith in the ever blessed Trinity. Perhaps I may have anticipated some things under the last head, which might properly have come in here; or I may chance to take some things in here, which might properly have come in there: but it is of no great moment which head they are brought under, so long as both centre in the same conclusion, and the two parts may be considered as supplemental to each other.

107. IGNATIUS.

I begin with Ignatius, who writes thus: "Be not led aside "by strange doctrines, nor by antiquated tales, which are un- "profitable: for if we yet live according to *Judaism*, it is as "much as declaring that we have not accepted *grace*[m]; for the "most holy Prophets lived according to *Christ Jesus*. And for "that cause were they persecuted, being inspired by his grace, "that the unbelievers might be convinced that there is one God "who hath manifested himself by *Jesus Christ his Son*, who is "his *eternal Word*, not proceeding from *silence*[n], who in all "things pleased him that sent him." The *Judaizing* heretics (whether Cerinthians, or Ebionites, or Gnostics at large) are the persons here pointed at without dispute[o]: and the *Judaism* here principally charged was, their denial of Christ's real and *eternal* Divinity. The Jews would not own a proper *Son* of *God*[p], an *eternal* subsisting *Logos*, but pertinaciously disputed

[m] Εἰ γὰρ μέχρι νῦν κατὰ [νόμον] Ἰουδαϊσμὸν ζῶμεν, ὁμολογοῦμεν χάριν μὴ εἰληφέναι. *Ignat. ad Magnes.* s. 8.

[n] Τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ Λόγος ἀΐδιος, οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθών. *Ibid.*

[o] Hæc est secunda hujus Epistolæ pars, quæ eos maxime præmunit contra *hæreticos*, eos præcipue qui *Judaismum* introducere conabantur; contra quos clare et expresse disputat. Erant autem ii ea tempestate, qui *divinam* Christi naturam negabant, ut Ebionitæ, Cerinthiani, Nazaræi, et Helxaitæ. *Pearson not. in loc.* p. 43. Conf. Vindic. p. 55.

[p] Ἰουδαῖος δὲ οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογῆσαι, ὅτι προφήτης τις εἶπεν ἥξειν Θεοῦ υἱόν. *Origen. contr. cels.* lib. i. p. 38.

Οὐ πάνυ τι Ἰουδαῖοι λέγουσι Θεὸν

that point with the Christians; as may appear sufficiently, besides other evidences, from Justin's celebrated Dialogue with Trypho. So here we may observe, how emphatically Ignatius expresses the Christian faith in opposition to those *Judaizers*, by asserting Christ to be God's *Son*, and his *eternal Word*, not proceeding from *silence*, as those *Judaizers* taught. I forbear to enter into the dispute about σιγὴ, which has been already exhausted by Bishop Pearson, Bishop Bull, and other learned men. What I am most concerned to observe is, that *Judaism* was the common and just reproach thrown upon all the impugners or underminers of Christ's *Divinity:* for that was part of the distinguishing character of the *Christian* faith, as opposed to the *Jewish*, in those days[q]. As to Cerinthus and Ebion, the early impugners of Christ's *Divinity*, it is well known that they were *Judaizers*, and brought their *heresy* along with them, transplanting it from the *Synagogue* to the *Church*. Those that followed them in their heresy were judged so far to desert the *Christian* cause, and to side with the *Jews*. Tertullian, though directly pointing to Praxeas, yet makes the charge general against all that deny a *real* and *divine* Trinity[r]. Novatian passes the like censure upon as many as denied Christ's *Divinity*[s]. Theodotus, though a Gentile *Christian*, is charged with *Jewish* blindness upon the same score[t]. Paul of Samosata is observed to have given up Christ's *Divinity* in complaisance to Jews[u]. And the Arians afterwards, on the same account, are frequently censured by orthodox Christians, as revivers of *Judaism*[x].

I now return to Ignatius, who, after charging those impugners of Christ's Divinity with *Judaism*, intimates their thereby for-

ὄντα τὸν Χριστὸν καταβήσεσθαι ἢ Θεοῦ υἱόν. *Ibid.* lib. iv. p. 162.

Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς Ἰουδαίοις καὶ σοφοῖς γε ἐπαγγελλομένοις εἶναι συμβαλὼν, οὐδενὸς ἀκήκοα ἐπαινοῦντος τὸ, Λόγον εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὡς ὁ Κέλσος εἴρηκε. *Ibid.* c. 2. p. 79.

[q] I say, *in those days*. For that the ancienter Jews were generally in like sentiments, is not probable, but the contrary. Of which see Allix's Judgment of the Jewish Church; and Considerations on Mr. Whiston's Historical Preface, p. 75, &c. and Primitive Christianity vindicated, p. 17, &c. and Stillingfleet on the Trinity, c. ix. p. 203, &c.

[r] *Judaicæ* fidei est res, sic *unum* Deum credere, ut *Filium* adnumerare ei nolis, et post Filium Spiritum—— Pater et Filius et Spiritus *unum Deum* sistunt. *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. 31.

[s] Ignari et imperiti Judæi hæredes sibi *hæreticos* istos reddiderunt. *Novat.* c. 15. ed. Welchm. alias c. 23.

[t] Cæcitatis Judaicæ consors. *Philastr. Hær.* 1. Conf. Epiphan. Hær. liv. lv.

[u] Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. ii. c. 8. Athanas. vol. i. p. 386. Epiphan. Hær. lxv. 2, 7. Philastr. Hær. lxiv.

[x] Athanas. de Decret. Synod. N. p. 209, 233. Orat. ii. 484. Basil. Homil. xxiv. tom. ii. p. 189. edit. Bened. Greg. Nyssen. contr. Eunom. Orat. i. p. 15.

feiting the *grace* of the Gospel. Then he proceeds to lay down the true Christian doctrine of a *Son of God*, an *eternal Word*, not produced in time, or from *silence*[y]. And since he asserts that the denial of that doctrine is *Judaizing*, and is renouncing the *grace* of the Gospel, it amounts to declaring that the article of Christ's *Divinity* is an *essential* of Christianity.

A. D. 155. Justin Martyr.

Justin Martyr, in a Fragment produced by Dr. Grabe, lays a very particular stress upon the article of Christ's *Divinity*, as the reconciliation of God and man is nearly concerned in it. The passage runs thus: "When man's nature had contracted cor-
" ruption, it was necessary that he who would save it, should do
" away the principle of corruption. But this could not be done
" without uniting *life by nature* [or *essential life*] with the nature
" so corrupted, to do away the corruption and to immortalize
" the corrupt nature ever after. Wherefore it was meet that
" the *Word* should become incarnate to deliver us from the
" death of natural corruption[z]."

Here Justin asserts, that it was necessary for *essential life* (or *life by nature*) to be united with human nature, in order to *save* it: which is the same as to say, that it was necessary for *God* to become incarnate, in order to save lost man. So *important* did he take that article to be, conceiving that the redemption of mankind depended upon it. The phrase of *life by nature*, undoubtedly imports *necessary existence* and proper *Divinity*, as I have observed and proved upon another occasion[a], and need not here do again. Bishop Bull brings some other passages from Justin of like import with this: but for brevity sake I choose to pass them over, and am content only to refer[b].

[y] Simplicissima et optima sententia videtur, quod Ignatius, contra omnes veteres hæreticos *Filii æternitatem* negantes, asseruerit Christum non esse instar *humani Verbi* quod post *silentium* prodit, sed *Verbum* Patri *coæternum*. *Ittigius, Histor. Eccl. Sæc.* ii. p. 118.

[z] Φύσει δὲ τῆς φθορᾶς προσγενομένης, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ὅτι σῶσαι βουλόμενος ἢ τὴν φθοροποιὸν οὐσίαν ἀφανίσας· τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἦν ἑτέρως γενέσθαι, εἰ μήπερ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ζωὴ προσεπλάκη τῷ τὴν φθορὰν δεξαμένῳ, ἀφανίζουσα μὲν τὴν φθορὰν, ἀθανατὸν δὲ τοῦ λοιποῦ τὸ δεξάμενον διατηροῦσα. διὰ τοῦτο τὸν Λόγον ἐδέησεν ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι, ἵνα τοῦ θανάτου τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἡμᾶς φθορᾶς ἐλευθερώσῃ. *Grab. Spicileg.* vol. ii. p. 172. Et in notis ad Bull. Judic. c. vii. s. 5. p. 344.

[a] Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 579. Compare Third Defence, p. 81. of this volume.

[b] Bull. Judic. c. vii. s. 5. p. 344, 345.

A. D. 176. IRENÆUS.

Irenæus has said much the same thing with Justin, in fuller and stronger words. After observing that the *Son of God* and *Word of the Father* became *man*, that he might give *salvation* to his own creature, or workmanship[c], he proceeds as follows: "Therefore, as I said before, he united *man* to *God*: for if it "were not *man* that should overcome the adversary of *man*, the "enemy would not have been rightly vanquished; and again, if "it were not *God* to give the *salvation*, we could not be firmly "possessed of it: besides, if man had not been united to *God*, he "could never have been partaker of incorruption. So it was meet "that a *Mediator* between God and man should bring both toge-"ther into amity and concord by his own proximity to both; that "so he might present man to God, and notify God to men[d]." What we have here to observe is, that if Irenæus believed it necessary for *God* to become man, in order to work man's salvation, he must of consequence judge the article of Christ's *Divinity* (in his high sense of *Divinity*) an *essential* of Christian faith, *necessary* to be believed by all to whom it should be revealed, under pain of forfeiting the benefit of it. Irenæus's constant way of reasoning in other places shews that he always carried that conclusion in his mind: and indeed he goes but one page further on, before he formally draws it, in these strong and emphatical words[e]: "They who make [*Jesus*] a mere man begotten of "Joseph, remaining under the bondage of the first disobedience, "are in a dead state, inasmuch as they are not yet conjoined

[c] Bonus vere Filius Dei et patiens, *Verbum* Dei Patris, Filius hominis factus.—Salutem donavit plasmati suo, destruens peccatum: est enim piissimus et misericors Dominus, et amans humanum genus. *Iren.* lib. iii. c. 18, alias 20.

[d] Ἥνωσεν οὖν, καθὼς προέφαμεν, τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ Θεῷ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησεν τὸν ἀντίπαλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ἐνικήθη ὁ ἐχθρός· πάλιν τε, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐδωρήσατο τὴν σωτηρίαν, οὐκ ἂν βεβαίως ἔσχομεν αὐτήν. καὶ εἰ μὴ συνηνώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἠδυνήθη μετασχεῖν ἀφθαρσίας· ἔδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους, οἰκειότητος, εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν, καὶ Θεῷ μὲν παραστῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ γνωρίσαι τὸν Θεόν. *Irenæus, ibid.*

[e] Qui nude tantum hominem eum dicunt ex Joseph generatum, perseverantes in servitute pristinæ inobedientiæ, moriuntur; nondum commixti *Verbo* Dei Patris, neque per *Filium* recipientes libertatem, quemadmodum ipse ait: *Si Filius vos manumiserit, vere liberi eritis.* Ignorantes autem eum qui ex Virgine est *Emmanuel*, privantur *munere ejus*, quod est *vita æterna*: non recipientes autem *Verbum* incorruptionis, perseverant in carne mortali; et sunt debitores mortis, antidotum vitæ non accipientes. *Iren.* lib. iii. c. 19, alias c. 21.

" with the *Word* of God the Father, nor have received *freedom* " by the *Son:* according to what himself says: *If the Son shall* " *make you free, you shall be free indeed*[f]. While they acknow- " ledge not him who of the Virgin is *Emmanuel*, [God with us,] " they forfeit the benefit of it, which is *life eternal.* While they " admit not the *Word* of incorruption, they continue in *mortal* " flesh, and are bound over to *death*, for want of receiving the " antidote of life." This excellent writer has a great deal more to the same purpose in the same chapter: but what I have cited may suffice for a summary view of his sentiments on this head. It is observable, that, according to him, the not receiving the *Emmanuel*, as *Emmanuel*, that is, as *God incarnate*, is in effect throwing up the privileges of it, (viz. *life eternal*,) and is remaining under the dominion of *death* and *hell.* Nothing can be stronger for the *importance* of the article of Christ's *Divinity;* especially if this passage be compared with the author's high and just sense of the name *Emmanuel*, importing that Christ is *substantially*, or essentially, *God* in one nature, as he is *man* in another[g]. I know not whether I again need to take notice (having twice before done it[h]) how Irenæus here mixes the two questions about the birth of a *virgin*, and about the Lord's *Divinity*, as amounting to one, upon the foot of the then present controversies. For the point then in question was, whether Christ was conceived in the common way of human generation, or whether the *divine Logos* coming upon the *Virgin* superseded and excluded *human* means? The question being so stated, the asserting a *divine Logos* in Christ was of course asserting the birth of a *virgin;* as the denying the birth of a *virgin* was of course denying any personal union of the *Logos* with man. Thus the two questions at that time resolved, in a manner, into one: which is the reason, as I hinted before, of their being intermingled together.

A. D. 177. ATHENAGORAS.

Athenagoras, in his Apology for the Christian Religion, written

[f] John viii. 36.

[g] Diligenter igitur significavit Spiritus Sanctus per ea quæ dicta sunt, generationem ejus quæ est ex *Virgine*, et *substantiam* quoniam *Deus* (*Emmanuel* enim nomen hoc significat) et manifestat quoniam *homo*, in eo quod dicit, &c. *Iren.* lib. iii. c. 21, alias 26. Οἱ τὸν ἐκ τῆς παρθένου Ἐμμανουὴλ κηρύττοντες, τὴν ἕνωσιν τοῦ Λόγου τοῦ Θεοῦ πρὸς τὸ πλάσμα αὐτοῦ ἐδήλουν· quoniam *Verbum* caro erit, et Filius Dei Filius hominis—et hoc factus quod et nos, *Deus fortis est*, et inenarrabile habet genus. *Iren.* lib. iv. c. 33, alias 66.

[h] See above, p. 572, 573.

at this time[i], has more passages than one[k] which plainly prove his belief of the *truth* of the doctrine of the *Trinity:* but as to the *necessity*, or the *importance* of such faith, he had the less occasion to speak particularly, or to press it with any earnestness, since his immediate concern was not with *heretics*, or with *Jews*, but with *Pagans* only. Nevertheless, he occasionally drops some expressions which intimate his high veneration for that sublime and tremendous doctrine, and shew how much it concerned Christians to make it the subject of their most serious thoughts and most devout meditations. Speaking of *Christians*, he describes them[l] "as men that made small account of the present "life, but were intent only upon contemplating *God*[m], and "knowing his *Word* who is from him; what *union* the *Son* has "with the *Father*, what *communion* the *Father* has with the *Son;* "what the *Spirit* is, and what the union and distinction are of "such so united, the *Spirit*, the *Son*, and the *Father*." From hence we may infer how *important* a doctrine that of the *Trinity*, as understood by Athenagoras, (the same as we understand at this day,) was conceived to be, that the then Christians made it one principal concern of their lives to contemplate and adore the three divine Persons. I say, *adore:* for though that is not expressed in this passage, it is undoubtedly *implied*, and is the *express* doctrine of the author in other places[n]. Thus much we may undoubtedly collect from the present passage, that *mysteries* of faith were not then thought barren *speculations*, or matters of slight concernment. The reflection of a learned foreigner hereupon is very just and proper, and I shall give it the reader in the margin[o], as an useful comment upon this paragraph of Athenagoras. I proceed to other ecclesiastical writers in their order.

[i] See Mosheim, Observ. Sacr. c. iv.

[k] Vid. Bull. Defens. F. N. sect. ii. c. 4. p. 67, alias 71. Dr. Bishop's Sermons, p. 186, &c. Nourrii Apparat. ad Bibl. Max. vol. i. p. 487, &c. My Sermons, vol. ii. p. 178. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 439—443, 580, &c.

[l] Ἄνθρωποι δὲ, τὸν μὲν ἐνταῦθα ὀλίγον καὶ μικροῦ τινος ἄξιον βίον λελογισμένοι, ὑπὸ μόνου δὲ παραπεμπόμενοι τούτου, ὃν ἴσως [forte νοήσασθαι] Θεὸν καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ Λόγον εἰδέναι, τίς ἡ τοῦ παιδὸς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ἑνότης, τίς ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν κοινωνία, τί τὸ πνεῦμα, τίς ἡ τῶν τοσούτων ἕνωσις καὶ διαίρεσις ἑνουμένων, τοῦ πνεύματος, τοῦ παιδὸς, τοῦ πατρός. *Athenag. Legat.* lib. xi. p. 46. edit. Oxon.

[m] Νοήσασθαι, for ὃν ἴσως, is an emendation of a learned foreigner, Godfr. Olearius, in his Dissertat. Theolog. de Spiritus Sanct. cum Patre et Filio Adoratione, contr. Gul. Whiston, A. D. 1711. p. 2. The emendation has been taken notice of before by Dr. Bishop, Sermons, p. 188.

[n] Athenag. c. x. p. 40. xxvi. p. 122.

[o] Quamquam in primis Christianismi temporibus id cum primis gloriæ sibi duxerint fidei nostræ sanctissimæ professores, quod non mediatione verborum, sed demonstratione et institutione operum Christianam rem absolvi profiterentur; non tamen

A. D. 209. TERTULLIAN.

Tertullian has some very remarkable expressions relating to the faith of the Church in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, *one God*, as being the *sum* and *substance* of the Gospel, the very life and spirit of the Christian religion. I have cited part of the passage before, but shall now give it entire. "It is mere *Judaism*, to "believe *one God* in such a sense as not to reckon the *Son* to "him, and after the Son, the *Spirit:* for wherein is the great "difference between them and us, except it be in this article? "What is it that the Gospel has done, what is the substance of "the New Testament, extending the Law and the Prophets as "far as John, if from thence forwards Father, Son, and Holy "Ghost, three Persons, are not believed to make one God[p]?" I have taken a little liberty in translating, just enough to keep the English up, and not to alter the sense. *Three Persons* is barely a literal rendering of *tres*, in that place, which cannot be otherwise so well expressed in English: besides, the word *Persona*, for the same thing, is common in Tertullian[q]. As to what concerns the *importance* of the doctrine of the Trinity, it is impossible to invent any thing fuller or stronger, in so few words, than this passage. I am sensible it will be pleaded in bar to his evidence, that he was a *Montanist*. The fact is true, but there is no argument at all in it, as has been often shewn by learned men; but more particularly by the learned and judicious Mr. Welchman[r], in his late very correct edition of the treatise against Praxeas. Tertullian was no *Montanist* in 198: but it has been sufficiently proved, both by Mr. Welchman and Mosheim, that

ista *praxis sacra* ita fuit a *theoria* doctrinæ Christianæ separata, ut non *mysteria* etiam *fidei*, a quorum recta cognitione *divini Numinis cultus*, tum *vitæ* de reliquo *recte instituendæ* ratio penderent, non temere quidem, sed neque tamen perfunctorie scrutarentur——Etenim qui in primis Christianismi initiis, inque ipso adeo φωτισμῷ suo, accepissent fidem in *Patrem*, *Filium*, et *Spiritum Sanctum*, eaque nomina perpetuo in ore haberent, eos sane oportebat eo contendere, ut crescerent in omni plenitudine scientiæ de *mysterio* tam augusto tamque venerando. *Godfr. Olear. in Dissertat.* p. 1, 2.

[p] Cæterum Judaicæ fidei est res, sic *unum Deum* credere ut *Filium* adnumerare ei nolis, et post Filium, *Spiritum*. Quid enim inter nos et illos, nisi differentia ista? Quod opus Evangelii? Quæ est substantia Novi Testamenti statuens Legem et Prophetas usque ad Johannem, si non exinde Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, tres crediti, unum Deum sistunt? *Tertull. adv. Prax.* c. xxxi. p. 102. edit. Welchm.

[q] Tertull. contr. Prax. c. xi. p. 32, 34. xii. 35, 37.

[r] Welchman, Præfat. ad Tertull. contr. Prax. p. 5—13. Conf. Mosheim, Disquis. Chronologico-Crit. de vera ætate Apologetici a Tertulliano conscripti.

his Apology (which contains the same doctrine) was as early as that year.

A. D. 256. CYPRIAN.

St. Cyprian has a remarkable passage which speaks full and close to our purpose. Arguing for the invalidity of *heretical* baptisms, he asks, how any person baptized by *heretics*, and thereby partaking in their heresy, (so he must mean,) can be presumed to obtain remission of sins, and to become the *temple of God?* "If he be thereby made the temple of God, I would "ask, of what God [or *divine Person*] it is? Is it of [God] the "*Creator?* he could not be so, if he believed not in him. Is it "of *Christ?* neither can he be his temple, while he *denies* "Christ to be *God*. Is it then of the *Holy Ghost?* But since "the *three are one*, how can the Holy Ghost have friendship "with him that is at enmity with either *Father* or *Son*[s]?" Here it is observable, 1. That St. Cyprian gives the name or title of *God* to each of the divine Persons. 2. That to deny Christ to be *God* is interpretatively excluding one's self from Christ, and declaring *enmity* towards all the *three*, who are *one*. 3. That therefore the acknowledging Christ to be *God* is necessary to salvation, and the impugning that doctrine is destructive of it: consequently, one is a *fundamental* article of faith, and the other a *fundamental* error. So far is plain. And now, if there remains any room for dispute, it can only be about the true and full meaning of the word *God* in this place. But Cyprian's declaring that salvation depends upon the article, is a strong presumption that he understood the word in its *just* and *proper* sense: his applying it indifferently to all the three Persons, without any mark of distinction, is a further presumption of the same thing: his saying that the *three are one*, [*unum*,] one substance, one thing, makes it still plainer: and lastly, his applying the title of *God* to the Son, in the strictest and highest sense, in other parts of his works, sets it beyond dispute[t]. I may observe, by the

[s] Si peccatorum remissionem consecutus est et sanctificatus est, et *templum Dei* factus est, quæro, *cujus Dei?* Si *Creatoris*, non potuit qui in eum non credidit: si *Christi*, nec hujus fieri potest templum, qui negat *Deum* Christum: si *Spiritus Sancti*, cum tres unum sint, quomodo Spiritus Sanctus placatus esse ei potest, qui aut *Patris*, aut *Filii* inimicus est? *Cyprian. Ep.* 73. *ad Jubaian.* p. 203. edit. Oxon.

[t] The passages are collected in Bishop Bull, Def. F. N. sect. ii. c. 10. p. 119, &c. and in my First Defence, vol. i. Qu. ii. p. 291, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. ii. p. 490.

way, of Cyprian, as I have before hinted of other Fathers, that he went upon this maxim, that whosoever shall *disbelieve* the doctrines of *salvation* revealed to mankind shall have no part in the salvation so tendered to them, ordinarily at least.

A. D. 257. NOVATIAN.

Novatian expresses the same thought in very clear and strong terms. "If God the Father saves none but through *God*, "then no one can be saved by God the Father, who does not "confess that Christ is *God; in whom*, and *by whom*, the Father "promises to give *salvation:* wherefore, very justly, whosoever "acknowledges him to be God, is in the way to be *saved* by "Christ, who is *God;* and whosoever doth not acknowledge "him to be *God* forfeits *salvation*, because he cannot otherwise "have it but in Christ as *God*[u]." Words too plain to need any comment. Only I may observe that Novatian, as well as Cyprian, understood the word *God*, as applied to Christ, to import *proper* and *substantial* Divinity; as I have abundantly proved elsewhere[x]. Besides which, it is certain that the Novatians, his followers, were always orthodox in the article of Christ's *Divinity*, as also in the doctrine of the whole *Trinity*[y].

A. D. 259. DIONYSIUS of Rome.

Dionysius, Bishop of Rome, in a valuable Fragment, preserved by Athanasius, styles the doctrine of the Trinity, "the most "venerable doctrine of the Church of God[z];" understanding the doctrine as we do at this day: it was not then looked upon as a *speculative* opinion, or as a matter of *slight* importance. But this is not all I have to observe from the same excellent writer: he goes on to speak of some who had the presumption to call the Son of God a *creature*, led to it by their indiscreet opposition to *Sabellianism*, as it was natural enough for weak

[u] Si non salvat nisi in *Deo* Pater Deus, *salvari* non poterit a Deo Patre quisquam nisi confessus fuerit Christum *Deum*, in quo, et per quem se repromittit Pater salutem daturum: ut merito, quisquis illum agnoscit esse *Deum*, salutem inveniat in *Deo* Christo; quisquis non recognoscit esse *Deum*, salutem perdiderit, quoniam alibi nisi in Christo *Deo* eam invenire non poterit. *Novat.* c. xii. p. 36.

[x] First Defence, vol. i. p. 282, &c. 354, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 427, &c. 476, &c. 492, 743, 746. Conf. Bull. Def. F. N. sect. ii. c. 10. p. 121, 122.

[y] The testimonies may be seen collected in a late pamphlet, entitled, An Answer to Dr. Clarke and Mr. Whiston, &c. by H. E. in the preface, p. 2, 3.

[z] Τὸ σεμνότατον κήρυγμα τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Θεοῦ. *Apud Athanas.* vol. i. p. 231.

men to run from one extreme to another. He rejects the notion with the utmost abhorrence, as every wise and good man would: and after censuring Marcion's Tritheistic doctrine as diabolical, he proceeds to speak of the other, as follows: "Nor are they "less to blame who think the Son *creature*, and who suppose "the Lord to have come into being, as if he were one of the "things that were really made: the sacred oracles assign him a "*generation*, suitable and proper, not a *formation* and *creation*. "Wherefore it must be *blasphemy* of no ordinary size, but of "the first magnitude, to say that the Lord was a kind of "handy-work. For if he began to be, he once was not: but "he existed eternally, if so be that he is *in the Father*, as himself "testifies, and if Christ be the *Word*, and *Wisdom*, and *Power*[a]." There is more to the same purpose in what follows: what I have cited may suffice to shew, that the doctrine of our Lord's coeternal *Divinity* was then looked upon as an article of the highest *importance*, and that to deny it was to *blaspheme* in a most grievous manner, according to the sentiments of the Church at that time. For Dionysius speaks not his own sense only, but the sense of the Roman Synod, and of good Christians in general; as he himself intimates by his saying to those whom he addresses himself to, that he had no need to dwell upon that matter before persons so enlightened by the Spirit of God, and so well apprised, as they were, of the great *absurdity* of making the Son a creature [b].

A. D. 259. DIONYSIUS of Alexandria.

The case of Dionysius of Alexandria is a famous case. He had written some things against the Sabellians, wherein expressing himself unwarily, he was suspected by some to lean too far towards the opposite extreme, as if he had not just notions of the *Divinity* of Christ. A jealousy being raised, the matter was thought considerable enough to be brought before the other Dionysius, Bishop of Rome: which probably occasioned his

[a] Οὐ μεῖον δ' ἂν τις καταμέμφοιτο καὶ τοὺς ποίημα τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι δοξάζοντας, καὶ γεγονέναι τὸν Κύριον, ὥσπερ ἕν τι ὄντως γενομένων νομίζοντας, τῶν θείων λογίων γέννησιν αὐτῷ τὴν ἁρμόττουσαν καὶ πρέπουσαν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ πλάσιν τινὰ καὶ ποίησιν προσμαρτυρούντων. Βλάσφημον οὖν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν, μέγιστον μὲν οὖν, χειροποίητον τρόπον τινὰ λέγειν τὸν Κύριον. εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν υἱὸς, ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν· ἀεὶ δὲ ἦν, εἴ γε ἐν τῷ πατρί ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτός φησι, καὶ εἰ λόγος, καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις ὁ Χριστός. *Apud Athanas.* vol. i. p. 231, 232.

[b] Καὶ τί ἂν ἐπὶ πλέον περὶ τούτων πρὸς ὑμᾶς διαλεγοίμην, πρὸς ἄνδρας πνευματοφόρους, καὶ σαφῶς ἐπισταμένους τὰς ἀτοπίας τὰς ἐκ τοῦ ποίημα λέγειν τὸν υἱὸν ἀνακυπτούσας; *Ibid.* p. 232.

writing what I have just now cited from him [c]. The Bishop of Rome took cognizance of the cause, and the Bishop of Alexandria, though not inferior to him, nor under his jurisdiction, submitted so far as to put in his answer or *apology*: which alone shews that it was looked upon by all parties as a cause of great moment; for in smaller matters, bishops were not obliged to give account to their colleagues. St. Cyprian well expresses both the cases, viz. where and when independent bishops were accountable to other bishops [d], and where they were not [e]. The sum is, that in the *ritual* part of religion such bishops were independent and unaccountable; but in the *substantial* part, in matters of *necessary* faith, they were liable to be censured by their brethren. Seeing therefore that Dionysius of Alexandria was accused in a cause of *heresy*, the Bishop of Rome could not decline hearing it, nor the other refuse to submit to have it heard and judged. The whole process of that affair shews that the *Divinity* of Christ (about which the question was) was looked upon by all parties as a cause of the utmost concernment to religion. The whole Christian world, in a manner, was in an alarm about it: complaint was brought from Egypt as far as to Italy: the Bishop of Rome, with his clergy in Synod, were in the greatest concern upon it, and sent their judgment of the matter in question to the Bishop of Alexandria, requiring him to give an account of his faith: and that aged venerable *Primate* did so soon after, declaring in the face of the world, that he never intended the least injury to the *Divinity* of Christ, or to his *consubstantiality*, but himself believed it as sincerely and fully as any man else could. This affair is recorded by Athanasius [f], from whom I have collected what I have said: and it is

[c] See Athanas. de Sententia Dionysii Alex. p. 252. de Synod. 757.

[d] Copiosum corpus est sacerdotum, concordiæ mutuæ glutino atque unitatis vinculo copulatum, ut si quis ex collegio nostro *hæresin* facere, et gregem Christi lacerare et vastare tentaverit, subveniant cæteri, et quasi pastores utiles et misericordes, oves dominicas in gregem colligant. *Cyprian. ad Steph.* Ep. lxviii. p. 178.

[e] Superest ut de hac ipsa re, singuli quid sentiamus, proferamus; neminem judicantes, aut a jure communionis aliquem, si diversum senserit, amoventes. Neque enim quisquam nostrum episcopum se episcoporum constituit, aut tyrannico terrore ad obsequendi necessitatem collegas suos adigit: quando habeat omnis episcopus pro licentia libertatis et potestatis suæ arbitrium proprium; tamque judicari ab alio non potest, quam nec ipse potest judicare: sed expectemus universi judicium Domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui unus et solus habet potestatem et præponendi nos in Ecclesiæ suæ gubernatione, et de actu nostro judicandi. *Concil. Carthagin. apud Cypr.* p. 229, 230.

[f] Athanas. de Sententia Dionys. p. 252. de Synod. 757, 758.

a standing monument of the high regard paid to the doctrine of our Lord's *Divinity* [g], as a most important and fundamental article of Christianity in those days, sixty years and more before the Council of Nice.

A.D. 319. ALEXANDER of Alexandria.

I shall close this account with the sentiments of Alexander and his clergy, among which were near a hundred more bishops of the province, upon the present question, at the first breaking out of the Arian heresy. In their synodical letter, after sentence of excommunication passed upon Arius and his adherents, they represent the Arians, or Eusebians, as fallen into an *apostasy*, and as forerunners of *antichrist* [h]: they compare them with Hymenæus and Philetus, and the traitor Judas; and they stigmatize them as enemies to God, and subverters of souls. Such was their sense of the high importance of the doctrine of Christ's *Divinity*, which Arius had impugned. About two years after, the same Alexander, in his circular letter to the other Alexander of Byzantium, after declaring his faith in Christ, as truly and essentially *God*, of that and other articles of his Creed, he says: "These we teach, and these we declare: "these are the Apostolical doctrines of the Church, for which "we should be content to die, making small account of them "who would compel us to deny them: for though they should "even torture us to comply, yet would we not cast off our hope "in those [*doctrines:*] for the opposing of which Arius and "Achillas, with their accomplices, being enemies to the truth, "are ejected out of the Church, as deserters of our holy faith, "[*godly doctrine;*] pursuant to St. Paul's rule: If any one "*preach any other Gospel unto you* than what you have received, "*let him be accursed*, though he should pretend to be an *angel* "*from heaven* [i]." Such were the sentiments of this good and great man, relating to the *importance* of the doctrine he taught;

[g] See the whole thing more particularly drawn out, and vindicated from exceptions, in Bull. Def. F. N. sect. ii. c. 11. Thirlby's Answers to Whiston's Suspicions, p. 31, &c. Berriman, Hist. Account, p. 127, &c.

[h] Ἄνδρες παράνομοι καὶ χριστομάχοι διδάσκοντες ἀποστασίαν, ἣν εἰκότως ἄν τις πρόδρομον τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου ὑπονοήσειεν καὶ καλέσειεν. *Ap. Athanas.* p. 397. *et ap. Socrat.* lib. i. c. 6.

[i] Ταῦτα διδάσκομεν, ταῦτα κηρύττομεν· ταῦτα τῆς ἐκκλησίας τὰ Ἀποστολικὰ δόγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν καὶ ἀποθνήσκομεν, τῶν ἐξόμνυσθαι αὐτὰ βιαζομένων ἧττον πεφροντικότες, εἰ· καὶ διὰ βασάνων ἀναγκάζουσι, τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδα μὴ ἀποστρεφόμενοι. ὧν ἐναντίοι κ. τ. λ. *Apud Theodorit. E. H.* lib. i. c. 4.

the same which was afterward confirmed by the general Council of Nice, summoned from out of all Christendom to decide so *momentous* a question.

The sum of what I have advanced in this chapter is, that by three several topics it is proved to be certain *fact*, that the doctrine of our Lord's *Divinity*, and so of the whole Trinity, was looked upon by the ancient churches of Christ as one of the *prime* verities, one of the *essentials* of Christianity. This, I say, is proved from Creeds, and from *censures* upon *heresies*, (*public* acts of the Church,) and from particular testimonies of *Fathers*, declaring their own private sentiments of the *weight* and *importance* of the doctrines we have been considering. Now I proceed to inquire of what *use* and *value* this view of the *ancients* may be to us.

CHAP. VII.

Shewing the Use *and* Value *of Ecclesiastical Antiquity with Respect to Controversies of Faith.*

I INTEND not here to consider *the use of the Fathers* in its largest extent, but only so far as concerns *articles* of *faith*. I shall endeavour to set this matter in as clear a light as I can, for the impartial and discerning reader to judge of, avoiding all *extremes*. A certain writer, whom I should not perhaps have taken the least notice of, had it not thus fallen in my way, has been pleased to tell the world, that "Dr. Waterland and some "others, who have appeared on the same side of the question, "have only considered the Scripture in that light which a sober "Turk or an Indian might discover in it. But Scripture has a "much greater force in the hands of St. Athanasius and of "St. Basil, (who viewed it in its true, that is, in its *original* and "*traditionary* sense, and under the lights of *faith*,) than it has in "Dr. Waterland's; who ascends no higher than the bare *letter*, "and that sense of which all men, who are sincere, may equally "judge, whether they believe it or not. But when St. Athana-"sius and St. Basil argue from Scripture, they have a regard to "*faith*, and those ideas which *Catholics* have always had con-"cerning the Son and the Holy Spirit[k]." The report which

[k] An Answer to Dr. Clarke and Mr. Whiston, concerning the Divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit, with a summary Account of the chief Writers of the three first Ages. By H. E. Printed by Roberts, 1729. See pref. p. 4, 5.

this gentleman has here made may be true in part: and, so far, what he intended as an article of blame may appear much otherwise to more equal judges. I doubt not to say, that the Scripture is plain enough in this cause for any honest Turk or Indian to judge of, who is but able to discern the difference between *wresting* a text, and giving it an *easy* and *natural* interpretation. Nor do I see why a man may not be as *certain* of the construction of Scripture in this article, from the words themselves, comparing Scriptures with Scriptures, as he may be of the sense of Homer or Aristotle, of Cicero or Cæsar, in plain and clear passages. Nevertheless, if, over and above this, any further *light* or *strength* may arise from comparing *Scripture* and *antiquity* together, it is an additional advantage to our cause, such as we are thankful for, and constantly make us of. All kinds of evidences are *useful;* and there is so much weakness generally in mankind, that we have no reason to throw aside any assistances given us for relief or remedy. *Antiquity* therefore, superadded to Scripture, is what we sincerely value, and pay a great regard to; perhaps much greater than that gentleman himself really does; for, if I be not very much mistaken in the drift and tendency of his censure, it is such as plainly discovers (notwithstanding his artful disguises) a much more affectionate concern for a *modern* corrupt Church, than for the pure and *ancient* faith. St. Athanasius and St. Basil pleaded the same cause, and exactly in the same way, as we of the Church of England do. They appealed to *Scripture* first, speaking for itself, and proving its own sense to the *common reason* of mankind, according to the just rules of grammar and criticism: after that, they referred also to the well known faith of all the *ancient* churches, as superabundantly confirming the same rational and natural construction. Athanasius and Basil were wise and honest men, and would never have admitted what this writer *meanly* insinuates[1], (while he pretends to be an advocate on the same side,) that *Arianism* would not be *heresy* upon the foot of *Scripture,* singly considered. Such unworthy suggestions are as contrary to the general sense of *antiquity* as they are to *truth* and *godliness,* and tend only to *betray* the *best* of causes, for the sake of serving and supporting one of the *worst.* Athanasius's sentiments may appear from one single passage, which is all I need refer to at

[1] An Answer to Dr. Clarke and Mr. Whiston, &c. pref. p. 6, 7.

length in proof of a thing so well known. He observes, that the Arians, finding nothing in *Scripture* to countenance their *heresy*, were forced to have recourse to confident presumptions and collusive sophistry; and when they had done with those, their next attempt was, to abuse the *Fathers* also[m], who favoured them as little as the Scripture did. Athanasius appealed to *Scripture* in the first place, and laid the main stress there: which indeed is his constant way in his dispute with the Arians. No man speaks more highly of the *perfection* and *sufficiency* of Scripture than he does: namely, that it affords the fullest and strongest evidences for establishing the *faith* against the Arians[n]; and that it is in itself *sufficient* for every thing[o]. The like might be shewn of Basil, were it needful. Therefore let not that gentleman hope to find shelter for his insidious conduct under those great and venerable names.

He proceeds to observe, that "*Catholics* (*Roman Catholics* I "suppose be means) are so accustomed to join *faith* and reading "the holy Scripture together, that they *account* this to be the "*natural* signification of the words[p]." Which is artfully insinuating, that the sense which Trinitarians affix to Scripture is not *natural*, but made to *appear* so, through the prejudice of education, or through the lights of an *infallible* chair. And so he pleads, under cover, for *imposing* a sense upon Scripture, instead of *taking* one from the natural force of the words. This never was the advice of the *ancients*[q], neither ought it to be the practice of *moderns*. We insist upon it, that our interpretation of Scripture is *just* and *natural*, and that one great use of *antiquity* is, to guard that *natural* construction against *unnatural* distortions. To do violence to Scripture, in order to bring it to speak what we have a mind to, or what we have preconceived, is making Scripture insignificant, and setting up a *new rule of faith*: and indeed this gentleman afterwards gives very broad intimations that Scripture is not the *whole* rule of faith[r]. So now the secret

[m] Τῶν δ' Ἀρειομανιτῶν τὴν ἀλογίαν καὶ νῦν ἐπέγνων. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτ' εὔλογον, οὔτε πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν ἐκ τῆς θείας γραφῆς ῥητὸν ἐχούσης τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτῶν, ἀεὶ μὲν προφάσεις ἀναισχύντους ἐπορίζοντο καὶ σοφίσματα πιθανά· νῦν δὲ καὶ διαβάλλειν τοὺς πατέρας τετολμήκασι. *Athanas. de Sent. Dionys.* p. 243.

[n] Vid. Athanas. p. 274, 720, 237. edit. Bened.

[o] Athanas. p. 1.

[p] Answer to Dr. Clarke, &c. p. 7.

[q] Optimus enim lector est, qui dictorum intelligentiam exspectet ex dictis potius quam imponat, et retulerit magis quam attulerit; neque cogat id videri dictis contineri, quod ante lectionem præsumserit intelligendum. *Hilar. de Trin.* lib. i. col. 777.

[r] Answer to Dr. Clarke, pref. p. 17. book 22, 23.

is out: and I suppose, by this time, it is manifest what cause he is serving; and that he has something else more at heart than the doctrine of the *Trinity*. However, to do him justice, though he has made too many concessions, and has not sufficiently considered his subject[s], he has yet given us a neat methodical summary of the doctrine of the *ancients* upon that head. Only it would grieve a man to observe, how disadvantageous circumstances he chooses to place those venerable saints in, as overruling the *natural* sense of words, and making that *heresy* which Scripture has not made so, having no authority for doing it but what they are forced to borrow from a particular Church[t], which gives the same to every article of the Trent Creed. But leaving this gentleman to take his own way, let us now proceed to the business in hand.

There is no occasion for magnifying *antiquity* at the expense of *Scripture*; neither is that the way to do real honour to either, but to expose both; as it is sacrificing their reputation to serve the ends of novelty and error. *Antiquity* ought to attend as an handmaid to Scripture, to wait upon her as her mistress, and to observe her; to keep off *intruders* from making too bold with her, and to discourage *strangers* from misrepresenting her. *Antiquity*, in this *ministerial* view, is of very great use; which I shall endeavour to shew as distinctly as may be.

But first let me premise a few things, in order to give the reader a clearer idea of the true state of the whole case. It is to be considered, that Scripture consists of *words*, and that words are but *signs*, and that *common* usage and acceptation is what must settle their *meaning*. And when any thing comes

[s] This appears from his lame and confused account of the word *person*, p. 5—11, 38.

[t] The very pious Mr. Nelson, in a Letter to a Popish Priest, has some reflections worth the inserting in this place.

"I am not ignorant that two of "your great champions, Cardinal "Perron and Petavius, to raise the "authority of *general councils*, and to "make the rule of their faith appear "more plausible, have *aspersed* not "only the holy *Scriptures*, as unca-"pable, by reason of their *obscurity*, "to prove the great and *necessary* "point of our Saviour's *Divinity*, but "have impeached also the Fathers of "the first three centuries as tardy in "the same point.——Blessed God! "that men should be so fond of *human* "inventions, as to sacrifice to them "those *pillars* of our faith which are "alone proper and able to support it; "I mean *Scripture* and primitive *an-*"*tiquity*. But to do justice to the "memory of so learned a man as Pe-"tavius, the Bishop of Meaux told "me, discoursing with him once on "this subject, that in the last edition "he made of his works he *retracted* "this opinion: which I am willing "to believe upon the authority of that "great man, &c." *Dr. Hickes's Letters*, &c. p. 334. Compare Chillingworth, pref. sect. 16, 17, 18.

down to us in a *dead* language, as Scripture now does, the customary use of words in that language, at the time when they were spoken or written, must be the rule and measure of interpretation[u]; only, taking in with it the drift and intention of the speaker, or writer, so far as it may be certainly known, or probably presumed from evidences or circumstances.

It is next to be considered, that there is something of *equivocalness* and *ambiguity*, for the most part, in *words* or *phrases*, though ever so well and wisely chosen; and that many through *ignorance*, or *inattention*, or *prepossession*, may mistake or pervert their true meaning. Subtle wits may at any time take advantage of this natural imperfection of all languages, and may wrest the *plainest expressions* from their true and certain meaning to a false and foreign one. The nature of language, I say, is such that it may be done, and the depravity or weakness of mankind is such that it often *will* be done: and then disputes will arise about the jarring and dissonant interpretations, all perhaps appearing severally *possible*, and all *plausibly* recommended, though amongst them all there is but one which is truly *reasonable*.

It may further be considered, that all languages abound with metaphors, tropes, figures, or schemes of speech; and it is allowable to interpret *figuratively*, *allegorically*, *emblematically*, as often as there is a *necessity* for it, or good reason to apprehend that the thing was written in the way of *figure*, *allegory*, or *emblem*. This allowable liberty may easily be extended too far, through want of *judgment*, or want of *care*, or want of *honesty* and *sincerity*. Indeed most of the *abuses* with regard to interpreting of Scripture, when traced up to their fountain head, will appear to have been owing to this, that some will *fancy* the plain and obvious sense *unreasonable* or *absurd*, when it really is not; and will thereupon obtrude their own *surmises*, *conjectures*, *prejudices* upon the word of God. For having taken their own *conceits* for certain *truths*, and having determined beforehand that the *letter* of Scripture shall give way to them, they will of course rack and torture Scripture, as far as wit, learning, or invention can assist them, in order to contrive some construction or other, which may but seem to favour their preconceived opinions; unless they choose rather to reject or adulterate the texts which make against them, or to devise *new* Scriptures to serve the purpose.

[u] See Rogers's Review, p. 41—51.

Add to this, that the art of *torturing* plain words has been advanced to great perfection in these latter ages, since the revival of learning and sciences; and especially since the Socinians[x] and Romanists have taken almost incredible pains to make themselves complete masters in that way. There is nothing now almost, but what some or other will attempt (if there be occasion) to drag over into the service of any cause, and to wrest to what sense they please, though ever so contrary to the words themselves, or to the known intention of the authors or compilers. The ancient misbelievers most of them were young practitioners in comparison: for they commonly *rejected* or *adulterated* the Scriptures which they did not like[y], not understanding, or however not trusting to *qualifying* interpretations, which might steal away the *sense*, without injuring the *letter*.

Lastly, it should be considered, that God has provided no other general remedies against these and the like *abuses*, or against men's being *imposed* upon by them, than what he has provided against any other wiles of *Satan*, or any other *temptations*; namely, *prayer* and *watchfulness*, *care* and *endeavour*, and the use of proper *means*. We are no more secure against *heresy* than we are against any other *sins*: but there are as strong temptations to it, (founded in natural *pride*, *vanity*, *curiosity*, *emulation*, *ambition*, or sometimes *credulity*, *supineness*, *secular*

[x] The Socinian management is thus elegantly described by Abr. Calovius.

Dici non potest quam nefario ausu, quam profana impietate, quam horrendo sacrilegio versentur illi Scripturarum corruptores in sacris literis, ut *suæ* aut favere videantur, aut saltem non adversari *sententiæ*: modo enim scripta *θεόπνευστα*, partim *Novi* partim et imprimis *Veteris* Testamenti, de sublimi auctoritatis *divinæ* fastigio deturbant; modo sententias et periodos quasdam Scripturæ sacræ *in dubium revocant*; modo distinctiones *parenthesium* et *cola* intervertunt, ac *trajectionum* novo *εὑρήματι* Spiritus S. sensum invertunt; modo per *apostrophas*, vel *exclamationes* mentem Scripturæ corrumpunt; modo per constructiones *recens excogitatas*, modo per vocum significationes *inusitatas*, nullisque lexicographis cognitas; modo per *ἀνάλυσιν* violentam, modo per *ἐξήγησιν* prorsus insolentem, interdum et *κατὰ διάμετρον* oppositam et contrariam, sacras literas detorquent: quadrata rotundis, supera inferis, cælum terris miscent, horrendaque *στρεβλότητι*, oracula sanctissima pervertunt, detestanda *μεταμορφώσει* transformant: quicquid denique apertum et clarum in sacris literis, id veluti sepiæ rationis suæ obscurant atramento. Ipsam autem Scripturam perplexitatis, *ἀνιστορησίας*, *ἀπαιδευσίας*, *ἀνακολουθείας*, ambiguitatis, obscuritatis, incertitudinis, erroris, falsitatis, impie postulant et accusant; scilicet juxta illud Hieronymi veriverbium, hæretici convicti de perfidia, conferunt se ad maledicta. *Vid. Wucherer. Vindic. adv. Whiston.* p. 21. A.D. 1732.

[y] The heretics, so charged, are Cerinthus, Ebion, Saturninus, Carpocrates, Cerdon, Marcion, Lucian, Appelles, Tatian, Ptolomæus, Theodotus, Artemon, Manichæus; the Ophitæ, Cainites, Sethoites, Alogi, Pepuzians, Severians, and perhaps some others.

interest, or *revenge*,) as there are to other vices of a coarser kind.

These things considered, it will be highly expedient to take in all the helps we can procure, for the *ascertaining* the true and full meaning of sacred Writ, and for preserving, so far as in us lies, the doctrines of Christ. No proper *means* are to be neglected or set aside, lest we fall into error for want of the use of such means, or be found guilty of despising the gifts of God. Now we may come to the main question, whether *antiquity* may not be justly reputed one of the *proper means*, or how far it is so? In which inquiry I shall proceed by several steps or degrees, for the clearer and more distinct conception of what belongs to it, under its several views.

I. The *ancients* who lived nearest to the *apostolical* times are of some *use* to us, considered merely as contemporary writers, for their *diction* or *phraseology*. Any other coetaneous writers, Jewish or Pagan, are of use in that view: but home writers, Christian authors, will be so more especially, as conversant in the same subjects, and breathing the same spirit with the sacred writers themselves[z]. This, however, is the least, and the lowest use of the ancient *Fathers*; besides that we have but *few*, and those very *short* tracts, which bear so early a date.

II. A further use of the ancient *Fathers* is seen, in their letting us into the knowledge of antiquated *rites* and *customs*, upon which some Scripture allusions may be formed, and upon the knowledge of which the true interpretation of some Scripture phrases or idioms may in some measure depend[a]. But this general use is such as may also be answered, in a lower degree, by any as early writings, Jewish or Pagan; as likewise by Lexicons, or books of *antiquities*.

III. The ancient *Fathers* are further useful, as giving us insight into the *history of the age* in which the sacred books (of the *New* Testament, I mean) were written. For there is nothing which is apt to give so much light to any writing, as the well understanding and considering the *historical occasion* of it: a much surer and safer rule to go by, generally speaking, than mere criticising upon words; as is manifest in the case of *charters*, *statutes*, *records*, and other ancient monuments.

[z] Vid. Dodwell. Dissert. in Iren. in præfat. sect. 15. et Dissert. 1.
[a] Dodwell. Dissert. in Iren. i. c. 44.

IV. I come, fourthly, to mention some more peculiar and eminent views, in which the ancientest *Fathers* may be exceeding *useful*, for fixing the sense of Scripture in controverted texts. Those that lived in or near the apostolical times might retain in memory what the Apostles themselves, or their *immediate* successors, thought and said upon such and such points. And though there is no trusting, in such case, to *oral* tradition distinct from Scripture, nor to *written*, disagreeing with Scripture; yet *written* accounts, consonant to Scripture, are of use to *confirm* and *strengthen* Scripture, and to *ascertain* its true meaning. Ignatius, for instance, had been intimately conversant with the Apostles[b], and was a disciple of St. John[c]: and therefore he may reasonably be presumed to have justly represented the mind of the Apostles in the doctrine he has left behind him, extant at this day. This the learned Mosheim has admitted, and even contended for[d], though otherwise no zealous admirer of the ancient *Fathers*.

The like may be said of Polycarp, who had been taught immediately by the Apostles, and had conversed with many who had seen *our Lord*[e]. He was also particularly acquainted with St. John[f], was one of his *disciples*, and ordained Bishop of Smyrna by his hands[g]. His doctrine, so far as it reaches, and may be certainly depended upon as his, (whether we have it at *first* or at *second* hand,) will be of great use for confirming the sense of Scripture, being a *secondary* attestation of the same doctrine: which Mosheim, before mentioned, does also allow and plead for[h]. Our most reverend metropolitan, speaking of the *authority* of the very early Fathers, sums it up in these several particulars. "1. That they were *contemporary* with the "*Apostles*, and instructed by them. 2. That they were men of "an eminent *character* in the *Church*, and therefore such as

[b] Chrysostom. Hom. in Ignat. tom. i. p. 499. Socrat. Eccl. H. l. vi. c. 8.

[c] Act. Ignat. p. 9. edit. Grab. in Spicileg.

[d] Si doctrinam quam hic publice proposuit, intelligimus, id simul quod Petrus, Joannes, cæterique Servatoris amici senserint et Antiochenis tradiderint, exploratum habemus. *Mosheim. Vindic. contr. Toland.* sect. i. cap. 8. Compare Abp. Wake, c. x. p. 111, 114. 2nd edit.

[e] Iren. lib. iii. c. 3. Euseb. E. H. lib. iv. c. 14.

[f] Iren. Ep. ad Florin. inter Fragment. p. 340. Euseb. E. H. v. 20.

[g] Hieronym. Catal. Scriptor. Eccl. 17. Tertullian. Præscript. c. 32.

[h] Indubitatæ itaque fidei testem rursus habemus, non modo doctrinæ, quam ipse cœtui suo tradidit, sed et ejus quam *optimus magister* discedens suis reliquit. *Mosheim. ibid.* p. 237. Abp. Wake's Apostolical Fathers, c. x. p. 111.

" could not be ignorant of what was taught in it. 3. They were " careful to preserve the *doctrine* of *Christ* in its purity, and to " oppose such as went about to corrupt it. 4. They were men " not only of a perfect *piety*, but of great *courage* and *constancy*, " and therefore such as cannot be suspected to have had any de- " sign to prevaricate in this matter. 5. They were endued with " a large portion of the *Holy Spirit*, and, as such, could hardly " err in what they delivered as the *Gospel* of *Christ*. 6. Their " writings were approved by the *Church* in those days, which " could not be mistaken in its approbation of them[i]."

Mr. Bayle allows that, " in the days of the Apostles, or their " *first disciples*, it had been easy to discover those who gave the " Scriptures a *wrong interpretation*, because the infallibility of " the Apostles, (who might have been consulted by word or by " letter,) and the *fresh remembrance* of the verbal instructions " they had given their *disciples* and *pastors*, whom *themselves* had " consecrated, was a ready means for clearing any doubt or dis- " puted point[k]." It appears then to be on all hands agreed, that those *most early* Fathers are competent witnesses of the doctrine of the Church in their days; nay, and of the doctrine also of *Christ* and his *Apostles*, to whom they immediately succeeded: and therefore their general sense is of signal use (so far as it reaches) to ascertain the interpretation of Scripture, and more especially as being consonant to the *easy* and *natural* import of the words themselves.

The like may be said in proportion, and in a lower degree, of the writings of Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Irenæus, and Clemens Alexandrinus[l]; eminent personages, who flourished within fifty or sixty, or at most ninety years of the *apostolical* age. Their nearness to the time, their known fidelity, and their admirable endowments, ordinary and extraordinary, add great weight to their testimony or doctrine, and make it a *probable* rule of interpretation in the *prime* things: but there is another consideration, to follow in its place, which will give it still greater strength of probability than what I have here suggested. As

[i] Abp. Wake's Apostolical Fathers, cap. x. p. 110.

[k] Bayle's Supplement to Philosophical Commentary, p. 692.

[l] Clemens of Alexandria, the latest of the four, yet testifies of himself, that he had received his doctrine from several *disciples* of the very chief Apostles, who had truly preserved the *tradition* of the blessed doctrine as coming directly from the holy Apostles, Peter, James, and Paul. *Strom.* lib. i. p. 322. Conf. Grabe, Instances of Omissions and Defects, &c. p. 9.

to later *Fathers*, the argument, in this view, loses its force more and more, the lower we descend. Yet it deserves our notice, that the *Fathers* of the *third* and *fourth* centuries had the advantage of many *written* accounts of the doctrine of the former ages, which have since been lost; and therefore their testimonies also are of considerable weight, and are a mark of direction to us, not to be slighted in the main things. Neither indeed is this saying any thing very highly of them, but may be thought rather to be setting them too low, and sinking them beneath their real value: for the testimonies of Jews, heretics, or Pagans, so far as we can depend upon them, must be allowed to carry in them the same use, where they testify any thing of the general doctrine or practice of the Christian Church in their times. Pliny, Lucian, Celsus, and Julian (to name no more) are all useful to us in this view, as they give some light into the doctrine of the first and purest ages. They confirm the *fact*, that such doctrines were then generally taught, and they corroborate other evidences. Socinus seems to have allowed more to one testimony of Lucian, than to many Christian evidences [m]. No doubt, but it was some advantage to it in his esteem, that it came from a Pagan: though still it had not weight enough to conquer his prejudices; for he never wanted evasions. But I pass on to what I intend further. All kinds of evidences are of use, which can bring us any light as to what the doctrine of the Church was in the best and purest ages: and when we are once advanced so far as to come to any certainty about that *fact*, than we have ground whereon to stand, and can build our argument upon it.

V. The next consideration therefore is this, that a very particular regard is due to the *public acts* of the ancient Church, appearing in *creeds* made use of in baptism, and in the *censures* passed upon heretics: and the observable *harmony* and *unanimity* of the several churches [n], in such acts, is a circumstance

[m] Nec vero nobis quidquam hactenus legere contigit, quod trini istius Dei, a Christianis jam tum recepti et culti, fidem facere videatur magis, quam quæ ex dialogo, qui Philopatris inscribitur, et inter Luciani opera numeratur, ad id probandum affert Genebrardus, lib. i. et ii. de Trinitate. *Socin. adv. Eutrop.* c. xv. p. 698. *Opp.*

[n] Traditionem itaque Apostolorum in *toto mundo* manifestatam in *omni Ecclesia* adest respicere omnibus qui vera volunt videre: et habemus annumerare eos, qui ab Apostolis instituti sunt episcopi in Ecclesiis, et successores eorum usque ad nos, qui nihil tale docuerunt, neque cognoverunt quale ab his deliratur. *Iren.* lib. iii. c. 3.

Itaque *tot* ac *tantæ* Ecclesiæ una

which adds irresistible force to them. It is not at all likely, that any *whole* church of those early times should vary from *apostolical* doctrine in things of moment: but it is, morally speaking, absurd to imagine, that *all the churches* should combine in the same error, and conspire together to corrupt the doctrine of Christ[o]. This is the argument which Irenæus and Tertullian insist much upon, and triumph in, over the *heretics* of their times: and it is obliquely glanced upon by Hegesippus and Clemens Alexandrinus of the same *second* century, and by Origen also of the *third*. The argument was undoubtedly true and just, as it then stood, while there were no *breaks* in the succession of doctrine, but a perfect *unanimity* of the churches all along, in the *prime* articles: though, afterwards, the force of this argument came to be obscured, and almost lost, by taking in things foreign to it, and blending it with what happened in later times. The force of it could last no longer than such *unanimity* lasted. I say, while the churches were all *unanimous* in the main things, (as they were in Irenæus's time, and Tertullian's, and for more than a century after,) that very *unanimity* was a presumptive argument that their faith was right, derived down to them from the *Apostles* themselves. For it was highly unreasonable to suppose, that those several churches, very distant from each other in place, and of different languages, and under no common visible head, should all *unite* in the same *errors*, and *deviate* uniformly from their rule at once. But that they should all agree in the same *common faith*, might easily be accounted for, as arising from the same *common cause*, which could be no other but the *common delivery* of the same uniform faith and doctrine to all the churches by the *Apostles* themselves[p]. Such *unanimity* could never come by *chance*, but must be derived from one common source: and therefore the *harmony* of their doctrine was in itself a pregnant argument of the truth of it[q]. As to the *fact*,

illa ab Apostolis prima, ex qua omnes. Sic omnes *primæ*, et *apostolicæ*, dum una omnes probant *unitatem*; dum est illis communicatio pacis, et appellatio fraternitatis, et contesseratio hospitalitatis: quæ jura non alia ratio regit, quam ejusdem sacramenti *una* traditio. *Tertull. Præscript.* c. 20.

[o] Ecquid verisimile est, ut *tot* ac *tantæ* in *unam* fidem erraverint? Nullus inter multos eventus unus est. Exitus variasse debuerat error doctrinæ ecclesiarum. Ceterum, quod apud multos *unum* invenitur, non est erratum, sed traditum. *Tertull. ibid.* c. 28.

[p] See this argument very well explained and enforced by Dr. Sherlock, in his Present State of the Socinian Controversy, cap. ii. sect. 2. p. 60, &c.

[q] Vero simile fit complures Ecclesias originis apostolicæ, regionibus linguaque dissitas, eam doctrinæ *concordiam* ab *uno fonte* hausisse, utpote quæ a casu non introducta videtur. *Sam. Basnag. Annal.* tom. i. p. 742.

that the churches were thus unanimous in all the prime things, in those days, Irenæus, who was a very knowing person, and who had come far east to settle in the west, bears ample testimony to it[r]. Tertullian, in the two passages last cited from him, testifies the same thing, as to the *unanimity* of the churches of those times in the fundamentals of Christian doctrine. Hegesippus, contemporary with Irenæus, gives much the same account of the *succession* of true doctrine, down to his own time, in the several churches[s]. Clemens of Alexandria means the same thing, where he recommends the faith of the *universal* Church as *one*, and as more *ancient* than heresies[t]. And Origen of the third century testifies the same of the Church in his time, and argues in the same manner from it[u]. Irenæus and Tertullian were both of them so strongly persuaded of the certainty, first, of the *fact*, and next of the *inference* from it, that they scrupled not to urge it as a very full and convincing proof of the *apostolical* faith, singly considered[x], and abstracting from *Scripture proof*. An argument which there is no need to be jealous of, if it be but rightly understood, and limited to such circumstances as it was grounded upon. For the meaning was not, that *apostolical* churches could *never* err, nor that *tradition* would be *always* a safe rule to go by: but *such* tradition as that was, which might easily be traced up to the *Apostles*, by the help of *writings* then extant, (as easily as we may now trace up the doctrine of our Church to the reign of Charles, or of James the First,) such a *tradition* might be depended upon. Besides that the *unanimity* of the churches all the world over (which could not be rationally ac-

[r] Iren. lib. i. c. 10, alias 3. lib. iii. c. 3, 4.

[s] Ἐν ἑκάστῃ δὲ διαδοχῇ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ὁ νόμος κηρύττει, καὶ οἱ προφῆται, καὶ ὁ Κύριος. *Hegesipp. ap. Euseb.* lib. iv. c. 22.

[t] Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. p. 898, 899. Conf. Strom. i. p. 322.

[u] Cum multi sint qui se putant scire quæ Christi sunt, et nonnulli eorum diversa prioribus sentiant, servetur vero ecclesiastica prædicatio per successionis ordinem ab Apostolis tradita, et *usque ad præsens in Ecclesiis permanens*: illa sola credenda est veritas quæ in nullo ab *ecclesiastica traditione* discordat. *Origen. in Apolog. Pamph. inter Opp. Hieron.* tom. v. p. 223.

[x] Tantæ igitur ostensiones cum sint, non oportet adhuc quærere apud alios veritatem, quam facile est ab Ecclesia sumere, &c.——Quid enim, et si de aliqua modica quæstione disceptatio esset, nonne oporteret in antiquissimas recurrere Ecclesias, in quibus Apostoli conversati sunt, et ab eis de præsenti quæstione sumere quod certum et re liquidum est? Quid autem si neque Apostoli quidem *Scripturas* reliquissent nobis, nonne oportebat ordinem sequi *traditionis* quam tradiderunt iis quibus committebant Ecclesias? Cui ordinationi assentiunt multæ gentes barbarorum eorum qui in Christum credunt, sine charta et atramento scriptam habentes per Spiritum in cordibus suis salutem, et veterem traditionem diligenter custodientes, &c. *Iren.* l. iii. cap. 4.

counted for on any other supposition but that they had been so taught *from the beginning*) confirmed the same thing. The argument in this light, and in those circumstances, was a very good one. But when those circumstances came to be altered, and there had been several *breaks* in the succession of doctrine, and that too even in the *apostolical* churches, then there could be no arguing in the same precise way as before: only thus far they might argue, in after times, (upon a supposition that their faith could be proved to be the same as in the former ages,) that since their doctrine was still that very doctrine which the churches held while they were *unanimous* and had admitted no *breaks*, therefore it is such as was *from the beginning* in the Church of Christ. In this manner we can reason even at this day, and can thereby make Irenæus's or Tertullian's argument our own[y]; provided we have first proved that the faith we contend for is the very same that obtained in the churches of that age.

But before I leave this head, I would observe something more particularly of Tertullian's manner of expressing himself in this case: he did not only conceive that an argument might be drawn from *tradition* alone, abstracting from *Scripture*, but he preferred that way of arguing, in disputes with heretics, as a shorter, easier, nay, and surer method of confuting them, than engaging with them upon the foot of *Scripture*[z]. This may appear to us now an odd way of talking: but if it be taken as he meant it, and with a view only to the then present circumstances,

[y] Ad hanc itaque formam probabuntur ab illis Ecclesiis quæ, licet nullum ex Apostolis, vel apostolicis, auctorem suum proferant, ut multo posteriores, quæ denique quotidie instituuntur, tamen in *eadem fide* conspirantes, non minus *apostolicæ* deputantur pro *consanguinitate* doctrinæ. *Tertull. Præscript.* c. 32.

[z] Quid promovebis exercitatissime *Scripturarum*, cum si quid defenderis, negatur; ex diverso, si quid negaveris defendatur: et tu quidem nihil perdes, nisi vocem in contentione; nihil consequeris nisi bilem de blasphematione. Ille vero, si quis est, cujus causa in congressum descendis Scripturarum, ut eum dubitantem confirmes, ad *veritatem*, an magis ad *hæreses* deverget? Hoc ipso motus, quod te videat nihil promovisse, æquo gradu negandi et defendendi adversa parte, statu certe pari, altercatione incertior discedet, nesciens quam *hæresin* judicet: hæc utique et ipsi habent in nos retorquere. Necesse est enim et illos dicere, a nobis potius *adulteria Scripturarum*, et *expositionum mendacia* inferri, qui proinde sibi defendant *veritatem*. Ergo non ad *Scripturas* provocandum, nec in his constituendum certamen, in quibus aut *nulla*, aut *incerta* victoria est, aut *par incertæ*.——Ordo rerum desiderabat illud prius proponi, quod nunc solum disputandum est, *quibus* competat *fides ipsa*, cujus sunt Scripturæ; a *quo*, et per *quos*, et *quando*, et *quibus* sit tradita disciplina qua fiunt Christiani. Ubi enim apparuerit esse *veritatem* et disciplinæ et fidei Christianæ, illic erit veritas *Scripturarum*, et *expositionum*, et omnium *traditionum* Christianarum. *Tertull. Præscript.* c. 17, 18.

I believe, it will be found to turn out right. He could not mean that the tradition of the *sense* of Scripture was more *certain* than the tradition of the *words* or *books* of Scripture: neither could he design to intimate that *Scripture texts* did not themselves afford as *certain*, or more certain proofs of a doctrine than *tradition* could do, among persons qualified to judge in a *critical* way: neither could he imagine, that *Scripture* should not be made use of, or should not be looked upon as the *principal* thing, in *written* debates against heretics; for no man makes more or better use of Scripture in that way than himself does. All he seems to have meant was, that in *verbal* conferences with *heretics*, in the presence of *weak* and *infirm* Christians, the wisest way would be, not to engage the adversaries on the foot of *Scripture*, (to bring on a debate about the Canon of Scripture, and the strict meaning of *words* or *phrases*, and so to discuss the whole in a *logical* and *critical* way, tiresome to ordinary Christians, and commonly *fruitless*[a],) but to put the issue of the cause upon a few plain and short questions, such as *common* Christians could better judge of. It was easy to discern, what party of men had been successors to the *Apostles*, and had in constant succession made up the body of the *Church*, preserving the same *faith* with great *unanimity*. This argument from *tradition* was an argument drawn from sensible *fact*, and was much more affecting, obvious, and popular, than dry altercations about the *authenticity* of the books of Scripture, or the precise meaning of *words*; and it was *certain* enough, at that time, to be depended upon: and therefore Tertullian recommended that method of debate, in such *verbal* conferences, rather than any other. Wherein to me he seems to have judged very well upon the prudential case, and like a wise and a sagacious man[b]. Nevertheless, as often as he employed his pen in controversy with *heretics*, and drew up polemical tracts, though he would not omit to mention the additional advantage he had[c] in point of *prescription*

[a] Scripturas obtendunt, et hac sua audacia statim quosdam movent: in ipso vero congressu *firmos* quidem fatigant, *infirmos* capiunt, *medios* cum scrupulo dimittunt. Hunc igitur potissimum gradum obstruimus, non admittendos eos ad ullam de *Scripturis* disputationem. Si hæ sint illæ vires eorum uti eas habere possint, dispici debet cui competat *possessio* Scripturarum, ne is admittatur ad eam cui nullo modo competit. *Ibid.* cap. 15. Conf. cap. 37.

[b] See Stillingfleet's Answer to several Treatises, Works, vol. v. p. 79, 80. Dodwell. Dissertat. in Iren. iii. sect. 30. p. 282, 283.

[c] Vid. Tertullian. contr. Marc. lib. i. cap. 1. 20. lib. iii. cap. 1. contr. Prax. cap. ii.

or *tradition*, yet he chose to pass it off in short hints, and not to dwell upon it, but rather to rest the issue of the main cause upon *Scripture* and *reason*.

A learned foreign divine has indeed blamed Tertullian for his conduct in this affair, as *derogating* from the authority of Scripture, by laying such stress upon *tradition*: which appears not to be a just censure; but that learned writer runs into the other *extreme*, while he avers, that it is by Scripture *only* that the *verity* or *antiquity* of a doctrine may be proved[d]. There are *two* ways of proving the *antiquity*, and consequently the *verity* of a doctrine; namely, *Scripture* and *Church history*: and these *two* differ only in the manner of proof, or in the *degree* of *moral* certainty. Can we prove, for instance, what were the tenets of the *ancient heretics*, by the help of Church history and records; and cannot we as well prove what were the tenets of *ancient Christians* in the same way? It is true, we might more *certainly* prove what those *heretics* held, from their own books, if we had them; and so we may more certainly prove what was the faith of the *first Christians*, from Scripture, than from any Church records: but still the same thing is *proved* both ways, and by *two* kinds of evidences, differing only, as I said, in *degree* of probability, or moral certainty. And therefore the learned Mosheim, as I before took notice[e], scruples not to assert in broad terms, that the *antiquity* of the Christian faith is *proved* from the writings of Ignatius and Polycarp[f]: and he allows the same thing with respect to Clemens Romanus, and Hegesippus[g], and Caius[h], and Irenæus[i], and, by parity of reason, to all other Church-writers whose accounts may be depended upon[k]. The admitting such a *secondary* proof, in this case, is not *derogating* from Scripture authority, but is *confirming* and *strengthening* it in more views than one: as it is accepting the same kind of proof here, which

[d] Huc illa referenda sunt effata, quibus *Scripturæ sacræ* derogare auctoritati videtur, cum tamen ea *sola* sit, ex qua et veritas et *antiquitas* dogmatis cujusdam probari queat. *Buddæi Isagog.* vol. i. p. 997.

[e] See above, p. 608.

[f] Mosheim, Vindic. adv. Toland. cap. viii. p. 221, 222, 223.

[g] Ibid. p. 218.

[h] Ibid. p. 224.

[i] Ibid. p. 238.

[k] It is observable of Polycarp, in particular, that he convinced and converted great numbers to the true faith, by the strength of *tradition*, being a sensible argument, and more affecting at that time, than any dispute from the bare letter of Scripture could be. [See Irenæus, lib. iii. cap. 3. p. 177.] It was under Anicetus, about the year 145. *See Pearson, Opp. Posth.* cap. xiv. &c. Dodwell, cap. xiii.

we accept, in another case, with respect to the Canon of Scripture; and as it is corroborating the Scripture account of the Christian faith with collateral evidences, both to illustrate and enforce it. Not that one would, at this time of day, presume to rest an *article* of *faith* upon Church records *alone*, or upon any thing besides *Scripture*: but while the *superior* proof from sacred Writ is the *ground* of our faith[l], the *subordinate* proof from antiquity may be a good mark of direction for the *interpretation* of Scripture in the *prime* doctrines[m]. If we can prove from ancient records what that *faith* was which obtained so universally in the second century, and later, we can then argue from it in like manner as Irenæus, Hegesippus, Tertullian, yea and Clemens also, and Origen did, and can make the like use of it against those that *pervert* Scripture. Only, indeed, there will be this difference, that the argument, as now urged, is become one of the *learned* kind, and therefore not so well adapted to *common* capacities as it formerly was: and it is somewhat *weaker* to us, in another respect, as we have not so *many* evidences now extant, as those writers then had, whereby to prove such *constant* succession of doctrine so long, and such *unanimity* of the churches in professing it. But notwithstanding, we have evidences sufficient to persuade rational men; and the argument is still a good one[n], though with some abatements.

[l] Scripture is the *ground of our faith*, considered as the *infallible* word of God: but then that it is really the *word of God*, and that such is the *sense* of this or that text, ordinarily stands only upon *moral proof*; so that our faith at length resolves into *moral* evidence, as it is a known rule, that the *conclusion* follows the *weaker* of the premises, and can be no stronger than that is. But then again, it is to be considered, that the strength of *moral evidence*, in the general, resolves at last into *divine* veracity and faithfulness; since *God* has so made us as to lay us under an *inevitable* necessity of submitting commonly to such evidence, and he cannot be supposed (without manifest absurdity or blasphemy) to have thus exposed the wisest, and most pious, and most considerate men to fatal and endless *delusions*. So then, in the last result, *faith* again resolves into, or rests upon, the *truth* and *goodness* of God.

[m] Quoties de scripti sensu quæritur, magnam vim habere solet, tum *usus sequens*, tum *prudentum auctoritas*: quod etiam in *divinis* Scriptis sequendum est. Neque enim probabile est, Ecclesias quæ ab Apostolis constitutæ sunt, aut *subito*, aut omnes defecisse ab iis quæ Apostoli breviter præscripta, ore liberalius explicaverant. *Grotius de Jur. B. et P.* lib. i. cap. 2. sect. 9. p. 60.

[n] "This is an unanswerable argument, as long as we can suppose the "tradition of the Catholic faith, and "the communion of the Church was "preserved *entire*: which it visibly "was, at least till the first Nicene "Council. And had we no other "ways to know it, we might learn the "*faith* of the Catholic Church, by its "opposition to those *heresies* which "it condemned." *Sherlock's Present State of Socin. Controv.* p. 64.

VI. There is one consideration more, tending still to strengthen the former, and which must by no means be omitted: namely, that the *charismata*, the *extraordinary gifts*, were then frequent, visibly rested in and upon the *Church*, and there only. I have occasionally hinted something of this matter before[o], so far as concerned Irenæus, and shall now throw in some additional evidences to make good the same thing. Justin Martyr is a witness of the frequency of the miraculous operations in his time: and he makes use of it, in his dispute with Tryphop, as an unanswerable argument in behalf of *Christianity* against the Jews; which St. Paul himself had done before him[q]. Irenæus, as observed above, made the like use of it against *heretics*: and so does Tertullian, though in remote hints, and somewhat more obscurely[r]. Those *extraordinary gifts* continued in a good measure, though decreasing gradually, for the three first centuries at least[s]. So then, besides *oral* tradition for the faith of the ancient churches, which was least to be depended upon, or lasted but a little time; besides *written* accounts, which might more securely be confided in; besides the *unanimity* of doctrine in all the churches, which was itself an argument that it had been *from the beginning*; I say, besides all these, the testimony of the *Spirit* visibly residing in the Church, and discovering itself in *supernatural operations*, that was a further evidence of the *truth* of the doctrine then generally held. For it is by no means probable, that those primitive churches, so highly favoured from above, so plentifully enlightened and comforted by the Holy Spirit of God, should be permitted to fall into any *dangerous* errors, or should not preserve, at least in points of *importance*, the true and ancient faith derived from Christ and his Apostles. But that this argument may appear to greater advantage, I shall take leave to borrow the excellent words of an abler hand[t], which has set it forth in a very true and strong light.

"It is, I think, impossible, in a *moral* sense, that those good "men should successively concur to impose upon the Church a

[o] See above, p. 569.

[p] Justin. Martyr. Dial. p. 308, 315. edit. Par. alias 315, 329.

[q] Gal. iii. 2.

[r] Tertullian. Præscript. cap. xxviii. xxix.

[s] Vid. Spencer in Notis ad Origen. contr. Cels. p. 5, &c. Dodwell. Dissert. in Irenæum, ii. Dissert. Cyprianic. iv. Remarks on Christianity, &c. part i. continued, p. 51, &c.

[t] Dr. Knight's preface to his Eight Sermons, p. 4, 5, 6. Compare Dr. Berriman's Historical Account, p. 2, 3, &c.

" false interpretation of *notorious* passages of the sacred writings,
" for the following reasons:

" 1. That the Spirit of God was given to the Church, to guide
" and instruct it in *necessary* truth.

" 2. That, according to the records of those early ages, the
" *extraordinary gifts* of the Spirit of God, continued in the
" Church, were undoubted evidences of his *presence* with it.

" 3. That it cannot be supposed, while the Spirit of God was
" present with the Church in so *remarkable* a manner, and the
" Church itself so little removed from the times of the Apostles,
" that the *letter* of Scripture, especially in matters of *greatest*
" *concern*, should be *generally* understood in another sense than
" what was agreeable to the *Spirit of God*, and to that which
" the *Apostles* had taught and delivered.

" 4. That the Doctors of the Church, through the *difficulty* of
" the times, and the dangers they were exposed to on account of
" religion, were more concerned to prepare for the blessings of
" another world, by recommending *truth* to the consciences of
" men, than to provide for the *flesh*, and the enjoyments of the
" *present*, by *dividing* the Church, and *seducing* the simple with
" pernicious doctrines.

" 5. That their writings *suppose*, or *expressly* affirm, that
" Scripture was received in an *uniform* sense, in the churches
" of Christ.

" 6. The consequence of which is, that whensoever it appears,
" that the doctrines of the Church *successively* agree, from the very
" beginning, in an *uniform*[u] interpretation of certain passages of
" the sacred writings, relating to the *chief* and *fundamental* arti-
" cles of revealed truths; such interpretation *ought to be received*
" as the *mind of the Spirit* in the aforesaid passages: and con-
" clusions drawn from such expositions are not founded on the
" *doctrines of men*, but the *mind of the Spirit* contained and con-
" veyed in the letter of Scripture."

This reasoning I apprehend to be just and solid, and to carry much greater weight with it, than any the most ingenious conceits and surprising subtilties of the Polonian brethren, whereby they have laboured to give something of a gloss or colour to their *novel* constructions of the sacred oracles. But to be a little more distinct and particular, I proceed to build upon the

[u] Iren. lib. iv. cap. 35, alias 69.

foundations here laid, for the more fully demonstrating the *use* of antiquity.

VII. The least that we can infer from what hath been already said is, that the sense of the *ancients* once known is an useful *check* upon any *new* interpretations of Scripture affecting the *main* doctrines. It has a *negative* voice, if I may so call it, in such a case: and it is reason sufficient for throwing off any such *novel* expositions, that they cross upon the undoubted faith of all the ancient churches, or contain some doctrine, as of *moment* to be received, which the *ancients* universally rejected, or never admitted[x]. This *negative* way of arguing is, I think, generally allowed, and can hardly bear any controversy. Bishop Stillingfleet observes to this purpose, "that it is sufficient *prescription* "against any thing which can be alleged out of Scripture, "that if it appear *contrary* to the sense of the Catholic Church "from the beginning, it *ought not* to be looked upon as the *true* "*meaning* of Scripture. All this security is built upon this "strong presumption, that nothing *contrary* to the *necessary* "articles of faith should be held by the Catholic Church, whose "very *being* depends upon the belief of those articles which are "*necessary* to salvation[y]."

The famous Daillé, whom no man can suspect of *partiality* towards the *ancients*, acknowledges as much as I have here mentioned, where he says, "What probability is there that those "holy Doctors of former ages, from whose hands Christianity "hath been derived down unto us, should be *ignorant* of any of "those things, which had been revealed and recommended by "our Saviour as *important* and *necessary* to salvation?—That "they should all of them have been *ignorant* of any article that "is *necessarily* requisite to salvation, is altogether impossible: "for, after this account, they should all have been deprived of "salvation, which, I suppose, every honest mind would tremble "at the thought of[z]."

[x] Sicut in legibus *humanis* valet quidem ad sensum indagandum, *verborum* ac *locutionum* cognitio, *antecedentium* et *consequentium* series, consideratio ejus quæ quoque libro tractatur *materiæ*, sed hæc omnia ita sunt dirigenda, ne impingant in id quod *ab initio* publicatæ legis de re quaque *receptum* et *judiciis* approbatum fuit; ita in legibus *divinis* quidem, sed humano more per *verba*, et verborum signa *literas*, expressis, eadem interpretationi circumdanda sunt repagula. *Grotius, Rivet. Apologet. Discuss.* p. 685. Conf. 724.

[y] Stillingfleet's Rational Account, cap. ii. p. 59.

[z] Daillé, Use of the Fathers, cap. vi. p. 188. Engl. edit.

Dr. Whitby, who was not prejudiced on the side of the Fathers, seems to carry the point rather further, in these words:

"In such doctrines as were rejected by the *universal* Church "as *heresies*, Austin saith truly, that it was sufficient cause to "reject them, because *the Church held the contrary*, they being "such as did *oppose* her *rule of faith*, or *symbol*, universally "received; and that it was sufficient to persuade any man, he "*ought not* to embrace any of the doctrines of *heretics*, as articles "of faith, because the Church, who could not be *deficient* in any "point of *necessary faith*, did not receive them. This way of "arguing *negatively*, we therefore, with St. Austin, do allow: "the universal Church knows no such doctrine; *ergo*, it is no "article I am obliged to receive as any part of Christian faith[a]." Thus far he at that time: and in another treatise which he published in Latin, twenty-five years after, when it is certain he had no very friendly disposition towards the *Fathers*, yet still he thought himself obliged to admit such a *negative* argument[b] as he had before admitted. A *negative* argument therefore being allowed, (as indeed there is plain reason for it,) it must be allowed also, that the *Fathers* are of *use* to us, so far as such an argument can be of use: and that the *ancients* may be of *great use* in the Church, in this view, is very apparent, being that they serve as an *outwork* (which Daillé takes notice of) for the repelling the presumption of those who would forge a *new faith*[c].

For example, they are of use, in this view, against the Romanists, with respect to the novel and supernumerary articles of the Trent Creed, or Creed of Pope Pius IV. imposed upon the consciences of men as *necessary* to salvation.

The *ancients* are likewise of use to us, under the same view, against the Socinians, who *innovate* in doctrines of the highest *importance*, teaching things *contrary* to the faith of all the primitive churches; things wherein Christian *worship*, as well as *faith* and *hope*, are very nearly and deeply concerned. It is sufficient

[a] Whitby's Treatise of Tradition, A. D. 1689, part ii. cap. 12. p. 131.

[b] Distinguendum est inter traditiones de rebus creditu factuque *necessariis*, et *non necessariis*. Traditionibus ad fidem moresque *necessariis* fides adhibenda est, utpote sine quibus nec fides nec vita Christiana esse potest: adeo ut argumentum *negativum* in his omnibus certissimum est; hoc vel illud inter fidei morumve dogmata *necessaria* prius locum non obtinuit, ergo nec hac ætate creditu, factuve *necessarium* dici possit; quoniam Ecclesia in *necessariis* nunquam deficit. *Whitby, Dissertat. de Scriptur. Interpretatione, Præf.* p. 94.

[c] Daillé, Use of the Fathers, p. 190.

reason for rejecting such *novelties*, and the *interpretations* which they are founded upon, that the Christian world, in the best and purest times, either knew nothing of them, or rejected them.

The like may be said with respect to the Arian doctrines, if any man should presume to obtrude them upon us as *articles of faith*. It is a sufficient reason for not receiving either *them*, or the *interpretations* brought to support them, that the *ancients*, in the best and purest times, either knew nothing of them, or, if they did, condemned them[d]. It has indeed been pretended, that the *ancients*, in general, supposed God the Father to be *naturally* Governor over the *Son* and *Holy Ghost*: but no proof has ever been made of it, nor ever can be. On the contrary, it will appear upon a careful inquiry, as I have particularly observed in another place[e], that the *ancients* never did, never *consistently* could intend any such thing; but that Arius and his confederates innovated in maintaining that doctrine, and were condemned for it immediately, upon their first introducing it. But it is needless to urge here (had not the course of my argument led to it) that *Arianism* was no matter of *necessary* faith, in the esteem of the *ancients*, having proved in these papers that the *contrary* to it was. Only, I was here to observe the *use* which might be made of the *negative* argument, supposing we could go no further, or had nothing more to plead from *antiquity*.

VIII. I would next advance a step further than the mere *negative* argument can *directly* carry us: for, I conceive, that a just inference may be drawn from that *concession*, which will extend our views somewhat beyond what I have just now mentioned. If the *ancients* could not be universally *ignorant* of any *necessary* doctrine, since it is morally absurd that they should be deficient in *necessaries*; by parity of reason it must be allowed,

[d] "In the doctrine of the *Deity* of "Christ, or of the *Trinity*, though the "subtilty of such modern heretics as "oppose either of those, may so far "prevail on persons, either not of "sufficient *judgment*, or not sufficiently *versed* in the *Scriptures*, as at "present to make them acknowledge "the places are not so *clear* as they "imagined them to be; yet their "being always otherwise interpreted "by the *Catholic Church*, or the "Christian societies of *all ages*, lays "this *potent prejudice* against all such "attempts, as not to believe such interpretations *true*, till they give a "just account why, if the belief of "these doctrines were not *necessary*, "the Christians of all ages since the "Apostles' times, did so *unanimously* "agree to them, that when any began "first to *oppose* them, they were declared and condemned for *heretics* "for their pains." *Stillingfleet, Rational Account*, cap. ii. p. 58.

[e] Third Defence, or Further Vindication, chap. 5. p. 80, &c. of this volume.

that they could not generally fall into *fundamental* errors, because that also would be failing in *necessaries*, inasmuch as nothing can be more *necessary* in our religious concernments than to stand clear of all *pernicious* or *dangerous* mistakes. From whence it follows, that whatever the *ancient* churches universally admitted as a *necessary* article of faith, must, at the lowest, be *safe* doctrine[f]. And because it is hard to conceive how such a doctrine as we are now upon could be *safe*, if it were not *true*, we may reasonably infer that it is *true*, as well as safe. Thus far I have been pursuing the consequences which appear to follow from the *concession* made by Daillé and others.

But I apprehend withal, that the same conclusion will more directly and closely follow from the principles before laid down; namely, that morally speaking, it is absurd to suppose that the primitive churches should so *universally* maintain one and the same doctrine, if they had not received it from the beginning; especially considering the *important* nature of the doctrine, and how *near* they lived to the apostolical age, and how remarkably they were blessed, all the time, with plentiful effusions of God's *Holy Spirit*. These considerations taken together do afford, as I conceive, a *positive* argument to prove that what the ancients so held as *true* and *important*, (Scripture also, in its easy and most natural sense, countenancing the same,) ought to be received by us as *Scripture doctrine*[g], and valued accordingly. Any other pretended sense of Scripture, as implying a kind of *moral* absurdity, ought to be rejected; unless it can be proved to carry with it such a degree of *moral certainty* as is more than sufficient to countervail such *prescription* or *prejudice* against it.

[f] Hic vero ex concessis Dallæanis recte concluditur, et nullum articulum *necessarium* eos ignorasse; et e fortiore, nulla execrabili hæresi implicitos, nobis errandi duces extitisse.—— Minime est probabile (judice ipso Dallæo) vel unicum fidei membrum eos *latuisse*, et multo incredibilius, prolapsos fuisse in errorem *perniciosum*, seu hæresim sanæ fidei contrariam. *Scrivenar. contr. Dal.* p. 222, 223.

[g] Cum majorem *omnibus* quam *singulis* Christianis, et *universæ* quam *particularibus* quibuscunque Ecclesiis fidem habendam esse nemo dubitet; cum plurima etiam sint in quæ *universalis Ecclesia* per multa post Apostolos secula consensit; cum hæc denique universalis Ecclesiæ consensio *certissima* sit, in iis quibus habeatur capitibus, sacræ Scripturæ *interpretatio;* hinc clarissime constat, quali quantoque *usui* sint *antiqui patres*, aliique omnium Ecclesiæ seculorum Scriptores, quamque necessario ab iis consulendi sint, quibus Ecclesiasticas agitantibus controversias vel sua salus, vel pax Ecclesiæ cordi est. ——Quicquid de aliis dicendum est, ea saltem in quæ *omnes ubique Ecclesiæ* consenserunt, non possunt non certissima esse, et necessario ab omnibus etiamnum retinenda. *Bevereg. Cod. Can. vindicat. in Proœm.* sect. iii.

But now as to the Arian or Socinian interpretations, in this case, they carry no *moral certainty* at all, to counterpoise the *moral absurdity* which stands against them: therefore the judgment of the universal Church (were there nothing else) ought to overrule their interpretations. For it was morally impossible that the primitive churches should err, in doctrines of that high importance, so soon, or so universally[h]: but it is not morally impossible, nor at all unlikely, that those later gentlemen should mistake in commenting upon sacred Writ.

The sum then of the whole case, in few words, is this: 1. We assert, that the received doctrine of the Trinity is proved directly to be *true*, and consequentially to be *important*, from Scripture itself, according to the known rules of grammar and criticism: and such proof cannot be evaded, or eluded, without doing the greatest *violence* imaginable to the texts. 2. In the next place, we maintain that the *ancient* churches taught the same doctrine as an *essential*, and condemned the contrary opinions as *pernicious* and *dangerous*: which consideration makes it now *doubly* absurd to interpret Scripture in contradiction to that doctrine[i]. 3. The result of the two foregoing considerations is, that since we have thus proved the *truth* of our doctrine, and the *importance* of it, both ways, (directly from *Scripture*, and indirectly from the *ancients*,) I say, the result is, that this is the faith which we ought to contend for: we are *morally* certain every way, that it is *true*, and if true, *important* of course. And since we have such *moral* certainty as things of this nature can be conceived to admit of, and such as God has obliged us to submit to and follow in other like cases, it is therefore *infallibly* certain (that I may once more

[h] Constat proinde omnem doctrinam quæ cum illis Ecclesiis apostolicis, matricibus et originalibus fidei conspiret, veritati deputandam, sine dubio tenentem quod Ecclesiæ ab Apostolis, Apostoli a Christo, Christus a Deo accepit. *Tertull. Præscript.* cap. 21.

[i] "The unanimous consent of so "many distinct visible churches, as "exhibited in their several Confes- "sions, Catechisms, or Testimonies "of their own or forefathers' faith "unto the Council of Nice, was an "argument of the same force and "efficacy against Arius and his par- "takers, as the general consent and "practice of all nations, in worship- "ping a divine power in all ages, is "against Atheists. Nothing but the "*ingrafted notion* of a *Deity* could "have induced so many several na- "tions, so much different in natural "dispositions, in civil discipline and "education, to affect or practise the "duty of adoration: and nothing but "the *ingrafted word* (as St. James "calls the Gospel) delivered by Christ "and his Apostles in the holy Scrip- "tures, could have hept so many "several churches as communicated "their Confessions unto that Coun- "cil, in the unity of the same faith." *Bishop Patrick, Discourse about Tradition*, p. 21. printed A.D. 1683.

copy after the great Chillingworth) that, in *true wisdom and prudence*, we ought to accept this doctrine as *revealed* by God, and to maintain it with a conscientious care and zeal; and consequently to decline communion with all such as openly impugn it.

Here I thought to have concluded this chapter, having offered what appeared sufficient for supporting or illustrating the *use* and *value* of ecclesiastical antiquity: but I considered, that some perhaps might think it an omission, if I should take no notice of sundry *objections*, which have been frequently urged against the *use* of *antiquity*, particularly in controversies of faith. Now, though I apprehend that a clear and just stating of the case (which is what I have been labouring) is the best way of removing objections, as it is leaving them no foundation to stand upon, or none considerable; yet rather than be thought wanting in any respect to a very important subject, I shall endeavour to return particular answers to the most noted objections which have fallen within my observation. The doing it may help to illustrate the subject; as it is considering it under various views, turned and tried every way: and sometimes just answers to objections have the force almost of *new proofs*, for confirming the positions before asserted. I incline the more to it, because great pains have been taken by many to depreciate the value of *antiquity*, and to throw contempt upon the primitive *Fathers:* which is a very unjustifiable practice, and is wounding *Christianity* itself through their sides; though some that have done it might be far from intending it. But I proceed to particulars.

I. It has been sometimes pleaded, that *the Scriptures* are in themselves a *perfect* rule of faith: what need therefore can there be of *Fathers*, with respect to the *fundamental* articles[k]? To which we answer, that we produce not *Fathers* to superadd *new* doctrines to Scripture, but only to secure the *old;* not to *complete* the rule, but more strongly to assert and maintain both its *true* sense and *whole* sense. The more *perfect* the rule is, the more care and circumspection it demands, that we may preserve it entire, both as to *words* and *meaning*. For if either of them happens to be stolen away, or wrested from us, Scripture so maimed or castrated is no longer that *perfect rule* which Christ has ordained. It is much to be suspected, that many pretend a

[k] Whitby, Dissertat. de Scriptur. Interpret. in præfat. p. 8, 9.

zeal for *Scripture*, who mean nothing by it, but to have its *fences* taken down, that they may deal the more freely or rudely with it. They would exclude the *ancients*, to make room for *themselves*, and throw a kind of slight upon the *received* interpretations, only to advance their *own*. Such commonly has been the way, and therefore there is the less regard to be paid to magnificent words. They complain sometimes, that interpreting Scripture by the *ancients* is debasing its majesty, and throwing *Christ* out of his *throne*[l]. But we think that Christ never sits more secure or easy in his throne than when he has his most faithful *guards* about him; and that none are so likely to strike at his *authority*, or to aim at *dethroning* him, as they that would displace his *old servants*, only to make way for *new* ones; who may either obtrude themselves without call, or may be unfurnished for the employ, or not well affected to his person and government. But to speak out of figure, and to come closer to the business, the *perfection* of Scripture is a point allowed, and is no part of the question between us: the main question is, how we may be most secure of reaping the full *benefits* of that perfection, whether with the light of *antiquity* before us, or without it? We know how Faustus Socinus, under colour of extolling the *perfection* of Scripture, studied nothing so much as to blazon the *perfection* of his own parts and abilities, deserting the *ancients*, and trusting only to *himself* and his uncle Lælius[m]. He presumed to set up his own fond *conceits* as the *measure* of all truth: which, in effect, was advancing a *new rule of faith*, and forcing Scripture to a compliance with it; preferring the rovings of his own imagination before the wisdom of *Heaven*. It might be shewn, on the other hand, that those who have least indulged their own fancies, but have adhered strictly to *antiquity* in the prime things, have done most honour to the *perfection* of *Scripture*, and have kept the rule of faith entire: this therefore is the way, rather than the other.

I may add, that when we say that Scripture is *perfect*, we

[l] Whitby, ibid. p. 9.

[m] Neminem enim ego in iis rebus de quibus in responsione illa mea disseritur, ex iis qui hodie vivunt, ulla ex parte magistrum agnosco; sed Deum tantummodo præceptorem habui sacrasque literas. Quinetiam in universa ipsa divinarum rerum scientia, quæcunque tandem illa in me sit, præter unum Lælium, patruum meum, qui jam diu mortuus est, vel potius præter quædam paucula ab ipso conscripta, et multa annotata, nullum prorsus magistrum me habere contigit. *Socin. Ep. ad Squarcialupum.* App. tom. i. p. 362.

mean generally, as to the *matter* of it, which is *full* and *complete* to be a rule of life and manners, without taking in any additional rule to join with it. But if we speak of Scripture being *perfect* in regard to *words* or *style*, we can mean only that it is as perfect as *words* can be, and words (to us now) of a *dead* language. Whatever *imperfection* necessarily goes along with *all languages* must of course go along with *Scripture language*; which, though dictated from heaven, or conducted by the Spirit of God, is yet adapted to the manner of men, and must take its construction from the common rules of interpretation agreed upon among men. Now if the *Fathers*, as living nearer the fountain, had some opportunities which we want, and might know some things much better than we at this distance can pretend to do, why should we neglect or despise any light or help which they can give for our direction, in settling the sense of Scripture? In *human* laws, as I have hinted above, it has been always thought a good rule of interpretation (not excluding any other good rule) to observe, upon what occasion the laws were made, what was their general scope or view, and how they were understood at their first framing, or immediately after, and to recollect how the *practice* ran: hence it is that *reports*, and *precedents*, and *adjudged cases* are so highly useful in interpreting *human* laws. The case is not much different in *divine laws*, being that they also are written in *human* language, and their sense is to be investigated and cleared up by the like *human* means. If the *Fathers* were *fallible*, so also are we: and if they, with all their advantages, might misconstrue Scripture, so may we much more. Therefore there is no prudence in throwing off their assistance as *useless* or *superfluous*. Even fallible men may be useful instructors to others as fallible: and in a *multitude of counsellors*, especially such counsellors, *there is safety*[n].

II. But it is further pleaded, that Scripture is *plain* in all *necessaries*, and therefore needs no illustration from the *ancients*[o]. We allow, that Scripture is *plain* in *necessaries*; yea, it is what we urge and contend for: and there is nothing which offends us more than that many persons will endeavour notwithstanding, by violent contortions, far-fetched subtleties, and studied evasions, to elude and frustrate these *plain* things. Such conduct on the

[n] Prov. xi. 14. [o] Whitby, Dissertat. in præf. p. 10, 19.

adverse side makes it the more necessary to have recourse to *antiquity*, for the greater *security* against all such attempts. For while Scripture is *plain*, antiquity is *plain* also, and *two* plain things are better than *one*. God himself hath taught us, by adding his *oath* to his *promise*, not to think any *confirmation* superfluous which he is pleased to afford us. His word alone might be *safely* depended upon, being *certain* and *infallible:* but *two immutable* things afford the *stronger consolation*[p]; and God considers the infirmities of mankind. In like manner, though Scripture be very *plain* to reasonable men, so far as concerns *necessaries*, yet by taking in *antiquity* to it, the evidence, upon the whole, becomes both *plainer*[q] and *stronger*. There is so much weakness commonly in human nature, and so much reluctance shewn to the reception of divine truths, that we have need of all the *plain* things we can any where procure: and had we twenty more as plain as these, we could make use of them all, and indeed should be obliged to do so, lest otherwise we should be found guilty of despising the blessings of Heaven. It is certain that there is something very particular in the concerns of *religion*, that *plain* things there have not the same force or weight as they have any where else. It is the only subject in the world wherein a man may dispute the most *certain facts*, and most *indubitable proofs*, and yet be allowed to be in his senses: for if any one, in the

[p] Hebr. vi. 17, 18.

[q] N. B. It should be observed that the word *plain* is an equivocal word, and of indeterminate meaning, till it be carefully distinguished. It is a *relative*, and means plain to some or other. To God *all things* are plain: to angels *more* things than to man. Doctrines plain to *some men* are not so to *others*, on account of ignorance, inattention, prejudice, or any *infirmity*, natural or contracted. Things also may be plain by the help of *means*, which are not so without the use of such means. Moreover, there are *degrees* of plainness, for it consists not in a point, but admits of a latitude. Besides, the *plainest* things in the world, taken in a *right* point of view, may *cease* to be plain, when put into a *wrong* one: when industriously obscured, embroiled, and entangled, by snares and fallacies, by involving many things in one, (which should be kept separate,) or by expressing them in ambiguous equivocal terms, or by perplexing them with captious and sophistical questions. There are *degrees* also of *attention*, upon which the degrees of *plainness* do very much depend: and attention depends upon the *will*, and the will is variously influenced by *motives*, external or internal.

But though *plainness* be really a *relative*, and often varies according to the *person*, and his degree of *attention*, *capacity*, *inclination*, &c. yet we have formed some kind of idea of an *absolute plainness*, abstracted from particular persons; and we mean by it, as to the point now in hand, such a plainness in the *thing* itself, or in the *words* expressing it, as any one of tolerable *capacity*, with a reasonable *attention*, and by the use of the ordinary *helps*, or *means*, may competently understand: in this sense, or by this standard, *fundamentals* are commonly said to be *plain*.

common affairs of life, were to make it a rule to believe nothing but what he *sees*, or were to reject the *faith* of all *history*, he would undoubtedly be despised or pitied by everybody, as not well in his wits. Seeing then that the case of religion is so widely different from all others, and that the *plainest* evidences there often lose their effect, we can never be too solicitous in accumulating evidence upon evidence, and testimony upon testimony, to do the most we can towards relieving the weakness or conquering the reluctance of men slow to believe. And when we have done the best we can, and have pursued every reasonable method we can think of, we are yet to look upon it as *sufficient*, only because we can do no more. Wherefore, no *plainness* of Scripture can ever be justly thought to *supersede* the use of *antiquity*; unless it could be supposed that no additional *light* nor *strength* can be borrowed from it: which is too extravagant a supposition to need any confutation; besides that I have already obviated every suggestion of that kind in the former part of this chapter.

If it be said, that *common Christians*, at least, can reap no benefit from *antiquity*, nor make any *use* of it; that will not be reason sufficient for throwing it aside, so long as the *learned* may. But even *common Christians* do enjoy the benefit of it, if not at *first* hand, yet at the *second*, *third*, or *fourth*; and that suffices here, as well as in other cases of as weighty concernment. How do they know, for instance, that Scripture is the word of God? They know it *immediately* or *proximately* from their proper guides, or other instructors; who in the last resort learn it from the *ancients*. So then *ordinary* Christians may thus *remotely* have the *use* of antiquity (not to mention other *nearer* ways[r]) with respect to the *sense* of Scripture, as well as with regard to its *authenticity*: and their *faith* may be both strengthened and brightened by this additional reinforcement. "The people are "to understand the *grounds* of their faith, and to judge, by the "*best helps* they can, what doctrine is agreeable to Scripture: "but among those *helps* we take in, not barely the assistance of "their own guide, but the *evidence* he brings as to the *sense* of "the teaching Church in the *best* and *purest* ages[s]." But to return.

[r] See this matter considered more at large in Bishop Hare's Scripture Vindicated, p. 111, &c.

[s] Stillingfleet's Answer to J. S.'s Catholic Letters, p. 58.

We admit, as I before said, that Scripture is very *plain* in *necessaries:* as, for instance, nothing can be *plainer* from Scripture than that Christ is *God,* and *over all God blessed for ever, true God, great God, Jehovah,* and the like; and that *divine* attributes are ascribed to him, and *divine* worship also, to make every thing clear, and to cut off all reasonable handle for dispute. But notwithstanding that all these things are so *plain,* yet considering that we are not the *first* men that ever looked into Scripture, but that others, who had as good eyes as we, and as upright hearts, and a competent measure of common sense, (besides some peculiar advantages beyond what we can pretend to,) have perused the same Scripture before us; I say, considering these things, it would be something of a mortification to us, or would appear somewhat strange, if such persons should not have found the same doctrines then which we have the pleasure to find now. For whatever is really *plain* to moderns, and *necessary,* must, one would think, by parity of reason, or for a stronger reason, have been *plain* to the *ancients* also, and *necessary* to them as well as to us. Accordingly, upon examining, we find that the same doctrine was *plain* to them, even so far as to be looked upon as an *essential:* a consideration which adds the more strength to what we had before proved from Scripture, as the want of such concurring suffrage would have been a perplexing difficulty; I mean, while we have such *ancient* monuments to look into, and to compare. Indeed, if they were all lost, burnt, or otherwise extinguished, our *Scripture proof* (supposing Scripture itself to want no proof) would stand firm without them: but when we have the *ancients* to compare with Scripture, and know that, in the very nature of the thing, they ought to tally with each other; the *ancients* now, of consequence, must be either a very strong *confirmation* as to any doctrines held for articles of faith, or as strong an *objection.* They are considerable disadvantages where they run counter, and as considerable advantages where they favour.

III. It is sometimes pleaded, that Scripture is its own best interpreter, by comparing texts with texts, and therefore there is no need of *Fathers* in the case; for in the *best* we have all[t].

In reply to which, we are very ready to allow, that comparing Scripture with Scripture is a very *good* method of interpretation,

[t] Whitby, Dissertat. præf. p. 12.

yea, and the *best* and most *satisfactory* of any, to every rational mind: but still we do not see reason why it should be thought to *supersede* any other that is *good*. For, after we have thereby obtained all the home light we can get, where will be the harm of admitting still further light, if we can procure it, from abroad? The more we have of both kinds, the better: every additional increase or improvement, though it were but small in comparison, yet has its use, either for confirming the *weak* and *wavering*, or for comforting them who are *strong* in faith, or for confuting and confounding *novelists*; but most of all for reclaiming those who are over apt to be led by *authority* and *great names*, perhaps of mere *moderns*. For certainly, if *authority*, or *great names*, or even *numbers*, are of any weight; *ancients* are preferable to *moderns*, considered as such, *Fathers* and *Councils* to *private* dogmatizers, and the *Christian world* to a *few* gainsayers. Such being the manifest and constant *use* of the argument drawn from *antiquity*, superadded to *Scripture*, there is great reason for taking it in after *Scripture*, that we may have the benefit of *both*.

The excellent Buddeus, otherwise a very judicious writer, appears not so clear, or not so accurate in his account of this matter, as might be wished. He gives his judgment, "that "neither *natural reason* nor *tradition* should be the *rule* of inter- "preting, but *Scripture* itself, and the *analogy* of *faith*[u]." Had he said, neither one nor other, but *all together*, I think he had said right: but as he has taken in only *two* of the things, excluding the rest, as it seems, from bearing a part in the interpretation of Scripture, he appears to me to have judged wrong upon the case, or at least to have fallen short of his wonted accuracy. For certainly he ought to have allowed something to *natural reason*, and something also to *antiquity*, though not *every thing*. There is a great deal of difference between admitting either of them to govern absolutely, and throwing them quite out: and there is a just *medium* between giving each of them a *negative*, and making either of them *sole* umpire. There are many considerations to be taken in, for the proceeding rightly in the

[u] A Socinianis, non minus quam Romanensibus discedimus, dum nec *rationem*, nec *traditiones*, (aut Ecclesiæ auctoritatem,) pro regula et norma interpretandi scripturam agnoscimus, sed Scripturam ex *Scriptura* secundum *analogiam fidei* explicandam contendimus: quam quidem viam et rectissimam et tutissimam esse, res ipsa ostendit, et facile perspiciat qui cuncta rite secum ponderaverit. *Buddæi Isagog.* vol. ii. p. 1795. Conf. ejusdem Præfat. ad Salom. Glassii Opera, edit. Lips. A. D. 1725.

interpretation of Scripture; and all of them respectively must have their share, as they have their weight. To exemplify what I mean; *true* interpretation of Scripture cannot, in any case whatever, run counter to any plain certain principle of *natural reason*, (inasmuch as *truth* can never be contrary to *truth*,) nor, in any case whatever, to *Scripture* itself *rightly* interpreted; nor, in any case whatever, to the *analogy* of faith, before proved, (which amounts nearly to the same with the preceding;) nor, without the utmost necessity, to the *natural*, *usual*, *unforced* sense of the words; nor, so far as concerns *fundamentals*, to the *universal* judgment of the first and purest ages of the Church. These, as I conceive, are the butts and boundaries within which every *true* interpretation is confined: and whenever any pretended interpretation is found to break through them, or through any of them, there needs no more to pronounce it *false*. To express the same thing *affirmatively* which before I have *negatively*, when any interpretation of Scripture has all those *five* characters, (viz. *natural reason, parallel* places of *Scripture, analogy* of *faith, propriety* of *language*, and *countenance* of *antiquity*,) to vouch directly for it, then it is as strongly supported as it is *possible* for an interpretation to be. If it has only *some* of those *positive* characters, or one only, the rest not interfering, it *may be* a good interpretation; but the *more* it has, so much the *surer*[x]. For example: the doctrine I am here defending has

[x] Dr. Rogers, in one of his Sermons, (Posth. Serm. iv. p. 95, &c.) explains this whole matter somewhat differently, but agreeing in the main with what I have here offered. His thoughts upon the point are comprised in the particulars here following, which I shall produce in his own words, as nearly as an abridgment will permit:

"1. Many places of sacred Writ "are so *plain*, that no man, who reads "or hears them, in a language he is "acquainted with, can doubt of their "meaning.

"2. The sense of *other* places we "collect from *rational deductions*, "comparing one Scripture with "another.

"3. Other places there are which "require the knowledge of *history*, of "ancient facts and customs, of *early* "*tradition*, and *primitive* acceptation, "to determine their sense.

"4. The inspiration of the Scrip- "tures *supposed*, we cannot, consist- "ently with such supposition, either "from the *construction of the words*, "or from *deductions* of reason, or "from *authority*, admit any proposi- "tion, as the intended sense of Scrip- "ture, which contradicts any *mani- "fest truth*.

"5. Neither can we admit *contra- "dictory* expositions of the same or "different places of Scripture.

"In the two last cases, we conclude "*negatively* with the clearest assur- "ance: but when we go on to ascer- "tain the meaning *positively*, the "sense of Scripture which we receive "in the *first way*, by an immediate "view, appears to us with *greatest* "evidence: and the sense we collect "in the *second way*, by rational de- "ductions, is *more evident* than what

four of the said characters *positively* for it, (viz. tenour of Scripture, analogy of faith, propriety of language, and *antiquity*,) and the *fifth*, which is *natural reason*, is not against it: therefore it is a very just and reasonable interpretation. So many plain legible characters of truth ought, in all equity, to overrule any *seeming* or *conjectural* repugnancies as to the nature of the thing confessedly *mysterious*, so long as there is no *plain* contrariety to any known truth.

Hitherto I have been answering those objections which aim at setting the *Fathers* aside as needless, being *superseded* (as is thought) by the perfection, or plainness, or fulness of sacred Writ. The remaining objections which I am to take notice of are of another kind, striking more directly at the *reputation* of the *Fathers*, in order to insinuate that they are by no means qualified to serve the purposes they are brought for, being more likely to perplex than to instruct a reader, more apt to mislead and draw us aside than to set us right.

IV. The *obscurity* of the *Fathers* makes up one half of the learned Daillé's Treatise upon that subject. I need not be very particular in examining into that plea here, because it will come up again, in part, under another article lower down, where I shall consider it more distinctly. For the present it may suffice to observe: 1. That Mr. Daillé, in some instances, rhetoricates upon the subject, and has frequently overstrained. 2. Many things have been cleared up since he wrote that piece, (since the year 1631;) some by himself, more by others after him: so that what might appear to be of some force then can have little or none now. 3. Particular answers have been returned to the several articles on the head of *obscurity*, by those who have professedly undertaken it[y], besides what has been done occasionally

" we receive in the *third* way, from " the affirmations of *authority*."

So this excellent writer resolves the *positive* characters of true and just interpretation into *immediate view*, *rational deductions*, and *authority*, all having their proper weight of *evidence* respectively, but in different degrees. The two *negative* characters are checks upon all the *positive* ones, to ascertain their application, and to prevent the pushing any of them too far. This account, in substance, differs so little from what I have offered, that it appears to contain much the same thoughts placed in another light, or differently ranged. It may be of use to a reader to take the same thing in two views, and so to form his own judgment, as he sees best, out of *both*: and therefore I have here presented him with both.

[y] Scrivener. adv. Dallæum, par. i. per tot. Reeves's Preface to the Apologists, p. 37, &c. Natalis Alexander, Hist. Eccl. Sæc. ii. diss. xvi. c. 22. p. 537, &c. Beveridge's Cod. Can. Vindicat. Procem. sect. viii.

in *new editions* of Fathers, or in *bibliothèques*, or in *critical* dissertations. 4. Whatever truth there may be in the objection, as to sundry controverted points of inferior moment, yet it affects not the cause now before us: for Daillé himself allows that the *Fathers* are generally clear enough in points *fundamental*, whereof this is one, in his judgment at least. He writes thus: "You shall there meet with very *strong* and *solid proofs* "of those *fundamental* principles of our religion, touching which "we are all agreed; and also many excellent things laid open, "tending to the *right understanding* of these *mysteries*, and also "of the *Scriptures* wherein they are contained. In this particu- "lar their *authority* may be of *good use* to you, and may serve "as a *probable* argument of the truth[z]." So then, whatever *obscurity* may otherwise be found in the *Fathers*, (like as in *Scripture* itself,) the cause which we have now in hand appears to be but little concerned in it, according to the judgment of that learned man, who made the most of the objection, as to other matters. For though he sometimes points out some *obscure* passages, as he conceived them to be, relating to things *fundamental*, yet, upon the whole, he apprehended that those doctrines might be plainly enough traced up to the very days of the Apostles, and that the *Fathers* might be exceeding *useful* to us in that view, and for that purpose.

V. It has been frequently objected, that many of the *Fathers* have *erred*, and sometimes grossly: and large collections of their real or supposed mistakes have been drawn out, and presented to public view[a]. Now, indeed, if any man should presume to say that the Fathers were *inspired*, or *infallible* in what they wrote, such a collection of *errors* might be of use for the confuting the false presumption: but how it affects their credit or character as *witnesses* of the Church's prime doctrines in their times, appears not. It is not uncommon for those very *Fathers*, where they give a *wrong* and *false* opinion, to make a *true* discovery of the Church's sentiments, in that very instance, *contrary* to their *own*. Therefore a reader should know how to distinguish

[z] Daillé of the Right Use of the Fathers, part ii. p. 184.

Si in vivis jam esset [Dallæus] quam ægre ferret vir pientissimus, si aliqui reperirentur qui argumentis, quibus ipse causam *Pontificiam* adeo feliciter debellavit, ad labefactandam et subvertendam Nicænam fidem abuterentur. *Cave, Ep. Apologet.* p. 19.

[a] Daillé, part ii. c. 4. p. 60, &c. Whitby, Dissertat. in Præfat. sect. iv. p. 15, &c.

between delivering an *opinion*, and reporting a *fact;* as also between appealing to the *Fathers* as unerring *judges*, and appealing to them as faithful *witnesses*.

But to speak more directly to the charge of *errors*, it may be justly pleaded in abatement, that upon a careful review, many of them have been found to be purely *imaginary*, mere mistakes or misrepresentations of the too precipitate correctors: and of those that are *real*, most will be seen in things only of a *problematical* kind, and of a *slight* nature[b]. Or if they be of a more *grievous* sort, they were the mistakes of some *few*, and were either not *universal*[c], or not *ancient*, and never insisted upon as articles of faith and *terms* of *communion*. So that, whatever *errors* are discovered in any *Father* or *Fathers*, they do not invalidate the argument drawn from the *universal* agreement of the ancient churches in the *prime* things. However, there have not been wanting, upon occasion, learned hands[d] to draw up apologies for the *Fathers*, either in separate discourses, or in prefaces to new editions, or by way of note, or the like; by which means most of those unworthy aspersions have been happily removed, and the black catalogues much reduced. A learned foreigner[e], not long ago, being justly sensible of the mischievous tendency of that *unnatural* practice of some Christians, in throwing contempt upon the brightest ornaments of the Christian Church, took the pains to consider the particular articles of doctrine upon which the *Fathers* have been wrongfully suspected or charged, and to do them justice against their indiscreet or over censorious accusers.

Since that time, I do not know a warmer or keener adversary that the *Fathers* have had than Mons. Barbeyrac, Professor of Civil Law at Groningen, and known to the learned world by his

[b] Monebo tantum, in patrum scriptis *dogmata philosophica* a *fidei articulis* probe esse distinguenda. In *his*, sacris literis et Catholicæ traditioni strictius se alligant, et in rei summa omnes conveniunt: in *illis*, majori utuntur libertate, et opiniones sæpius adhibent quæ in philosophorum scholis ventilari solebant; quin et in explicandis fidei mysteriis quandoque voces e schola philosophica petitas admovent, sed ad Christianum sensum accommodatas. *Cave, Epist. Apologet.* p. 48.

[c] See Grotius de Jur. B. et P. lib. i. c. 2. s. 9. p. 60.

[d] Thorndicius de Rat. et Jur. Fin. Controv. c. 25. Scrivener. adv. Dall. par. ii. c. iv. p. 185. Cavii Epistola Apologetica. Reeves's Preface, p. 67, &c. Remarks on Christianity as old &c. with regard to Primitive Antiquity, part i. continued, printed for Crownfield, 1733.

[e] Zornius Hamburgensis. Vindiciæ Patrum per omnes fidei Christianæ articulos, oppositæ Joanni Dallæo: una cum selectis observationibus contra recentiores Patrum censores, Anglos, Belgas, Gallos. *Inter Opuscul. Sac.* tom. i. A.D. 1709. Giessæ Hassorum. p. 659. edit. Nup. A.D. 1731.

French translations of Puffendorf and Grotius, and his learned notes upon both. He attacks the *Fathers* principally upon the head of *morality*, (as his subject led him to do,) and seems to exert his utmost endeavours to sink their reputation for *sense* and *conduct*, and even for *conscience* too, in some measure, in order to strike them out of all credit or authority[f]. His work has twice appeared in English, (as well as in French,) and may therefore deserve some notice in this place, as much as I may have room for, not to make too long an excursion.

That *satire* upon the *Fathers* (for it deserves no better name) had not long been abroad, before Mr. Ceillier, a learned Roman Catholic, drew up a formal answer to it, of which I have seen little more than the titles[g], and a few extracts. Afterwards, the learned Buddeus animadverted pretty largely upon him, detecting some of his mistakes, but with great tenderness; moderating, as it were, between Mr. Ceillier and him, in respect of several particulars. [h] Buddeus was himself not the most zealous admirer of the *Fathers;* and therefore what he says in their *favour* may be justly thought not to exceed in any respect, but to fall within compass. Some officious gentleman amongst us, having met with Mons. Barbeyrac's French treatise, published it separately in our language, prefixing a kind of boyish title[i] to it, and recommending it with some airs of insult, such as are frequently incident to little minds. Not long after, an ingenious gentleman printed a reply[j], to rebuke the *translator* for his rudeness, and at the same time to defend the *Fathers* against the injurious accusations of the *author* himself: which he has effectually performed, with good learning and solid judgment.

Now, seeing that so much has been done already, I may content myself with a few strictures, or brief reflections. In justice to the *Fathers*, and to *primitive Christianity* struck at through their sides, it ought to be told, that the learned *civilian* has not dealt fairly with the public in that article. He has not been careful about the *facts* upon which he grounds his censure, but

[f] Prefatory Discourse to his French Version of Puffendorf; since rendered into English, and prefixed to the English edition of 1729, sect. ix. x. p. 18, &c.

[g] Apologie de la Morale der Pères de l'Eglise contre les injustes Accusations du Sieur Jean Barbeyrac. Paris, 1718.

[h] Buddæus, Isagog. vol. i. p. 610—642.

[i] The Spirit of Ecclesiastics of all Sects and Ages, &c. 1723.

[j] The Spirit of Infidelity detected. By a Believer. 1723.

has often taken them upon *trust* from others, transcribing the oversights, or *partial* accounts. Indeed he makes a kind of apology for his taking so much at *second* hand: for he says, he "designedly pitched upon examples which had been *already* re "marked and produced by *others*, and are extant in books mos "common and easy to be had[k]." But then he should have in quired whether those examples had not been *already* replied to and competently cleared up, and whether, at least, they were no capable of it. And he should have considered further, whether the authors whom he copies from were all persons to be entirely relied upon in what they say, as men of known learning, judg ment, candour, and modesty; not *prejudiced* against the Fathers nor otherwise apt to be censorious, and over severe in discover ing *imaginary* faults, or exposing *real* ones. Before one deter mines any thing as to the *character* of the Fathers from second hand reports, it would be proper to inquire whether their ac cusers were themselves men of clear and unexceptionable cha racters. It is no excuse to a person of learning and abilities, that he suffered himself to be imposed upon by others, in a matter which required care and faithfulness.

Besides his too often deceiving himself or others with *false* facts, even those that are *true*, in part, or in the main, are yet seldom placed in a true light. Every real or seeming fault of the *ancients* is rhetorically aggravated, the hardest construction commonly put upon it, and no favourable allowances are brought in to qualify: but after saying the unkindest things which he had any *colour* for, and a great deal of art used to contrive such colour, he forgets to afford them their due praises in any thing, to counterbalance the obloquy. So that, were a reader to form his idea of the *Fathers* only by what he finds in that representa tion, he would go near to make it the very reverse of their true and just character. I cannot here take upon me to criticise the whole work; that has been done already by abler hands: but I shall mention a few particulars, to give the readers a taste of his way and manner, whereby they may competently judge of the rest.

The author falls first upon Athenagoras, and charges him with "seeming to establish the worship of angels[l]." But this is a *false* report. Athenagoras neither *says* it, nor *seems* to say

[k] Prefatory Discourse, sect. x. p. 33.

[l] Ibid. sect. ix. p. 18.

it. Indeed Dupin, whether to favour the Romish cause, or whether by mere forgetfulness or oversight, had said the same thing: but Mons. Barbeyrac understands the nature of *evidence* too well to apprehend that the retailing a misreport can amount to a proof. He has another complaint against the same Athenagoras for disallowing *second* marriages. The fact is true in some sense or other; but what *second* marriages, is the question. Might not Athenagoras mean, marrying again after wrongful *divorce?* A very learned man[m] has pleaded much, and well, for that construction: and it is favoured by Athenagoras's[n] grounding his doctrine upon our Lord's own words[o] relating to *such* second marriages.

And though he speaks against the marriage as not good after the *death* of the *wife*, yet he may be understood only of *such wife* wrongfully divorced before. For he thought that the *adultery* before incurred, by marrying in her *lifetime*, did not cease by her *death*. The marriage contracted in *adultery*, like an error in the first concoction, could never be fully corrected, but would still retain its primitive impurity, as having been *null*, and wrong from the first. If his words may admit that sense, it is sufficient: for an accuser is bound to make good his allegation, and the old rule is, *in dubiis benigniora semper præferenda*. I may add, that Athenagoras has been always reputed a man of the *Church:* and yet it is certain that the doctrine here charged upon him was condemned by the *Church* in the Montanists and Novatians. Which is a further presumption in his favour, and seems to justify the mild and candid construction of the words in question.

The next man Mr. B. falls upon is Clemens of Alexandria, whom he uses more unkindly than he had before used Athenagoras. He charges him with three special faults[p]. 1. With teaching *stoical paradoxes* for Christian doctrine. 2. With maintaining that "Christ and his Apostles had not any passions at "all." 3. With "justifying the idolatry of the Pagans." The first article appears captious and frivolous. For what if Clemens, whether the better to reconcile the Stoics to Christianity, or whether to turn their own artillery upon them, made use of their language and phraseology to recommend true and sound

[m] Suicer. Thesaur. in voce δίγαμος, p. 895.
[n] Athenag. Legat. p. 130.
[o] Mark x. 11. Matt. xix. 9. Luke xvi. 18.
[p] Prefatory Discourse, p. 19.

Christian principles by[q]; where was the harm? Or what w there in it which might not well become so wise and so good man? Let Mr. B. put himself in Clemens's place, and then co sider, whether he could do any thing better or more commendal in those circumstances.

The *second* article is founded in nothing but misconstructio and was cleared up long ago by the learned Dr. Cave[r], a by others[s] after him: not to mention what the Benedictin have said more largely in defence of Hilary against the sam accusation[t].

The *third* article is entirely without grounds; a conclusio drawn without *premises* to support it[u], a *false* inference charge upon very innocent words, in contradiction to the whole tenou of Clemens's writings. Is this dealing fairly with the *ancients* o with the *public*?

Besides these particular charges upon Clemens, he has som others, more *general*, which are either injurious or frivolous. He blames him for want of *method* and *coherence*, for being full of *declamation* and *mystical allusion*, and the like[x]. Which kind of discourse is itself *declamatory* and *detracting*, not becoming a person of candour or gravity, who would make allowances for circumstances and times, and weigh things in an equal balance. Why must every author walk in trammels, and be confined to rules of art? Immethodical collections are useful in their kind, and ought to have their proper commendation. But it is further said, as from Le Clerc, that "Clemens's Pedagogue abounds "with maxims excessively rigid, and far remote from any thing "now in practice." We might except to Le Clerc, as to a person of uncommon delicacy, known to lean generally to the *severer* side, and none of the best natured or most happy in his censures[y], but *prejudiced*, by his principles, against the primitive *Fathers*; jealous of a reputation which, he saw, stood in his way, and much afraid of their superiority. Perhaps, after all, he

[q] See Spirit of Infidelity detected, p. 31.

[r] Cave, Epist. Apolog. p. 50, &c.

[s] Natal. Alexand. E. H. sect. ii. dissert. 8. p. 395. Nourrii Apparat. ad Biblioth. Max. vol. i. p. 968.

[t] Præfat. General. sect. iii. p. 30, &c.

[u] Vid. Buddæi Isagog. pag. 623. Spirit of Infidelity detected, p. 33.

[x] Prefatory Discourse, p. 19.

[y] Vid. Perizonius in Ægypt. Origin. Præfat. p. 8. Curtius Vindicat. p. 10—23, 185—191. Jenkins. Def. Augustin. adv. Phereponum. Præf. p. 9. Reflections on Learning, p. 235, &c. Continuation of the Answer of the Hist. of Oracles, Pref. p. 47, &c. Cave, Epist. Apologet. p. 9, 10, 11, 12. Cum multis aliis.

mistakes Clemens's meaning: or if he does not, his censure may be more an argument of the *present* degeneracy, than of Clemens's excessive rigour or austerity. I shall only add, that before we blame the *ancients* for too strict a morality, (an error, if it be one, on the right hand,) we ought to be well apprised of the *circumstances* of those times: for diversity of circumstances requires a diversity in the application of the same general rules, and prescribes as different a conduct.

I shall not go on to the other *Fathers* whom this worthy gentleman has animadverted upon: I have given enough for a sample in the two first. But I shall proceed to observe something with respect to his general manner of carrying on the impeachment. After he has done with the particulars charged upon the *Fathers* man by man, he pretends to have *demonstrated clearly*, that the *most celebrated* doctors of the *six* first *centuries* were but *bad masters*, and *very poor guides* in matters of *morality*. Here we see what it was that he *aimed* at; though he has *demonstrated* nothing but a strong inclination to detract from true and great worth. There is an artificial confusedness in his throwing *six centuries* together: *three* or a little more will be enough for us to insist upon, so far as our argument from *antiquity* is concerned. Everybody knows that corruptions came in *gradually*, more and more every day, after the *world*, as it were, crept into the *Church*[z]: we make a distinction between the elder and the later times. It will not be easy to persuade us, that in those *best* and *purest* ages, when *Christian practice* was in the height of perfection, that the *theory* of it was so very lame and defective as he is pleased to intimate; or that the *guides* and *masters* were so exceeding *low* or *bad*, when the *scholars* or *disciples* were, for the most part, eminently good. If any one doubts of the fact, he may satisfy himself by looking into the accounts given both by *Christians* and *Pagans*[a]; such as make it evident that the morals of that time were the admiration and envy of the *heathen* world

[z] Scribere disposui ab adventu Salvatoris usque ad nostram ætatem, id est ab Apostolis usque ad *nostram temporis fæcem*, quomodo et per quos Christi Ecclesia nata sit, et adulta, persecutionibus creverit, et martyriis coronata sit: et postquam ad Christianos principes venerit *potentia* quidem et *divitiis* major, sed *virtutibus minor* facta sit. *Hieronym. Vit. Malch. Opp.* vol. iv. p. 91.

[a] The testimonies are collected into one view by Cave, in his Primitive Christianity; Bingham, in his Christian Antiquities, b. vi. c. 1. Fabricius, Salutaris Lux Evangelii, c. x. p. 194, &c. Baltus's Answer to Fontenelle's Hist. of Oracles, vol. ii. p. 97.

then, as they are an excellent *pattern*[b] for the Christian world since. The author may conceive as highly as he pleases of *modern morality*, but impartial judges will think it no commendation of it to have it set at *variance* with *primitive Christianity*: to *differ* from that standard, in any thing material, is to come *short* of it, supposing *circumstances* to be the same. Neither is want of *artificial* method any more an objection against the *ancients* than against *Scripture* itself, the best *ethics* of any.

But to proceed with our author, he runs off for a while into declamatory invective against those who are "jealous of the "honour of the Fathers:" he "pities them with all his heart," thinking it "inhuman to insult them[c];" but doing it all the time. Then he gravely tells his reader a formal *untruth*, that they *tacitly* suppose the *Fathers* to have been *infallible*[d]; as if he had intended only to guard against a false notion of the *infallibility* of the Fathers[e]. But there is a very wide distance between supposing them *infallible*, and representing them as *bad masters*, *very poor guides*, &c. This learned gentleman, I presume, does not pretend to be *infallible*; and yet he might think himself ill used if represented as a *bad master*, or a *very poor guide*: there is a *medium* between the *extremes*.

He brings up again, soon after, the charge of *gross errors*, *most profound ignorance* of what they *ought* to have known; adding, that *most of them*, more or less, were *led by passion*, and that their conduct *frequently* was neither *regular* nor *justifiable*[f]. Well then, surely this is something more than barely saying they were *fallible* men; and one may presume to contradict such a misreport of them, without maintaining that they were *infallible*. How will this learned gentleman be able to prove that the character he has here given is their true general character, such as will suit the *three first* centuries? Church history is flatly con-

[b] Dr. Wotton, in a treatise where he intended to extol the *moderns*, and to adjudge them the preference as often as he could, yet took care to give this testimony to *ancient* Christianity:

"It is certain, that many of the "ablest of the ancient *Fathers* were "*excellent casuists*; as indeed every "man who has a right judgment, an "honest mind, and a thorough ac-"quaintance with the design of our "blessed Saviour revealed in the "Gospel, must of necessity be. And "if at this distance many of their de-"cisions seem over severe, there is as "great at least (if not greater) reason "to suspect, that the complaints now-"a-days raised against them may arise "from *our degeneracy*, as from their "*unwarrantable strictness*." *Wotton's Reflections on Ancient and Modern Learning*, p. 369.

[c] Prefatory Discourse, p. 25.

[d] Ibid.

[e] Ibid. p. 26.

[f] Ibid. p. 26.

trary, and the Christian world hitherto has been used to honour them with the title of the *best* and *purest* ages. He refers us twice[g] to some tart reflections of Gregory Nazianzen upon some of the clergy in his time, about A. D. 381. Perhaps Nazianzen himself might be led by resentment to aggravate in some measure; for he was a man of spirit, had some warmth, and might drop too severe a censure, under a sense of the ill usage he had met with. But supposing his censure to be strictly just, what argument is there in it? The clergy about 381. were guilty of many and great faults, therefore the *whole order* were as guilty all along, for two hundred and eighty years together; reckoning from the apostolic age. I see not by what rules of reasoning such *consequence* can be drawn[h]. Everybody knows how miserably the Church had been rent asunder by parties and factions from the time that *Arianism* broke out; that is, for sixty years backwards, or thereabout: by means whereof men's passions were inflamed, and their tempers soured. But how does this affect the elder times, when all the bishops of the Christian Church were in the main unanimous, and held amicably together against *Jews*, *Pagans*, and *heretics*? Allow that heats and animosities prevailed much among Churchmen towards the end of the fourth century, and that the state of the Church at that time was become very corrupt, according to the accounts given by Nazianzen: but then allow also, that such corruptions were of recent date, and that the like had not been seen in elder times, before the rise of Arius, as Nazianzen himself testifies[i]. And he had a vast esteem of one council, at least, the Council of Nice, older than what he speaks of. So then, if Nazianzen is a competent evidence to found the *objection* upon, let him be so also on our side, to supply us with a proper answer, as far as our cause can be concerned in the question.

The author proceeds to contest the right which the *Fathers* have been thought to have to the very modest title of *propagators of the Christian religion:* he thinks it should be given to the *Apostles* only[k]. But certainly the *Fathers* succeeded to the

[g] Ibid. p. 18, 34.

[h] Exemplum profert [*Clericus*] Concilii C. P. I. quo Gregorius Nazianzenus factiosis quorundam artibus vexatus, sede sua cessit potius quam expulsus est; unde *fervidioris ingenii vir* πολυθρύλλητον illud de synodis judicium protulit. Sed fac hanc illamve synodum inique se gessisse, et nullam veritatis, nullam innocentiæ rationem habuisse: an mox *omnes* sunt damnandæ rejiciendæ, exterminandæ? *Cave, Epist. Apologet.* p. 25.

[i] Nazianz. Orat. xxi. p. 380.

[k] Prefatory Discourse, p. 26, 27.

Apostles in the great work of *propagating* Christianity, and therefore were as *properly* (though not altogether so *eminently*) propagators of it as the Apostles themselves. Yea, they also were *eminently* such during the time that *miracles* lasted, that is to say, for *three* centuries at least. But he is pleased to ask, a little lower in the same page, "Why must the Fathers of the "three or six first centuries have been men of true piety and "knowledge, rather than those of the tenth or eleventh?" But why does he insert, *or six*, except it be to blend and confound what should be kept distinct, and to put a fallacy upon the reader? Let the question be asked about the *three first* centuries, and we can assign many and good *reasons* why they must have been, in the general, *better men* than those of the *tenth* or *eleventh*: or if the *reasons* should not satisfy, we appeal to testimony, to certain *fact*, which supersedes all reasons. As to the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, they might decline in proportion, and did so, though there were some excellent men in all: which however I have no need to consider.

A little after, he falls again to softening, and now he asks, "Must the Fathers have been liable to no failings, no passions, "no errors, no ignorance at all[k]?" But was that the question! Why all this shifting and shuffling, if a man were not conscious of a bad cause, and of his acting an unhandsome part? The *Fathers* of the *three first* centuries, (that *golden age* of Christianity, tried and purified in the fire of persecution,) though not exempt from *failings*, nor *infallible*, were yet men of a higher character than those of the *tenth* or *eleventh*; and were not *bad masters*, nor *very poor guides*, but the contrary: that is what we say, and what we abide by. He goes on to tell us, that he does "not "pretend to say," that they were all "a pack of profligate "wretches[l]." No; God forbid. I know not whether Celsus, Porphyry, or Julian would have said such a thing, in the greatest extremity of their rage: they had some regard to truth, and to public report, and to their own *characters*[m]. But though he does not say that, what will he at length say? "There

[k] Prefatory Disc. p. 28.

[l] Id. ibid.

[m] "The heathens themselves, even "such as were the greatest enemies "to the Christian religion, could not "forbear often to do justice to their "great knowledge and eminent sanc-"tity." So says F. Baltus in answer to Fontenelle. *Continuation*, &c. p. 97. And he instances in Porphyry, and the *heathen* philosophers of his time; he mentions Libanius also, and Longinianus, and Maximus Madaurensis.

" were *some* among them who were, in *some measure*, men of " piety and knowledge[n]." How hard to extort the slightest compliment upon those great and good men! Though he can be lavish enough elsewhere towards Confucius, a Pagan[o], and towards Hobbes[p], a reputed Atheist. He proceeds again to pass a decretory sentence upon the *Fathers*, in the same *detracting* way; that " their virtues were, for the *generality*, far from " being any way considerable, and their knowledge commonly false " and confused[q]:" and he appears to be much offended with those who would *bring* him *back* to the primitive food of *husks* and *acorns*[r]. Yet the illustrious Grotius was plentifully fed with those *husks*, or else he had never been Grotius. And he had a very great esteem and value for them: which, as it appears in all his works, so more particularly in that admirable treatise of his, his System of Morality. He understood the valuable use of them to that very science, has intimated it over and over in express words[s], and exemplified it quite through that excellent performance. I am aware that Mons. Barbeyrac, in his edition of Grotius, and in his French version, has *notes* of *correction* upon those passages of his author, and condemns even his master Grotius now, as well as the *Fathers* before. But Grotius was a wise man, and knew what he said; besides that the thing speaks itself. I may add, that this gentleman himself, who has *profited* so much by Grotius and Puffendorf, (who *profited* by the *Fathers*,) has been in some measure obliged to the *Fathers*, though it were only at second or third hand. But the *first* hand is undoubtedly the best[t]: and if any man would expect ever to come up to Grotius, it must be, not merely by reading Grotius, but by reading as he read, and doing as he did[u].

[n] Ibid. p. 28.
[o] Pref. Disc. sect. xv. p. 44.
[p] Ibid. sect. xxix. p. 80.
[q] Pref. Disc. p. 33.
[r] Ibid. p. 35.
[s] Grotius de Jur. B. et P. Proleg. n. li. p. 32, 33. ed. 1720. Conf. lib. i. c. 2. s. 9. p. 60.
[t] " Constant reading of the most " perfect *modern* books, which does " not go jointly on with the *ancients* " in their turns, will, by bringing the " *ancients* into disuse, cause the *learn-* " *ing* of the men of the next genera- " tion to sink; by reason that they, " not drawing from those *springs* from " whence those *excellent moderns* " drew, whom they only propose to " follow, nor taking those measures " which these men took, must for " want of that foundation which their " *modern guides* first carefully laid, " fail in no long compass of time." *Wotton's Reflections*, &c. pref. p. 3.
[u] The learned Buddeus, a judicious and moderate man, and not prejudiced on the side of the *Fathers*, does justice to them and to Grotius, both at once, in these remarkable words: " Sæpius igitur antiquis-

The conclusion which the author makes is suitable to the re and runs thus: "Notwithstanding that great *inaccuracy* of th "*Fathers*, which has often caused them to commit *considerab* "*errors*; notwithstanding that fancy they had for *vain subtleti* "which made them neglect things of *greater importance*; not "withstanding all this, I say, the *fundamental* doctrines of reli "*gion* and *morality* have still been preserved amongst Christian "even in the most dismal ages of darkness and vice[x]." Now though here he is pleased to attribute no more (in respect o *fundamentals*) to the *best* and *purest* times, than to the "mos "dismal ages of darkness and vice," (as before he had been pleased to compare the *tenth* and *eleventh* with the *three first*,) yet one might have expected to find that he had agreed however with those *first* ages in all those *fundamentals*, and had acknowledged his obligations to them for their care and zeal in handing them down to us. But he refers us, for explication of *fundamentals*, to a famous treatise of Le Clerc's, at the end of Grotius de Veritate Religionis Christianæ, A.D. 1709. A treatise so indefinite and loose, that one scarce knows what it aims at; except it be, that nothing should pass for a *fundamental* which has been ever *disputed* by men calling themselves *Christians*, and professing *Scripture*, however interpreted, to be their *rule*[y]. Which is judging of *important* truths, not by the *Word of God*, soberly understood, nor by *Catholic tradition*, nor by the *reason* of things, but by the floating humours and fancies of men; as if all Christian doctrines were to be expunged out of the list of *necessaries*, which have had the misfortune to be *disputed* amongst us, and a *short creed* were to be made out of the *remainder*. But what if others, with Baron Herbert of Cherbury, or with the author of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, building upon the

"simis etiam Ecclesiæ doctoribus, de "juris naturalis capitibus, *haud per-* "*functorie* sermo instituitur. Basilium "Magnum, Gregorium Nazianzenum, "ipsumque Chrysostomum, non tan- "tum Græcæ, sed universæ quacun- "que patet Ecclesiæ summum decus "evolvat, legat, scrutetur, cui dubium "forte ambiguumque id quod asse- "ritur, videtur. Hos *ingenio acri*, "*judicio singulari*, juris hujus quæ- "stiones, quoties eas attingerent (atti- "gerunt autem sæpius) expedivisse "constat: ut ipse Hugo Grotius, re- "staurator hujus philosophiæ felicis- "simus, tum demum et pondus et "robur, et lucem insignem, se asser- "tis suis conciliare posse, si præsulum "horum auctoritate sententiam suam "muniret, fuerit opinatus." *Budd. Histor. Juris. Naturalis*, p. 16.

[x] Prefatory Discourse, p. 34.

[y] See that treatise of Le Clerc's briefly examined by Buddeus, in his Miscellanea Sacra, par. i. p. 320. Compare Turretin. de Articul. Fundament. p. 13.

same principles of *latitude*, and willing to compound all *differences*, should advise us to admit nothing for a *fundamental*, but what all mankind have hitherto agreed in, and for the future shall agree in, Atheists only excepted; where will then at length these presumptuous schemes end? or when will weak men leave off dictating to an all-knowing God, preferring their own fond devices to the wisdom of Heaven?

To be short, that treatise of Le Clerc's, while wholly intent upon discharging *unnecessaries*, (as he supposed them,) takes no due care for preserving the *vitals* of Christianity; but is much such another cure for our religious ferments, as bleeding a man to death would be for a *fever*. I presume, one principal view was, to throw out the doctrine of the *Trinity*; (though it might lead a great deal further;) and it was that consideration chiefly which induced him, and many others, to vilify the ancient *Fathers* of the Christian Church[z]. But I proceed.

Mr. B., besides his ill-will towards the *Fathers*, appears to discover something of an unfriendly disposition towards *ecclesiastics* at large, in more instances than one. But he is particularly offended with the *public sermons*, as *seeming* to him *not very instructive* on the head of *morality*[a]. His translator here, sensible of the indecency of the reflection, endeavours to excuse and soften it by a note; suggesting that he might intend it only against *sermons and books in French*, not against the compositions of the English or Dutch. It was kindly offered: but I find not that the author himself has any where made the exception, or insinuated that he intended any. However, admitting that he had a view to the French only, yet the reflection can hardly be acquitted of some degree of *immodesty*: for surely the French Protestant Divines have deserved a better treatment. He quotes Placette and Ostervald to give some colour to his invectives: but neither of them will bear him out in any such general aspersions

[z] Serio hæc mecum pensitanti, vix ulla commodior occurrit ratio, quam quod sancti patres *Catholicæ fidei*, Nicænorumque dogmatum testes sint inconcussi, vindices acerrimi: qui fidem ab Apostolis traditam, a majoribus acceptam, ad nos usque propagarunt, acceptam, vita, voce, etiam et sanguine suo confirmarunt, invictisque argumentis contra omnia *hæreticorum* molimina sartam tectam conservarunt; quique nullis sophismatibus flecti queant, ut in *unitariorum* causam testimonium dicant. Hinc illæ *lachrymæ!* Hæc fundi calamitas. Adeo ut de *antiquitate* ecclesiastica dici potest quod de *ratione* alicubi habet Malmsburiensis philosophus: ubicunque *ratio* homini repugnat, hominem ipsi *rationi* repugnaturum. *Cave, Epist. Apologet.* p. 17. Conf. p. 23.

[a] Prefatory Disc. sect. xi. p. 35.

upon their whole body. And what if *Divines* ordinarily (as *Civilians* also) fall short of Grotius and Puffendorf; or what if they do not follow the same laboured *method*, (any more than the Sermon on the Mount did,) yet their discourses may be *very instructive*, and the more so for their artless simplicity, being better adapted to the capacities of common hearers. There are many *instructive* ways of inculcating *moral* precepts; and it is by no means serving morality, to disparage all others for the sake of one which a man chooses to be fond of, perhaps as thinking it *his own*. It is natural enough for any person to applaud his own taste, and to prefer his own way: but still it must be acknowledged that there is more of human infirmity than there is of equity or justice in it. *Ancients* ought to have their due praises as well as *moderns*; and *Divines* as well as *Civilians*: and it is not fair dealing to monopolize esteem, or to affect to draw all into one channel, where a man has placed himself to receive it, disregarding his neighbours.

It is very true, what this gentleman says, that it "was not "any of the ecclesiastics, or professors of Divinity[b]," who drew up that *vast system* of morality which Grotius is so justly famed for. It was a work proper for so large a *genius*, and so accomplished a *Civilian* and *Statesman*. Ecclesiastics, I am confident, are so far from envying him the great honour which he thereby acquired, without seeking it, that they would be heartily glad if every other writer of his profession were *like* him, and *equal* to him, in learning, candour, capacity, gravity, sincerity. This gentleman does not make a just report, when he says, that "the "ecclesiastics, instead of returning thanks to Grotius for his ex- "cellent work, every where declared against him, and that many "even Protestant Divines laboured to cry it down[c]." He should have been content to say, that the *Romanists* condemned it[d], while the *Protestants* in general, *Divines* and others, justly esteemed it, and the *reformed* Universities paid suitable regards to it[e]. It was not a *Divine*, but a *Civilian*[f], who first appeared

[b] Prefatory Discourse, p. 36.

[c] Ibid.

[d] Nec quisquam quam diu vixit Grotius, contra eos (Grotii libros) quicquam movere ausus est, nisi quod tertio ab eo tempore quo prodierunt anno 1627. die quarto Februarii, ab *Inquisitionis* quod Romæ est officio, nota hæreseos inureretur. *Buddæi Histor. Jur. Naturalis*, p. 31, 32. Conf. Bayle, Dict. in Grotius, note o.

[e] Crescere tum in dies existimatio de utilitatibus librorum Grotii; ut in *academiis* viri docti eosdem prælegere et interpretari consultum ducerent. *Buddæus, ibid.* p. 39. Conf. Bayle in note o.

[f] Johannes a Felden, A.D. 1653.

against it: and why may I not add, that *Divines* at this day, probably, have a greater esteem of the *work*, and a truer value for it, than the last *Civilian* who translated it, and who has animadverted sometimes too *freely* upon it. Who is it that has told the world that the incomparable Grotius was "not throughly "acquainted with the art of thinking justly?" Is it not this very gentleman[g] detracting from Grotius, to compliment the author of the Parrhasiana, who had said the same thing before[h]. It was Grotius's misfortune, it seems, to fall half a century short in the art of *just thinking*. But what pains will not some men take to draw reputation to their own apartments: first, disparaging *ancients* in comparison of *moderns*, to bring it so much *nearer* towards *themselves*; next, excluding *Divines* at large, to fix it among *critics* or *civilians*; then, highly extolling two or three very *eminent* personages, to beat off *rivals*, and, as it were, to devolve all repute upon them for a season; lastly, giving broad intimations that there are yet *greater* men than those, as to *true reasoning*, (a prime excellency,) and the perfection of *just thinking*: and who should these at length be, but the same that sit as *judges* upon *them*, as upon all the rest? Various are the windings and turnings of *self-love*, and its illusions many: but I forbear. These reflections, if not capable of the strictest proof, yet have most undoubtedly greater appearances of truth[i] than most of those unworthy *aspersions* cast upon the primitive *Fathers*.

After all, we take not upon us to acquit the *Fathers* of all kinds of mistakes, or of human *frailties*; for we very well know that they were *men*, though excellent men. All we desire is, that no *errors* may be imputed more than belong to them, nor that those which they really gave into be aggravated beyond reason; nor that that wherein any of them *singly* offended be collectively thrown upon them all. In short, we desire no *favour* in their behalf, but *truth*, *justice*, *equity*, *candour*, and *humanity*, which are *due* to all men, living or dead; and much more to persons of such exemplary virtues, and so exalted a character in

[g] Prefatory Discourse, p. 79.

[h] Le Clerc's Parrhasiana, p. 247, 248. Engl. edit.

[i] Qui ita omnia reprehendunt, et *inveteratæ existimationis* auctores tam lubenter explodunt, plerumque id agunt ut *soli* habeantur laude digni: vel certe ad *suum judicium*, quasi ab erroribus humanis immune, omnia *aliena* volunt conformata; quod arrogantiæ est haud vulgaris. *Perizonius*, *Q. Curt. Vindicat.* p. 192.

the churches of Christ[k]. I shall only add, that had the *Fathers*, several of them, really fallen into as many errors of doctrine as some would make us believe they did, yet our two main positions would stand firm as before: viz. 1. That from the writings of the *Fathers*, taken with other collateral evidences, we may competently learn, as to matter of *fact*[l], what was the *general sense* of the three first centuries in the *important* articles of faith[m]. 2. That the historical knowledge of the fact so testified may be of very great use to us for the interpreting of Scripture, so far as concerns those articles, and for guarding the word of God against any novel and dangerous misconstructions.

VI. It has been sometimes objected, that the Fathers were but very indifferent *critics* upon Scripture, and that they frequently misinterpreted particular texts. A learned writer has been at the pains to draw up a moderate *octavo*, full of *supposed* examples of that kind, beginning with Genesis, and descending regularly through the Scripture, almost as far as the Revelations[n]. He had a wide field to range in, four or five whole centuries, and more. And if any thing amiss, by way of comment, happened to drop from any *Father* in all that time, perhaps in some very hasty composition, some *extempore* homily, or the like, that must be brought in to swell the account: and whatsoever any one *singly* has offended in a *single* place, (somewhere else perhaps making us amends for it,) he is to bear the odium of it; and not only he, but all his predecessors and successors for so many centuries, all that pass under the name of *Fathers:* for the design is to shew that the *Fathers* in general were very weak

[k] Recte igitur nostri docent, æquitatis legem postulare, ut quos propter multa præclare dicta non æquamus *Scripturæ*, eosdem propter nævos et errores nonnullos protinus non rejiciamus. Circumtulerunt et ipsi carnem et sanguinem; fassi sunt, se humanæ infirmitati obnoxios: perhumane igitur tractandi sunt, non proterve sugillandi. *Rivet. Tractat. de Patr. Autoritat.* cap. x. p. 65.

[l] A proper distinction should be made (as I before hinted) between the *reasonings* of the Fathers, and their *testimonies* as to fact. Of which see Dodwell. Dissert. in Iren. i. sect. xliii. p. 77, &c. Bishop Smalbroke's Vindicat. of Miracles, &c. vol. i. p. 123.

[m] Nihil dubii esse possit, quin per *duo* saltem aut *tria* ab Apostolis secula, Ecclesia in primitivo suo vigore, atque, ut ita loquar, *virginitate* permanserit: eodem nimirum statu quo ab ipsis Apostolis relicta fuit; nisi quod novæ subinde *hæreses* istis etiam diebus erumperent, quibus Ecclesia *exercitata* fuit, minime *corrupta:* haud magis scilicet quam Ecclesia *Apostolica* ab istis *hæresibus* depravata fuit quæ Apostolis adhuc superstitibus emergebant; vix citius enim exortæ sunt quam ab Ecclesia rejectæ. *Bevereg. Cod. Can. Vindic. in Proœm.* s. vii.

[n] Whitby, Dissert. de Script. Interpret.

men. It would be tedious to enter into a detail of the texts said to be misinterpreted. Therefore I shall only observe, as follows, upon the examination I have made. 1. That some of the interpretations found fault with are *true* and *just* interpretations, blamed without reason, and brought in for show, or to make bulk. 2. Several others are *doubtful*, and may claim candid allowances. 3. Some are *misreported*, or represented otherwise than the good *Fathers* intended. 4. Most of the blamable ones are of the *allegorical* kind; and they very often are not so properly *interpretations*, (for the Fathers generally admitted a *literal* interpretation besides of the same texts,) as a kind of moral or spiritual *uses* or *improvements* raised upon the texts, for the practical edification of the people. The design seems to have been much the same (only employed upon a nobler subject) with what several pious persons have attempted, in endeavouring to turn every common incident of life, every thing they hear, read, or see, to some spiritual improvement, by apposite reflections or meditations. The reader may find a specimen of such *spiritual exercises* as I speak of in the very pious and ingenious Mr. Boyle, in his treatise entitled, Occasional Reflections upon several Subjects. Such a kind of *exercise* I take many of those *allegorical* comments (those especially of the *tropological* kind) to have been. They were well meant, and had their use, though often carried too far; but, in strictness, they were not *interpretations* of Scripture, but rather pious meditations upon Scripture. I am sensible that *some* of them were intended as *interpretations:* but in the general, and for the most part, I conceive, they were rather what I have said. 5. But supposing that the Fathers sometimes, or often, mistook in their interpretations of Scripture, (in such texts more especially upon which no *fundamental* doctrine of the Church depended, nor perhaps was concerned in,) what can be supposed to follow from such a concession? Nothing, so far as I can yet apprehend, that will at all affect our present question. It may be allowed, and cannot indeed justly be denied, that *modern* Critics and Divines of the first rank, having the light of the *Fathers* before them, and greater skill in the *languages*, and many additional helps which the Fathers wanted, are better *textuaries*, upon the whole[o], than the ablest of the

[o] Eruditionem patribus, aut sagacitatem in sequelis colligendis, potiorem nullam asserimus quam coævis aliis eorundem temporum scriptoribus: sed nec potiorem illis antiquis *in universum*, quam junioribus nostris. Quin

ancients were, or than all the *Fathers* together, because they contain them, in a manner, or the best things in them, with additional improvements. But admitting all this, it concludes nothing against the *use* or *value* of the ancients, but *supposes it* all the time. Besides, the stress is not laid upon any *critical* acumen of the *Fathers* in interpreting every particular text, but upon their faithfulness in relating what was the *doctrine* of the *Church* as to the *prime* things, in their times, or before, and upon their interpretation of some remarkable and leading texts (such for instance as John i. 1.) upon which chiefly the fundamental doctrines were conceived to rest. From whence it is manifest, that the learned collector of *erroneous* comments (supposing his representations just, which they often are not) has shot wide of the mark: and indeed he was sensible of it[p]; however, notwithstanding, he thought fit to publish his collection. He acknowledges our meaning to be no more than this; that Scripture be interpreted by the *general doctrine* of the ancient Church in the prime things[q]. But then he runs on to call it *imposing* a sense upon Scripture, instead of *taking* one from it: making the *Fathers* speak for *Christ*, instead of permitting *Christ* to speak for *himself*, and the like. Now indeed, if every man

bonas literas studiosius excultas a nuperis nostris Ecclesiæ Reformatoribus libenter agnoscimus: nec in *philosophia* modo, sed in *antiquitate*, in ipsis etiam *linguis* illorum temporum vernaculis: sed et *pressiorem* nostris et *solidiorem* argumentandi methodum agnoscimus quam sit alia illa laxior, et sophistica, et declamatoria, quæ non apud *patres* duntaxat, sed et alios eorundem temporum scriptores erat receptissima. Itaque, exceptis illis quæ ad *fidem* pertinent, aut quæ ad propriorum temporum *historiam;* in aliis facile ferimus dissentientes, judicantesque de eorum ratiociniis juniores. Sed vero in coævis scriptoribus intelligunt *coævi* etiam *idiotæ*, quæ lateant *remotiorum* seculorum etiam eruditissimos. *Dodwell. Dissert. in Iren.* in præfat. sect. 15.

[p] Nec hoc in animum induxisse hos patrum antistites existimo (quod eorum verba præ se ferunt) nempe sacras Scripturas interpretandas esse juxta *sensum quem patres de iis speciatim, verbisque conceptis exhibuerunt*, quemque nos in hoc opere protulimus; sed tantum eas interpretandas esse juxta *doctrinam quam existimant apud primævos patres obtinuisse.* Quod quidem non est sensum Scripturæ ex verbis Scripturæ accipere, sed sensum patrum Scripturis adferre, &c. *Whitby, Dissert.* præf. p. 19.

[q] This matter is very clearly and accurately expressed by Mr. Thorndike.

Est enim magnopere advertendum, cum definiendam ex *traditione Ecclesiæ* Scripturæ sententiam dico, non hoc me velle quasi teneri possit sensus Scripturæ traditione (quis enim putet Scripturarum scientiam, omni literarum genere constantem, traditione teneri posse?) sed quod recusandum sit, tanquam a vero Scripturæ sensu alienum, quicquid *in traditionem incurrit:* quod est dicere, intra *fines traditionis* continendam esse interpretationem Scripturæ. *Thorndike de Ration. Fin. Contr.* p. 147. Compare Sherlock, Socin. Contr. p. 78.

that should undertake to interpret Scripture out of his own head were *infallibly* certain to make *Christ* speak for *himself*, and were in no manner of danger of *imposing* a sense upon him, there would be some weight in such reasoning: but did Socinus, did Arius, did Sabellius, did Valentinus, or an hundred more, succeed so well in that way, that that should be recommended as the only *safe* way of delivering the mind of Christ? It is granted on all hands, that Scripture should speak its *own* sense, and that no *foreign* sense ought to be *imposed* upon it: but then one of the best rules we can think of to secure to it its *own* sense, and to exclude all *foreign* senses, is to keep to the *old sense* (while the words will bear it, much more if they require it) which obtained from the beginning, among the *churches* favoured in a very particular manner by the illustrious presence of the Spirit of God[r].

VII. It has been sometimes objected, that there have been *Fathers* against *Fathers*, Councils against Councils, and warm contests amongst the *ancient* Doctors themselves; particularly about the time for observing Easter, and about *heretical* baptisms. All which we allow, but further plead, that the more they differed in *rituals*, or matters of *discipline*, (things of slighter concern,) the more regard is to be paid to them in the greater matters wherein they all agreed. For if they would not suffer any *innovation*, or the *appearance* of any, even in the smaller matters, but were exceeding jealous of every thing that looked *new*, and were prepared to oppose any person or persons, how considerable soever in station, age, or dignity, rather than admit a *novelty;* how can we imagine that they should all so unanimously agree in the doctrine of our Lord's *Divinity*, if it were not *old* doctrine, the faith which was once delivered unto the saints? Their *differences* in inferior matters serve to strengthen

[r] The very judicious and learned Ger. Vossius speaks excellently well on this head.

Ante omnia quidem scrutandum, quid Deus dicat in *verbo suo:* sed ne perperam illud interpretemur, quando omnes ad errorem sumus proclives, attendere etiam debemus, non modo quid unus et alter, sed omnino quid *constanter* docuerit *Ecclesia Dei*. Quantopere enim repugnat *perspicuitati* Scripturæ, si ita exaratæ credantur, ut ab Apostolorum excessu, ne in *præcipuis* quidem fidei capitibus, ipsi eas Ecclesiarum doctissimi ceperint antistites! Quantum item adversetur *bonitati* Dei et *amori* erga nos, si per tot secula, ad Scripturarum intelligentiam defuisse statuamus *Spiritum Dei*, viris licet pietate et sanctimonia præcellentibus, ecclesiæque semper commendatissimis, atque eo melioribus quo apostolicis propiores erant temporibus. *Voss. in Epist. ad Forbes. præfix. Histor. Instruct. A.D.* 1645.

the plea drawn from their *unanimity* in this, and so are an argument on our side, rather than any objection against us[s].

VIII. It has been objected[t], that our sixth Article condemns the method of interpreting Scripture by *antiquity*, or, at least, *supersedes* it; because it says, HOLY SCRIPTURE CONTAINETH ALL THINGS NECESSARY TO SALVATION; SO THAT WHATSOEVER IS NOT READ THEREIN, NOR MAY BE PROVED THEREBY, IS NOT TO BE REQUIRED OF ANY MAN, THAT IT SHOULD BE BELIEVED AS AN ARTICLE OF FAITH, OR NECESSARY TO SALVATION. The Article says nothing but what is perfectly right, and perfectly consistent with all we have been pleading for. We allow no doctrine as *necessary*, which stands only on *Fathers*, or on *tradition*, oral or written: we admit none for such, but what is *contained* in Scripture, and *proved* by Scripture, *rightly* interpreted. And we know of no way more safe in *necessaries*, to preserve the *right* interpretation, than to take the *ancients* along with us[u]. We think it a good method to secure our *rule of faith* against impostures of all kinds; whether of *enthusiasm*, or false *criticism*, or *conceited* reason, or *oral* tradition, or the assuming dictates of an *infallible* chair. If we thus preserve the *true* sense of Scripture, and upon that sense build our faith, we then build upon Scripture *only;* for the *sense* of Scripture is Scripture[v]. Suppose a man were to prove his *legal*

[s] Daillé himself argues in like manner as we here do.

"As for those *differences* in *opinion* "which are sometimes found amongst "them, touching some certain points "of religion, some whereof we have "formerly set down; these things "are so far from taking off any thing "from the *weight* of their testimonies, "as that, on the contrary, they add "rather very much to the same. For "this must acquit their *consenting* of "all suspicion that some persons "might have, that it proceeded from "some *combination*, or some correspondence and mutual intelligence." *Daillé, Use of the Fathers*, part ii. c. 6. p. 186. Conf. Bevereg. Cod. Can. Vindicat. in Proœm. s. 5.

[t] Whitby, Dissert. p. 4.

[u] So the great Casaubon, speaking both for *himself* and for the Church of England; and at the same time for Melancthon, and Calvin also.

Opto cum Melancthone et Ecclesia Anglicana, per canalem *antiquitatis* deduci ad nos dogmata fidei, e fonte sacræ *Scripturæ* derivata. Alioquin quis futurus est novandi finis?—— Etsi omnis mea voluptas est et sola, versari in lectione sacræ *Scripturæ*, nullam tamen inde me hausisse *propriam* sententiam, nullam habere, neque unquam, σὺν Θεῷ εἰπεῖν, esse habiturum. Magni Calvini hæc olim fuit mens, cum scriberet præfationem suam in Commentarium Epistolæ ad Romanos; non debere nos ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις, a consensu Ecclesiæ recedere. A. D. 1611. *Casaub. Epist.* 744, *Dan. Heinsio*, p. 434. edit. 3. Roterodami.

[v] "We reverently receive the *unani*"*mous* tradition or doctrine of the "Church in all ages, which determines "the *meaning* of the holy Scripture, "and makes it more clear and un"questionable in any point of *faith*, "wherein we can find it hath declared "its *sense*. For we look upon this

title to an estate; he appeals to the *laws:* the true sense and meaning of the laws must be proved by the best rules of interpretation; but, after all, it is the *law* that gives the title, and that *only*. In like manner, after using all proper means to come at the *sense* of Scripture, (which is Scripture,) it is that, and that only, which we *ground* our faith upon, and *prove* our faith by. We allege not Fathers as *grounds*, or *principles*, or *foundations* of our faith, but as witnesses, and as interpreters, and faithful conveyers.

That the Church of England has a very particular regard to *antiquity*, may sufficiently appear from a Canon set forth in the same year when our Articles were first perfected and authorized by act of parliament, namely, in the year 1571. By that Canon it is provided, "that preachers shall not presume to deliver any "thing from the pulpit, as of moment, to be *religiously* observed "and believed by the people, but that which is agreeable to the "doctrine of the Old or New Testament, and collected out of the "same doctrine by the Catholic Fathers and the Bishops of the "*ancient* Church[x]." A wise regulation, formed with exquisite judgment, and worded with the exactest caution. The Canon does not order that they shall teach *whatever had been taught* by Fathers; no, that would have been setting up a *new* rule of faith: neither does it say that they shall teach *whatsoever* the Fathers had *collected from Scripture;* no, that would have been making them *infallible* interpreters, or infallible *reasoners:* the *doctrine* must be found first in *Scripture;* only, to be the more secure that we have found it there, the *Fathers* are to be called in, to be, as it were, constant checks upon the presumption or wantonness of *private* interpretation. But then again, as to *private* interpretation, there is *liberty* enough allowed to it. Preachers are not forbidden to interpret this or that text, or hundreds of texts, differently from what the *Fathers* have done; provided still they keep within the *analogy of faith*, and presume

"*tradition* as nothing else but the "*Scripture unfolded:* not a *new* thing "which is not in the Scripture, but "the *Scripture explained* and made "more evident." *Dr.* (*afterward Bishop*) *Patrick's Discourse about Tradition*, p. 18. Printed A. D. 1683.

[x] Imprimis vero videbunt [Concionatores] ne quid unquam doceant pro concione, quod a populo religiose teneri et credi velint, nisi quod consentaneum sit doctrinæ Veteris aut Novi Testamenti, quodque ex illa ipsa doctrina Catholici patres et veteres episcopi collegerint. *Sparrow Collect.* p. 238.

not to raise any *new* doctrine: neither are they altogether restrained from teaching any thing *new*, provided it be offered as *opinion* only, or an *inferior* truth, and not pressed as *necessary* upon the people. For it was thought, that there could be no *necessary* article of faith or doctrine now drawn from *Scripture*, but what the *ancients* had drawn out before from the same Scripture: to say otherwise would imply that the ancients had failed universally in *necessaries*, which is morally absurd.

From this account it may appear, that the Church of England is exactly in the same sentiments which I have been pleading for. And indeed, if there be any church now in the world which truly reverences antiquity, and pays a proper regard to it, it is this Church[y]. The Romanists talk of *antiquity*, while we observe and follow it. For, with them, both Scripture and Fathers are, as to the *sense*, under the correction and control of the *present* Church[z]: with us, the present Church says nothing, but under the direction of *Scripture* and *antiquity* taken together, one as the *rule*, and the other as the *pattern* or *interpreter*. Among them, the *present* Church speaks by *Scripture* and *Fathers*: with us, *Scripture* and *Fathers* speak by the Church. I have before thrown in some testimonies of the high regard which our Church pays to *antiquity*: and if the reader desires more of

[y] Ecclesia Anglicana hoc se universo orbi charactere dignoscendum, hoc æquæ posteritati æstimandum proponit, quod in controversiis fidei aut praxeos decernendis, illud firmum ratumque semper habuerit (et huic basi reformationem Britannicam niti voluerit) ut Scripturis *primæ*, dein primorum sæculorum episcopis, martyribus, scriptoribus ecclesiasticis *secundæ* deferrentur. *Hammond. contr. Blondell.* in prælim. cap. xiv. sect. 13.

Rex cum Ecclesia Anglicana pronuntiat, eam demum se doctrinam pro *vera* simul et *necessaria* ad salutem agnoscere, quæ e fonte *Sacræ Scripturæ* manans, per consensum *veteris Ecclesiæ*, ceu per canalem, ad hæc tempora fuerit derivata. *Casaubon. Epist. ad Perron.* 838. p. 493. A.D. 1612.

Quod si me conjectura non fallit, totius reformationis pars integerrima est in Anglia, ubi cum studio *veritatis*, viget studium *antiquitatis*. *Idem ad Salmas. Epist.* 837. p. 489. A.D. 1612.

[z] Vid. Rivet. Tractat. de Patr. Authoritate, cap. vii. p. 40, &c. Patrick on Tradition, p. 41. Stillingfleet's Rational Account, part i. c. 5. p. 80. &c.

N. B. In the fourteenth article of the Creed of Pope Pius IV. the words run thus: "I do receive the holy "Scriptures in the same sense that "holy Mother Church doth, and al-"ways hath——neither will I receive "and interpret them otherwise than "according to the unanimous consent "of the Fathers." Here are two *contradictory* things blended together, the sense of their *present Church*, and the *unanimous consent of Fathers*: which ar eno more to be reconciled than light and darkness; except it be by making *antiquity* as much a Lesbian rule as they make the Scripture. I follow the copy of that Creed given in Latin and English at the end of Dr. Hickes's Letters, published A.D. 1705.

like kind, he may please to consult such as have collected them, some of which I refer to at the bottom of the page[a].

IX. It may still be objected, that the appealing to *antiquity* may be both fruitless and endless, and can never decide differences or silence disputes, because all parties almost have or may put in their claim to it; and as it will be hard to decide among the several claimants, so the whole will terminate in confusion[b]: therefore the shortest and best method is, to throw off *antiquity*, and to abide by Scripture alone. This objection does, in some measure, fall in with others before mentioned: but because it contains, in a manner, the sum and substance of several, I shall return a distinct answer to it, in so many particulars.

1. I would observe, that since all parties almost have put in their claim to *antiquity*, it is a certain sign that they have a *value* and esteem for it, and think it of some force. They appeal to *Scripture* also, because it is of weight: one has a *plea* from it, and another a *pretence*. Whatever is worth the *having*, where it is to be had, will be also thought worth the *counterfeiting*, where it is not: therefore, we may expect, in such cases, counterfeit Scripture and counterfeit antiquity, to give colour to *false* claims, as well as genuine Scripture and genuine *antiquity*, to support *true* ones. All this shews that it is generally thought a great advantage to have *antiquity* on one's side, and as great a disadvantage to any cause to want it. Men would never contend about it, were it worthless or insignificant: they would not take pains to adulterate the coin, if the coin itself were not *valuable*. Therefore let us not too hastily part with any thing which all parties either openly speak well of, or secretly covet and admire[c].

[a] Scrivener adv. Dallæum, par. i. cap. 9. p. 57, &c. Dr. Puller's Moderation of the Church of England, p. 80, &c. Bull. Apolog. pro Harmon. sect. i. p. 634. Grabe, Spicileg. vol. i. in præfatione. Saywell, Præfat. Apologet. præfix. Launoii Epist. A.D. 1689.

"It is a *calumny*, to affirm that the "Church of England rejects all *tra-* "*dition*: and I hope none of her "children are so ignorant, as, when "they hear that word, to imagine "they must rise up and oppose it. "No, the Scripture itself is a *tradi-* "*tion*; and we admit all other *tradi-* "*tions* which are subordinate and "agreeable to that; together with all "those things which can be proved "to be *apostolical* by the *general* "testimony of the Church in all "ages." *Patrick on Tradition*, p. 48.

[b] Whitby, Dissert. præf. p. 28, 75, 80.

[c] It is remarkable of Socinus, who contemned *tradition* and all the *ancients*, undertaking to coin a *new* religion from Scripture *alone*; I say, it is remarkable of him, that when he found that his disciples would not submit to *worship* Christ, after all he could bring from *Scripture* to persuade

2. As to *deciding* differences, or *silencing* disputes, it is granted that *antiquity* will not always be *effectual*, neither will *Scripture*; neither indeed will any thing but what would be effectual to make all men *humble* and *modest*, *wise* and *good*. That so many several *sects* and *parties* differ so widely from each other, and from the truth, is not generally owing to this, that their *different interpretations* of Scripture have led them into different opinions in religion, but their *different opinions* have led them into *different interpretations*. All must of necessity pretend *colour*, at least, from Scripture, (if they would not be taken for madmen or infidels,) and if *true* interpretation will not answer the purpose, *false* must come up of course. So it is in vain to cast about for any rules of interpretation, as *certain remedies* for the *healing* differences, or *ending* all disputes: the disease lies deeper, and is too stubborn for human means. There is no *infallible* preservative, no *irresistible* expedient against *heresy*, any more than against any other *vices*: neither ought there to be any; for then a *right belief* would be no matter of *choice*, nor *faith* any longer a *virtue*, as God designed it should be. We pretend not therefore to *infallible* cures by any *means* whatever. But though we cannot expect to work *miracles* by the help of *antiquity* and *Scripture* together, (for *heresies* there will be notwithstanding, and Scripture itself intimates there *must be*[d],) yet they are both of them of very great use, and may have their effect, in a human way, among *reasonable* men; which is sufficient. We are very sensible that they who study to pervert Scripture will pervert *tradition* too, and will often turn those weapons against the truth which were intended only for defence of it. That is an inconvenience common to a thousand other cases besides this: we must be content to bear with it, and to conduct as prudently as we can, under direction from the word of God. And when we have so done all that is proper or required, and without effect, the appeal must lie to the *common reason* of mankind; and there it must rest till the cause comes to be heard before a higher tribunal.

them to it, he reminded them of the *ancient* and *universal* practice of *saints* and *martyrs*, as an argument to prove that such was the *sense* of Scripture. *Quia nimis aperte in sanctis literis ea illi tribui animadvertunt* &c. [Ad Matt. Radec. Epist. iii. p. 391.] An argument which, if he had uniformly attended to it, ought to have given some check to his most exorbitant wantonness and self-sufficiency in other matters.

[d] 1 Cor. xi. 19.

3. But though *Scripture* and *antiquity* may both of them be *resisted*, or both *perverted*, and are not certainly *effectual*, nor intended to be so, yet both together are of greater force than Scripture *singly* can be; and that is reason sufficient for superadding *antiquity*. Two witnesses are better than one, though one be superior; and two proofs of the same thing (though one be as *primary*, and the other *secondary*) amount to more than either of them singly can do. Every additional light contributes some lustre, and every accessional weight helps to turn the scale. A man may be able to evade Scripture alone, who may not be able to evade both *Scripture* and *antiquity;* or if he can evade both, yet perhaps not so *easily:* therefore, if the taking in *antiquity* is of service, as it reinforces *truth*, and bears the harder upon *error*[e], it is worth the urging, for the same reason as all kinds of arguments or dissuasives against sin and wickedness are to be urged in due place.

4. Lastly, I must observe, that there is no such great difficulty as some persons may fancy, in distinguishing *false* claims from *true*, or in pointing out, among the several claimants, where the *right* lies. Men of ready wit and invention may draw up a catalogue of innumerable difficulties, taking in all such as might possibly happen in *any* case, and throwing them together, so as to make up one large and floating idea of difficulty, for the reader to apply to *every* case: but if one looks a little closer into any particular instance, he will be surprised to find how *easy* it is, after all, to form a judgment of it, and that not a hundredth part perhaps of that general confuse idea of difficulty does really belong to it. If a man were inclined to hear what fine harangues might be made upon the uncertainty of the reports of *sense*, how often, and how many several ways his eyes or ears, or other senses might deceive him, (which may be illustrated with great variety of instances from *history*, embellished with all the ornaments of wit and fancy,) he might be apt, for some time, almost to mistrust his *senses*, and to take life itself for a *dream*. But notwithstanding all, when he comes to consider *use* and *experience*, he will soon find that his *senses* may, for the

[e] Quis vero non fateatur, *præscriptione* ejusmodi multum *firmari* animos nostros in *genuina* Scripturæ interpretatione, *validius* quoque *munitiusque* hæreses refelli? Quare hoc armorum genere semper pugnatum fuit a sanctis patribus: qui præcipue quidem se tuentur *Scripturæ* auctoritate, nec tamen prætereunt priorum temporum consensum. *Gerard. Voss. Epist. ad Forbes.*

most part, be securely trusted to, without danger of deception, and that it is scarce once in a thousand trials that they lead him into error. The like may be said, with regard to the studied harangues drawn up by some writers, about the *uncertainty* of all tradition, and the *obscurity* of the Fathers, and the danger of *deception:* they amount only to loose, general *discourse*, which may seem, at first, to have something in it[f], but is soon confuted by *use* and *experience*, the safest *criterion* to judge by. The truth of what I say may best appear by an induction of particulars; and therefore I shall next briefly run over the most observable pretences to *tradition*, ancient and modern, (such as at present occur to me,) that we may judge from the particular instances how that case stands.

Basilides, of the first or second century, and his partizans, pleaded *antiquity*, and put in their claim to *tradition*, deriving it, by one Glaucias, from St. Peter himself[g]. But the vanity and folly of the plea was apparent at first sight: and no sensible man could ever think it at all reasonable to give credit to a wandering tale, or to that obscure Glaucias, rather than to *certain* fact, (appearing in *Scripture*, and in the *churches* founded by St. Peter,) that St. Peter's doctrine was quite another thing from what Basilides had fathered upon him.

Valentinus, of the second century, and his disciples, pleaded *antiquity* also, as well as *Scripture*, and fetched their doctrine by one Theodades, as they said, from the Apostle Paul[h]. A likely matter! that Theodades, whoever he was, should know more of St. Paul's mind than all the churches founded by that blessed Apostle. The silliness of such a plea betrayed itself at once; and but to name it was to *expose* it.

The Marcionites, along with the Basilidians and Valentinians, pretended also to derive their *common* doctrines down by tradition from the Apostle Matthias[i]. But their plea was mere artifice and pretence, and was effectually confuted by the standing doctrine of all the *apostolical churches*. By their *common doctrines*, I mean such as they all agreed in, as about the *origin of evil*, and the denial of Christ's real *humanity*, or the like.

[f] Legi libros de *abusu patrum*, et quidem sæpius: sed, nescio quomodo, dum lego, assentior; cum posui libros, et mecum ipse de nervis argumentorum cœpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabatur. *Zornius*, p. 665.

[g] Clemens Alexandrin. Strom. vii. p. 898. ed. Oxon.

[h] Clemens Alexandrin. ibid.

[i] Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. p. 900. Conf. Dodwell. Dissert. in Iren. i. p. 48.

The Artemonians, of the third century, pretended *tradition* for their heresy, from the Apostles themselves, and by the *apostolical* churches[k]. Which was saying something, had they been able to make out the fact: but the falsity of the report was palpable, and a child might see it. For they had contrived their story so oddly, and brought it down so low, that besides ancient records in great numbers, there might be thousands of living witnesses who could contradict it, and expose it as a shameful imposture.

The Arians after them, in the fourth century, claimed *tradition*, equally with the Catholics, but not with equal reason. They pretended to derive their doctrine down by the *Fathers* that lived before them; particularly by Origen, and Theognostus, and Dionysius Alexandrinus: but Athanasius easily detected the iniquity of their claim, and effectually confuted it[l].

The Macedonians also, in their turn, pleaded *tradition* for their rejecting the Divinity of the *Holy Ghost*. But the great St. Basil laid open the falsity of their pretences that way, and demonstrated that *tradition* was on the contrary side[m]. Afterwards, (A. D. 383,) when both they and the Arians were solemnly called upon, and asked if they would admit the common suffrage of the *ancients*, and be concluded by it; they shrunk, and would not stand the test, choosing rather to rest the issue of the cause upon *logical* disputation[n], their usual refuge, and which they thought their safest retreat. It seldom happens, but that those who make false pretences to antiquity do, by their own conduct, (by their evading, or shifting when pressed, or some other as significant marks,) betray their own cause; insomuch that a stander by, of ordinary sagacity, may often, without entering into the heart of the dispute, give a shrewd conjecture how the case stands. Having considered some of the most noted instances of unjustifiable claims among the *ancients*, let us next descend to *moderns*, for further illustration of what we are upon.

The Romanists are great pretenders to *Catholic tradition*, or *primitive antiquity*: and yet the *fact* is so full and plain against

[k] Euseb. Eccl. Hist. lib. v. cap. 28.

[l] Athanas. De Decret. Synod. Nic. p. 230, &c. de sententia Dionysii, 243, &c.

[m] Basil. de Spiritu Sancto.

[n] Socrat. Eccles. Histor. lib. v. cap. 10. Sozom. E. Hist. lib. vii. cap. 12. See my Second Defence, Preface, vol. ii.

them, that we can point out to them in every age, when, and where, and how every *corruption* almost commenced, and every *innovation* crept in[o]: or can prove, at least, that it was not from the beginning. And it gives ground for suspicion that they are themselves conscious of the nullity of their claim, when they decline fair disputation. They screen themselves under *modern* infallibility, and take sanctuary commonly in their *own* authority, as *sole* judges of every thing, rather than rest the issue of the cause upon a strict and fair inquiry into *ancient* fact. I may further add, that it can scarce be thought a very difficult matter, to discern how *antiquity* stands as to that controversy, when a single writer of our own (our excellent Bishop Jewel) was not afraid, though a very modest man, to challenge them publicly upon a great many articles, twenty-seven in number, and to give them six whole centuries to look out in, only to produce any *one sufficient sentence* out of any *old Catholic Doctor* or *Father*, or *general Council*, that should be found to declare *clearly* and *plainly* on their side, in any of the said articles. He made the challenge, and upon trial was sufficient to stand his ground[p]. The like challenges, with respect to the first three or four centuries, have been offered by others[q], and may be easily maintained by any man of competent learning or judgment[r]; so little difficulty is there in tracing *tradition*, or in distinguishing *pretence* from *reality*. Wherefore one can scarce forbear lamenting, that so able a writer as Daillé should take the pains he did to depreciate the *use* and *value* of the *Fathers*, only for fear the Romanists should take advantage of them[s]. He wanted at that time either the *spirit* or the *penetration* of Jewel: otherwise he might have considered, that the Protestant cause could not desire any fairer or greater advantage than to join issue upon the point of

[o] See more particularly Bishop Bull's Answer to the Bishop of Meaux; and Bishop Stillingfleet's Council of Trent examined and disproved by Catholic Tradition, A. D. 1688, and Dr. Whitby's Treatise of Tradition.

[p] Fidem fecerint vel solius Magnæ Britanniæ vestræ, vel etiam nostræ, tot theologi summi: ante omnes κειμήλιον illud hominis, Joannes Juellus, antistes Sarisburiensis. Quis enim e Conciliis vel Doctoribus, quotquot primis fuere annis sexcentis, non animosius modo, sed doctius quoque, vel felicius impugnavit adversarios? Non defuere quidem quibus hoc disputandi genus minus probaretur, sed præstantissimi etiam Whitakeri judicio, *timidiores* hi fuere quam necesse erat. *Ger. Voss. ad Forbes.*

[q] See Dr. Hickes's Letters to a Popish Priest, p. 188, 189.

[r] See his Epistle Dedicatory prefixed to his Right Use of the Fathers; as also his Preface to the same.

[s] Vid. Scrivener in Præfat.

genuine *antiquity*, and to be concluded by it. Indeed, it seems that he did perceive it afterwards, and made very good use of it, when *years* and *experience* had more enlarged his views.

The modern Socinians, though their way has been, for the most part, to reject *antiquity*, or to undervalue it, (finding it run against them,) have yet many of them, and of late more especially, thought it policy to set up a claim to *tradition*, deducing it from the Apostles, by the Ebionites and Nazaræans, (whom they ignorantly or artfully confound,) down as far as to the days of Justin Martyr, where they are pleased to imagine a break in the descent, making him the first *innovator*. The story is better laid than that of their predecessors the Artemonians, before mentioned: for they confine us within fifty years from the apostolical age; and they know that we have but *few* records, within that compass, to confute their tale by. However, by laying all our evidences together, and making the best of them, means have been found to demonstrate[t], so far as a matter of fact can be demonstrated, the falsity and nullity of their pretended *tradition*. And indeed it must look very odd, at first sight, to every considering man, that a tradition from the *Apostles* should be brought down by Ebionites, men condemned by all the *apostolical* churches; nay, and by the *Apostles* themselves, as may appear from what I have offered above.

There remain now only the modern Arians to be spoken to. Some of whom do with great *assurance* lay claim to *ancient tradition;* while others fluctuate and hesitate upon it, as upon a point which they neither know how to abide by, nor how to give up. As to those who put on the greatest *assurance*, it is a strong presumption of their consciousness of something wrong, that they are unwilling to acquiesce in the Canonical Scriptures, without superadding another Gospel to them, a *new* book of Constitutions, spurious and interpolated pieces of the *third*, *fourth*, and *fifth* centuries[u]; which, whatever else they be, are undoubtedly no part of the oracles of God. Another circumstance which looks suspicious is, that this pretended *tradition*

[t] Bull. Primitiva et Apostolica Traditio, per tot. Mosheim Vindic. Antiq. contr. Joan. Toland. Stillingfleet's Vindication of the Trinity, cap. iii. p. 15, &c.

[u] See Mr. Turner on the Apostolical Constitutions. Printed A. D. 1715.

is confined within *two centuries*. The reason is, because the evidences afterwards come in too full and strong to be eluded: besides that Clemens of Alexandria, and Tertullian, who are both within the compass, but happen to speak too broad and clear, are excluded from giving their testimony[x]. And yet, after all, even those which are taken in, as Justin, Irenæus, Athenagoras, &c. furnish out evidence enough to confute the ill-contrived claim, and to prove it a *figment*.

As to other more prudent and cautious abettors of the same cause, though they decline not testimonies from the *ancients*, when any can be made to look favourable to that side, yet they endeavour, more ways than one, to sink the value of *antiquity*, and to lessen the just esteem which we ought to have for it. The testimonies of the *ancients* are depreciated under the low name of bare *illustrations*[y], because they are not *proofs* in the highest sense, as the *Scriptures* themselves are. But there is a *medium* between *proofs* in that strongest sense, and mere *illustrations*; for subordinate proofs of the Church's doctrine from the beginning drawn from Church writers are *proofs* of something, (though not *foundations* of our faith,) proofs in the moral kind, *second* only to Scripture[z], and such as ought at least to have a *negative*, so far as concerns *fundamentals*, in the interpretation of Scripture.

Another instance of the low esteem which those gentlemen have of the Fathers is seen in this, that while they quote passages from them, such as they can most easily warp to their own *hypothesis*, yet they undertake not, so far as I have observed, to *reconcile* the other numerous passages, or to make the *Fathers*, upon the whole, *consistent* evidences on their side, as we do on ours: this, I say, is another presumptive argument that they are themselves, in some measure, *conscious* how precarious and unsupported their claims to *antiquity* are.

I may add, that some amongst them have taken all possible pains to *expose* the *Fathers* to the utmost[a], on purpose to render their suffrage, in this cause, *useless* and *insignificant*: a plain sign

[x] Whiston, Primitive Christianity Revived, vol. iv. p. 2. Compare Grabe's Instances of Defects, &c. p. 8, &c.

[y] Clarke's Script. Doctr. Introduct. p. 24. third edit.

[z] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 538. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 736, &c. See also above, p. 615.

[a] Dr. Whitby's Dissertation, [de Scripturar. Interpret.] is entirely on this subject, and written with that view.

that they take them not for *friends*, since they do not use them like friends. From this single mark, a man of ordinary discernment may competently judge (without looking further) whom the *Fathers* belong to, as Solomon, by a like direction, knew whose was the *child*.

Enough hath been said to shew, that it is no such very difficult matter, as some would represent, to judge between the claimants, or to distinguish the *rightful* possessor from the false challenger. I believe it is, at least, as easy (generally speaking) as it is to judge in a *critical* way upon texts: for that is what the *plainest* texts imaginable must at length be brought to[b], if one has a subtle adversary to deal with, who has learned to play the whole game. Much learning commonly will be spent on both sides, before the plainest cause can be brought to a full hearing, and argued quite through. I need but instance in the rounds which Artemonius has led us upon John i. 1. mentioned above.

X. There is one objection more, which, though sufficiently obviated already, may yet perhaps deserve to have something more distinctly said to it in this place. It is pleaded, that men ought to *judge for themselves*, to make use of their *own understandings*, and to admit no *human authorities*. I allow the plea: but, I presume, it is not hereby meant that we should receive no *human* explications of texts; for then we must receive none at all. If I interpret Scripture for myself, my explication is *human* to me: or else, how it should become *human* to others who may take it of me, I do not see. No doubt but Socinus's, or Crellius's, or Enjedine's explications were *human*, as it is certain that many of them were false: and therefore they that talk in the general against all *human* explications seem not to consider what they say, or they forget themselves to be *men*.

As to *authority*, in a strict and proper sense, I do not know that the *Fathers* have any over us: they are all dead men. Therefore we urge not their *authority*, but their *testimony*, their *suffrage*, their *judgment*, as carrying great force of *reason* with it; and *reason* we should all submit to[c]. Taking them in here, as

[b] Le Clerc very well observes, that, "to men governed by their passions, "and conceited of their prejudices, "the most *evident* things in the world "are *obscure*; and that there is no "*law* so clear, but a wrangler may "raise a thousand difficulties about "it." *Le Clerc, Causes of Incredulity*, p. 172.

[c] "*Reason* is that faculty whereby "a man must judge of every thing: "nor can a man *believe* any thing ex-"cept he have some *reason* for it; "whether that reason be a deduction

lights or *helps*, is doing what is *reasonable*, and using our *own understanding* in the best manner, and to the best purposes: it is judging *rightly* for ourselves. If it were not so, what prudent man would advise it, or endeavour to persuade others to it! But, says an objector, do not you follow the *Fathers?* Yes, as far as *reason* requires, and no further; therefore this is following our *own* reason: and he that deserts the *Fathers*, in this instance, deserts *himself* and his *own reason*. Their sentiments, so *ancient*, so *universal*, carry the force of an *argument*[d] along with them, and a very *strong* argument too, all things considered[e]. Therefore the being conducted by those sentiments, along with Scripture, is the same thing with being convinced or persuaded by *argument*; which is hearkening to *right reason*, which is submitting to *God*, (who gave us *reason* for our guide,) and not to *human* authority. It is following the safest and best light which divine Providence has graciously afforded us: for, as a great and good Prelate has observed, "the *general tradition* of the Church, "next to Scripture, is the *best* and *surest* confirmation of this "great point now in question between us; and that which gives

"from the *light of nature*, or a branch "of *divine revelation* in the oracles of "holy Scripture, or the *general* interpretation of genuine *antiquity*, or "the proposal of our *own Church* "consentaneous thereto, or lastly, the "result of some or all of these; for "he that will rightly make use of his "*reason*, must take all that is *reasonable* into consideration. And it is "admirable to consider how the same "conclusions do naturally flow from "all these several principles: and "what, in the faithful use of the faculties that God hath given, men "have believed for true, doth excellently agree with that *revelation* that "God hath exhibited in the Scripture; and the doctrine of the *ancient* "*Church* with them both." *New Sect of Latitude-men, in the Phœnix*, vol. ii. p. 706. written A.D. 1662.

[d] "It is a good *argument* for us to "follow such an opinion, because it "is made sacred by the *authority* of "councils and ecclesiastical tradition: "and sometimes it is the *best reason* "we have in a question; and then it "is to be strictly followed. But there "may be also at other times a reason "*greater* than it, that speaks against "it; and then the *authority* must not "carry it. But then the difference is "not between *reason* and *authority*, "but between *this* reason and *that*, "which is *greater*: for *authority* is a "very *good reason*, and is to prevail, "unless a *stronger* comes and disarms it, and then it must give place. "So that in this question, by *reason* "I do not mean a distinct topic, but "a transcendent that runs through "all topics." *Taylor's Liberty of Prophesying*, sect. x. p. 220.

[e] "Since we know what the *Catholic faith* was, and how the *Catholic* "*Fathers* expounded Scripture, if the "words of Scripture will *naturally* "and *easily* admit that sense, (much "more if they will not admit any "other sense, without great *force* and "*violence*,) let any man judge which "is most *safe* and *reasonable*, to expound Scripture as the Catholic "faith and Catholic Fathers expound "it, and as Scripture most *easily* and "*naturally* expounds itself, or to "*force* new senses and old heresies "upon Scripture, which the Catholic "Church has always rejected and "condemned." *Sherlock's Present State of Soc. Controv.* p. 80.

" us the *greatest* and *truest* light for the right understanding " of the true sense and meaning of Scripture, not only in this, " but in most other *important* doctrines of the Christian re- " ligion[f]."

What I have said appears sufficient to shew, that the taking the *ancients* in for the assisting or informing our judgments in this question, is *judging for ourselves* in the most *rational* way that can be thought on. Nevertheless, I take the liberty to observe, that those who talk most of men's using their *own* understandings often mean little by it, but to get the direction of their *faith* and *consciences* to themselves, or to make them change a *reasonable* veneration of the *ancients* for a *blind* admiration of some *modern* preceptors. They very well know that the generality of mankind (such as read little, and think less) will scarce judge for themselves at all, except it be as to the choice of some leader or leaders, whom they may suppose it safest to confide in. And it is among such as these, commonly, that *new* teachers seek proselytes; obtruding themselves as *guides*, and at the same time assuring them that they need *no guides*: which, in effect, is leading them about what way soever they please, artfully telling them that they go by themselves, when, in truth, they only change their leaders. To say all at once, the true and the whole meaning of the incredible pains which some persons have taken to set the *Fathers* aside, has been generally neither more nor less than this; to *remove* as much of the *evidence* which stands against them as they can with any *decency* attempt to remove. They cannot, they dare not pretend to throw off *Scripture* itself, unless they were resolved to throw up Christianity with it, and to declare openly for *infidelity*: but there may be *colours* invented for throwing off the *Fathers*; and therefore thus far they can proceed, in opposing the ancient faith, and at the same time save appearances. There lies the whole of this matter, as I conceive, generally speaking: otherwise, it is manifestly against all sense and reason to make the least question either of the *use* or the *value* of ecclesiastical antiquity.

The sum of what I have been endeavouring through this whole chapter is, that *Scripture* and *antiquity* (under the conduct of *right reason*) are what we ought to abide by for the settling points of doctrine. I have not put the case of *Scripture*

[f] Archbishop Tillotson, vol. i. Serm. xliv. p. 456. fol. edit.

and *antiquity* interfering or clashing with each other: because it is a case which never will appear in points of *importance*, such as that is which we are now upon. However, as to the general case, we may say, that those two ought always to go together, and to coincide with each other, and when they do so, they stand the firmer in their *united* strength: but if ever they clash, or appear to clash, then undoubtedly there is an error somewhere, like as when two accountants vary in casting up the same sum. In such a case, a wise man will not rest satisfied, (if the thing be of moment,) till he finds out, if possible, the reason of the difference, and discovers where the *error* lies. For either it must lie on the *Scripture side*, (when a man takes that for *Scripture* which is not Scripture, or that for *true* interpretation which is not true interpretation,) or it must lie on the *tradition* side, through some *misreport* made of the ancients, or some mistake of the ancients themselves. Then the question will be, which of the two suppositions is most likely to be true in that instance: and the resolution at length must turn upon a due weighing and considering all *circumstances*, with the *reasons* offered here and there, and then balancing the whole account.

CHAP. VIII.

Shewing that what has been lately offered in favour of the Arian Interpretation of John i. 1, 2. *and of Hebr.* i. *is of no Force or Validity.*

THE author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition had been pleased to say, that "an *honest* mind, inquisitive after *truth*, and "*willing* to weigh the matter *impartially*, and to examine the "evidence on both sides *thoroughly*, might be long in *suspense* "before he could determine to his full satisfaction: and that "several men of *equal* sense, learning, capacity, probity, and "piety, may after such examination make different determina-"tions upon the matter[s]." He refers to his appendix for proof, which appendix contains two opposite views of John i. 1. and of Hebr. i. I would here previously remark something of his manner of wording the thing, and then proceed. Might it not as well have been said, that there is as *much reason* on one side of the question as there is on the other? Why should an *invidious*

[s] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 42, 43.

turn be given to what we are doing, that if we maintain our point, and insist upon it as true and just, it shall be interpreted to be as much as saying, that our adversaries have not *equal* sense, learning, &c. with ourselves? We design not, we desire not to make any such *comparisons*: we leave *persons* out of the question, and desire only to come to the truth of *things*. It is natural for many to admire the founders of their sect, or the leading advocates of their party[h]: and it might look like rudeness to say a word reflecting on their *sense, learning, capacity*, or *probity*. Neither indeed is there any occasion for detracting from their general character, since it is certain that men of as great *sense, learning*, and *piety*, to all outward appearance, as any in their times, have sometimes fallen into *heresy*, (as they might into any other *great sin*,) and have perverted the Gospel of Christ: "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest "he fall." It is a wrong way to judge of faith by the *men*[i], rather than of the men by their *faith* and *conduct*. There is no *sense* however in going against *truth*, no *learning* in contradicting the *wisdom* of Heaven, no *piety* nor *probity* in departing from *God*. *Persons* must be tried by the *rule*, and not the *rule* by their character, be it otherwise ever so high or commendable[j]. Men may behave unworthy of themselves; and God permits even *wise* men and *good* men (as Solomon and David) sometimes to fall, when they grow *secure* or *assuming*, for a punishment to them, and for a *trial* to others[k], and for a warning to all, that

[h] Magnus profecto nescio quis significatur magister, et tantæ scientiæ qui sectatoribus propriis non solum quæ *humana* sunt nosse, verum etiam quæ *supra hominem* sunt prænoscere posse videatur; quales fere discipuli sui jactitant fuisse Valentinum, Donatum, Photinum, Apollinarem, cæterosque ejusmodi. *Vincent. Lirinens.* c. xv.

[i] Solent quidem isti *infirmiores* etiam de quibusdam *personis* ab hæresi captis ædificari in ruinam: quare ille vel ille *fidelissimi* et *usitatissimi* in Ecclesia, in illam partem transierunt? Quis, hoc dicens, non ipse sibi respondet, neque *prudentes*, neque *fideles*, neque *usitatos* æstimandos, quos *hæreses* potuerint demutare. *Tertull. Præscript.* c. iii.

[j] Quid ergo si *episcopus*, si *diaconus*, si *vidua*, si *virgo*, si *doctor*, si etiam *martyr* lapsus a regula fuerit, ideo hæreses veritatem videbuntur obtinere? Ex *personis* probamus fidem, an ex *fide* personas? Nemo *sapiens* est nisi fidelis, nemo *major* nisi Christianus; nemo autem *Christianus*, nisi qui ad finem perseveraverit. *Tertull. Præscript.* c. iii.

[k] Luce clarius aperta causa est, cur interdum divina Providentia quosdam Ecclesiarum *magistros* nova quædam dogmata prædicare patiatur: *ut tentet vos*, inquit, *Dominus Deus vester*. Deut. xiii. 3. Et profecto magna *tentatio* est, cum illum quem tu *Prophetam*, quem *Prophetarum* discipulum, quem *Doctorem*, et adsertorem *veritatis* putes, quem summa *veneratione* et *amore* complexus sis, is subito latentes noxios subinducat errores; quos nec cito deprehendere valeas, dum *antiqui*

they may learn to be *humble* and *watchful*, and not to trust so much to their own *worth* or *parts*, as to their *care* and *circumspection*, and God's *blessing* upon it.

Thus much being premised for the taking off all undue *admiration* of any man's person, and for the preventing any invidious *comparisons*, (foreign and useless to the point in hand,) as well as for the putting the cause upon a right issue; I now proceed to examine the merits of the debate between the Arians and the Athanasians, so far as concerns John i. 1. and Hebr. i. 10.

I. The author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition undertook to represent the Athanasian and Arian constructions of John i. 1. fairly and impartially, as indeed common equity and justice required. He begins with the Athanasian: but how soon does he discover marks of *partiality* and *unequal* dealing. He smooths over the Arian construction with all affectionate tenderness, covering even its *real* and *greatest* faults, as we shall see presently: but does he shew any favour at all to the other! When he is interpreting for us, THE WORD WAS GOD, he presently throws in, *the self-same Being with the Father* [k]. He must have known how ambiguous and equivocal [l] that expression of *self-same Being* is, and that, in one sense of it, it is not our doctrine, but the *Sabellian heresy*. Might it not therefore have sufficed to have said, the *same God with the Father*, or *one God with the Father*? That is a doctrine which we inviolably maintain and adhere to, because Scripture forbids us to admit *two* adorable *Gods*. As to the question about calling them the *self-same Being*, it is a question about a name, or a *phrase*, and a *scholastic* question, invented several ages after our doctrine had stood secure and independent of it. And when the *Schoolmen* undertook to consider this *verbal* affair, (for it is no more,) they either rejected or admitted the *expression* with proper distinctions; not scrupling to say *tres res*, or *tria entia relativa*, always meaning that the *union* was too close to admit of the name of *Beings* in the plural [m], without a softening epithet: and therefore *Being of being*, or *Substance of substance*, (not *beings* or *substances*,) has been the Catholic language. Let but those who object *sameness*

magisterii duceris præjudicio, nec facile damnare fas ducis, dum *magistri veteris* impediris affectu. *Vincent. Lirin.* c. xv.

[k] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 51.

[l] See my First Defence, vol. i. p. 371, 465.

[m] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. Query xxiii. p. 712—718.

of *being* define the terms, and tell us what constitutes *sameness*, and then it will be very easy to tell them how far we suppose the three Persons to be the *same Being*. All the difficulties about *sameness*, or *individual*, or *numerical*, &c. resolve only into this, that we know not precisely, in all cases, what to call *same*, *individual*, *numerical*, and the like. The general notion of the Trinity is clear, but the meaning of those *terms* is loose, confuse, and undeterminate: so that the perplexity (if there be any) lies not in the *thing*, but in some dark *names*, which many use without any certain meaning. Say but what those *words* or *names* precisely signify, and it will be very easy to determine how far they are applicable to the *true notion* of the Trinity. But to proceed:

I have observed how unfairly the gentleman has dealt with our doctrine: let us next take notice, how tenderly he deals with the Arian construction of the same words. *The Word was God*, viz. a *divine Person*, a *most God-like Being*[n]. He should have said, *another God*, a *creature* of the *great God*[o], which is their plain and certain meaning; though they are very reserved and bashful in the wording of that article, as they have always been, dreading to speak it out in broad terms. However, if God the Son be *God*, as the text plainly says, he must be either *another God*, or *one God with the Father:* so that if our doctrine of *one God* be rejected, *two Gods* is the consequence directly. Besides, since they must own, and do own, that he was *God* before the world was made, they should tell us, whether he was God *by nature*, or *by office*. He had no *office* so early, that I know of: it seems then he was God *by nature*. So there are *two Gods* by nature upon the Arian principles. Therefore let any sober Christian judge which is the true interpretation of the text, theirs or ours, thus far. Now let us proceed.

The Word WAS IN THE BEGINNING WITH GOD. That is, say we, *before* any thing was *made*. And we say it for these two plain reasons: because the order of the sentence requires it, since the account of the creation follows after; and because *all things* were made *by the Word:* therefore he was *before* all *creatures*. The Arian construction, as this gentleman represents it[p], is, "IN "THE BEGINNING, when God created the heavens and the earth."

[n] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 54.

[o] See my First and Second Defence, vol. i. and ii. Query v.

[p] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 54, 55.

Now if *heaven* and *earth* are words which signify *all creatures*, we admit the exposition: but if they mean any thing less, they are short of St. John's exposition of his own phrase, which he interprets to mean *all things* that ever were *made*, that is, *all creatures*.

ALL THINGS WERE MADE BY HIM, AND WITHOUT HIM WAS NOT ANY THING MADE THAT WAS MADE[q]. Now we interpret and say, that if all things were made *by him*, then he himself must be *unmade*: and since *made by him* amounts to declaring him *Maker* of all *creatures*, (as we shall see upon Heb. i. 10.) we again conclude he is no creature; because a *creature creator*, if at all reconcilable with *reason*[r], is however utterly irreconcilable with *Scripture*, which every where makes *creative* power the distinguishing character of God most high[s]. The Arian construction is, "All [*other*] things were made by him, and without him "was not any thing made that was [*then*] made." So by inserting *other* there, and *then* here, that is, by altering St. John's most express, most emphatical propositions, a *new* sense is made for him which he had *doubly* excluded, as far as words could do it. For our construction we have, 1. Express text. 2. The *order* and coherence of the sentence. 3. The *tenor* of *Scripture*, appropri-

[q] One may observe the force of this text even upon those that came very unwillingly (and upon the whole not sincerely) into the doctrine it contained, since it obliged Eunomius himself, one of the grosser kind of Arians, but the shrewdest man of the sect, to admit thus much, that Christ must be as much superior to his *creatures*, as the *Maker* must be to the things he has *made*; and that he was really invested with *creative* powers by the Father. A remarkable concession, and such as ought to have made a *modest* man renounce all his *metaphysics*; which alone hindered him from coming entirely into Church principles. The place I speak of is in his Apologetic, (which was answered by St. Basil,) and runs as here follows: *Τοσαύτην αὐτῷ νέμομεν ὑπεροχὴν, ὅσην ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἰδίων ποιημάτων τὸν ποιητήν. πάντα γὰρ δι' αὐτοῦ γεγεννῆσθαι κατὰ τὸν μακάριον Ἰωάννην ὁμολογοῦμεν, συναπογεννηθείσης ἄνωθεν αὐτῷ τῆς δημιουργικῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς εἶναι Θεὸν μονογενῆ πάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν, καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ γενομένων.* *Eunom. Apolog.* p. 281. Fabr. Bibl. Græc. lib. v. c. 23. Basil. Opp. tom. i. p. 623. edit. Bened. Conf. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. ii. p. 255. edit. Bened.

[r] A late ingenious writer argues the point, in a very rational manner, thus: "*Creation*, or the bringing a "thing into being which before had "none, or was once nothing, is un- "doubtedly the proper act of an *al-* "*mighty* or *infinite* power: and, as "must be granted, infinite power is "an *incommunicable* attribute or "perfection. Besides, if a power of "*creating* could be *communicated*, "then the being on which it is con- "ferred, having the *same power*, "might endue a creature of its *own* "with such a power; and this crea- "ture might *make* another such crea- "ture, and so on *in infinitum*; which is "so shocking an absurdity, that no one "can bear the thought or imagination "of it." *Essay concerning Rational Notions*, p. 159. printed for W. Innys, 1733.

[s] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 72, &c.

ating *creative* powers to God supreme. 4. The *reason* of the thing: for it is not *reasonable* to suppose that one *creature* should *create* another. 5. The *universal* judgment of the first and purest ages of the Christian Church. What is there now, on the other hand, to counterbalance these reasons, or to oblige us to run cross to so many evident marks of a *true* interpretation? The author of Sober and Charitable &c. pleads on the other side, that the Apostle, if he had intended to teach that the Logos was *God, Creator of all things*, might have said it more *plainly*, and with less circumlocution[t]. But we think St. John has done it in *chosen* and *expressive* words, and could not have made use of better to express what he intended, all things considered[u]. He might have said, adds this gentleman, that "in "God are three personal distinctions, the Father, the Word, "and the Spirit." But St. John was wiser than to teach *Sabellianism*, as it has been since called; the blessed Three are not *personal distinctions*, but *distinct persons*; as is proved from St. John in this very place, because the *Word* was *with* God.

It is asked, could either *Jew* or *heathen* guess that he did not mean a *distinct being*[x]? I answer, neither *Jew* nor *heathen*, who knew that St. John believed the *Old Testament*, could be so weak as to imagine that he meant to teach *another God*, or *two Gods*. However, the *Christian Church* are the properest interpreters of St. John's meaning: why must *Jews* or *heathens*, as such, be appealed to[y], rather than Christ's disciples, for the understanding *Christian* doctrine? The objector here twice[z] confounds *personal characters* (as he had before done *personal distinctions*) with *persons*; which is not *fair* towards our side, nor so *prudent* for the other side, because it is tacitly confessing that our notion wants to be *misrepresented*, in order to afford some *colour* for disputing against it.

He asks, "Why is it doubled over, THE SAME WAS IN THE "BEGINNING?" To be the more emphatical against *heretics*, or the better to connect the sentence, and to introduce what follows.

"And why so minute, as to inform us, not one is to be ex-

[t] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 55.

[u] See the whole explained above. Compare Tillotson, Sermon xliii. vol. i. fol. edit.

[x] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 56.

[y] See my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 46, 47.

[z] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 56, 57.

" cepted[a]?" Perhaps to foreclose, condemn, and put to shame all those who, notwithstanding such his *minuteness*, would yet be bold enough to foist in *other* there, and *then* here, to elude and frustrate his meaning: experience shews that all his guards are *useful*, none superfluous. But if the reader desires a fuller account, he may please to look back to what I have said above[b]. I have answered all the *questions*: and now let the reader judge, whether they have weight enough to bear down the Christian interpretation founded upon the reasons before recited. Yet the author is pleased to recommend the other in very high terms: " Not a word is lost, *in that way*, every thing has a plain, " proper, and obvious sense[c]." Is it possible? Has the word *God*, for instance, its *plain*, *proper*, and *obvious* sense[d], when it is made to signify a Godlike *creature?* And is there not *a word lost*, when the very strongest expressions which the Apostle could use, to exempt the *Logos* from being one of the things *made*, are defeated and frustrated, by forcing the words *other* and *then* upon him, which he never wrote, and by obtruding a *sense*, which, it is likely, he abhorred? Have the words, *all things*, and *was not any thing*, their *plain* and *obvious* sense assigned them, when they are violently wrested from their *absolute* meaning to a *limited* one; and are arbitrarily clogged with reserves and restrictions, though, according to the plain letter, and other plain circumstances, they form *universal* propositions, affirmative and negative? If such liberties as these are to be taken with *plain* texts, and without any apparent *necessity*, it is in vain to prescribe any *sober* rules of interpretation, or to attempt to *prove* any thing from *dead* writings. But if *words* can be of any weight or significancy, these texts of St. John are plainly *definitive* on our side of the question: which I have shewn more at large elsewhere[e]. Or if the reader pleases to peruse Professor Frank's Treatise, lately translated from the German into English[f], he will there find the *Divinity* of our blessed Lord solidly demonstrated by *six* several *arguments* drawn from this *single* chapter, but compared with other texts.

I may over and above advance one more argument, fairly de-

[a] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 57.
[b] See above, p. 543.
[c] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 55.
[d] As to the strict sense of the word *God*, in that place, see my Sermons, vol. ii. p. 44, 45.
[e] Sermons the first, second, and third, at Lady Moyer's Lecture.
[f] Frank's Nucleus, or Christ the Sum and Substance of Scripture, p. 93—173.

ducible from the distress which the impugners of Christ's *Divinity* have all along been in, with relation to this proeme of St. John, and the difficulties they have lain under in contriving to evade its force. The Alogis, (who appear to have been a branch of the Ebionites,) as also Theodotus[h], took the short and plain way, which was to reject the whole Gospel, as not being of St. John's inditing.

The Arians were so distressed with the same passages, that they knew not how to evade them but by a *new* invention of a twofold *Logos*[i], one considered as an *attribute, quality,* or *operation* of God, (after the Sabellian way,) the other considered as a *creature,* made by the former. And here they were under a *dilemma* which they could never get clear of: for either all things were made by the *Logos* in the former sense, and then how was the *Logos* MADE FLESH? Or all things were made by the *Logos* in the latter sense, created by a *creature,* who must also, if the word *all* be strictly taken, have created himself; which is palpably absurd. It seems that they inclined most to the former; and if we may trust to Anastasius Sinaita, that was the very construction which Arius himself espoused[k].

Next let us inquire, whether the *modern* impugners of Christ's Divinity have succeeded any better, or whether *they* also have not betrayed the like confusion and distress. I need not say any thing of Socinus's wild and extravagant interpretation, which has long been exploded by his own disciples, and which stands now only as a monument of the wonderful virtue of strong *prejudices* and *self-admiration.* Zwicker came after, and he took the surer way, which was to deny the authenticity of the *proeme,* and to strike it out of the Canon of the New Testament. Artemonius (alias Sam. Crellius) is a later instance, and which comes as fully up to my purpose: he has been moving heaven and earth (as I have before[l] intimated) to persuade us into a *different reading* of one of the *critical* words in St. John, on which much depends. He has ransacked

[g] Epiphan. Hær. l. i. 3. Philastr. Hær. lx. Damascen. Hær. li.

[h] Epiphan. Hær. liv. 1.

[i] Vid. Athanasii Opp. 260, 282, 398, 409, 413, 503, 505, 620. edit. Bened.

[k] Arius's interpretation of the place, according to Anastasius in his Hodegus, runs thus:

Καλῶς εἶπεν ὁ Ἰωάννης, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. οὐ γὰρ εἶπεν, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Υἱὸς, ἀλλ' ὁ Λόγος ὁ προφορικὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ. *Anastas. Hodeg.* p. 330.

[l] See above, p. 567.

all *antiquity*[m] for authorities to justify an *alteration*; and because he could *find* none, he has *made* as many as he pleased, by mere dint of wit and fancy. Certainly St. John had some direction *extraordinary*, or was otherwise a very sagacious person, that, after the utmost improvements made in the art of chicanery, and wire-drawing of words, yet nothing can effectually do the business, even at this day, but *altering the text*; though, after all, there is no manner of countenance from any copies for doing it. One thing however I may observe of Artemonius, which, as it shews his *acuteness*, betrays at the same time a *consciousness*, or a tacit acknowledgment, that we are in the right to interpret the word *God* in the strict sense, as we do. He argues, that it was by no means proper that the *Word* should be called *God*, lest that appellation, taken with so many other plausible circumstances, should lead men into a snare, and make them believe Christ to be *God most high*[n]. Now what is this but confessing, that such an inference is *natural* and *obvious*, upon the supposition that Christ is called *God* in Scripture? He saw the force of it, and the inevitable necessity we are under of so interpreting: and that consideration made him take such immense, but fruitless pains, to defeat all those texts where Christ is expressly called *God*. But if that single consideration struck this gentleman in so sensible a manner, what can we think of all the other texts, which over and above ascribe to Christ *divine* perfections, and *divine* worship also! It is plain, that Artemonius could not have been against us, had he not set out at first upon a *false* principle, that *human imagination* is the measure of *divine truths*.

II. From John i., I now pass on to Hebr. i., in order to examine whether what we find there be not altogether as *definitive* as the former. Here the author of Sober and Charitable &c. undertakes to give a fair and impartial account of both parties. Notwithstanding which, in his very first setting out, he represents us as direct and manifest Sabellians, against all reason and justice, and common equity. He puts these words upon us, as expressing our sense: "God may be said to make all things by "his Son, as a man to understand by his reason[o]." This is

[m] Initium Evangelii S. Joannis ex Antiquitate Ecclesiastica restitutum. Per L. M. Artemonium, A. D. 1726.

[n] Artemonius, par. ii. p. 295.

[o] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 59.

not our way of speaking or thinking on the subject, (it was Sabellius's, it was Arius's,) and therefore ought not to be reported as *ours*. For what if we do not call Father and Son *two substances*, (the union being too close to admit of such expressions,) yet we scruple not to say, *Substance of substance*, like as *God of God*. We contrive our expressions so as to suit the Scripture idea of a *real* distinction without *division*, and of an *union* also without confusion. We maintain, that there may be a real *diversity* consistent with real *unity*, and that what is *multiple* in one respect may be *one* in another. And thus we stand clear, as of *Sabellianism* on one hand, so likewise of *Tritheism* on the other[p]. The author proceeds to set forth[q] a summary of our reasonings upon Hebr. i. And he has indeed brought together a great deal more than can ever be fairly answered. But without replying to what was offered on our side, and without so much as endeavouring to shew how the force of those many strong expressions can be evaded, or the words accounted for, he contents himself barely with representing the pleadings on the other side, producing our antagonists not as *respondents*, but *opponents* only. But supposing that the adversaries had ever so much to urge in that way, yet, unless they could reconcile it with the words of the texts, and give a clear account of the whole, it is doing the work by halves, and can, at most, be esteemed but as a lame defence. However, by this means all our arguments from Hebr. i. are left standing in full force, and it remains only that we remove objections, to clear the whole thing. Two considerations are suggested by this author; first, that the chapter here under inquiry makes the Son *another being from God;* secondly, it makes him also an *inferior being*[r]. Let us now examine how these pretences are supported.

1. As to the first suggestion, it is to be observed, that it amounts only to a *metaphysical* subtlety about *being* and *person*, as if the words werec onvertible terms; which, though it has been tried a thousand times over, could never yet be made out. But here we may perceive, who they are that run into *metaphysical* and *logical* niceties to evade plain words of Scripture[s], in-

[p] See my First Defence, vol. i. Query xxii. p. 465, &c. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 716, &c. Further Vindication, vol. iii. p. 43—46.

[q] Sober and Charitable Disquisition, p. 59—65.

[r] Ibid. p. 66.

[s] How common and constant the practice is, I have often observed elsewhere. First Defence, vol. i. Query

stead of keeping close to sacred Writ, and what it teaches in full and express terms. But I would further remark, though I have occasionally hinted it before, that all this discourse about *being* and *person* is foreign, and not pertinent; because, if both these terms were thrown out, our doctrine would stand just as before, independent of them, and very intelligible without them. So it stood for above one hundred and fifty years, before *person* was heard of in it: and it was later before *being* was mentioned. Therefore, if all the objection be against those, however innocent, *expressions*, let the objectors drop the *names*, and accept the *thing*. They may express the doctrine thus, if they please; that the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God, and all *one God;* and yet the *Father* is not the *Son*, nor *Holy Ghost*, nor *either* of them the *Father:* this is plainly the doctrine of Scripture, let them express it in what terms they please. Each is *Jehovah*, and yet they are not three *Jehovahs:* this is truth, (if Scripture can prove a truth,) and we need no more. But if any one has a mind to express this doctrine in such words as Justin Martyr, and Athenagoras, and Irenæus, and Theophilus, and Clemens Alexandrinus expressed it in, (before *person* or *being* was heard of[t],) he is at liberty as to *words*, while he admits the *sense:* for we are not bound down to *names*, but to *things*. These considerations premised, I now proceed with our author.

He objects, that the "Son is distinguished from God[u]." From *God the Father*, he means: and so he should be, because *God the Son* is not *God the Father*. He adds, if "God means *God the* "*Father*, he only must be God, for he says of himself, he is GOD "ALONE." Here I might run out into a particular explication of what concerns *exclusive terms:* but because I have often done it before, I choose to refer[x]. But in the mean while, if the *exclusive* terms are so strict, how come the Arians off with their doctrine of *two Gods?* We can give a good reason why the *exclusive* terms should yet tacitly suppose and include what so intimately belongs to God: but certainly all *creatures* are for ever excluded.

The author goes on to observe, that Father and Son must be

xxii. p. 463, 464, 555. Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 432, 468, 496, 550, 629, 696, 703, 737, 757, 758, 762.

[t] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 709.

[u] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 66.

[x] Vol. ii. Sermon iv. *per tot.* Second Defence, vol. ii. p. 405, 423, 424, 444, 455, 527, 665. Third Defence, or Further Vindication, p. 28 of this vol.

two things[y]. One would hope he does not mean *two Gods*, equal or unequal: as to any thing else, we are unconcerned; we allow that the Father is not the *Son*, and so *vice versa*. He says further, the Son is "not the self-same individual substance[z]." Here again the reader may observe what kind of arguments we are attacked with: no regard to the *proper, obvious, natural* sense of the texts, but all the dispute is made to turn upon *logical* niceties, or *metaphysical* subtleties about the nature of things confessedly *mysterious*, or rather upon the meaning of *technical* terms and names, such as *individual*[a], &c. It is sufficient again to say, that the *Son is not the Father*, and yet each is *Jehovah*, and *Jehovah* is *one*. Either deny this to be Scripture, or say that no Scripture can prove the point: and then what signifies arguing from John i. or from Hebr. i.? it is all but empty amusement.

It is asked, can a person *begotten* be the express image of a person *unbegotten*, when the properties are so unlike[b]? That our Scripture has so taught[c], is as plain as the sun: therefore the question should have been put, whether the texts shall be allowed, or shall be struck out of the Canon? As to *begotten* and *unbegotten*, they are *relations* only; and (to compare *small* things with *great*) Adam *unbegotten* and Seth *begotten* were exceedingly *alike*, and one the *express image* of the other, notwithstanding: so there must be something more than the circumstance before mentioned, to prove a dissimilitude, or inequality[d]. But this way of prying into what is unsearchable, in order to evade plain Scripture texts, is not treating the Scripture reverently: neither is there any argument in it, any more than in a blind man's reasoning about the nature of colours. A very acute and judicious writer well says, "It is certain we cannot speak of *God* with too "great moderation. It is better to rest satisfied with an *im-* "*perfect* knowledge of him, by being content with *general* ideas, "than to run the hazard of thinking unworthily of that great "Being, by our *rashness* in proceeding to *determinate* ideas[e]." That is to say, by attempting to *determine* the *modus*, about which we have properly no ideas; or by turning ideas of pure

[y] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 67.
[z] Ibid. p. 68.
[a] See my Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. ix. p. 620. Qu. xviii. p. 709.
[b] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 68.
[c] Col. i. 15. Hebr. i. 3.
[d] See my Answer to Whitby, vol. ii. p. 555, 556.
[e] Crousaz, New Art of Thinking, vol. ii. p. 80. English edition.

intellect into ideas of *imagination*, which is equally absurd. Hitherto we have been considering, whether the Son be *another being* (by which the author means *another God*) different from God the Father: which the objector has not proved.

2. We are next to consider, whether the Son be *inferior*, in nature or perfections, or can be proved to be so from Hebr. i. It is pleaded, that God "appointed him heir of all things[f]." Therefore (for that must be the consequence, or none) he is an *inferior* God. Why then is it not said that they are *two Gods?* However, to answer more directly, but withal very briefly; the Son's *voluntary* condescension neither *supposes* him *inferior*, nor *makes* him so.

It is further objected, that since God made the worlds *by him*, the Father only is *efficient*, and the Son the *instrument*[g]. It must be owned that the Arians, formerly[h] as well as since, have suggested as much: but it is all fiction and fancy, without support from Scripture, confuted in this very chapter, as we shall see presently. There is no foundation in the text for any such unworthy thought of God the Son. The preposition *by* proves nothing of it; for it is frequently made use of in Scripture, when the *Father* himself is the person to whom it is applied[i]. But what room is there for further dispute here upon that head, when the text itself expresses the proper *efficiency* of God the Son, as fully and clearly as it is possible to be expressed? THOU, LORD, IN THE BEGINNING HAST LAID THE FOUNDATION OF THE EARTH; AND THE HEAVENS ARE THE WORKS OF THINE HANDS[k]. This is said of God the Son[l], who is also *Jehovah* in the Psalm from whence these words are taken: could there be any words thought on, either plainer or stronger to express a proper *efficiency* than those are? and if those are not sufficient to ground our doctrine upon, what can we think of *sacred Writ*, (with reverence be it spoken,) but as of a book overspread with traps and snares, to deceive the Christian world? It is true, there are tropes, figures, and metaphors in holy Scripture, as when Christ is called a *door*,

[f] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 69.

[g] Id. Ibid.

[h] Vid. Athanas. Orat. i. p. 430. Orat. ii. p. 498.

[i] Basil. de Spir. Sancto, Opp. tom. iii. c. 5. p. 6, &c. edit. Bened. Taylor's True Scripture Doctrine, p. 347. Alexander's Essay on Irenæus, p. 148. Franck's Nucleus, p. 118.

[k] Hebrews i. 10. Compare Psalm cii. 25.

[l] See my Defence, vol. i. p. 327. Sermons, vol. ii. p. 37. Compare Bull. Judic. Eccl. c. v. s. 8. p. 319. Dr. Knight's Sermons, p. 51, &c.

a *vine*, a *way*, and the like; or when God is said to have *eyes*, *hands*, *mouth*, *heart*, &c. And, in such cases, every sensible man knows that a *literal* construction would be absurd: but in the instance now before us, here is no mark at all of any trope, figure, or metaphor, nor any reasonable objection against interpreting up to the *letter*. So far from it, that the whole tenour of Scripture confirms us in it, that Christ is *Jehovah*, and properly *Creator*: and the *worship* ascribed to him is another concurring circumstance to complete the demonstration. In short then, those Arian salvos come too late: the text itself has, in *express* words, precluded them.

The author goes on to object: "Upholding all things, but by "the word of God's power." Dr. Clarke interprets it *Father's power*: which is a possible, not a certain construction. The text may as probably, or more probably, be understood of the Son's *own* power. However, be it Father's or Son's, it is all *one power*, and he and his Father are *one*. The author[m] adds, "Seating "himself not in God's throne, but at his right hand[n]." And what then? Is he not a *second* Person? But, it seems, that if he had been seated in the *same throne*, the author would then allow the *equality*. Turn we therefore to the book of Revelations, and there we find them both in one throne. It is THE THRONE (not thrones) OF GOD AND OF THE LAMB[o]: and Christ himself declares that he was in his *Father*'s throne[p].

It is asked, why should angels be called upon to worship him, if he were God *equal* to the Father? "Can they be supposed ig- "norant, if that were the case[q]?" To which I reply, that though *angels* were fully apprised of his high perfection and dignity, yet as to the particular *times*, *places*, and *circumstances*, when, and where, and in what manner, they should pay their homage or devotions, they might wait for *special* orders. The Father's manifesting his Son to the world was a new and extraordinary occasion: and how should the *angels* know in what manner they were to behave upon it, without particular direction? They were ordered thereupon to repeat or renew their solemn exercises of devotion towards the Son, now become man, and clothed in flesh:

[m] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 69.

[n] What the phrase of *sitting at God's right hand* imports, is very judiciously and carefully discussed by Vitringa, Observ. Sacr. lib. ii. c. 4, 5.

[o] Revel. xxii. 1.

[p] Revel. iii. 21. Compare Zechar. vi. 12, 13. and Vitringa, ibid. c. 5. p. 310.

[q] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 70, 71.

as they had also special directions for celebrating his nativity or incarnation in devout doxologies[r].

It is further pleaded, that the words, GOD, EVEN THY GOD, argue some *inferiority* of God the Son. Yes, of the Son considered as *man*[s] and in his state of humiliation, in which God the Father *anointed* him *with the oil of gladness*, with the unction of the Spirit, *above* his *fellows;* his *partners* in the same nature[t], partakers of the same flesh and blood; on which account "he is "not ashamed to call them brethren[u]."

The author asks, *why should* not the Apostle *roundly assert* that Christ was *Jehovah*, if it were *his purpose to set* him forth as such[x]? Had he done it ever so roundly, a contentious adversary might still have found fault, and might have required somewhat further. The Apostle has said what is *sufficient* for the conviction of any *reasonable* man, by applying what is directed to *Jehovah* in the Psalm, to God the *Son* in this chapter. This is saying the thing roundly enough: and we are not obliged to give reasons why he has said no more, if he has said what may suffice with men of ordinary discernment. But I may hint further, that a very probable reason may be assigned why he did not take that precise method which the objector fancies he should have done. It was the Apostle's direct design, as it seems, to prove that the *Son* was above the *angels*, in opposition, very probably, to the Simonians or Cerinthians of that time, who attributed the creation of the world to *angels*, and who looked upon *Jesus* as a mere *man*, and as such *inferior* to angels[y]. Therefore the Apostle chiefly labours these two points, namely, to prove that Christ was really *Creator*[z], and that he is vastly *superior* to *angels*. What he further insinuates of his being *Jehovah* comes in by the bye: and it would not have been directly to his purpose to have insisted more particularly upon it: because even that would not have proved him (in the opinion of

[r] Luke ii. 13, 14. Compare Rev. xii. 11, 12.

[s] Ἡ θεότης οὐ χρίεται, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀνθρωπότης. εἶτα παρὰ τοὺς μετόχους σου φησί. τίνες δέ εἰσιν οἱ μέτοχοι, ἀλλ' ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι; τοῦτέστι τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ἐκ μέτρου ἔλαβεν ὁ Χριστός. *Chrysost. in loc.* And so other Greek Fathers, Basil, Theodoret, Theophylact, Œcumenius.

[t] See Dr. Bennet on the Trinity, who explains the text at large, and very justly; excepting that he dislikes the ancient notion of the *unction* of the *Spirit*, which yet seems to be the true one, p. 31—35.

[u] Hebr. ii. 11.

[x] Sober and Charitable &c. p. 73.

[y] Vid. Bull. Judic. Eccl. c. v. s. 8. p. 320.

[z] Hebr. i. 2, 10.

the heretics then prevailing) superior to *angels*, since they looked upon *Jehovah*, the God of the Old Testament, as no more than *angel*[a]. However, though I assign a reason which appears not improbable for the Apostle's saying no more, yet we have a right to insist upon it, that there is no need of assigning any reason at all for his not saying more than was *sufficient* for every purpose. There is no end of cavils when men are disposed to indulge them. The Jews sought after a *sign*, but had none more given them, after they had had *enough*. They demanded that Christ should come *down* from the *cross* for their satisfaction: but infinite wisdom would not condescend to satisfy them in *their* way, when they would not submit to other very *sufficient* and better evidences. The question therefore is not, whether the Apostle in this place has said all that *could have been said*, but whether he has said as much as was *needful*. We conceive that he has; and let those who think otherwise consider how they can fairly evade the force of what they here find, before they require more. Let them think how it is possible to elude what St. Paul has here said to prove that Christ is *Jehovah*, though he has proved it only by the bye, and has not largely or directly insisted upon it.

I shall only add, that if the point is to be decided by the asking of *questions* in this way, let leave be given to the orthodox also to ask a few questions in their turn. If Christ be a *creature*, why is it not *roundly asserted* either in Old or New Testament? And if he and the Father be *two Gods*, supreme and inferior, why is not that also *roundly asserted*, in some part of Scripture at least? We have the more reason to expect it should, because otherwise the *contrary* doctrine hath so many and so plausible appearances of *truth*, that the most serious and conscientious persons are under *inevitable* danger of deception by them. And therefore, if we may be allowed to reason and argue with the tremendous Deity upon the subject of his revelations, or dispensations towards mankind, none, we imagine, can with more justice, or with better grace, ask, why has not Scripture some-

[a] Post hunc Cerinthus hæreticus erupit, similia docens: nam et ipse mundum institutum esse ab illis [angelis] dicit: Christum ex semine Joseph natum proponit, hominem illum tantummodo sine divinitate contendens; ipsam quoque legem ab *angelis* datam perhibens; *Judæorum Deum*, non Dominum, sed *angelum* promens. *Pseudo-Tertull. Præscript.* c. xlviii. Conf. Epiphan. Hær. xxviii. 1.

where or other dropped a hint or two about Christ's being a *creature*, or about his being an *inferior* God, admitting *two Gods*, two *adorable* Deities, to prevent our falling into an otherwise unavoidable delusion? I doubt not, if that were the *truth*, but that our *Lord* himself, (whose humility is so justly celebrated,) and his *Disciples* after him, would have openly proclaimed it; and that we should have as plainly found it in the New Testament throughout, as now we find the reverse. Can we imagine that a truth of that moment (if it were a truth) should be left in obscurity, to be drawn out, at length, after more than 300 years, by Arius, Aetius, and Eunomius[b]; and that by the help chiefly of *logical* conceits and *metaphysical* speculations, far above the reach of common capacities? Certainly, Divine Wisdom could not be so much wanting to the bulk of mankind, but would have provided better for them in a *scriptural* way, and by plain words, that so they might be more beholden to *Christ* and his *Apostles* for their *faith*, than to the Dialectics of Aristotle, or Chrysippus's subtleties[c]. But I forbear to press this further: and having briefly run through all that the author of Sober and Charitable Disquisition had to urge in favour of the Arian interpretation, both of John i. and Hebr. i., I must now leave it to the impartial readers to judge, whether any thing has been offered on that side, which can be thought sufficient to counterbalance our plain and direct evidences brought from *express* words, fixed to a certain meaning by all the approved rules of *grammar* and *criticism*, and confirmed by the *universal* suffrage of the *first* and *purest* ages. Thus far I was obliged to enter into a small part of the other controversy, which affects the *truth* of the doctrine, rather than the *importance;* because, as I hinted in the entrance, the author I am concerned with had

[b] Clarissimis Scripturæ testimoniis argumentationes metaphysicæ argutiæ opponere, Eunomii est, qui ab Aetio magistro edoctus, essentiam divinam penitus ac perfecte scilicet cognitam sibi habere persuadebat. *Tam perspicue Deum qualis sit novi, ac tantam illius notitiam sum consecutus, ut ne me ipsum quidam melius quam illum noverim.* Aetius apud Epiphanium lxxvi. p. 916, 989. Eunomius ipse, majore etiam insolentia apud Socratem, iv. 7. *De sui ipsius essentia, Deus nihil amplius scit quam nos: nec illa ipsi quidem notior, nobis autem obscurior.* Fabric. Bibl. Græc. lib. v. c. 23. p. 272. Conf. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. i. p. 224. Theodorit. Hæret. Fab. lib. iv. c. 3. Cyrill. Alex. Thesaur. p. 260. Chrysost. Hom. xxvii. tom. i. p. 307. Philostorg. lib. i. p. 468, 470. ed. Vales. Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. xxxiv. p. 539.

[c] Vid. Basil. contr. Eunom. lib. i. p. 214, 221.

mingled them in some sort together. But they who desire fuller satisfaction in that other question may please to consult those treatises which are professedly written upon it. What comes in here amounts only to slight touches, and so far only as related to the texts mentioned: which, though justly reckoned *definitive* on our side, are yet but a very slender part of what the whole Scripture affords us in that cause.

ADDENDA.

Additional Illustrations referring to the respective Pages above.

Page 406. *IDEAS of intellect*, &c. The distinction between ideas of *intellect* and ideas of *imagination* is much insisted on by Des Cartes in his Metaphysics[a], and is explained more clearly and to better advantage in a late judicious treatise written by Mr. Crousaz in French, and now rendered into English[b].

P. 441. *The same with denying his eternal existence.* I should have omitted the word *denying*, or else have said, *the same with denying* the necessity of believing *his eternal existence.* All I meant to say was, that Episcopius (which is true also of Limborch) did not distinguish in that instance between the *eternal generation* of the Logos and the *eternal existence*; as some of the *ancients* did[c].

P. 460. *Such effects might last beyond the apostolic age.* I might have expressed myself with greater assurance, and said, that they actually did last as far down as to the *Cyprianic* age[d]: nay, and if we may believe Paulinus[e], who reports it as an eyewitness, they continued down to the latter end of the fourth century. From whence may fairly be accounted for the long continuance of the phrase of *delivering over to Satan* in excommunications[f].

[a] Cartesii Meditat. vi. p. 36. Object. v. p. 45. Respons. v. p. 78.

[b] Crousaz, New Treatise of the Art of Thinking, vol. i. p. 16, &c.

[c] See my Defence, vol. i. Qu. viii. p. 368, 369. Second Defence, vol. ii. Qu. viii. p. 618.

[d] See Dodwell, Dissertat. in Iren. ii. 54. p. 191—194.

[e] Quem cum interrogasset [Ambrosius] et deprehendisset autorem tanti flagitii, ait: Oportet illum *tradi Satanæ in interitum carnis*, ne talia in posterum audeat admittere: quem eodem momento, cum adhuc sermo esset in ore sacerdotis, spiritus immundus arreptum discerpere cœpit. Quo viso, non minimo timore repleti sumus et admiratione. *Paulin. in Vit. Ambros.* p. 9.

[f] See Bishop Hare, Scripture Vindicated, p. 69, 70.

Indeed, the use of the form remained afterwards, when such *miraculous* effects had entirely ceased: because the form had been customary from the beginning; and because it might still be understood in a sense not altogether foreign to its first intention, such as I have expressed above.

P. 468. *He may be in some measure hurt in his reputation by it, and that is all.* I would be understood here of the *general* case only[g], abstracting from particular cases and circumstances; as of *ministers*, suppose, whose *maintenance* also may be accidentally affected by it. An inconvenience common to *ecclesiastical* offices or *civil*, as often as men disable themselves from serving, either by refusing to give the legal securities, or by opposing the public measures.

P. 469. *Or to pay them so much as common civilities.* That is to say, when such civilities were likely to be interpreted as an approbation of the men and of their principles. But see this rule of the Apostle considered more at large, under its proper restrictions and limitations, by an able hand[h].

P. 485. *A wicked life the worst heresy, which is scarce sense,* &c. At the best, it is a *strong figure*, or a turn of wit, and the thought *not just* upon the whole. But something of it may be traced up as high as to St. Bernard of the twelfth century, who argued that vicious persons were *seducers* by their bad example, and therefore were a kind of *heretics* in practice, corrupting more by their *ill lives* than heretics, properly so called, could do by their *bad doctrines*[i]: and he applies it particularly to vicious clergymen; not to extenuate the guilt of *heresy*, but to enhance the guilt of such *bad example*. The thought was not much amiss, if he had not carried it too far. He should not have suggested that bad example is *worse* than *heresy*, properly so called. It is true, that bad example commonly will do more harm than sound preaching will do good; because such example runs in with *cor-*

[g] Denique bono aut æquo non contraria est *excommunicationis* pœna, qua nulla mansuetior. Non admovet *flagra* corporibus, non aptat *vincula*, non denuntiat *mortem*, non eripit *bona*, non abdicat *dignitates*; indignis abnuit sacramenta quibus in perniciem suam abuterentur. Itaque tota et ad Dei gloriam et ad peccantis salutem est comparata. *Sam. Basnag. Annal.* tom. ii. p. 481.

[h] Dr. Berriman's Sermon, in the Appendix to his Boyle's Lectures, vol. ii. p. 339.

[i] Multi sunt Catholici *prædicando*, qui hæretici sunt *operando*. Quod hæretici faciunt per *prava dogmata*, hoc faciunt plures hodie per *mala exempla*: seducunt scilicet populum et inducunt in *errorem*; et tanto graviores sunt *hæreticis* quanto prævalent opera verbis. *Bernard. Serm. ad Pastores*, p. 1732.

rupt nature, and the other is *contrary*: but if the doctrine be on the same side, it will do infinitely more mischief; and one *loose casuist* will debauch more than a hundred others shall do who are only *loose* in their *lives*. Bad example, under the check and discountenance of *sound doctrine* taught by the same person, carries its antidote along with it. But bad doctrine is a very dangerous snare: it is not merely breaking a law, but loosening the *authority* of all[k]. Therefore Bernard strained the thought too far: and so did Dean Colet after him[l]; who is the first man I have met with that ventured formally to say (for Bernard had not expressed the figure so boldly) that a *bad life was a heresy*, and the *worst* heresy. However, neither of them intended to extenuate the guilt of *heresy* at all, but to magnify another kind of guilt, as still *greater* according to their way of reasoning, or rather rhetoricating.

Archbishop Tillotson glances upon the same thought[m], but gives a very different turn to it; and cannot, I think, be reasonably understood of heresy *strictly* and *properly* such, but of what some have wrongfully *called* so. Bishop Taylor, a very moderate

[k] "Who will maintain that a prince "would do better in *changing* the laws "according to his present passions, "than to let them subsist, and *break* "them every hour? Nobody. For if "he observes not the laws as he "should, he leaves them their *autho-* "*rity* however, with respect to his "subjects and such other princes as "are willing to observe them; which "is absolutely necessary to society.— "If it be asked then, which carriage "is most *dangerous* and *blamable*, "that of such as *violate* the laws of "the Gospel which they believe to be "divine, or that of the incredulous "who *reject* the Divinity of those "laws, because they have no mind to "obey them; it is plain that the latter "is much *worse* than the former, sup- "posing the laws of the Gospel to be "beneficial to society, which cannot "be doubted." *Le Clerc, Causes of Incredulity*, p. 88, 89.

The case which Le Clerc here puts is not precisely the *same* with the other, but the *reason* is the same for both.

[l] "He sheweth plainly, that there "be two kinds of heresies, one arising "from *perverse teaching*, and the "other from a naughty life: of which "two this latter is far *worse* and more "perilous, reigning now in priests." *Colet's Sermon before the Convocation, A. D.* 1511. Reprinted in the Phœnix, vol. i. p. 7.

[m] Tillotson's Sermons, vol. i. p. 402. fol. edit. His reflection upon those who were too censorious in charging *heresy* upon others, and at the same time too indulgent to their own *vices*, runs thus:

"Deluded people! that do not con- "sider, that *the greatest heresy in the* "*world is a wicked life*, because it is "so directly opposite to the whole "design of the Christian faith and "religion; and that do not consider, "that God will sooner forgive a man "a hundred *defects* of his *under-* "*standing*, than one *fault* of his *will*."

N. B. Heresy, justly so called, is not a mere *defect* of understanding, but a *fault* of the *will*: and it is more *directly opposite* to religion than common offences; as overturning the *authority* of a law is worse than *transgressing* it, or as *mutiny*, *sedition*, and *rebellion* are worse than common felonies.

man, in a treatise written on the side of *liberty*, may be a very proper arbitrator to clear and determine the whole dispute.

" Men think they have more reason to be zealous against " *heresy* than against a *vice* in manners, because it is *infectious* " and *dangerous*, and the *principle of much evil*. Indeed, if by " heresy we mean that which is against an *article of the Creed*, " and breaks part of the *covenant* between God and man by the " mediation of Jesus Christ, I grant it to be a *grievous crime*, a " calling God's veracity in question, and a *destruction* also of a " *good life;* because upon the articles of the Creed *obedience* is " *built*, and it lives or dies as the *effect* does by its proper *cause:* " for *faith* is the moral cause of *obedience*. But then *heresy*, that " is, such as this, is also a *vice*, and the person *criminal*, and so " the sin is to be esteemed in its degrees of *malignity*. And let " men be as *zealous* against it as they can, and employ the whole " arsenal of the *spiritual* armour against it. Such as this is " *worse* than *adultery* or *murder;* inasmuch as the *soul* is more " noble than the *body*, and a false doctrine is of greater dissemi- " nation and *extent* than a single act of *violence* or *impurity*. " Adultery or murder is a *duel*, but heresy (truly and indeed " such) is an unlawful *war*, it slays *thousands*. The losing of " faith is digging down a *foundation:* all the *superstructure* of " hope and patience and charity fall with it.—But then concern- " ing those things which men nowadays *call* heresy, they cannot " be so formidable as they are represented. And if we consider " that *drunkenness* is certainly a damnable sin, and that there " are *more* drunkards than heretics, and that drunkenness is the " *parent* of a *thousand vices*, it may be better said of this vice than " of most of those *opinions* which we *call* heresies, it is *infectious* " and *dangerous*, and the *principle of much evil*, and therefore as " fit an object of our pious *zeal* to contest against[n]," &c. Thus far Bishop Taylor.

In the sum of the matter I entirely agree with him. The result, I think, is, that *nominal* heresy, or an *error* in slight matters, not affecting the *foundation*, not hurting the *vitals* of Christianity, is not so bad as *real* immorality: and it is equally true, on the other hand, that *nominal* immorality is not so bad as *real* error in religion, though in the slighter doctrines. But supposing the error and the maintaining of it to amount to *real* heresy,

[n] Taylor's Liberty of Prophesying, Dedicat. p. 42, 43.

it is then a *vice*, and the *greatest* of vices: so the whole will turn upon the nature, quality, and tendency of what is charged as an *heresy*. *Invincible ignorance* will equally excuse any *other* vice; and so is wide of the purpose.

P. 508. *All parties are for creeds under one shape or other.* It may be asked perhaps, what *creed* the Sceptics are for, who profess to *doubt* of every thing? I answer, that their pretended *scepticism* is mostly *affectation*, and they generally are as *credulous* as other men; frequently more so. If they believe less of *religion*, as some of them perhaps may, yet they are easy of belief as to any thing else. They have their *systems*, their *maxims*, their *probabilities*, (as they are pleased to call them,) which make up as long and large *creeds* as our *certainties* do: only there is this difference, that they commonly prefer a creed of *paradoxes*, and sometimes glaring *absurdities*, before a *rational* faith. And while we believe as much as we can *prove*, and no more, (which is believing like *wise* men,) they believe what they have a mind to, *proving nothing*, by their own confession; which is resolving all into fond persuasion and credulity.

The most considerable writer I know of that ever appeared in behalf of general *scepticism* (matters of faith only excepted) is the celebrated Huetius, in a posthumous treatise[o], written, I suppose, for an exercise of wit, to divert himself and friends; unless he had some further latent view to serve the Romish cause. I may remark, that one article of his sceptical creed is, that the certainty of faith is superior to that of *sense*: a second is, that it is superior even to that of the *first principles* and *axioms* of *Geometry*[p]. One cannot desire any two plainer instances of the *credulity* of a sceptic. I mention not how often he forgets the part he was to act, talking in the style of a *dogmatist*: *Sure it is*, or *It is certain*[q]. Sometimes, he is *fully persuaded*[r], or *fully convinced*[s], or *certainly knows*[t]: at other times he speaks of *evident proof*[u], and *irrefragable argument*[x], and *demonstration*[y], just an any *dogmatist* would do. So hard a thing is it for the finest wit even to *personate* a *sceptic* with any tolerable grace, or without perpetual inconsistency: for which reason

[o] A Philosophical Treatise concerning the Weakness of human Understanding. Printed in English, London, 1725.

[p] Huet. Philosoph. Treatise, &c. p. 15.

[q] Page 28, 30, 34, 68, 75, 98, 150.

[r] P. 7. [s] P. 33.

[t] P. 14. [u] P. 40.

[x] P. 52.

[y] P. 99. comp. 100, 104.

I before hinted that I look upon *scepticism*, so called, to be little else but *affectation*. Or if there really be any such kind of men who *believe* that they *believe nothing*, that very instance is an undeniable argument of their more than common *credulity*. Indeed, for a man to fall to *arguing* and *proving* that there is no such thing as *proof* or *argument*, is much the same as if one should make an eloquent harangue, lamenting that mortal men have not the faculty of *speech*, loudly complaining that all mankind are *mutes*.

P. 510. *Our way supposes that men ought to examine* (*if capable*, and as far as capable) *in order to* know *that the doctrine proposed is true*. If it should be asked, what *need* of examination after so many wise and good men, and all morally *certain*; I would ask again, what need is there of studying the demonstrations of Euclid, which all the world agree in, as containing *certain* truth? A man might safely enough take them for granted, and by so doing might as soon become a *sound Geometrician*, as by the like method, in the other case, he might commence a *sound Divine*, or a *confirmed Christian*. At best, it would be resting faith upon mere *human* authority, which would be resting it on a *wrong* bottom; and, besides, would be neglecting the due improvement of the heart and cultivation of the mind.

But may there not be *danger* in examining, danger of being led to *dissent* from what is *right*, and to embrace some *error*? Undoubtedly there may. And what conveniency is there without some inconveniency? Such danger must be risked, rather than found our faith upon a wrong principle, to render it worthless or contemptible: and it is better to hazard the *chance* of falling into some *error* in *faith*, than to be *certain* of committing a *greater* error in *conduct*. However, if men come with *humility*, *modesty*, and *circumspection* to the examination, and have patience to stay till they are *clear*, before they formally *dissent*, or before they declare it *openly*; there will be no great *danger* in examining every thing with the utmost severity.

P. 511. *The phrase of having dominion over one's faith, is of obscure meaning*, &c. I did not then call to mind how well the meaning of that phrase had been lately cleared up by a very learned hand[z].

P. 544. *The darkness cometh not upon it*. I referred to a very judicious critic, Lambert Bos, for the justifying my rendering of

[z] Bishop Hare, Scripture Vindicated, p. 60—63.

this text. I find since, that the learned Wolfius disapproves of what Bos had offered[a]: but I abide by Bos notwithstanding, who plainly has reason on his side. He did not insist merely upon the force of the *word* καταλαβεῖν, but upon the *phrase*, upon the verb as joined with σκότος, or σκοτία. The examples which he gives from *sacred* and *profane* writers, of the use of the *phrase*, are all clear and full to his purpose. And if there be need of additional examples from *ecclesiastical* writers, there are several; as Origen[b], Cyril of Alexandria[c], and Theophylact[d]. Clemens of Alexandria, in his comment, (if it be his,) seems to take in both the senses of that verb into his construction of the text[e]. As to the allusion to the *Gnostic* principles (I use the word *Gnostic* in the larger sense) which I suppose in the words of St. John, neither Bos nor Wolfius take notice, nor seem to have been aware of it. But if the observation be *just*, as it appears very *probable*, (and I shall say more of it presently,) that also is a confirmation of such sense of the phrase as Bos pleads for; and the two considerations taken together answer very aptly to each other, which is an argument that both are right.

544. *The ancient Magian notion of a good God and an evil God, the first called* light, *and the other* darkness, &c. A brief account of that ancient notion may be seen in Dean Prideaux[f], and a large history both of its rise and progress among the Pagans, in Wolfius[g]. And how the same notion was revived, or augmented with new fooleries, among the heretics of the apostolical times, may be understood from a noted fragment of Basilides, preserved by Archelaus, of the third century, in his account of his Disputation with Manes[h]. Now, considering that

[a] Ingeniosior quam verior hîc est Lamb. Bos interpretatio — quod natura Λόγου sanctissima et purissima sit, nec minimam cum impuritate habet communionem. Quæ notio quamvis in N.T. et apud ipsum Joannem nostrum, cap. xii. 35, occurrat, ab hoc tamen loco *aliena* merito censetur, in quo non tam quid *tenebræ* in Christum molitæ sint, aut moliri potuerint, quam quid Christus in *tenebras* molitus sit, exponitur. Conf. v. 10, 11.— Itaque rectius notio illa vocis καταλαβεῖν hic tenetur, quæ *receptionem* aut *agnitionem* infert. Hanc enim N.T. Scriptoribus imprimis familiarem esse patet ex Actor. v. 13. Rom. ix. 30. *Wolfii Curæ Philolog. et Crit. in loc.* vol. i. p. 784.

[b] Origen. Comment. in Johan. edit. Huet. p. 73, 74.

[c] Cyril. Alex. Comment. in Johan. p. 23.

[d] Theophylact. in loc. p. 561.

[e] Clemens Alex. Excerpt. Theodoti. p. 969. edit. Ox.

[f] Prideaux's Connection, vol. i. p. 179. 8vo. edit.

[g] Wolfii Manichæismus ante Manichæum, sect. ii. p. 48—174.

[h] The fragment of Basilides is as follows:

"Desine ab inani et curiosa varie-
"tate; requiramus autem magis quæ

Cerinthus was among those who had adopted the old notion of a *good God* and an *evil God*, (as Epiphanius has informed us[i],) and so of course must have fallen in with the old Magian principles; Basilides may reasonably be allowed of as a good interpreter of Cerinthus in those articles: and since St. John very manifestly struck at several other tenets of Cerinthus, in his divine proeme, it is more than probable that what he says in verse the fifth about *light* and *darkness* alludes to the *Gnostic* notion then prevailing, and is a confutation of it[k]. They pretended that the evil God Darkness *pursued* the Light, and came up to it: he asserts, that the Darkness *came not upon it*, never laid hold of it, never approached to obstruct or obscure it, but was irradiated and illuminated by it. It may further be considered, that Basilides probably flourished in the *first century*, and might be contemporary with St. John, as both Jerome[l] and Epiphanius[m] seem to assert: and though learned men have disputed it, yet [n]Massuet appears to have well cleared up the point against the most material objections. Now, if Basilides himself was so early, it is so much the more likely that St. John, writing at that time, might have an eye to the pernicious doctrine then propagated by him, and by the whole set of *Gnostics*. By *Gnostics* I understand all that sort of men who derived their principles from Simon Magus, and lived in the apostolic age;

" de *bonis* et *malis* etiam barbari in-
" quisierunt, et in quas opiniones de
" his omnibus pervenerunt. Quidam
" enim horum dixerunt, *Initia* omnium
" *duo* esse, quibus *bona* et *mala* asso-
" ciaverunt, ipsa dicentes initia esse
" et ingenita: id est, in principiis,
" *lucem* fuisse ac *tenebras*, quæ ex
" semetipsis erant, non quæ esse di-
" cebantur. Hæc cum apud semet-
" ipsa essent, proprium unum quod-
" que eorum vitam agebat quam vel-
" let, et qualis sibi competeret: om-
" nibus enim amicum est quod est
" proprium, et nihil sibi ipsi malum
" videtur. Postquam autem ad alter-
" utrûm agnitionem uterque pervenit,
" et *tenebræ* contemplatæ sunt *lucem*,
" tanquam melioris rei sumpta con-
" cupiscentia, *insectabantur* ea com-
" misceri." *Archel. et Manet. Disput.* p. 194. Fabric. Conf. Wolf. Manich. p. 177. Grab. Spicileg. vol. ii. p. 30.

[i] Epiphan. Hæres. xxviii. 2. p. 111.

[k] Accordingly, Archelaus (in his dispute with Manes) confutes that hypothesis from this very text; which is a great confirmation, not only of the *construction* of the phrase before given, but likewise of such *application* of the text as I have been pleading for. His words are:

" Quomodo et ipse [malus Deus]
" cum sit omnino totus *tenebræ*, luci
" supervenit et comprehendit, Evan-
" gelista testimonium ferente, quia
" *lucet in tenebris, et tenebræ eam non*
" *comprehenderunt?*"

" How could it be that the *evil God*,
" being that he is all darkness, should
" *come upon* the light, and *compass* it,
" when the Evangelist declares, that
" the light shined *through the dark-*
" *ness, and the darkness compassed it*
" *not.*"

[l] Hieronym. contr. Lucifer. p. 304. Opp. tom. iv. Bened. ed.

[m] Epiphan. Hæres. xxxi. 2.

[n] Massuet. Dissertat. Præv. in Irenæum, p. 60.

though I am aware that, in a stricter and more special sense[o], the *Gnostics* may be said to have risen up in the *second* century.

P. 568. *Irenæus born in or near the Apostles' times, and was advanced in years when he wrote.* I here follow Dodwell in a matter which requires not, and indeed admits not, of a scrupulous or critical exactness. However, since Dodwell has been blamed by more than one for his chronology in that article, I may just mention how the different accounts stand in relation to the year when Irenæus was born. According to Dodwell, A. D. 97: Grabe chooses the year 108; Tillemont, the year 120; others, 135: Massuet sets it the latest of all, A. D. 140. According to which different computations, Irenæus must be supposed either *older* or *younger* when he wrote, if he wrote in 176, or thereabouts, as most agree that he did: though some differ also as to that, setting the date of his writings ten or fifteen years lower.

P. 649. *In strictness they were not* interpretations *of Scripture, but rather pious meditations upon Scripture: I am sensible that some of them were intended as* strict *interpretations: but in the general,* &c.

To confirm and illustrate what I have here said, it may be observed, that St. Austin took into the *allegorical* way of interpreting when he was yet but a *new convert*, because he thought it much *easier* than the *literal* way, which he was not then so well prepared for. He had not at that time (so he tells us himself[p]) sufficient leisure or abilities to undertake so hard a province as the unfolding the *literal* sense, and therefore contented himself with giving only the *mystical* or *allegorical*. Could a sensible man so speak, and at the same time imagine that the *mystical* construction he pretended to give was the true mind of the Holy Ghost? Or could he conceive that he had any *certain* foundation for the *mystical* sense (so considered) before he had found out the *literal* one to ground it upon? No, surely. But thinking himself at

[o] See Wolfius, Manichæismus, &c. p. 206. Buddæus, Eccles. Apostol. p. 344, 345, 571, &c.

[p] Et quia non mihi tunc occurrebant omnia quemadmodum *proprie* possint accipi, magisque non posse accipi videbantur, aut vix posse, aut difficile; ne retardarer, quid *figurate* significarent ea *quæ ad literam non potui invenire*, quanta valui brevitate et perspicuitate explicavi, ne vel multa lectione vel disputationis obscuritate deterriti, in manus ea sumere non curarent. *Augustin. de Gen. ad Liter.* lib. viii. c. 2. p. 227. tom. iii. Bened.

Note, that St. Austin in the year 389, then a new convert, ventured no further than the *allegorical* exposition of Genesis: but in the year 401 he undertook the *literal* explication also, in twelve books, [*de Genesi ad Literam*,] which he finished about 415.

liberty to raise any *true* and *instructive* moral from the text, he gave it as a *good lesson* to ruminate upon rather than as a *strict interpretation* of the words before him. He, and other allegorizers like him, might apprehend that dry history, or a mere narrative of facts, would be unentertaining or unedifying to common readers or hearers, and therefore they had a mind to furnish them with proper meditations, *moral* and *religious*, to graft upon such parts of sacred Writ; that so, whenever they should hear or read any Scripture history, such reflections also might occur to their minds, for improving the same to *spiritual* uses[q]. And whether such spiritual uses were really intended in such place by the sacred penman or no; yet if the words might be but aptly accommodated thereto, and were but pertinently and soberly applied, and the analogy of faith preserved, a good end was answered thereby, and true *doctrine* at least kept, if not true *interpretation*[r].

Nevertheless it must be owned that the *allegorizing* Fathers did sometimes intend such comments as strict and proper *interpretations*; particularly where they thought that the obvious *literal* meaning carried some *absurdity* in it, or else was too *low* and *trivial* to be the *whole* design of the sacred writer, or Spirit of God. They had St. Paul's example to go upon: "Doth God," says he, "take care for oxen[s]?" Intimating that such *literal* interpretation, *singly* considered, was too *low* and *jejune* a sense to fix upon the law in Deuteronomy[t], and that therefore there was a necessity of supposing some *higher meaning*, and good reason for looking out for one. The like might be the case with other passages of the Old Testament, and very probably is: and so the *Fathers* endeavoured, wherever they apprehended any

[q] Eo minus vero mirandum, quod veteris Ecclesiæ doctoribus hæc ipsa (*allegorica*) scripturarum explicandi ratio placuerit, quod et illi crederent, in Scripturæ lectione unice hoc agendum, ut quæ *fidem* alere ac fovere, *vitamque instruere* possunt, inde hauriamus, reliqua non magnopere ad nos pertinere.——Prævaluit fere *mystica* illa et *allegorica* interpretandi ratio; pluribusque, ob insignem quem in vitæ fideique praxi habere videbatur usum, se commendabat. *Buddæi Isagog.* vol. ii. p. 1786.

[r] Cum divinos libros legimus, in tanta multitudine verorum intellectuum qui de paucis verbis eruuntur, et sanitate Catholicæ fidei muniuntur, id potissimum deligamus quod certum apparuerit eum sensisse quem legimus. Si autem hoc latet, id certe quod *circumstantia Scripturæ* non impedit, et cum *sana fide* concordat. Si autem et Scripturæ circumstantia pertractari ac discuti non potest, saltem id solum quod *fides sana* præscribit. Aliud est enim quid potissimum scriptor senserit non dignoscere, aliud a *regula pietatis* errare.——Si voluntas scriptoris *incerta* sit, *sanæ fidei* congruam non inutile est eruisse sententiam. *Augustin de Gen. ad Literam*, lib. i. cap. 41. p. 132.

[s] 1 Cor. ix. 9.

[t] Deuteron. xxv. 4.

necessity of rising above the *letter*, to search out the *mystical* intendment; and in their searches of that kind they sometimes indulged their fancies too far, giving their own conjectures (but modestly, and within the analogy of faith) for the sense of Scripture. And what *commentator* is there that may not sometimes, or often, mistake in interpreting the *obscure* places of sacred Writ! A *good sense*, that is to say, a sense consistent with *sound* doctrine, every wise man will be sure to make choice of: but as to the *true sense* of the place, in such instances, it is what the wisest cannot often be sure of, or take upon them to warrant.

I shall only add, that in order to form a more distinct idea of the *ancient* ways of interpreting, it may be proper to bear in mind that *threefold* method of commenting which St. Jerome lays down[u]; namely, the *historical, tropological,* and *theorical:* or, in more familiar terms, the *literal, moral,* and *sublime.* The first of the three looked only to the *grammatical* meaning of the words, for the information of the hearers: the other two aimed at *improving* their *morals* and *elevating* their *affections:* which ends might be, in a good measure, answered by apposite meditations upon the text, though they should not happen to be *true* interpretations. And it was that consideration chiefly, as I conceive, which made the *Fathers* take the more freedom in *moralizing* and *spiritualizing* (if I may so speak) the *letter* of sacred writ. See the last passage which I quoted from St. Austin, intimating as much.

P. 667. *Men of as great sense, learning, and piety, to all outward appearance, as any in their times, have sometimes fallen into heresy.* I might mention Tertullian, Apollinaris, and several more[x]. But it has been suggested by some persons, that according to the Scripture account of *heresy,* none were chargeable with it but men who *knowingly* espoused *false* doctrine, who were directly *self-condemned* as teaching what they *knew* to be *wrong,* men of *vile* and *dishonest* principles, and of a *flagitious* character; in short, *monsters* of lewdness or impiety. And all

[u] Triplex in corde nostro descriptio et regula Scripturarum est. Prima, ut intelligamus eas juxta *historiam:* secunda, juxta *tropologiam:* tertia, juxta intelligentiam *spiritualem.*

1. In *historia,* eorum quæ scripta sunt ordo servatur:

2. In *tropologia,* de litera ad *majora* consurgimus: et quidquid in priori populo carnaliter factum est, juxta *moralem* interpretamur locum, et ad animæ nostræ emolumenta convertimus.

3. In *spirituali θεωρία,* ad *sublimiora* transimus, terrena dimittimus, de futurorum beatitudine et cælestibus disputamus, ut præsentis vitæ meditatio umbra futuræ beatitudinis sit. *Hieronym. ad Hedib.* tom. iv. p. 186. edit. Bened.

[x] Vid. Vincent. Lirinens. cap. xv. xvi. xxiii. xxiv.

this is grounded upon the scattered descriptions given of several kinds of *heretics* in several parts of the New Testament. I have not here room to consider this whole matter at large; nor is it necessary I should, since I have obviated the main of it in the preceding sheets: but to prevent any person's being imposed upon by such suggestions, I may here throw in a few brief and, I hope, pertinent considerations.

1. All heresies mentioned in Scripture were not of *equal* malignity. It is not right to apply to *all* what was true of *some* only; or to draw together all the ill features of several sects, or men, into one picture of deformity, and to make it serve for the picture of every individual.

2. The Apostles do not charge all the false teachers with *flagitious*, or openly *scandalous* lives and *lewd* doctrines, but the Nicolaitans chiefly, if not solely.

3. Some others are charged with *secularity* and *selfish* views, but not all. The Apostles, having the gift of *discerning spirits*, and writing by the *Spirit of God*, might justly so charge them: otherwise many of them might have passed, and would have passed, as persons of a *fair character*, full of *godly zeal*[y], and *ministers of righteousness*[z]. It was to prevent their passing for such that the Apostles took the advantage they extraordinarily had to *expose* the *secret* views of the men, lest they should deceive whole churches by a fair outward deportment.

4. As to those whom the Apostles so charged with *sinister views*, or *corrupt motives*, it cannot be proved that they taught what they *knew* to be *false*, or *believed* to be *wrong*: but their *inclinations* governed their *faith*, and they easily *believed* what their *passions*, *pride*, *vanity*, or *popularity* suggested to them; which is a very common case[a]. So that it does not appear that those false Apostles were formally *self-condemned*, or any otherwise than as all false teachers and evil-doers are self-condemned, when they *might* know and do better; though many of them enjoy great *self-satisfaction*.

5. Whatever the motives of such men were, the Apostles did not anathematize them for their *corrupt motives*, but for their *corrupt doctrines*; which would have deserved the same *anathema*, though taught with the *best intention* and most upright views,

[y] Gal. iv. 17.

[z] 2 Cor. xi. 13, 14, 15.

[a] "Men are apt to *believe* what they "*desire*: and the *weakest* reasons "which persuade them appear like "*demonstrations*." *See Le Clerc's whole chapter on this head, in his Parrhasiana*, chap. vii. p. 226. Compare Causes of Incredulity, part i. c. 1, 2, 3.

either by the *Apostles* themselves, or by an *angel* from *heaven*[b]. St. John, in particular, does not say, whosoever upon *ill motives* abideth not in Christ's doctrine, or bringeth not this doctrine, "receive him not;" but simply, "whosoever transgresseth, and "abideth not in the doctrine of Christ, or bringeth not this doc- "trine[c]:" there lay all the stress.

6. *Ill motives* would corrupt even the *best works:* so the throwing all the malignity of heresy upon the *ill motives*, is making no *fault* of the heresy at all, nor specifying any difference, in moral account, between preaching the *truth* of the Gospel, and *subverting* it: for to do either upon wicked motives is undoubtedly a *wicked thing.*

7. The design of the Apostles in exposing the *corrupt views* of heretics was not to *justify* their *anathema*, or *censure*, (which was *just* without, because of the *corrupt doctrine*,) but to prevent the deception of the simple, who were in danger of being beguiled by flattering professions of *love* and *tenderness* towards men, and of *zeal* and *conscience* towards God: as is plain in the case of the *Judaizing* heretics, who were believing *Pharisees*, and who plausibly pleaded the *law* of *God*[d]. To obviate such plausible and ensnaring pretences, it was very proper to acquaint the unwary, that those false teachers were really men of *selfish* views and *secular* aims[e], and were not to be implicitly *trusted* upon ever so many smooth speeches or artful professions, whether of *friendliness* or *godliness.*

8. Lastly, let it be noted, that open declared *libertines* are not the most *dangerous* of heretics; neither are the *wildest* heresies, though worst in quality, the most *destructive* in their consequences. Some things are too *gross* to deceive many, and too *shocking* to prevail much, or long. There is vastly greater danger of the Christian world's running into an *half religion*, than there is of their taking up with *none*, or with one that is plainly *scandalous:* and infinitely more, in all likelihood, will at length perish for not being *good enough*, than for being *monsters* of lewdness or impiety.

[b] Gal. i. 8. [c] 2 John 9, 10. [d] Acts xv. 5. [e] Rom. xvi. 17, 18.

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